### 8. calls for the commission and the member states to foster a more diverse cultural sector by removing barriers to participation in culture for racialised communities through funding from all the relevant programmes; encourages the creation of support networks and outreach activities , especially for those in rural and outermost regions; ### 8. calls for the commission and the member states to foster a more diverse cultural sector by removing barriers to participation in culture for ethnic and racialised communities in particular through funding from all the relevant programmes; encourages the creation of support networks and outreach activities , especially for those in rural and outermost regions;


### 8. calls for the commission and the member states to foster a more diverse cultural sector by removing barriers to participation in culture for racialised communities through funding from all the relevant programmes; encourages the creation of support networks and outreach activities , especially for those in rural and outermost regions; ### 8. calls for the commission and the member states to foster a more diverse cultural sector by removing barriers to participation in culture for racialised communities and individuals through funding from all the relevant programmes; encourages the creation of support networks and outreach activities , especially for those in rural and outermost regions;


### 9. calls on the commission and the member states to improve monitoring and evaluation , including by testing and sharing participatory tools , which can demonstrate the effects of promoting inclusion and non-discrimination and combating racism through culture and help to create more inclusive policies; ### 9. calls on the commission and the member states to improve monitoring , evaluation and exchange of best-practices , including by testing and sharing participatory tools , which can demonstrate the effects of promoting inclusion and non-discrimination and combating racism through culture and help to create more inclusive policies;


### 10. welcomes the recent report by the open method of cooperation (omc) working group of member states’ experts on gender equality in the cultural and creative sectors; calls on the omc working group to produce a study on the role that culture plays in promoting racial equality within the cultural and creative sectors; ### 10. welcomes the work of the open method of cooperation (omc) working group of member states’ experts on gender equality in the cultural and creative sectors; calls on the member states to include in the next work plan for culture an omc working group of member states’ experts on combatting racism through arts and culture;


### 12. underlines the lasting negative impact of european colonialism on today’s society , including in the development of educational curricula; ### 12. underlines the lasting negative impact of particular elements of european history including colonialism , slavery and genocide on today’s society , including in the development of educational curricula;


### 13. calls on the member states to foster the development of diverse educational curricula to ensure that authors , historians , scientists and artists among other figures from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds are included in key materials; ### 13. calls on the member states to foster the development of educational curricula to ensure that authors , historians , scientists , artists and other prominent figures from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds are included in them as well as in other key materials;


### 14. calls for the history of all racial and ethnic communities living in europe to be included in all history curricula in order to encourage a broader perspective on world history centred on the interactions between different continents before and after european colonisation; ### 14. calls for the history of all racial and ethnic communities living in europe to be included in all history curricula in order to encourage a broader perspective on world history centred on the interactions between different continents before and after european colonisation; urges that history books emphasize on the contribution that immigrants have made for the development and shaping of today's europe;


### 14. calls for the history of all racial and ethnic communities living in europe to be included in all history curricula in order to encourage a broader perspective on world history centred on the interactions between different continents before and after european colonisation; ### 14. calls for the history of all racial and ethnic communities living in europe to be included in history curricula in order to encourage a broader and more factual perspective on european and world history centred on the interactions between different continents before and after european colonisation;


### 15. deplores the practice of segregation in schools; calls on all member states to introduce policies to prevent children from minority groups from being placed in separate schools or classes , whether intentionally or not; ### 15. deplores the practice of segregation in schools; calls on all member states to introduce policies to prevent children from minority groups from being placed in separate schools or classes , whether intentionally or not; encourages the member states to actively promote the integration of children from minority groups to schools and local societies , while respecting their cultural identity;


### 15. deplores the practice of segregation in schools; calls on all member states to introduce policies to prevent children from minority groups from being placed in separate schools or classes , whether intentionally or not; ### 15. deplores the practice of segregation in education; calls on all member states to introduce or reinforce inclusive policies to prevent children from marginalised groups from being placed in separate schools or classes , whether intentionally or not;


### 16. calls on the member states to ensure that teaching staff from minority groups are recruited at all levels and are protected from racial discrimination in the school system; ### 16. calls on the member states to ensure that teaching staff from minority groups are recruited at all levels and are protected from racial discrimination in the school system; calls on member states for the systematic training of all teaching staff in promoting social inclusion , non-discrimination and tolerance


### 16. calls on the member states to ensure that teaching staff from minority groups are recruited at all levels and are protected from racial discrimination in the school system; ### 16. calls on the member states to ensure that teaching staff from racial and ethnic minority groups are recruited at all levels of education and that measures are put in place to ensure that both educators and learners are protected from racial discrimination in the school system;


### 19. welcomes the commission’s commitment to launching a communication campaign to foster diversity in the audiovisual sector; calls for this campaign to be centred on the diversity and history of racialised communities and on how achieving racial justice can contribute to a more democratic europe; ### 19. welcomes the commission’s communication campaign to foster diversity in the audiovisual sector; calls for this campaign to include the diversity and history of racialised communities , as well as other marginalised communities , and to highlight how achieving racial justice can contribute to a more democratic europe for all;


### 21. notes that some member states have audiovisual regulatory bodies with the power to issue sanctions following programmes that show discriminatory or racist content; encourages the member states to empower their regulatory agencies in this sense; calls for the european regulators group for audiovisual media services to be given a greater role in coordinating the national agencies and collecting and sharing data; ### 21. notes that some member states have audiovisual regulatory bodies with the power to issue sanctions following programmes that show discriminatory or racist content; encourages the member states to empower their regulatory agencies in this sense; calls for the european regulators group for audiovisual media services to be given a greater role in coordinating the national agencies and collecting and sharing data; calls on the commission and member states to stop eu and state funding for media outlets that are found guilty by official bodies for promoting hate speech and xenophobia;


### 23. calls on the commission to open a specific call for funding for grassroots sports initiatives focused on inclusion and the fight against racism; calls on the commission , furthermore , to systematically monitor the number and type of sports projects whose main focus is the fight against racism , and the amount of funding allocated to them; ### 23. calls on the commission to open a specific call for funding for grassroots sports initiatives focused on inclusion and the fight against racism; calls on the commission , furthermore , to systematically monitor the number and type of sports projects whose main focus is the fight against racism , and the amount of funding allocated to them; calls on the commission to promote the inclusion of migrants and people from racial and ethnic minority backgrounds in grassroots sport clubs;


### 23. calls on the commission to open a specific call for funding for grassroots sports initiatives focused on inclusion and the fight against racism; calls on the commission , furthermore , to systematically monitor the number and type of sports projects whose main focus is the fight against racism , and the amount of funding allocated to them; ### 23. notes that racism is mentioned under the sector-specific priorities in key action 2 partnerships for sport and that grassroots sports initiatives focusing on inclusion and the fight against racism can be funded under the new the small scale partnerships scheme; calls on the commission to systematically monitor the number and type of sports projects whose main focus is the fight against racism , and the amount of funding allocated to them;


### 25. instructs its president to forward this resolution to the council and the commission. ### 25. instructs its president to forward this resolution to the council , the commission and the member states.


### a. whereas the eu single market and other eu policies have contributed to the natural development of a european educational space , historically underpinned by the traditions of european humanism; ### a. whereas the creation of the european community and the subsequent eu policies have contributed to the natural development of a european educational space , historically underpinned by the traditions of european humanism;


### b. whereas the ultimate goal is building a bottom-up european education area with common european policy objectives , requiring existing obstacles to be removed , european tools to be utilised and supporting policies at national and european levels to be developed; ### b. whereas the ultimate goal is building a bottom-up european education area with common european policy objectives , requiring existing obstacles to be removed , european tools to be utilised and supporting policies at national and european levels to be developed , designed with the future of the planet in mind and encompassing the key roles to be played by education systems in addressing the climate crisis and enabling a successful digital transformation and green transition;


### d. whereas the challenges the eu and its member states are faced with today , including climate change , various forms of extremism and populism , and the covid-19 pandemic , require appropriate educational answers and concerted european action; ### d. whereas the challenges the eu and its member states are currently faced with , including climate change , exacerbation of existing inequalities as a result of the covid-19 pandemic , and the rise of far-right extremism , neo-facism and authoritarianism require appropriate educational answers and concerted european action;


### e. whereas the realities of educational infrastructure , expertise and resources vary within and across member states , and whereas those differences have become further pronounced during the covid-19 pandemic; ### e. whereas the realities of educational infrastructure , expertise and access to resources vary within and across member states , with those differences having become further pronounced during the covid-19 pandemic primarily as a result of increased inequality , including lack of access to it infrastructure for people from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds , negatively impacting access to education; whereas in person education remains essential in both the intellectual and personal development of the student.


