### 8. article 63 of regulation (ec) no 726/2004 shall apply to the emergency task force as regards transparency and the independence of its members. ### 8. article 63 of regulation (ec) no 726/2004 shall apply to the emergency task force as regards transparency and the independence of its members. declarations of interest shall be made publicly available for all stakeholders and experts consulted. stakeholders and experts with conflicts of interest shall not participate in the process.


### 6. where a developer is the recipient of scientific advice , the developer shall subsequently submit the data resulting from clinical trials to the agency following a request made pursuant to article 16. ### 6. where a developer is the recipient of scientific advice , the developer shall subsequently and continuously submit all the data resulting from clinical trials to the agency following a request made pursuant to article 16.


### 3. based on a request from one or more member states , or the commission , the emergency task force shall provide recommendations to the committee for medicinal products for human use for an opinion in accordance with paragraph 4 on the following: ### 3. based on a request from one or more member states , or the commission , the emergency task force shall provide independent recommendations , driven only by public-health needs and not by other interests , to the committee for medicinal products for human use for an opinion in accordance with paragraph 4 on the following:


### (1) directive 2004/37/ec of the european parliament and the council45 aims to protect workers against risks to their health and safety from exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at the workplace. a consistent level of protection from the risks related to the occupational exposure to carcinogens and mutagens is provided for in that directive by a framework of general principles to enable member states to ensure the consistent application of minimum requirements. the aim of these minimum requirements is to protect workers at union level. more stringent provisions can be set by member states. ### (1) directive 2004/37/ec of the european parliament and the council45 aims to protect workers against risks to their health and safety from exposure to carcinogens or mutagens and reprotoxic substances at the workplace. a consistent level of protection from the risks related to the occupational exposure to carcinogens and mutagens and reprotoxic substances is provided for in that directive by a framework of general principles to enable member states to ensure the consistent application of minimum requirements. the aim of these minimum requirements is to protect workers at union level. more stringent provisions can be set by member states.


### (1) directive 2004/37/ec of the european parliament and the council45aims to protect workers against risks to their health and safety from exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at the workplace. a consistent level of protection from the risks related to the occupational exposure to carcinogens and mutagens is provided for in that directive by a framework of general principles to enable member states to ensure the consistent application of minimum requirements. the aim of these minimum requirements is to protect workers at union level. more stringent provisions can be set by member states. ### (1) directive 2004/37/ec of the european parliament and the council45 aims to protect workers against risks to their health and safety from exposure to carcinogens , mutagens or reprotoxic substances at the workplace. a consistent level of protection from the risks related to the occupational exposure to carcinogens , mutagens or reprotoxic substances is provided for in that directive by a framework of general principles to enable member states to ensure the consistent application of minimum requirements. the aim of these minimum requirements is to protect workers at union level. more stringent provisions can be set by member states. these minimum requirements should be established in consultation with the economic and social stakeholders concerned and be based on proportionate and technically feasible values and procedures , in the best interest of the health and safety of workers.


### (2) principle 10 of the european pillar of social rights46 , jointly proclaimed by the european parliament , the council and the commission at the social summit for fair jobs and growth on 17 november 2017 , provides workers’ right to a high level of protection of their health and safety at work , which includes the protection from the exposure to carcinogens and mutagens at the workplace. ### (2) principle 10 of the european pillar of social rights46 , jointly proclaimed by the european parliament , the council and the commission at the social summit for fair jobs and growth on 17 november 2017 , provides workers’ right to a high level of protection of their health and safety at work , which includes the protection from the exposure to carcinogens and mutagens and reprotoxic substances at the workplace.


### (3) binding occupational exposure limit values are important component of the general arrangements for the protection of workers established by directive 2004/37/ec and must not be exceeded. limit values and other directly related provisions should be established for all those carcinogens or mutagens for which the available information , including scientific and technical data , make this possible. ### (3) binding occupational exposure limit values are important component of the general arrangements for the protection of workers established by directive 2004/37/ec and must not be exceeded. limit values and other directly related provisions should be established for all those carcinogens or mutagens or reprotoxic substances for which the available information , including scientific and technical data , make this possible.


### (4) compliance with binding occupational exposure limit values is without prejudice to other employers’ obligations pursuant to directive 2004/37/ec , such as the reduction of the use of carcinogens and mutagens at the workplace , the prevention or reduction of workers’ exposure to carcinogens or mutagens and the measures which should be implemented to that effect. those measures should include , as far as it is technically possible , the replacement of the carcinogen or mutagen by a substance , mixture or process which is not dangerous or is less dangerous to workers’ health , the use of a closed system or other measures aiming to reduce the level of workers’ exposure. ### (4) compliance with binding occupational exposure limit values is without prejudice to other employers’ obligations pursuant to directive 2004/37/ec , such as the reduction of the use of carcinogens , mutagens and reprotoxic substances at the workplace , the prevention or reduction of workers’ exposure to carcinogens , mutagens or reprotoxic chemicals and the measures which should be implemented to that effect. those measures should include , as far as it is technically possible , the replacement of the carcinogen , mutagen or reprotoxic substance by a substance , mixture or process which is not dangerous or is less dangerous to workers’ health , the use of a closed system or other measures aiming to reduce the level of workers’ exposure.


### (4) compliance with binding occupational exposure limit values is without prejudice to other employers’ obligations pursuant to directive 2004/37/ec , such as the reduction of the use of carcinogens and mutagens at the workplace , the prevention or reduction of workers’ exposure to carcinogens or mutagens and the measures which should be implemented to that effect. those measures should include , as far as it is technically possible , the replacement of the carcinogen or mutagen by a substance , mixture or process which is not dangerous or is less dangerous to workers’ health , the use of a closed system or other measures aiming to reduce the level of workers’ exposure. ### (4) compliance with binding occupational exposure limit values is without prejudice to other employers’ obligations pursuant to directive 2004/37/ec , such as the reduction of the use of carcinogens and mutagens at the workplace , the prevention or reduction of workers’ exposure to carcinogens or mutagens and the measures which should be implemented to that effect. those measures should include , as far as it is technically possible , the replacement of the carcinogen or mutagen by a substance , mixture or process which is not dangerous to workers’ health , the use of a closed system or other measures aiming to reduce or eliminate the level of workers’ exposure. research programmes in this area , notably on the risks to workers’ health , could be funded under future national and european recovery plans.


### (5) this directive strengthens the protection of workers’ health and safety at their workplace. new limit values should be set out in directive 2004/37/ec in the light of available information , including new scientific and technical data and should also be based on a thorough assessment of the socioeconomic impact and availability of exposure measurement protocols and techniques at the workplace. that information should , if possible , include data on residual risks to the health of workers , opinions of the committee for risk assessment (rac) of the european chemicals agency (echa) , as well as opinions of the advisory committee on safety and health at work (acsh). information related to residual risk , made publicly available at union level , is valuable for any future work to limit risks from occupational exposure to carcinogens and mutagens. ### (5) this directive strengthens the protection of workers’ health and safety at their workplace. new limit values should be set out in directive 2004/37/ec using a risk-based methodology. all available information should be considered , including new scientific and technical data , a thorough assessment of the socioeconomic impact and the availability of exposure measurement protocols and techniques at the workplace. that information should , if possible , include data on residual risks to the health of workers , opinions of the committee for risk assessment (rac) of the european chemicals agency (echa) , as well as opinions of the advisory committee on safety and health at work (acsh). information related to residual risk , made publicly available at union level , is valuable for any future work to limit risks from occupational exposure to carcinogens , mutagens and reprotoxic substances.


### (6) in accordance with the recommendations of the rac and the acsh , where possible , limit values for the inhalation route of exposure are established in relation to a reference period of eight hours time-weighted average (long-term exposure limit values) and , for certain carcinogens or mutagens to a shorter reference period , in general fifteen minutes time-weighted average (short-term exposure limit values) , in order to limit , to the extent possible , the effects arising from short-term exposure. ### (6) in accordance with the recommendations of the rac and the acsh , where possible , limit values for the inhalation route of exposure are established in relation to a reference period of eight hours time-weighted average (long-term exposure limit values) and , for certain carcinogens , mutagens or reprotoxic substances to a shorter reference period , in general fifteen minutes time-weighted average (short-term exposure limit values) , in order to limit , to the extent possible , the effects arising from short-term exposure.


### (7) it is also necessary to consider other absorption pathways than inhalation of all carcinogens and mutagens , including the possibility of uptake through the skin , in order to ensure the best possible level of protection. ### (7) it is also necessary to consider other absorption pathways than inhalation of all carcinogens , mutagens and reprotoxic substances , including the possibility of uptake through the skin , in order to ensure the best possible level of protection.


### (7) it is also necessary to consider other absorption pathways than inhalation of all carcinogens and mutagens , including the possibility of uptake through the skin , in order to ensure the best possible level of protection. ### (7) it is also necessary to consider other absorption pathways than inhalation of all carcinogens and mutagens , including the possibility of uptake through the skin , transdermally or through the mucous membranes , in order to ensure the best possible level of protection.


