### 15. recalls the importance of the efficient regulation of the banking and financial sectors in order to prevent a new crisis; believes that such regulation must integrate the ecological situation; emphasises the importance of completing the banking union and the need to reform the european stability mechanism; ### 15. recalls the importance of the efficient regulation of the banking and financial sectors in order to prevent a new crisis; believes that such regulation must integrate the ecological situation; emphasises the importance of completing the banking union , giving full priority to edis and measures to control and revert transnational financial concentration and bank size; recalls also the need to reform the european stability mechanism;


### 16. calls for qualified majority voting in council on tax matters; ### 16. calls for qualified majority voting in council on tax matters , with the specific aim of reducing incentives for tax dumping and fighting tax evasion and money laundering;


### 17. calls for the systematic inclusion of tax matters in the country specific recommendations (csrs) , with the aim of ensuring economic coherence across eu member states as well as the fairness of eu tax systems; believes that the csrs could ensure a fair balance between sources of revenue and should also include innovative elements aiming at promoting the green deal; further believes that they should also support member states in tackling tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning; ### 17. calls for the systematic inclusion of tax matters in the country specific recommendations (csrs) , with the aim of ensuring economic coherence across eu member states as well as the fairness of eu tax systems , inline with the resolution on beps 2.0 recently adopted by the european parliament; believes that the csrs could ensure a fair balance between sources of revenue and should also include innovative elements aiming at promoting the green deal taking into account its social dimension; further believes that they should also support member states in tackling tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning;


### 18. notes that the eu-28 employment rate currently stands at 73.1 % - the highest annual average ever recorded - while unemployment stands at 7.6 % in the euro area and 6.3 % in the eu as a whole; ### 18. notes that the eu-28 employment rate currently stands at 73.1% - the highest annual average ever recorded - while unemployment stands at7.6 % in the euro area and 6.3 % in the eu as a whole; however , stresses that unemployment levels are still significantly higher in periphery countries such as greece (17 ,3% in 2019) or spain (13 ,9% in 2019) , while youth unemployment remains at worrying levels in these countries; notes that this trend reflects the dual post-crisis recovery in europe , thus exacerbating the divergence between surplus and deficit countries within the euro area;


### 19. stresses that , according to the eu labour force survey , there are 8.3 million involuntary part-time workers in the eu , two thirds of them women; requests the commission to undertake a study to analyse the impact of this development on pension systems and public finances; ### 19. stresses that , according to the eu labour force survey , there are 8.3 million involuntary part-time workers in the eu , two thirds of them women; recalls that the rise of precarious work in the eu , such as the emergence of new types of employment created by online platforms , is a direct consequence of labour market deregulation and poses risks to social cohesion(mainly affecting the youth) , while damaging aggregate demand; request the commission to undertake measures to protect workers in these new forms of work and requests the commission to undertake a study to analyse the impact of this development on pension systems and public finances;


### 20. takes note of amr 2020’s finding that wage growth at euro area level remains below what would be expected at the current levels of unemployment on the basis of historical data , and that this affects the inflation rate; highlights that the currently low productivity and inflation together with structural reforms transferring collective bargaining to the enterprise level are detrimental to wage growth and are leading to greater income inequality and an increase in the numbers of working poor , with in-work poverty affecting almost one in ten workers in europe; accordingly advocates wage growth; ### 20. takes note of amr 2020’s finding that wage growth at euro area level remains below what would be expected at the current levels of unemployment on the basis of historical data , and that this affects the inflation rate; highlights that the currently low productivity and inflation together with structural reforms transferring collective bargaining to the enterprise level are detrimental to wage growth and are leading to greater income inequality and an increase in the numbers of working poor , with in-work poverty affecting almost one in ten workers in europe; accordingly advocates that the necessary wage growth can only be achieved by reversing the process of labour market liberalization and promoting job quality and stability; calls on the commission to revert its systematic csr’s demanding labour market deregulation.


### 21. agrees that it is a matter of great concern that income inequality is above pre-crisis levels in some countries , being frequently linked to unequal opportunities in access to education , training and social protection; ### 21. agrees that it is a matter of great concern that income inequality is above pre-crisis levels in some countries , affecting new groups of people and being frequently linked to unequal opportunities in access to education , training and social protection; stresses the importance of redistributive , i.e. , progressive income taxes to tackle growing inequality within the eu; points out that corporate tax dumping promotes inequality , both by depriving member-states of the necessary resources to fund public services and transferring the tax burden toward labour income.


### 22. underlines the fact that the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion stands , on 2017 figures , at 113 million , or 22.5 % of the population; ### 22. underlines the fact that the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion stands , on 2017 figures , at 113 million , or 22.5 % of the population; underlines the fact that , in 2017 , 9 ,4% of all employed people in the eu were at risk of poverty; recalls that the objectives laid out in 2010 in the europe 2020 strategy (namely , to lift 20million people out of poverty and social exclusion by 2020) haven’t been met yet , as the number of people in this situation has increased significantly.


### 26. looks forward to the stronger involvement of the ep and the national parliaments in the european semester process and to the creation of an institutionalised dialogue with the commission , the social partners , territories and civil society , at both eu and national level , in order to further boost the process’s democratic legitimacy; ### 26. looks forward to the stronger involvement of the ep and the national parliaments in the european semester process and to the creation of an institutionalised dialogue with the commission , the social partners , territories and civil society , at both eu , local , regional and national level , in order to further boost the process’s democratic legitimacy; points out that ownership , in order not to be a void concept , implies that democratic institutions at the different levels effectively shape the recommendations.


### 27. invites the stakeholders in this necessary next step to create enhanced democratic accountability mechanisms at both eu and national levels , while formalising the scrutiny role of the ep in the european semester; calls on the commission and the member states to enhance the social dialogue , including over the csrs , and to engage in dialogue with the social partners; ### 27. invites the stakeholders in this necessary next step to create enhanced democratic accountability mechanisms at both eu , local , regional and national levels , while formalising the scrutiny role of the ep in the european semester; calls on the commission and the member states to enhance the social and civil dialogue , including over the csrs , and to engage in dialogue with the social partners;


### 3. calls on the eib to maximise additionality and the development impact of its operations outside the union by increasing its engagement in ldcs , enhancing the transparency of operations carried out by financial intermediaries , cooperating with eu delegations , and increasing its presence on the ground where necessary; ### 3. calls on the eib to maximise additionality and the development impact of its operations outside the union by increasing its engagement in ldcs , enhancing the transparency of operations carried out by financial intermediaries , cooperating with eu delegations , and increasing its presence on the ground where necessary; the eib should only finance clients that demonstrate willingness and experience in positive sustainable development impacts , and refrain supporting those primarily seeking profit maximisation , such as investment funds.


