### best practices for very large online platforms to mitigate the systemic risks identified. ### best practices for large online platforms to mitigate the systemic risks identified.


### best practices for very large online platforms to mitigate the systemic risks identified. ### best practices for very large online platforms to mitigate the systemic risks identified.


### 3. the commission , in cooperation with the digital services coordinators , may issue general guidelines on the application of paragraph 1 in relation to specific risks , in particular to present best practices and recommend possible measures , having due regard to the possible consequences of the measures on fundamental rights enshrined in the charter of all parties involved. when preparing those guidelines the commission shall organise public consultations. ### 3. the board , in cooperation with the digital services coordinators , may issue general guidelines on the application of paragraph 1 in relation to specific risks , in particular to present best practices and recommend possible measures , having due regard to the possible consequences of the measures on fundamental rights enshrined in the charter of all parties involved. when preparing those guidelines the board , in cooperation with an independent enforcement and monitoring unit of the commission , shall organise public consultations.


### 1. very large online platforms shall be subject , at their own expense and at least once a year , to audits to assess compliance with the following: ### 1. large online platforms shall be subject , at their own expense and at least once a year , to audits to assess compliance with the following:


### 1. very large online platforms shall be subject , at their own expense and at least once a year , to audits to assess compliance with the following: ### 1. very large online platforms shall be subject , at their own expense and at least once a year , to independent audits to assess compliance with the following:


### 2. audits performed pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be performed by organisations which: ### 2. audits performed pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be performed by the not-for-profit bodies , organisation or association which have been properly constituted in accordance with the law of a member state which:


### 1. very large online platforms that display advertising on their online interfaces shall compile and make publicly available through application programming interfaces a repository containing the information referred to in paragraph 2 , until one year after the advertisement was displayed for the last time on their online interfaces. they shall ensure that the repository does not contain any personal data of the recipients of the service to whom the advertisement was or could have been displayed. ### 1. large online platforms that display advertising on their online interfaces shall compile and make publicly available through application programming interfaces a repository containing the information referred to in paragraph 2 , until one year after the advertisement was displayed for the last time on their online interfaces. they shall ensure that the repository does not contain any personal data of the recipients of the service to whom the advertisement was or could have been displayed.


### 2. upon a reasoned request from the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission , very large online platforms shall , within a reasonable period , as specified in the request , provide access to data to vetted researchers who meet the requirements in paragraphs 4 of this article , for the sole purpose of conducting research that contributes to the identification and understanding of systemic risks as set out in article 26(1). ### 2. upon a reasoned request from the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission , large online platforms shall , within a reasonable period , as specified in the request , provide access to data to vetted researchers who meet the requirements in paragraphs 4 of this article , for the sole purpose of conducting research that contributes to the identification and understanding of systemic risks as set out in article 26(1).


### 2. upon a reasoned request from the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission , very large online platforms shall , within a reasonable period , as specified in the request , provide access to data to vetted researchers who meet the requirements in paragraphs 4 of this article , for the sole purpose of conducting research that contributes to the identification and understanding of systemic risks as set out in article 26(1). ### 2. upon a reasoned request from the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission , very large online platforms shall , within a reasonable period , as specified in the request , provide access to data to vetted researchers who meet the requirements in paragraphs 4 of this article and to vetted not-for-profit body , organisation or association which has been properly constituted in accordance with the law of a member state , for the sole purpose of conducting research that contributes to the identification and understanding of systemic risks as set out in article 26(1).


### 5. the commission shall , after consulting the board , adopt delegated acts laying down the technical conditions under which very large online platforms are to share data pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 and the purposes for which the data may be used. those delegated acts shall lay down the specific conditions under which such sharing of data with vetted researchers can take place in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 , taking into account the rights and interests of the very large online platforms and the recipients of the service concerned , including the protection of confidential information , in particular trade secrets , and maintaining the security of their service. ### 5. the commission shall , after consulting the board , adopt delegated acts laying down the technical conditions under which large online platforms are to share data pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 and the purposes for which the data may be used. those delegated acts shall lay down the specific conditions under which such sharing of data with vetted researchers can take place in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 , taking into account the rights and interests of the very large online platforms and the recipients of the service concerned , including the protection of confidential information , in particular trade secrets , and maintaining the security of their service.


### it does not have access to the data; ### deleted


### giving access to the data will lead to significant vulnerabilities for the security of its service or the protection of confidential information , in particular trade secrets. ### deleted


### 7. requests for amendment pursuant to point (b) of paragraph 6 shall contain proposals for one or more alternative means through which access may be provided to the requested data or other data which are appropriate and sufficient for the purpose of the request. ### deleted


### 1. very large online platforms shall appoint one or more compliance officers responsible for monitoring their compliance with this regulation. ### 1. large online platforms shall appoint one or more compliance officers responsible for monitoring their compliance with this regulation.


### 1. very large online platforms shall publish the reports referred to in article 13 within six months from the date of application referred to in article 25(4) , and thereafter every six months. ### 1. large online platforms shall publish the reports referred to in article 13 within six months from the date of application referred to in article 25(4) , and thereafter every six months.


### 1. very large online platforms shall publish the reports referred to in article 13 within six months from the date of application referred to in article 25(4) , and thereafter every six months. ### 1. very large online platforms shall publish , in an universally accessible and easily readable format , the reports referred to in article 13 within six months from the date of application referred to in article 25(4) , and thereafter every six months.


### 2. where significant systemic risk within the meaning of article 26(1) emerge and concern several very large online platforms , the commission may invite the very large online platforms concerned , other very large online platforms , other online platforms and other providers of intermediary services , as appropriate , as well as civil society organisations and other interested parties , to participate in the drawing up of codes of conduct , including by setting out commitments to take specific risk mitigation measures , as well as a regular reporting framework on any measures taken and their outcomes. ### 2. where significant systemic risk within the meaning of article 26(1) emerge and concern several very large online platforms , the commission shall request the very large online platforms concerned , other very large online platforms , other online platforms and other providers of intermediary services , as appropriate , as well as civil society organisations , women’s rights organizations , lgbtiq+ support groups and other interested parties , to participate in the drawing up of codes of conduct , including by setting out commitments to take specific risk mitigation measures , as well as a regular reporting framework on any measures taken and their outcomes.


### 2. where a digital services coordinator of establishment has reasons to suspect that a very large online platform infringed this regulation , it may request the commission to take the necessary investigatory and enforcement measures to ensure compliance with this regulation in accordance with section 3. such a request shall contain all information listed in article 45(2) and set out the reasons for requesting the commission to intervene. ### (2) where a digital services coordinator of establishment or the digital services coordinators of at least three member states have reasons to suspect that a very large online platform infringed this regulation , it may request the commission to take the necessary investigatory and enforcement measures to ensure compliance with this regulation in accordance with section 3. such a request shall contain all information listed in article 45(2) and set out the reasons for requesting the commission to intervene.


