### 8. the competent authority shall release the guarantee immediately after 31 may of the second year in which the authorised declarant has surrendered cbam certificates in accordance with article 22. ### 8. the cbam authority shall release the guarantee immediately after 31 may of the second year in which the authorised declarant has surrendered cbam certificates in accordance with article 22.


### 9. the competent authority shall revoke the authorisation for a declarant who no longer meets the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 , or who fails to cooperate with that authority. ### 9. the cbam authority shall revoke the authorisation for a declarant who no longer meets the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 , or who fails to cooperate with that authority.


### 2. where a cbam declaration in accordance with article 6 has not been submitted , the competent authority of the member state of establishment of the authorised declarant shall assess the cbam obligations of that declarant on the basis of the information at its disposal and calculate the total number of cbam certificates due at the latest by the 31 december of the fourth year following that when the cbam declaration should have been submitted. ### 2. where a cbam declaration in accordance with article 6 has not been submitted , the cbam authority shall assess the cbam obligations of that declarant on the basis of the information at its disposal and calculate the total number of cbam certificates due at the latest by the 31 december of the fourth year following that when the cbam declaration should have been submitted.


### 3. where the competent authority has established that the declared number of cbam certificates to be surrendered is incorrect , or that no cbam declaration has been submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 , it shall adjust the number of cbam certificates due by the authorised declarant. the competent authority shall notify the authorised declarant of the adjustment and request that the authorised declarant shall surrender the additional cbam certificates within one month. ### 3. where the cbam authority has established that the declared number of cbam certificates to be surrendered is incorrect , or that no cbam declaration has been submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 , it shall adjust the number of cbam certificates due by the authorised declarant. the cbam authority shall notify the authorised declarant of the adjustment and request that the authorised declarant shall surrender the additional cbam certificates within one month.


### 5. where cbam certificates have been surrendered in excess of the number due , the competent authority shall , without delay , reimburse the authorised declarant the value of cbam certificates surrendered in excess , calculated at the average price paid for cbam certificates by the authorised declarant during the year of import. ### 5. where cbam certificates have been surrendered in excess of the number due , the cbam authority shall , without delay , reimburse the authorised declarant the value of cbam certificates surrendered in excess , calculated at the average price paid for cbam certificates by the authorised declarant during the year of import.


### 1. the competent authority of each member state shall sell cbam certificates to declarants authorised in that member state at the price calculated in accordance with article 21. ### 1. the cbam authority shall sell cbam certificates to declarants authorised at the price calculated in accordance with article 21.


### 2. the competent authority shall ensure that each cbam certificate is assigned a unique unit identification code upon its creation and shall register the unique unit identification number , the price and date of sale of the certificate in the national registry in the account of the authorised declarant purchasing it. ### 2. the cbam authority shall ensure that each cbam certificate is assigned a unique unit identification code upon its creation and shall register the unique unit identification number , the price and date of sale of the certificate in the cbam registry in the account of the authorised declarant purchasing it.


### 1. the commission shall calculate the price of cbam certificates as the average price of the closing prices of eu ets allowances on the common auction platform in accordance with the procedures laid down in commission regulation (eu) no 1031/201054 for each calendar week. ### 1. the european central carbon authority shall calculate and set the minimum price of cbam certificates.


### 1. the commission shall calculate the price of cbam certificates as the average price of the closing prices of eu ets allowances on the common auction platform in accordance with the procedures laid down in commission regulation (eu) no 1031/201054 for each calendar week. ### 1. the cbam authority shall calculate and set the minimum price of cbam certificates.


### 2. this average price shall be published by the commission on its website on the first working day of the following calendar week and shall be applied from the following working day to the first working day of the following calendar week. ### 2. this minimum price shall be published by the european central carbon authority on its website on the first working day of the following calendar week and shall be applied from the following working day to the first working day of the following calendar week.


### 2. this average price shall be published by the commission on its website on the first working day of the following calendar week and shall be applied from the following working day to the first working day of the following calendar week. ### 2. this minimum price shall be published by the cbam authority on its website on the first working day of the following calendar week and shall be applied from the following working day to the first working day of the following calendar week.