### 4. recalls the need for robust ex ante impact assessments to mitigate the risks of eib operations on human rights and on environmental , labour and social standards , and the need for meaningful consultations with stakeholders , including civil society organisations; stresses that the eib needs to deal with complaints in a transparent and effective manner; ### 4. recalls the need for robust ex ante impact assessments to mitigate the risks of eib operations on human rights and on environmental , labour and social standards , and the need for meaningful consultations with stakeholders , including civil society organisations; stresses that the eib needs to deal with complaints in a transparent and effective manner; insists on the eib making astringent use of its non-cooperative jurisdiction policy so that its operations do not contribute to tax evasion or avoidance;


### a. whereas under article 309 of the tfeu and in line with the case law of the court of justice of the european union , the eib is tasked with contributing to the achievement of the union’s objectives; ### a. whereas under article 309 of the tfeu and in line with the case law of the court of justice of the european union , the eib is tasked with contributing to the achievement of the union’s objectives; whereas under article 18 of its statute , the eib should ensure that its funds are employed as rationally as possible in the interests of the union;


### 6. stresses the importance of avoiding further geographical imbalances in the eib’s lending activity so as to ensure a broader geographical and sectoral allocation of investments , reduce regional disparities and enhance convergence; welcomes the efforts already made by the eib in this regard; ### 6. stresses the importance of avoiding further geographical imbalances in the eib’s lending activity so as to ensure a broader geographical and sectoral allocation of investments , reduce regional disparities and enhance economic and social convergence; calls on the eib to address systemic shortcomings that prevent certain regions or countries from taking full advantage of its financial activities , inter alia by providing technical assistance and advisory support , especially in regions with low investment capacity , and by advising on the development of projects; welcomes the efforts already made by the eib in this regard;


### 9. welcomes the creation of a eur 6 billion investment instrument to support the financing of the healthcare sector , namely medical infrastructure , research , and the development of vaccines; ### 9. welcomes the creation of a eur 6 billion investment instrument to support the financing of the healthcare sector , namely medical infrastructure , research , and the development of vaccines; calls on the eib to prioritise the reinforcement of public health systems and cautions against risks of privatisations and the use of public private partnerships;


### 13. welcomes the proposal to increase eib financing for climate action and environmental sustainability , including renewable energies , from around 30 % to at least 50 % by 2025 , which would unlock investment of more than eur 1 trillion over the next decade; ### 13. welcomes the decision to increase eib financing for climate action and environmental sustainability , including renewable energies , from around 30 % to at least 50 % by 2025 , which would unlock investment of more than eur 1 trillion over the next decade;


### 14. notes , however , that the roadmap envisages the introduction of a transition period until the end of 2022 , which would mean that the eib will not be aligned with the objectives of the paris agreement until 2023 at the earliest; ### 14. notes , however , that the roadmap envisages the introduction of a transition period until the end of 2022 , which would mean that the eib , including eif operations , will not be aligned with the objectives of the paris agreement until 2023 at the earliest; calls on the eib to strive for full compliance with the paris agreement in the ongoing appraisal procedures;


### 15. recalls that the review of the eib’s transport lending policy is a key priority; stresses the importance of aligning the eib’s transport portfolio with the paris agreement as soon as possible; ### 15. recalls that the review of the eib’s transport lending policy is a key priority; stresses the importance of aligning the eib’s transport portfolio with the paris agreement as soon as possible; calls for the adoption of a new transport financing policy to decarbonise the eu transport sector by 2050 at the latest;


### 17. considers that investment in innovation , infrastructure and skills are crucial elements to recover from the economic and social crisis , ensure sustainable growth and create high-quality jobs and long-term competitiveness; ### 17. considers that investment in innovation , infrastructure and skills are crucial elements to recover from the economic and social crisis , ensure sustainable and inclusive growth and create high-quality jobs and long-term competitiveness;


### 18. reiterates that supporting smes and mid-caps must remain a fundamental objective for the eib , notably to assist them with decarbonisation and access to ict tools; welcomes efforts made to provide online assistance and counselling to smes in accessing eib lending; ### 18. underlines the pivotal role of smes as the backbone of europe’s economy , representing almost 99 % of all businesses and providing around three quarters of all jobs , while being key drivers of innovation; points out that smes have been severely hit by the covid-19 crisis and many of them are facing unprecedented challenges , especially liquidity challenges; reiterates that supporting smes and mid-caps must remain a fundamental objective for the eib , notably to provide capital support and to assist them with decarbonisation and access to ict tools; welcomes efforts made to provide online assistance and counselling to smes in accessing eib lending and calls on the eib to further enhance its support to smes;


### 22. calls on the eib to play an active role in helping member states to deliver on the implementation of the european pillar of social rights , while standing ready to align with the forthcoming commission action plan and the social summit in porto; points to the importance of ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of the sustainability , economic , social and environmental impact of projects; ### 22. calls on the eib to play an active role in helping member states to deliver on the implementation of the european pillar of social rights and the un sustainable development goals , while standing ready to align with the forthcoming commission action plan and the social summit in porto; points to the importance of ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of the sustainability , economic , social and environmental impact of projects;


### 25. recalls its request for an interinstitutional agreement between the eib and parliament in order to improve access to eib documents and data and enhance democratic accountability; ### 25. recalls its request for an interinstitutional agreement between the eib and parliament in order to improve access to eib documents and data and enhance democratic accountability , including the ability to submit questions for written answer to the eib as already provided for in the case of the ecb;


### 27. welcomes the eib’s launch of a public consultation on the review of its transparency policy in december 2020; recalls its request for the eib to step up its transparency policy in line with the best practices and standards employed by other financial institutions; asks the eib to publish more regular , in-depth and comprehensive information on the financial intermediaries responsible for leveraging eib funds and to include contractual clauses concerning mandatory disclosures from these institutions on lending activity; ### 27. welcomes the eib’s launch of a public consultation on the review of its transparency policy in december 2020; recalls its request for the eib to step up its transparency policy in line with the best practices and standards employed by other financial institutions; asks the eib to publish more regular , in-depth and comprehensive information on the financial intermediaries responsible for leveraging eib funds and to include contractual clauses concerning mandatory disclosures from these institutions on lending activity; calls on the eib to put an emphasis on the consultations with all interested stakeholders , in particular local communities , civil society and population affected by its projects;


### 28. welcomes the eib’s group strategy on gender equality and gender action plan; regrets the fact that women are still not sufficiently represented in managerial and senior office positions; believes that more needs to be done in this regard during the implementation of the second phase of the action plan in 2021; ### 28. welcomes the eib’s group strategy on gender equality and gender action plan; regrets the fact that women are still not sufficiently represented in managerial and senior office positions; believes that more needs to be done in this regard during the implementation of the second phase of the action plan in 2021; calls on the eib to further enhance the promotion of all forms of diversity and inclusion within its organisation and to set ambitious targets;


### 29. welcomes the fact that the eib will review its environmental and social standards and calls for a wide and inclusive public consultation on these issues; invites the eib to take account of the do-no harm principle in its operations; calls on the eib to take this opportunity to strengthen its human rights policy; ### 29. welcomes the fact that the eib will review its environmental and social standards; calls on eib to introduce binding social and environmental criteria as part of the guidelines on counterparty alignment , including the requirement for clients to have clear and binding decarbonisation plans in line with the paris agreement; calls for a wide and inclusive public consultation on these issues; invites the eib to incorporate the do-no harm principle in all its operations; calls on the eib to take this opportunity to strengthen its human rights policy and to increase the human rights dimension in its project planning , including by providing a human rights strategy , as well as hr assessment and evaluation of its programmes , also on the ground , to ensure that local communities are meaningfully consulted and that the right to free prior and informed consent (fpic) is implemented in a systematic manner; calls on the eib to develop specific policies on human rights defenders and protocols to respond to risks of reprisals;


