### (6) in this respect , the centre should be tasked with providing epidemiological information and its analysis , epidemiological modelling , anticipation and forecasting , relevant risk assessments and recommendations , which set out options for prevention and control of communicable diseases. its actions should be consistent with a one-health approach , recognising the interconnections between human and animal health and the environment. it should monitor the capacity of the national health systems to respond to communicable disease threats , in particular given the importance of this information in the preparation of the national preparedness and response plans. the centre should support the implementation of actions funded by the relevant union funding programmes and instruments and related to communicable diseases , provide guidelines for treatment and case management based on a thorough assessment of the latest evidence , support epidemic and outbreak responses in member states and third countries , including field response , and provide timely objective , reliable and easily accessible information on communicable diseases to the public. the centre should also establish clear procedures for cooperation with the public health actors in third countries , as well as international organisations competent in the field of public health hence contributing to eu’s commitment to reinforcing partners’ preparedness and response capacity. ### (6) in this respect , the centre should be tasked with providing epidemiological information and its analysis , epidemiological modelling , anticipation and forecasting , relevant risk assessments and recommendations , which set out options for prevention and control of communicable diseases. its actions should be consistent with a one-health policy framework , recognising the interconnections between climate change and the spread of zoonotic diseases. communication mechanisms and frameworks should therefore be established during non-emergency periods , and always with a focus on the one health approach. it should monitor the capacity of the national health systems to respond to communicable disease threats , in particular given the importance of this information in the preparation of the national preparedness and response plans. the centre should support the implementation of actions funded by the relevant union funding programmes and instruments and related to communicable diseases , provide guidelines for treatment and case management based on a thorough assessment of the latest evidence , support epidemic and outbreak responses in member states and third countries , including field response , and provide timely objective , reliable and easily accessible information on communicable diseases to the public. the centre should also establish clear procedures for cooperation with the public health actors in third countries , as well as international organisations competent in the field of public health hence contributing to eu’s commitment to reinforcing partners’ preparedness and response capacity.


### adoption of guidance for the member states for the prevention and control of a serious cross-border threat to health. ### adoption of common guidelines for the member states for the prevention , treatment and control of a serious cross-border threat to health.


### 2. members of the advisory forum shall not be members of the management board. members’ term of office shall be three years and can be extended.; ### 2. members of the advisory forum shall not be members of the management board. members’ term of office shall be four years and can be extended.;


### 2. regrets the shortcomings of the international tax system , which is unfit for properly addressing the challenges of globalisation and digitalisation; calls for an international agreement aiming for a fair and effective tax system; ### 2. regrets the shortcomings of the international tax system , which is unfit for properly addressing the challenges of globalisation and digitalisation; welcomes recognition of the value of taxing multinational corporations on the basis of their global consolidated profits , with taxing rights being allocated between governments based on an agreed formula; recalls that the commission proposal on a common consolidated corporate tax base (ccctb) (com(2016)0683) aims to introduce such a system within the eu; deplores the fact that the member states were not able to agree on a joint approach regarding the c(c)ctb; calls for an international agreement aiming for a fair and effective tax system;


### — having regard to the commission proposals pending for adoption , in particular on the common corporate tax base (cctb) , the common consolidated corporate tax base (ccctb)4 , and the digital taxation package5 , as well as parliament’s positions on these proposals , ### — having regard to the commission proposals pending for adoption , in particular on the common corporate tax base (cctb) , the common consolidated corporate tax base (ccctb)4 , the digital taxation package5 , and public country-by-country reporting (cbcr) 5a , as well as parliament’s positions on these proposals , 5b


### c. whereas the beps action plan succeeded in establishing a global consensus on many issues in order to fight tax evasion , aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance; whereas , however , there was no agreement on addressing the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy , which led to the adoption of the separate beps action 1 – 2015 final report; ### c. whereas the beps action plan succeeded in establishing a consensus on many issues in order to fight tax evasion , aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance; whereas , however , there was no agreement on addressing the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy , which led to the adoption of the separate beps action 1 – 2015 final report;


### e. whereas the commission put forward two proposals on the taxation of the digital economy in 2018 , including a short-term solution introducing a digital services tax (dst) , and a long-term solution defining a significant digital presence (sdp) as a nexus for corporate taxation which should replace the dst; whereas parliament supported these proposals , but they were not adopted in the council because member states could not reach the unanimous agreement needed in the realm of taxation at eu level; ### e. whereas the commission put forward two proposals on the taxation of the digital economy in 2018 , including a short-term solution introducing a digital services tax (dst) , and a long-term solution defining a significant digital presence (sdp) as a nexus for corporate taxation which should replace the dst; whereas parliament supported these proposals , but they were not adopted in the council because member states could not reach the unanimous agreement needed in the realm of taxation at eu level; whereas the commission put forward a proposal of 25 october 2016 for a council directive on a common consolidated corporate tax base (ccctb) (com(2016)0683); whereas the commission put forward a proposal for a directive of the european parliament and of the council amending directive 2013/34/eu as regards disclosure of income tax information by certain undertakings and branches (2016/0107(cod));


### f. whereas , in accordance with a mandate given by g20 finance ministers in march 2017 and following the adoption of a programme of work (pow) in may 2019 , the oecd/g20 inclusive framework on beps (if) , through its task force on the digital economy , has been working on a consensus-based global solution based on two pillars: pillar one on the allocation of taxing rights through new profit allocation and nexus rules and pillar two on addressing the remaining beps issues and introducing measures to ensure a minimum level of tax; ### f. whereas , in accordance with a mandate given by g20 finance ministers in march 2017 and following the adoption of a programme of work (pow) in may 2019 , the oecd/g20 inclusive framework on beps (if) , through its task force on the digital economy , has been working on a global solution based on two pillars: pillar one on the allocation of taxing rights through new profit allocation and nexus rules and pillar two on addressing the remaining beps issues and introducing measures to ensure a minimum level of tax;


### 1. welcomes the annual sustainable growth strategy 2021 assessments , the strategy’s enhanced focus on social and environmental dimensions and its emphasis on the importance of combining crisis management with the transformative aspirations of the green deal and the digital transition; underlines that the covid-19 crisis is having an impact on the notion of reforms , recovery and resilience and highlights the portuguese presidency’s emphasis on the european social model as a valuable contribution in this regard; ### 1. takes note of the annual sustainable growth strategy 2021 assessments , the strategy’s enhanced focus on social and environmental dimensions and its emphasis on the importance of combining crisis management with the transformative aspirations of the green deal and the digital transition; expresses its deep concern about the deep recession caused by the covid-19 crisis , the substantial rise of unemployment , the big loss of peoples’ income , the millions of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion , the sharp increase in cases of domestic and gender-based violence , and the increasing disparities among member states and their regions; underlines that the covid-19 crisis has radically changed the notion of reforms , recovery and resilience and highlights the portuguese presidency’s emphasis on the european social model as a valuable contribution in this regard;


### 1. welcomes the fact that the annual sustainable growth strategy 2021 confirms the refocusing of the european semester (semester) process to place sustainability , health and the wellbeing of citizens at the centre of economic and social policies; ### 1. welcomes the fact that the annual sustainable growth strategy 2021 confirms the refocusing of the european semester (semester) process to place sustainability , health and the wellbeing of citizens at the centre of economic and social policies , within the planetary boundaries; stresses that environmental sustainability and social fairness are key components of the overarching objective of ‘competitive sustainability’ pursued under the semester;


### 2. considers that the agreements on the multiannual financial framework , next generation eu , the own resources (or) decision , the recovery and resilience facility (rrf) and the rule of law (rol) regulation constitute a viable baseline for innovative policies and is convinced that the common issuance of bonds at eu level is a sea change in eu public finances which adds value by mutualising the outstanding credit rating of the eu budget based on its or system; ### 2. considers that the agreements on the multiannual financial framework (mff) , next generation eu (ngeu) , the own resources (or) decision , the recovery and resilience facility (rrf) and the rule of law (rol) regulation constitute a viable baseline for innovative , sustainable and socially just policies , reforms and investments and is convinced that the common issuance of bonds at eu level is a fundamental change in eu public finances which adds value by mutualising the outstanding credit rating of the eu budget based on its or system; regrets , however , the limited size of the eu budget and the significant cuts in the fields of cohesion and social policies , especially in the financial envelopes of the cohesion fund and the european social fund; stresses the need to take full advantage of all possibilities and synergies under the mff and the ngeu;