### 3. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts to further define the methodology to calculate the average price of cbam certificates and practical arrangements for the publication of the price. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(2). ### 3. the commission shall ensure that european producers pay an average carbon price equivalent to the price of cbam certificates.


### 1. by 31 may of each year , the authorised declarant shall surrender a number of cbam certificates to the competent authority that corresponds to the embedded emissions declared in accordance with article 6(2)(c) and verified in accordance with article 8 for the calendar year preceding the surrender ### 1. by 31 may of each year , the authorised declarant shall surrender a number of cbam certificates to the cbam authority that corresponds to the embedded emissions declared in accordance with article 6(2)(c) and verified in accordance with article 8 for the calendar year preceding the surrender


### 2. for the purposes of paragraph 1 , the authorised declarant shall ensure that the required number of cbam certificates is available on its account in the national registry. in addition , the authorised declarant shall ensure that the number of cbam certificates on its account in the national registry at the end of each quarter corresponds to at least 80 per cent of the embedded emissions , determined by reference to default values in accordance with the methods set out in annex iii , in all goods it has imported since the beginning of the calendar year. ### 2. for the purposes of paragraph 1 , the authorised declarant shall ensure that the required number of cbam certificates is available on its account in the cbam registry. in addition , the authorised declarant shall ensure that the number of cbam certificates on its account in the national registry at the end of each quarter corresponds to at least 80 per cent of the embedded emissions , determined by reference to default values in accordance with the methods set out in annex iii , in all goods it has imported since the beginning of the calendar year.


### 3. where the competent authority finds that the number of cbam certificates in the account of an authorised declarant is not in compliance with the obligations pursuant to paragraph 2 , second sentence , that authority shall notify the adjustment and request that the authorised declarant surrenders the additional cbam certificates within one month. ### 3. where the cbam authority finds that the number of cbam certificates in the account of an authorised declarant is not in compliance with the obligations pursuant to paragraph 2 , second sentence , it shall notify the adjustment and request that the authorised declarant surrenders the additional cbam certificates within one month.


### 1. the competent authority of each member state shall , on request by a declarant authorised in that member state , re-purchase the excess of cbam certificates remaining on the account of the declarant in the national registry after the certificates have been surrendered in accordance with article 22. the request to re-purchase shall be submitted by 30 june of each year when cbam certificates were surrendered. ### 1. the cbam authority shall , on request by a declarant authorised , re-purchase the excess of cbam certificates remaining on the account of the declarant in the cbam registry after the certificates have been surrendered in accordance with article 22. the request to re-purchase shall be submitted by 30 june of each year when cbam certificates were surrendered.


### by 30 june of each year , the competent authority of each member state shall cancel any cbam certificates that were purchased during the year before the previous calendar year and that remained in the accounts in the national registry of the declarants authorised in that member state. ### by 30 june of each year , the cbam authority of shall cancel any cbam certificates that were purchased during the year before the previous calendar year and that remained in the accounts in the cbam registry of the declarants.


### 1. the customs authorities shall not allow the importation of goods unless the declarant is authorised by a competent authority at the latest at the release for free circulation of the goods. ### 1. the customs authorities shall not allow the importation of goods unless the declarant is authorised by the cbam authority at the latest at the release for free circulation of the goods.


### 2. the customs authorities shall periodically communicate information on the goods declared for importation , which shall include the eori number and the cbam account number of the declarant , the 8-digit cn code of the goods , the quantity , the country of origin , the date of declaration and the customs procedure , to the competent authority of the member state where the declarant has been authorised. ### 2. the customs authorities shall periodically communicate information on the goods declared for importation , which shall include the eori number and the cbam account number of the declarant , the 8-digit cn code of the goods , the quantity , the country of origin , the date of declaration and the customs procedure , to the cbam authority.