### 1. highlights the importance of the activities of the european investment bank (eib) to increase the current levels of investment in the eu , which are below historical averages and insufficient to fulfil the eu’s sustainability , social and innovation ambitions; stresses that in order to achieve these ambitions , more risk-taking by the eib may be necessary in parallel to increasing equity and the development of expertise in innovative funding instruments; calls for adequate capitalisation of the eib to allow for the use of innovative instruments in the financing of projects with substantial potential sustainability , social and innovation gains; ### 1. highlights the importance of the activities of the european investment bank (eib) to increase the current levels of investment in the eu , which are below historical averages and insufficient to fulfil the eu’s sustainability , social and innovation ambitions; notes the european fiscal board in its review of the two and six pack legislation stressed that the current eu fiscal rules do not prevent severe cutbacks in public investment; welcomes the commission’s commitment to review those rules; calls on the commission to pay special attention in its legislative proposal to this issue raised by the european fiscal board and to make sure the eu fiscal rules supports the future efforts of the eib to increase the levels of public investment in the eu; moreover stresses that in order to achieve these ambitions , more risk-taking by the eib may be necessary in parallel to increasing equity and the development of expertise in innovative funding instruments; calls for adequate capitalisation of the eib to allow for the use of innovative instruments in the financing of projects with substantial potential sustainability , social and innovation gains;


### 1. highlights the importance of the activities of the european investment bank (eib) to increase the current levels of investment in the eu , which are below historical averages and insufficient to fulfil the eu’s sustainability , social and innovation ambitions; stresses that in order to achieve these ambitions , more risk-taking by the eib may be necessary in parallel to increasing equity and the development of expertise in innovative funding instruments; calls for adequate capitalisation of the eib to allow for the use of innovative instruments in the financing of projects with substantial potential sustainability , social and innovation gains; ### 1. highlights the importance of the activities of the european investment bank (eib) to increase the current levels of investment in the eu , which are below historical averages and insufficient to fulfil the eu’s sustainability , social and innovation ambitions; stresses that in order to achieve these ambitions , more risk-taking by the eib may be necessary in parallel to increasing equity and the development of expertise in innovative funding instruments; calls for adequate capitalisation of the eib to allow for the use of innovative instruments in the financing of projects with substantial potential sustainability , social and innovation gains , especially projects creating sustainable jobs , reducing inequalities , supporting social and regional cohesion;


### 2. welcomes the commitment by the commission president-elect to turn sections of the eib into a climate bank , and the commitments from the eib president to increase the share of eib financing for climate action and environmental sustainability to at least 50 % by 2025 and to align all eib financing activities with the goals of the paris agreement by the end of 2020; calls on the commission to present an ambitious new european sustainable investment plan , including additional financial commitments , as soon as possible , and to fully support the eib in its sustainability ambitions; ### 2. welcomes the commitment by the commission president-elect to turn sections of the eib into a climate bank , and the commitments from the eib president to increase the share of eib financing for climate action and environmental sustainability to at least 50 % by 2025 and to align all eib financing activities with the goals of the paris agreement by the end of 2020; welcomes the commitment by the eib to end financing of oil , gas and coal projects after 2021; calls on the commission to present an ambitious new european sustainable investment plan , including additional financial commitments , as soon as possible , and to fully support the eib in its sustainability ambitions; calls on the eib to adopt a key role in sustainable finance both in and outside europe;


### 3. stresses that in order for the eib to become the eu’s climate bank , it should stop all financial support to fossil fuel projects by the end of 2020 , and align all its activities , including eif operations , with the paris agreement’s goals; calls on the eib to make decarbonisation commitments a condition for companies to receive eib support; calls on the eib to apply the eu taxonomy framework , once it has been formally adopted , as a benchmark for its climate and environmental investments; calls on the eib to develop a credible methodology to measure , disclose and achieve ‘paris alignment’ of its financing operations; ### 3. stresses that in order for the eib to become the eu’s climate bank , it should stop all financial support to fossil fuel projects by the end of 2020 , and align all its activities , including eif operations and energy strategy , with the paris agreement’s goals and the eu green deal; calls on the eib to make decarbonisation commitments a condition for companies to receive eib support; calls on the eib to apply the eu taxonomy framework , once it has been formally adopted , as a benchmark for its climate and environmental investments; calls on the eib to develop a credible methodology to measure , disclose and achieve ‘paris alignment’ of its financing operations;


### 4. stresses that the key quantitative target of the european fund for strategic investments (efsi) of mobilising eur 500 billion of additional private and public investment should be replaced by measurable targets on sustainability and social impact in future investment strategies; calls on the eib to increase the share of efsi and investeu financing to projects that substantially contribute to the eu’s sustainability and social objectives; calls on the commission to ensure that investeu’s sustainability-proofing methodologies are fully consistent with the eu’s sustainability objectives; ### 4. stresses that the key quantitative target of the european fund for strategic investments (efsi) of mobilising eur 500 billion of additional private and public investment should be replaced by measurable targets on sustainability and social impact in future investment strategies; calls on the eib to increase the share of efsi and investeu financing to projects that substantially contribute to the eu’s sustainability and social objectives; calls on the commission to ensure that investeu’s sustainability-proofing methodologies are fully consistent with the eu’s sustainability objectives; regrets the eib has been funding projects that resulted in human rights violations; stresses some weaknesses have been identified in how the eib handled complaints filed with the complaints mechanism; calls on the eib to undertake systematic human rights impact assessment prior to funding a project;


### 4. stresses that the key quantitative target of the european fund for strategic investments (efsi) of mobilising eur 500 billion of additional private and public investment should be replaced by measurable targets on sustainability and social impact in future investment strategies; calls on the eib to increase the share of efsi and investeu financing to projects that substantially contribute to the eu’s sustainability and social objectives; calls on the commission to ensure that investeu’s sustainability-proofing methodologies are fully consistent with the eu’s sustainability objectives; ### 4. stresses that the key quantitative target of the european fund for strategic investments (efsi) of mobilising eur 500 billion of additional private and public investment should be replaced by measurable targets on sustainability and social impact in future investment strategies; calls on the eib to increase the share of efsi and investeu financing to projects that substantially contribute to the eu’s sustainability , social objectives and to the reduction of inequalities; calls on the eib to prioritise supporting through its lending activities the achievement of the united nations sustainable development goals; calls on the commission to ensure that investeu’s sustainability-proofing methodologies are fully consistent with the eu’s sustainability objectives;


### 5. calls on the eib group to be more transparent about its economic operations , its use of the eu budget guarantee , the additionality of eib operations and on possible future plans for a development subsidiary at the eib , and for the eib group to improve its accountability on these issues; calls for a memorandum of understanding between the eib and parliament to improve access to eib documents and data related to strategic orientation and financing policies in the future in order to strengthen the bank’s accountability. ### 5. calls on the eib group to be more transparent about its economic operations , its use of the eu budget guarantee , the additionality of eib operations and on possible future plans for a development subsidiary at the eib , and for the eib group to improve its accountability on these issues; calls for a memorandum of understanding between the eib and parliament to improve access to eib documents and data related to strategic orientation and financing policies in the future in order to strengthen the bank’s accountability; calls for making the eib more accountable towards the european parliament by creating a dedicated sub-committee to monitor eib operations and provide political guidance to the eib; calls for the eib to participate to the econ dialogues with a mandatory series of hearings.


