### (10) the identification of a criminal is essential for a successful criminal investigation and prosecution. the automated searching of facial images of suspects and convicted criminals should provide for additional information for successfully identifying criminals and fighting crime. ### deleted


### (11) the automated search or comparison of biometric data (dna profiles , dactyloscopic data and facial images) between authorities responsible for the prevention , detection and investigation of criminal offences under this regulation should only concern data contained in databases established for the prevention , detection and investigation of criminal offences. ### (11) the automated search or comparison of biometric data (dna profiles , dactyloscopic data and facial images) between authorities responsible for the prevention , detection and investigation of criminal offences under this regulation should only concern data contained in databases established for the prevention , detection and investigation of serious criminal offences.


### (12) participation in the exchange of police records should remain voluntary. where member states decide to participate , in the spirit of reciprocity , it should not be possible for them to query other member states’ databases if they do not make their own data available for queries by other member states. ### deleted


### (13) in recent years , europol has received a large amount of biometric data of suspected and convicted terrorists and criminals from several third countries. including third country-sourced data stored at europol in the prüm framework and thus making this data available to law enforcement authorities is necessary for better prevention and investigation of criminal offences. it also contributes to building synergies between different law enforcement tools. ### deleted


### (14) europol should be able to search member states’ databases under the prüm framework with data received from third countries in order to establish cross-border links between criminal cases. being able to use prüm data , next to other databases available to europol , should allow establishing more complete and informed analysis on the criminal investigations and should allow europol to provide better support to member states’ law enforcement authorities. in case of a match between data used for the search and data held in member states’ databases , member states may supply europol with the information necessary for it to fulfil its tasks. ### deleted


### (15) decisions 2008/615/jha and 2008/616/jha provide for a network of bilateral connections between the national databases of member states. as a consequence of this technical architecture , each member state should establish at least 26 connections , that means a connection with each member state , per data category. the router and the european police records index system (epris) established by this regulation should simplify the technical architecture of the prüm framework and serve as connecting points between all member states. the router should require a single connection per member state in relation to biometric data and epris should require a single connection per member state in relation to police records. ### (15) decisions 2008/615/jha and 2008/616/jha provide for a network of bilateral connections between the national databases of member states. as a consequence of this technical architecture , each member state should establish at least 26 connections , that means a connection with each member state , per data category. the router established by this regulation should simplify the technical architecture of the prüm framework and serve as connecting points between all member states. the router should require a single connection per member state in relation to biometric data.


### (16) the router should be connected to the european search portal established by article 6 of regulation (eu) 2019/817 of the european parliament and of the council34 and article 6 of regulation (eu) 2019/818 of the european parliament and of the council35 to allow member states’ authorities and europol to launch queries to national databases under this regulation simultaneously to queries to the common identity repository established by article 17 of regulation (eu) 2019/817 and article 17 of regulation (eu) 2019/818 for law enforcement purposes. ### (16) in light of the very serious negative consequences for persons and violations of fundamental rights that would ensue if connection were made , the router should not be connected to the european search portal established by article 6 of regulation (eu) 2019/817 of the european parliament and of the council34and article 6 of regulation (eu) 2019/818 of the european parliament and of the council35 to allow member states’ authorities and europol to launch queries to national databases under this regulation simultaneously to queries to the common identity repository established by article 17 of regulation (eu) 2019/817 and article 17 of regulation (eu) 2019/818 for law enforcement purposes.


### (18) any exchange between member states’ authorities or with europol at any stage of one of the processes described under this regulation , which is not explicitly described in this regulation , should take place via siena to ensure that a common , secure and reliable channel of communication is used by all member states. ### (18) any exchange between member states’ authorities at any stage of one of the processes described under this regulation , which is not explicitly described in this regulation , should take place via siena to ensure that a common , secure and reliable channel of communication is used by all member states.


### (19) the universal message format (umf) standard should be used in the development of the router and epris. any automated exchange of data in accordance with this regulation should use the umf standard. member states’ authorities and europol are encouraged to use the umf standard also in relation to any further exchange of data between them in the context of the prüm ii framework. the umf standard should serve as a standard for structured , cross-border information exchange between information systems , authorities or organisations in the field of justice and home affairs. ### (19) the universal message format (umf) standard should be used in the development of the router. any automated exchange of data in accordance with this regulation should use the umf standard. member states’ authorities are encouraged to use the umf standard also in relation to any further exchange of data between them in the context of the prüm ii framework. the umf standard should serve as a standard for structured , cross-border information exchange between information systems , authorities or organisations in the field of justice and home affairs.


### (23) as the router should be developed and managed by the european union agency for the operational management of large-scale information systems in the area of freedom , security and justice established by regulation (eu) 2018/1726 of the european parliament and of the council37 (eu-lisa) , it is therefore necessary to amend regulation (eu) 2018/1726 by adding that to the tasks of eu-lisa. in order to allow for the router to be connected to the european search portal to carry out simultaneous searches of the router and the common identity repository it is therefore necessary to amend regulation (eu) 2019/817. in order to allow for the router to be connected to the european search portal to carry out simultaneous searches of the router and the common identity repository and in order to store reports and statistics of the router on the common repository for reporting and statistics it is therefore necessary to amend regulation (eu) 2019/818. those regulations should therefore be amended accordingly. ### (23) as the router should be developed and managed by the european union agency for the operational management of large-scale information systems in the area of freedom , security and justice established by regulation (eu) 2018/1726 of the european parliament and of the council37 (eu-lisa) , it is therefore necessary to amend regulation (eu) 2018/1726 by adding that to the tasks of eu-lisa. in order to allow for the router to be connected to the european search portal to carry out simultaneous searches of the router and the common identity repository it is therefore necessary to amend regulation (eu) 2019/817. in order to allow for the router to be connected to the european search portal to carry out simultaneous searches of the router and the common identity repository and in order to store reports and statistics of the router on the common repository for reporting and statistics it is therefore necessary to amend regulation (eu) 2019/818. those regulations should therefore be amended accordingly to provide for specific safeguards in order to address specific challenges relating to the modalities of querying and the quality and the performance of the matching of data , including of facial images.


### this regulation establishes a framework for the exchange of information between authorities responsible for the prevention , detection and investigation of criminal offences (prüm ii). ### this regulation establishes a framework for the exchange of information between authorities responsible for the prevention , detection and investigation of serious cross-border criminal offences (prüm ii).


### this regulation lays down the conditions and procedures for the automated searching of dna profiles , dactyloscopic data , facial images , police records and certain vehicle registration data and the rules regarding the exchange of core data following a match. ### this regulation lays down the conditions and procedures for the automated searching of dna profiles , dactyloscopic data and certain vehicle registration data and the rules regarding the exchange of core data following a match.


### the purpose of prüm ii shall be to step up cross-border cooperation in matters covered by part iii , title v , chapter 5 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union , particularly the exchange of information between authorities responsible for the prevention , detection and investigation of criminal offences. ### the purpose of prüm ii shall be to facilitate cross-border cooperation in matters covered by part iii , title v , chapter 5 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union , particularly the exchange of information between authorities responsible for the prevention , detection and investigation of serious cross-border criminal offences.


### the purpose of prüm ii shall also be to allow for the search for missing persons and unidentified human remains by authorities responsible for the prevention , detection and investigation of criminal offences. ### deleted


### this regulation applies to the national databases used for the automated transfer of the categories of dna profiles , dactyloscopic data , facial images , police records and certain vehicle registration data. ### this regulation applies to the national databases used for the automated transfer of the categories of dna profiles , dactyloscopic data , and certain vehicle registration data.