### 4. the customs authorities may communicate in accordance with article 12(1) of regulation (eu) no 952/2013 , confidential information acquired by the customs authorities in the course of performing their duty or provided on a confidential basis , to the competent authority of the member state where the declarant has been authorised. the competent authorities of the member states shall treat and exchange this information in accordance with council regulation (ec) no 515/97. ### 4. the customs authorities may communicate in accordance with article 12(1) of regulation (eu) no 952/2013 , confidential information acquired by the customs authorities in the course of performing their duty or provided on a confidential basis , to the cbam authority. it shall treat and exchange this information in accordance with council regulation (ec) no 515/97.


### 3. payment of the penalty shall in no case release the authorised declarant from the obligation to surrender the outstanding number of cbam certificates in a given year to the competent authority of the member state where the declarant has been authorised. ### 3. payment of the penalty shall in no case release the authorised declarant from the obligation to surrender the outstanding number of cbam certificates in a given year to the cbam authority.


### 4. if the competent authority determines that an authorised declarant has failed to comply with the obligation to surrender cbam certificates as specified in paragraph 1 , or that a person has introduced goods into the customs territory of the union as specified in paragraph 2 , the competent authority shall impose the penalty and notify the authorised declarant or , in the situation under paragraph 2 , the person: ### 4. if the cbam authority determines that an authorised declarant has failed to comply with the obligation to surrender cbam certificates as specified in paragraph 1 , or that a person has introduced goods into the customs territory of the union as specified in paragraph 2 , it shall impose the penalty and notify the authorised declarant or , in the situation under paragraph 2 , the person:


### that the competent authority has concluded that the authorised declarant or the person fails to comply with the obligation of surrendering cbam certificates for a given year; ### that the cbam authority has concluded that the authorised declarant or the person fails to comply with the obligation of surrendering cbam certificates for a given year;


### of the action the competent authority considers the authorised declarant or the person should take to comply with its obligation under point (a) depending on the facts and circumstances of the case; and ### of the action the cbam authority considers the authorised declarant or the person should take to comply with its obligation under point (a) depending on the facts and circumstances of the case; and


### of the right of the authorised declarant or of the person to appeal under national rules. ### of the right of the authorised declarant or of the person to appeal.


### 2. practices of circumvention include situations where a change in the pattern of trade in relation to goods included in the scope of this regulation has insufficient due cause or economic justification other than avoiding obligations as laid down in this regulation and consist in replacing those goods with slightly modified products , which are not included in the list of goods in annex i but belong to a sector included in the scope of this regulation. ### 2. practices of circumvention include situations where a change in the pattern of trade in relation to goods included in the scope of this regulation has insufficient due cause or economic justification other than avoiding obligations as laid down in this regulation and consist in replacing those goods with slightly modified products , which are not included in the list of goods in annex i but belong to a sector included in the scope of this regulation; (b) transhipment of those goods through third countries with the result of excluding such goods from cbam under article 2(3) or securing lower embedded emissions due to the application of article 7 with respect to default values.


### 2. the power to adopt delegated acts referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) shall be conferred on the commission for an indeterminate period of time. ### 2. the power to adopt delegated acts referred to in articles 2(6) , 2(10) , 2(11) , 2a(2) , 8(3) , 18(3) , 27(5) , 31(2) and 35(6) shall be conferred on the commission for an indeterminate period of time.


### 3. the delegation of power referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council. ### 3. the delegation of power referred to in articles 2(6) , 2(10) , 2(11) , 2a(2) , 8(3) , 18(3) , 27(5) , 31(2) and 35(6) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council.


### 7. a delegated act adopted pursuant to articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the european parliament or by the council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the european parliament and to the council or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the commission that they will not object. that period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the european parliament or of the council. ### 7. a delegated act adopted pursuant to articles 2(6) , 2(10) , 2(11) , 2a(2) , 8(3) , 18(3) , 27(5) , 31(2) and 35(6) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the european parliament or by the council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the european parliament and to the council or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the commission that they will not object. that period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the european parliament or of the council.


### 3. the report by the commission shall , if appropriate , be accompanied by a legislative proposal. ### 3. the commission shall collect all the information needed to eventually extend the scope of this regulation to all imported goods. by 31 december 2030 , the commission shall present an assessment report to the european parliament on this matter , including whether the scope of this regulation could be extended to agricultural products.