### 2. stresses that the alignment of the semester process with the eu’s long-term climate and environmental objectives must be accelerated , as per the commission’s engagements under the green deal; underlines that the coordination of the member states’ macroeconomic policies is , among others , an essential tool to achieve the green deal; ### 2. stresses that the alignment of the semester process with the eu’s long-term climate and environmental objectives must be accelerated through a substantial reform of the process , as per the commission’s engagements under the european green deal and the paris agreement; underlines that the coordination of the member states’ macroeconomic policies is , among others , an essential tool to achieve the european green deal; highlights the potential of the semester process as a tool to measure progress towards the achievement of the objectives of the european green deal and the union commitments under the paris agreement; calls in this regard the commission to assess options of appropriate metrics and indicators to integrate in the semester;


### 4. recalls that the social impacts of the redundancies are expected to be important for workers in the basque region , where the number of unemployed persons increased by 25 % between march and august 202011 , and where long-term unemployment represented 55 ,6 % of total unemployment in may 2021 (3 ,6 p.p. higher than in january 2021) and unemployed persons with basic education or less represented 60 ,8 %; ### 4. recalls that the social impacts of the redundancies are expected to be important for workers in the basque region , where the number of unemployed persons increased by 25 % between march and august 202011 , and where long-term unemployment represented 55 ,6 % of total unemployment in may 2021 (3 ,6 p.p. higher than in january 2021) and unemployed persons with basic education or less represented 60 ,8 %; recalls also that the wage gap between men and women is 22.6% and the temporary employment rate is 25.8% in the basque region , 11.6 points above the union average , which is 14.2%;


### 9. welcomes that the co-ordinated package of personalised services was drawn up by spain in consultation with the social partners12 ; the involvement of social partners was ensured by their representation in lanbide's governance board , which is made up of representatives of the regional government , trade unions and employer organisations; ### 9. welcomes that the co-ordinated package of personalised services was drawn up by spain in consultation with the social partners12 ; the involvement of certain social partners was ensured by their representation in lanbide's governance board , which is made up of representatives of the regional government , trade unions and employer organisations; considers that the biggest trade unions and the cooperative ventures of the basque region should have also been consulted , as they are essential social partners in the context of the social dialogue;


### (6) the gross reductions in annual gni-based contributions granted to denmark , germany , austria , the netherlands and sweden under article 2(4) of decision (eu , euratom) 20../….+ should be taken into account for the entry of the gni-based own resource in the accounts pursuant to the third subparagraph of article 6(3) of regulation (eu , euratom) no 609/2014 and for the making available of that own resource pursuant to article 10a of that regulation. ### deleted


### 2. the third subparagraph of article 6(3) and article 10a of regulation (eu , euratom) no 609/2014 shall apply to the gross reductions in annual gni-based contributions granted to denmark , germany , austria , the netherlands and sweden under article 2(4) of decision (eu , euratom) 20../….+. ### deleted


### 2. notes that as part of the eu coordinated package responding to the covid-19 pandemic , the scope of the eusf was extended by a modifying regulation adopted on 1 april 2020; appreciates that public health crises are now within the scope of the eusf , allowing for its mobilisation , if needed , to support the hardest hit member states and accession countries; welcomes the increase of the rate of advance payments to affected countries from 10 % of the anticipated aid amount (limited to a maximum amount of eur 30 million) to 25 % (limited to a maximum eur 100 million) in the course of this revision; encourages the member states to make use of this possibility; ### 2. notes that as part of the eu coordinated package responding to the covid-19 pandemic , the scope of the eusf was extended by a modifying regulation adopted on 1 april 2020; welcomes that public health crises are now within the scope of the eusf , allowing for its mobilisation , if needed , to support the hardest hit member states and accession countries; welcomes the increase of the rate of advance payments to affected countries from 10 % of the anticipated aid amount (limited to a maximum amount of eur 30 million) to 25 % (limited to a maximum eur 100 million) in the course of this revision; encourages the member states to make use of this possibility;


### 6. notes with regret that the quality of applications for funding varies and that this can prolong the mobilisation process; notes that the estimation of damage is often the most difficult component in this regard , due to challenges in data collection , overlap and duplication , and development of aggregated data in line with the commission’s requirements; calls on the commission to formulate requirements that are as simple and straightforward as possible , while still maintaining the necessary level of detail; calls on the commission to develop a common tool or system to strengthen the beneficiaries’ capacity to use standardised approaches for disaster loss data quantification and loss data collection systems; ### 6. notes with regret that the quality of applications for funding varies and that this can prolong the mobilisation process; notes that the estimation of damage is often the most difficult component in this regard , due to challenges in data collection , overlap and duplication , and development of aggregated data in line with the commission’s requirements; calls on the commission to formulate requirements that are as simple and straightforward as possible , while still maintaining the necessary level of detail; calls on the commission to develop a common tool or system to strengthen the beneficiaries’ capacity to use standardised approaches for disaster loss data quantification and loss data collection systems , in doing so reducing the administrative burden and simplifying as much as possible the application procedure;


### (4) as europe faces increasing threats from organised crime groups and terrorist attacks , an effective law enforcement response must include the availability of well-trained interoperable special intervention units specialised in the control of crisis situations. in the union , the law enforcement units of the member state cooperate on the basis of council decision 2008/617.53 europol should be able to provide support to these special intervention units , including by providing operational , technical and financial support. ### deleted


### (5) in recent years large scale cyber attacks targeted public and private entities alike across many jurisdictions in the union and beyond , affecting various sectors including transport , health and financial services. cybercrime and cybersecurity cannot be separated in an interconnected environment. the prevention , investigation and prosecution of such activities is supported by coordination and cooperation between relevant actors , including the european union agency for cybersecurity (‘enisa’) , competent authorities for the security of network and information systems (‘nis authorities’) as defined by directive (eu) 2016/114854 , law enforcement authorities and private parties. in order to ensure the effective cooperation between all relevant actors at union and national level on cyber attacks and security threats , europol should cooperate with the enisa through the exchange of information and by providing analytical support. ### (5) in recent years large scale cyber attacks targeted public and private entities alike across many jurisdictions in the union and beyond , affecting various sectors including transport , health and financial services. the prevention , investigation and prosecution of such activities is supported by coordination and cooperation between relevant actors , including the european union agency for cybersecurity (‘enisa’) , competent authorities for the security of network and information systems (‘nis authorities’) as defined by directive (eu) 2016/114854 , law enforcement authorities and private parties. in order to ensure the effective cooperation between all relevant actors at union and national level on cyber attacks and security threats , europol should cooperate with the enisa through the exchange of information and by providing analytical support.


### (14) one of europol’s objectives is to support and strengthen action by the competent authorities of the member states and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combatting forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a union policy. to strengthen that support , europol should be able to request the competent authorities of a member state to initiate , conduct or coordinate a criminal investigation of a crime , which affects a common interest covered by a union policy , even where the crime concerned is not of a cross-border nature. europol should inform eurojust of such requests. ### deleted


### (17) data collected in criminal investigations have been increasing in size and have become more complex. member states submit large and complex datasets to europol , requesting europol’s operational analysis to detect links to other crimes and criminals in other member states and outside the union. member states cannot detect such cross-border links through their own analysis of the data. europol should be able to support member states’ criminal investigations by processing large and complex datasets to detect such cross-border links where the strict requirements set out in this regulation are fulfilled. where necessary to support effectively a specific criminal investigation in a member state , europol should be able to process those data sets that national authorities have acquired in the context of that criminal investigation in accordance with procedural requirements and safeguards applicable under their national criminal law and subsequently submitted to europol. where a member state provides europol with an investigative case file requesting europol’s support for a specific criminal investigation , europol should be able to process all data contained in that file for as long as it supports that specific criminal investigation. europol should also be able to process personal data that is necessary for its support to a specific criminal investigation in a member state if that data originates from a third country , provided that the third country is subject to a commission decision finding that the country ensures an adequate level of data protection (‘adequacy decision’) , or , in the absence of an adequacy decision , an international agreement concluded by the union pursuant to article 218 tfeu , or a cooperation agreement allowing for the exchange of personal data concluded between europol and the third country prior to the entry into force of regulation (eu) 2016/794 , and provided that the third county acquired the data in the context of a criminal investigation in accordance with procedural requirements and safeguards applicable under its national criminal law. ### (17) member states submit large and complex datasets to europol , requesting europol’s operational analysis to detect links to other crimes and criminals in other member states and outside the union. in light of the edps’s admonishment of europol in regard to its processing of such datasets , europol should cease all such processing.