### (74) the digital services coordinator , as well as other competent authorities designated under this regulation , play a crucial role in ensuring the effectiveness of the rights and obligations laid down in this regulation and the achievement of its objectives. accordingly , it is necessary to ensure that those authorities act in complete independence from private and public bodies , without the obligation or possibility to seek or receive instructions , including from the government , and without prejudice to the specific duties to cooperate with other competent authorities , the digital services coordinators , the board and the commission. on the other hand , the independence of these authorities should not mean that they cannot be subject , in accordance with national constitutions and without endangering the achievement of the objectives of this regulation , to national control or monitoring mechanisms regarding their financial expenditure or to judicial review , or that they should not have the possibility to consult other national authorities , including law enforcement authorities or crisis management authorities , where appropriate. ### (74) the digital services coordinator , as well as other competent authorities designated under this regulation , play a crucial role in ensuring the effectiveness of the rights and obligations laid down in this regulation and the achievement of its objectives. accordingly , it is necessary to ensure that those authorities act in complete independence from private and public bodies , without the obligation or possibility to seek or receive instructions , including from the government , and without prejudice to the specific duties to cooperate with other competent authorities , the digital services coordinators , the board and the commission. on the other hand , the independence of these authorities should not mean that they cannot be subject , in accordance with national constitutions and without endangering the achievement of the objectives of this regulation , to national control or monitoring mechanisms regarding their financial expenditure or to judicial review , or that they should not have the possibility to consult other national authorities , including authorities responsible for consumer protection , market surveillance , data protection , law enforcement or crisis management , where appropriate.


### adapting content moderation or recommender systems , their decision-making processes , the features or functioning of their services , or their terms and conditions; ### adapting content moderation or recommender systems , their decision-making processes , the features or functioning of their services , or their terms and conditions , including gender equality;


### adapting content moderation or recommender systems , their decision-making processes , the features or functioning of their services , or their terms and conditions; ### adapting content moderation or recommender systems , their decision-making processes , the features or functioning of their services , or their terms and conditions; the rules and penalties for all decisions on content moderation must be clear , specific and applicable for users;


### adapting content moderation or recommender systems , their decision-making processes , the features or functioning of their services , or their terms and conditions; ### adapting content moderation or recommender systems , their decision-making processes , the features or functioning of their services , or their terms and conditions including but not limited to progressively redesigning their content recommendation algorithms to reduce and mitigate risks identified under article 26(1)(c) to place less emphasis on the retention of attention and more on emphasis of the protection of fundamental human rights and ensuring adequate labelling and notification to users of legal but harmful content on their service;


### the obligations set out in chapter iii; ### the obligations set out in chapter iii; these should include auditing the processes and procedures enforced by very large online platforms;


### safeguards to address any negative effects on the exercise of the fundamental rights enshrined in the charter , in particular the freedom of expression and information and the right to non-discrimination; ### safeguards to address any negative effects on the exercise of the fundamental rights enshrined in the charter , in particular the freedom of expression and information , the right to equality between women and men , the right to non-discrimination and the rights of the child;


### 5. the board may invite experts and observers to attend its meetings , and may cooperate with other union bodies , offices , agencies and advisory groups , as well as external experts as appropriate. the board shall make the results of this cooperation publicly available. ### 5. the board may invite experts and observers to attend its meetings , and may cooperate with other union bodies , offices , agencies and advisory groups , as well as external experts , in areas such as equality , in particular gender equality , lgbtiq+ equality and non-discrimination , gender and other identity-based online violence and harassment , online sex trafficking , online stalking , child abuse , disinformation , data protection , electronic communications , audiovisual services , detection and investigation of frauds against the union budget as regards custom duties , or consumer protection , if necessary for the performance of its tasks. the board shall make the results of this cooperation publicly available and easily accessible , including persons with disabilities.


### whether the decision entails either the removal of , or the disabling of access to , the information and , where relevant , the territorial scope of the disabling of access; ### whether the decision entails either the removal of , or the disabling of access to , the information , or the limiting of its visibility or the ceasing of its monetisation , and , where relevant , the territorial scope of the disabling of access;


### whether the decision entails either the removal of , or the disabling of access to , the information and , where relevant , the territorial scope of the disabling of access; ### whether the decision entails either the removal of , or the disabling of access to , the information and the territorial scope of the disabling of access;


### 4. providers of hosting services shall publish the decisions and the statements of reasons , referred to in paragraph 1 in a publicly accessible database managed by the commission. that information shall not include personal data. ### 4. providers of hosting services shall publish the decisions and the statements of reasons , referred to in paragraph 1 in a database managed by the commission which is accessible to national and european authorities. that information shall not include personal data.


### 4. providers of hosting services shall publish the decisions and the statements of reasons , referred to in paragraph 1 in a publicly accessible database managed by the commission. that information shall not contain personal data. ### 4. providers of hosting services shall publish the decisions and the statements of reasons , referred to in paragraph 1 in a publicly and universally accessible database managed by the commission. that information shall not contain personal data.


### the fees charged by the body for the dispute settlement shall be reasonable and shall in any event not exceed the costs thereof. ### the fees charged by the body for the dispute settlement shall be reasonable and shall in any event not exceed the costs thereof. out-of-court dispute settlement procedures should preferably be free of charge for consumers. if a charge is made , the procedure should be accessible and inexpensive for consumers. to this end , such charges should not exceed a symbolic amount.


### 4. the commission shall publish the information referred to in paragraph 3 in a publicly available database and keep the database updated. ### 4. the commission shall publish the information referred to in paragraph 3 in a publicly available and universally accessible database and keep the database updated.


### 2. where the online platform cannot identify with reasonable certainty the member state concerned , it shall inform the law enforcement authorities of the member state in which it is established or has its legal representative or inform europol. ### 2. where the online platform or an online service provider cannot identify with reasonable certainty the member state concerned , it shall inform the law enforcement authorities of the member state in which it is established or has its legal representative or inform europol.


### reinforcing the internal processes or supervision of any of their activities in particular as regards detection of systemic risk; ### reinforcing the internal processes or supervision of any of their activities in particular as regards conducting mandatory ex ante human rights impact assessment , including but not limited to ensuring that the data sets that inform the detection of risk do so in all relevant languages in which the services operate and do so in a manner that promotes diversity and inclusion and does not breach fundamental rights to freedom form discrimination;


### initiating or adjusting cooperation with trusted flaggers in accordance with article 19; ### adjusting cooperation with trusted flaggers in accordance with article 19;


### (65) given the complexity of the functioning of the systems deployed and the systemic risks they present to society , very large online platforms should appoint compliance officers , which should have the necessary qualifications to operationalise measures and monitor the compliance with this regulation within the platform’s organisation. very large online platforms should ensure that the compliance officer is involved , properly and in a timely manner , in all issues which relate to this regulation. in view of the additional risks relating to their activities and their additional obligations under this regulation , the other transparency requirements set out in this regulation should be complemented by additional transparency requirements applicable specifically to very large online platforms , notably to report on the risk assessments performed and subsequent measures adopted as provided by this regulation. ### (65) given the complexity of the functioning of the systems deployed and the systemic risks they present to society , very large online platforms should appoint compliance officers , which should have the necessary qualifications to operationalise measures and monitor the compliance with this regulation within the platform’s organisation. large online platforms should ensure that the compliance officer is involved , properly and in a timely manner , in all issues which relate to this regulation. in view of the additional risks relating to their activities and their additional obligations under this regulation , the other transparency requirements set out in this regulation should be complemented by additional transparency requirements applicable specifically to very large online platforms , notably to report on the risk assessments performed and subsequent measures adopted as provided by this regulation.