### 3. the report by the commission shall , if appropriate , be accompanied by a legislative proposal. ### 3. the commission shall collect all the information needed to eventually extend the scope of this regulation to all imported goods. by 31 december 2030 , the commission shall present an assessment report to the european parliament on this matter.


### 2. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts laying down a calculation methodology for the reduction referred to in paragraph 1. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(2). ### 2. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts laying down a calculation methodology for the reduction referred to in paragraph 1. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(2).


### 3. the customs authorities shall , by means of the surveillance mechanism established pursuant to article 56(5) of regulation (eu) no 952/2013 , communicate to the competent authority of the member state of importation information on imported goods , including processed products resulting from the outward processing procedure. such information shall include the eori number of the declarant , the 8-digit cn code , the quantity , the country of origin and the declarant of the goods , the date of declaration and the customs procedure. ### 3. the customs authorities shall , by means of the surveillance mechanism established pursuant to article 56(5) of regulation (eu) no 952/2013 , communicate to the cbam authority information on imported goods , including processed products resulting from the outward processing procedure. such information shall include the eori number of the declarant , the 8-digit cn code , the quantity , the country of origin and the declarant of the goods , the date of declaration and the customs procedure.


### 1. each declarant shall , for each quarter of a calendar year , submit a report (‘cbam report’) containing information on the goods imported during that quarter , to the competent authority of the member state of importation or , if goods have been imported to more than one member state , to the competent authority of the member state at the declarant’s choice , no later than one month after the end of each quarter. ### 1. each declarant shall , for each quarter of a calendar year , submit a report (‘cbam report’) containing information on the goods imported during that quarter , to the cbam authority no later than one month after the end of each quarter.


### 3. the competent authority shall communicate the information referred to in paragraph 2 to the commission at the latest two months after the end of the quarter covered by a report. ### 3. the competent authority shall communicate the information referred to in paragraph 2 to the european central carbon authority at the latest two months after the end of the quarter covered by a report.


### 3. the competent authority shall communicate the information referred to in paragraph 2 to the commission at the latest two months after the end of the quarter covered by a report. ### 3. the cbam authority shall communicate the information referred to in paragraph 2 to the commission at the latest two months after the end of the quarter covered by a report.


### 4. the competent authority shall impose a proportionate and dissuasive penalty on declarants who fail to submit a cbam report. ### 4. the cbam authority shall impose a proportionate and dissuasive penalty on declarants who fail to submit a cbam report.


### 5. if the competent authority determines that a declarant has failed to comply with the obligation to submit a cbam report as specified in paragraph 1 , the competent authority shall impose the penalty and notify the declarant: ### 5. if the cbam authority determines that a declarant has failed to comply with the obligation to submit a cbam report as specified in paragraph 1 , it shall impose the penalty and notify the declarant:


### that the competent authority has concluded that the declarant fails to comply with the obligation of submitting a report for a given quarter; ### that the cbam authority has concluded that the declarant fails to comply with the obligation of submitting a report for a given quarter;


### of the action the competent authority considers the declarant should take to comply with its obligation under point (a) depending on the facts and circumstances of the case; and ### of the action the cbam authority considers the declarant should take to comply with its obligation under point (a) depending on the facts and circumstances of the case; and


### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts concerning the information to be reported , the procedures for communicating the information referred to in paragraph 3 and the conversion of the carbon price paid in foreign currency into euro at yearly average exchange rate. the commission is also empowered to adopt implementing acts to further define the necessary elements of the calculation method set out in annex iii , including determining system boundaries of production processes , emission factors , installation-specific values of actual emissions and their respective application to individual goods as well as laying down methods to ensure the reliability of data , including the level of detail and the verification of this data. the commission is further empowered to adopt implementing acts to develop a calculation method for indirect emissions embedded in imported goods. ### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts concerning the information to be reported , the procedures for communicating the information referred to in paragraph 3 and the conversion of the carbon price paid in foreign currency into euro at yearly average exchange rate. the commission is also empowered to adopt implementing acts to further define the necessary elements of the calculation method set out in annex iii , including determining system boundaries of production processes , emission factors , installation-specific values of actual emissions and their respective application to individual goods as well as laying down methods to ensure the reliability of data , including the level of detail and the verification of this data. the commission is further empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 28 supplementing this regulation to develop a calculation method for indirect emissions embedded in imported goods.