### 1. emphasises the importance of quality education and that the european education area (eea) initiative should provide more and better opportunities for every single european citizen to study , train and work abroad , and cultivate an environment where skills and diplomas are recognised throughout europe; ### 1. emphasises the importance of quality education founded upon the principle of inclusiveness and accessibility for all and that the european education area (eea) initiative should provide more and better opportunities for everyone in europe to study , train and work abroad , and cultivate the environment where skills and diplomas are recognised throughout europe;


### 2. stresses the role of the eea in fostering a sense of european belonging and in providing economic opportunities by addressing existing educational challenges; ### 2. stresses the role of the eea in fostering a sense of european community and in providing fair and equal opportunities by addressing existing educational challenges;


### 6. appreciates the commission’s efforts to foster an eea , while noting the need for a more holistic approach , requiring meaningful cooperation and coordination between all actors and stakeholders; ### 6. appreciates the commission’s efforts to foster an eea , while noting the need for a more holistic approach , requiring meaningful cooperation and coordination between all actors and stakeholders across national , regional &; local authorities;


### 7. cautions that the commission’s proposals are still mainly a strategic outline rather than a concrete policy roadmap , and thus suggests setting clear priorities and realistic deadlines for the actions that should be adopted , including clearly defined interim deliverables; ### 7. cautions that the commission’s proposals are still mainly a strategic outline rather than a concrete policy roadmap , and thus suggests setting clear priorities including the establishment of a governance body that is inclusive of civil society and facilitates a sustained and meaningful dialogue with relevant actors and realistic deadlines for the actions that should be adopted , including clearly defined interim deliverables;


### 9. emphasises the urgent need to develop a common implementation strategy and roadmap that includes the european institutions , member states and all relevant stakeholders , and defines their respective responsibilities; ### 9. emphasises the urgent need to develop a common implementation strategy and roadmap that includes the european institutions , member states and all relevant stakeholders including local and regional authorities and civil society , and defines their respective responsibilities;


### turning vision into reality: common strategic priorities and eu-level targets ### turning vision into reality: common strategic priorities , funding and eu-level targets


### 10. stresses the potential of using european policy coordination tools to achieve the common objectives of an eea; ### 10. stresses the potential of using european policy coordination tools to achieve the common objectives of an eea; considers the importance of fostering the whole-school approach , ensuring the promotion of the idea that all education stakeholders , including non-formal and informal learning and youth work must collaborate , placing the learner at the centre of the learning process , and sharing expertise and practice to ensure that the transversal skills needed for the 21st century challenges for all learners are fostered; acknowledges the potential of these arenas of learning to enhance accessibility and to foster the key competences such as citizenship education , sustainability and digital competences that are key elements for the european education area;


### 12. highlights inclusiveness as a central dimension of an eea and a prerequisite for achieving quality education for all , ensuring that no talent is left behind; ### 12. highlights inclusiveness of the most marginalised communities including women in all their diversity , racial and ethnic minorities , lgbtiq+ people , persons with disabilities , refugees and migrants , as a central dimension of an eea and a prerequisite for achieving quality education for all , ensuring that no learner is left behind;


### 14. calls for synergies between the eea , the european research area and the european higher education area to be exploited and for a further strengthening of the erasmus+ programme for the benefit of all teachers and learners; ### 14. calls for synergies between the eea , the european research area and the european higher education area as well as the european youth work agenda to be exploited and for a further strengthening of the erasmus+ programme for the benefit of all current and future teachers , educational workers and providers , youth workers and all learners;


### 15. aims to foster media literacy and critical thinking at all stages of learning as a central means to empower responsible european citizens; ### 15. aims to foster inclusion , equality , media literacy and critical thinking at all stages of learning as a central means to empower responsible members of society and counter the increasing tide of disinformation;


### 16. calls for a common framework on the development of digital competences and on learning about the eu throughout all appropriate levels and areas of education; ### 16. calls for a common framework on the development of digital competences and on learning about the eu throughout all appropriate levels and areas of education; prioritising the development of basic digital skills above the development of advanced digital skills , and of significantly reducing digital competences gaps across europe rather than further exacerbating them via the insistence on new , more advanced digital competences;


### 17. stresses the importance of enhancing competences and motivation in the education profession , especially supported through the improved recognition of educators’ value to society and by bolstering pedagogical autonomy; ### 17. stresses the importance of improving working conditions and enhancing competences and motivation in the education profession , especially supported through the greater societal valuation of educators and by bolstering pedagogical autonomy;


### 18. underlines the need for member states to take action to support the development of linguistic competences in primary and secondary education , to embrace the council of europe’s goal of ‘plurilingualism’ and to achieve the benchmark of all pupils having a sufficient knowledge of english at the end of lower secondary education; ### 18. underlines the need for member states to take action to support the development of linguistic competences in primary and secondary education as well as through non formal education providers , including the promotion and protection of non-official or co-official languages as well as those included in unesco's atlas of languages in danger , to embrace the recommendation of the barcelona convention to enabling citizens to communicate in 2 languages other than their mother tongue at the end of lower secondary education or any informal equivalent;


### 19. stresses the importance of commission and member state action in higher education , such as reinforcing the bologna process , strengthening the international dimension of the eea and furthering the european student card , including through embracing the synergies offered by existing eu programmes; ### 19. stresses the importance of commission and member state action in higher education , such as reinforcing the bologna process , strengthening the international dimension of the eea , including partners from the global south , and furthering the european student card , including through embracing the synergies offered by existing eu programmes;


### 20. calls on the commission and member states to facilitate the expansion of automatic mutual recognition of learning outcomes and study periods abroad , including in vet; ### 20. calls on the commission and member states to facilitate the expansion of automatic mutual recognition of learning outcomes and study periods abroad , including in vet , non-formal exchanges and volunteering;


### 21. calls on the commission and the member states to establish a concrete european education area strategic framework 2030 (eeasf 2030) by the end of 2022 with a comprehensive steering , monitoring and evaluation mechanism , in line with un sustainable development goal 4 to ‘ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all’; ### 21. calls on the commission and the member states to establish a concrete european education area strategic framework 2030 (eeasf 2030) by the end of 2022 with a comprehensive steering , monitoring and evaluation mechanism , in line with un sustainable development goal 4 to ‘ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all’ and the first principle of the european pillar of social rights;


### 22. urges the commission and the member states to clarify the type of participation required from member states and other levels of government , including local and regional authorities , and to devise effective multi-level governance arrangements that respect subsidiarity while aiming to generate european added value; ### 22. urges the commission and member states to commit to meaningful participation as well as to engage with and promote participation of other levels of government , including local and regional authorities , and to devise effective governance arrangements that respect subsidiarity whilst aiming to generate european added value;


### 23. seeks clarity on the level of involvement expected from stakeholders , education sectors that have been underrepresented so far , and relevant civil society actors; ### 23. seeks clarity on the level of involvement expected from stakeholders , education sectors that have been underrepresented so far , and relevant civil society actors; stresses that the governance framework should involve all relevant stakeholders working in all arenas of learning. this also includes the involvement of youth workers and youth organisations specifically;


### 23. seeks clarity on the level of involvement expected from stakeholders , education sectors that have been underrepresented so far , and relevant civil society actors; ### 23. seeks to increase the level of involvement expected from stakeholders , education sectors that have been underrepresented so far , and relevant civil society actors;


### 24. calls on the commission to establish an eea platform as an interactive public gateway to support member states and stakeholders in exchanging information and promoting cooperation and exchange of good practices; ### 24. calls on the commission to establish an eea platform that is accessible in all european languages , both official and co-official , as an interactive public gateway to support member states and stakeholders in exchanging information and promoting cooperation and exchange of good practices;


### 25. underlines the need for a european dimension in education by strengthening a distinct european perspective in students’ curricula and teachers’ training , including with support from jean monnet actions and teacher academies; proposes that these teacher academies be called ‘comenius teacher academies’; ### 25. underlines the need for a european dimension in education by strengthening a distinct european perspective in students’ curricula and teachers’ training , with regards to all teachers , trainers & learners from both formal & non-formal organisations including with support from jean monnet actions and teacher academies; proposes that these teacher academies be called ‘comenius teacher academies’;


### 26. emphasises the need to provide learners with knowledge about european history and cultural heritage , both tangible and intangible , and to foster a critical european memory and historical consciousness; ### 26. emphasises the need to provide learners with knowledge about european history and cultural heritage , both tangible and intangible , and to foster a critical european memory and historical consciousness , taking into account the legacy of colonialism and its continued influence throughout european society and beyond;


### 1. calls on the eu to adopt a more holistic approach to sports policy and step up efforts to mainstream it into other eu policies; ### 1. calls on the eu to adopt a more holistic approach to sports policy and step up efforts to mainstream it into other eu policies , such as the eu cohesion policy;