### (6) ‘unidentified dna profile’ means the dna profile obtained from traces collected during the investigation of criminal offences and belonging to a person not yet identified; ### (6) ‘unidentified dna profile’ means the dna profile obtained from traces collected during the investigation of serious criminal offences and belonging to a person not yet identified;


### (9) ‘individual case’ means a single investigation file; ### (9) ‘individual case’ means an individual person who is being investigated based on reasonable suspicion of having committed a serious criminal offence;


### (10) ‘facial image’ means digital image of the face; ### deleted


### (11) ‘biometric data’ means dna profiles , dactyloscopic data or facial images; ### (11) ‘biometric data’ means dna profiles or dactyloscopic data;


### (16) ‘police records’ means any information available in the national register or registers recording data of competent authorities , for the prevention , detection and investigation of criminal offences; ### deleted


### (16) ‘police records’ means any information available in the national register or registers recording data of competent authorities , for the prevention , detection and investigation of criminal offences; ### (16) ‘police records’ means specific information regarding persons convicted of having committed serious criminal offences , available in the national register or registers recording criminal record data ;


### (18) ‘europol data’ means any personal data processed by europol in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/794; ### deleted


### establishment of national dna analysis files ### establishment of national dna analysis databases


### 1. member states shall open and keep national dna analysis files for the investigation of criminal offences. ### 1. if foreseen in their national law , member states shall keep national dna databases to support the investigation of serious criminal offences.


### processing of data kept in those files , under this regulation , shall be carried out in accordance with this regulation , in compliance with the national law of the member states applicable to the processing of those data. ### processing of data kept in those databases , under this regulation , shall be carried out in accordance with this regulation , in compliance with the national law of the member states applicable to the processing of those data.


### 2. member states shall ensure the availability of dna reference data from their national dna analysis files as referred to in paragraph 1. ### 2. member states shall ensure the availability of dna reference data from their national dna databases as referred to in paragraph 1.


### 1. member states shall allow national contact points referred to in article 29 and europol access to the dna reference data in their dna analysis files , to conduct automated searches by comparing dna profiles for the investigation of criminal offences. ### 1. member states shall request a query by submitting dna profile data. requests shall only be in individual cases , in compliance with the national law of the requesting member state , and where they are necessary and proportionate to the purposes of investigating serious criminal offences.


### searches may be conducted only in individual cases and in compliance with the national law of the requesting member state. ### deleted


### 2. should an automated search show that a supplied dna profile matches dna profiles entered in the requested member state's searched file , the national contact point of the requesting member state shall receive in an automated way the dna reference data with which a match has been found. ### 2. on receiving the request for a query from the router , each requested member state shall launch a query of their dna profiles database in an automated manner and without delay.


### 3. the national contact point of the requesting member state shall confirm a match of dna profiles data with dna reference data held by the requested member state following the automated supply of the dna reference data required for confirming a match. ### 3. any matches resulting from the query in each member state’s database shall manually reviewed by the requested member state. if a match is confirmed , the requested member state shall invite the requesting member state to send a reasoned follow-up request containing any additional relevant information to the requested member state(s).


### article 7 ### deleted


### each member state shall inform the commission and eu-lisa of the national dna analysis files , to which articles 5 to 7 apply , in accordance with article 73. ### each member state shall inform the commission and eu-lisa of the national dna databases , to which articles 5 to 7 apply , in accordance with article 73.


### 1. appropriate measures shall be taken to ensure confidentiality and integrity for dna reference data being sent to other member states , including their encryption. ### 1. all necessary measures shall be taken to ensure confidentiality and integrity for dna reference data being sent to other member states , including their encryption.


### the type of dna profiles transmitted (unidentified dna profiles or reference dna profiles); ### the type of dna profiles matched (unidentified dna profiles or reference dna profiles);


### the matching dna profiles. ### deleted


### 3. automated notification of a match shall only be provided if the automated search or comparison has resulted in a match of a minimum number of loci. the commission shall adopt implementing acts to specify this minimum number of loci , in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 76(2). ### 3. automated notification of a match shall only be provided if the automated search or comparison has resulted in a match of a minimum number of loci. the minimum number of loci shall be independently verified by the european data protection board to ensure that the thresholds are sufficiently high to ensure accuracy , reasonably minimise the risk of misidentification and prevent discrimination. the commission shall adopt delegated acts to specify this minimum number of loci and maximum number of candidates , in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 76(2).


### 1. member states shall ensure the availability of dactyloscopic reference data from the file for the national automated fingerprint identification systems established for the prevention , detection and investigation of criminal offences. ### 1. member states shall ensure the availability of dactyloscopic reference data from the file for the national automated fingerprint identification systems established for the prevention , detection and investigation of serious criminal offences.


### 1. for the prevention , detection and investigation of criminal offences , member states shall allow national contact points of other member states and europol access to the dactyloscopic reference data in the automated fingerprint identification systems which they have established for that purpose , to conduct automated searches by comparing dactyloscopic reference data. ### 1. member states shall request a query by submitting dactyloscopic data. requests shall only be in individual cases , in compliance with the law enforcement directive 680/2016 (led) and the national law of the requesting member state , and where they are necessary and proportionate to the purposes of investigating serious criminal offences.


### 2. the national contact point of the requesting member state shall confirm a match of dactyloscopic data with dactyloscopic reference data held by the requested member state following the automated supply of the dactyloscopic reference data required for confirming a match. ### 2. on receiving the request for a query from the router , each requested member state shall launch a query of the dactyloscopic reference data in their database in an automated manner and without delay. if there is no match , the requesting member state shall be notified about it in an automated manner.


### 2. each member state shall ensure that the dactyloscopic data it transmits are of sufficient quality for a comparison by the automated fingerprint identification systems. ### 2. each member state shall ensure that the dactyloscopic data it transmits are of sufficient quality for a comparison by the automated fingerprint identification systems. the commission shall adopt delegated acts to specify the minimum standards for dactyloscopic data that must be met by member states before any transmission of data. these minimum standards shall be independently verified by the european data protection board to ensure that the thresholds are sufficiently high to ensure accuracy , reasonably minimise the risk of misidentification and prevent discrimination. those delegated acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 76(2).


### 3. member states shall take appropriate measures to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of dactyloscopic data being sent to other member states , including their encryption. ### 3. member states shall take all necessary measures to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of dactyloscopic data being sent to other member states , including their encryption.


### the matching dactyloscopic data. ### deleted


### 1. for the prevention , detection and investigation of criminal offences , member states shall allow national contact points of other member states and europol access to the following national vehicle registration data , to conduct automated searches in individual cases: ### 1. for the prevention , detection and investigation of serious cross-border criminal offences , member states shall allow national contact points of other member states access to the following national vehicle registration data , to conduct automated searches in individual cases:


### data relating to owners or operators; ### the name under which the vehicle is registered;


### data relating to vehicles. ### data regarding the vehicle make , model , year , colour and/or main identifying features.


### 3. the commission shall adopt implementing acts to specify the data elements of the vehicle registration data to be exchanged. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 76(2). ### 3. the commission shall adopt delegated acts to specify the data elements of the vehicle registration data to be exchanged and the definition of the authority or authorities having the responsibility for the processing of personal data in eucaris. those delegated acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 76(2).


### each member state and europol shall keep logs of all data processing operations concerning vehicle registration data. those logs shall include the following: ### each member state shall keep logs of all data processing operations concerning vehicle registration data. those logs shall include the following:


### those logs shall be protected by appropriate measures against unauthorised access and erased one year after their creation. if , however , they are required for monitoring procedures that have already begun , they shall be erased once the monitoring procedures no longer require the logs. ### those logs shall be protected by all necessary measures against unauthorised access and erased four year after their creation. if , however , they are required for monitoring procedures that have already begun , they shall be erased once the monitoring procedures no longer require the logs.


### [...] ### deleted


### 1. member states shall ensure the availability of facial images from their national databases established for the prevention , detection and investigation of criminal offences. those data shall only include facial images and the reference number referred to in article 23 , and shall indicate whether the facial images are attributed to an individual or not. ### 1. member states shall ensure the availability of high quality facial images on individuals suspected or convicted of a serious criminal offence from their national databases established for the prevention , detection and investigation of serious criminal offences. those data shall only include facial images and the reference number referred to in article 23 , and shall clearly indicate the source of the facial image and whether the facial images are attributed to an individual or not . member states shall not make available in this context any data from which an individual can be directly identified.


### 1. for the prevention , detection and investigation of criminal offences , member states shall allow national contact points of other member states and europol access to facial images stored in their national databases , to conduct automated searches. ### 1. for the prevention , detection and investigation of serious criminal offences , member states may allow national contact points of other member states and europol to request automated searches of facial images of convicted criminals and suspects , stored in their national databases , in line with article 6 of the law enforcement directive 680/2016 (led).