### (27) given the borderless nature of the internet , these services can often be provided from anywhere in the world. as a result , victims , perpetrators , and the digital infrastructure in which the personal data is stored and the service provider providing the service may all be subject to different national jurisdictions , within the union and beyond. private parties may therefore hold data sets relevant for law enforcement which contain personal data with links to multiple jurisdictions as well as personal data which cannot easily be attributed to any specific jurisdiction. national authorities find it difficult to effectively analyse such multi-jurisdictional or non-attributable data sets through national solutions. when private parties decide to lawfully and voluntarily share the data with law enforcement authorities , they do currently not have a single point of contact with which they can share such data sets at union-level. moreover , private parties face difficulties when receiving multiple requests from law enforcement authorities of different countries. ### (27) given the borderless nature of the internet , victims , perpetrators , and the digital infrastructure in which the personal data is stored and the service provider providing the service may all be subject to different national jurisdictions , within the union and beyond. private parties may therefore hold data sets relevant for law enforcement which contain personal data with links to multiple jurisdictions as well as personal data which cannot easily be attributed to any specific jurisdiction. national authorities find it difficult to effectively analyse such multi-jurisdictional or non-attributable data sets through national solutions.


### (39) europol should inform the european data protection supervisor prior to the launch of its research and innovation projects that involve the processing of personal data. for each project , europol should carry out , prior to the processing , an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data and all other fundamental rights , including of any bias in the outcome. this should include an assessment of the appropriateness of the personal data to be processed for the specific purpose of the project. such an assessment would facilitate the supervisory role of the european data protection supervisor , including the exercise of its corrective powers under this regulation which might also lead to a ban on processing. the development of new tools by europol should be without prejudice to the legal basis , including grounds for processing the personal data concerned , that would subsequently be required for their deployment at union or national level. ### (39) europol should inform the european data protection supervisor prior to the launch of projects that involve the processing of personal data. for each project , europol should carry out , prior to the processing , an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data and all other fundamental rights , including of any bias in the outcome. this should include an assessment of the appropriateness of the personal data to be processed for the specific purpose of the project. such an assessment would facilitate the supervisory role of the european data protection supervisor , including the exercise of its corrective powers under this regulation which might also lead to a ban on processing.


### (40) providing europol with additional tools and capabilities requires reinforcing the democratic oversight and accountability of europol. joint parliamentary scrutiny constitutes an important element of political monitoring of europol's activities. to enable effective political monitoring of the way europol applies additional tools and capabilities , europol should provide the joint parliamentary scrutiny group with annual information on the use of these tools and capabilities and the result thereof. ### (40) providing europol with additional tools and capabilities requires reinforcing the democratic oversight and accountability of europol. joint parliamentary scrutiny constitutes an important element of political monitoring of europol's activities. to enable effective political monitoring of the way europol applies additional tools and capabilities , europol should provide the joint parliamentary scrutiny group with annual information on the use of these tools and capabilities and the result thereof. the jpsg should also be furnished with all documentation provided to the management board as part of its functions. the jpsg should be empowered to conduct on-site visits and to convene emergency hearings with the executive director and/or any other representatives of europol in circumstances where it is concerned that fundamental rights may have been breached by europol activities or operations , and should be empowered to request that the management board order the suspension of a project or activity , as well empowered to request that the management board propose to the council the dismissal of the executive director.


### (41) europol’s services provide added value to member states and third countries. this includes member states that do not take part in measures pursuant to title v of part three of the treaty on the functioning of the european union. member states and third countries may contribute to europol’s budget based on separate agreements. europol should therefore be able to receive contributions from member states and third countries on the basis of financial agreements within the scope of its objectives and tasks. ### (41) europol’s services provide added value to member states and third countries. this includes member states that do not take part in measures pursuant to title v of part three of the treaty on the functioning of the european union. member states may contribute to europol’s budget based on separate agreements. europol should therefore be able to receive contributions from member states on the basis of financial agreements within the scope of its objectives and tasks.


### 4a. europol shall assist the commission in identifying key research themes , drawing up and implementing the union framework programmes for research and innovation activities that are relevant to achieve the objectives set out in article 3. when europol assists the commission in identifying key research themes , drawing up and implementing a union framework programme , the agency shall not receive funding from that programme. ### 4a. europol shall assist the commission in identifying whether security research and innovation projects carried out under the union framework programmes for research and innovation activities that are relevant to the objectives set out in article 3 are effective in reducing crime and making europe safer and more secure.


### 4b. europol shall support the screening of specific cases of foreign direct investments into the union under regulation (eu) 2019/452 of the european parliament and of the council* that concern undertakings providing technologies used or being developed by europol or by member states for the prevention and investigation of crimes covered by article 3 on the expected implications for security. ### deleted


### 6b. europol’s infrastructure may be used for exchanges between the competent authorities of member states and private parties in accordance with the respective member states’ national laws. in cases where member states use this infrastructure for exchanges of personal data on crimes falling outside the scope of the objectives of europol , europol shall not have access to that data. ### deleted


### 4. europol may benefit from union funding in the form of contribution agreements or grant agreements in accordance with its financial rules referred to in article 61 and with the provisions of the relevant instruments supporting the policies of the union. contributions may be received from countries with whom europol or the union has an agreement providing for financial contributions to europol within the scope of europol’s objectives and tasks. the amount of the contribution shall be determined in the respective agreement.; ### 4. europol may benefit from union funding in the form of contribution agreements or grant agreements in accordance with its financial rules referred to in article 61 and with the provisions of the relevant instruments supporting the policies of the union. contributions may be received from countries with whom europol or the union has an agreement providing for financial contributions to europol within the scope of europol’s tasks. the amount of the contribution shall be determined in the respective agreement.


### 4. europol may benefit from union funding in the form of contribution agreements or grant agreements in accordance with its financial rules referred to in article 61 and with the provisions of the relevant instruments supporting the policies of the union. contributions may be received from countries with whom europol or the union has an agreement providing for financial contributions to europol within the scope of europol’s objectives and tasks. the amount of the contribution shall be determined in the respective agreement.; ### 4. europol may benefit from union funding in the form of contribution agreements or grant agreements in accordance with its financial rules referred to in article 61 and with the provisions of the relevant instruments supporting the policies of the union.;


### 2. europol may award grants related to the fulfilment of its objectives and tasks as referred to in articles 3 and 4.”; ### 2. europol may award grants related to the fulfilment of its objectives as referred to in article 3.”;


### 3. europol may award grants without a call for proposals to member states for performance of activities falling within europol’s objectives and tasks.; ### 3. europol may award grants without a call for proposals to member states for performance of activities falling within europol’s tasks.;


### paragraphs 2 and 3 are replaced by the following: ### deleted


### the following paragraph 3a is inserted: ### deleted


### 3a. where duly justified for operational purposes , financial support may cover the full investment costs of equipment , infrastructure or other assets.; ### 3a. financial support may not cover the full investment costs of equipment , infrastructure or other assets.;


### (3) these threats spread across borders , cutting across a variety of crimes that they facilitate , and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. as action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , member states’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that europol offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. since regulation (eu) 2016/794 became applicable , the operational importance of europol’s tasks has changed substantially. the new threat environment also changes the support member states need and expect from europol to keep citizens safe. ### (3) these threats spread across borders , cutting across a variety of crimes that they facilitate , and manifest themselves inpoly-criminal organised crime groups that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. member states’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that europol offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. since regulation (eu) 2016/794 became applicable , europol has substantially expanded its areas of operations. regulation 2016/794 includes a requirement that it be evaluated by the european commission , by 1 may 2022. article 68 lays down that this evaluation should assess , in particular , the impact , effectiveness and efficiency of europol and of its working practices. in the absence of this evaluation , it is difficult if not impossible to assess what changes , if any , are necessary to the support member states need and expect from europol.