### 3. calls on the commission to set up regular high-level structured cooperation with all sports stakeholders and other institutions to deliver more targeted and accountable recommendations for action on the challenges facing the sport sector; ### 3. calls on the commission to set up regular high-level structured cooperation with all sports stakeholders and other institutions to deliver more targeted and accountable recommendations for action on the challenges facing the sport sector , including the challenges imposed by covid-19 , the lack of financial resources , doping , hate speech , gender gap , corruption , governance and accessibility challenges , so that no one is left behind;


### 4. calls on the commission to present a communication on the future of sport linked to the eu’s strategic goals; ### 4. calls on the commission to present a communication on the future of sport linked to the eu’s strategic goals , including the green and the digital transition , as well as social inclusion;


### 8. calls for a european sports model that recognises the need for a strong commitment to integrating the principles of solidarity , sustainability , inclusiveness , open competition and sporting merit; ### 8. calls for a european sports model that recognises the need for a strong commitment to integrating the principles of solidarity , sustainability , inclusiveness for all , open competition , mobility and sporting merit , and fair play; strongly opposes breakaway competitions that undermine such principles and endanger the stability of the overall sports ecosystem;


### 9. recognises the role of federations in governing their sport and encourages closer coordination with authorities and all relevant stakeholders; ### 9. recognises the role of federations in governing their sport and encourages closer coordination , cooperation and exchange of views with authorities and all relevant stakeholders;


### 10. highlights the need for increased solidarity and financial redistribution , especially between professional and grassroots sport; ### 10. highlights the need for increased solidarity , more targeted funding and financial redistribution , especially between professional and grassroots sport;


### 12. urges public authorities , sports federations and organisations to uphold values such as human rights , democracy and the rule of law when awarding host status for major sporting events; ### 12. urges public authorities , sports federations and organisations to uphold values such as human rights , equality , inclusiveness , democracy and the rule of law when awarding host status for major sporting events;


### 13. considers that a renewed commitment to good governance is needed in order to rebalance the social and economic elements in sport and to ensure that stakeholder representation in decision-making bodies is respected; ### 13. considers that a renewed commitment to good governance is needed in order to rebalance the social and economic elements in sport and to ensure that stakeholder representation in decision-making bodies is respected and fairly balanced;


### 14. calls on international , european and national sports organisations and stakeholder representative organisations to implement the highest governance standards; ### 14. calls on international , european and national sports organisations and stakeholder representative organisations to implement the highest governance standards , which must be clearly defined and equally applied and harmonized throughout the eu;


### 15. urges sports governing bodies to implement measures on diversity and inclusion , in particular to address the low numbers of women and ethnic minorities in leadership positions; ### 15. urges sports governing bodies to implement measures on diversity and inclusion , especially regarding people with disabilities and lgbtiq+ in particular to address the low numbers of women , lgbtiq+ , people with disabilities , and ethnic minorities and all people from vulnerable groups in decision-making and leadership positions , leaving no one behind;


### 16. calls for the eu institutions to promote the fundamental rights of athletes , including freedom of association , collective bargaining and non-discrimination; ### 16. calls for the eu institutions to promote and protect the fundamental rights of athletes , including freedom of association , collective bargaining and non-discrimination; to this goal , strongly suggest to promote and ensure athlete representation in decision-making bodies;


### 17. calls on member states , sports governing bodies and clubs to acknowledge the status of fans in sport by involving them in governance and decision-making bodies; ### 17. calls on member states , sports governing bodies and clubs to acknowledge the status of fans in sport by involving them their representation in governance and decision-making bodies;


### 18. calls on the commission to build on its existing work on social dialogue and to extend its scope to all professional sports; ### 18. calls on the commission to build on its existing work on social dialogue and to extend its scope to all sports;


### 23. calls on the commission and the member states to ensure that sports policy and legislation support gender equality , with particular attention to media coverage , remuneration gaps , award disparities and harassment; ### 23. calls on the commission and the member states to ensure that sports policy and legislation , include grassroots sports and professional sports as well as adaptive and disability sports and support gender equality with particular attention to media coverage , remuneration gaps , award disparities and harassment;


### 24. calls on the commission to recognise the importance and support the social inclusion of refugees , ethnic minorities and the lgbtqi+ community in sport; ### 24. calls on the commission to recognise the importance and support the social inclusion of refugees , ethnic minorities and the lgbtqi+ community and all vulnerable groups in sport;


### 25. urges sports bodies and public authorities to effectively tackle discrimination , violence and hate speech and to guarantee safe , inclusive sport for all athletes , spectators and staff in sport venues and online; ### 25. urges sports bodies and public authorities to effectively tackle discrimination , violence and hate speech and to guarantee safe , inclusive sport for all athletes , spectators and staff in sport venues and online , while safeguarding that personal freedoms will not be hindered by no means;


### 26. calls on the member states to step up efforts towards the inclusion in sports activities and programmes of persons with disabilities; ### 26. calls on the member states to step up efforts towards the inclusion in sports activities and programmes of persons with disabilities , improving as well visibility and media coverage;


### 27. calls for the eu institutions , the member states and sports organisations to prioritise policies that safeguard children from any form of abuse and provide access to remedies; ### 27. calls for the eu institutions , the member states and sports organisations to prioritise policies that safeguard children from any form of abuse and provide access to remedies , including legal advice and their timely protection;


### 28. calls on the member states and public authorities to develop sports infrastructure and to increase the amount of physical education and extracurricular physical activities in schools; ### 28. calls on the member states and public authorities to develop sports infrastructure and to increase the amount of physical education and extracurricular physical activities in schools , including during weekends and holidays; insists that sports should be provided to children in schools for free;


### 33. calls on the commission and the member states to create a system for the recognition of qualifications gained by volunteers; ### 33. calls on the commission and the member states to create a system for the recognition of qualifications gained by volunteers , safeguarding at the same time quality jobs and descent working and remuneration conditions;


### 34. insists on the need for support mechanisms to get the sport sector back on track in the wake of covid-19; ### 34. insists on the need for support and funding mechanisms to get the sport sector back on track in the wake of covid-19; , including through national support funds , the recovery and resilience facility and the structural funds;


### 35. stresses the need to further increase funding for sport; ### 35. stresses the need to further increase funding for sport , including grassroots sport , which has restrained resources , while it involves the majority of people participating in sport activities and , therefore , plays fundamental role for society’s physical and mental well-being;


### 36. welcomes the higher budget for sport under the new erasmus+ programme and supports further synergies between programmes and funds; ### 36. welcomes the higher budget for sport under the new erasmus+ programme and supports further synergies between programmes and funds , and make a better use of this tool to support recovery in sport , keeping in mind the key goal of promoting social inclusion;


### 41. underlines the need to ensure environmental sustainability when promoting the development of sport and the organisation of sporting events; ### 41. underlines the need to ensure environmental sustainability , by providing relevant additional funds , when promoting the development of sport and the organisation of sporting events;


### 42. insists on the alignment of sport with the principles of the european green deal and its contribution to environmental education and behaviour change; ### 42. insists on the alignment of sport with the principles of the european green deal and its contribution to environmental education and behaviour change; calls on the commission and member states to support the sports sector with special funding and support schemes facilitating the green transition of the sector;


### 43. calls on the commission to establish minimum accessibility criteria , safety standards and sustainability benchmarks for sports infrastructure; ### 43. calls on the commission to establish minimum accessibility criteria , safety standards and sustainability benchmarks , for sports infrastructure , harmonized throughout the eu , supporting inclusion , as well as mobility of athletes and sport-related workers;


### 44. highlights the importance of innovation and cross-sectoral cooperation in sport , especially of developing digital tools to increase participation in physical activity; ### 44. highlights the importance of innovation and cross-sectoral cooperation in sport , especially of developing digital tools to increase participation in physical activity , especially targeting young people , with the aim of establishing sport as a healthy habit;


### 45. calls on the commission and the european institute for technology to create a knowledge and innovation community (kic) in the field of sport to boost innovation and resilience; ### 45. calls on the commission and the european institute for technology to create a knowledge and innovation community (kic) in the field of sport to boost innovation and resilience , as well as monitoring , transnational collaboration , mobility and solidarity;


### 46. calls for the eu institutions to launch a debate on the future of e-sport and to present a study on its social and economic impact; ### 46. calls for the eu institutions to launch a debate on the future and possibilities of e-sport and to collect data in order to present a study on its social and economic impact; highlights that e-sports should not be considered as replacing actual sports by any means;


### 69. on september 21 , 2021 nikos androulakis , leader of the centre-left pasok-kinal and member of european parliament was targeted with the predator spyware when a malicious link was sent to his telephone128 . androulakis received a text message stating ‘let’s get a little serious , man , we’ve got a lot to gain’. in addition , the message included a link to install the predator spyware on his phone but , unlike koukakis , androulakis did not click on the link that was sent to him129 . ### 69. on september 21 , 2021 nikos androulakis , leader of the centre-left pasok-kinal and member of european parliament was targeted with the predator spyware when a malicious link was sent to his telephone128 . androulakis received a text message stating ‘let’s get a little serious , man , we’ve got a lot to gain’. in addition , the message included a link to install the predator spyware on his phone but , unlike koukakis , androulakis did not click on the link that was sent to him129 . in september 2021 , androulakis announced his candidacy in the race for party leadership. according to adae’s inquiry , during that time his mobile phone was under eyp surveillance via telecommunications providers. eyp prosecutor vasiliki vlachou approved the removal of confidentiality of androulakis’ telephone communications on “national security” grounds. the approval coincided with both the predator targeting and androulakis’ candidacy. when mep androulakis was elected party leader in december 2021 , the “official” eyp monitoring was abruptly terminated , despite the two-month authorisation for his surveillance not yet having expired.