### (3) tackling climate and other environmental-related challenges and reaching the objectives of the paris agreement are at the core of the european green deal. the value of the european green deal has only grown in light of the very severe effects of the covid-19 pandemic on the health and economic well-being of the union’s citizens. ### (3) tackling climate and other environmental-related challenges , reaching the objectives of the paris agreement and creating a safe and equitable space for humanity in which a society that assures sustainable human development can thrive are the objectives to which the european green deal must contribute. the urgent need to meet these objectives has only grown in light of the very severe effects of the covid-19 pandemic on the health and well-being of the union’s citizens.


### (3) tackling climate and other environmental-related challenges and reaching the objectives of the paris agreement are at the core of the european green deal. the value of the european green deal has only grown in light of the very severe effects of the covid-19 pandemic on the health and economic well-being of the union’s citizens. ### (3) tackling climate and other environmental-related challenges and reaching the objectives of the paris agreement , the convention on biological diversity and creating a safe and equitable space for humankind in which a society that ensures sustainable human development are the objectives to which the european green deal must contribute. the urgent need to meet these objectives has only grown in light of the very severe effects of the covid-19 pandemic on the health and general well-being of the union’s citizens.


### (7) the union has been pursuing an ambitious policy on climate action and has put in place a regulatory framework to achieve its 2030 ghg emissions reduction target. the legislation implementing that target consists , inter alia , of directive 2003/87/ec of the european parliament and of the council37 , which establishes a system for ghg emission allowance trading within the union (‘eu ets’) and delivers harmonised pricing of ghg emissions at union level for energy-intensive sectors and subsectors , regulation (eu) 2018/842 of the european parliament and of the council38 , which introduces national targets for reduction of ghg emissions by 2030 , and regulation (eu) 2018/841 of the european parliament and of the council39 , which requires member states to compensate ghg emissions from land use with removals of emissions from the atmosphere. ### (7) the union has to date pursued an ambitious policy on climate action which has been insufficient to limit the global temperature increase to below 1.5°c. the current regulatory framework for achieving its 2030 ghg emissions reduction target , which consists , inter alia , of directive 2003/87/ec of the european parliament and of the council37 , which establishes a system for ghg emission allowance trading within the union (‘eu ets’) and delivers harmonised pricing of ghg emissions at union level for energy-intensive sectors and subsectors , regulation (eu) 2018/842 of the european parliament and of the council38 , which introduces national targets for reduction of ghg emissions by 2030 , and regulation (eu) 2018/841 of the european parliament and of the council39 , which requires member states to compensate ghg emissions from land use with removals of emissions from the atmosphere , must be fundamentally revised.


### (7) the union has been pursuing an ambitious policy on climate action and has put in place a regulatory framework to achieve its 2030 ghg emissions reduction target. the legislation implementing that target consists , inter alia , of directive 2003/87/ec of the european parliament and of the council37 , which establishes a system for ghg emission allowance trading within the union (‘eu ets’) and delivers harmonised pricing of ghg emissions at union level for energy-intensive sectors and subsectors , regulation (eu) 2018/842 of the european parliament and of the council38 , which introduces national targets for reduction of ghg emissions by 2030 , and regulation (eu) 2018/841 of the european parliament and of the council39 , which requires member states to compensate ghg emissions from land use with removals of emissions from the atmosphere. ### (7) the union's climate action policy has so far been insufficient to limit the global temperature increase to below 1.5 °c. the current regulatory framework for achieving its 2030 ghg emissions reduction target , which consists , inter alia , of directive 2003/87/ec of the european parliament and of the council37 , which establishes a system for ghg emission allowance trading within the union (‘eu ets’) and delivers harmonised pricing of ghg emissions at union level for energy-intensive sectors and subsectors , regulation (eu) 2018/842 of the european parliament and of the council38 , which introduces national targets for reduction of ghg emissions by 2030 , and regulation (eu) 2018/841 of the european parliament and of the council39 , which requires member states to compensate ghg emissions from land use with removals of emissions from the atmosphere , must be fundamentally revised.