### (69) the rules on codes of conduct under this regulation could serve as a basis for already established self-regulatory efforts at union level , including the product safety pledge , the memorandum of understanding against counterfeit goods , the code of conduct against illegal hate speech as well as the code of practice on disinformation. in particular for the latter , the commission will issue guidance for strengthening the code of practice on disinformation as announced in the european democracy action plan. ### deleted


### (73) given the cross-border nature of the services at stake and the horizontal range of obligations introduced by this regulation , the authority appointed with the task of supervising the application and , where necessary , enforcing this regulation should be identified as a digital services coordinator in each member state. where more than one competent authority is appointed to apply and enforce this regulation , only one authority in that member state should be identified as a digital services coordinator. the digital services coordinator should act as the single contact point with regard to all matters related to the application of this regulation for the commission , the board , the digital services coordinators of other member states , as well as for other competent authorities of the member state in question. in particular , where several competent authorities are entrusted with tasks under this regulation in a given member state , the digital services coordinator should coordinate and cooperate with those authorities in accordance with the national law setting their respective tasks , and should ensure effective involvement of all relevant authorities in the supervision and enforcement at union level. ### (73) given the cross-border nature of the services at stake and the horizontal range of obligations introduced by this regulation , the authority appointed with the task of supervising the application and , where necessary , enforcing this regulation should be identified as a digital services coordinator in each member state. where more than one competent authority is appointed to apply and enforce this regulation , only one authority in that member state should be identified as a digital services coordinator. the digital services coordinator should act as the single contact point with regard to all matters related to the application of this regulation for the commission , the board , the digital services coordinators of other member states , as well as for other competent authorities of the member state in question. in particular , where several competent authorities are entrusted with tasks under this regulation in a given member state , the digital services coordinator should coordinate and cooperate with those authorities in accordance with the national law setting their respective tasks , and should ensure effective involvement of all relevant authorities , particularly the independent national media regulation authorities , in the supervision and enforcement at union level.


### (76) in the absence of a general requirement for providers of intermediary services to ensure a physical presence within the territory of one of the member states , there is a need to ensure clarity under which member state's jurisdiction those providers fall for the purposes of enforcing the rules laid down in chapters iii and iv by the national competent authorities. a provider should be under the jurisdiction of the member state where its main establishment is located , that is , where the provider has its head office or registered office within which the principal financial functions and operational control are exercised. in respect of providers that do not have an establishment in the union but that offer services in the union and therefore fall within the scope of this regulation , the member state where those providers appointed their legal representative should have jurisdiction , considering the function of legal representatives under this regulation. in the interest of the effective application of this regulation , all member states should , however , have jurisdiction in respect of providers that failed to designate a legal representative , provided that the principle of ne bis in idem is respected. to that aim , each member state that exercises jurisdiction in respect of such providers should , without undue delay , inform all other member states of the measures they have taken in the exercise of that jurisdiction. ### (76) in the absence of a general requirement for providers of intermediary services to ensure a physical presence within the territory of one of the member states , there is a need to ensure clarity under which member state's jurisdiction those providers fall for the purposes of enforcing the rules laid down in chapters iii and iv by the national competent authorities.


### (87) in view of the particular challenges that may emerge in relation to assessing and ensuring a very large online platform’s compliance , for instance relating to the scale or complexity of a suspected infringement or the need for particular expertise or capabilities at union level , digital services coordinators should have the possibility to request , on a voluntary basis , the commission to intervene and exercise its investigatory and enforcement powers under this regulation. ### (87) in view of the particular challenges that may emerge in relation to assessing and ensuring a large online platform’s compliance , for instance relating to the scale or complexity of a suspected infringement or the need for particular expertise or capabilities at union level , digital services coordinators should have the possibility to request the commission to intervene and exercise its investigatory and enforcement powers under this regulation.


### (94) given the importance of very large online platforms , in view of their reach and impact , their failure to comply with the specific obligations applicable to them may affect a substantial number of recipients of the services across different member states and may cause large societal harms , while such failures may also be particularly complex to identify and address. ### (94) given the importance of large online platforms , in view of their reach and impact , their failure to comply with the specific obligations applicable to them may affect a substantial number of recipients of the services across different member states and may cause large societal harms , while such failures may also be particularly complex to identify and address.


### (96) where the infringement of the provision that solely applies to very large online platforms is not effectively addressed by that platform pursuant to the action plan , only the commission may , on its own initiative or upon advice of the board , decide to further investigate the infringement concerned and the measures that the platform has subsequently taken , to the exclusion of the digital services coordinator of establishment. after having conducted the necessary investigations , the commission should be able to issue decisions finding an infringement and imposing sanctions in respect of very large online platforms where that is justified. it should also have such a possibility to intervene in cross-border situations where the digital services coordinator of establishment did not take any measures despite the commission’s request , or in situations where the digital services coordinator of establishment itself requested for the commission to intervene , in respect of an infringement of any other provision of this regulation committed by a very large online platform. ### (96) where the infringement of the provision that solely applies to large online platforms is not effectively addressed by that platform pursuant to the action plan , only the commission may , on its own initiative or upon advice of the board , decide to further investigate the infringement concerned and the measures that the platform has subsequently taken , to the exclusion of the digital services coordinator of establishment. after having conducted the necessary investigations , the commission should be able to issue decisions finding an infringement and imposing sanctions in respect of large online platforms where that is justified. it should also have such a possibility to intervene in cross-border situations where the digital services coordinator of establishment did not take any measures despite the commission’s request , or in situations where the digital services coordinator of establishment itself requested for the commission to intervene , in respect of an infringement of any other provision of this regulation committed by a large online platform.


### (97) the commission should remain free to decide whether or not it wishes to intervene in any of the situations where it is empowered to do so under this regulation. once the commission initiated the proceedings , the digital services coordinators of establishment concerned should be precluded from exercising their investigatory and enforcement powers in respect of the relevant conduct of the very large online platform concerned , so as to avoid duplication , inconsistencies and risks from the viewpoint of the principle of ne bis in idem. however , in the interest of effectiveness , those digital services coordinators should not be precluded from exercising their powers either to assist the commission , at its request in the performance of its supervisory tasks , or in respect of other conduct , including conduct by the same very large online platform that is suspected to constitute a new infringement. those digital services coordinators , as well as the board and other digital services coordinators where relevant , should provide the commission with all necessary information and assistance to allow it to perform its tasks effectively , whilst conversely the commission should keep them informed on the exercise of its powers as appropriate. in that regard , the commission should , where appropriate , take account of any relevant assessments carried out by the board or by the digital services coordinators concerned and of any relevant evidence and information gathered by them , without prejudice to the commission’s powers and responsibility to carry out additional investigations as necessary. ### (97) the commission should remain free to decide whether or not it wishes to intervene in any of the situations where it is empowered to do so under this regulation. once the commission initiated the proceedings , the digital services coordinators of establishment concerned should be precluded from exercising their investigatory and enforcement powers in respect of the relevant conduct of the large online platform concerned , so as to avoid duplication , inconsistencies and risks from the viewpoint of the principle of ne bis in idem. however , in the interest of effectiveness , those digital services coordinators should not be precluded from exercising their powers either to assist the commission , at its request in the performance of its supervisory tasks , or in respect of other conduct , including conduct by the same large online platform that is suspected to constitute a new infringement. those digital services coordinators , as well as the board and other digital services coordinators where relevant , should provide the commission with all necessary information and assistance to allow it to perform its tasks effectively , whilst conversely the commission should keep them informed on the exercise of its powers as appropriate. in that regard , the commission should , where appropriate , take account of any relevant assessments carried out by the board or by the digital services coordinators concerned and of any relevant evidence and information gathered by them , without prejudice to the commission’s powers and responsibility to carry out additional investigations as necessary.