### 2. the requesting member state shall receive a list composed of matches concerning likely candidates. that member state shall review the list to determine the existence of a confirmed match. ### 2. the requested member state(s) shall process such requests without delay to decide whether to share the data stored in their database. upon confirmation , the requested member state(s) shall share with the requesting member state a list composed of matches concerning likely candidates. that member state shall review the list to reconfirm the existence of a match.


### 3. a minimum quality standard shall be established to allow for search and comparison of facial images. the commission shall adopt implementing acts to specify that minimum quality standard. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 76(2). ### 3. a minimum quality standard shall be established to allow for search and comparison of facial images. the commission shall adopt delegated acts to specify that minimum quality standard. those delegated acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 76(2).


### the matching facial images. ### deleted


### 1. member states may decide to participate in the automated exchange of police records. member states participating in the automated exchange of police records shall ensure the availability of biographical data of suspects and criminals from their national police records indexes established for the investigation of criminal offences. this set of data , if available , shall contain the following data: ### 1. member states may decide to facilitate the exchange of police records. member states participating in the exchange of police records shall ensure the availability of biographical data of suspects and criminals from their national police records indexes established for the investigation of serious criminal offences. this set of data , if available , shall contain the following data:


### 1. this regulation addresses situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum within the union and provides for specific rules derogating from those set out in regulations (eu) xxx/xxx [asylum and migration management] and (eu) xxx/xxx [asylum procedures regulation] and in directive xxx [recast return directive]. ### 1. this regulation addresses situations of emergency in the field of asylum within the union and provides for specific rules in such situations. its aim is to support member states in such situations by sharing responsibility among member states and simplifying procedures for international protection and relocation.


### 2. for the purposes of this regulation , a situation of crisis is to be understood as: ### 2. for the purposes of this regulation , a situation of emergency is to be understood as an exceptional situation that entails a considerable number of people arriving over an international border , a rapid rate of arrival , inadequate absorption or response capacity in a member state , particularly during the emergency and individual asylum procedures which are unable to deal with the assessment of such large numbers.


### an imminent risk of such a situation. ### deleted


### ii solidarity mechanism ### ii determination of the situation of emergency


### article 2 ### deleted


### iii asylum and return procedures in a situation of crisis ### iii asylum responsibility-sharing and solidarity in a situation of emergency


### article 4 ### deleted


### article 5 ### deleted


### article 6 ### deleted


### article 7 ### deleted


### [...] ### deleted


### article 9 ### deleted


### v granting of immediate protection ### v granting of prima facie international protection


### article 10 ### deleted


### b. whereas the precarious situation faced by migrant domestic workers is an example where the intersectionality of race , gender , socioeconomic status and nationality is visible; ### b. whereas the majority of women of african , middle-eastern , latin-american and asian descent in europe work in low paying jobs , especially migrant domestic workers whose precarious situation renders the intersectionality of race , gender , socioeconomic status and nationality visible; whereas the dependency of a resident permit to a spouse or an employer exposes migrant women to other risks such as gender-biased violence and institutional discrimination;


### 3. calls on forthcoming presidencies of the council to make equal treatment and the fight against discrimination a key priority and to adopt without delay the anti-discrimination directive; stresses that this directive presents a unique opportunity to address intersectional discrimination in fields other than employment and occupation; ### 3. recalls the long-standing call of the parliament for the anti-discrimination directive that has been blocked in council since 2008; calls on forthcoming presidencies of the council to make equal treatment and the fight against discrimination in all its forms a key priority to break the deadlock; calls for the adoption of a new equality legislative framework combating intersectional discrimination , including in its structural and institutional forms , to move away from a single-axis individual approach and address systemic discrimination;


### (16) it is particularly important that the protection of personal data , in accordance with union law , is ensured in connection to all exchanges of information under this directive. to that aim , the rules of this directive should be aligned with directive (eu) 2016/680 of the european parliament and of the council60 . in particular , it should be specified that any personal data exchanged by single points of contacts and law enforcement authorities is to remain limited to the categories of data listed in section b point 2 , of annex ii to regulation (eu) 2016/794 of the european parliament and of the council61 . furthermore , as far as possible , any such personal data should be distinguished according to their degree of accuracy and reliability , whereby facts should be distinguished from personal assessments , in order to ensure both the protection of individuals and the quality and reliability of the information exchanged. if it appears that the personal data are incorrect , they should be rectified or erased without delay. such rectification or erasure , as well as any other processing of personal data in connection to the activities under this directive , should be carried out in compliance with the applicable rules of union law , in particular directive (eu) 2016/680 and regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council62 , which rules this directive leaves unaffected. ### (16) it is particularly important that the protection of personal data , in accordance with union law , is ensured in connection to all exchanges of information under this directive. to that aim , the rules of this directive should be aligned with directive (eu) 2016/680 of the european parliament and of the council60 . in particular , it should be specified that any personal data exchanged by single points of contacts and law enforcement authorities is to remain limited to the categories of data listed in section b point 2 , of annex ii to regulation (eu) 2016/794 of the european parliament and of the council61 . furthermore , as far as possible , any such personal data should be distinguished according to their degree of accuracy and reliability , whereby facts should be distinguished from personal assessments , in order to ensure both the protection of individuals and the quality and reliability of the information exchanged. if it appears that the personal data are incorrect , they should be rectified or erased without delay. such rectification or erasure , as well as any other processing of personal data in connection to the activities under this directive , should be carried out in compliance with the applicable rules of union law , in particular directive (eu) 2016/680 of the european parliament and of the council62 . this directive leaves the rules from directive (eu) 2016/680 unaffected.


### (18) the further development of the european union agency for law enforcement cooperation (europol) as the union’s criminal information hub is a priority. that is why , when information or any related communications are exchanged , irrespective of whether that is done pursuant to a request for information submitted to a single point of contact or law enforcement authority , or on their own-imitative , a copy should be sent to europol , however only insofar as it concerns offences falling within the scope of the objectives of europol. in practice , this can be done through the ticking by default of the corresponding siena box. ### deleted


### (19) the proliferation of communication channels used for the transmission of law enforcement information between member states and of communications relating thereto should be remedied , as it hinders the adequate and rapid exchange of such information. therefore , the use of the secure information exchange network application called siena , managed by europol in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/794 , should be made mandatory for all such transmissions and communications under this directive , including the sending of requests for information submitted to single points of contact and directly to law enforcement authorities , the provision of information upon such requests and on their own initiative , communications on refusals and clarifications , as well as copies to single points of contact and europol. to that aim , all single points of contact , as well as all law enforcement authorities that may be involved in such exchanges , should be directly connected to siena. in this regard , a transition period should be provided for , however , in order to allow for the full roll-out of siena. ### (19) the proliferation of communication channels used for the transmission of law enforcement information between member states and of communications relating thereto should be remedied , as it hinders the adequate and rapid exchange of such information. therefore , the use of the secure information exchange network application called siena , managed by europol in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/794 , should be made mandatory for all such transmissions and communications under this directive , including the sending of requests for information submitted to single points of contact and directly to law enforcement authorities , the provision of information upon such requests and on their own initiative , communications on refusals and clarifications , as well as copies to single points of contact. to that aim , all single points of contact , as well as all law enforcement authorities that may be involved in such exchanges , should be directly connected to siena. in this regard , a transition period should be provided for , however , in order to allow for the full roll-out of siena.


### (22) in order for them to be able to effectively perform their coordinating functions under this directive , the single points of contact should be composed of representatives of national law enforcement authorities whose involvement is necessary for the adequate and rapid exchange of information under this directive. while it is for each member state to decide on the precise organisation and composition needed to meet that requirement , such representatives may include police , customs and other law enforcement authorities competent for preventing , detecting or investigating criminal offences , as well as possible contact points for the regional and bilateral offices , such as liaison officers and attachés seconded or posted in other member states and relevant union law enforcement agencies , such as europol. however , in the interest of effective coordination , at minimum , the single points of contact should be composed of representatives of the europol national unit , the sirene bureau , the passenger information unit and the interpol national central bureau , as established under the relevant legislation and notwithstanding this directive not being applicable to information exchanges specifically regulated by such union legislation. ### (22) in order for them to be able to effectively perform their coordinating functions under this directive , the single points of contact should be composed of representatives of national law enforcement authorities whose involvement is necessary for the adequate and rapid exchange of information under this directive. while it is for each member state to decide on the precise organisation and composition needed to meet that requirement , such representatives may include police , customs and other law enforcement authorities competent for preventing , detecting or investigating criminal offences , as well as possible contact points for the regional and bilateral offices , such as liaison officers and attachés seconded or posted in other member states and relevant union law enforcement agencies , such as europol. however , in the interest of effective coordination , at minimum , the single points of contact should be composed of representatives of the europol national unit , the sirene bureau and the interpol national central bureau , as established under the relevant legislation and notwithstanding this directive not being applicable to information exchanges specifically regulated by such union legislation.


