### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining and , or cross-using personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data. the specific choice shall not subvert or impair consumers’ autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of their online interface or any part thereof;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services and through own direct online sales channels of the business user at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### refrain from setting contractual obligations which limit the possibility for business users and providers of ancillary services of the gatekeeper to offer the same products or services to end users , either themselves through online direct sales channels or through third party online intermediation services , at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users by any other means , including through third party online intermediation services and through the business users’ own direct online sales channels at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy , in particular in the internal market , by providing new business opportunities in the union and facilitating cross-border trading. ### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy and society. in the european internal market they provide new business opportunities and facilitate cross-border trading.


### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy , in particular in the internal market , by providing new business opportunities in the union and facilitating cross-border trading. ### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy , in particular in the internal market , by providing new business opportunities in the union and facilitating cross-border trading. they also bring new challenges to democratic societies.


### (2) core platform services , at the same time , feature a number of characteristics that can be exploited by their providers. these characteristics of core platform services include among others extreme scale economies , which often result from nearly zero marginal costs to add business users or end users. other characteristics of core platform services are very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , a significant degree of dependence of both business users and end users , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing for the same purpose by end users , vertical integration , and data driven-advantages. all these characteristics combined with unfair conduct by providers of these services can have the effect of substantially undermining the contestability of the core platform services , as well as impacting the fairness of the commercial relationship between providers of such services and their business users and end users , leading to rapid and potentially far-reaching decreases in business users’ and end users’ choice in practice , and therefore can confer to the provider of those services the position of a so-called gatekeeper. ### (2) core platform services , which are used in the economy and society , feature a number of characteristics that can be exploited by their providers. these characteristics of core platform services include among others extreme scale economies , which often result from nearly zero marginal costs to add business users or end users. other characteristics of core platform services are very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , a significant degree of dependence of both business users and end users , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing for the same purpose by end users , vertical integration , and data driven-advantages. all these characteristics combined with unfair conduct by providers of these services can have the effect of substantially undermining the contestability of the core platform services , as well as impacting the fairness of the commercial relationship between providers of such services and their business users and end users , leading to rapid and potentially far-reaching decreases in business users’ and end users’ choice in practice , and therefore can confer to the provider of those services the position of a so-called gatekeeper.


### (8) by approximating diverging national laws , obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services , including retail services , within the internal market should be eliminated. a targeted set of harmonised mandatory rules should therefore be established at union level to ensure contestable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market. ### (8) by approximating diverging national laws , obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services , including retail services , within the internal market should be eliminated. a targeted set of harmonised mandatory rules should therefore be established at union level to ensure contestable , sustainable and fair digital markets within the internal market.


### (9) a fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if member states are prevented from applying national rules which are specific to the types of undertakings and services covered by this regulation. at the same time , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. however , the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market. ### (9) this regulation should not prevent the application by member states of national rules whose purpose is to support legitimate public interests , in accordance with union law. such national rules may lay down obligations on undertakings which are identical or similar to , stricter than or different from those laid down in this regulation. those legitimate public interests include consumer protection , respect for the ‘cultural exception’ , the fight against unfair competition and the protection and fostering of media freedom and pluralism of media and opinion , as well as multilingualism and defence of intellectual property. in particular , the right of member states to impose on undertakings deemed to be ‘gatekeepers’ within the meaning of this regulation , as well as on other undertakings , obligations which serve to enforce legitimate public interests remains unaffected , and since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding provisions at national level as well as to other provisions at national level regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question.


### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation. ### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive 2002/58/ec , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation. this regulation does not particularise or replace any of the obligations of core platform services under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec.


### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu)xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation. ### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules adopted in accordance with union legislation.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , online browser , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , streaming services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services , voice-controlled virtual assistants and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32. in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services (such as application stores , digital voice assistants and marketplaces) , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , internet browsers , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32. in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , online browser , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , streaming services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services , voice-controlled virtual assistants and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32. in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply only to undertakings designated on the basis of these three objective criteria , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users. ### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply to undertakings designated on the basis of two of these three objective criteria.


### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply only to undertakings designated on the basis of these three objective criteria , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users. ### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply only to undertakings designated on the basis of two out of these three objective criteria , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users.


### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply only to undertakings designated on the basis of these three objective criteria , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users. ### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply to undertakings designated on the basis of two of these three objective criteria , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users.


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between gatekeepers and business users , gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself.


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### deleted


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.


### article 8 ### deleted


### 1. the commission may , acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative , by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , exempt it , in whole or in part , from a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to article 3(7) , where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this article. the commission shall adopt the exemption decision at the latest 3 months after receiving a complete reasoned request. ### 1. the commission may on its own initiative , by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , exempt it , in whole or in part , from a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to article 3(7) , where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this article. the commission shall adopt the exemption decision at the latest 3 months after receiving a complete reasoned request.


### 1. the commission may , acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative , by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , exempt it , in whole or in part , from a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to article 3(7) , where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this article. the commission shall adopt the exemption decision at the latest 3 months after receiving a complete reasoned request. ### 1. the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , exempt a gatekeeper , in whole or in part , for a limited period of time , from a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to article 3(7) , where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this article. the commission shall adopt the exemption decision within 3 months.


### 2. an exemption pursuant to paragraph 1 may only be granted on grounds of: ### 2. an exemption pursuant to paragraph 1 may only be granted on grounds of public interest , public health or public security.


### public morality; ### deleted


### 3. the commission may , acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative , provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1. ### deleted


### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to update the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6. ### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to update the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , for reasons of public interest or based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations.


### 2. a practice within the meaning of paragraph 1 shall be considered to be unfair or limit the contestability of core platform services where: ### deleted


### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on end users or business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or


### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and end users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users and end users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or end users; or


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. the gate keeper shall not subvert or impair consumers’ autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of their online interface or any part thereof while exercising those rights or specific choices.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. the gatekeeper shall not subvert or impair consumers’ autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of their online interface or any part thereof while exercising those rights or specific choices.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. the gatekeeper shall not subvert or impair consumers’ autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of their online interface or any part thereof while those consumers are exercising those rights or specific choices.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. a gatekeeper shall not subvert or impair consumers’ autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of their online interface or any part thereof while exercising those rights or specific choices.


### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules.


### 2. the notification pursuant to paragraph 1 shall at least describe for the acquisition targets their eea and worldwide annual turnover , for any relevant core platform services their respective eea annual turnover , their number of yearly active business users and the number of monthly active end users , as well as the rationale of the intended concentration. ### 2. the notification pursuant to paragraph 1 shall at least describe for the merger or acquisition targets their eea and worldwide annual turnover , for any relevant core platform services their respective eea annual turnover , their number of yearly active business users and the number of monthly active end users , as well as the rationale of the intended concentration. the rationale shall demonstrate that the intended concentration will not stifle but promote competition and consumer welfare. the commission shall publish the notification.


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any employment of data-intelligence to coordinate , organize and control the entire set of activities and actors involved including techniques for profiling of consumers , especially in view of pricing , offers and ranking that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually.


### 1. when the commission intends to carry out a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of decisions pursuant to articles 15 , 16 and 17 , it shall adopt a decision opening a market investigation. ### 1. when the commission intends to carry out a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of decisions pursuant to articles 15 , 16 and 17 , it may consider the advise of end users and civil society organisations , and shall adopt a decision opening a market investigation.


### 1. when the commission intends to carry out a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of decisions pursuant to articles 15 , 16 and 17 , it shall adopt a decision opening a market investigation. ### 1. when the commission intends to carry out a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of decisions pursuant to articles 15 , 16 and 17 , it may consider the advice of end users and civil society organisations , and shall adopt a decision opening a market investigation.


### 1. when the commission intends to carry out a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of decisions pursuant to articles 15 , 16 and 17 , it shall adopt a decision opening a market investigation. ### 1. when the commission intends to carry out a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of decisions pursuant to articles 15 , 16 and 17 , it shall consider the advice of consumer organisations , and shall adopt a decision opening a market investigation.


### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within six months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within six months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6). ### deleted


### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6). ### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within three months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6).