### (8) the schengen information system (sis) , established in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters by regulation (eu) 2018/1862 of the european parliament and of the council55 56 , is an essential tool for maintaining a high level of security within the area of freedom , security and justice. europol , as a hub for information exchange in the union , receives and holds valuable information from third countries and international organisations on persons suspected to be involved in crimes falling within the scope of europol's mandate. following consultation with the member states , europol should be able to enter data on these persons in the sis in order to make it available directly and in real-time to sis end-users. ### deleted


### (9) europol has an important role to play in support of the evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the schengen acquis as established by council regulation (eu) no 1053/2013. given the need to reinforce the union’s internal security , europol should contribute with its expertise , analysis , reports and other relevant information to the entire evaluation and monitoring process , from programming to on-site visits and the follow-up. europol should also assist in developing and updating the evaluation and monitoring tools. ### (9) europol has an important role to play in support of the evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the schengen acquis as established by council regulation (eu) no 1053/2013. europol should , therefore , upon request , contribute to the schengen evaluation mechanism with its expertise.


### (11) in order to help eu funding for security research to develop its full potential and address the needs of law enforcement , europol should assist the commission in identifying key research themes , drawing up and implementing the union framework programmes for research and innovation that are relevant to europol’s objectives. when europol assists the commission in identifying key research themes , drawing up and implementing a union framework programme , it should not receive funding from that programme in accordance with the conflict of interest principle. ### (11) the eu spends hundreds of millions of euro on security research through various programmes. europol should assist the commission in identifying whether such security research spending is effective in reducing crime and in creating a safer europe , and whether it therefore represents value for money.


### (12) it is possible for the union and the members states to adopt restrictive measures relating to foreign direct investment on the grounds of security or public order. to that end , regulation (eu) 2019/452 of the european parliament and of the council57 establishes a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the union that provides member states and the commission with the means to address risks to security or public order in a comprehensive manner. as part of the assessment of expected implications for security or public order , europol should support the screening of specific cases of foreign direct investments into the union that concern undertakings providing technologies used or being developed by europol or by member states for the prevention and investigation of crimes. ### deleted


### (15) publishing the identity and certain personal data of suspects or convicted individuals , who are wanted based on a member state’s judicial decision , increases the chances of locating and arresting such individuals. to support member states in this task , europol should be able to publish on its website information on europe’s most wanted fugitives for criminal offences in respect of which europol is competent , and facilitate the provision of information by the public on these individuals. ### (15) publishing the identity and certain personal data of suspects or convicted individuals , who are wanted based on a member state’s judicial decision , increases the chances of locating and arresting such individuals. to support member states in this task , europol should be able to publish on its website information on europe’s most wanted fugitives for criminal offences in respect of which europol is competent.


### (16) to ensure that processing of personal data by europol is limited to the categories of data subjects whose data may be processed under this regulation , europol should be able to verify if personal data received in the context of preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of europol’s objectives corresponds to one of those categories of data subjects. to that end , europol should be able to carry out a pre-analysis of personal data received with the sole purpose of determining whether such data falls into those categories of data subjects. to this end , europol should be able to filter the data by checking it against data already held by europol. such pre-analysis should take place prior to europol’s data processing for cross-checking , strategic analysis , operational analysis or exchange of information. if the pre-analysis indicates that personal data does not fall into the categories of data subjects whose data may be processed under this regulation , europol should delete that data. ### (16) to ensure that processing of personal data by europol is limited to the categories of data subjects whose data may be processed under this regulation , europol should be able to verify if personal data received in the context of preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of europol’s objectives corresponds to one of those categories of data subjects. to that end , europol should be able to carry out a pre-analysis of personal data received with the sole purpose of determining whether such data falls into those categories of data subjects. to this end , europol should be able to filter the data by checking it against data already held by europol. such pre-analysis should take place prior to , and separate from , europol’s data processing for cross-checking , strategic analysis , operational analysis or exchange of information. if the pre-analysis indicates that personal data does not fall into the categories of data subjects whose data may be processed under this regulation , europol should delete that data.


### (18) to ensure that any data processing is necessary and proportionate , member states should ensure compliance with national and union law when they submit an investigative case file to europol. europol should verify whether , in order to support a specific criminal investigation , it is necessary and proportionate to process personal data that may not fall into the categories of data subjects whose data may generally be processed under annex ii of regulation (eu) 2016/794. europol should document that assessment. europol should store such data with functional separation from other data and should only process it where necessary for its support to the specific criminal investigation , such as in case of a new lead. ### (18) to ensure that any data processing is necessary and proportionate , member states should ensure compliance with national and union law when they submit personal data to europol , bearing in mind that the european court of human rights has ruled that the mere storing of data relating to the private life of an individual , irrespective of their subsequent use , amounts to an interference within the meaning of article 8 of the european convention on human rights , which guarantees the right to respect for private and family life , home and correspondence , and that for its part , the court of justice of the european union considers that access to personal data with a view to its retention or use affects the fundamental right to respect for private life guaranteed in article 7 of the charter of the fundamental rights of the eu. such processing of personal data also falls within the scope of article 8 of the charter because it constitutes the processing of personal data within the meaning of that article and , accordingly , must necessarily satisfy the data protection requirements laid down in that article. moreover , both courts consider that access to personal data by a public authority constitutes a further interference. as a consequence , access , retention and further use of personal data by public authorities , such as law enforcement authorities must not exceed the limits of what is strictly necessary , assessed in the light of the charter , in order to be justified within a democratic society. in addition , europol should , in order to support a specific criminal investigation , only process personal data that fall into the categories of data subjects whose data may generally be processed under annex ii of regulation (eu) 2016/794.


### (19) to ensure that a member state can use europol’s analytical reports as part of judicial proceedings following a criminal investigation , europol should be able to store the related investigative case file upon request of that member state for the purpose of ensuring the veracity , reliability and traceability of the criminal intelligence process. europol should store such data separately and only for as long as the judicial proceedings related to that criminal investigation are on-going in the member state. there is a need to ensure access of competent judicial authorities as well as the rights of defence , in particular the right of suspects or accused persons or their lawyers of access to the materials of the case. ### (19) to ensure that a member state can use europol’s analytical reports as part of judicial proceedings following a criminal investigation , europol should be able to store the data underlying such analytical reports upon request of that member state for the purpose of ensuring the veracity , reliability and traceability of the criminal intelligence process. europol should store such data separately and only for as long as the judicial proceedings related to that criminal investigation are on-going in the member state. there is a need to ensure access of competent judicial authorities as well as the rights of defence , in particular the right of suspects or accused persons or their lawyers of access to the materials of the case , and to ensure that the ‘chain of custody’ of evidence at europol is respected and all evidence and the methods by which it has been produced and/or come into europol's possession logged , allowing for effective scrutiny of evidence by the defence.


### (24) serious crime and terrorism often have links beyond the territory of the union. europol can exchange personal data with third countries while safeguarding the protection of privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjects. to reinforce cooperation with third countries in preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of europol’s objectives , the executive director of europol should be allowed to authorise categories of transfers of personal data to third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis , where such a group of transfers related to a specific situation are necessary and meet all the requirements of this regulation. ### (24) serious crime and terrorism often have links beyond the territory of the union. europol can exchange personal data with third countries while safeguarding the protection of privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjects. in circumstances where it is essential to the investigation of crimes falling within the scope of europol’s objectives , the executive director of europol should be allowed to authorise transfers of personal data to third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis , where such a transfer related to a specific situation is proportionate ,necessary and meets all the requirements of this regulation.


### (25) to support member states in cooperating with private parties providing cross-border services where those private parties hold information relevant for preventing and combatting crime , europol should be able to receive , and in specific circumstances , exchange personal data with private parties. ### (25) to support member states in cooperating with private parties providing cross-border services where those private parties hold information relevant for preventing and combatting crime , europol should be able to indirectly receive , and in specific circumstances , exchange personal data with private parties.