### 72. on 15 november 2021 , former minister of infrastructure and lawmaker for the syriza party christos spirtzis was targeted with the predator spyware on his mobile phone133 . ### 72. on 15 november 2021 , former minister of infrastructure and lawmaker for the syriza party christos spirtzis was targeted with the predator spyware on his mobile phone133 . mp spirtzis had submitted critical parliamentary questions to the government on eyp’s surveillance powers on november 15 , 2021. on that same day , he received a message similar to the one one sent to mep androulakis. on november 19 , a second message was sent to mp spirtzis , containing a link to an article of a well-established news outlet (efimerida ton syntakton). on september 9 , 2022 , citizen lab informed christos spirtzis of the attempted hacking , after which he lodged a complaint to the prosecutor of the supreme court. spirtzis is a confidante of syriza party leader and former prime minister tsipras , and frequently at high-level meetings of the party leadership.


### 73. tasos telloglou and eliza triantafylou have allegedly been spied upon during their investigative work for the inside story. ### 73. besides tasos telloglou , eliza triantafylou and thodoris chondrogiannos have allegedly been spied upon during their investigative work for inside story. in an article for the heinrich-böll-stiftung on october 24 , 2022 , telloglou shared his shadowing and intimidation experiences whilst investigating the surveillance scandals in greece. according to his narrative , he believes he was being monitored between may and august 2022. in addition , a source from the security services had informed him in june 2022 that both him and his colleagues eliza triantafyllou (insidestory) and thodoris chondrogiannos (reporters united) were monitored by the authorities , to discover which sources they were meeting with. the greek government has not yet responded to the allegations.


### 75. on 5 and 6 november 2022 documento reported on a list containing 33 names of persons targeted with predator spyware136 . among them many high profile politicians , including members of the current government , former prime minister samaras , former eu commissioner avramopoulos , the editor in chief of a national government-friendly newspaper , and persons in the entourage of vangelis marinakis , ship-owner , media mogul and owner of football clubs olympiakos and nottingham forest. the revelations of the list are highly disturbing not just because of the high profile names on it , but also because it suggests that the abuse of spyware is systematic , large-scale , and part of a political strategy. ### 75. on 5 and 6 november 2022 documento reported on a list containing 33 names of persons targeted with predator spyware136 . among them many high profile politicians , including members of the current government , former prime minister samaras , former eu commissioner avramopoulos , the editor in chief of a national government-friendly newspaper , and persons in the entourage of vangelis marinakis , ship-owner , media mogul and owner of football clubs olympiakos and nottingham forest. and also ministers nikos dendias , niki kerameos , giorgos gerapetritis , aris skertsos , nikos papathanasis , giannis oikonomou , mihalis chrysochoidis , nikos hardalias , aristotelia peloni , mps olga gerovasili , andreas loverdos the then head of hellenic police michalis karamalakis , the chief of armed forces konstantinos floros , the -then- head of hellenic army haralambos lalousis and officers of the directorate of equipment of the armed forces , the head of the economic prosecutor's office christos bardakis , the prosecutor of the eyp eleni vlachou and deputy chief vassilis grizis , facebook’s cybersecurity manager artemis seaford , a.o. the revelations of the list are highly disturbing not just because of the high profile names on it , but also because it suggests that the abuse of spyware is systematic , large-scale , and part of a political strategy.


### 83. the president of cyprus has a significant say in the formation of the committee that is capable of starting critical inquiries in the actions of the kyp. in addition , the annual reports with the committee’s findings are first sent out to the president148 . ### 83. the president of cyprus has a significant say in the formation of the committee that is capable of starting critical inquiries in the actions of the kyp. in addition , the annual reports with the committee’s findings are first sent out to the president148. the president of cyprus is responsible for the appointment of the attorney general and the deputy attorney general , and also has the most significant influence in the formation of the commission that is able to initiate investigations into the actions of the cyprus police. the council of ministers , upon the recommendation of the president of the republic , appoints the director of the cyprus intelligence services.


### 85. in cyprus , dilian got closely associated with abraham sahak avni. avni has formerly been involved in the israeli police special forces as special detective152 . in november 2015 , he acquired cypriot citizenship and a golden passport because of a 2.9 million euro investment in real estate153 . avni founded the cypriot ncis intelligence services ltd154 , a company that was reportedly involved with the most powerful technology-oriented companies in the world155 . ncis intelligence and security services provided security software to the police headquarters between 2014 and 2015 and instructed employees of the office of crime analysis and statistics between 2015 and 2016156 . government party disy (dimokratikós sinagermós) is also part of the company’s clientele. reportedly , avni had installed security equipment in the party’s offices157 . next to avni’s security equipment , dilian’s materials were also sold to the cyprus drug enforcement agency and the cypriot police158 . ### 85. in cyprus , dilian got closely associated with abraham sahak avni. avni has formerly been involved in the israeli police special forces as special detective152 . in november 2015 , he acquired cypriot citizenship and a golden passport because of a 2.9 million euro investment in real estate153 . avni founded the cypriot ncis intelligence services ltd154 , a company that was reportedly involved with the most powerful technology-oriented companies in the world155 . ncis intelligence and security services provided security software to the police headquarters between 2014 and 2015 and instructed employees of the office of crime analysis and statistics between 2015 and 2016156 . government party disy (dimokratikós sinagermós) is also part of the company’s clientele. reportedly , avni had installed security equipment in the party’s offices157 . next to avni’s security equipment , dilian’s materials were also sold to the cyprus drug enforcement agency and the cypriot police158. according to the media reports and statements made by the disy president , wispear sent an email to the governing party [disy] asking for help and mediation with the ministry of commerce to export ws wispear products , as part of an offer launched by a dutch intelligence service and won by their company.151a


### 90. opposition party akel expressed outrage over the cases against dilian and staff being dropped , and denounced the legal decision as a cover-up by the attorney general170 . after all , the cypriot government had reportedly purchased equipment from dilian’s company and one of the accused employees had allegedly worked for nso , providing the kyp with instructions on how to use the pegasus spyware171 . dropping the charges ensured that the information on the links between dilian’s company and the cypriot government would remain protected172 . this example shows that the violation of data protection rights of individuals by mass surveillance equipment is not fully guaranteed. whilst legal remedy exists on paper , judicial outcomes are influenced by governmental interventions , leaving the individual victim defenceless. ### 90. opposition party akel expressed outrage over the cases against dilian and staff being dropped , and denounced the legal decision as a cover-up by the attorney general170 . the attorney general ge refused to hand over the conclusions of the investigation , even though it was requested by the official mission by the pega committee in cyprus. after all , the cypriot government had reportedly purchased equipment from dilian’s company and one of the accused employees had allegedly worked for nso , providing the kyp with instructions on how to use the pegasus spyware171 . dropping the charges ensured that the information on the links between dilian’s company and the cypriot government would remain protected172 . this example shows that the violation of data protection rights of individuals by mass surveillance equipment is not fully guaranteed. whilst legal remedy exists on paper , judicial outcomes are influenced by governmental interventions , leaving the individual victim defenceless.


### 92. according to recent testimonies in light of the judicial investigations in the van case , lawyer aleksandros sinka has had significant influence in the move to greece. sinka - who formerly played a key role in the centre-right disy party - apparently had good relations with both dilian and avni174 . it appears that sinka was also an acquaintance of former general secretary of the greek government dimitriadis. both men held positions in the bureau of the european democrat students (eds) , the student organisation of the european people’s party (epp). between 2003 and 2004 , sinka served as chairman and dimitriadis as vice-chairman175 . dimitriadis allegedly introduced his friend and greek businessperson felix bitzios to sinka , in view of bitzios’ long-standing dispute in the cypriot court. sinka in turn recommended lawyer harris kyriakidis to help bitzios in his dispute. kyriakidis equally had good relations with the disy176 . ### 92. according to recent testimonies in light of the judicial investigations in the van case , lawyer aleksandros sinka has had significant influence in the move to greece. sinka - who formerly played a key role in the centre-right disy party , was one of the closest collaborators/advisors of the disy president - apparently had good relations with both dilian and avni174 . it appears that sinka was also an acquaintance of former general secretary of the greek government dimitriadis. both men held positions in the bureau of the european democrat students (eds) , the student organisation of the european people’s party (epp). between 2003 and 2004 , sinka served as chairman and dimitriadis as vice-chairman175 . dimitriadis allegedly introduced his friend and greek businessperson felix bitzios to sinka , in view of bitzios’ long-standing dispute in the cypriot court. sinka in turn recommended lawyer harris kyriakidis to help bitzios in his dispute. kyriakidis equally had good relations with the disy176 .