### (97) the commission should remain free to decide whether or not it wishes to intervene in any of the situations where it is empowered to do so under this regulation. once the commission initiated the proceedings , the digital services coordinators of establishment concerned should be precluded from exercising their investigatory and enforcement powers in respect of the relevant conduct of the very large online platform concerned , so as to avoid duplication , inconsistencies and risks from the viewpoint of the principle of ne bis in idem. however , in the interest of effectiveness , those digital services coordinators should not be precluded from exercising their powers either to assist the commission , at its request in the performance of its supervisory tasks , or in respect of other conduct , including conduct by the same very large online platform that is suspected to constitute a new infringement. those digital services coordinators , as well as the board and other digital services coordinators where relevant , should provide the commission with all necessary information and assistance to allow it to perform its tasks effectively , whilst conversely the commission should keep them informed on the exercise of its powers as appropriate. in that regard , the commission should , where appropriate , take account of any relevant assessments carried out by the board or by the digital services coordinators concerned and of any relevant evidence and information gathered by them , without prejudice to the commission’s powers and responsibility to carry out additional investigations as necessary. ### (97) once the commission initiated the proceedings , the digital services coordinators of establishment concerned should be precluded from exercising their investigatory and enforcement powers in respect of the relevant conduct of the very large online platform concerned , so as to avoid duplication , inconsistencies and risks from the viewpoint of the principle of ne bis in idem. however , in the interest of effectiveness , those digital services coordinators should not be precluded from exercising their powers either to assist the commission , at its request in the performance of its supervisory tasks , or in respect of other conduct , including conduct by the same very large online platform that is suspected to constitute a new infringement. those digital services coordinators , as well as the board and other digital services coordinators where relevant , should provide the commission with all necessary information and assistance to allow it to perform its tasks effectively , whilst conversely the commission should keep them informed on the exercise of its powers as appropriate. in that regard , the commission should , where appropriate , take account of any relevant assessments carried out by the board or by the digital services coordinators concerned and of any relevant evidence and information gathered by them , without prejudice to the commission’s powers and responsibility to carry out additional investigations as necessary.


### (98) in view of both the particular challenges that may arise in seeking to ensure compliance by very large online platforms and the importance of doing so effectively , considering their size and impact and the harms that they may cause , the commission should have strong investigative and enforcement powers to allow it to investigate , enforce and monitor certain of the rules laid down in this regulation , in full respect of the principle of proportionality and the rights and interests of the affected parties. ### (98) in view of both the particular challenges that may arise in seeking to ensure compliance by large online platforms and the importance of doing so effectively , considering their size and impact and the harms that they may cause , the commission should have strong investigative and enforcement powers to allow it to investigate , enforce and monitor certain of the rules laid down in this regulation , in full respect of the principle of proportionality and the rights and interests of the affected parties.


### (99) in particular , the commission should have access to any relevant documents , data and information necessary to open and conduct investigations and to monitor the compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in this regulation , irrespective of who possesses the documents , data or information in question , and regardless of their form or format , their storage medium , or the precise place where they are stored. the commission should be able to directly require that the very large online platform concerned or relevant third parties , or than individuals , provide any relevant evidence , data and information. in addition , the commission should be able to request any relevant information from any public authority , body or agency within the member state , or from any natural person or legal person for the purpose of this regulation. the commission should be empowered to require access to , and explanations relating to , data-bases and algorithms of relevant persons , and to interview , with their consent , any persons who may be in possession of useful information and to record the statements made. the commission should also be empowered to undertake such inspections as are necessary to enforce the relevant provisions of this regulation. those investigatory powers aim to complement the commission’s possibility to ask digital services coordinators and other member states’ authorities for assistance , for instance by providing information or in the exercise of those powers ### (99) in particular , the commission should have access to any relevant documents , data and information necessary to open and conduct investigations and to monitor the compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in this regulation , irrespective of who possesses the documents , data or information in question , and regardless of their form or format , their storage medium , or the precise place where they are stored. the commission should be able to directly require that the large online platform concerned or relevant third parties , or than individuals , provide any relevant evidence , data and information. in addition , the commission should be able to request any relevant information from any public authority , body or agency within the member state , or from any natural person or legal person for the purpose of this regulation. the commission should be empowered to require access to , and explanations relating to , data-bases and algorithms of relevant persons , and to interview , with their consent , any persons who may be in possession of useful information and to record the statements made. the commission should also be empowered to undertake such inspections as are necessary to enforce the relevant provisions of this regulation. those investigatory powers aim to complement the commission’s possibility to ask digital services coordinators and other member states’ authorities for assistance , for instance by providing information or in the exercise of those powers


### (101) the very large online platforms concerned and other persons subject to the exercise of the commission’s powers whose interests may be affected by a decision should be given the opportunity of submitting their observations beforehand , and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. while ensuring the rights of defence of the parties concerned , in particular , the right of access to the file , it is essential that confidential information be protected. furthermore , while respecting the confidentiality of the information , the commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of its decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that lead up to the decision. ### (101) the large online platforms concerned and other persons subject to the exercise of the commission’s powers whose interests may be affected by a decision should be given the opportunity of submitting their observations beforehand , and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. while ensuring the rights of defence of the parties concerned , in particular , the right of access to the file , it is essential that confidential information be protected. furthermore , while respecting the confidentiality of the information , the commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of its decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that lead up to the decision.


### (104) in order to fulfil the objectives of this regulation , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty should be delegated to the commission to supplement this regulation. in particular , delegated acts should be adopted in respect of criteria for identification of very large online platforms and of technical specifications for access requests. it is of particular importance that the commission carries out appropriate consultations and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of 13 april 2016. in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. ### (104) in order to fulfil the objectives of this regulation , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty should be delegated to the commission to supplement this regulation. in particular , delegated acts should be adopted in respect of criteria for identification of large online platforms and of technical specifications for access requests. it is of particular importance that the commission carries out appropriate consultations and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of 13 april 2016. in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.


### a framework for the conditional exemption from liability of providers of intermediary services; ### a framework for liability of providers of intermediary services


### 3. this regulation shall apply to intermediary services provided to recipients of the service that have their place of establishment or residence in the union , irrespective of the place of establishment of the providers of those services. ### 3. this regulation shall apply to intermediary services provided to recipients of the service , irrespective of the place of establishment of the providers of those services.


### 5. this regulation is without prejudice to the rules laid down by the following: ### 5. this regulation shall not affect the rules laid down by the following:


### directive 2010/13/ec; ### directive (eu) 2019/882


### union law on copyright and related rights; ### union law on copyright and related rights as implemented in national laws so as to ensure the highest level of protection of these rights;


### ‘to offer services in the union’ means enabling legal or natural persons in one or more member states to use the services of the provider of information society services which has a substantial connection to the union; such a substantial connection is deemed to exist where the provider has an establishment in the union; in the absence of such an establishment , the assessment of a substantial connection is based on specific factual criteria , such as: ### ‘to offer services in the union’ means enabling legal or natural persons in one or more member states to use the services of the provider of information society services which has a substantial connection to the union; such a substantial connection is deemed to exist where the provider has an establishment in the union; such a substantial connection is established where the activities are conducted in one or more member states.