### (26) criminals increasingly use cross-border services of private parties to communicate and carry out illegal activities. sex offenders abuse children and share pictures and videos world-wide using online platforms on the internet. terrorists abuse cross-border services by online service providers to recruit volunteers , plan and coordinate attacks , and disseminate propaganda. cyber criminals profit from the digitalisation of our societies using phishing and social engineering to commit other types of cybercrime such as online scams , ransomware attacks or payment fraud. as a result from the increased use of online services by criminals , private parties hold increasing amounts of personal data that may be relevant for criminal investigations. ### (26) criminals increasingly use cross-border services of private parties to communicate and carry out illegal activities. sex offenders exploit children and share pictures and videos world-wide using online platforms on the internet. terrorists utilise cross-border services by online service providers to recruit volunteers , plan and coordinate attacks , and disseminate propaganda. cyber criminals profit from the digitalisation of our societies using phishing and social engineering to commit other types of cybercrime such as online scams , ransomware attacks or payment fraud. as a result from the increased use of online services , private parties hold increasing amounts of personal data that may be relevant for criminal investigations.


### (28) to ensure that private parties have a point of contact at union level to lawfully share multi-jurisdictional data sets or data sets that could not be easily attributed so far to one or several specific jurisdictions , europol should be able to receive personal data directly from private parties. ### deleted


### (29) to ensure that member states receive quickly the relevant information necessary to initiate investigations to prevent and combat serious crime and terrorism , europol should be able to process and analyse such data sets in order to identify the relevant member states and forward to the national law enforcement authorities concerned the information and analysis necessary to investigate these crimes under their respective jurisdictions. ### (29) to ensure that member states receive quickly the relevant information necessary to initiate investigations to prevent and combat serious crime and terrorism , europol should be able to process and analyse such data sets , which have been transmitted to europol by member states , in order to identify the relevant member states and forward to the national law enforcement authorities concerned the information and analysis necessary to investigate these crimes under their respective jurisdictions.


### (30) to ensure that it can identify all relevant national law enforcement authorities concerned , europol should be able to inform private parties when the information received from them is insufficient to enable europol to identify the law enforcement authorities concerned. this would enable private parties which have shared information with europol to decide whether it is in their interest to share additional information with europol and whether they can lawfully do so. to this end , europol can inform private parties of missing information , as far as this is strictly necessary for the identification of the relevant law enforcement authorities. special safeguards should apply to such transfers in particular when the private party concerned is not established within the union or in a third country with which europol has a cooperation agreement allowing for the exchange of personal data , or with which the union has concluded an international agreement pursuant to article 218 tfeu providing for appropriate safeguards , or which is the subject of an adequacy decision by the commission , finding that the third country in question ensures an adequate level of data protection. ### (30) to ensure that it can identify all relevant national law enforcement authorities concerned , europol should be able to inform private parties when the information received from them is insufficient to enable europol to identify the law enforcement authorities concerned. to this end , on a case-by-case basis , europol can inform private parties of missing information , as far as this is strictly necessary for the identification of the relevant law enforcement authorities. special safeguards should apply to such transfers in particular when the private party concerned is not established within the union or in a third country with which europol has a cooperation agreement allowing for the exchange of personal data , or with which the union has concluded an international agreement pursuant to article 218 tfeu providing for appropriate safeguards , or which is the subject of an adequacy decision by the commission , finding that the third country in question ensures an adequate level of data protection.


### (31) member states , third countries , international organisation , including the international criminal police organisation (interpol) , or private parties may share multi-jurisdictional data sets or data sets that cannot be attributed to one or several specific jurisdictions with europol , where those data sets contain links to personal data held by private parties. where it is necessary to obtain additional information from such private parties to identify all relevant member states concerned , europol should be able to ask member states , via their national units , to request private parties which are established or have a legal representative in their territory to share personal data with europol in accordance with those member states’ applicable laws. in many cases , these member states may not be able to establish a link to their jurisdiction other than the fact that the private party holding the relevant data is established under their jurisdiction. irrespective of their jurisdiction with regard the specific criminal activity subject to the request , member states should therefore ensure that their competent national authorities can obtain personal data from private parties for the purpose of supplying europol with the information necessary for it to fulfil its objectives , in full compliance with procedural guarantees under their national laws. ### (31) member states , third countries , or international organisation , including the international criminal police organisation (interpol) , may share multi-jurisdictional data sets or data sets that cannot be attributed to one or several specific jurisdictions with europol , where those data sets contain links to personal data held by private parties. where it is necessary to obtain additional information from such private parties to identify all relevant member states concerned , europol should be able to ask member states , via their national units , to request private parties which are established or have a legal representative in their territory to share personal data with europol in accordance with those member states’ applicable laws. in many cases , these member states may not be able to establish a link to their jurisdiction other than the fact that the private party holding the relevant data is established under their jurisdiction. irrespective of their jurisdiction with regard the specific criminal activity subject to the request , member states should therefore ensure that their competent national authorities can obtain personal data from private parties for the purpose of supplying europol with the information necessary for it to fulfil its objectives , in full compliance with procedural guarantees under their national laws.


### (32) to ensure that europol does not keep the data longer than necessary to identify the member states concerned , time limits for the storage of personal data by europol should apply. once europol has exhausted all means at its disposal to identify all member states concerned , and cannot reasonably expect to identify further member states concerned , the storage of this personal data is no longer necessary and proportionate for identifying the member states concerned. europol should erase the personal data within four months after the last transmission has taken place , unless a national unit , contact point or authority concerned resubmits the personal data as their data to europol within this period. if the resubmitted personal data has been part of a larger set of personal data , europol should only keep the personal data if and in so far as it has been resubmitted by a national unit , contact point or authority concerned. ### (32) to ensure that europol does not keep the data longer than necessary to identify the member states concerned , time limits for the storage of personal data by europol should apply. once europol has exhausted all means at its disposal to identify all member states concerned , and cannot reasonably expect to identify further member states concerned , the storage of this personal data is no longer necessary and proportionate for identifying the member states concerned. europol should erase the personal data immediately after the last transmission has taken place , unless a national unit , contact point or authority concerned resubmits , on duly justified grounds , in compliance with national and union law , the personal data as their data to europol within this period. if the resubmitted personal data has been part of a larger set of personal data , europol should only keep the personal data if and in so far as it has been resubmitted by a national unit , contact point or authority concerned.


### (34) europol should be able to provide the necessary support for national law enforcement authorities to interact with private parties , in particular by providing the necessary infrastructure for such interaction , for example , when national authorities refer terrorist content online to online service providers or exchange information with private parties in the context of cyber attacks. where member states use the europol infrastructure for exchanges of personal data on crimes falling outside the scope of the objectives of europol , europol should not have access to that data. ### deleted


### (35) terrorist attacks trigger the large scale dissemination of terrorist content via online platforms depicting harm to life or physical integrity , or calling for imminent harm to life or physical integrity. to ensure that member states can effectively prevent the dissemination of such content in the context of such crisis situations stemming from ongoing or recent real-world events , europol should be able to exchange personal data with private parties , including hashes , ip addresses or urls related to such content , necessary in order to support member states in preventing the dissemination of such content , in particular where this content aims at or has the effect of seriously intimidating a population , and where there is an anticipated potential for exponential multiplication and virality across multiple online service providers. ### deleted


### (37) given the challenges that the use of new technologies by criminals pose to the union’s security , law enforcement authorities are required to strengthen their technological capacities. to that end , europol should support member states in the use of emerging technologies in preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of europol’s objectives. to explore new approaches and develop common technological solutions for member states to prevent and counter crimes falling within the scope of europol’s objectives , europol should be able to conduct research and innovation activities regarding matters covered by this regulation , including with the processing of personal data where necessary and whilst ensuring full respect for fundamental rights. the provisions on the development of new tools by europol should not constitute a legal basis for their deployment at union or national level. ### (37) given the challenges that the use of new technologies by criminals pose to the union’s security , law enforcement authorities are required to strengthen their technological capacities. to that end , europol should support member states in the use of emerging technologies in preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of europol’s objectives.