### 100. the july 2021 revelations by the pegasus project showed a large number of targets in spain. however , they seem to have been targeted by different actors and for different reasons. it is widely believed that the moroccan authorities targeted prime minister pedro sanchez , minister for defence margarita robles and minister of the interior fernando grande-marlaska , similarly to the case of the french president and government ministers185 . the targeting of a second group of victims is referred to as ‘catalangate’186 . it includes catalan parliamentarians , members of the european parliament , lawyers , civil society organisation members and some family and staff connected to those victims187 . the ‘catalangate’ surveillance scandal was first reported on in 2020 , but it was not until april 2022 that citizen lab completed their in-depth investigation that the scale of the scandal was revealed. the results of that probe showed that at least 65 persons were targeted188 . in may 2020 , the spanish authorities admitted to targeting 18 of those 65 victims with court authorisation189 . ### 100. the july 2021 revelations by the pegasus project showed a large number of targets in spain. however , they seem to have been targeted by different actors and for different reasons. it is widely believed that the moroccan authorities targeted prime minister pedro sanchez , minister for defence margarita robles and minister of the interior fernando grande-marlaska , similarly to the case of the french president and government ministers185 . the targeting of a second group of victims is referred to as ‘catalangate’186 . it includes catalan parliamentarians , members of the european parliament , lawyers , civil society organisation members , academics and some family and staff connected to those victims187 . the ‘catalangate’ surveillance scandal was first reported on in 2020 , but it was not until april 2022 that citizen lab completed their in-depth investigation that the scale of the scandal was revealed. the results of that probe showed that at least 65 persons were targeted188 . in may 2020 , the spanish authorities admitted to targeting 18 of those 65 victims with court authorisation189 .


### 103. the spanish intelligence service is made up of three main agencies. firstly , the national intelligence service (cni) which is under the control of the ministry of defence. the director of the cni is nominated by the minister for defence and serves as the prime minister’s lead advisor on issues relating to intelligence and counter-intelligence199 . the second body is the domestic intelligence agency , the intelligence centre for counter-terrorism and organised crime (citco). the third and final body is the spanish armed forces intelligence centre (cifas). the cifas is also under the direct supervision of the ministry of defence200 201 . ### 103. the spanish intelligence service is made up of three main agencies. firstly , the national intelligence service (cni) which acts as both a domestic and international agency , is under the control of the ministry of defence. the director of the cni is nominated by the minister for defence and serves as the prime minister’s lead advisor on issues relating to intelligence and counter-intelligence199 . the second body is the domestic intelligence agency , the intelligence centre for counter-terrorism and organised crime (citco). the third and final body is the spanish armed forces intelligence centre (cifas). the cifas is also under the direct supervision of the ministry of defence200 201 . the country’s policing and law enforcement , known as the ‘guardia civil’ is of a ‘military nature’ which is also accountable to the head of government through the ministry of defense.


### 105. the laws establishing the cni also established the defence committee of the congress of deputies and it is responsible for allocating the confidential funds for the cni and producing an annual report on the cni. however , the spanish constitution does not stipulate that access will be granted to documents or information relating to the work of the intelligence services and the requirement is also notably absent in the legal framework of the law on transparency. therefore , much of the work of the cni is kept secret and lacks transparency210 . ### 105. the laws establishing the cni also established the defence committee of the congress of deputies and it is responsible for allocating the confidential funds for the cni and producing an annual report on the cni. however , the spanish constitution does not stipulate that access will be granted to documents or information relating to the work of the intelligence services and the requirement is also notably absent in the legal framework of the law on transparency. therefore , much of the work of the cni is kept secret and lacks transparency210 . the cni’s activities are shrouded in secrecy , and the agency lacks public transparency. the cni has also been at the centre of surveillance and espionage scandals. ensuring transparency and public accountability in the operations of spain’s intelligence apparatus is an enduring challenge , despite the requirement of some degree of judicial oversight. however , given the secret nature of the commission , the spanish public opinion still does not know if the spanish government has made any purchase contract with ngo group and specifically , if it has acquired and use for this purpose pegasus , and the victims do not know the scope and consequences of the interception of their communication.210a


### 106. the official secrets committee is required to submit an annual report on the activities of the intelligence services , however when it was convened as a result of the surveillance by the cni , it was the first meeting of the body in more than two years. head of the cni paz esteban appeared before the committee on 5 may 2022 to present the court authorisations for the 18 victims that the authorities have taken responsibility for targeting.211 the hearing was not public and those present were not allowed to enter with any electronic on them whatsoever212 . ### 106. the official secrets committee is required to submit an annual report on the activities of the intelligence services , however when it was convened as a result of the surveillance by the cni , it was the first meeting of the body in more than two years. head of the cni paz esteban appeared before the committee on 5 may 2022 to present the court authorisations for the 18 victims that the authorities have taken responsibility for targeting.211 the hearing was not public and those present were not allowed to enter with any electronic on them whatsoever212 . according to the information that has since transcended , the director of the cni would have shown documentation that would support that the intervention of the communications would have been carried out according to the current legislation.


### 107. there has been a significant amount of public scrutiny on the ‘catalangate’ scandal since it came to light in april 2022. the spanish media and media outlets around the world have worked extensively in conjunction with civil society organisations to scrutinise the surveillance system in spain and advocate for the fundamental rights of the victims. inversely , some spanish politicians have tried to discredit citizenslab , suggesting their methods are unsound or that they are politically motivated. a collaborator of citizenslab , himself of catalan origin , was among the targets , along with his parents , who are not politically active at all213 . ### 107. there has been a significant amount of public scrutiny on the ‘catalangate’ scandal since it came to light in april 2022. the spanish media and media outlets around the world have worked extensively in conjunction with civil society organisations to scrutinise the surveillance system in spain and advocate for the fundamental rights of the victims. it violates basic fundamental rights such as right to privacy , freedom of expression and assembly , and the right to equality in political participation. inversely , some spanish politicians have tried to discredit citizenslab , suggesting their methods are unsound or that they are politically motivated. a collaborator of citizenslab , himself of catalan origin , was among the targets , along with his parents , who are not politically active at all213 .


### 114. in total , 65 catalonians were confirmed to have been targeted with mercenary spyware , 63 with pegasus , four with candiru and at least two people were targeted by both233 . at least 51 individuals were successfully infected234 . the spanish government have refused to comment as to whether or not they were responsible for the surveillance any of the other victims outside of the 18 they admit to having targeted235 . the majority of those 18 persons were never charged with a crime , and yet were included on this list. minister for defence robles has relied heavily on the official secrets act rather than expand on what were the reasons for the surveillance of those specific targets236 . all 65 catalan targets have at some point in time been in contact with the catalan separatists living outside spain. ### 114. in total , 65 catalonians were confirmed to have been targeted with mercenary spyware , 63 with pegasus , four with candiru and at least two people were targeted by both233 . at least 51 individuals were successfully infected234 . the spanish government have refused to comment as to whether or not they were responsible for the surveillance any of the other victims outside of the 18 they admit to having targeted235 . the majority of those 18 persons were never charged with a crime , and yet were included on this list. minister for defence robles has relied heavily on the official secrets act rather than expand on what were the reasons for the surveillance of those specific targets236 . all 65 catalan targets have at some point in time been in contact with the catalan separatists living outside spain. in addition , victims have also been spied on beyond the borders of spain , such as in belgium , switzerland , germany and france.