### ‘to offer services in the union’ means enabling legal or natural persons in one or more member states to use the services of the provider of information society services which has a substantial connection to the union; such a substantial connection is deemed to exist where the provider has an establishment in the union; in the absence of such an establishment , the assessment of a substantial connection is based on specific factual criteria , such as: ### ‘to offer services in the union’ means enabling legal or natural persons in one or more member states to use the services of the provider of information society services which has a substantial connection to the union; such a substantial connection is deemed to exist based on specific factual criteria , such as the targeting of activities towards one or more member states , and/or the fact that there are users in one or more member states;


### — a significant number of users in one or more member states; or ### deleted


### — the targeting of activities towards one or more member states. ### deleted


### ‘trader’ means any natural person , or any legal person irrespective of whether privately or publicly owned , who is acting , including through any person acting in his or her name or on his or her behalf , for purposes relating to his or her trade , business , craft or profession; ### ‘trader’ means any natural person , or any legal person irrespective of whether privately or publicly owned , who is acting , including through any person marketing products and/or services in his or her name or on his or her behalf , for purposes relating to his or her trade , business , craft or profession;


### 1. very large online platforms shall provide the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission , upon their reasoned request and within a reasonable period , specified in the request , access to data that are necessary to monitor and assess compliance with this regulation. that digital services coordinator and the commission shall only use that data for those purposes. ### 1. large online platforms shall provide the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission , upon their reasoned request and within a reasonable period , and within a maximum of 72 hours , specified in the request , access to data that are necessary to monitor and assess compliance with this regulation. that digital services coordinator and the commission shall only use that data for those purposes.


### 3. very large online platforms shall provide access to data pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 through online databases or application programming interfaces , as appropriate. ### 3. large online platforms shall provide access to data pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 through online databases or application programming interfaces , as appropriate.


### 6. within 15 days following receipt of a request as referred to in paragraph 1 and 2 , a very large online platform may request the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission , as applicable , to amend the request , where it considers that it is unable to give access to the data requested because one of following two reasons: ### 6. within 3 days following receipt of a request as referred to in paragraph 1 and 2 , a large online platform may request the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission , as applicable , to amend the request , where it considers that it is unable to give access to the data requested.


### 2. very large online platforms shall only designate as compliance officers persons who have the professional qualifications , knowledge , experience and ability necessary to fulfil the tasks referred to in paragraph 3. compliance officers may either be staff members of , or fulfil those tasks on the basis of a contract with , the very large online platform concerned. ### 2. large online platforms shall only designate as compliance officers persons who have the professional qualifications , knowledge , experience and ability necessary to fulfil the tasks referred to in paragraph 3. compliance officers may either be staff members of , or fulfil those tasks on the basis of a contract with , the very large online platform concerned.


### 4. very large online platforms shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the compliance officers can perform their tasks in an independent manner. ### 4. large online platforms shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the compliance officers can perform their tasks in an independent manner.


### 5. very large online platforms shall communicate the name and contact details of the compliance officer to the digital services coordinator of establishment and the commission. ### 5. large online platforms shall communicate the name and contact details of the compliance officer to the digital services coordinator of establishment and the commission.


### 6. very large online platforms shall support the compliance officer in the performance of his or her tasks and provide him or her with the resources necessary to adequately carry out those tasks. the compliance officer shall directly report to the highest management level of the platform. ### 6. large online platforms shall support the compliance officer in the performance of his or her tasks and provide him or her with the resources necessary to adequately carry out those tasks. the compliance officer shall directly report to the highest management level of the platform.


### transparency reporting obligations for very large online platforms ### transparency reporting obligations for large online platforms


### 2. in addition to the reports provided for in article 13 , very large online platforms shall make publicly available and transmit to the digital services coordinator of establishment and the commission , at least once a year and within 30 days following the adoption of the audit implementing report provided for in article 28(4): ### 2. in addition to the reports provided for in article 13 , large online platforms shall make publicly available and transmit to the digital services coordinator of establishment and the commission , at least once a year and within 30 days following the adoption of the audit implementing report provided for in article 28(4):


### 3. where a very large online platform considers that the publication of information pursuant to paragraph 2 might result in the disclosure of confidential information of that platform or of the recipients of the service , might cause significant vulnerabilities for the security of its service , might undermine public security or might harm recipients , the platform may remove such information from the reports. in that case , that platform shall transmit the complete reports to the digital services coordinator of establishment and the commission , accompanied by a statement of the reasons for removing the information from the public reports. ### deleted


### 3. where a very large online platform considers that the publication of information pursuant to paragraph 2 may result in the disclosure of confidential information of that platform or of the recipients of the service , may cause significant vulnerabilities for the security of its service , may undermine public security or may harm recipients , the platform may remove such information from the reports. in that case , that platform shall transmit the complete reports to the digital services coordinator of establishment and the commission , accompanied by a statement of the reasons for removing the information from the public reports. ### deleted


### 3. where a very large online platform considers that the publication of information pursuant to paragraph 2 may result in the disclosure of confidential information of that platform or of the recipients of the service , may cause significant vulnerabilities for the security of its service , may undermine public security or may harm recipients , the platform may remove such information from the reports. in that case , that platform shall transmit the complete reports to the digital services coordinator of establishment and the commission , accompanied by a statement of the reasons for removing the information from the public reports. ### 3. where a very large online platform considers that the publication of information pursuant to paragraph 2 may result in the disclosure of confidential information of that platform or of the recipients of the service , may cause significant vulnerabilities for the security of its service , may undermine public security or may harm recipients , the platform may remove such information from the reports. in that case , that platform shall transmit the complete reports to the digital services coordinator of establishment and the commission , accompanied by a statement of the reasons for removing the information from the public reports. the digital services coordinator should be required to publish its decision as to whether it upholds the platform’s decision giving the reasons for this. this decision must be subject to review by the relevant judiciary body. for the absence of doubt , mere commercial confidentiality shall not be a reason for a very large online platform to fail to disclose the relevant information.


### 3. paragraph 2 is without prejudice to the tasks of digital services coordinators within the system of supervision and enforcement provided for in this regulation and the cooperation with other competent authorities in accordance with article 38(2). paragraph 2 shall not prevent supervision of the authorities concerned in accordance with national constitutional law. ### 3. paragraph 2 is without prejudice to the tasks of digital services coordinators within the system of supervision and enforcement provided for in this regulation and the cooperation with other competent authorities in accordance with article 38(2). paragraph 2 shall not prevent supervision of the authorities concerned in accordance with national constitutional law. digital services coordinators shall write a report , which is to be published in the information sharing system pursuant to article 67 of this regulation and presented to the european parliament.


### right to lodge a complaint ### right to lodge a complaint and right to judicial remedy


### 6. the board shall adopt its rules of procedure , following the consent of the commission. ### 6. the board shall adopt its rules of procedure , by a two-thirds majority of its members and shall organise its own operational arrangements.


### advise the commission to take the measures referred to in article 51 and , where requested by the commission , adopt opinions on draft commission measures concerning very large online platforms in accordance with this regulation; ### advise the commission to take the measures referred to in article 51 and , where requested by the commission , adopt opinions on draft commission measures concerning large online platforms in accordance with this regulation;


### advise the commission to take the measures referred to in article 51 and , where requested by the commission , adopt opinions on draft commission measures concerning very large online platforms in accordance with this regulation; ### decide to take the measures referred to in article 51 and , where requested by the commission , adopt opinions on draft commission measures concerning very large online platforms in accordance with this regulation;


### 3 supervision , investigation , enforcement and monitoring in respect of very large online platforms ### 3 supervision , investigation , enforcement and monitoring in respect of large online platforms


### enhanced supervision for very large online platforms ### enhanced supervision for large online platforms


### 1. in the context of proceedings which may lead to the adoption of a decision of non-compliance pursuant to article 58(1) , where there is an urgency due to the risk of serious damage for the recipients of the service , the commission may , by decision , order interim measures against the very large online platform concerned on the basis of a prima facie finding of an infringement. ### 1. in the context of proceedings which may lead to the adoption of a decision of non-compliance pursuant to article 58(1) , where there is an urgency due to the risk of serious damage for the recipients of the service , the commission or the board may , by decision , order interim measures against the very large online platform concerned on the basis of a prima facie finding of an infringement.