### (38) europol should play a key role in assisting member states to develop new technological solutions based on artificial intelligence , which would benefit national law enforcement authorities throughout the union. europol should play a key role in promoting ethical , trustworthy and human centric artificial intelligence subject to robust safeguards in terms of security , safety and fundamental rights. ### deleted


### the following point (q) is added: ### deleted


### point (h) is replaced by the following: ### deleted


### support member states’ actions in preventing and combating forms of crime listed in annex i which are facilitated , promoted or committed using the internet , including , in cooperation with member states , the coordination of law enforcement authorities’ response to cyberattacks , the taking down of terrorist content online , and the making of referrals of internet content , by which such forms of crime are facilitated , promoted or committed , to the online service providers concerned for their voluntary consideration of the compatibility of the referred internet content with their own terms and conditions;; ### support member states’ actions in preventing and combating forms of crime listed in annex i which are facilitated , promoted or committed using the internet , including , in cooperation with member states , and the coordination of law enforcement authorities’ response to cyberattacks;;


### (iv) the following points (q) to (r) are added: ### (iv) the following point is added:


### support member states in identifying persons whose involvement in crimes falling within the scope of europol’s mandate , as listed in annex i , constitute a high risk for security , and facilitate joint , coordinated and prioritised investigations; ### deleted


### enter data into the schengen information system , in accordance with regulation (eu) 2018/1862 of the european parliament and of the council* , following consultation with the member states in accordance with article 7 of this regulation , and under authorisation by the europol executive director , on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which europol is competent and of which it is aware on the basis of information received from third countries or international organisations within the meaning of article 17(1)(b); ### deleted


### support the implementation of the evaluation and monitoring mechanism under regulation (eu) no 1053/2013 within the scope of europol’s objectives as set out in article 3; ### support , through the provision of expertise and analyses upon request , the implementation of the evaluation and monitoring mechanism under regulation (eu) no 1053/2013 within the scope of europol’s objectives as set out in article 3;


### proactively monitor and contribute to research and innovation activities relevant to achieve the objectives set out in article 3 , support related activities of member states , and implement its research and innovation activities regarding matters covered by this regulation , including the development , training , testing and validation of algorithms for the development of tools. ### proactively monitor research and innovation activities relevant to achieve the objectives set out in article 3.


### support member states’ actions in preventing the dissemination of online content related to terrorism or violent extremism in crisis situations , which stems from an ongoing or recent real-world event , depicts harm to life or physical integrity or calls for imminent harm to life or physical integrity , and aims at or has the effect of seriously intimidating a population , and where there is an anticipated potential for exponential multiplication and virality across multiple online service providers. ### deleted


### europol shall also assist in the operational implementation of those priorities , notably in the european multidisciplinary platform against criminal threats , including by facilitating and providing administrative , logistical , financial and operational support to member states-led operational and strategic activities.; ### europol shall also assist in the operational implementation of those priorities , by facilitating and providing operational support to member states-led operational and strategic activities.;


### the following paragraphs 4a and 4b are inserted: ### the following paragraph 4a is inserted:


### europol staff may assist the competent authorities of the member states , at their request and in accordance with their national law , in the taking of investigative measures. ### europol staff may assist the competent authorities of the member states , at their request and in accordance with their national law , in the taking of investigative measures that are not coercive.


### (3) in article 6 , paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: ### deleted


### point (d) is replaced by the following wording: ### deleted


### (ii) the following points (e) and (f) are added: ### (ii) the following point (f) is added:


### research and innovation regarding matters covered by this regulation for the development , training , testing and validation of algorithms for the development of tools; ### deleted


### supporting member states in informing the public about suspects or convicted individuals who are wanted based on a national judicial decision relating to a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent , and facilitate the provision of information by the public on these individuals. ### supporting member states in informing the public about suspects or convicted individuals who are wanted based on a national judicial decision relating to a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent.


### the following paragraph 3a is inserted: ### deleted


### 5. without prejudice to article 8(4) and article 18a , categories of personal data and categories of data subjects whose data may be collected and processed for each purpose referred to in paragraph 2 are listed in annex ii. ### 5. without prejudice to article 8(4) , categories of personal data and categories of data subjects whose data may be collected and processed for each purpose referred to in paragraph 2 are listed in annex ii.


### 5a. prior to the processing of data under paragraph 2 of this article , europol may temporarily process personal data received pursuant to article 17(1) and (2) for the purpose of determining whether such data comply with the requirements of paragraph 5 of this article , including by checking the data against all data that europol already processes in accordance with paragraph 5. ### 5a. prior to the processing of data under paragraph 2 of this article , europol may in exceptional cases , on objectively justified grounds , which are duly recorded , temporarily process personal data received pursuant to article 17(1) for the purpose of determining whether such data comply with the requirements of paragraph 5 of this article , where it is impossible for the provider of that data to separate relevant from non-relevant data.


### [...] ### deleted


### in paragraph 5 , the introductory phrase is replaced by the following: ### deleted


### in paragraph 8 , the following sentence is deleted: ### paragraph 8 is replaced by the following:


### 2. europol may receive personal data directly from private parties and process those personal data in accordance with article 18 in order to identify all national units concerned , as referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1. europol shall forward the personal data and any relevant results from the processing of that data necessary for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction immediately to the national units concerned. europol may forward the personal data and relevant results from the processing of that data necessary for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction in accordance with article 25 to contact points and authorities concerned as referred to in points (b) and (c) of paragraph 1. once europol has identified and forwarded the relevant personal data to all the respective national units concerned , or it is not possible to identify further national units concerned , it shall erase the data , unless a national unit , contact point or authority concerned resubmits the personal data to europol in accordance with article 19(1) within four months after the transfer takes place. ### 2. where europol receives personal data from private parties , it may process those personal data in accordance with article 18 in order to identify all national units concerned , as referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1. europol shall forward the personal data and any relevant results from the processing of that data necessary for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction immediately to the national units concerned. europol may forward the personal data and relevant results from the processing of that data necessary for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction in accordance with article 25 to contact points and authorities concerned as referred to in points (b) and (c) of paragraph 1. once europol has identified and forwarded the relevant personal data to all the respective national units concerned , or it is not possible to identify further national units concerned , it shall erase the data , unless a national unit , contact point or authority concerned resubmits the personal data to europol in accordance with article 19(1) within four months after the transfer takes place.


### 4. if europol receives personal data from a private party in a third country , europol may forward those data only to a member state , or to a third country concerned with which an agreement on the basis of article 23 of decision 2009/371/jha or on the basis of article 218 tfeu has been concluded or which is the subject of an adequacy decision as referred to in point (a) of article 25(1) of this regulation. where the conditions set out under paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 25 are fulfilled , europol may transfer the result of its analysis and verification of such data with the third country concerned. ### 4. if europol receives personal data from a private party in a third country in accordance with paragraph 1 , europol may forward those data only to a member state , or to a third country concerned with which an agreement on the basis of article 23 of decision 2009/371/jha or on the basis of article 218 tfeu has been concluded or which is the subject of an adequacy decision as referred to in point (a) of article 25(1) of this regulation. where the conditions set out under paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 25 are fulfilled , europol may transfer the result of its analysis and verification of such data with the third country concerned.


### the transmission or transfer of personal data which are publicly available is strictly necessary for the performance of the task set out in point (m) of article 4(1) and the following conditions are met: ### deleted


### 6. with regard to points (a) , (b) and (d) of paragraph 5 of this article , if the private party concerned is not established within the union or in a country with which europol has a cooperation agreement allowing for the exchange of personal data , with which the union has concluded an international agreement pursuant to article 218 tfeu or which is the subject of an adequacy decision as referred to in point (a) of article 25(1) of this regulation , the transfer shall only be authorised by the executive director if the transfer is: ### deleted


### paragraphs 9 and 10 are deleted; ### paragraphs 9 is deleted;


### 1. this regulation , article 3 and chapter ix of regulation (eu) 2018/1725 of the european parliament and of the council* shall apply to the processing of operational personal data by europol. ### 1. this regulation , article 3 , article 66 , and chapter ix of regulation (eu) 2018/1725 of the european parliament and of the council* shall apply to the processing of operational personal data by europol.


### 2. processing of personal data , by automated or other means , revealing racial or ethnic origin , political opinions , religious or philosophical beliefs or trade union membership and processing of genetic data and biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person or data concerning a person’s health or sex life or sexual orientation shall be allowed only where strictly necessary and proportionate for preventing or combating crime that falls within europol’s objectives and if those data supplement other personal data processed by europol.; ### 2. processing of personal data , by automated or other means , revealing racial or ethnic origin , political opinions , religious or philosophical beliefs or trade union membership and processing of genetic data and biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person or data concerning a person’s health or sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited unless it is strictly necessary and proportionate for preventing or combating crime that falls within europol’s objectives and if those data supplement other personal data processed by europol. the selection of a particular group of persons solely on the basis of such personal data shall be prohibited.