### 5. calls on the eib group to be more transparent about its economic operations , its use of the eu budget guarantee , the additionality of eib operations and on possible future plans for a development subsidiary at the eib , and for the eib group to improve its accountability on these issues; calls for a memorandum of understanding between the eib and parliament to improve access to eib documents and data related to strategic orientation and financing policies in the future in order to strengthen the bank’s accountability. ### 5. calls on the eib group to be more transparent about its economic operations , its use of the eu budget guarantee , the additionality of eib operations and on possible future plans for a development subsidiary at the eib , and for the eib group to improve its accountability on these issues; calls the eib to review its framework for anti-corruption fight to improve cooperation with european authorities , especially olaf and the european public prosecutor’s office and to make it mandatory for the eib to report potential fraud cases to national authorities; calls for a memorandum of understanding between the eib and parliament to improve access to eib documents and data related to strategic orientation and financing policies in the future in order to strengthen the bank’s accountability.


### 5. calls on the eib group to be more transparent about its economic operations , its use of the eu budget guarantee , the additionality of eib operations and on possible future plans for a development subsidiary at the eib , and for the eib group to improve its accountability on these issues; calls for a memorandum of understanding between the eib and parliament to improve access to eib documents and data related to strategic orientation and financing policies in the future in order to strengthen the bank’s accountability. ### 5. calls on the eib group to be more transparent about its economic operations , its use of the eu budget guarantee , the additionality of eib operations and on possible future plans for a development subsidiary at the eib , and for the eib group to improve its accountability on these issues; calls for a memorandum of understanding between the eib and parliament to improve access to eib documents and data related to strategic orientation and financing policies in the future in order to strengthen the bank’s accountability; calls the eib to require a public country by country reporting to its clients without waiting for the outcome of ongoing discussion at the eu level.


### 5. calls on the eib group to be more transparent about its economic operations , its use of the eu budget guarantee , the additionality of eib operations and on possible future plans for a development subsidiary at the eib , and for the eib group to improve its accountability on these issues; calls for a memorandum of understanding between the eib and parliament to improve access to eib documents and data related to strategic orientation and financing policies in the future in order to strengthen the bank’s accountability. ### 5. calls on the eib group to be more transparent about its economic operations , which operations are contributing to achieve the paris agreement’s goals , the eu green deal objectives and the sdgs; its use of the eu budget guarantee , the additionality of eib operations and on possible future plans for a development subsidiary at the eib , and for the eib group to improve its accountability on these issues; calls for a memorandum of understanding between the eib and parliament to improve access to eib documents and data related to strategic orientation and financing policies in the future in order to strengthen the bank’s accountability; .


### 21. considers that , given the strategic role of smes , the eib should reinforce its administrative and advisory capacities to provide information and technical support to smes with a view to facilitating their access to finance; ### 21. considers that , given the strategic role of smes , the eib should reinforce its administrative and advisory capacities to provide information and technical support to smes with a view to facilitating their access to finance , particularly in less-developed countries and countries in post-financial assistance phase;


### 23. urges the eib , the largest multilateral lender in the world , to maintain its leading role in future eu financing mechanisms for third countries; opposes the recent initiatives to encourage the eib to be more active in defence and security , migration management and border control; ### 23. urges the eib , the largest multilateral lender in the world , to maintain and further enhance its leading role in future eu financing mechanisms for third countries; calls on the eib to pay special attention to third countries and regions suffering from conflict and extreme poverty in order to reduce the development gap between the eu and those countries and regions , with a special focus on the southern mediterranean and eastern european neighbourhood countries , while respecting the legislation of the beneficiary countries and increasing the efficiency of the results measurement (rem) framework; opposes the recent initiatives to encourage the eib to be more active in defence and security , migration management and border control;


### governance and transparency ### governance , transparency and accountability


### 31. calls on the eib to review its transparency policy in 2020 in order to ensure the timely publication of more ample information on its financing activities , so as to ensure that its transparency policy is compliant with its climate and environmental commitments; ### 31. calls on the eib to review its transparency policy in 2020 in order to ensure the timely publication of more ample information on all its financing activities , so as to ensure that its transparency policy is compliant with its social , climate and environmental commitments;


### 34. expects the eib to adapt its internal policies to take account of the new legal framework put in place to combat not only tax fraud but also tax evasion; encourages the eib to work with the european anti-fraud office (olaf) and national authorities to prevent fraud and money laundering , and to ensure that the european public prosecutor takes a proactive interest in the eib’s activities; ### 34. expects the eib to adapt its internal policies to take account of the new legal framework put in place to combat not only tax fraud but also tax evasion and tax avoidance; encourages the eib to enhance the independence and efficiency of its fraud investigations division , to work with the european anti-fraud office (olaf) and national authorities to prevent fraud and money laundering and to ensure that the european public prosecutor takes a proactive interest in the eib’s activities;


### 37. calls for the european court of auditors to be fully empowered to audit all eib operations and for it to draw up an annual report on the results of its external lending activities; ### 37. calls for the european court of auditors to be fully empowered to audit all eib operations and for it to draw up an annual report with recommendations on the results of its lending activities and their performance and alignment with eu policies;


### 39. calls as a matter of urgency for parliament’s powers be strengthened as regards the strategic direction and policies of the eib , in order to ensure democratic scrutiny of investments; ### 39. calls as a matter of urgency for parliament’s powers be strengthened as regards the strategic direction and policies of the eib , in order to ensure democratic scrutiny of investments , including the ability to submit questions for written answer to the eib as already provided for the ecb;


### 1. is deeply concerned that currently none of the nationally determined contributions (ndcs) submitted , including those of the union and its member states , are in line with the objective of pursuing efforts to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°c above pre-industrial levels; ### 1. is deeply concerned that currently none of the nationally determined contributions (ndcs) submitted , including those of the union and its member states , are in line with the objective of pursuing efforts to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°c above pre-industrial levels and deplores the union and member states for not contributing to the 1.5°c paris agreement target; calls on all member states to immediately revise their ndcs to contribute equitably to the 1.5°c paris agreement target;


### 1. believes that the main aim of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) should be to support the eu’s green objectives by fighting carbon leakage; ### 1. recalls the international obligations of the union under the paris agreement; acknowledges the green deal , the goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 and the newly announced target as voted by the european parliament of at least 60% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030; notes the lack of international climate efforts to limit global warming to 1.5 c; believes that the main aim of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) should be to support the eu’s green objectives and fight climate change , notably by fighting carbon leakage;


### 1. welcomes the paris agreement , the green deal and the goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050; notes the lack of international climate efforts; believes that an eu carbon border adjustment mechanism (‘the mechanism’) could incentivise international efforts to combat climate change; ### 1. recalls the international obligations of the union under the paris agreement; acknowledges the green deal , the goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 and the newly announced target of at least 55% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030; notes the lack of international climate efforts; believes that an eu carbon border adjustment mechanism (‘the mechanism’) could incentivise international efforts to combat climate change;


### b. whereas the average global temperature has already risen by about 1.1°c above pre-industrial levels; ### b. whereas the average global temperature has already risen past 1.1°c above pre-industrial levels;1a


### c. whereas the union and its member states are committed to delivering climate action on the basis of the latest available scientific evidence; ### c. whereas the union and its member states must be committed to delivering climate action on the basis of the latest available scientific evidence;


### e. whereas existing carbon leakage provisions under union law have failed to demonstrate their effectiveness in delivering the necessary decarbonisation of the sectors concerned; ### e. whereas existing carbon leakage provisions under union law have failed to demonstrate their effectiveness in delivering the necessary decarbonisation of the sectors concerned; whereas free allowances , in particular , have substantially undermined union decarbonisation measures;