### 1. for the purposes of carrying out the tasks assigned to it under this section , the commission may take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with this regulation by the very large online platform concerned. the commission may also order that platform to provide access to , and explanations relating to , its databases and algorithms. ### 1. for the purposes of carrying out the tasks assigned to it under this section , the commission and the board may take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with this regulation by the very large online platform concerned. the commission and the board may also order that platform to provide access to , and explanations relating to , its databases and algorithms.


### 1. the commission shall adopt a non-compliance decision where it finds that the very large online platform concerned does not comply with one or more of the following: ### 1. the commission and the board shall adopt a non-compliance decision where it finds that the very large online platform concerned does not comply with one or more of the following:


### 1. the commission shall adopt a non-compliance decision where it finds that the very large online platform concerned does not comply with one or more of the following: ### 1. the commission shall adopt a non-compliance decision and act according to article 59 where it finds that the very large online platform concerned does not comply with one or more of the following:


### 5. where the commission finds that the conditions of paragraph 1 are not met , it shall close the investigation by a decision. ### 5. where the commission or the board finds that the conditions of paragraph 1 are not met , it shall close the investigation by a decision.


### 2. the commission may by decision impose on the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1) fines not exceeding 1% of the total turnover in the preceding financial year , where they intentionally or negligently: ### 2. the commission or the board may by decision impose on the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1) fines not exceeding 5% of the total turnover in the preceding financial year , where they intentionally or negligently:


### 3. before adopting the decision pursuant to paragraph 2 , the commission shall communicate its preliminary findings to the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1). ### 3. before adopting the decision pursuant to paragraph 2 , the commission or the board shall communicate its preliminary findings to the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1).


### 1. where all powers pursuant to this article to bring about the cessation of an infringement of this regulation have been exhausted , the infringement persists and causes serious harm which cannot be avoided through the exercise of other powers available under union or national law , the commission may request the digital services coordinator of establishment of the very large online platform concerned to act pursuant to article 41(3). ### 1. where all powers pursuant to this article to bring about the cessation of an infringement of this regulation have been exhausted , the infringement persists and causes serious harm which cannot be avoided through the exercise of other powers available under union or national law , the commission or the board may request the digital services coordinator of establishment of the very large online platform concerned to act pursuant to article 41(3).


### 1. by five years after the entry into force of this regulation at the latest , and every five years thereafter , the commission shall evaluate this regulation and report to the european parliament , the council and the european economic and social committee. ### 1. by three years after the entry into force of this regulation at the latest , and every five years thereafter , the commission and the board shall evaluate this regulation and report to the european parliament , the council and the european economic and social committee.


### a framework for the conditional exemption from liability of providers of intermediary services; ### a framework for the liability of providers of intermediary services;


### where the decision concerns allegedly illegal content , a reference to the legal ground relied on and explanations as to why the information is considered to be illegal content on that ground; ### where the decision concerns allegedly illegal content , a reference to the legal ground relied on and explanations as to why the information is considered to be illegal content on that ground and how long to expect the national authority decision for;


### where the decision is based on the alleged incompatibility of the information with the terms and conditions of the provider , a reference to the contractual ground relied on and explanations as to why the information is considered to be incompatible with that ground; ### where the decision is based on the alleged incompatibility of the information with the terms and conditions of the provider or with citizens’ fundamental rights , a reference to the contractual ground relied on and explanations as to why the information is considered to be incompatible with that ground;


### 3. the information provided by the providers of hosting services in accordance with this article shall be clear and easily comprehensible and as precise and specific as reasonably possible under the given circumstances. the information shall , in particular , be such as to reasonably allow the recipient of the service concerned to effectively exercise the redress possibilities referred to in point (f) of paragraph 2. ### 3. the information provided by the providers of hosting services in accordance with this article shall be universally accessible , clear and easily comprehensible and as precise and specific as reasonably possible under the given circumstances. the information shall , in particular , be such as to reasonably allow the recipient of the service concerned to effectively exercise the redress possibilities referred to in point (f) of paragraph 2.


### 2. the commission shall adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 69 to adjust the number of average monthly recipients of the service in the union referred to in paragraph 1 , where the union’s population increases or decreases at least with 5 % in relation to its population in 2020 or , after adjustment by means of a delegated act , of its population in the year in which the latest delegated act was adopted. in that case , it shall adjust the number so that it corresponds to 10% of the union’s population in the year in which it adopts the delegated act , rounded up or down to allow the number to be expressed in millions. ### 2. the commission shall adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 69 to adjust the number of average monthly recipients of the service in the union referred to in paragraph 1 , where the union’s population increases or decreases at least with 5 % in relation to its population in 2020 or , after adjustment by means of a delegated act , of its population in the year in which the latest delegated act was adopted. in that case , it shall adjust the number so that it corresponds to 5% of the union’s population in the year in which it adopts the delegated act , rounded up or down to allow the number to be expressed in millions.


### have proven objectivity and professional ethics , based in particular on adherence to codes of practice or appropriate standards. ### have proven objectivity and professional ethics and transparent record of the compliance with international human rights framework , based in particular on adherence to the eu charter of fundamental rights , the un guiding principles and the shadow eu action plan on the implementation of the un guiding principles on business and human rights within the eu.


### the power to order the cessation of infringements and , where appropriate , to impose remedies proportionate to the infringement and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end; ### the power to order the cessation of infringements and , where appropriate , to impose remedies proportionate to the infringement and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end. digital service coordinators and national authorities with relevant expertise to exercise oversight of this regulation shall have the power to order the prohibition on the deployment of recommender systems at least until compliance with fundamental rights is guaranteed and the consumer and fundamental rights of online users are sufficiently protected ;


### 4. member states shall ensure that the maximum amount of a periodic penalty payment shall not exceed 5 % of the average daily turnover of the provider of intermediary services concerned in the preceding financial year per day , calculated from the date specified in the decision concerned. ### 4. member states shall ensure that the maximum amount of a periodic penalty payment shall not exceed 10 % of the average daily turnover of the provider of intermediary services concerned in the preceding financial year per day , calculated from the date specified in the decision concerned.


### intervention by the commission and opening of proceedings ### intervention by the commission and/or the board and opening of proceedings


### 3. where the commission requires the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1) to supply information by decision , it shall state the legal basis and the purpose of the request , specify what information is required and set the time period within which it is to be provided. it shall also indicate the penalties provided for in article 59 and indicate or impose the periodic penalty payments provided for in article 60. it shall further indicate the right to have the decision reviewed by the court of justice of the european union. ### 3. where the commission or the board requires the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1) to supply information by decision , it shall state the legal basis and the purpose of the request , specify what information is required and set the time period within which it is to be provided. it shall also indicate the penalties provided for in article 59 and indicate or impose the periodic penalty payments provided for in article 60. it shall further indicate the right to have the decision reviewed by the court of justice of the european union.


### 5. at the request of the commission , the digital services coordinators and other competent authorities shall provide the commission with all necessary information to carry out the tasks assigned to it under this section. ### 5. at the request of the commission or the board , the digital services coordinators and other competent authorities shall provide the commission or the board with all necessary information to carry out the tasks assigned to it under this section.