### (13) benzene meets the criteria for classification as carcinogenic (category 1a) in accordance with regulation (ec) no 1272/2008 and is therefore carcinogen within the meaning of directive 2004/37/ec. benzene can also be absorbed through the skin. the limit value set out in annex iii to directive 2004/37/ec for benzene should be revised in the light of more recent scientific data and it is appropriate to keep the skin notation. the acsh , based on the rac opinion , agreed on the usefulness of the biomonitoring for benzene. this should be considered when developing guidance on the practical use of biomonitoring. ### (13) benzene meets the criteria for classification as carcinogenic (category 1a) in accordance with regulation (ec) no 1272/2008 and is therefore carcinogen within the meaning of directive 2004/37/ec. benzene can also be absorbed through the skin. the limit value set out in annex iii to directive 2004/37/ec for benzene should be revised in the light of more recent scientific data no later than 1 january 2030 in accordance with the acsh opinion and it is appropriate to keep the skin notation. the acsh , based on the rac opinion , also agreed on the usefulness of the biomonitoring for benzene. this should be considered when developing guidance on the practical use of biomonitoring.


### (13) benzene meets the criteria for classification as carcinogenic (category 1a) in accordance with regulation (ec) no 1272/2008 and is therefore carcinogen within the meaning of directive 2004/37/ec. benzene can also be absorbed through the skin. the limit value set out in annex iii to directive 2004/37/ec for benzene should be revised in the light of more recent scientific data and it is appropriate to keep the skin notation. the acsh , based on the rac opinion , agreed on the usefulness of the biomonitoring for benzene. this should be considered when developing guidance on the practical use of biomonitoring. ### (13) benzene meets the criteria for classification as carcinogenic (category 1a) in accordance with regulation (ec) no 1272/2008 and is therefore carcinogen within the meaning of directive 2004/37/ec. benzene can also be absorbed through the skin. the limit value set out in annex iii to directive 2004/37/ec for benzene should be revised in the light of more recent scientific data by 1 january 2030 at the latest , in accordance with the opinion of the acsh , and it is appropriate to keep the skin notation. the acsh , based on the rac opinion , agreed on the usefulness of the biomonitoring for benzene. this should be considered when developing guidance on the practical use of biomonitoring.


### (14) with regard to benzene , a revised limit value of 0.2 ppm (0.66 mg/m³) may be difficult to be complied with in some sectors in the short term. a transitional period of 4 years after entry into force of this directive should be introduced. from two years up to four years after entry into force , a transitional limit value of 0.5 ppm (1.65 mg/m³) should apply. ### (14) with regard to benzene , a revised limit value of 0.05 ppm (0.16 mg/m³) may be difficult to be complied with in some sectors in the short term. a transitional period of 4 years after entry into force of this directive should be introduced. from two years up to four years after entry into force , a transitional limit value of 0.5 ppm (1.65 mg/m³) should apply.


### (17) since the objective of this directive , namely to protect workers against risks to their health and safety , including the prevention of such risks , arising or likely to arise from exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work , cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states , but can rather , by reason of its scale and effects , be better achieved at union level , the union may adopt measures , in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union. in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. ### (17) since the objective of this directive , namely to protect workers against risks to their health and safety , including the prevention of such risks , arising or likely to arise from exposure to carcinogens , mutagens or reprotoxic substances at work , cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states , but can rather , by reason of its scale and effects , be better achieved at union level , the union may adopt measures , in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union. in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.


### (16) the limit values established in this directive are to be kept under regular scrutiny and review to ensure consistency with regulation (ec) no 1907/200649. ### (16) the limit values established in this directive are to be kept under regular scrutiny and strictly reviewed every five years at least and on the basis of advances in knowledge and technologies to ensure consistency with regulation (ec) no 1907/200649.


### (4) taking into account the provisions of article 9(3) of the aarhus convention , as well as concerns expressed by the aarhus convention compliance committee62 , union law should be brought into compliance with the provisions of the aarhus convention on access to justice in environmental matters in a way that is compatible with the fundamental principles of union law and with its system of judicial review. ### (4) taking into account the provisions of article 9(3) of the aarhus convention , as well as concerns expressed by the aarhus convention compliance committee62 , union law should be brought into full compliance with the provisions of the aarhus convention on access to justice in environmental matters in a way that is compatible with the fundamental principles of union law , with fundamental rights , and with its system of judicial review.


### a. whereas methane is a powerful greenhouse gas , 86 times more potent than carbon dioxide (co2) over a 20-year period , making it the second most important greenhouse gas , contributing to about a quarter of the global warming experienced today4 ; ### a. whereas methane is a powerful greenhouse gas , 86 times more potent than carbon dioxide (co2) over a 20-year period , making it the second most important greenhouse gas , as well as a precursor pollutant to tropospheric ozone(o3) , contributing to about a quarter of the global warming experienced today4 ;


### b. whereas the european climate law commits the eu to reaching climate neutrality by 2050 with increased emission reductions by 2030; whereas addressing energy-related methane emissions is a key component of the european green deal , as are measures in the agriculture and waste sectors; whereas the eu strategy to reduce methane emissions notes that the eu should also play a role in ensuring methane emission reductions at global level , as the largest global importer of fossil fuels and a significant player in the agriculture sector; ### b. whereas the european climate law commits the eu to reaching climate neutrality by 2050 and sets a binding domestic reduction target of net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% compared to 1990 levels by 2030; whereas addressing energy-related methane emissions is a key component of the european green deal , as are measures in the agriculture and waste sectors; whereas the eu strategy to reduce methane emissions notes that the eu should also play a role in ensuring methane emission reductions at global level , as the largest global importer of fossil fuels and a significant player in the agriculture sector;


### b. whereas the european climate law commits the eu to reaching climate neutrality by 2050 with increased emission reductions by 2030; whereas addressing energy-related methane emissions is a key component of the european green deal , as are measures in the agriculture and waste sectors; whereas the eu strategy to reduce methane emissions notes that the eu should also play a role in ensuring methane emission reductions at global level , as the largest global importer of fossil fuels and a significant player in the agriculture sector; ### b. whereas the european climate law commits the eu to reaching climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest with increased emission reductions by 2030; whereas immediately and significantly reducing energy-related methane emissions is a key component of the european green deal , as are measures in the agriculture and waste sectors; whereas the eu strategy to reduce methane emissions notes that the eu should also play a role in ensuring methane emission reductions at global level , as the largest global importer of fossil fuels and a significant player in the agri-food sector globally;


### b. whereas the european climate law commits the eu to reaching climate neutrality by 2050 with increased emission reductions by 2030; whereas addressing energy-related methane emissions is a key component of the european green deal , as are measures in the agriculture and waste sectors; whereas the eu strategy to reduce methane emissions notes that the eu should also play a role in ensuring methane emission reductions at global level , as the largest global importer of fossil fuels and a significant player in the agriculture sector; ### b. whereas the european climate law commits the eu to reaching climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest , with increased emission reductions by 2030; whereas addressing energy-related methane emissions is a key component of the european green deal , as are measures in the agriculture and waste sectors; whereas the eu strategy to reduce methane emissions notes that the eu should also play a role in ensuring methane emission reductions at global level , as the largest global importer of fossil fuels and a significant player in the agriculture sector;


### c. whereas reducing methane emissions is indispensable in the fight against climate change , in line with the goals of the paris agreement; whereas methane emissions contribute to air pollution and it is therefore necessary to tackle these emissions in order to protect the health of eu citizens; ### c. whereas reducing methane emissions is indispensable in the fight against climate change , in line with the goals of the paris agreement; whereas methane emissions contribute to air pollution and it is therefore necessary to tackle these emissions in order to protect the health of eu citizens and ecosystems;


### d. whereas cutting methane emissions can have a quicker impact on slowing the rate of global warming than reducing co2 emissions , since methane does not stay in the atmosphere for as long , and it could therefore be one of the most cost-effective strategies to rapidly reduce the rate of warming and avoid some tipping points for global warming; ### d. whereas reducing methane emissions has a major impact on slowing the rate of global warming , and is therefore one of the most effective strategies to rapidly reduce the rate of warming and avoid tipping points for global warming; whereas increases in methane emissions , compared to other ghgs can drastically accelerate global warming; whereas although reductions in methane can produce the quickest cooling effect , it is imperative that action is taken across all sectors to reduce all greenhouse gases;


### d. whereas cutting methane emissions can have a quicker impact on slowing the rate of global warming than reducing co2 emissions , since methane does not stay in the atmosphere for as long , and it could therefore be one of the most cost-effective strategies to rapidly reduce the rate of warming and avoid some tipping points for global warming; ### d. whereas cutting methane emissions can have a quicker impact on slowing the rate of global warming than reducing co2 emissions , since methane does not stay in the atmosphere for as long , and it therefore is one of the most effective strategies to rapidly reduce the rate of warming , achieve the objectives of the paris agreement by limiting warming to 1.5°c , and avoid some tipping points for global warming;