### (25) the cross-border nature of crime and terrorism requires member states to rely on one another to tackle such criminal offences. adequate and rapid information flows between relevant law enforcement authorities and to europol cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states acting alone. due to the scale and effects of the action , this can be better achieved at union level through the establishment of common rules on the exchange of information. thus , the union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union. in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. ### (25) the cross-border nature of certain crime and terrorism requires member states to rely on one another to tackle such criminal offences. adequate and rapid information flows between relevant law enforcement authorities and to europol cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states acting alone. due to the scale and effects of the action , this can be better achieved at union level through the establishment of common rules on the exchange of information. thus , the union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union. in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.


### requests for information submitted to the single points of contact established or designated by the member states , in particular on the content of such requests , mandatory time limits for providing the requested information , reasons for refusals of such requests and the channel of communication to be used in connection to such requests; ### requests for information submitted to the single points of contact established or designated by the member states , in particular on the content of such requests , mandatory time limits for providing the requested information , reasons for refusals of such requests , the channel of communication to be used in connection to such requests , and obligations to redress incorrect information and verify outgoing information;


### (1) 'law enforcement authority' means any authority of the member states competent under national law for the purpose of preventing , detecting or investigating criminal offences; ### (1) 'law enforcement authority' means any authority of the member states competent under national law for the purpose of preventing , detecting or investigating serious criminal offences;


### (2) 'criminal offences' means any of the following: ### (2) 'serious criminal offences' means:


### offences referred to in article 2(2) of council framework decision 2002/584/jha72 ; ### deleted


### offences referred to in article 3(1) and (2) of regulation (eu) 2016/794; ### deleted


### tax crimes relating to direct and indirect taxes , as laid down in national law; ### deleted


### (3) 'information' means any content concerning one or more natural persons , facts or circumstances relevant to law enforcement authorities in connection to the exercise of their tasks under national law of preventing , detecting or investigating criminal offences; ### (3) 'information' means any content concerning one or more natural or legal persons , facts or circumstances relevant to law enforcement authorities in connection to the exercise of their tasks under national law of preventing , detecting or investigating serious criminal offences as defined in article 2 (2);


### (4) 'available' information means information that is either held by the single point of contact or the law enforcement authorities of the requested member state , or information that those single points of contact or those law enforcement authorities can obtain from other public authorities or from private parties established in that member state without coercive measures; ### (4) 'available' information means information that is either held by the single point of contact or the law enforcement authorities of the requested member state , or information that those single points of contact or those law enforcement authorities can obtain from other public authorities established in that member state without coercive measures;


### (6) ‘personal data’ means personal data as defined in article 4 , point (1) of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ### (6) ‘personal data’ means personal data as defined in article 34 , point (1) of directive (eu) 2016/680.


### any relevant information available to the single point of contact or the law enforcement authorities of member states is provided to the single point of contact or the law enforcement authorities of other member states (‘principle of availability’); ### relevant information available to the single point of contact or the law enforcement authorities of member states is provided to the single point of contact or the law enforcement authorities of other member states (‘principle of availability’);


### essential for the prevention of an immediate and serious threat to the public security of a member state; ### essential for the prevention of an immediate and serious threat to the public security of a member state under crimes listed in article 2(2);


### at imminent risk of losing relevance if not provided urgently. ### deleted


### eight hours , for urgent requests relating to information that is available to the law enforcement authorities of the requested member state without having to obtain a judicial authorisation; ### twenty-four hours , for urgent requests relating to information that is available to the law enforcement authorities of the requested member state without having to obtain a judicial authorisation;


### three calendar days , for urgent requests relating to information that is available to the law enforcement authorities of the requested member state subject to a requirement to obtain a judicial authorisation; ### three working days , for urgent requests relating to information that is available to the law enforcement authorities of the requested member state subject to a requirement to obtain a judicial authorisation;


### be contrary to the essential interests of the security of the requested member state; ### deleted


### (ii) jeopardise the success of an ongoing investigation of a criminal offence; or; ### (ii) jeopardise an ongoing investigation of a criminal offence; or;


### (iii) unduly harm the vital interests of a natural or legal person. ### (iii) harm the vital interests of a natural person.


### the time limits referred to in article 5(1) shall be suspended from the moment that the single point of contact or , where applicable , the law enforcement authority of the requesting member state receives the request for clarifications , until the moment that the single point of contact of the requested member state receives the clarifications. ### deleted


### 1. member states shall ensure that their single point of contact or their law enforcement authorities provide , on their own initiative , any information available to them to the single points of contact or to the law enforcement authorities of other member states , where there are objective reasons to believe that such information could be relevant to that member state for the purpose referred to in article 1(1). however , no such obligation shall exist insofar as the reasons referred to in points (c) , (d) or (e) of article 6(1) apply in respect of such information. ### 1. member states shall ensure that their single point of contact or their law enforcement authorities provide , on their own initiative , information to the single points of contact of other member states , where there are objective reasons to believe that such information is necessary for that member state for the purpose referred to in article 1(1). however , no such obligation shall exist insofar as the reasons referred to in article 6(1) apply in respect of such information.


### 2. member states shall ensure that , where their single point of contact or their law enforcement authorities provide information on their own-initiative in accordance with paragraph 1 , they do so in one of the languages included in the list established by the requested member state and published in accordance with article 11. ### deleted


### member states shall ensure that , where their single point of contact or their law enforcement authorities provide such information to the law enforcement authority of another member state , they also send , at the same time , a copy of that information to the single point of contact of that other member state. ### deleted


### article 12 ### deleted


### the judicial authorities competent to grant the judicial authorisations required under national law in accordance with article 9 are available to the single point of contact 24 hours a day , 7 days a week. ### deleted


### the passenger information unit established under article 4 of directive (eu) 2016/681; ### deleted


### 3. member states shall ensure that any personal data processed by their single point of contact are contained in the case management system only for as long as is necessary and proportionate for the purposes for which the personal data are processed and are subsequently irrevocably deleted. ### 3. member states shall ensure that any personal data processed by their single point of contact are contained in the case management system only for as long as is necessary and proportionate for the fulfilment of deadlines as set out in article 5 , and are subsequently irrevocably deleted.


### proposal for a regulation of the european parliament and of the council introducing a screening of third country nationals at the external borders and amending regulations (ec) no 767/2008 , (eu) 2017/2226 , (eu) 2018/1240 and (eu) 2019/817 ### proposal for a regulation of the european parliament and of the council introducing a screening of third country nationals at the external borders and amending regulation (eu) 2019/817


### having regard to the treaty on the functioning of the european union , and in particular points (b) and (d) of article 77(2) thereof , ### having regard to the treaty on the functioning of the european union , and in particular points (b) and (d) of article 77(2) and point (e) of article 78(2) thereof ,


### (1) the schengen area was created to achieve the union’s objective of establishing an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of persons is ensured , as set out in article 3(2) of the treaty on european union (teu). the good functioning of this area relies on mutual trust between the member states and efficient management of the external border. ### (1) the schengen area was created to achieve the union’s objective of establishing an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of persons is ensured , as set out in article 3(2) of the treaty on european union (teu). the good functioning of this area relies on mutual trust between the member states , the management of the external border and the full respect of fundamental rights during all related actions and procedures.