### 3. where the provider of core platform services satisfies the thresholds set out in article 3(2) , but has presented significantly substantiated arguments in accordance with article 3(4) , the commission shall endeavour to conclude the market investigation within five months from the opening of the market investigation by a decision pursuant to paragraph 1. in that case the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings pursuant to paragraph 2 to the provider of core platform services within three months from the opening of the investigation. ### deleted


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision.


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper the obligations laid down in article 5 and article 6 as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4.


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5 and article 6 as specified in the designation decision , hence preventing that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4.


### market investigation into systematic non-compliance ### market investigation into non-compliance


### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any structural or equally effective behavioural remedies. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within six months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within six months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies , including separation or divestiture of a business if appropriate , according to competition law , which are proportionate to the infringement committed or necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within six months from the opening of the market investigation.


### (21) an entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. this is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least three member states to a very high number of business users and end users during at least three years. ### (21) an entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. this is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least three member states to a very high number of business users and end users during at least two years.


### (21) an entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. this is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least three member states to a very high number of business users and end users during at least three years. ### (21) an entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. this is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service on the internal market to a very high number of business users and end users during at least three years.


### (22) such thresholds can be impacted by market and technical developments. the commission should therefore be empowered to adopt delegated acts to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds are met , and to regularly adjust it to market and technological developments where necessary. this is particularly relevant in relation to the threshold referring to market capitalisation , which should be indexed in appropriate intervals. ### (22) such thresholds can be impacted by market and technical developments. the commission should therefore be empowered to adopt delegated acts to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds are met , and to regularly adjust it to market and technological developments and a more qualitative approach where necessary. this is particularly relevant in relation to the threshold referring to market capitalisation , which should be indexed in appropriate intervals.


### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. ### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded business acquisitions. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation and under merger control law.


### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. ### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation and under competition law , especially on mergers and acquisitions.


### (33) the obligations laid down in this regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. therefore , the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained , for example in the enforcement of the eu competition rules , shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users. in addition , it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. the obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified , following an in-depth investigation , as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations. ### (33) the obligations laid down in this regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. therefore , the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained , for example in the enforcement of the eu competition rules , shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users , and ultimately possibly on democracy and fundamental rights too. in addition , it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. the obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified , following an in-depth investigation , as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services or online direct sales channels belonging to them. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services or through the business users own direct online sales channels. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price or availability. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates , de-ranking or de-listing of the offers of business users.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates , de-ranking or de-listing of the offers of business users.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users or end users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users or end users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users , end users and third parties having a legitimate interest to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative , judicial or other public authorities. for example , business users , end users and third parties having a legitimate interest may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user or end user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use , in clear and intelligible language , including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users , end users or civil society organisations may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users , end users and civil organisations to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users , end users and civil organisations may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.


### (40) identification services are crucial for business users to conduct their business , as these can allow them not only to optimise services , to the extent allowed under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec of the european parliament and of the council33 , but also to inject trust in online transactions , in compliance with union or national law. gatekeepers should therefore not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to include any identification services provided by the gatekeeper itself as part of the provision of services or products by these business users to their end users , where other identification services are available to such business users. ### (40) identification services are crucial for business users to conduct their business , as these can allow them not only to optimise services , to the extent allowed under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec of the european parliament and of the council33 , but also to inject trust in online transactions , in compliance with union or national law. gatekeepers should therefore not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to include any identification or payment services provided by the gatekeeper itself as part of the provision of services or products by these business users to their end users , where other identification or payment services are available to such business users.


### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching. ### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching.


### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. this possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation. ### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers.


### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. this possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation. ### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. this possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation and in no way be used to water down obligations and measures for gatekeepers.


### (62) in order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this regulation , the commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified. such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe , by using clear procedures and deadlines , in order to support the ex ante effect of this regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector , and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty. ### (62) in order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this regulation , the commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified. such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe , by using clear procedures and deadlines , in order to support the ex ante effect of this regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector , and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty. member states as well as european organisations and associations that have a legitimate interest in representing business users or consumers should be given the right to formally request a market investigation where they can provide evidence supporting reasonable grounds to suspect that any of four abovementioned cases has occurred. the requirement for the presentation of evidence must not be unreasonable high. the commission may be decide not further investigate upon such request. in this case , it shall give sufficient reason for its decision.