### 1. welcomes the cross-sectoral approach outlined in the eu strategy to reduce methane emissions and fully supports a fair framework covering the agriculture , waste and energy sectors; ### 1. notes the cross-sectoral approach outlined in the eu strategy to reduce methane emissions and fully supports a comprehensive policy framework covering the agriculture , waste and energy sectors; regrets however , the lack of binding measures and emissions reduction targets for the agricultural sector; stresses the need for the agricultural sector , with particular emphasis on the industrial livestock industry , to take responsibility for their contribution to the climate crisis , calls on the commission and the member states to swiftly commit to concrete , sustained and binding measures to reduce agricultural emissions of methane and other greenhouse gases;


### 1. welcomes the cross-sectoral approach outlined in the eu strategy to reduce methane emissions and fully supports a fair framework covering the agriculture , waste and energy sectors; ### 1. welcomes the cross-sectoral approach outlined in the eu strategy to reduce methane emissions and fully supports a fair and effective framework covering the agriculture , waste and energy sectors; regrets that the strategy failed to lay down measures and targets for real methane reductions in these and other sectors;


### 2. underlines the importance of improving measurement , reporting and verification (mrv) as well as leak detection and repair (ldar) standards; ### 2. underlines the importance of improving measurement , reporting and verification (mrv) as well as leak detection and repair (ldar) standards; stresses , however , that lack of data should not prevent swift and effective action on anthropogenic methane emissions , especially measures targeting the agricultural sector;


### 3. underscores the need to revise eu climate and environmental legislation in a coherent manner; takes the view that the binding emissions reduction targets for member states in the effort sharing regulation5 should remain the main legislative tool to reduce methane emissions , while the industrial emissions directive6 and other legislation could serve as a complementary tool; ### 3. underscores the need to revise eu climate and environmental legislation in a coherent manner to reflect enhanced ambition in line with the goals of the paris agreement; takes the view that , in light of the urgency to mitigate methane emissions , there is a need for adopting an overarching legislative framework setting binding european and national methane reduction targets in all the relevant emitting sectors; takes the view that the binding emissions reduction targets for member states in the effort sharing regulation5 should remain one of the main legislative tools to reduce methane emissions , as well as the common agricultural policy , the industrial emissions directive6 and the national emission reduction commitments (nec) directive; welcomes the proposal in the strategy to review the nec directive and to explore the possible inclusion of methane among the regulated pollutants , urges the commission to complete this review as soon as possible and much earlier than 2025.


### 3. underscores the need to revise eu climate and environmental legislation in a coherent manner; takes the view that the binding emissions reduction targets for member states in the effort sharing regulation5 should remain the main legislative tool to reduce methane emissions , while the industrial emissions directive6 and other legislation could serve as a complementary tool; ### 3. underscores the need to revise eu climate and environmental legislation in a coherent manner; notes that alongside the binding emissions reduction targets for member states in the effort sharing regulation , the industrial emissions directive should be revised to better address methane emissions; urges the commission to expand the scope of the industrial emissions directive by including effective measures and binding targets to drastically curb greenhouse gas emissions from all industrial and agriculture sources , including cattle-rearing;


### 4. stresses the importance of developing an inventory of best practices and available technologies to promote the wider uptake of innovative mitigating actions; ### 4. stresses the importance of developing an inventory of best practices and available technologies to promote the wider uptake of innovative mitigating actions; underlines that all measures and technologies need to be in line with the animal welfare and environmental objectives and the ‘do no harm’ principle of the green deal;


### 4. stresses the importance of developing an inventory of best practices and available technologies to promote the wider uptake of innovative mitigating actions; ### 4. stresses the importance of developing an inventory at eu-level of best practices and available technologies for methane mitigation to promote the wider and more accelerated uptake of innovative mitigating actions;


### 5. stresses that the upcoming methane regulatory measures should strive to achieve emissions reductions as cost-effectively as possible and provide flexibility for companies to achieve performance standards in an optimal , technologically neutral manner , and at the lowest possible cost; ### 5. stresses that the upcoming methane regulatory measures should strive to achieve emissions reductions as swiftly and effectively as possible;


### 5. stresses that the upcoming methane regulatory measures should strive to achieve emissions reductions as cost-effectively as possible and provide flexibility for companies to achieve performance standards in an optimal , technologically neutral manner , and at the lowest possible cost; ### 5. stresses that the upcoming methane regulatory measures should strive to achieve significant emissions reductions as effectively as possible; considers it inappropriate and ineffective to provide flexibility for companies to achieve performance standards , as this could risk undermining the regulatory measures;


### 6. recognises the importance of voluntary industry initiatives aimed at reducing methane emissions and considers that any regulatory initiatives should build upon best practices from existing voluntary actions and must be duly preceded by thorough impact assessments; ### 6. considers voluntary industry initiatives aimed at reducing methane emissions to be highly problematic based on the urgent need for such reductions; considers that regulatory measures must be assessed , introduced and implemented in their own right based on the latest available science;


### 6. recognises the importance of voluntary industry initiatives aimed at reducing methane emissions and considers that any regulatory initiatives should build upon best practices from existing voluntary actions and must be duly preceded by thorough impact assessments; ### 6. recognises the importance of regulatory measures , underlines that voluntary industry initiatives aimed at reducing methane emissions or other greenhouse gases have not yielded significant results and that we have no more time to waste;


### energy ### energy and petrochemicals


### 7. welcomes the upcoming legislative proposal on compulsory mrv for all energy-related methane emissions; ### 7. welcomes that the commission is working on a legislative proposal on compulsory mrv for all energy-related methane emissions; insists that the legislative proposal introduces measures for methane emissions for all energy categories , including coal; calls on the commission to also include the petrochemicals sector in its proposal; calls on the commission to prohibit fossil gas , oil and coal suppliers from placing fossil gas , oil and coal , as well as fossil gas , oil and coal products , including energy and fuels derived therefrom , on the eu market without mandatory methane mrv or any comparably effective measure put in place , including abandoned coal mines where ownership is known; emphasises verification should be fully independent; stresses that this mrv should be based on a comprehensive equipment survey and application of the most up-to-date emission factors , with a directive to move to actual measurement data within two years;


### 8. welcomes the commission’s proposal to consider legislation on venting and flaring in the energy sector covering , if feasible , the full supply chain; considers that existing national legislation addressing routine venting and flaring , taking into account complex safety and environmental aspects , must be taken into consideration when developing eu legislation; ### 8. calls on the commission to immediately introduce a legislative proposal to ban all routine venting and flaring in the energy and petrochemical sectors covering the full supply chain , and to prohibit fossil gas , natural gas liquids (ngl) and oil suppliers from placing on the eu market fossil gas , ngl and oil as well as fossil gas , ngl and oil products , including energy and fuels derived therefrom , as well as pellets and plastics derived from ngl , where no venting and flaring ban or any comparably effective measure is in place unless evidence is provided that the limited use of flaring is for a legitimate purpose , e.g. safety testing or safe disposal of harmful gases , and no technique exists that could capture the methane;


### 8. welcomes the commission’s proposal to consider legislation on venting and flaring in the energy sector covering , if feasible , the full supply chain; considers that existing national legislation addressing routine venting and flaring , taking into account complex safety and environmental aspects , must be taken into consideration when developing eu legislation; ### 8. welcomes the commission’s proposal to consider legislation on venting and flaring in the energy sector covering the full supply chain; considers that existing national legislation addressing routine venting and flaring , is insufficient; calls on the commission to propose the swift elimination of the practice of routine venting and flaring;


### 9. acknowledges that imports comprise over four fifths of the oil and gas consumed in the eu and that most methane emissions associated with oil and gas occur outside eu borders; calls on the commission to explore regulatory tools for fossil energy imports , including extending forthcoming obligations on mrv , ldar , venting and flaring to imports; ### 9. acknowledges that imports comprise over four fifths of the oil and gas consumed in the eu and that most methane emissions associated with oil and gas occur outside eu borders; calls on the commission to propose regulatory tools for fossil energy imports , including extending forthcoming obligations on mrv , ldar , venting and flaring to imports and developing mandatory performance standards; stresses that the only long-term solution for this problem is reducing the eu’s dependency on imports of oil and gas by phasing-out the consumption of these energy sources in the eu;


### 9. acknowledges that imports comprise over four fifths of the oil and gas consumed in the eu and that most methane emissions associated with oil and gas occur outside eu borders; calls on the commission to explore regulatory tools for fossil energy imports , including extending forthcoming obligations on mrv , ldar , venting and flaring to imports; ### 9. acknowledges that imports comprise over four fifths of the oil and gas consumed in the eu and that most methane emissions associated with oil and gas occur outside eu borders; acknowledges also , therefore , that the eu must play a role in the mitigation of methane emissions beyond its borders; calls on the commission to introduce regulatory tools for all fossil energy imports , including extending forthcoming mandatory obligations on mrv , ldar , venting and flaring to imports for placing on the eu market;