### (2) the rules governing border control of persons crossing the external borders of the member states of the union are laid down in regulation (eu) 2016/399 of the european parliament and of the council (schengen borders code)21 as adopted under article 77(2)(b) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu). to further develop the union’s policy with a view to carrying out checks on persons and efficiently monitoring the crossing of external borders referred to in the first paragraph of article 77 tfeu , additional measures should address situations where third-country nationals manage to avoid border checks at the external borders , or where third-country nationals are disembarked following search and rescue operations as well as where third-country nationals request international protection at a border crossing point without fulfilling entry conditions. the present regulation complements and specifies regulation (eu) 2016/399 with regard to those three sets of situations. ### (2) the rules governing border control of persons crossing the external borders of the member states of the union are laid down in regulation (eu) 2016/399 of the european parliament and of the council (schengen borders code)21 as adopted under article 77(2)(b) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu). to further develop the union’s policy to address situations where third-country nationals have not been subject to border checks at the external borders or where third-country nationals are disembarked following search and rescue operations as well as where third-country nationals request international protection at a border crossing point or at any other part of the external borders , without fulfilling entry conditions. the present regulation complements and specifies regulation (eu) 2016/399 with regard to those situations.


### (3) it is essential to ensure that in those three sets of situations , the third country nationals are screened , in order to facilitate a proper identification and to allow for them being referred efficiently to the relevant procedures which , depending on the circumstances , can be procedures for international protection or procedures respecting directive 2008/115/ec of the european parliament and of the council (the “return directive”)22 . the screening should seamlessly complement the checks carried out at the external border or compensate for the fact that those checks have been circumvented by the third country nationals when crossing the external border. ### (3) it is essential to ensure that in those situations , the third country nationals are screened , in order to facilitate a proper identification to be referred to the relevant procedures which , depending on the circumstances , can be the common procedures for international protection as laid down in regulation (eu) xxxx/202x of the european parliament and of the council [asylum procedures regulation]. this is without prejudice to the protection of persons identified as stateless or at risk of statelessness , who should be referred to the competent authorities to determine whether the individual is stateless and offer adequate protection , in accordance with international and national law. once the screening is over and if a third-country national has clearly denied to apply for international protection and is not eligible to apply for a residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay for compassionate , humanitarian or other grounds under member state legislation or other provisions of union or international law , then the member state competent authorities may decide that the person should be returned. in such cases directive (eu)2008/115/ec (return directive) should apply. the screening should seamlessly complement the checks carried out at the external border.


### (4) border control is in the interest not only of the member states at whose external borders it is carried out but of all member states which have abolished internal border control. border control should help to combat illegal migration and trafficking of human beings and to prevent any threat to the member states’ internal security , public policy , public health and international relations. as such , measures taken at the external borders are important elements of a comprehensive approach to migration , allowing to address the challenge of mixed flows of migrants and persons seeking international protection. ### (4) border control is in the interest not only of the member states at whose external borders it is carried out but of all member states which have abolished internal border control. border control should help to protect victims of trafficking of human beings and to prevent any threat to the member states’ internal security , public health and international relations. as such , measures taken at the external borders should be proportionate to the objectives pursued and enable decisions under this regulation to be taken on an individual basis.


### (5) in accordance with article 2 of regulation (eu) 2016/399 , border control consists of border checks carried out at the border crossing points and border surveillance , which is carried out between the border crossing points , in order to prevent third-country nationals from circumventing border checks. in accordance with article 13 of regulation (eu) 2016/399 a person who has crossed a border in an unauthorised manner and who has no right to stay on the territory of the member state concerned shall be apprehended and made subject to procedures respecting directive 2008/115/ec. in accordance with article 3 of regulation (eu) 2016/399 , border control should be carried out without prejudice to the rights of refugees and persons requesting international protection , in particular as regards non-refoulement. ### (5) in accordance with article 2 of regulation (eu) 2016/399 , border control consists of border checks carried out at the border crossing points and border surveillance , which is carried out between the border crossing points. in accordance with article 13 of regulation (eu) 2016/399 a person who has crossed a border in an unauthorised manner and who has no right to stay on the territory of the member state concerned shall be apprehended and made subject to procedures respecting directive 2008/115/ec. however , also in accordance with article 3 of the same regulation border control should be carried out without prejudice to the rights of refugees and persons requesting international protection , in particular as regards non-refoulement and , in accordance with article 4 , member states shall , among others , act in full compliance with relevant union law , including the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (‘the charter’) , relevant international law , including the convention relating to the status of refugees done at geneva on 28 july 1951 (‘the geneva convention’).


### (6) border guards are often confronted with third-country nationals who are requesting international protection without travel documents , both following apprehension during border surveillance and during checks at the border crossing points. moreover , at some border sections the border guards are confronted with large numbers of arrivals at the same time. in such circumstances , it is particularly difficult to ensure that all relevant databases are consulted and to immediately determine the appropriate asylum or return procedure. ### (6) border guards are often confronted with situations where third-country nationals , without travel documents , are requesting international protection , both following apprehension during border surveillance and during checks at the border crossing points. moreover , at some border sections large numbers of arrivals can occur at the same time. in all circumstances , the relevant procedures should take place in compliance with all established safeguards.


### (7) in order to ensure a swift handling of third-country nationals who try to avoid border checks or who request international protection at a border crossing point without fulfilling the entry conditions or who are disembarked following a search and rescue operation , it is necessary to provide a stronger framework for cooperation between the different national authorities responsible for border control , the protection of public health , the examination of the need for international protection and the application of return procedures. ### (7) in order to improve procedures in regards to third country nationals who have not been subject to border checks or request international protection at a border crossing point or at any other part of the external borders , cooperation is needed between the different national authorities such as those responsible for border control , for the protection of individual and public health , for child protection and for the examination of the requests for international protection.


### (8) in particular , the screening should help to ensure that the third-country nationals concerned are referred to the appropriate procedures at the earliest stage possible and that the procedures are continued without interruption and delay. at the same time , the screening should help to counter the practice whereby some applicants for international protection abscond after having been authorised to enter the territory of a member state based on their request for international protection , in order to pursue such requests in another member state or not at all. ### deleted


### (9) with regard to those persons who apply for international protection , the screening should be followed by an examination of the need for international protection. it should allow to collect and share with the authorities competent for that examination any information that is relevant for the latter to identify the appropriate procedure for the examination of the application , thus speeding up that examination. the screening should also ensure that persons with special needs are identified at an early stage , so that any special reception and procedural needs are fully taken into account in the determination of and the pursuit of the applicable procedure. ### (9) with regard to those persons who apply for international protection , the screening should take place during the initial stage of the examination of the request for international protection. the screening authorities should provide all the information relating to the third country national to the authorities examining their application for international protection in a way that the third country national has also full knowledge of. the screening should also contribute to identifying vulnerabilities so that persons with special needs are identified at an early stage in order for any special reception and procedural needs to be fully taken into account. however , a third-country national may be identified as a person with special needs even after the screening process has ended and this should then be taken into account.


### (11) this regulation should apply to third-country nationals and stateless persons who are apprehended in connection with the unauthorised crossings of the external border of a member state by land , sea or air , except third country nationals for whom the member state is not required to take the biometric data pursuant to article 14(1) and (3) of the eurodac regulation for reasons other than their age , as well as to persons who have been disembarked following search and rescue operations , regardless of whether they apply or not for international protection. this regulation should also apply to those who seek international protection at the border crossing points or in transit zones without fulfilling the entry conditions ### (11) this regulation should apply to third-country nationals and stateless persons who are apprehended in connection with irregular crossings of the external border of a member state by land , sea or air , except third country nationals for whom the member state is not required to take the biometric data pursuant to article 14(1) and (3) of the eurodac regulation for reasons other than their age , as well as to persons who have been disembarked following search and rescue operations , regardless of whether they apply or not for international protection. this regulation should also apply to those who seek international protection at the border crossing points or in transit zones without fulfilling the entry conditions.


### (12) the screening should be conducted at or in proximity to the external border , before the persons concerned are authorised to enter the territory. the member states should apply measures pursuant to national law to prevent the persons concerned from entering the territory during the screening. in individual cases , where required , this may include detention , subject to the national law regulating that matter. ### (12) the screening should be conducted within the territory of the member state at any appropriate location that guarantees the proper implementation of regulation(eu) xxxx/202x of the european parliament and of the council [asylum procedures regulation] and of directive 2013/33/eu of the european parliament and of the council [reception conditions directive] and would ensure that third-country nationals may exercise their rights , including effective access to legal aid. member states could decide that the third country nationals should reside in a specific place but this should not result in their detention , particularly when these are unaccompanied children or children in families who should never be detained as detention is never in the best interests of the child and should never be applied to them. hence , the use of detention should only be as a last resort , when ordered in writing by judicial or administrative authorities and subject to the relevant union and national law after an individual examination and vulnerability screening and unless other less coercive measures can be applied effectively in a specific case.