### (62) in order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this regulation , the commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified. such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe , by using clear procedures and deadlines , in order to support the ex ante effect of this regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector , and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty. ### (62) in order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this regulation , the commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified. such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe , by using clear procedures and legally binding deadlines , in order to support the ex ante effect of this regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector , and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty.


### (62) in order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this regulation , the commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified. such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe , by using clear procedures and deadlines , in order to support the ex ante effect of this regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector , and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty. ### (62) in order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this regulation , the commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified. such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe , by using clear procedures and binding deadlines , in order to support the ex ante effect of this regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector , and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty.


### (65) the services and practices in core platform services and markets in which these intervene can change quickly and to a significant extent. to ensure that this regulation remains up to date and constitutes an effective and holistic regulatory response to the problems posed by gatekeepers , it is important to provide for a regular review of the lists of core platform services as well as of the obligations provided for in this regulation. this is particularly important to ensure that behaviour that may limit the contestability of core platform services or is unfair is identified. while it is important to conduct a review on a regular basis , given the dynamically changing nature of the digital sector , in order to ensure legal certainty as to the regulatory conditions , any reviews should be conducted within a reasonable and appropriate time-frame. market investigations should also ensure that the commission has a solid evidentiary basis on which it can assess whether it should propose to amend this regulation in order to expand , or further detail , the lists of core platform services. they should equally ensure that the commission has a solid evidentiary basis on which it can assess whether it should propose to amend the obligations laid down in this regulation or whether it should adopt a delegated act updating such obligations. ### (65) the services and practices in core platform services and markets in which these intervene can change quickly and to a significant extent. to ensure that this regulation remains up to date and constitutes an effective and holistic regulatory response to the problems posed by gatekeepers , it is important to provide for a regular review of the lists of core platform services as well as of the obligations provided for in this regulation. this is particularly important to ensure that behaviour that may limit the contestability of core platform services or is unfair is identified. while it is important to conduct a review on a regular basis , given the dynamically changing nature of the digital sector , in order to ensure legal certainty as to the regulatory conditions , any reviews should be conducted within a reasonable and appropriate time-frame , at least every two years , in line with article 4. market investigations should also ensure that the commission has a solid evidentiary basis on which it can assess whether it should propose to amend this regulation in order to expand , or further detail , the lists of core platform services. they should equally ensure that the commission has a solid evidentiary basis on which it can assess whether it should propose to amend the obligations laid down in this regulation or whether it should adopt a delegated act updating such obligations.


### (72) the commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation. such actions should include the ability of the commission to appoint independent external experts , such as and auditors to assist the commission in this process , including where applicable from competent independent authorities , such as data or consumer protection authorities. ### (72) the commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation. such actions should include the ability of the commission to appoint independent external experts , such as and auditors to assist the commission in this process , including where applicable from competent independent authorities , such as data or consumer protection authorities. the commission may require gatekeepers to provide independent experts with continuous access to data and algorithms in order to enforce the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 of this regulation.


### (72) the commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation. such actions should include the ability of the commission to appoint independent external experts , such as and auditors to assist the commission in this process , including where applicable from competent independent authorities , such as data or consumer protection authorities. ### (72) the commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation. such actions should include the ability of the commission to appoint independent external experts , such as and auditors to assist the commission in this process , including where applicable from competent independent authorities , such as data or consumer protection authorities. the experts may be embedded within the gatekeeper to ensure the monitoring process.


### (72) the commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation. such actions should include the ability of the commission to appoint independent external experts , such as and auditors to assist the commission in this process , including where applicable from competent independent authorities , such as data or consumer protection authorities. ### (72) the commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation. such actions should include the ability of the commission to appoint independent external experts and auditors to assist the commission in this process , from competent independent authorities , such as data or consumer protection authorities. the experts could be embedded within the gatekeeper to ensure the monitoring process.