### 10. calls on the commission to support the establishment of an independent international methane emissions observatory , in partnership with the united nations environmental programme , the climate and clean air coalition and the international energy agency , tasked with collecting , reconciling , verifying and publishing anthropogenic methane emissions data at a global level; ### 10. calls on the commission to support the establishment of an independent international methane emissions observatory , in partnership with the united nations environmental programme , the climate and clean air coalition and the international energy agency , tasked with collecting , reconciling , verifying and publishing anthropogenic methane emissions data at a global level; welcomes that the commission wants to spearhead this initiative , including by mobilising funding; considers it imperative that the scope of the observatory covers methane emissions also from coal , waste and agricultural activities from the outset and that there is no two-stepped approach with the scope of the observatory;


### 11. welcomes the commission’s initiatives on the utilisation and mitigation of methane from coal mines; expresses its strong support for mandatory mrv for coal mine methane emissions , including the requirement for companies that own closed sites or member states (for abandoned mines where no existing owner is liable) to adopt the same mrv and ldar measures as for operating sites; ### 11. welcomes the commission’s initiatives on the utilisation and mitigation of methane from coal mines; expresses its strong support for mandatory mrv for coal mine methane emissions , including the requirement for companies that own closed sites or member states (for abandoned mines where no existing owner is liable) to adopt the same mrv and ldar measures as for operating sites; stresses that the only real solution is a very rapid complete phase-out of coal mining and coal-fired electricity production and consumption in the eu and insists that swift regulatory action to achieve this is necessary;


### 12. stresses that technologies and practices to limit methane emissions from agriculture are developing at a fast pace; calls on the commission to ensure that proven effective and cost-efficient innovations are quickly implemented in the eu and integrated into eu agriculture policies; ### 12. stresses that technologies and practices to limit methane emissions from agriculture are developing at a fast pace , notes that many of the so-called solutions which are put forward by the industry are in fact only end-of-pipe measures , which do not address the roots of the problem and that implementation of these measures will delay effective action; calls on the commission to ensure that only proven effective innovations which are in line with the intrinsic value of animals and their enshrined right to be treated as sentient beings with full regard to their welfare requirements are quickly implemented in the eu and integrated into eu agriculture policies;


### 12. stresses that technologies and practices to limit methane emissions from agriculture are developing at a fast pace; calls on the commission to ensure that proven effective and cost-efficient innovations are quickly implemented in the eu and integrated into eu agriculture policies; ### 12. stresses that many technologies and practices to limit and reduce methane emissions from agriculture already exist and that more are developing at a fast pace; calls on the commission to ensure that proven effective methane mitigation practices and technologies are quickly implemented in the eu and integrated into eu agriculture policies; stresses that while methane emission efficiency improvements in agriculture are welcome , efficiency improvements will not necessarily lead to absolute methane emissions reductions;


### 13. underlines the key role that the eu should play in supporting research , innovation and development , as well as in scaling up new technologies to help address methane emissions from livestock agriculture , while protecting animal health and welfare; points especially to the need for multigenerational studies on feed additives; ### 13. underlines the key role that the eu should play in supporting the development of agro-ecological and plant-based agricultural practices , as well as in reducing the methane emissions from livestock agriculture by reducing animal density and animal livestock numbers , while protecting animal health and welfare; points out that feed additives are no effective solution and could lead to serious animal health problems as well as to food safety issues;


### 13. underlines the key role that the eu should play in supporting research , innovation and development , as well as in scaling up new technologies to help address methane emissions from livestock agriculture , while protecting animal health and welfare; points especially to the need for multigenerational studies on feed additives; ### 13. underlines the key role that the eu should play in supporting research , innovation and development , as well as in scaling up new sustainable technologies to address methane emissions from livestock agriculture , while improving animal health and welfare; points to the need for multigenerational studies on feed additives;


### 15. calls on the member states to fully comply with the existing requirements of the landfill directive , including the objective for 2035 , by which date the amount of municipal waste landfilled is to be reduced to 10 % or less of the total amount of municipal waste generated , by weight; calls on the commission to develop a comprehensive strategy to ensure that member states that are likely to miss that target take corrective measures and actions; ### 15. calls on the member states to fully comply with the existing requirements of the landfill directive , including the objective for the amount of biodegradable municipal waste landfilled to be reduced to 35% or less of the total amount of biodegradable municipal waste generated , by weight; calls on the commission to ensure that member states that have missed that target take corrective measures and actions;


### 1. welcomes the contribution of the european food safety authority (the 'authority') to the safety of the union food and feed chain , and its considerable efforts in providing risk managers with comprehensive , independent and up-to-date scientific advice on questions linked to the food chain , communicating clearly to the public on its outputs and the information on which they are based , and cooperating with interested parties and institutional partners to promote coherence and trust in the food safety system; ### 1. welcomes the contribution of the european food safety authority (the 'authority') to the safety of the union food and feed chain and to improving animal welfare , urges the authority to step up its efforts in providing risk managers with timely , comprehensive , independent and up-to-date scientific advice on questions linked to the food and feed chain , and to communicating more clearly to the public on its outputs and the information and sometimes lack thereof on which they are based , to promote coherence and trust in the food safety system;


### 2. notes that the authority's final budget for 2020 was eur 103 023 255 ,80 , and that the entire sum derives from the union budget; notes that the budget monitoring efforts during 2020 resulted in an implementation rate of 100 % for commitment appropriations and 88 % for payment appropriations; insists that the authority be granted sufficient resources to carry out its tasks; ### 2. notes that the authority's final budget for 2020 was eur 103 023 255 ,80 , and underlines that the entire sum derives from the union budget and this contributes to authority's independence; notes that the budget monitoring efforts during 2020 resulted in an implementation rate of 100 % for commitment appropriations and 88 % for payment appropriations; insists that the authority be granted sufficient resources to carry out its tasks;


### 7. notes with satisfaction that the authority is moving towards cutting-edge technologies , incorporating new approach methodologies and artificial intelligence to avoid animal testing methods; ### 7. notes with satisfaction that the authority is moving towards cutting-edge technologies , incorporating new approach methodologies and artificial intelligence to avoid animal testing methods , encourages the authority to increase its efforts to protect animal welfare even further and to promote the use of non-animal testing methods , also in its cooperation with other institutions;


### 11. recommends , based on the facts available , that discharge be granted to the executive director of the european food safety authority in respect of the implementation of the authority's budget for the financial year 2020. ### 11. recommends , based on the facts available , that discharge should not be granted to the executive director of the european food safety authority in respect of the implementation of the authority's budget for the financial year 2020.


### a. whereas soil is an essential , complex , multifunctional , and living ecosystem of crucial environmental and socio-economic importance which performs many key functions and delivers services vital to human activities and ecosystems survival; ### a. whereas soil is an essential , complex , multifunctional , and living ecosystem of crucial environmental and socio-economic importance which performs many key functions and delivers services vital to human existence and ecosystems survival , such as the provision of food , energy and raw materials , carbon sequestration , water purification , nutrient regulation , pest control , and support for biodiversity and recreation;


### a. whereas soil is an essential , complex , multifunctional , and living ecosystem of crucial environmental and socio-economic importance which performs many key functions and delivers services vital to human activities and ecosystems survival; ### a. whereas soil is an essential , complex , multifunctional , and living ecosystem of crucial environmental and socio-economic importance which performs many key functions and delivers services vital to human health and activities and ecosystems survival so that future generations can meet their own needs;


### 15. calls on euibas and national authorities to adopt a dedicated communications framework containing measures to rapidly detect foreign interference attacks and attempts to manipulate the information sphere in order to prevent and counter them; welcomes the role of nato stratcom coe and hybrid coe as important partners in developing increased situational awareness and additional responses to counter fimi; ### 15. calls on euibas and national authorities to adopt a dedicated communications framework containing measures to rapidly detect foreign interference attacks and attempts to manipulate the information sphere in order to prevent and counter them;


### 1. stresses that all the conditions necessary to guarantee animal welfare during transport must be ensured at all times , regardless of their species , age , physical condition or the means and length of the journey; ### 1. stresses that all the conditions necessary to guarantee animal welfare during transport must be ensured at all times , for all the animals transported , regardless of their species , age , category , physical condition , the means of transport and length of the journey;


### 2. agrees with the court of auditors that the eu3 has some of the world’s highest animal welfare standards , but insists that these only become effective if they are fully enforced; considers that the eu needs to step up its efforts to ensure that animal welfare during transport is fully respected everywhere , at all times , and by every party concerned , from the origin until the final destination; ### 2. notes that according to the court of auditors the eu has some of the world’s highest animal welfare standards , but notices that recently some countries/regions took further steps by banning live export and the transport of specific categories of animals;