### (13) wherever it becomes clear during the screening that a third-country national subject to it fulfils the conditions of article 6 of regulation (eu) 2016/399 , the screening should end and the third-country national concerned should be authorised to enter the territory , without prejudice to the application of penalties as referred to in article 5(3) of that regulation. ### deleted


### (15) all persons subject to the screening should be submitted to checks in order to establish their identity and to ascertain that they do not pose a threat to internal security or public health. in the case of persons requesting international protection at border crossing points , the identity and security checks carried out in the context of border checks should be taken into account to avoid duplication. ### (15) all persons subject to the screening should be submitted to checks in order to establish their identity and to ascertain that they do not pose a threat to public health. in the case of persons requesting international protection at border crossing points , the identity checks carried out in the context of border checks according regulation (eu) 2016/399 should not be duplicated.


### (16) on completion of the screening , the third-country nationals concerned should be referred to the relevant procedure to establish responsibility for examining an application for and to assess the need for international protection , or be made subject to procedures respecting directive 2008/115 (return directive) , as appropriate. the relevant information obtained during the screening should be provided to the competent authorities to support the further assessment of each individual case , in full respect of fundamental rights. the procedures established by directive 2008/115 should start applying only after the screening has ended. article 26 and 27 of the asylum procedures regulation should apply only after the screening has ended. this should be without prejudice to the fact that the persons applying for international protection at the moment of apprehension , in the course of border control at the border crossing point or during the screening , should be considered applicants. ### (16) the information obtained during the screening should be provided to the competent authorities to support the further assessment of each individual case , in full respect of fundamental rights. the refusal of entry , as defined in regulation(eu) no 2016/399 , should apply only for persons not having entered yet the territory of the member states , such as transit areas , and only at official land and air border crossing points. in compliance with the principle of non-refoulement , upon a third-country national’s wish to make an application for international protection , whether this happens at the moment of apprehension , in the course of border control at the border crossing point or at any part of the external borders or during the screening , the person should be considered applicant therefore , from that moment , regulation(eu) xxxx/xxxx [asylum procedure regulation] and directive 2013/33/eu [reception conditions directive] apply. where applicable , persons identified as stateless or at risk of statelessness should also be referred to the competent authorities to determine whether the individual is stateless and offer adequate protection , in accordance with international and national law.


### (17) the screening could also be followed by relocation under the mechanism for solidarity established by regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [asylum and migration management] where a member state is contributing to solidarity on a voluntary basis or the applicants for international protection are not subject to the border procedure pursuant to regulation (eu) no. xxx/xxx (asylum procedures regulation) , or under the mechanism addressing situations of crisis established by regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [regulation on situations of crisis]. ### (17) member states should relocate applicants for international protection swiftly and without undue delay after the screening , including persons disembarked after search and rescue operations , under the automatic distribution mechanism established by regulation (eu) xxx/xxx[asylum and migration management] , or under the mechanism addressing situations of crisis established by regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [regulation on situations of crisis]. unaccompanied minors and families with minors , as well as vulnerable applicants should have their transfers prioritised. the right to family reunification should always be respected.


### (18) in accordance with article 12 of regulation (eu) 2016/399 , the fulfilment of entry conditions and the authorisation of entry are expressed in an entry stamp in a travel document. the absence of such entry stamp or the absence of a travel document may therefore be considered as an indication that the holder does not fulfil the entry conditions. with the start of the operation of the entry/exit system leading to substitution of the stamps with an entry in the electronic system , that presumption will become more reliable. member states should therefore apply the screening to third-country nationals who are already within the territory and who are unable to prove that they fulfilled the conditions of entry into the territory of the member states. the screening of such third-country nationals is necessary in order to compensate for the fact that they presumably managed to evade entry checks upon arrival in the schengen area and therefore could have not been either refused entry or referred to the appropriate procedure following screening. applying the screening could also help in ascertaining , through the consultation of the databases referred to in this regulation , that the persons concerned do not pose a threat to internal security. by the end of the screening within the territory , the third-country nationals concerned should be subject to a return procedure or , where they apply for international protection , to the appropriate asylum procedure. submitting the same third-country national to repeated screenings should be avoided to the utmost extent possible. ### deleted


### (19) the screening should be completed as soon as possible , and should not exceed 5 days where it is conducted at the external border and 3 days where it is conducted within the territory of a member state. any extension of the 5 days’ time limit should be reserved for exceptional situations at the external borders , where the capacities of the member state to handle screenings are exceeded for reasons beyond its control such as crisis situations referred to in article 1 of regulation xxx/xxx [crisis proposal]. ### (19) the screening should be completed as soon as possible , and should not exceed 5 days.


### (20) the member states should determine appropriate locations for the screening at or in proximity to the external border taking into account geography and existing infrastructures , ensuring that apprehended third-country nationals as well as those who present themselves at a border crossing point can be swiftly submitted to the screening. the tasks related to the screening may be carried out in hotspot areas as referred to in point (23) of article 2 of regulation (eu) 2019/1896 of the european parliament and of the council23 . ### deleted


### (21) in order to achieve the objectives of the screening , close cooperation should be ensured between the competent national authorities referred to in article 16 of regulation 2016/399 , those referred to in article 5 of the [asylum procedures regulation] as well as those responsible for carrying out return procedures respecting directive 2008/115. child protection authorities should also be closely involved in the screening wherever necessary to ensure that the best interests of the child are duly taken into account throughout the screening. member states should be allowed to avail themselves of the support of the relevant agencies , in particular the european border and coast guard agency and the [european union agency for asylum] , within the limits of their mandates. member states should involve the national rapporteurs for anti-trafficking wherever the screening reveals facts relevant for trafficking in line with directive 2011/36/eu of the european parliament and of the council24 . ### (21) in order to achieve the objectives of the screening , notably the recognition of vulnerabilities , close cooperation should be ensured between the competent national authorities referred to in article 16 of regulation 2016/399 and those referred to in article 5 of the [asylum procedures regulation]. child protection authorities should also be closely involved in the screening to ensure that the best interests of the child are duly taken into account throughout the screening. a representative should be appointed to represent and assist the unaccompanied minor during the screening. where applicable , this representative should be the same as the representative to be appointed in accordance with article 23 of directive 2013/33/eu [reception conditions directive]. member states should seek the cooperation with the monitoring mechanism as established in article 7 to ensure that all actions and procedures are in compliance with the respect of fundamental rights. in addition to the monitoring mechanism , ngos and civil society organisations specialised in child protection should be granted access to monitor procedures of identification , verification and age assessment. member states should be allowed to avail themselves of the support of the relevant agencies , in particular the european border and coast guard agency and the [european union agency for asylum] , within the limits of their mandates. the tasks , functions and activities performed by the relevant eu agencies in support of member states pursuant to this regulation should fall under the scope of the independent monitoring mechanism to be established by each member state in accordance with this regulation. member states should also put in place measures to identify potential victims of trafficking of human beings as early as possible to prevent further trafficking , provide them with protection and involve the national rapporteurs for anti-trafficking wherever the screening reveals facts relevant for trafficking in line with directive 2011/36/eu of the european parliament and of the council24 .


### (22) when conducting the screening , the competent authorities should comply with the charter of fundamental rights of the european union and ensure the respect for human dignity and should not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex , racial , colour , ethnic or social origin , genetic features , language , religion or belief , political or any other opinions , membership of a national minority , disability , age or sexual orientation. particular attention should be paid to the best interests of the child. ### (22) when conducting the screening , the competent authorities should comply with the charter of fundamental rights of the european union and ensure the respect for human dignity and should not discriminate against persons on grounds of sex , racial , colour , ethnic or social origin , genetic features , language , religion or belief , political or any other opinions , membership of a national minority , disability , age or sexual orientation. the best interests of the child should be the primary consideration in the implementation of this regulation.