### (19) the following article 33a is inserted: ### deleted


### 1. in the event of a personal data breach , europol shall without undue delay notify the competent authorities of the member states concerned , of that breach , in accordance with the conditions laid down in article 7(5) , as well as the provider of the data concerned unless the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.; ### 1. without prejudice to article 92 of regulation (eu)2018/1725 , in the event of a personal data breach , europol shall without undue delay notify the competent authorities of the member states concerned , of that breach , in accordance with the conditions laid down in article 7(5) , as well as the provider of the data concerned unless the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.;


### 3. any data subject wishing to exercise the right of access referred to in article 80 of regulation (eu) 2018/1725 to personal data that relate to the data subject may make a request to that effect , without incurring excessive costs , to the authority appointed for that purpose in the member state of his or her choice , or to europol. where the request is made to the member state authority , that authority shall refer the request to europol without delay , and in any case within one month of receipt.; ### 3. any data subject wishing to exercise the right of access referred to in article 80 of regulation (eu) 2018/1725 to personal data that relate to the data subject may make a request to that effect , without cost , to the authority appointed for that purpose in the member state of his or her choice , or to europol. where the request is made to the member state authority , that authority shall refer the request to europol without delay , and in any case within one month of receipt. member states providing the data shall communicate the breach to the data subject concerned in accordance with the procedures of their national law.


### 4. the data protection officer shall be designated for a term of four years and shall be eligible for reappointment. the data protection officer may be dismissed from his or her post by the executive board only with the agreement of the edps , if he or she no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his or her duties ### 4. the data protection officer shall be designated for a term of four years and shall be eligible for reappointment. the data protection officer may be dismissed from his or her post by the management board only with the agreement of the edps , if he or she no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his or her duties


### paragraph 1 is deleted; ### paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:


### in paragraph 3 , the following points (f) to (i) are are added: ### in paragraph 3 , the following point (f) is added:


### annual information about the number of cases where it was necessary for europol to process personal data outside the categories of data subjects listed in annex ii in order to support member states in a specific criminal investigation in accordance with article 18a , including examples of such cases demonstrating why this data processing was necessary; ### deleted


### annual information about the number of cases in which europol issued alerts in the schengen information system in accordance with article 4(1)(r) , and the number of ‘hits’ these alerts generated , including specific examples of cases demonstrating why these alerts were necessary for europol to fulfil its objectives and tasks; ### deleted


### annual information about the number of pilot projects in which europol processed personal data to train , test and validate algorithms for the development of tools , including ai-based tools , for law enforcement in accordance with article 33a , including information on the purposes of these projects and the law enforcement needs they seek to address.; ### deleted


### 3. the commission shall , by [three years after entry into force of this regulation] , submit a report to the european parliament and to the council , assessing the operational benefits of the implementation of the competences provided for in article 18(2)(e) and (5a) , article 18a , article 26 and article 26a with regard to europol’s objectives. the report shall cover the impact of those competences on fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined in the charter of fundamental rights.. ### 3. the commission shall , by [three years after entry into force of this regulation] , submit a report to the european parliament and to the council , assessing the operational benefits of the implementation of the competences provided for in article 18(2)(e) and (5a) and article 26 with regard to europol’s objectives. the report shall cover the impact of those competences on fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined in the charter of fundamental rights..


### (2) article 10(3) of the treaty on european union states that every union citizen has the right to participate in the democratic life of the union. the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (the ‘charter’) provides , inter alia , for the rights to respect for private and family life (article 7) , the protection of personal data (article 8) , freedom of expression and information , which includes respect for the freedom and pluralism of the media (article 11) , and to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (article 47). ### (2) article 10(3) of the treaty on european union states that every union citizen has the right to participate in the democratic life of the union. the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (the ‘charter’) provides , inter alia , for the rights to respect for private and family life (article 7) , the protection of personal data (article 8) , freedom of expression and information , which includes respect for the freedom and pluralism of the media (article 11) , freedom of assembly and of association (article 12) , and to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (article 47).


### (3) the right to freedom of expression and information as set forth in article 11 of the charter includes the right to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. article 11 of the charter should be given the meaning and scope of the correspondent article 10 of the european convention on human rights (“echr”) on the right to freedom of expression as interpreted by the european court of human rights (“ecthr”). ### (3) the right to freedom of expression and information as set forth in article 11 of the charter includes the right to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. article 11 of the charter should be given the meaning and scope of the correspondent article 10 of the european convention on human rights (“echr”) on the right to freedom of expression as interpreted by the european court of human rights (“ecthr”). the right to freedom of expression has consistently been held to be one of the ‘essential foundations’ of a democratic society by the european court of human rights , and both the charter and the echr provide for a very wide right to express oneself freely.


### (4) the purpose of this directive is to provide protection to natural and legal persons who engage in public participation on matters of public interest , in particular journalists and human rights defenders , against court proceedings , which are initiated against them to deter them from public participation (commonly referred to as strategic lawsuits against public participation or ‘slapps’). ### (4) the purpose of this directive is to provide protection to natural and legal persons who engage in public participation on matters of public interest , in particular journalists , whistleblowers , activists , academics , researchers , artists and human rights defenders , including civil society , non-governmental organisations and trade unions against court proceedings , which are initiated against them to deter them from public participation (commonly referred to as strategic lawsuits against public participation or ‘slapps’).


### (5) journalists play an important role in facilitating public debate and in the imparting and reception of information , opinions and ideas. it is essential that they are afforded the necessary space to contribute to an open , free and fair debate and to counter disinformation , information manipulation and interference. journalists should be able to conduct their activities effectively to ensure that citizens have access to a plurality of views in european democracies. ### (5) journalists can play an important role in facilitating public debate and in the imparting and reception of information , opinions and ideas. it is essential that they are afforded the necessary space to contribute to an open , free and fair debate and to report truthfully , factually and objectively , all of which will contribute to countering disinformation , information manipulation and interference. journalists should be able to conduct their activities effectively and free of corporate , political or other pressure or influence in order to ensure that citizens have access to a plurality of views in european democracies.


### (7) human rights defenders also play an important role in european democracies , especially in upholding fundamental rights , democratic values , social inclusion , environmental protection and the rule of law. they should be able to participate actively in public life and make their voice heard on policy matters and in decision-making processes without fear of intimidation. human rights defenders refer to individuals or organisations engaged in defending fundamental rights and a variety of other rights , such as environmental and climate rights , women’s rights , lgbtiq rights , the rights of the people with a minority racial or ethnic background , labour rights or religious freedoms. other participants in public debate , such as academics and researchers , also deserve adequate protection. ### (7) human rights defenders also play an important role in european democracies , especially in upholding fundamental rights , democratic values , social inclusion , environmental protection and the rule of law. they should be able to participate actively in public life , promote accountability , and make their voice heard on policy matters and in decision-making processes without fear of intimidation. human rights defenders refer to individuals or organisations engaged in defending fundamental rights and a variety of other rights , such as environmental and climate rights , women’s rights , lgbtiq rights , the rights of the people with a minority racial or ethnic background , labour rights , trade union rights , political freedoms , freedom of speech , privacy rights , or religious freedoms. other participants in public debate , such as academics , researchers and artists , also deserve adequate protection.


### (8) a healthy and thriving democracy requires that people are able to participate actively in public debate without undue interference by public authority or other powerful actors , be they domestic or foreign. in order to secure meaningful participation , people should be able to access reliable information , which enables them to form their own opinions and exercise their own judgement in a public space in which different views can be expressed freely. ### (8) a functioning democracy requires that people are able to participate actively in public debate without undue interference by public authority or other powerful actors , be they domestic or foreign. in order to secure meaningful participation , people should be able to access reliable information , which enables them to form their own opinions and exercise their own judgement in a public space in which different views can be expressed freely.