### 26. considers that equipping the means of transport with a cctv system , with a particular focus on the loading and unloading operations , should be promoted for the sake of animal welfare protection and in order to safeguard operators who comply with the rules; stresses that data protection and privacy rights must be ensured by the competent authorities throughout the entire process; ### 26. considers it necessary to equip all means of animal transport with a cctv system , with a particular focus on the loading and unloading operations , for the sake of animal welfare protection and in order to safeguard operators who comply with the rules , and in order to ensure full transparency the images of the cctv cameras on board of lorries and vessels should be made publicly accessible through web streaming; stresses that data protection and privacy rights must be fully ensured by the competent authorities throughout the entire process;


### 26. recalls that , while under the current legislation , the submission of contingency plans in the event of emergencies is a legal requirement to obtain transporter authorisations for long journeys , this is not the case for each journey and the possible specific needs thereof; observes with concern that few competent authorities , road transporters and transport organisers have feasible contingency plans to respond to emergency situations; ### 26. recalls that , while under the current legislation , the submission of contingency plans in the event of emergencies is a legal requirement to obtain transporter authorisations for long journeys , this is not the case for each journey and the possible specific needs thereof; observes with concern that few competent authorities , road transporters and transport organisers have feasible contingency plans to respond to emergency situations , while situations like these can arise at any time , and especially have huge consequences for animals transported at sea;


### 27. draws attention to the fact that , under the current framework , the certificate of competence for the drivers and attendants of the means of transport can be valid for life , without any mandatory requirement set at european level for refresher courses and skills updates; ### 27. is concerned with the fact that , under the current framework , the certificate of competence for the drivers and attendants of the means of transport can be valid for life , without any mandatory requirement set at european level for refresher courses and skills updates;


### 28. recognises that training and education are essential to safeguarding the welfare of animals during transport , to guaranteeing that transport operators are well-prepared for activating contingency planning and ensuring that species-specific requirements are properly met; recognises that the workers responsible for the handling of animals in the ports , in particular , do not always receive appropriate training; ### 28. recognises that training and education are essential to safeguarding the welfare of animals during transport , to guaranteeing that transport operators are well-prepared for activating contingency planning and ensuring that species-specific requirements are properly met; recognises that the workers responsible for the handling of animals in the ports , in particular , do not always receive appropriate training and the welfare of the animals is therefore not guaranteed and often violated;


### 29. recalls that the official controls regulation (eu) no 2017/625 will replace , as of 15 december 2022 , several provisions of regulation (ec) no 1/2005 , namely on checks on long journeys , training of the competent authorities’ staff , checks at exit points , emergency measures in the case of non-compliance , mutual assistance and exchange of information , infringements and on-the-spot checks by the commission; ### 29. recalls that the official controls regulation (eu) no 2017/625 will replace , as of 15 december 2022 , several provisions of regulation (ec) no 1/2005 , namely on checks on long journeys , training of the competent authorities’ staff , checks at exit points , emergency measures in the case of non-compliance , mutual assistance and exchange of information , infringements and on-the-spot checks by the commission , and emphasises the need for frequent and thorough inspections;


### 30. recalls that according to the court of auditors report from 2018 , most of the national authorities did not use the information available in the trade control and expert system (traces) to target their inspections and/or audits , in part due to existing user access restrictions; recognises that a better use of the traces system for the performance of retrospective checks should be ensured; ### 30. recalls that according to the court of auditors report from 2018 , most of the national authorities did not use the information available in the trade control and expert system (traces) to target their inspections and/or audits , in part due to existing user access restrictions; recognises that a better use of the traces system for the performance of retrospective checks should be ensured , by solving the issue of user access restrictions and expanding the rights to public access;


### 32. notes that further improvements to data collection systems and to traces can be made in the current legislative framework , to help harmonise procedures between member states’ competent authorities; ### 32. notes that further improvements to data collection systems and to traces can and should be made in the current legislative framework , to help harmonise procedures between member states’ competent authorities;


### 33. expresses concern that the member states are not required to record data on the transport of animals directly exported from their territories to outside the eu in traces; ### 33. expresses concern that the member states are not required to record data on the transport of animals directly exported from their territories to outside the eu in traces , and that there is still a lack of coherent data collection and reporting from third countries , which prevents an accurate view of the trade of live animals and the protection of these animals outside of the eu;


### 9. emphasises the clear link between respect for the rule of law and the efficient implementation of the union budget in accordance with the principles of sound financial management: economy , efficiency and effectiveness , as laid down in the financial regulation; recalls that , upon adoption of the conditionality regulation , parliament , the council and the commission agreed to consider including the content of the conditionality regulation into the financial regulation upon its next revision; calls on the commission to examine possibilities to strengthen coherence between the two instruments; ### 9. emphasises the clear link between respect for the rule of law and the efficient implementation of the union budget in accordance with the principles of sound financial management: economy , efficiency and effectiveness , as laid down in the financial regulation; recalls that , upon adoption of the conditionality regulation , parliament , the council and the commission agreed to include the content of the conditionality regulation into the financial regulation upon its next revision; calls on the commission to strengthen coherence between the two instruments; recalls that in june 2021 , the ep triggered article 265 and called the commission to fulfill its obligations under the rule of law conditionality regulation;


### 20. notes that article 59 of the financial regulation relates to the conferral on ‘other union institutions’ of the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them; welcomes the fact that the concept of ‘conferral’ underlines the autonomy of the other institutions as regards the management of their funds; notes , however , that the commission has repeatedly and consistently taken the view that it is not in a position to exercise scrutiny over the implementing activities carried out by other institutions; proposes to address this issue by changing article 260 of the financial regulation , to make parliament explicitly responsible for scrutinising the budget implementation by the other institutions in the discharge procedure; ### 20. notes that article 59 of the financial regulation relates to the conferral on ‘other union institutions’ of the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them; welcomes the fact that the concept of ‘conferral’ underlines the autonomy of the other institutions as regards the management of their funds; notes , however , that the commission has repeatedly and consistently taken the view that it is not in a position to exercise scrutiny over the implementing activities carried out by other institutions; proposes to address this issue by changing article 260 of the financial regulation , to make parliament explicitly responsible for scrutinising the budget implementation by the other institutions in the discharge procedure; in this regards , reminds that both the council and eppo should be considered within the scope of other institutions and submitted as such to the discharge procedure;


### — having regard to articles 4 , 26 , 114 , 169 , 173 , 179 , 180 , 181 and 187 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) , ### — having regard to articles 4 , 16 , 26 , 114 , 169 , 173 , 179 , 180 , 181 and 187 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) ,


### 1. notes that the world stands on the verge of the fourth industrial revolution; points out that in comparison with the three previous waves , initiated by the introduction of steam , electricity , and then computers , the fourth wave draws its energy from an abundance of data combined with powerful algorithms; stresses that today’s digital revolution is shaped by its unprecedented scale , fast convergence , and the enormous impact of emerging technological breakthroughs on states , economies and societies; ### 1. notes that the world stands on the verge of the fourth industrial revolution; points out that this industrial revolution will depend on raw materials such as cobalt , tungsten and others , much like the first industrial revolution depended on coal and the second on oil; stresses that today’s digital revolution is shaped by its unprecedented scale , fast convergence , and the enormous impact of emerging technological breakthroughs on states , economies and societies;


### 2. observes that the digital revolution has , at the same time , triggered a global tech race , in which digital sovereignty is seen as a prerequisite for great-power status in both political and economic terms; stresses the growing realisation among decision makers that emerging technologies could lead to a global power shift away from the western world; ### 2. observes that the digital revolution has , at the same time , triggered a global tech race , in which digital sovereignty is seen as a prerequisite for great-power status in both political and economic terms; stresses that it has been estimated that the digital transformation of europe could yield 14% of cumulative additional gdp growth by20301a;underlines , however , that to reach the potential benefits from digital transformation the european investment bank quantifies the eu investment gap to eur 65 billion per year;


### 2. observes that the digital revolution has , at the same time , triggered a global tech race , in which digital sovereignty is seen as a prerequisite for great-power status in both political and economic terms; stresses the growing realisation among decision makers that emerging technologies could lead to a global power shift away from the western world; ### 2. observes that the digital revolution has , at the same time , triggered a global tech race , in which digital sovereignty is a prerequisite for strategic autonomy and sovereign decisions in both political and economic terms; stresses , particularly in the context of global competition , that the european union has been able , with the gdpr , to lead the way towards trustworthy systems based on the high standards set by union values and fundamental rights;


### 3. points out that europe , which for centuries set international standards , dominated technological progress and led in high-end manufacturing and deployment , has therefore fallen behind in a new ‘winner-takes-most’ or ‘superstar’ economy; underlines the risk of european values being globally replaced , our companies becoming marginalised and our living standards being drastically reduced; ### deleted