### (23) in order to ensure compliance with eu and international law , including the charter of fundamental rights , during the screening , each member state should establish a monitoring mechanism and put in place adequate safeguards for the independence thereof. the monitoring mechanism should cover in particular the respect for fundamental rights in relation to the screening , as well as the respect for the applicable national rules regarding detention and compliance with the principle of non-refoulement as referred to in article 3(b) of regulation (eu) 2016/399. the fundamental rights agency should establish general guidance as to the establishment and the independent functioning of such monitoring mechanism. member states should furthermore be allowed to request the support of the fundamental rights agency for developing their national monitoring mechanism. member states should also be allowed to seek advice from the fundamental rights agency with regard to establishing the methodology for this monitoring mechanism and with regard to appropriate training measures. member states should also be allowed to invite relevant and competent national , international and non-governmental organisations and bodies to participate in the monitoring. the independent monitoring mechanism should be without prejudice to the monitoring of fundamental rights provided by the european border and coast guard agency’s fundamental rights monitors provided for in regulation (eu) 2019/1896. the member states should investigate allegations of the breach of the fundamental rights during the screening , including by ensuring that complaints are dealt with expeditiously and in an appropriate way. ### (23) in order to ensure compliance with eu and international law , including the charter of fundamental rights , in all operations taking place at the external borders and all procedures taking place in the context of migration , each member state should establish a monitoring mechanism and put in place adequate safeguards for the independence thereof. the monitoring mechanism should cover in particular the respect for fundamental rights in relation to border surveillance , the screening , the asylum and return procedures , as well as the respect for the applicable national rules regarding detention and compliance with the principle of non-refoulement as referred to in article 3(b) of regulation (eu) 2016/399. the fundamental rights agency should establish general guidance as to the establishment and the independent functioning of such monitoring mechanism. member states should furthermore be encouraged to request the support of the fundamental rights agency for developing their national independent monitoring mechanism. member states should also be allowed to seek advice from the fundamental rights agency with regard to establishing the methodology for this monitoring mechanism and with regard to appropriate training measures. independent national , international and non-governmental organisations and bodies , civil society organisations and human rights defenders should participate in the creation , management and operation of the monitoring mechanism and shall be ensured adequate protection when carrying out their work. the independent monitoring mechanism should be without prejudice to the monitoring of fundamental rights provided by the european border and coast guard agency’s fundamental rights monitors provided for in regulation (eu) 2019/1896 , the mechanism for the purpose of monitoring the operational and technical application of the common european asylum system (ceas) as set out in article 14 of regulation (eu) xxxx/xxxx [eu asylum agency regulation] and in addition to the possible monitoring carried out by existing national or international monitoring bodies. the member states should ensure that national independent authorities involved in the monitoring mechanism and the mechanism itself can properly conduct their work , including by providing access to sites or documents , and by conducting investigations and providing reporting. member states should investigate allegations of the breach of the fundamental rights , including by ensuring that complaints are dealt with expeditiously and in an appropriate way , including by the establishment of effective , proportionate and dissuasive penalties and by procedures that , in cases of breaches of the law , will lead to the identification and sanctioning of those responsible.


### (24) by the end of the screening , the authorities responsible for the screening should fill in a de-briefing form. the form should be transmitted to the authorities examining applications for international protection or to the authorities competent for return – depending on whom the individual is referred to. in the former case , the authorities responsible for the screening should also indicate any elements which may seem to be relevant for determining whether the competent authorities should submit the application of the third-country national concerned to an accelerated examination procedure or to the border procedure. ### (24) by the end of the screening , the authorities responsible for the screening should fill in a de-briefing form. the form should be transmitted to the authorities examining applications for international protection. the form , including the annex , should have a limited retention period clearly defined and based on the principle that the data should be erased when they are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are collected or otherwise processed. the third-country national concerned , should , obtain a copy of the de-briefing form and all information relating to him or her , before this is transmitted to the relevant authorities. the copy should be also in a language that the third-country national understands and should contain all relevant information for the person to exercise their rights to rectify or supplement data or information provided during the screening procedure.


### (25) the biometric data taken during the screening should , together with the data referred to in articles [12 , 13 , 14 and 14a] of the eurodac regulation be transmitted to eurodac by the competent authorities in accordance with the deadlines provided for in that regulation. ### deleted


### (26) a preliminary health examination should be carried out on all persons submitted to the screening at the external borders with a view to identifying persons in need of immediate care or requiring other measures to be taken , for instance isolation on public health grounds. the specific needs of minors and vulnerable persons should be taken into account. if it is clear from the circumstances that such examination is not needed , in particular because the overall condition of the person appears to be very good , the examination should not take place and the person concerned should be informed of that fact. the preliminary health examination should be carried out by the health authorities of the member state concerned. with regard to third-country nationals apprehended within the territory , the preliminary medical examination should be carried out where it is deemed necessary at first sight. ### (26) preliminary health examination and vulnerability checks should be carried out on all persons subject to the screening with a view to identifying persons in a vulnerable situation with special reception needs , including in need of health care or requiring other measures to be taken , for instance isolation on public health grounds. the specific needs of minors and vulnerable persons should be primary consideration. the preliminary health examination should be carried out by the health authorities of the member state concerned , by qualified medical personnel. member states should ensure the adequate staffing both in terms of numbers of medical professionals and their specific training , in particular as they may be dealing with children and persons having suffered various traumatic events. preliminary health and vulnerability checks that have not been completed during the screening should be promptly resumed in the subsequent appropriate procedure in which the third-country national concerned will be referred , without prejudice to the mandatory vulnerability checks to be carried out in the those procedures under regulation (eu) no xx/xxx [asylum and migration management regulation] or directive 2008/115 (return directive).


### (27) during the screening , all persons concerned should be guaranteed a standard of living complying with the charter of fundamental rights of the european union and have access to emergency health care and essential treatment of illnesses. particular attention should be paid to individuals with vulnerabilities , such as pregnant women , elderly persons , single parent families , persons with an immediately identifiable physical or mental disability , persons visibly having suffered psychological or physical trauma and unaccompanied minors. in particular , in case of a minor , information should be provided in a child-friendly and age appropriate manner. all the authorities involved in the performance of the tasks related to the screening should respect human dignity , privacy , and refrain from any discriminating actions or behaviour. ### (27) during the screening , all persons concerned should be guaranteed a standard of living complying with the charter of fundamental rights of the european union and have access to emergency health care and essential treatment of illnesses. without prejudice to article 14 on refusal of entry , as defined in regulation(eu) no 2016/399 , during the screening all relevant provisions of regulation(eu) xxxx/xxxx [asylum procedure regulation] and directive 2013/33/eu [reception conditions directive] apply. particular attention should be paid to vulnerable persons , such as children , unaccompanied children , pregnant women , elderly persons , single parent families , persons with physical or mental disability , victims of trafficking in human beings , victims of torture and inhumane and degrading treatment , victims of sexual and gender-based violence , persons having suffered psychological or physical trauma persons with ptsd symptoms and stateless persons. in particular , in case of children information should be provided in a child-friendly and age appropriate manner and a , where appropriate , a representative should be appointed. all the authorities involved in the performance of the tasks related to the screening should respect human dignity , privacy , and refrain from any discriminating actions or behaviour. the “benefit of the doubt” principle in favour of the minor should always apply when a person’s age is unclear or contested , and no supporting documentation exists that proves his/her age. age assessment procedures should only be initiated when there is a reasonable doubt that the person is not a minor and should foreground a presumption of minority , respect the best interests of the child and primarily use non-medical procedures. under no circumstances should age assessment procedures use forced undressing or genitalia examination.


### (28) since third-country nationals subject to the screening may not carry the necessary identity and travel documents required for the legal crossing of the external border , an identification procedure should be provided for as part of the screening. ### (28) since third-country nationals subject to the screening may not carry the necessary identity and travel documents required for the legal crossing of the external border , an identification procedure should be conducted as part of the screening.