### 131. in september 2021 , it was reported that the german federal criminal police office (bka) had acquired pegasus in late 2020. it is important to note here that german law distinguishes two forms of spyware use254 : access all information (online-durchsuchung255 ) and access only live communication (quellen-tkü256 ). since the original pegasus software could access all information on a device , and not just live communication , its use by the bka would violate the law. the bka therefore asked nso to write a source code , so that pegasus would only be able to access only what was allowed by law. initially , nso declined to do so257 . only after new negotiations , nso agreed , so the bka acquired a modified version258 . it has allegedly been deployed since march 2021. the version purchased by the bka had certain functions blocked to prevent abuse , although it is unclear how that works in practice. the bka has written a report about this modified version , which remains classified259 . ### 131. in september 2021 , it was reported that the german federal criminal police office (bka) had acquired pegasus in late 2020. it is important to note here that german law distinguishes two forms of spyware use254 : access all information (online-durchsuchung255 ) and access only live communication (quellen-tkü256 ). since the original pegasus software could access all information on a device , and not just live communication , its use by the bka would violate the law. for the german police authorities like the bka exists a “standardisierende leistungsbeschreibung für software zur durchführung von maßnahmen der quellen-telekommunikationsüberwachung und der online-durchsuchung”. any spyware used by police authorities has to be in compliance with those standards. the bka therefore asked nso to write a source code , so that pegasus would only be able to access only what was allowed by law. initially , nso declined to do so257 . only after new negotiations , nso agreed , so the bka acquired a modified version258 . it has allegedly been deployed since march 2021. the version purchased by the bka had certain functions blocked to prevent abuse , although it is unclear how that works in practice. the bka has written a report about this modified version , which remains classified259 . the german government declined to answer parliamentary questions and to disclose any information concerning how pegasus has been tested , in how many cases it was used and how the diversion of data from surveilled communicative devices was monitored.250a german authorities examined communicative devices of its officers for the misuse by pegasus in particular cases , but did not find any indication (evidence).250b


### 134. in the summer of 2021 , the pegasus project revealed several cases of attempted hacks by the pegasus spyware in france260 . this leaked dataset included the telephone number of president emmanuel macron , as well as the phone numbers of 14 members of his cabinet261 262 . findings of forensic analyses have confirmed that the telephones of several ministers were infected with the pegasus spyware263 . ### 134. in the summer of 2021 , the pegasus project revealed several cases of attempted hacks by the pegasus spyware in france260 . this leaked dataset included the telephone number of president emmanuel macron , as well as the phone numbers of 14 members of his cabinet261 262 . findings of forensic analyses have confirmed that the telephones of several ministers were infected with the pegasus spyware263 . a member of the opposition party la france insoumise , adrien quatennens , also had his phone infected. 263a


### 167. governments have targeted eu citizens with powerful spyware. this poses threats to democracy and individual citizens’ rights. the eu has powers to act on these threats , albeit very few. when member states , however , invoke ‘national security’ , the eu is basically out of the game. member states define national security unilaterally , and can shut the door at any time. in addition to these legal constraints , there are political reasons that amount to eu-passiveness. the european commission , as guardian of the eu treaties , has grown reticent when it comes to enforcing eu law331 . this is not because there are legal constraints , but rather because it is a political choice. the commission tends to interpret its powers in the narrowest possible way. when faced with flagrant violations of the rule of law and fundamental rights , this stance becomes very problematic. subsidiarity and respect for the exclusive national competences risks turning in to impunity. below we will examine the powers that the eu institutions have at their disposal. the parliament , commission and council have the power and the duty to legislate , regulate and enforce and they have to do so with vigour and ambition , putting defence of our democracy over short-term political considerations. ### 167. governments have targeted eu citizens with powerful and highly invasive spyware. this poses threats to democracy fundamental rights , rule of law and individual citizens’ rights. the eu has powers to act on these threats , albeit very few. when member states , however , invoke ‘national security’ , the eu is basically out of the game. member states define national security unilaterally , and can shut the door at any time. in addition to these legal constraints , there are political reasons that amount to eu-passiveness. the european commission , as guardian of the eu treaties , has grown reticent when it comes to enforcing eu law331 . this is not because there are legal constraints , but rather because it is a political choice. the commission tends to interpret its powers in the narrowest possible way. when faced with flagrant violations of the rule of law and fundamental rights , this stance becomes very problematic. subsidiarity and respect for the exclusive national competences risks turning in to impunity. below we will examine the powers that the eu institutions have at their disposal. the parliament , commission and council have the power and the duty to legislate , regulate and enforce and they have to do so with vigour and ambition , putting defence of our democracy over short-term political considerations.


### 176. europol does not have any autonomous operational powers , and it cannot act without the consent and cooperation of the member state(s) concerned. that presents a problem when there is clear evidence of criminal acts - such as cybercrime , corruption and extortion - but national authorities fail to investigate. this problem is made worse when the member state authorities are themselves complicit in the crimes. ### deleted


### 177. however , europol has recently obtained new powers allowing it to pro-actively propose an investigation , even when it concerns a crime committed only in one member state334 , but so far it has been reluctant to make use of those powers. europol wants to cherish the good relations with the governments , as it fears such an initiative would lead to a breakdown of cooperation in other areas. ### 177. europol has recently obtained new powers allowing it to pro-actively propose an investigation , even when it concerns a crime committed only in one member state334 , but so far it has been reluctant to make use of those powers. europol wants to cherish the good relations with the governments , as it fears such an initiative would lead to a breakdown of cooperation in other areas.


### repealing all export licences that are not fully in line with both the letter and the spirit of the dual-use regulation; ### repealing all export licences that are not fully in line with both the letter and the spirit of the dual-use regulation or the wassenaar arrangement;


### 28. considers that the fulfilment of the conditions must be assessed by the commission; ### 28. considers that the fulfilment of the conditions must be assessed by the commission; the findings of the assessment shall be published in a report;


### — having regard to the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (the ‘charter’) , and in particular articles 7 , 8 , 11 , 17 , 21 and 47 thereof , ### — having regard to the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (the ‘charter’) , and in particular articles 7 , 8 , 11 , 17 , 21 , 41 , 42 and 47 thereof ,


### — having regard to the european convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms , and in particular articles 8 , 9 , 13 and 17 thereof , and the protocols to that convention , ### — having regard to the european convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms , and in particular articles 8 , 10 , 13 , 14 and 17 thereof , and the protocols to that convention , in particular protocol 12 ,


### d. whereas the use of spyware surveillance should remain the exception and always subject to an effective and meaningful ex ante judicial authorisation by an impartial and independent judicial authority , which must ensure that the measure is necessary and proportionate and strictly limited to cases affecting national security , terrorism and serious crime; ### d. whereas the use of spyware surveillance should as a minimum always remain the exception and always subject to an effective and meaningful ex ante judicial authorisation by an impartial and independent judicial authority , which must ensure that the measure is necessary and proportionate and strictly limited to cases affecting national security;


### e. whereas any spyware surveillance must be scrutinised by an independent ex post oversight authority , which must ensure that any authorised surveillance is carried out in compliance with fundamental rights and in accordance with the conditions set out by the court of justice of the european union (cjeu) , the european court of human rights (ecthr) and the venice commission and must be able to terminate the surveillance if it is not; ### e. whereas any spyware surveillance must be scrutinised by an independent ex post oversight authority , which must ensure that any authorised surveillance is carried out in compliance with fundamental rights and in accordance with the conditions set out by the court of justice of the european union (cjeu) , the european court of human rights (ecthr) and the venice commission and must be able to terminate the surveillance immediately if it is not;


### f. whereas spyware surveillance failing to meet the requirements set out in union law and the jurisprudence of the cjeu and the ecthr would entail a violation of the values enshrined in article 2 teu and the fundamental rights enshrined in the charter and , in particular , articles 7 , 8 , 11 , 17 , 21 and 47 thereof that recognise the specific rights , freedoms and principles set out in it , such as respect for private and family life , the protection of personal data , freedom of expression and information , right to property , right to non-discrimination , as well as the right to effective remedy and fair trial; ### f. whereas spyware surveillance failing to meet the requirements set out in union law and the jurisprudence of the cjeu and the ecthr should entail a violation of the values enshrined in article 2 teu and the fundamental rights enshrined in the charter and , in particular , articles 7 , 8 , 11 , 17 , 21 and 47 thereof that recognise the specific rights , freedoms and principles set out in it , such as respect for private and family life , the protection of personal data , freedom of expression and information , right to property , right to non-discrimination , as well as the right to effective remedy and fair trial;


### g. whereas the rights of targeted persons are laid down in the charter of fundamental rights and international conventions , notably the right to privacy and the right to a fair trial , and in union rules on the rights of suspects and accused; ### g. whereas some of the rights of targeted persons are laid down in the charter of fundamental rights and international conventions , notably the right to privacy and the right to a fair trial , and in union rules on the rights of suspects and accused;


### h. whereas it results from the testimonies of victims that even if legal remedy and civil rights may exist on paper , they mostly become void in the face of obstruction by government bodies , the absence of implementation of the right to be informed for victims and the administrative burden to prove the status as victim; ### h. whereas it results from the testimonies of victims of surveillance that even if legal remedy and civil rights may exist on paper , they mostly become void in the face of obstruction by government bodies , the absence of implementation of the right to be informed for victims and the administrative burden to prove the status as victim;