### in order to carry out the tasks assigned to it under this section , the commission may interview any natural or legal person which consents to being interviewed for the purpose of collecting information , relating to the subject-matter of an investigation , in relation to the suspected infringement or infringement , as applicable. ### in order to carry out the tasks assigned to it under this section , the commission and the board may interview any natural or legal person which consents to being interviewed for the purpose of collecting information , relating to the subject-matter of an investigation , in relation to the suspected infringement or infringement , as applicable.


### 2. on-site inspections may also be carried out with the assistance of auditors or experts appointed by the commission pursuant to article 57(2). ### 2. on-site inspections may also be carried out with the assistance of auditors or experts appointed by the commission or the board pursuant to article 57(2).


### article 56 ### deleted


### 2. the actions pursuant to paragraph 1 may include the appointment of independent external experts and auditors to assist the commission in monitoring compliance with the relevant provisions of this regulation and to provide specific expertise or knowledge to the commission. ### 2. the actions pursuant to paragraph 1 may include the appointment of independent external experts and auditors to assist the commission and the board in monitoring compliance with the relevant provisions of this regulation and to provide specific expertise or knowledge to the commission and the board.


### commitments made binding pursuant to article 56 , ### deleted


### 2. before adopting the decision pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall communicate its preliminary findings to the very large online platform concerned. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain the measures that it considers taking , or that it considers that the very large online platform concerned should take , in order to effectively address the preliminary findings. ### 2. before adopting the decision pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission or the board shall communicate its preliminary findings to the very large online platform concerned. in the preliminary findings , the commission or the board shall explain the measures that it considers taking , or that it considers that the very large online platform concerned should take , in order to effectively address the preliminary findings.


### 3. in the decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 the commission shall order the very large online platform concerned to take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with the decision pursuant to paragraph 1 within a reasonable time period and to provide information on the measures that that platform intends to take to comply with the decision. ### 3. in the decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 the commission or the board shall order the very large online platform concerned to take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with the decision pursuant to paragraph 1 within a reasonable time period and to provide information on the measures that that platform intends to take to comply with the decision.


### 4. the very large online platform concerned shall provide the commission with a description of the measures it has taken to ensure compliance with the decision pursuant to paragraph 1 upon their implementation. ### 4. the very large online platform concerned shall provide the commission or the board with a description of the measures it has taken to ensure compliance with the decision pursuant to paragraph 1 upon their implementation.


### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 58 , the commission may impose on the very large online platform concerned fines not exceeding 6% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that that platform , intentionally or negligently: ### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 58 , the commission or the board may impose on the very large online platform concerned fines not exceeding 10% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that that platform , intentionally or negligently:


### fails to comply with a voluntary measure made binding by a decision pursuant to articles 56. ### deleted


### fail to rectify within the time period set by the commission , incorrect , incomplete or misleading information given by a member of staff , or fail or refuse to provide complete information; ### fail to rectify within the time period set by the commission or the board , incorrect , incomplete or misleading information given by a member of staff , or fail or refuse to provide complete information;


### comply with commitments made legally binding by a decision pursuant to article 56(1); ### deleted


### 2. where the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1) has satisfied the obligation which the periodic penalty payment was intended to enforce , the commission may fix the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment at a figure lower than that which would arise under the original decision. ### 2. where the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1) has satisfied the obligation which the periodic penalty payment was intended to enforce , the commission or the board may fix the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment at a figure lower than that which would arise under the original decision.


### 1. the powers conferred on the commission by articles 59 and 60 shall be subject to a limitation period of five years. ### 1. the powers conferred on the commission and the board by articles 59 and 60 shall be subject to a limitation period of ten years.


### 3. any action taken by the commission or by the digital services coordinator for the purpose of the investigation or proceedings in respect of an infringement shall interrupt the limitation period for the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments. actions which interrupt the limitation period shall include , in particular , the following: ### 3. any action taken by the commission , the board or by the digital services coordinator for the purpose of the investigation or proceedings in respect of an infringement shall interrupt the limitation period for the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments. actions which interrupt the limitation period shall include , in particular , the following:


### 4. each interruption shall start time running afresh. however , the limitation period for the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments shall expire at the latest on the day on which a period equal to twice the limitation period has elapsed without the commission having imposed a fine or a periodic penalty payment. that period shall be extended by the time during which the limitation period is suspended pursuant to paragraph 5. ### 4. each interruption shall start time running afresh. however , the limitation period for the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments shall expire at the latest on the day on which a period equal to twice the limitation period has elapsed without the commission or the board having imposed a fine or a periodic penalty payment. that period shall be extended by the time during which the limitation period is suspended pursuant to paragraph 5.


### 5. the limitation period for the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments shall be suspended for as long as the decision of the commission is the subject of proceedings pending before the court of justice of the european union. ### 5. the limitation period for the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments shall be suspended for as long as the decision of the commission or the board is the subject of proceedings pending before the court of justice of the european union.


### 1. the power of the commission to enforce decisions taken pursuant to articles 59 and 60 shall be subject to a limitation period of five years. ### 1. the power of the commission and the board to enforce decisions taken pursuant to articles 59 and 60 shall be subject to a limitation period of ten years.


### by any action of the commission , or of a member state acting at the request of the commission , designed to enforce payment of the fine or periodic penalty payment. ### by any action of the commission , the board or of a member state acting at the request of the commission , designed to enforce payment of the fine or periodic penalty payment.


### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to articles 58(1) , 59 or 60 , the commission shall give the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1) the opportunity of being heard on: ### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to articles 58(1) , 59 or 60 , the commission or the board shall give the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1) the opportunity of being heard on:


### preliminary findings of the commission , including any matter to which the commission has taken objections; and ### preliminary findings of the commission or the board , including any matter to which they have taken objections; and


### measures that the commission may intend to take in view of the preliminary findings referred to point (a). ### measures that the commission or the board may intend to take in view of the preliminary findings referred to point (a).


### 2. the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1) may submit their observations on the commission’s preliminary findings within a reasonable time period set by the commission in its preliminary findings , which may not be less than 14 days. ### 2. the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1) may submit their observations on the commission’s or the board's preliminary findings within a reasonable time period set by the commission or the board in their preliminary findings , which may not be less than 14 days.


### 3. the commission shall base its decisions only on objections on which the parties concerned have been able to comment. ### 3. the commission or the board shall base its decisions only on objections on which the parties concerned have been able to comment.


### 4. the rights of defence of the parties concerned shall be fully respected in the proceedings. they shall be entitled to have access to the commission's file under the terms of a negotiated disclosure , subject to the legitimate interest of the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1) in the protection of their business secrets. the right of access to the file shall not extend to confidential information and internal documents of the commission or member states’ authorities. in particular , the right of access shall not extend to correspondence between the commission and those authorities. nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the commission from disclosing and using information necessary to prove an infringement. ### 4. the rights of defence of the parties concerned shall be fully respected in the proceedings. they shall be entitled to have access to the commission's or the board's file under the terms of a negotiated disclosure , subject to the legitimate interest of the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1) in the protection of their business secrets. the right of access to the file shall not extend to confidential information and internal documents of the commission , the board or member states’ authorities. in particular , the right of access shall not extend to correspondence between the commission or the board and those authorities. nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the commission or the board from disclosing and using information necessary to prove an infringement.


### 1. the commission shall publish the decisions it adopts pursuant to articles 55(1) , 56(1) , 58 , 59 and 60. such publication shall state the names of the parties and the main content of the decision , including any penalties imposed. ### 1. the commission or the board shall publish the decisions it adopts pursuant to articles 55(1) , 56(1) , 58 , 59 and 60. such publication shall state the names of the parties and the main content of the decision , including any penalties imposed.