### 2. strongly deplores the non-cooperative and disloyal behaviour of some of the union’s trade partners in international climate negotiations , as recently observed at cop25; considers that this behaviour hampers our collective global ability to reach the objectives of the paris agreement; ### 2. strongly deplores the non-cooperative and disloyal behaviour of some of the union’s trade partners , namely usa , brazil and saudi arabia , in international climate negotiations , as recently observed at cop25; considers that this behaviour hampers our collective global ability to reach the objectives of the paris agreement; insists that the commission and council engage in good faith with all parties and also lead discussion on making the decision-making process in the unfccc fairer , more transparent and less vulnerable to stalling;


### 2. strongly deplores the non-cooperative and disloyal behaviour of some of the union’s trade partners in international climate negotiations , as recently observed at cop25; considers that this behaviour hampers our collective global ability to reach the objectives of the paris agreement; ### 2. strongly deplores the non-cooperative and disloyal behaviour of some of the union’s trade partners in international climate negotiations , as recently observed at cop25; considers that this behaviour hampers our collective global ability to reach the objectives of the paris agreement; regrets , in particular , the decision by the united states to withdraw from the paris agreement;


### 2. proposes that the cbam be implemented as an extension of the eu emissions trading system (eu ets) , which would require importers to purchase allowances for the volume of carbon emissions incorporated in their products; notes that the mechanism should ensure a single carbon price , both for domestic producers and importers; ### 2. proposes that the cbam be created as an alternative to the eu emissions trading system (eu ets) which has proven to be highly ineffective in increasing the carbon price; stresses the need for the mechanism to include the emissions resulting from transport in the carbon content pricing; urges the mechanism to aim for a reduction of eu share of imported emissions; notes that the mechanism should ensure a single carbon price , both for domestic producers and importers;


### 2. underlines that international carbon pricing and fully competitive low-emission solutions would render the mechanism obsolete; stresses , therefore , that the eu needs to step up efforts in this respect; ### 2. underlines that international carbon pricing and fully competitive low-emission solutions could render the mechanism obsolete; stresses that the us decision to pull out of the paris agreement has strongly undermined global response to climate change; stresses , therefore , that the eu needs to step up efforts in this respect meanwhile implementing the mechanism; recalls that the union has a historical responsibility regarding the accumulation of greenhouse gas and therefore has a duty to take ambitious climate and environmental actions;


### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; ### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; regrets that , to date , the union has been more self-congratulatory rather than truly leading; recalls the unfccc principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ , which grants the union and the member states a particular responsibility , as well as acknowledges their capacity , to act;


### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; ### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; notes that the union and its member states bear significant historic responsibility for the build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and , thus , for the ongoing global warming;


### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market; ### 3. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors which are emissions intensive and with the highest risk of carbon leakage , before being enlarged over time to encompass all imports; underlines that the proposed cbam should end up applying to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market;


### 3. emphasises that decentralised climate actions can lead to carbon leakage and a competitive disadvantage on international markets for the eu industry; urges the commission , therefore , to ensure full carbon-leakage protection and to consider the inclusion of export rebates in the mechanism; ### 3. emphasises that decentralised climate actions can lead to carbon and investments leakage and a competitive disadvantage on international markets for the eu industry; urges the commission , therefore , to ensure full carbon-leakage protection with a mechanism created as an alternative to the current measures against carbon leakage under the eu ets and to consider the inclusion of export rebates in the mechanism; stresses the need for the mechanism to include the emissions resulting from transport in the carbon content pricing; urges the mechanism to aim for a reduction of eu share of imported emissions , which implies a reduction in value chains and their length;


### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55% net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; ### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55% net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; is deeply concerned about the fact that , according to the commission’s impact assessment , unless absorbed by the carbon sinks , the actual emissions reduction target proposed by the commission is just 52.8% by 20301a;


### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; ### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; recalls the parliament's position for at least 60% emissions reduction by 2030;


### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; ### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities as laid down in the unfccc;


### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at country level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; ### 4. notes the proposal from the european economic and social committee to introduce a design that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition; recalls that this approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which could be defined at country level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; stresses the importance to also measure and include in the mechanism the emissions resulting from transport;


### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions; ### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors which are emissions intensive and with the highest risk of carbon leakage such as clinker , cement , iron , steel , aluminium , some bulk chemicals , pulp , paper and oil refining , before being enlarged over time to encompass all imports; recalls the importance of adopting complementary measures to reduce the emissions intensity of these sectors , such as renovation of the building stock and raw construction material substitution;


### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2 % below 1990 levels in 2018 , while at the same time its ghg emissions embedded in international trade have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global footprint; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu represent more than 20 % of the union’s domestic co2 emissions; ### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2 % below 1990 levels in 2018 , while at the same time its ghg emissions embedded in international trade have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global footprint; believes , therefore , that the commission should refrain from referring to its calculated domestic ghg emissions reductions without also referring to its embedded emissions; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu represent more than 20 % of the union’s domestic co2 emissions;


### 5. requests that the implementation of the cbam should lead to the progressive phasing out of the free allocation of allowances , following an appropriate transition period , since the mechanism ensures that eu producers and importers would have to deal with the same carbon costs in the eu market; notes that this phasing out should be coupled in parallel with the introduction of export rebates in order to maintain strong decarbonisation incentives , while ensuring a level playing field for eu exports; ### 5. requests that the implementation of the cbam should lead to the progressive phasing out of the free allocation of allowances , following an appropriate transition period , since the mechanism ensures that eu producers and importers would have to deal with the same carbon costs in the eu market;


### 5. stresses the need to limit international retaliation measures against the eu caused by the mechanism; urges the commission to make the mechanism world trade organization-compatible and to take a multilateral approach to its design; ### 5. stresses the need to limit international retaliation measures against the eu caused by the mechanism; urges the commission to take a multilateral approach to its design; strongly suggests to use the environmental exemption provisions under the article 20 of the gatt agreement; recalls that over the last decade the world trade organization has proven increasingly blocked and bypassed by third states; stresses that the union has other international obligations , notably under the paris agreement; recalls that the european parliament has declared a climate and environmental emergency and has called on the commission to ensure that every legislative and budgetary proposals are all fully aligned with the objective of limite global warming to under 1.5°c; calls therefore on the union to initiate a profound reform wto rules in order to ensure that world trade is fully aligned with the realisation of the paris agreement long-term goal to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°c above pre-industrial levels;


### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; ### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners;


### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; ### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address all ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism;


### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered eu own resources; is convinced that these resources must be used for climate measures; ### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered eu own resources; is convinced that these resources must be used for social and climate measures , including for supporting third countries , particularly developing countries , in their efforts to decarbonize their economies , mitigate and adapt to climate change; stresses the importance of transferring decarbonized technologies towards developing countries; urges member states to take measures , particularly fiscal measures , to support low-income households and compensate any rise in price on imported goods as a result of the implementation of the mechanism;


### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local jobs and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition; ### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local quality jobs and while fulfilling the union’s climate obligations;


### 7. calls for the inclusion of cbam revenues into the eu budget; ### 7. calls for the inclusion of cbam revenues into the eu budget; is convinced that these resources must be used for social and climate measures , including for supporting third countries in their efforts to decarbonize their economies , decarbonize and build a greener european industry , mitigate and adapt to climate change and to support low-income households and compensate any rise in price on imported goods as a result of the implementation of the mechanism;


### 7. calls on the commission to conduct an impact assessment of different mechanisms and designs to incentivise international climate action and prevent carbon leakage before presenting a legislative proposal. ### 7. calls on the commission to conduct an impact assessment of different mechanisms and designs to incentivise international climate action and prevent carbon and investment leakage before presenting a legislative proposal.