### 4. highlights , firstly , that digital tools are increasingly becoming an instrument of manipulation in the hands of authoritarian states and their proxies , used to trigger a clash between political systems; explains that digital espionage , low-scale warfare and disinformation campaigns are deployed in order to pose an existential threat to our democratic societies and question the european way of life; ### 4. highlights , firstly , that digital tools are increasingly becoming an instrument of manipulation; explains that digital espionage , low-scale warfare and disinformation campaigns are deployed in order to pose an existential threat to our democratic societies;


### 5. underlines , secondly , that the eu is failing to commercialise its ground-breaking technological innovations , thereby enabling fast-growing non-european corporations to take our best ideas , talent and companies; points out that , as a result , only eight of today’s top 200 digital companies are domiciled in the eu , while our economic growth is constantly declining; notes that europe’s high wages and the world’s most generous social welfare systems are financially dependent on us competing with the rest of the world; ### 5. underlines , secondly , that the eu is failing to commercialise its ground-breaking technological innovations , thereby enabling fast-growing non-european corporations to take our best ideas , talent and companies; points out that , as a result , only eight of today’s top 200 digital companies are domiciled in the eu , while our economic growth is constantly declining; notes that europe’s wages and social welfare systems are financially dependent on us competing with the rest of the world and could benefit from reclaiming data-based intelligence and re-designing the institutional frameworks and global-to-local governance mechanisms that control data and digital infrastructures;


### 6. warns that as a result of these and other existential threats to our democracy and prosperity , the global tech race has become a fight for survival for the eu; stresses that if the eu does not act swiftly and courageously , it will end up becoming a digital colony of china , the us and other states and risk losing its political stability , social security and individual liberties; ### 6. stresses that the eu should refrain from depending on ai from china , the us and other states as it risks losing its political stability , social security and individual liberties; emphasises that the union and its member states have a particular responsibility to make sure that ai contribute to the well - being and general interests of their citizens;


### 6. warns that as a result of these and other existential threats to our democracy and prosperity , the global tech race has become a fight for survival for the eu; stresses that if the eu does not act swiftly and courageously , it will end up becoming a digital colony of china , the us and other states and risk losing its political stability , social security and individual liberties; ### 6. stresses that maintaining its strategic ai autonomy , and not being dependent on china , the us or other states , is a precondition for the eu to safeguard its political stability , social security , citizens’ fundamental rights and individual liberties;


### 7. argues that artificial intelligence (ai) is the key emerging technology within the fourth industrial revolution; notes that ai is the control centre of the new data layer that surrounds us and which can be thought of as the fifth element after air , earth , water and fire; states that by 2030 , ai is expected to contribute more than eur 11 billion to the global economy , an amount that almost matches china’s gdp in 2020; ### 7. argues that artificial intelligence (ai) is the key emerging technology within the fourth industrial revolution; notes that ai is the control centre of the new data layer that surrounds us; states that by 2030 , ai is expected to contribute more than eur 15.7 trillion to the global economy1a;


### 8. explains that there is therefore a race for ai leadership within the global tech race; points out that the countries that master ai will gain key advantages; highlights , however , that ai is not a technology with magical powers but rather an efficient tool that we can put to good use; states that the rise of ai likewise does not require us to completely rewrite our laws to counter new kind of threats or to prevent intelligent machines from taking over; believes that although ai is indeed reshaping the world as we know it , the reality is much less dramatic and most developments in the field of ai are positive; ### 8. explains that there is therefore a race for ai leadership within the global tech race; points out that the countries that master ai will gain key advantages; highlights , however , that ai is not a technology with magical powers but rather a tool the use of which must be carefully framed for the greater good; states that the rise of ai likewise does require us to rewrite some laws to counter new kind of threats , especially in the field of freedom of expression or to prevent intelligent machines from taking over;


### 8. explains that there is therefore a race for ai leadership within the global tech race; points out that the countries that master ai will gain key advantages; highlights , however , that ai is not a technology with magical powers but rather an efficient tool that we can put to good use; states that the rise of ai likewise does not require us to completely rewrite our laws to counter new kind of threats or to prevent intelligent machines from taking over; believes that although ai is indeed reshaping the world as we know it , the reality is much less dramatic and most developments in the field of ai are positive; ### 8. explains that there is therefore a race for ai leadership within the global tech race; points out that the countries that master ai will gain key advantages; highlights , however , that ai is not a technology with magical powers but rather a very important tool whose use must be carefully regulated and monitored to benefit people and society as a whole; states that the rise of ai requires us to rewrite some of our laws to counter new kinds of threats; believes that although ai is indeed reshaping the world as we know it , the reality is much less dramatic and most developments in the field of ai are positive;


### 9. explains that ai is actually an umbrella term that covers a wide range of old and new technologies that often have little more in common than being guided by a given set of human-defined objectives and having some degree of autonomy in their actions; notes that while some of these technologies are already in widespread use , others are still under development or are even just speculative concepts that may or may not exist in the future; ### 9. explains that ai is actually an umbrella term that covers a wide range of old and new technologies that often have little more in common than being guided by a given set of human-defined objectives and having some margin for decision in their actions; notes that while some of these technologies are already in widespread use , others are still under development or are even just speculative concepts that may or may not exist in the future;


### 11. notes that in the second wave , the automated learning processes of algorithms based on the processing of large amounts of high-quality data , the ability to bring together inputs from multiple radars , lidars and cameras to form a single image of the environment , and the identification of patterns made ai systems more complex , autonomous and opaque; stresses that current ai can therefore be broken down into many different sub-domains and techniques , whereby deep learning is for instance a subfield of machine learning , which itself is a subfield of ai; ### 11. notes that in the second wave , the automated learning processes of algorithms based on the processing of large amounts of high-quality data , and the identification of patterns together with the lack of accountability of main players made ai systems more complex and opaque; stresses that current ai can be broken down into many different sub-domains and techniques , whereby deep learning is for instance a subfield of machine learning , which itself is a subfield of ai;


### 12. notes that although today’s ai has become much more powerful than symbolic ai , it can still only solve tasks in domain-specific niches such as chess or facial recognition and does not understand the actions it performs; points out that it is therefore referred to as ‘narrow’ or ‘weak’ ai and is still not more than a tool that provides recommendations and predictions; explains that self-driving cars operate , for instance , through a combination of various one-task ai systems that together are able to provide a three-dimensional map of the surroundings of the vehicle so that its operating system can make the appropriate decisions; ### 12. notes that although today’s ai has become much more powerful than symbolic ai , it can still only solve tasks in domain-specific niches such as chess or facial recognition and does not understand the actions it performs; points out that it is therefore referred to as ‘narrow’ or ‘weak’ ai and is still not more than a tool that provides recommendations; explains that self-driving cars operate , for instance , through a combination of various one-task ai systems that together are able to create a representation of a three-dimensional map of the surroundings of the vehicle so that its operating system can make the appropriate decisions;


### 13. highlights that many fears linked to ai are based on hypothetical concepts such as general ai , artificial superintelligence and singularity which could , in theory , lead to a power shift from humans to ai and create machines that could even break free from human control; stresses , however , that there are significant doubts as to whether this speculative ai can even be achieved with our technologies and scientific laws; ### deleted


### 14. underlines that , on the contrary , the vast majority of ai systems currently in use , are almost or even completely risk-free; refers , for instance , to automatic translations , ‘eureka machines’ , gaming machines and robots that execute repetitive manufacturing processes; concludes that only a very small number of use cases can be categorised as risky and that only such cases require regulatory action and effective safeguards; ### 14. notes that some ai systems currently in use , are almost risk-free; refers , for instance , to automatic translations , ‘eureka machines’ , gaming machines and robots that execute repetitive manufacturing processes;


### 15. considers that the public debate should therefore be more focused on the enormous potential of ai; believes that ai offers humankind the unique chance to improve almost every area of our lives , from combating global societal challenges such as climate change , pandemics and starvation , to enhancing quality of life through personalised medicine , fitness programmes and assisted living; ### deleted


### 16. explains that the present report addresses six ai case studies in detail , outlining the opportunities offered by ai in the respective sector , the risks to be addressed and the obstacles currently preventing us from fully harnessing the benefits of ai; highlights that the case studies represent some of the most important ai use cases and , at the same time , reflect the main topics of the public hearings held by the aida committee during its mandate , namely health , the green deal , external policy and security , competitiveness , the future of democracy and the labour market; ### 16. explains that the present report addresses six ai case studies in detail , outlining the opportunities offered by ai in the respective sector , the risks to be addressed and the obstacles preventing us from fully harnessing the benefits of ai; highlights that the case studies represent some of the most important ai use cases and , at the same time , reflect the main topics of the public hearings held by the aida committee during its mandate , namely health , the green deal , external policy and security , competitiveness , the future of democracy and the labour market;