### prior to making such request to the digital services coordinator , the commission shall invite interested parties to submit written observations within a time period that shall not be less than two weeks , describing the measures it intends to request and identifying the intended addressee or addressees thereof. ### prior to making such request to the digital services coordinator , the commission or the board shall invite interested parties to submit written observations within a time period that shall not be less than two weeks , describing the measures it intends to request and identifying the intended addressee or addressees thereof.


### 2. where the coherent application of this regulation so requires , the commission , acting on its own initiative , may submit written observations to the competent judicial authority referred to article 41(3). with the permission of the judicial authority in question , it may also make oral observations. ### 2. where the coherent application of this regulation so requires , the commission or the board , acting on their own initiative , may submit written observations to the competent judicial authority referred to article 41(3). with the permission of the judicial authority in question , they may also make oral observations.


### for the purpose of the preparation of its observations only , the commission may request that judicial authority to transmit or ensure the transmission to it of any documents necessary for the assessment of the case. ### for the purpose of the preparation of its observations only , the commission or the board may request that judicial authority to transmit or ensure the transmission to it of any documents necessary for the assessment of the case.


### 2. the digital services coordinators , the commission and the board shall use the information sharing system for all communications pursuant to this regulation. ### 2. the digital services coordinators , the commission and the board shall use the information sharing system for all communications pursuant to this regulation. relevant committees of the european parliament shall be given access to that information sharing system to provide democratic oversight.


### 2. for the purpose of paragraph 1 , member states and the board shall send information on the request of the commission. ### 2. for the purpose of paragraph 1 , member states shall send information on the request of the commission or the board. the commission and the board shall also exchange information between themselves.


### 3. in carrying out the evaluations referred to in paragraph 1 , the commission shall take into account the positions and findings of the european parliament , the council , and other relevant bodies or sources. ### 3. in carrying out the evaluations referred to in paragraph 1 , the commission and the board shall take into account the positions and findings of the european parliament , the council , and other relevant bodies or sources.


### (10) for reasons of clarity , it should also be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to regulation (eu) 2019/1148 of the european parliament and of the council30 and regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council ,31 , directive 2002/58/ec of the european parliament and of the council32 and regulation […/…] on temporary derogation from certain provisions of directive 2002/58/ec33 as well as union law on consumer protection , in particular directive 2005/29/ec of the european parliament and of the council34 , directive 2011/83/eu of the european parliament and of the council35 and directive 93/13/eec of the european parliament and of the council36 , as amended by directive (eu) 2019/2161 of the european parliament and of the council37 , and on the protection of personal data , in particular regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council.38 the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data is solely governed by the rules of union law on that subject , in particular regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec. this regulation is also without prejudice to the rules of union law on working conditions. ### (10) for reasons of clarity , it should also be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to regulation (eu) 2019/1148 of the european parliament and of the council30 and regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council ,31 , directive 2002/58/ec of the european parliament and of the council32 and regulation […/…] on temporary derogation from certain provisions of directive 2002/58/ec33 as well as union law on consumer protection , in particular directive 2005/29/ec of the european parliament and of the council34 , directive 2011/83/eu of the european parliament and of the council35 and directive 93/13/eec of the european parliament and of the council36 , as amended by directive (eu) 2019/2161 of the european parliament and of the council37 , and on the protection of personal data , in particular regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council.38 the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data is solely governed by the rules of union law on that subject , in particular regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec. this regulation is also without prejudice to the rules of union or national law on working conditions.


### (27) since 2000 , new technologies have emerged that improve the availability , efficiency , speed , reliability , capacity and security of systems for the transmission and storage of data online , leading to an increasingly complex online ecosystem. in this regard , it should be recalled that providers of services establishing and facilitating the underlying logical architecture and proper functioning of the internet , including technical auxiliary functions , can also benefit from the exemptions from liability set out in this regulation , to the extent that their services qualify as ‘mere conduits’ , ‘caching’ or hosting services. such services include , as the case may be , wireless local area networks , domain name system (dns) services , top–level domain name registries , certificate authorities that issue digital certificates , or content delivery networks , that enable or improve the functions of other providers of intermediary services. likewise , services used for communications purposes , and the technical means of their delivery , have also evolved considerably , giving rise to online services such as voice over ip , messaging services and web-based e-mail services , where the communication is delivered via an internet access service. those services , too , can benefit from the exemptions from liability , to the extent that they qualify as ‘mere conduit’ , ‘caching’ or hosting service. ### (27) since 2000 , new technologies have emerged that improve the availability , efficiency , speed , reliability , capacity and security of systems for the transmission and storage of data online , leading to an increasingly complex online ecosystem. in this regard , it should be recalled that providers of services establishing and facilitating the underlying logical architecture and proper functioning of the internet , including technical auxiliary functions , can also benefit from the exemptions from liability set out in this regulation , to the extent that their services qualify as ‘mere conduits’ , ‘caching’ or hosting services. such services include , as the case may be , wireless local area networks , domain name system (dns) services , top–level domain name registries , certificate authorities that issue digital certificates , virtual private networks (vpn) or content delivery networks , that enable or improve the functions of other providers of intermediary services. likewise , services used for communications purposes , and the technical means of their delivery , have also evolved considerably , giving rise to online services such as voice over ip , messaging services and web-based e-mail services , where the communication is delivered via an internet access service. those services , too , can benefit from the exemptions from liability , to the extent that they qualify as ‘mere conduit’ , ‘caching’ or hosting service.


### due diligence obligations for a transparent and safe online environment ### due diligence obligations for a transparent , accessible and safe online environment


### the commission shall ensure that the list of designated very large online platforms is published in the official journal of the european union and keep that list updated. the obligations of this section shall apply , or cease to apply , to the very large online platforms concerned from four months after that publication. ### the commission shall ensure that the list of designated very large online platforms is published in the official journal of the european union and keep that list updated. the obligations of this section shall apply , or cease to apply , to the very large online platforms concerned from two months after that publication.


### 7. for each gatekeeper identified pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6 , the commission shall identify the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b). ### 7. for each gatekeeper identified pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6 , the commission shall identify the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users or for other end users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b).


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within two months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article.


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 as quickly as possible , and by no later than three months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article.


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within three months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article.


### where the commission , on the basis of that review pursuant to the first subparagraph , finds that the facts on which the designation of the providers of core platform services as gatekeepers was based , have changed , it shall adopt a corresponding decision. ### where the commission , on the basis of that review pursuant to the first subparagraph , finds that the facts on which the designation of the providers of core platform services as gatekeepers was based , have changed , it shall adopt a corresponding decision and shall be made public.


### where the commission , on the basis of that review pursuant to the first subparagraph , finds that the facts on which the designation of the providers of core platform services as gatekeepers was based , have changed , it shall adopt a corresponding decision. ### where the commission , on the basis of that review pursuant to the first subparagraph , finds that the facts on which the designation of the providers of core platform services as gatekeepers was based , have changed , it shall adopt a corresponding decision which shall be made public.


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining and , or cross-using personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679.the specific choice shall not subvert or impair consumers’ autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of their online interface or any part thereof ;


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/679. the specific choice shall not attempt to subvert or impair consumers’ autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of their online interface or any part thereof ;


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in business users or end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data;


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining and , or cross-using personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. the specific choice shall not subvert or impair consumers’ autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of their online interface or any part thereof;


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### not combine personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from other core platform services , any other services offered by the gatekeeper or from third-party services , and not sign in business users and end users to other services of the gatekeeper;