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should eventually cover all imports , but that in an initial phase , from 2023 , it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , aluminium , chemicals , glass , paper , oil refining and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover at least the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions;


### 8. believes that the above proposal is compatible with world trade organization rules , since it does not discriminate between producers , is based on objective criteria and has a clear environmental objective. ### 8. recalls the environmental exemption provisions under the article 20 of the gatt agreement; believes that the above proposal is compatible with world trade organization rules , since it does not discriminate between producers , is based on objective criteria and has a clear environmental objective.


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the national average ghg emissions content of individual products for each country of origin; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; emphasises the need to incorporate the emissions from transport to the union in the ghg emissions content of the imports covered by the cbam; stresses that the emissions content of the imports concerned should cover not just carbon dioxide , but all ghg , especially methane and nitrous oxide;


### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that the introduction of a rising carbon floor price under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu; ### deleted


### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; ### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; insists that interpretations of wto rules cannot be used to weaken the integrity of the cbam , and that the cbam must be an effective tool even despite wto rules;


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal;


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; insists the commission does not include export rebates in its proposal;


### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and for stepping up the union’s contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states , which are most vulnerable to climate change; ### 14. supports the ringfencing of revenues from the cbam strictly for climate action , including international climate finance; asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and for stepping up the union’s contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states , which are most vulnerable to climate change;


### 2. stresses the urgent need to release financial assistance through the european union solidarity fund (‘the fund’) to the regions affected by natural disasters in the union in 2019; ### 2. stresses the urgent need to release financial assistance through the fund to all regions affected by natural disasters in the union in 2019;


### (37) in order to enhance cooperation with long-standing members sharing eu values , contributions from member parties having their seat in a country outside the union but in the council of europe , should be allowed. however , such contributions should be subject to a cap in relation to total contribution , to limit the risk of foreign interference. ### deleted


### (39) in order to reach out to their members and constituencies across the union , european political parties should have the right to use their funding for cross-border political campaigns. the funding and limitation of election expenses for parties and candidates in those campaigns should be governed by the rules applicable in each member state. ### (39) in order to reach out to their members and constituencies across the union , european political parties should have the right to use their funding for cross-border political campaigns , conducted in the context of elections to the european parliament , including the setting up of union-wide lists and referendum campaigns. the funding and limitation of election expenses for parties and candidates in those campaigns should be governed by the rules applicable in each member state.


### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to support political activities in the common interest , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern the implementation of the teu and the tfeu . these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice. ### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties or political foundations from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties or member organisations in the union on issues of relevance for the union , from supporting political activities in the common interest , or from engaging in educational activities , in order to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. the prohibition of indirect funding should not prevent the participation of both representatives and staffers of political parties , nor of potentially politically active persons in events of european political foundations. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern the implementation of the teu and the tfeu . these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice.


### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to support political activities in the common interest , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern the implementation of the teu and the tfeu . these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice. ### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to support political activities in the common interest , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should not finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns. these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice.


### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member parties that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party. the value of contributions from member parties that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members. ### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party.


### 10. contributions from members of a european political foundation that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member organisations that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe , and from the european political party with which it is affiliated , shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political foundation and shall not derive from funds received by a european political party pursuant to this regulation from the general budget of the european union. the value of contributions from member organisations that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members. ### 10. contributions from members of a european political foundation that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state and from the european political party with which it is affiliated , shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political foundation and shall not derive from funds received by a european political party pursuant to this regulation from the general budget of the european union.


### 2. the funding of european political parties and european political foundations from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance referendum campaigns when those campaigns concern the implementation of the treaties of the union. ### deleted


### (23) the european legal status granted to european political parties and their affiliated foundations should provide them with legal capacity and recognition in all the member states. such legal capacity and recognition do not entitle them to nominate candidates in national elections or elections to the european parliament . any such or similar entitlement remains under the competence of member states. ### (23) the european legal status granted to european political parties and their affiliated foundations should provide them with legal capacity and recognition in all the member states. such legal capacity and recognition do not entitle them to nominate candidates in national elections or elections to the european parliament or to participate in referendum campaigns. any such or similar entitlement remains under the competence of member states.


### 4. financial contributions or grants from the general budget of the european union shall not exceed 95 % of the annual reimbursable expenditure indicated in the budget of a european political party and of the eligible costs incurred by a european political foundation. european political parties may use any unused part of the union contribution awarded to cover reimbursable expenditure within the financial year following its award. amounts unused after that financial year shall be recovered in accordance with regulation (eu , euratom) 2018/1046 . financial contributions in the year of elections to the european parliament may cover 100% of the reimbursable expenditure incurred by a european political party. ### 4. financial contributions or grants from the general budget of the european union shall not exceed 95 % of the annual reimbursable expenditure indicated in the budget of a european political party and of the eligible costs incurred by a european political foundation. european political parties may use any unused part of the union contribution awarded to cover reimbursable expenditure within the financial year following its award. amounts unused after that financial year shall be recovered in accordance with regulation (eu , euratom) 2018/1046 . financial contributions in the year of elections to the european parliament may cover 100% of the reimbursable expenditure incurred by a european political party and foundation.


### 1. subject to the second subparagraph , the funding of european political parties from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance campaigns conducted by the european political parties in the context of elections to the european parliament in which they or their members participate as required by article 3(1) , point (f). ### 1. subject to the second subparagraph , the funding of european political parties from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance campaigns conducted by the european political parties in the context of elections to the european parliament in which they or their members participate as required by article 3(1) , point (f) including setting up union-wide lists.


### 1. underlines that the swift and decisive mobilisation of significant eu budgetary resources was instrumental in cushioning the impact of the covid-19 crisis; ### 1. underlines that the swift and decisive mobilisation of significant eu budgetary resources was and will continue to be instrumental in cushioning the health , social and economic impact of the covid-19 crisis; stresses the general importance of significant public investment to support a sustainable , fair and inclusive recovery in the eu , to promote strengthened public healthcare systems , pandemic and crisis prevention and preparedness , upward social and economic convergence , social and economic resilience , social justice and equality and to contribute to the full implementation of the un sustainable development goals , the european pillar of social rights , the eu’s climate and biodiversity objectives , the just green and digital transitions and the eu gender equality strategy;


### 1. welcomes the annual sustainable growth strategy 2022 pledge to continue placing a sustainable , fair and green transition at the heart of the european semester (semester) process , enshrining environmental sustainability , climate neutrality , public health and the wellbeing of citizens as guiding principles for the eu’s recovery. ### 1. welcomes the annual sustainable growth strategy 2022 pledge to place a sustainable , fair and green transition at the heart of the european semester (semester) process , enshrining environmental sustainability , climate neutrality , public health and the wellbeing of citizens as guiding principles for the recovery of the eu member states.