### (7) the union has been pursuing an ambitious policy on climate action and has put in place a regulatory framework to achieve its 2030 ghg emissions reduction target. the legislation implementing that target consists , inter alia , of directive 2003/87/ec of the european parliament and of the council37 , which establishes a system for ghg emission allowance trading within the union (‘eu ets’) and delivers harmonised pricing of ghg emissions at union level for energy-intensive sectors and subsectors , regulation (eu) 2018/842 of the european parliament and of the council38 , which introduces national targets for reduction of ghg emissions by 2030 , and regulation (eu) 2018/841 of the european parliament and of the council39 , which requires member states to compensate ghg emissions from land use with removals of emissions from the atmosphere. ### (7) the eu's climate action policy has so far been insufficient to limit the global temperature increase to below 1.5 °c. the current regulatory framework for achieving its 2030 ghg emissions reduction target , which consists , inter alia , of directive 2003/87/ec of the european parliament and of the council37 , which establishes a system for ghg emission allowance trading within the union (‘eu ets’) and delivers harmonised pricing of ghg emissions at union level for energy-intensive sectors and subsectors , regulation (eu) 2018/842 of the european parliament and of the council38 , which introduces national targets for reduction of ghg emissions by 2030 , and regulation (eu) 2018/841 of the european parliament and of the council39 , which requires member states to compensate ghg emissions from land use with removals of emissions from the atmosphere , must be fundamentally revised.


### (14) this regulation should apply to goods imported into the customs territory of the union from third countries , except where their production has already been subject to the eu ets , whereby it applies to third countries or territories , or to a carbon pricing system fully linked with the eu ets. ### (14) this regulation should apply to goods imported into the customs territory of the union from third countries.


### (15) in order to exclude from the cbam third countries or territories fully integrated into , or linked , to the eu ets in the event of future agreements , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of tfeu should be delegated to the commission in respect of amending the list of countries in annex ii. conversely , those third countries or territories should be excluded from the list in annex ii and be subject to cbam whereby they do not effectively charge the ets price on goods exported to the union. ### deleted


### (18) the eu ets and the cbam have a common objective of pricing ghg emissions embedded in the same sectors and goods through the use of specific allowances or certificates. both systems have a regulatory nature and are justified by the need to curb ghg emissions , in line with the environmental objective set out in union. ### (18) according to a report of the united nations conference on trade and development (unctad) , a cbam which would merely be a competitiveness policy compensating for a difference in production costs between the eu and regions without a binding climate policy would have a limited contribution to climate change mitigation , as it would reduce only 0.1% of global co2 emissions.


### (18) the eu ets and the cbam have a common objective of pricing ghg emissions embedded in the same sectors and goods through the use of specific allowances or certificates. both systems have a regulatory nature and are justified by the need to curb ghg emissions , in line with the environmental objective set out in union. ### (18) according to a report of the united nations conference on trade and development (unctad) , a cbam which would merely be a competitiveness policy compensating for a difference in production costs between the eu and regions without a binding climate policy would have a limited contribution to climate change mitigation , as it would reduce only 0.1 % of global co2 emissions.


### (19) however , while the eu ets sets an absolute cap on the ghg emissions from the activities under its scope and allows tradability of allowances (so called ‘cap and trade system’) , the cbam should not establish quantitative limits to import , so as to ensure that trade flows are not restricted. moreover , while the eu ets applies to installations based in the union , the cbam should be applied to certain goods imported into the customs territory of the union. ### (19) the cbam should therefore set an absolute cap on the ghg emissions associated with goods imported into the customs territory of the union along the lines of the absolute cap set by the eu ets for ghg emissions from the activities falling within its scope.