### 17. stresses that ai can unlock solutions in the health sector that could save millions of lives , improve our standards of living and bring a competitive edge to the european ict sector; ### 17. stresses that health is a particularly sensitive sector for the processing of personal data and that , while ai will undoubtedly bring societal benefits in this sector , it nevertheless entails risks which justify strict human oversight and regulation; stresses that ai can have beneficial applications in the health sector that could save millions of lives and improve our standards of living if used in strict compliance with fundamental rights and while respecting the necessary supervision and safeguards;


### 18. underlines that ai is already being used to detect diseases and abnormalities at an early stage and more accurately through real-time pattern recognition and image processing , thus speeding up diagnosis and treatment and reducing unnecessary biopsies; ### 18. points to medical diagnosis as one application of ai in the field of health , where ai can be used , under human oversight to detect diseases and abnormalities at an early stage and more accurately , potentially enhancing diagnosis and treatment and reducing unnecessary biopsies;


### 20. underlines that ai has the potential to tailor treatments and drug development to specific patient needs and enhance engagement with stakeholders and participants in the healthcare system; finds that ai and access to datasets increase the potential for healthcare professionals to better understand the patterns and symptoms of their patients and therefore provide better feedback , guidance and support; ### 20. underlines that ai has the potential to tailor treatments and drug development to specific patient needs and enhance engagement with stakeholders and participants in the healthcare system; finds that ai could increase the potential for healthcare professionals to better understand the patterns and symptoms of their patients and therefore provide better feedback , guidance and support; recalls in this regard that health data are particularly sensitive and that access thereto should be limited in accordance with data protection law and requires a very careful supervision by public independent authorities; insists , nevertheless , that all uses of ai in the area of public health must guarantee the protection of patients’ personal data and prevent the uncontrolled dissemination of those data1a;


### 21. finds that the fight against covid-19 has both accelerated research into and the deployment of new technologies , notably ai applications , in the quest for improved case detection , and heightened the need for industry and publicly funded research to be able to deploy ai to strengthen the monitoring and modelling of the spread of future pandemics , without excessive limitations on freedom of movement , the infringement of data protection principles or the risk of establishing excessive surveillance regimes; ### 21. finds that the fight against covid-19 has both accelerated research into and the deployment of new technologies , notably ai applications , in the quest for improved case detection , and heightened the need for industry and publicly funded research to be able to deploy ai to strengthen the monitoring and modelling of the spread of future pandemics , in accordance with data protection law and without excessive limitations on freedom of movement , the infringement of data protection principles or the risk of establishing surveillance regimes;


### 22. highlights the potential of ai systems to relieve healthcare systems , and especially medical staff , by supporting routine tasks such as patient transport and reminding patients of their medication , and to remedy challenges posed by rapidly ageing populations; ### deleted


### 22. highlights the potential of ai systems to relieve healthcare systems , and especially medical staff , by supporting routine tasks such as patient transport and reminding patients of their medication , and to remedy challenges posed by rapidly ageing populations; ### 22. underlines that routine tasks , such as patient transport and reminding patients of their medication , are also the occasion for medical staff to check on their patients’ physical and mental health and reaction to treatment;


### 23. stresses that consumer health applications based on ai can help to track an individual’s health status , yield data which can apply to early triage questions and encourage healthy behaviour , thus reducing the need to seek advice from a healthcare professional; ### deleted


### 23. stresses that consumer health applications based on ai can help to track an individual’s health status , yield data which can apply to early triage questions and encourage healthy behaviour , thus reducing the need to seek advice from a healthcare professional; ### 23. stresses that individuals must remain fully in control over personal data relating to their health ; further stresses that no information concerning a patient's health should be communicated without the patient's full and informed consent and that personal health data , due to their extremely sensitive nature , must be scrupulously protected; points out that the highest cybersecurity standards must be established for any health application; draws attention to the legal risks in the event of transfers of data outside the european union;


### 24. stresses that ai in the health sector is particularly dependent on large amounts of personal data , data sharing , data accessibility and data interoperability to realise the full potential of ai and health , which are currently lacking; stresses the need to combat mistrust and to educate and better inform citizens about the benefits of ai in the field of health; ### 24. stresses that ai in the health sector is particularly dependent on large amounts of personal data , data sharing , data accessibility and data interoperability to realise the full potential of ai and health; stresses the need to educate and better inform citizens about the uses of ai in the field of health , especially in situations where an ai performs tasks for a patient; agrees with the commission that citizens should have secure access to a comprehensive electronic record of data concerning their health and that they should retain control over personal data concerning their health and be able to share it securely with authorised third parties , while unauthorised access should be prohibited , in compliance with data protection legislation; affirms that data should be stored on secure local servers and processed by independent bodies;


### 25. stresses that additional legal steps , time and purpose limitations introduced by the gdpr , and differing interpretations across member states have led to legal uncertainty and a lack of cooperation in the health sector; underlines that specific consent obligations hinder the processing of used medical data for further analysis and studies; stresses that this leads to lengthy delays to scientific discoveries and a significant bureaucratic burden in health research20 ; ### deleted


### 25. stresses that additional legal steps , time and purpose limitations introduced by the gdpr , and differing interpretations across member states have led to legal uncertainty and a lack of cooperation in the health sector; underlines that specific consent obligations hinder the processing of used medical data for further analysis and studies; stresses that this leads to lengthy delays to scientific discoveries and a significant bureaucratic burden in health research20 ; ### 25. stresses that in crucial areas such as health , human supervision is required for automated decision - making , according to gdpr article 22(3) ; further stresses the particular importance for ai systems developed in healthcare to respect fundamental rights , specifically equality , fairness and non-discrimination;


### 26. underlines that automatic decision-making in healthcare applications may pose risks to patients’ well-being , although ai already outperforms doctors’ diagnoses in several instances , such as breast cancer21 ; finds that current liability frameworks do not provide sufficient legal certainty over who is accountable in the event of misdiagnosis through ai , for example; ### 26. underlines that automate decision-making in healthcare applications may pose risks to patients’ well-being , and therefore human supervision of the automated decision - making process , as well as the right to obtain human intervention , especially when diagnosing a patient remains crucial; finds that current liability frameworks do not provide sufficient legal certainty over who is accountable in the event of misdiagnosis through ai , for example , and regulation on liability should make clear that medical professionals should always remain liable;


### 104. calls for the creation of an adequately resourced mechanism to supervise the uniform , eu-wide implementation and enforcement of the upcoming ai laws; prefers a european ai board over the creation of a costly new eu agency for ai; suggests , however , that this board should be made up of not only the national ai supervisory authorities and the european data protection board (edpb) , but also a broad range of relevant eu bodies , such as the eu agency for fundamental rights , the high-level expert group on ai , the eu agency for cybersecurity , the european consumer consultative group , and standardisation organisations the european committee for standardization , the european committee for electrotechnical standardization and the european telecommunications standards institute; ### 104. calls for the creation of an adequately resourced mechanism to supervise the uniform , eu-wide implementation and enforcement of the upcoming ai laws; prefers a european ai board over the creation of a costly new eu agency for ai; suggests , however , that this board should be made up of not only the national ai supervisory authorities and the european data protection board (edpb) , but also a broad range of relevant eu bodies , such as the eu agency for fundamental rights , the eu agency for cybersecurity , the european consumer consultative group , and standardisation organisations the european committee for standardization , the european committee for electrotechnical standardization and the european telecommunications standards institute;


### 105. highlights that the underlying objective of the eu’s digital strategy , as well as that of the ai strategy is to create a ‘european way’ in a digitalised world; clarifies that this approach should be human-centred , value-oriented and based on the concept of the social market economy; underlines that the individual , with their respective dignity and individual freedoms , should always remain at the centre of all political considerations; ### 105. highlights that the underlying objective of the eu’s digital strategy , as well as that of the ai strategy is to create a ‘european way’ in a digitalised world; clarifies that this approach should be human-centred and fundamental rights oriented; underlines that the individuals and the protection of their fundamental rights should always remain at the centre of all political considerations; highlights that the race for europe to become a global leader in ai should not be done at the expense of other countries development and citizen’s rights;


### 106. agrees with the conclusion drawn by the commission in its 2020 white paper on artificial intelligence that there is a need to establish a risk-based legal framework for ai , covering high-level ethical standards combined with appropriate liability rules and sector-specific provisions , while at the same time providing the private sector with enough flexibility , practicability and legal certainty to develop new business models based on ai technologies; ### 106. takes note of the conclusion drawn by the commission in its 2020 white paper on artificial intelligence that there would be a need to establish a risk-based legal framework for ai , notably covering high-level ethical standards combined with appropriate liability rules and sector-specific provisions in order to ensure the respect of fundamental rights while at the same time providing the private sector with ethical guidelines based on transparency , auditability and accountability on how to develop new business model based on ai technologies;