### 1. welcomes the annual sustainable growth strategy 2022 pledge to continue placing a sustainable , fair and green transition at the heart of the european semester (semester) process , enshrining environmental sustainability , climate neutrality , public health and the wellbeing of citizens as guiding principles for the eu’s recovery. ### 1. notes the annual sustainable growth strategy 2022 pledge to continue placing a sustainable , fair and green transition at the heart of the european semester (semester) process , enshrining environmental sustainability , climate neutrality , public health and the wellbeing of citizens as guiding principles for the eu’s recovery.


### 2. stresses that the recovery and resilience facility (rrf) requires that the european semester be reshaped to ensure the delivery of high-quality and ambitious national recovery and resilience plans (nrrps); considers that the nrrps are an opportunity for the member states to address identified structural challenges and to make their economies more shock-resistant , sustainable and inclusive in line with the european pillar of social rights and the sustainable development goals; ### 2. stresses that the recovery and resilience facility (rrf) requires that the european semester be completely reshaped to ensure the delivery of effective , high-quality , inclusive and ambitious national recovery and resilience plans (nrrps) given that the european semester process has proved insufficient to address social and economic disparities and inequalities in the eu; considers that the rrf aims at the recovery from the covid-19 crisis and offers an opportunity for the member states to address identified structural challenges , to implement growth-enhancing and socially-just reforms and investments , and to make their economies more shock-resistant , sustainable , fair and inclusive in line with the european pillar of social rights and the sustainable development goals; underlines that member states aim to spend around 40% of their total grant allocation in 2022 alone , thus making the success of the rrf one of the greatest challenges for 2022; points out that support from the rrf is not meant to substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure; regrets the lack of adequate and substantial consultation with all relevant stakeholders in the preparation and implementation of nrrps;


### 2. stresses the importance of accelerating the alignment of the semester process with the eu’s long-term climate and environmental objectives as set up under the european green deal and reinforced in the fit for 55 package; welcomes the insertion , at each european semester country report , of dedicated sections on the member state’s progress in the different sdg areas , as well as the set-up of additional indicators to monitor and guide member states’ performance in view of eu green deal policy goals. ### 2. stresses the importance of achieving an alignment of the semester process with the paris agreement and the eu’s long-term climate and environmental objectives as set up under the european green deal and reinforced in the fit for 55 package; welcomes the insertion , as long as the european semester includes country specific advice in its reports , of dedicated sections in these reports on the member state’s progress in the different sdg areas , as well as the set-up of additional indicators to monitor and guide member states’ performance in view of eu green deal policy goals.


### 2. stresses the importance of accelerating the alignment of the semester process with the eu’s long-term climate and environmental objectives as set up under the european green deal and reinforced in the fit for 55 package; welcomes the insertion , at each european semester country report , of dedicated sections on the member state’s progress in the different sdg areas , as well as the set-up of additional indicators to monitor and guide member states’ performance in view of eu green deal policy goals; ### 2. stresses the importance of radically reforming the semester process and aligning it with the eu’s long-term climate and environmental objectives as set up under the european green deal and reinforced in the fit for 55 package; welcomes the insertion , at each european semester country report , of dedicated sections on the member state’s progress in the different sdg areas , as well as the set-up of additional indicators to monitor and guide member states’ performance in view of eu green deal policy goals;


### 2. is concerned about emerging new variants , localised pandemic lockdowns , increased energy prices , inflationary pressure , supply-side disruptions and emerging labour shortages; notes that these risks could hamper economic growth prospects in the coming months and delay the transition to a more sustainable and future-proof economy; ### 2. is concerned about emerging new variants , localised pandemic lockdowns , increased energy prices , inflationary pressure , supply-side disruptions and emerging labour shortages; notes that these risks could further increase inequalities and deteriorate life conditions in the coming months and delay the transition to a more sustainable and future-proof economy; notes that these variants emerge due to the stark inequalities in the distribution of vaccines among the different regions of the world , in which the eu plays a role;


### 3. notes that , meeting the eu’s ambitious green deal agenda will require significant investment and that , according to the commission , the private and public investment gap to cater for the green transition are estimated at nearly eur 520 billion per year , for the next decade; further notes that whereas a substantial share of the investment will be borne by the private sector , public investment will have to increase as well. ### 3. notes that , meeting the eu’s green deal agenda will require significant investment and that , according to the commission , the private and public investment gap to cater for the green transition are estimated at nearly eur 520 billion per year , for the next decade; further notes that whereas a substantial share of the investment will be borne by the private sector , public investment will have to increase substantially.


### 4. reiterates the need for member states to have the necessary control mechanisms in place to ensure respect for the rule of law and protect the eu’s financial interests; ### 4. reiterates the need for member states to have the necessary control and audit mechanisms in place to ensure respect for the rule of law , protect the eu’s financial interests , secure transparency and prevent corruption; regrets that the commission has not yet implemented the rule of law conditionality regulation (rol regulation) , despite its entry into force on 1 january 2021 , and is therefore not fulfilling its duty as guardian of the eu treaties; reiterates its call for the commission to apply the rol regulation completely and without ambiguity;


### 4. calls therefore on the commission to extend the current semester approach to deliver on its political commitment to make it a governance tool supporting the achievement of the european green deal and the sustainable development goals; underlines the need to further integrate , without weakening the monitoring process of this extended european semester , the union’s climate , environmental , including biodiversity and social objectives in a more comprehensive manner to provide member states with analysis and indicators beyond economic indicators only , thus better reflecting the current challenges faced by member states in reducing their ecological footprint and making the process a driver of change towards a sustainable wellbeing for all in europe. ### 4. calls therefore on the commission to redesign the semester approach to deliver on the european green deal and the sustainable development goals; underlines the need to further integrate the union’s climate , environmental , including biodiversity and social objectives in a more comprehensive manner to provide member states with analysis and indicators beyond economic indicators only , thus better reflecting the current challenges faced by member states in reducing their ecological footprint and making the process a driver of change towards a sustainable wellbeing for all in europe.


### 4. calls therefore on the commission to extend the current semester approach to deliver on its political commitment to make it a governance tool supporting the achievement of the european green deal and the sustainable development goals; underlines the need to further integrate , without weakening the monitoring process of this extended european semester , the union’s climate , environmental , including biodiversity and social objectives in a more comprehensive manner to provide member states with analysis and indicators beyond economic indicators only , thus better reflecting the current challenges faced by member states in reducing their ecological footprint and making the process a driver of change towards a sustainable wellbeing for all in europe; ### 4. calls therefore on the commission to radically reform the semester in order to deliver on its political commitment to make it a governance tool supporting the achievement of the european green deal and the sustainable development goals; underlines the need to integrate , the union’s climate , environmental , including biodiversity and social objectives in a comprehensive manner to provide member states with analysis and indicators beyond economic indicators only , thus better reflecting the current challenges faced by member states in reducing their ecological footprint , material and consumption footprint , and making the process a driver of change towards a sustainable wellbeing and prosperity for all in europe;


### 4. recognises that the crisis triggered by the covid-19 pandemic has been especially severe for enterprises , mostly small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) , in tourism , hospitality and culture; recognises the notion of european solidarity underpinning the establishment of the rrf; ### 4. recognises that the crisis triggered by the covid-19 pandemic has been especially severe for enterprises , mostly small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) , in tourism , hospitality and culture; stresses that member states which were more dependent on such services suffered a harshest economic impact;