### (19) however , while the eu ets sets an absolute cap on the ghg emissions from the activities under its scope and allows tradability of allowances (so called ‘cap and trade system’) , the cbam should not establish quantitative limits to import , so as to ensure that trade flows are not restricted. moreover , while the eu ets applies to installations based in the union , the cbam should be applied to certain goods imported into the customs territory of the union. ### (19) the cbam should therefore set an absolute cap on the ghg emissions associated with goods imported into the customs territory of the union along the lines of the absolute cap set by the eu ets for ghg emissions from activities falling within its scope.


### (20) the cbam system has some specific features compared with the eu ets , including on the calculation of the price of cbam certificates , on the possibilities to trade certificates and on their validity over time. these are due to the need to preserve the effectiveness of the cbam as a measure preventing carbon leakage over time and to ensure that the management of the system is not excessively burdensome in terms of obligations imposed on the operators and of resources for the administration , while at the same time preserving an equivalent level of flexibility available to operators under the eu ets. ### (20) the cbam system has some specific features compared with the eu ets , including on its own target for reducing imported emissions , on the calculation of the price of cbam certificates , on the possibilities to trade certificates and on their validity over time. these are due to the need to preserve the effectiveness of the cbam as a framework for organising the reduction of the union’s imported emissions and to ensure that the management of the system is not excessively burdensome in terms of obligations imposed on the operators and of resources for the administration.


### (20) the cbam system has some specific features compared with the eu ets , including on the calculation of the price of cbam certificates , on the possibilities to trade certificates and on their validity over time. these are due to the need to preserve the effectiveness of the cbam as a measure preventing carbon leakage over time and to ensure that the management of the system is not excessively burdensome in terms of obligations imposed on the operators and of resources for the administration , while at the same time preserving an equivalent level of flexibility available to operators under the eu ets. ### (20) the cbam system has some specific features compared with the eu ets , including on its own target for reducing imported emissions , on the calculation of the price of cbam certificates , on the possibilities to trade certificates and on their validity over time. these are due to the need to preserve the effectiveness of the cbam as a framework for organizing the reduction of the union's imported emissions and to ensure that the management of the system is not excessively burdensome in terms of obligations imposed on the operators and of resources for the administration.


### (20) the cbam system has some specific features compared with the eu ets , including on the calculation of the price of cbam certificates , on the possibilities to trade certificates and on their validity over time. these are due to the need to preserve the effectiveness of the cbam as a measure preventing carbon leakage over time and to ensure that the management of the system is not excessively burdensome in terms of obligations imposed on the operators and of resources for the administration , while at the same time preserving an equivalent level of flexibility available to operators under the eu ets. ### (20) the cbam system has some specific features compared with the eu ets , including on its own target for reducing imported emissions , on the calculation of the price of cbam certificates , on the possibilities to trade certificates and on their validity over time. these are due to the need to preserve the effectiveness of the cbam as a framework for organising the reduction of the union's imported emissions and to ensure that the management of the system is not excessively burdensome in terms of obligations imposed on the operators and of resources for the administration.


### (21) in order to preserve its effectiveness as a carbon leakage measure , the cbam needs to reflect closely the eu ets price. while on the eu ets market the price of allowances is determined through auctions , the price of cbam certificates should reasonably reflect the price of such auctions through averages calculated on a weekly basis. such weekly average prices reflect closely the price fluctuations of the eu ets and allow a reasonable margin for importers to take advantage of the price changes of the eu ets while at the same ensuring that the system remains manageable for the administrative authorities. ### (21) in order to ensure that the cbam does not unduly disadvantage developing and vulnerable countries , it is important that goods imported into the union and goods produced within the union are subject to equivalent carbon pricing consistent with the paris agreement.