### (9) to foster this environment , it is important to protect journalists and human rights defenders from court proceedings against public participation. such court proceedings are not initiated for the purpose of access to justice , but to silence public debate typically using harassment and intimidation. ### (9) to foster this environment , it is important to protect natural or legal persons who engage in public participation , in particular journalists , whistleblowers , activists , academics , researchers , artists and human rights defenders , including civil society , non-governmental organisations and trade unions from court proceedings against public participation. such court proceedings are not initiated for the purpose of access to justice in order to genuinely assert , vindicate or exercise a right , but to prevent , restrict or penalise public participation , ultimately seeking to silence public debate typically using harassment and intimidation.


### (10) slapps are typically initiated by powerful entities , for example individuals , lobby groups , corporations and state organs. they often involve an imbalance of power between the parties , with the claimant having a more powerful financial or political position than the defendant. although not being an indispensable component of such cases , where present , an imbalance of power significantly increases the harmful effects as well as the chilling effects of court proceedings against public participation. ### (10) slapps are typically initiated by powerful entities , for example individuals , lobby groups , corporations and state organs. they often involve an imbalance of power between the parties , with the claimant having a more powerful financial or political position than the defendant. an imbalance of power is a significant and typical component of such cases , but may be absent in some cases which fulfil the slapp criteria , if all of the other components characterising a slapp are present. cases where an imbalance of power is not present should be interpreted cautiously , in order to avoid slapp allegations being vexatiously levelled at ngos , human rights defenders , activists , journalists and others who turn to the courts to defend against defamatory comment by powerful actors. where present , an imbalance of power significantly increases the harmful effects as well as the chilling effects of court proceedings against public participation.


### (11) court proceedings against public participation may have an adverse impact on the credibility and reputation of journalists and human rights defenders and exhaust their financial and other resources. because of such proceedings , the publication of information on a matter of public interest may be delayed or altogether avoided. the length of procedures and the financial pressure may have a chilling effect on journalists and human rights defenders. the existence of such practices may therefore have a deterrent effect on their work by contributing to self-censorship in anticipation of possible future court proceedings , which leads to the impoverishment of public debate to the detriment of society as a whole. ### (11) court proceedings against public participation may have an adverse impact on the credibility and reputation of journalists , whistleblowers , activists , academics , researchers , artists and human rights defenders , including civil society , non-governmental organisations and trade unions and exhaust their financial and other resources. because of such proceedings , the publication of information on a matter of public interest may be delayed or altogether avoided. the length of procedures and the financial pressure may have a chilling effect on journalists , whistleblowers , activists , academics , researchers , artists and human rights defenders , including civil society , non-governmental organisations and trade unions. the existence of such practices may therefore have a deterrent effect on their work by contributing to self-censorship in anticipation of possible future court proceedings , which leads to the impoverishment of public debate to the detriment of society as a whole.


### (16) public participation should mean any statement or activity by a natural or legal person expressed or carried out in exercise of the right to freedom of expression and information on a matter of public interest , such as the creation , exhibition , advertisement or other promotion of journalistic , political , scientific , academic , artistic , commentary or satirical communications , publications or works , and any preparatory activities directly linked thereto. it can also include activities related to the exercise of the right to freedom of association and peaceful assembly , such as the organisation of or participation to lobbying activities , demonstrations and protests or activities resulting from the exercise of the right to good administration and the right to an effective remedy , such as the filing of complaints , petitions , administrative and judicial claims and participation in public hearings. public participation should also include preparatory , supporting or assisting activities that have a direct and inherent link to the statement or activity in question and that are targeted to stifle public participation. in addition , it can cover other activities meant to inform or influence public opinion or to further action by the public , including activities by any private or public entity in relation to an issue of public interest , such as the organisation of or participation to research , surveys , campaigns or any other collective actions. ### (16) public participation should mean any statement or activity by a natural or legal person expressed or carried out in exercise of the right to freedom of expression and information on a matter of public interest , such as the creation , exhibition , advertisement or other promotion of journalistic , political , scientific , academic , artistic , commentary or satirical communications , publications or works , and any preparatory activities directly linked thereto. it can also include activities related to the exercise of academic freedom , the right to freedom of association and peaceful assembly , such as the organisation of or participation to lobbying activities , demonstrations and protests or activities resulting from the exercise of the right to good administration and the right to an effective remedy , such as the filing of complaints , petitions , administrative and judicial claims and participation in public hearings. public participation should also include preparatory , supporting or assisting activities that have a direct and inherent link to the statement or activity in question and that are targeted to stifle public participation. in addition , it can cover other activities meant to inform or influence public opinion or to further action by the public , including activities by any private or public entity in relation to an issue of public interest , such as the organisation of or participation to research , surveys , campaigns or any other collective actions.


### (18) the notion of a matter of public interest should include also quality , safety or other relevant aspects of goods , products or services where such matters are relevant to public health , safety , the environment , climate or enjoyment of fundamental rights. a purely individual dispute between a consumer and a manufacturer or a service provider concerning a good , product or service should be covered only when the matter contains an element of public interest , for instance concerning a product or service which fails to comply with environmental or safety standards. ### (18) the notion of a matter of public interest should include also quality , safety or other relevant aspects of goods , products or services where such matters are relevant to public health , safety , the environment , climate or enjoyment of fundamental rights. a purely individual dispute between a consumer and a manufacturer or a service provider concerning a good , product or service should be covered only when the matter contains an element of public interest , for instance concerning a product or service which fails to comply with environmental or safety standards , labour rights , consumer rights or human rights , including the principle of non-discrimination.


### (20) abusive court proceedings typically involve litigation tactics used in bad faith such as delaying proceedings , causing disproportionate costs to the defendant in the proceedings or forum shopping. these tactics are used by the claimant for other purposes than gaining access to justice. such tactics are often , although not always , combined with various forms of intimidation , harassment or threats. ### (20) abusive court proceedings typically involve litigation tactics used in bad faith such as delaying proceedings , causing disproportionate costs to the defendant in the proceedings or forum shopping. these tactics are used by the claimant for other purposes than gaining access to justice in order to genuinely assert , vindicate or exercise a right. such tactics are often , although not always , combined with various forms of intimidation , harassment or threats.


### (26) to provide the defendant with an additional safeguard , there should be a possibility to grant him or her a security to cover procedural costs and/or damages , when the court considers that even if the claim is not manifestly unfounded , there are elements indicating an abuse of procedure and the prospects for success in the main proceedings are low. a security does not entail a judgement on the merits but serves as a precautionary measure ensuring the effects of a final decision finding an abuse of procedure. it should be for member states to decide whether a security should be ordered by the court on its own motion or upon request by the defendant. ### (26) when the court considers that there are elements indicating an abuse of procedure and it has been adjudicated by a judge , or where applicable , a jury , that the prospects for success in the main proceedings are low , there should be a possibility to grant the defendant a security to cover procedural costs and/or damages in order to provide him or her with an additional safeguard. a security does not entail a judgement on the merits but serves as a precautionary measure ensuring the effects of a final decision finding an abuse of procedure. it should be for member states to decide whether a security should be ordered by the court on its own motion or upon request by the defendant.


### (29) to ensure high expediency in the accelerated procedure on an application for early dismissal , member states may set time limits for the holding of hearings or for the court to take a decision. they may as well adopt schemes akin to procedures in relation to provisional measures. member states should make efforts to ensure that when the defendant has applied for other procedural safeguards , the decision is also taken in an expeditious manner. for expeditious treatment , member states could take into account , amongst others , whether the claimant has initiated multiple or concerted proceedings in similar matters and the existence of attempts to intimidate , harass or threat the defendant. ### (29) to ensure high expediency in the accelerated procedure on an application for early dismissal , member states may set time limits for the holding of hearings or for the court to take a decision. they may as well adopt schemes akin to procedures in relation to provisional measures. member states should make efforts to ensure that when the defendant has applied for other procedural safeguards , the decision is also taken in an expeditious manner. for expeditious treatment , member states could take into account , amongst others , an imbalance of power between the parties , whether the claimant has initiated multiple or concerted proceedings in similar matters and the existence of attempts to intimidate , harass or threat the defendant.


### this directive provides safeguards against manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings in civil matters with cross-border implications brought against natural and legal persons , in particular journalists and human rights defenders , on account of their engagement in public participation. ### this directive provides safeguards against manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings in civil matters with cross-border implications brought against natural and legal persons , in particular journalists , whistleblowers , activists , academics , researchers , artists and human rights defenders , including civil society , non-governmental organisations and trade unions , on account of their engagement in public participation.