### 5. recalls that public funding is key to achieving the 2030 climate objectives and addressing other social and economic challenges; considers that all options to incentivise member state investments to tackle those challenges should be on the table , specifically the revision of the stability and growth pact to promote a future-oriented economy and the extension of lending and borrowing capacities at eu level , building on nextgenerationeu; ### 5. recalls that public funding is key to achieving the 2030 climate objectives , promoting the digital transition and addressing other social , economic and public health challenges; considers that all options to incentivise member state investments to tackle those challenges should be on the table , specifically the thorough revision of the stability and growth pact to promote a just , sustainable and future-oriented economy and the establishment of permanent lending and borrowing capacities at eu level , building on nextgenerationeu; calls on the commission and the member states to urgently reform the eu economic governance framework well in advance of the deactivation of the general escape clause in order to effectively promote fair , inclusive and sustainable growth , enhance democratic accountability and avoid a new debt crisis;


### 5. stresses that the european semester should support the union’s effort to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; calls therefore on the commission to assess the discrepancy between the structure of the member states’ budgets and a paris-aligned scenario for each of their national budgets; thus enabling the commission to provide recommendations on member states’ climate debt and climate-friendly investment gap associated to the union’s 2030 objective and the objective of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; ### 5. stresses that the european semester should be radically reformed in order to support the union’s effort to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest , and preferably earlier; calls therefore on the commission to assess the discrepancy between the structure of the member states’ budgets and a paris-aligned scenario for each of their national budgets; thus enabling the commission to provide recommendations on member states’ climate debt and climate-friendly investment gap associated to the achieving the paris agreement 1.5 temperature goal , including at least the union’s 2030 objective and the objective of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest;


### 5. points out that the successful roll-out of the rrf will help to make eu economies and societies more sustainable , inclusive , resilient and better prepared for the green and digital transitions; ### 5. points out that the successful roll-out of the rrf will help to make eu economies and societies more sustainable , inclusive , resilient and better prepared for the green and digital transitions; stresses , however , that this depends on the design and implementation of the national plans , as well as on the chosen method for the financing of the facility;


### 6. believes that rrf governance , notably the assessment and approval of the nrrps by the commission and the council , provides a solid foundation for discussions on how to allow sufficient public investment under the fiscal rules; ### 6. believes that rrf governance , notably the assessment and approval of the nrrps by the commission and the council , provides a solid foundation for discussions on how to allow sufficient public investment under the fiscal rules; supports the introduction of a golden rule to exclude public investment on tackling climate change , promoting digitisation of the public sector and strengthening public healthcare and education systems as well as public spending to meet emergency needs , from the calculation of public deficit;


### 6. recalling the importance of ensuring the semester is aligned with the recovery and resilience facility and the need to swiftly address the covid 19 pandemic impact on the european economy; highlights that the rrf presents an unprecedented and unique opportunity for all member states to address key structural challenges and investment needs and transform their economies to make them sustainable , more competitive and more resilient to future shocks; stresses the importance of implementing investment policies and sustainable reforms in line with the european priorities identified in the rrf; is of the view that the rrf should serve as an inspiration for the review of the framework for macroeconomic governance , notably in identifying common structural challenges and investment needs; further stresses that this review should design an enabling framework for member states to accelerate their green transition and close their climate and environment friendly investment gap; ### 6. recalling the importance of ensuring the semester is aligned with the recovery and resilience facility and the need to swiftly address the covid 19 pandemic impact on the european economy; highlights that the rrf presents an unprecedented and unique opportunity for all member states to address key structural challenges and investment needs and transform their economies to make them oriented on improving wellbeing , fully sustainable and resilient to all sorts of future shocks; stresses the importance of implementing investment policies and sustainable reforms in line with the european priorities identified in the rrf; is of the view that the rrf should serve as an inspiration for the review of the framework for macroeconomic governance , notably in identifying common structural challenges and investment needs; further stresses that this review should design an enabling framework for member states to accelerate their green transition and close their climate and environment friendly investment gap with urgency;


### 6. recalling the importance of ensuring the semester is aligned with the recovery and resilience facility and the need to swiftly address the covid 19 pandemic impact on the european economy; highlights that the rrf presents an unprecedented and unique opportunity for all member states to address key structural challenges and investment needs and transform their economies to make them sustainable , more competitive and more resilient to future shocks; stresses the importance of implementing investment policies and sustainable reforms in line with the european priorities identified in the rrf; is of the view that the rrf should serve as an inspiration for the review of the framework for macroeconomic governance , notably in identifying common structural challenges and investment needs; further stresses that this review should design an enabling framework for member states to accelerate their green transition and close their climate and environment friendly investment gap. ### 6. recalling the importance of ensuring the semester is aligned with the recovery and resilience facility and the need to swiftly address the covid 19 pandemic impact on the european economy; highlights that the rrf presents an unprecedented and unique opportunity for all member states to address key structural challenges and investment needs and transform their economies to make them sustainable , more fair and more resilient to future shocks; stresses the importance of implementing investment policies and sustainable reforms; is of the view that the rrf should serve as an inspiration for the review of the framework for macroeconomic governance , notably in identifying common structural challenges and investment needs; further stresses that this review should design an enabling framework for member states to accelerate their green transition , invest in climate justice and close their climate and environment friendly investment gap.


### 7. recalls that the design of nextgenerationeu requires debt repayment through new own resources of the eu budget. ### 7. recalls that the design of nextgenerationeu requires debt repayment through the introduction of a basket of new own resources of the eu budget; calls on the commission and the council to respect in full the timeline included in the legally-binding roadmap as agreed in the interinstitutional agreement; stresses that delays or failure to introduce the agreed basket of new own resources will be to the detriment of european programmes and instruments and result in much higher national contributions for the repayment of the nextgenerationeu debt.


### 7. believes that the review of the eu’s economic governance framework is necessary; agrees with the european fiscal board on the importance of having a clear pathway towards a reviewed fiscal framework , preferably prior to the deactivation of the general escape clause; ### 7. believes that the review of the eu’s economic governance framework is necessary; calls on the commission to submit a proposal in a timely manner; agrees with the european fiscal board on the importance of having a clear pathway towards a reviewed fiscal framework , prior to the deactivation of the general escape clause , as well as on the need to do away with its current pro-cyclical bias;


### a. whereas the european semester plays an important role in coordinating economic and budgetary policies in the member states , thereby safeguarding the macroeconomic stability of the economic and monetary union; ### a. whereas the european semester was design to coordinate economic and budgetary policies in the member states , should be further simplified in order not to constrain the sovereignty of the member states;


### 8. is convinced that the coordination of national fiscal policies remains crucial in underpinning the recovery; notes that the overall fiscal stance , taking into account national budgets and the rrf , is projected to remain supportive in 2022 to sustain the recovery; agrees with the commission that member states with low or medium levels of debt should pursue or maintain a supportive fiscal stance , and that member states with high levels of debt should use the rrf to finance additional investment to support the recovery , while pursuing a prudent fiscal policy; agrees with the commission that all member states should preserve or broadly preserve their national financed investment; ### 8. is convinced that the coordination of national fiscal policies remains crucial in underpinning the recovery; notes that the overall fiscal stance , taking into account national budgets and the rrf , is projected to remain supportive in 2022 to sustain the recovery; notes that member states should pursue or maintain a supportive fiscal stance and use the rrf to finance additional investment to support the recovery; agrees with the commission that all member states should at least preserve their national financed investment;