### i. whereas the polish government has weakened and eliminated institutional and legal safeguards including proper oversight and scrutiny procedures , effectively leaving victims without any meaningful remedy; whereas the pegasus surveillance spyware has been illegally deployed to spy on journalists , politicians , prosecutors and civil society actors for political purposes; ### i. whereas the polish government has weakened and eliminated institutional and legal safeguards including proper oversight and scrutiny procedures , effectively leaving victims without any meaningful remedy; whereas the pegasus surveillance spyware has been illegally deployed to spy on journalists , politicians , opposition , prosecutors and civil society actors for political purposes;


### j. whereas the hungarian government has weakened and eliminated institutional and legal safeguards including proper oversight and scrutiny procedures , effectively leaving victims without any meaningful remedy; whereas the pegasus surveillance spyware has been illegally deployed to spy on journalists , politicians , prosecutors and civil society actors for political purposes; ### j. whereas the hungarian government has weakened and eliminated institutional and legal safeguards including proper oversight and scrutiny procedures , effectively leaving victims without any meaningful remedy; whereas the pegasus surveillance spyware has been illegally deployed to spy on journalists , politicians , opposition , prosecutors and civil society actors for political purposes;


### l. whereas revelations showed two categories of spyware targets in spain; whereas the first includes the prime minister and the minister of defence that are believed to be spied upon by morocco; whereas the second concerns some 65 victims referred to as ‘catalangate’ including catalan parliamentarians , members of parliament , lawyers and civil society actors; whereas the spanish authorities admitted in may 2020 to targeting 18 of those 65 victims with court authorisation , however , they have refrained from providing further information , invoking national security; ### l. whereas revelations showed two categories of spyware targets in spain; whereas the first includes the prime minister and the minister of defence that are believed to be spied upon by morocco; whereas the second concerns some 65 victims referred to as ‘catalangate’ including catalan parliamentarians , members of parliament , lawyers , academics and civil society actors; whereas the spanish authorities admitted in may 2020 to targeting 18 of those 65 victims with court authorisation , however , they have refrained from providing further information , invoking national security;


### n. whereas there are strong indications of among others the governments of morocco and ruanda targeting union citizens with spyware , including the president of france , the prime minister and defence minister of spain , the then prime minister of belgium , the former president of the commission and former prime minister of italy , and the daughter of paul rusesabagina; ### n. whereas there are strong indications of among others the governments of morocco and ruanda targeting union citizens with spyware , including the president of france , the prime minister and defence minister of spain , the then prime minister of belgium , the former president of the commission and former prime minister of italy , and carine kanimba , the daughter of paul rusesabagina;


### o. whereas it can be safely assumed that all member states have purchased or used one or more spyware systems; whereas most governments will refrain from illegitimate use of spyware , but in the absence of a solid legal framework including safeguards and oversight , the risk of abuse is very high; ### o. whereas it can be safely assumed that all member states have purchased or used one or more spyware systems; whereas most governments will refrain from illegitimate use of spyware , but in the absence of a solid legal framework including safeguards and oversight , and in light of technical challenges to detect and trace infections , the risk of abuse is very high;


### p. whereas the member state governments and member state parliaments have not provided parliament with meaningful information about the legal frameworks governing the use of spyware in their member states beyond what was already publicly known , despite an obligation to do so pursuant to article 3 , paragraph 4 of the decision of the european parliament , the council and the commission of 6 march 1995 on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the european parliament’s right of inquiry; whereas it is difficult to assess the enforcement of union legislation and the safeguards , oversight , and means of redress which prevents the adequate protection of citizen’s fundamental rights; ### p. whereas the member state governments and member state parliaments have not provided the european parliament with meaningful information about the legal frameworks governing the use of spyware in their member states beyond what was already publicly known , despite an obligation to do so pursuant to article 3 , paragraph 4 of the decision of the european parliament , the council and the commission of 6 march 1995 on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the european parliament’s right of inquiry; whereas it is difficult to assess the enforcement of union legislation and the safeguards , oversight , and means of redress which prevents the adequate protection of citizen’s fundamental rights;


### 1. highlights the undeniable importance of protection of privacy and the right to dignity and private life in an increasingly digital world where more and more of our activities take place online; ### 1. highlights the undeniable importance of protection of privacy , freedom of expression and information and freedom of assembly and association and the right to dignity and private life , in particular in an increasingly digital world where more and more of our activities take place online;


### 2. takes the firm position that breaches of the right to dignity , privacy and private life is not only a question of respect for the common legal principles set out in the treaties and in other sources but a fundamental question of whether future human life will be free and democratic or controlled by digital processes; ### 2. takes the firm position that breaches of the right to dignity , privacy and private life are not only a question of respect for the common legal principles set out in the treaties and in other sources but a fundamental question of whether future human life will be free and democratic or controlled by authoritarian governments.


### 3. strongly condemns the use of spyware by member state governments or members of government for the purpose of monitoring , blackmailing , intimidating , manipulating and discrediting opposition and critics , eliminating democratic scrutiny and free press , and manipulating elections; ### 3. emphasizes that surveillance software is a tool for exercising power; strongly condemns the use of spyware by member state governments or members of government for the purpose of monitoring , blackmailing , intimidating , manipulating and discrediting opposition and critics and civil society , eliminating democratic scrutiny and free press , and manipulating elections;


### 5. notes with grave concern the fundamental inadequacy of the current union governance structure to respond to attacks on democracy from within the union; ### 5. notes with grave concern the fundamental inadequacy of the current union governance structure to respond to attacks on democracy and the rule of law from within the union; notes that when the rule of law is threatened in one member state then democracy is threatened throughout the eu;


### 7. is of the opinion that contraventions , or maladministration in the implementation of union law with regard to the use of , and trade in spyware , have taken place in poland , hungary , greece , spain and cyprus; ### 7. considers that contraventions , or maladministration in the implementation of union law with regard to the use of , and trade in spyware , have taken place in poland , hungary , greece , spain and cyprus;


### after having applied the adjustment referred to in article 22(5) , member states that have made use of the derogation provided for in paragraph 4 of this article may decide that payment entitlements held by farmers on 31 december 2019 having a value lower than the national or regional unit value for the year 2020 as calculated in accordance with the second subparagraph of this paragraph have their unit value increased towards the national or regional unit value in the year 2020. the increase shall be calculated under the following conditions: ### after having applied the adjustment referred to in article 22(5) , member states that have made use of the derogation provided for in paragraph 4 of this article shall ensure that payment entitlements held by farmers on 31 december 2019 having a value lower than the national or regional unit value for the year 2020 as calculated in accordance with the second subparagraph of this paragraph have their unit value increased towards the national or regional unit value during the transitional period. the increase shall be calculated under the following conditions:


### by way of derogation from the first subparagraph , member states that have made use of the derogation provided for in paragraph 4 may decide to keep the value of payment entitlements calculated in accordance with that paragraph subject to the adjustment referred to in article 22(5). ### deleted


### 12. for calendar year 2021 , member states may decide to apply further internal convergence by applying paragraph 11 to the respective year. ### 12. during the transitional period , member states shall apply further internal convergence by applying paragraph 11 to the respective year or years.


### a. whereas the principle of equality between women and men is a core value of the eu , enshrined in the treaties and the charter of fundamental rights of the european union; whereas gender mainstreaming should therefore be implemented and integrated as a horizontal principle in all eu activities and policies; ### a. whereas the principle of gender equality is a core value of the eu , enshrined in the treaties and the charter of fundamental rights of the european union; whereas gender mainstreaming should therefore be implemented and integrated as a horizontal principle in all eu activities , policies and programmes;


### b. whereas cohesion policy is as an important policy tool to support gender equality; ### b. whereas cohesion policy is as an important policy tool to actively and effectively support the achievement of gender equality;


### c. whereas promoting gender equality is important to reduce regional economic and social disparities and for ensuring the long-term sustainable development of regions; ### c. whereas achieving gender equality is a precondition for the elimination of regional , economic and social disparities and for ensuring the long-term fair , inclusive and sustainable development of the eu , its members states and its regions;


### g. whereas preliminary studies suggest that the covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing inequalities , by disproportionately impacting women and marginalised groups; ### g. whereas preliminary studies suggest that the covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing inequalities and has a disproportionate impact on women and marginalised groups , especially in terms of layoffs , work-life imbalance and domestic violence , which cohesion policy should take into account;


### 1. stresses the importance of cohesion policy in promoting gender equality and the eu gender equality strategy; recalls that all policy goals need appropriate resources dedicated to their implementation; ### 1. stresses the importance of cohesion policy in promoting gender equality and implementing the eu gender equality strategy; recalls that all policy goals need appropriate and sufficient resources dedicated to their implementation;


### 4. stresses the need for a strong political commitment on the importance of gender equality for the entire population and for economic growth and territorial development; ### 4. stresses the need for a strong political commitment on the importance of gender equality for the entire population and for fair , inclusive and sustainable economic growth and territorial development;