### (29) the common identity repository (“cir”) was established by regulation (eu) 2019/817 of the european parliament and of the council (interoperability regulation)25 to facilitate and assist in the correct identification of persons registered in the entry/exit system (“ees”) , the visa information system (“vis”) , the european travel information and authorisation system (“etias”) , eurodac and in the european criminal records information system for third country nationals (“ecris-tcn”) , including of unknown persons who are unable to identify themselves. for that purpose , the cir contains only the identity , travel document and biometric data recorded in ees , vis , etias , eurodac and ecris-tcn , logically separated. only the personal data strictly necessary to perform an accurate identity check is stored in the cir. the personal data recorded in the cir is kept for no longer than strictly necessary for the purposes of the underlying systems and should automatically be deleted where the data are deleted from the underlying systems. consultation of the cir enables a reliable and exhaustive identification of persons , by making it possible to consult all identity data present in the ees , vis , etias , eurodac and ecris-tcn in one go , in a fast and reliable manner , while ensuring a maximum protection of the data and avoiding unnecessary processing or duplication of data. ### (29) the common identity repository (“cir”) was established by regulation (eu) 2019/817 of the european parliament and of the council (interoperability regulation)25 to facilitate and assist in the correct identification of persons registered in the entry/exit system (“ees”) , the visa information system (“vis”) , the european travel information and authorisation system (“etias”) , eurodac and in the european criminal records information system for third country nationals (“ecris-tcn”) , including of unknown persons who are unable to identify themselves. for that purpose , the cir contains only the identity , travel document and biometric data recorded in ees , vis , etias , eurodac and ecris-tcn , logically separated. only the personal data strictly necessary to perform an accurate identity check is stored in the cir. the personal data recorded in the cir is kept for no longer than strictly necessary for the purposes of the underlying systems and should automatically be deleted where the data are deleted from the underlying systems. consultation of the cir enables a reliable and exhaustive identification of persons , by making it possible to consult all identity data present in the ees , vis , etias , eurodac and ecris-tcn in one go , in a fast and reliable manner , while ensuring a maximum protection of the data and avoiding unnecessary processing or duplication of data. for the purposes of screening and in line with the principles of necessity and proportionality , when querying the cir only the ees , vis and eurodac should be checked.


### (30) in order to establish the identity of the persons subject to the screening , a verification should be initiated in the cir in the presence of the person during the screening. during that verification , the biometric data of the person should be checked against the data contained in the cir. where the biometric data of a person cannot be used or if a query with that data fails , the query could be carried out with identity data of the person in combination with travel document data , where such data are available. in accordance with the principles of necessity and proportionality , and where the query indicates that data on that person are stored in the cir , member state authorities should have access to the cir to consult the identity data , travel document data and biometric data of that person , without the cir providing any indication as to which eu information system the data belong to. ### (30) in order to establish the identity of the persons subject to the screening , a verification should be initiated in the cir in the presence of the person during the screening. during that verification , the biometric data of the person should be checked against the data contained in the cir. where the biometric data of a person cannot be used or if a query with that data fails , the query could be carried out with identity data of the person in combination with travel document data , where such data are available. in accordance with the principles of necessity and proportionality , and where the query indicates that data on that person are stored in the cir , member state authorities should have access to the cir to consult the identity data , travel document data and biometric data of that person , without the cir providing any indication as to which eu information system the data belong to. access to cir by competent member states authorities should be limited to the extent that it is strictly necessary for the performance of their specific tasks in accordance with those purposes , and should be proportionate to the objectives pursued.


### (31) since the use of the cir for identification purposes has been limited by regulation (eu) 2019/817 to facilitating and assisting in the correct identification of persons registered in the ees , vis , etias , eurodac and ecris-tcn in situations of police checks within the territory of the member states , that regulation needs to be amended to provide for the additional purpose of using the cir to identify persons during the screening established by this regulation. ### (31) regulation (eu) 2019/817 needs to be amended to provide for the additional purpose of using the cir to identify persons during the screening as established by this regulation.


### (33) the identification of persons during border checks at the border crossing point and any consultation of the databases in the context of border surveillance or police checks in the external border area by the authorities who referred the person concerned to the screening should be considered as part of the screening and should not be repeated , unless there are special circumstances justifying such repetition. ### (33) the identification of persons during border checks at the border crossing point and any consultation of the databases in the context of border surveillance or police checks in the external border area by the authorities who referred the person concerned to the screening should be considered as part of the screening and should not be repeated. the collection of personal data , and in particular the taking of biometric data in accordance with articles 10 , 13 and 14a of regulation (eu) xxxx/xxxx [eurodac regulation] , should take place only once as part of the screening.


### (34) in order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of articles 11(5) and 12(5) of this regulation , implementing powers should be conferred on the commission. those powers should be exercised in accordance with regulation (eu) no 182/2011 of the european parliament and of the council26 . for the adoption of relevant implementing acts , the examination procedure should be used. ### deleted


### (35) the screening should also assess whether the entry of the third-country nationals into the union could pose a threat to internal security or to public policy. ### deleted


### (36) as the screening concerns persons present at the external border without fulfilling entry conditions , or disembarked after a search and rescue operation , the security checks as part of the screening should be at least of a similar level as the checks performed in respect of third country nationals that apply on beforehand for an authorisation to enter the union for a short stay , whether they are under a visa obligation or not. ### (36) as the screening concerns persons present at the external border who may not fulfil entry conditions , without prejudice to the right to seek international protection , the security checks as part of the screening should be , as long as they comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality , of a similar level as the checks performed in respect of third country nationals that apply on beforehand for an authorisation to enter the union for a short stay , whether they are under a visa obligation or not. in this regard , the persons subject to screening should also have the same rights in relation to their data protection as those third-country nationals applying beforehand for an authorisation to enter the union.


### (39) it follows from the reasoning developed in recital (36) that as regards persons subject to the screening , automated verifications for security purposes should be carried out against the same systems as is provided for applicants for a visa or for a travel authorisation under the european travel information and authorisation system: the vis , ees , etias , sis , ecris-tcn , europol and interpol’s sltd and tdawn. persons submitted to the screening should also be checked against ecris-tcn as regards persons convicted in relation to terrorist offences and other forms of serious criminal offences , europol data referred to in the preceding recital 38 , the interpol’s lost and stolen travel documents database and travel documents associated with notices databases (tdawn). ### (39) as regards persons subject to the screening , automated verifications for security purposes should be carried out against the vis , ees , sis , europol and interpol’s sltd.


### (40) those checks should be conducted in a manner that ensures that only data necessary for carrying out the security checks is retrieved from those databases. with regard to persons who have requested international protection at a border crossing point , the consultation of databases for the security check as part of the screening should focus on the databases that were not consulted during the border checks at the external border , thus avoiding repeated consultations. ### (40) those checks should be conducted in a manner that ensures that only data necessary for carrying out the security checks are consulted and that does not allow for repeated consultations.


### (41) where justified for the purpose of the security check , the screening could also include verification of objects in the possession of third-country nationals , in accordance with national law. any measures applied in this context should be proportionate and should respect the human dignity of the persons subject to the screening. the authorities involved should ensure that the fundamental rights of the individuals concerned are respected , including the right to protection of personal data and freedom of expression. ### (41) where justified for the purpose of the security check , the screening could also include verification of objects in the possession of third-country nationals , in accordance with national law. in any case , verification of objects and , more in general , the screening should not include the accessing of electronic devices in the possession of third-country nationals nor access to their private communications or social media accounts. any measures applied in this context should be proportionate and should respect the human dignity of the persons subject to the screening. the authorities involved should ensure that the fundamental rights of the individuals concerned are respected , including the right to protection of personal data and freedom of expression.


### (42) since access to ees , etias , vis and ecris-tcn is necessary for the authorities designated to carry out the screening in order to establish whether the person could pose a threat to the internal security or to public policy , regulation (ec) no 767/2008 , regulation (eu) 2017/2226 , regulation (eu) 2018/1240 and regulation (ec) no 2019/816 , respectively , should be amended to provide for this additional access right which is currently not provided by those regulations. in the case of regulation (eu) no 2019/816 , this amendment should for reasons of variable geometry take place through a different regulation than the present one. ### deleted


### (43) the european search portal (esp) established by regulation (eu) 2019/817 should be used to carry out the searches against the european databases , ees , etias , vis and ecris-tcn , for identification or for the purpose of security checks , as applicable. ### (43) the european search portal (esp) established by regulation (eu) 2019/817 should be used to carry out the searches against the ees and the vis for identification or for the purpose of security checks , as applicable.