### 107. states that the co-legislators should aim to align the ai definition in future legislation with the concepts , terminologies and standards developed together with other like-minded democratic countries in the oecd44 ; stresses that doing so would give the eu an advantage in shaping a future international ai governance system; ### 107. states that the co-legislators should aim to align the ai definition in future legislation with the concepts , terminologies and standards developed together with the oecd44 ; stresses that doing so would give the eu an advantage in shaping a future international ai governance system;


### 108. is convinced that it is not ai as a technology that should be regulated , but that the type , intensity and timing of regulatory intervention should solely depend on the type of risk incurred by the use of an ai system; underlines , in this regard , the importance of distinguishing between a minority of ‘high-risk’ and the vast majority of ‘low-risk’ ai use cases; concludes that while only the former category indeed demands legislative safeguards , businesses should self-regulate ‘low-risk’ technologies by choosing measures that deliver the best outcomes; ### deleted


### 109. specifies that the classification of technologies as ‘high-risk’ should be based on the concrete use and context , complexity and autonomy of the ai system , the probability and likelihood of the worst-case scenario , the severity of the harm and its irreversibility , the techniques used and the governance arrangements adopted; stresses that this classification should be introduced together with best practices and guidance for ai developers and should also recognise that ai technologies can significantly reduce certain risks; ### 109. specifies that the classification of technologies as ‘high-risk’ should be based on the potential threat to fundamental rights and context , complexity and autonomy of the ai system , the probability and likelihood of causing harm to one or more persons , in a manner that is random and goes beyond what can reasonably be expected; stresses that this classification should be dynamic and contain more categories than only low or high risk and be introduced together with best practices and guidance for ai developers;


### 110. notes that the requirements that ai systems need to fulfil differ significantly in a business-to-business (b2b) environment compared to a business-to-consumer (b2c) environment; points out that while consumer rights need to be legally protected through consumer protection legislation , companies can solve liability and other legal challenges more quickly and cost-effectively by contractual means with business partners directly; concludes that , in particular , smes and start-ups investing in ai technologies would benefit from a b2b exclusion as they are disproportionately affected by new legal obligations , which also harms their ability to attract investments; ### deleted


### 111. underlines the need to address open ethical questions raised by new technological possibilities , but clarifies that new ai ethical guidelines should not set up stricter rules than those already existing for human or automated actions; proposes that on these grounds the eu should introduce ethical guidelines that consist of three categories of core values and principles; ### 111. underlines the need to address open ethical questions raised by new technological possibilities; proposes that on these grounds the eu should introduce binding ethical requirements that consist of seven categories of core values and principles1a;


### 112. explains that the first category could list fundamental , mandatory principles such as the non-maleficence principle , the principle of respecting human dignity or the protection of the democratic process; states that the second category could include good practices in ai development such as human-centric ai , responsible governance and the principles of transparency and explainability; concludes that the last category could include principles of sustainable ai that would be fully aligned with the un 2030 agenda for sustainable development; ### deleted


### 113. highlights , with regard to the third category , the gap in leadership on ai global governance , which gives the eu the chance to become the leading voice in aligning ai with the un sdgs and using ai technologies to push worldwide for their achievement; stresses , however , that not all ai technologies developed or applied in the eu should need to comply with all three categories; suggests , for example , that sustainable ai could only be mandated for ai implemented or procured by public tender or in specific sectors , while the majority of ai developers and companies would only be encouraged to align with the second and third categories through soft law; ### 113. highlights , the need to align ai with the un sdgs;


### 114. is convinced that efforts to completely ‘de-bias’ ai algorithms are frequently misguided , because this strategy wrongly suggests that bias-free data sets exist; notes that in this regard the requirement that data used to train ai systems is ‘complete and free of errors’ needs to be revisited; stresses , however , that the eu should at the same time cooperate very closely with ai developers to counterbalance structural biases in our societies and daily life; ### deleted


### 115. elaborates that transparency or explainability obligations for ai systems , while helpful in certain cases , may not be possible to implement in every instance; notes that both concepts also need to be balanced against other factors , including the interests of businesses in maintaining trade secrets or the potential value of exposed data to potential competitors; stresses , however , that a mandatory self-identification of ai systems or accessible machine logs seem to be very useful for many ai use cases that interfere with the fundamental rights of individuals or affect consumers; ### 115. promotes transparency or explainability obligations for ai systems , stresses that a mandatory self-identification of ai systems or accessible machine logs seem to be very useful for many ai use cases that interfere with the fundamental rights of individuals or affect consumers;


### 116. states that the legislative framework on intellectual property must continue to incentivise and protect ai innovators by granting them patents as a reward for developing and publishing their creations; finds that existing laws are mostly future-proof , but proposes certain adjustments , including the integration of open source elements and new forms of patent licensing to ensure that tools are available to regions and initiatives that could not otherwise afford them; recognises that it will also be necessary to clarify whether ai will be able to hold intellectual property rights in itself; ### 116. states that the legislative framework on intellectual property must continue to incentivise and protect ai innovators by granting them patents as a reward for developing and publishing their creations; finds that existing laws are mostly future-proof , but proposes certain adjustments , including the integration of open source elements and new forms of patent licensing to ensure that tools are available to regions and initiatives that could not otherwise afford them;


### 117. elaborates that obligatory ex ante risk self-assessments , comparable with ce markings or data protection impact assessments , combined with market surveillance based on clear rules and standards , and complemented with ex post enforcement for high-risk ai systems , seem to be a sufficiently robust governance approach for ai; warns that overly burdensome conformity assessment obligations could create significant burdens that make the business models of ai developers and companies economically unviable; ### 117. considers that obligatory ex ante risk self-assessments , comparable with ce markings or data protection impact assessments , combined with market surveillance based on clear rules and standards , and complemented with ex ante stricter assessment by an independent authority for high-risk ai systems is necessary before putting any ai system on the market;


### 118. notes that in order to increase product safety and improve the identification of faults , the developers of high-risk ai should at least be obliged to ensure that accessible logs of algorithmic activity are maintained securely; considers that developers should also design high-risk ai systems with embedded mechanisms – ‘kill switches’ – for human intervention to immediately halt automated activities at any moment; ### 118. notes that in order to increase product safety and improve the identification of faults , the developers of high-risk ai should at least be obliged to ensure that accessible logs of algorithmic activity are maintained securely; considers that developers should also design high-risk ai systems with embedded mechanisms – ‘kill switches’ – for human intervention to immediately halt automated activities at any moment; further suggests that the assessment by the commission of whether an ai-system poses a high-risk should start at the same time as the product safety assessment , in order to prevent a situation in which a high-risk ai-system is already approved for the market but not yet classified as high-risk and thus operates without mandatory insurance cover1a;


### 119. is convinced that despite the legal challenges caused by ai systems , there is no need for a complete revision of the existing liability rules; stresses that the product liability directive and the national fault-based liability regimes can in principle remain the centrepiece legislation for countering most harm caused by ai; underlines that only in some cases could there be inappropriate outcomes , but warns that any revision should take the existing product safety legislation into account and should solely be based on clearly identified gaps; ### 119. is convinced that despite the legal challenges caused by ai systems , there is no need for a complete revision of the existing liability rules; stresses that the product liability directive and the national fault-based liability regimes can in principle remain the centrepiece legislation for countering most harm caused by ai; underlines that in some cases could there be inappropriate outcomes , but warns that any revision should take the existing product safety legislation into account and should be based on clearly identified gaps;


### 120. notes that certain changes to the legal definitions of ‘product’ , including integrated software applications , digital services and inter-product dependency , and ‘producer’ , including backend operator , service provider and data supplier , do however seem necessary to ensure that compensation is available for harm caused by emerging technologies; stresses , however , that an overly broad approach to the definition of ‘product’ should be avoided , as this may make it difficult to differentiate between ai and other algorithms; ### 120. notes that certain changes to the legal definitions of ‘product’ , including integrated software applications , digital services and inter-product dependency , and ‘producer’ , including backend operator , service provider and data supplier , do however seem necessary to ensure that compensation is available for harm caused by emerging technologies;


### 122. agrees with the conclusion drawn by the commission in its 2020 communication entitled ‘a european strategy for data’ that the creation of a single european data space is key to ensuring the eu’s global competitiveness in ai , as well as its strategic sovereignty and economic prosperity; recalls the essential link between the availability of high-quality data and the development of ai; ### 122. takes note of the conclusion drawn by the commission in its 2020 communication entitled ‘a european strategy for data’ that the creation of a single european data space is key to ensuring the eu’s global competitiveness in ai , as well as its strategic sovereignty and economic prosperity; recalls the essential link between the availability of high-quality data and the development of ai;


### 124. urges the commission to continue its work on removing key barriers for developers and companies in areas such as country-based discrimination , burdensome market access procedures and high regulatory costs , as well as to address the frequent use of derogations which results in diverging rules among different member state jurisdictions; ### deleted