### 11. believes that all programmes implemented under cohesion policy should ensure gender equality throughout their preparation , implementation , monitoring and evaluation , as well as equal opportunities for all , without discrimination based on gender or sexual orientation; ### 11. believes that all programmes implemented under cohesion policy should ensure gender equality throughout their preparation , implementation , monitoring and evaluation , as well as equal opportunities for all , without discrimination based on gender or sexual orientation , including through positive action when necessary and applicable;


### 12. recognises the burden placed on women as principal caregivers in formal and informal settings , as well as its social value , especially during the covid-19 crisis; therefore points out the crucial role of cohesion policy in securing investments in care services , to improve working conditions in this sector and to support a transition towards a care economy; ### 12. recognises the burden placed on women as principal caregivers in formal and informal settings , as well as its social value , especially during the covid-19 crisis; therefore points out the crucial role of cohesion policy in securing adequate investments in care services , to improve working conditions , fight informal employment and precariousness and create new high-quality jobs in this sector as well as to support a transition towards a care economy that is accessible for all;


### 13. stresses that cohesion policy needs to support equal access to training for women in order to bridge the digital gender gap and to support the green and digital transitions; ### 13. stresses that cohesion policy needs to support equal access to training for women , implement positive action in order to bridge the digital gender gap and to support the green and digital transitions while protecting workers that will be affected by these transitions;


### 15. calls for a strong political commitment to gender equality at eu and national level in order to enhance the attention given by national and local stakeholders to gender equality , both from a human rights perspective and as a crucial factor for socio-economic development , and to promote further commitment in this area; ### 15. calls for a strong political commitment to gender equality at eu , national and regional level in order to enhance the attention given by national , regional and local stakeholders to gender equality , both from a human rights perspective and as a crucial factor for socio-economic development , and to promote further commitment in this area;


### 16. calls for compulsory requirements on gender equality objectives to be introduced in all post-2020 operational programmes , with specific and interdisciplinary measures to be translated into all operations; ### 16. calls for compulsory requirements on gender equality objectives to be introduced in all post-2020 operational programmes , with specific and interdisciplinary measures to be translated into all operations; calls for specific obligations and binding guidelines , including positive action when necessary and applicable;


### 17. strongly supports the ex ante requirement of developing a national gender equality strategy to underpin cohesion policy interventions; ### 17. strongly supports the ex ante requirement of developing a binding national gender equality strategy to underpin cohesion policy interventions and their effectiveness;


### 21. calls on all institutions to provide guidance documents and training sessions , so as to disseminate concrete examples of good practices on gender mainstreaming; stresses , moreover , that at the project selection stage the criteria for gender mainstreaming should be strengthened through higher scoring and requirements for more practical actions; recommends making use of the existing tools developed by the european institute for gender equality (eige) such as its toolkit for gender budgeting in the esi funds; ### 21. calls on all institutions to provide guidance documents , training sessions and binding gender equality targets , so as to disseminate concrete examples of good practices on gender mainstreaming; stresses , moreover , that at the project selection stage the criteria for gender mainstreaming should be strengthened through higher scoring and requirements for more practical actions; calls for the integration of the gender dimension in all stages of the evaluation , implementation and monitoring of esi funds; recommends making use of the existing tools developed by the european institute for gender equality (eige) such as its toolkit for gender budgeting in the esi funds;


### (1) the commission adopted a communication on the european green deal on 11 december 20199 , drawing its roadmap towards a new growth policy for europe and setting ambitious objectives to counter climate change and for environmental protection. in line with the objective to achieve climate neutrality in the union by 2050 in an effective and fair manner , the european green deal announced a just transition mechanism to provide means for facing the climate challenge while leaving no one behind. the most vulnerable regions and people are the most exposed to the harmful effects of climate change and environmental degradation. at the same time , managing the transition requires significant structural changes. ### (1) the commission adopted a communication on the european green deal on 11 december 20199 , drawing its roadmap towards a new growth policy for europe and setting ambitious objectives to counter climate change and for environmental protection. in line with the objective to achieve climate neutrality in the union by 2050 at the latest in an effective and fair manner , the european green deal announced a just transition mechanism to provide financial means and knowledge for facing climate crisis while leaving no one behind. the most vulnerable regions and people are the most exposed to the harmful effects of climate change and environmental degradation. at the same time , managing the transition requires significant structural changes both at regional and national level.


### (4) a public sector loan facility (the ‘facility’) should be provided. it constitutes the third pillar of the just transition mechanism , supporting public sector entities in their investments. such investments should meet the development needs resulting from the transition challenges described in the territorial just transition plans as adopted by the commission. the activities envisaged for support should be consistent with and complement those supported under the other two pillars of the just transition mechanism. ### (4) a public sector loan facility (the ‘facility’) should be provided. it constitutes the third pillar of the just transition mechanism , supporting public sector entities in their investments. such investments should meet the development needs resulting from the social and economic transition challenges described in the territorial just transition plans as adopted by the commission after meaningful consultation with all relevant stakeholders at regional level. the activities envisaged for support should be consistent with and complement those supported under the other two pillars of the just transition mechanism.


### (5) in order to enhance the economic diversification of territories impacted by the transition , the facility should cover a wide range of investments , on condition that they contribute to meet the development needs in the transition towards a climate neutral economy , as described in the territorial just transition plans. the investments supported may cover energy and transport infrastructure , district heating networks , green mobility , smart waste management , clean energy and energy efficiency measures including renovations and conversions of buildings , support to transition to a circular economy , land restoration and decontamination , as well as up- and re-skilling , training and social infrastructure , including social housing. infrastructure developments may also include solutions leading to their enhanced resilience to withstand disasters. comprehensive investment approach should be favoured in particular for territories with important transition needs. investments in other sectors could also be supported if they are consistent with the adopted territorial just transition plans. by supporting investments that do not generate sufficient revenues , the facility aims at providing public sector entities with additional resources necessary to address the social , economic and environmental challenges resulting from the adjustment to climate transition. in order to help identify investments with a high positive environmental impact eligible under the facility , the eu taxonomy on environmentally sustainable economic activities may be used. ### (5) in order to enhance the regional cohesion and economic diversification of territories impacted by the transition , the facility should cover a wide range of sustainable investments , on condition that they contribute to meet the development needs in the transition towards a climate neutral economy , as described in the territorial just transition plans. the investments supported should exclude fossil fuels and should cover renewable energy and transport infrastructure , district heating networks only for coal regions in transition , green mobility , smart waste management , clean energy and energy efficiency measures including renovations and conversions of buildings , support to transition to a circular economy , land restoration and decontamination , as well as up- and re-skilling , training and social infrastructure , including social housing. infrastructure developments may also include solutions leading to their enhanced resilience to withstand disasters. comprehensive investment approach in accordance with the "do not harm" principle should be favoured in particular for territories with important transition needs. investments in other sectors could also be supported if they are consistent with the adopted territorial just transition plans. by supporting investments that do not generate sufficient revenues , the facility aims at providing public sector entities with additional resources necessary to address the social , economic and environmental challenges resulting from the adjustment to climate transition. in order to help identify investments with a high positive environmental impact eligible under the facility , the eu taxonomy on environmentally sustainable economic activities should be used.


### (14) specific eligibility conditions and award criteria should be set out in the work programme and the call for proposals. those eligibility conditions and award criteria should take into account the relevance of the project in the context of the development needs described in the territorial just transition plans , the overall objective of promoting regional and territorial convergence and the significance of the grant component for the viability of the project. union support established by this regulation should thus only be made available to member states with at least one territorial just transition plan adopted. the work programme and calls for proposals will also take into account the territorial just transition plans submitted by member states to ensure that coherence and consistency across the different pillars of the mechanism is ensured. ### (14) specific eligibility conditions and award criteria should be set out in the work programme and the call for proposals. those eligibility conditions and award criteria should take into account the relevance of the project in the context of the development needs described in the territorial just transition plans , the overall objective of promoting regional and territorial cohesion and the significance of the grant component for the viability of the project. union support established by this regulation should thus only be made available to member states with at least one territorial just transition plan adopted. the work programme and calls for proposals will also take into account the territorial just transition plans submitted by member states to ensure that coherence and consistency across the different pillars of the mechanism is ensured.


### the facility shall provide support benefitting union territories facing serious social , environmental and economic challenges deriving from the transition process towards a climate-neutral economy of the union by 2050. ### the facility shall provide support benefitting union territories facing serious social , environmental and economic challenges deriving from the transition process towards a climate-neutral economy of the union by 2050 at the latest.


### 5. 'territorial just transition plan' means a plan established in accordance with article 7 of regulation [jtf regulation] and approved by the commission; ### 5. 'territorial just transition plan' means a plan established in accordance with article 7 of regulation [jtf regulation] prepared by the member states , together with the relevant local and regional authorities and stakeholders after meaningful consultation of the territories concerned and approved by the commission;