### (22) under the eu ets , the total number of allowances issued (the ‘cap’) determines the supply of emission allowances and provides certainty about the maximum emissions of ghg. the carbon price is determined by the balance of this supply against the demand of the market. scarcity is necessary for there to be a price incentive. as it is not possible to impose a cap on the number of cbam certificates available to importers , if importers had the possibility to carry forward and trade cbam certificates , this could result in situations where the price for cbam certificates would no longer reflect the evolution of the price in the eu ets. that would weaken the incentive for decarbonisation between domestic and imported goods , favouring carbon leakage and impairing the overarching climate objective of the cbam. it could also result in different prices for operators of different countries. therefore , the limits to the possibilities to trade cbam certificates and to carry them forward is justified by the need to avoid undermining the effectiveness and climate objective of the cbam and to ensure even handed treatment to operators from different countries. however , in order to preserve the possibility for importers to optimise their costs , this regulation should foresee a system where authorities can re-purchase a certain amount of excess certificates from the importers. such amount is set at a level which allows a reasonable margin for importers to leverage their costs over the period of validity of the certificates whilst preserving the overall price transmission effect , ensuring that the environmental objective of the measure is preserved. ### (22) in order to address the risk that the carbon price may fluctuate too much , making it too uncertain for importers to plan the reduction of imported emissions , or that the carbon price may be too low to encourage the reduction of imported emissions , a new independent agency should be set up with a mandate to ensure the irreversible and gradual reduction of the union’s imported emissions through a monopoly on the issuance of cbam certificates with a fixed price , the number of which decreases over time: the european central carbon authority. competent national authorities should sell cbam certificates to a limited number of importers. together with the european central carbon authority , they should form a european system of carbon authorities.


### (22) under the eu ets , the total number of allowances issued (the ‘cap’) determines the supply of emission allowances and provides certainty about the maximum emissions of ghg. the carbon price is determined by the balance of this supply against the demand of the market. scarcity is necessary for there to be a price incentive. as it is not possible to impose a cap on the number of cbam certificates available to importers , if importers had the possibility to carry forward and trade cbam certificates , this could result in situations where the price for cbam certificates would no longer reflect the evolution of the price in the eu ets. that would weaken the incentive for decarbonisation between domestic and imported goods , favouring carbon leakage and impairing the overarching climate objective of the cbam. it could also result in different prices for operators of different countries. therefore , the limits to the possibilities to trade cbam certificates and to carry them forward is justified by the need to avoid undermining the effectiveness and climate objective of the cbam and to ensure even handed treatment to operators from different countries. however , in order to preserve the possibility for importers to optimise their costs , this regulation should foresee a system where authorities can re-purchase a certain amount of excess certificates from the importers. such amount is set at a level which allows a reasonable margin for importers to leverage their costs over the period of validity of the certificates whilst preserving the overall price transmission effect , ensuring that the environmental objective of the measure is preserved. ### (22) in order to address the risk that the carbon price may fluctuate too much , making it too uncertain for importers to plan the reduction of imported emissions , or that the carbon price may be too low to encourage the reduction of imported emissions , a new independent agency should be set up with a mandate to ensure the irreversible and gradual reduction of the union's imported emissions through a monopoly on the issuance of cbam certificates with a fixed price , the number of which decreases over time.


### (22) under the eu ets , the total number of allowances issued (the ‘cap’) determines the supply of emission allowances and provides certainty about the maximum emissions of ghg. the carbon price is determined by the balance of this supply against the demand of the market. scarcity is necessary for there to be a price incentive. as it is not possible to impose a cap on the number of cbam certificates available to importers , if importers had the possibility to carry forward and trade cbam certificates , this could result in situations where the price for cbam certificates would no longer reflect the evolution of the price in the eu ets. that would weaken the incentive for decarbonisation between domestic and imported goods , favouring carbon leakage and impairing the overarching climate objective of the cbam. it could also result in different prices for operators of different countries. therefore , the limits to the possibilities to trade cbam certificates and to carry them forward is justified by the need to avoid undermining the effectiveness and climate objective of the cbam and to ensure even handed treatment to operators from different countries. however , in order to preserve the possibility for importers to optimise their costs , this regulation should foresee a system where authorities can re-purchase a certain amount of excess certificates from the importers. such amount is set at a level which allows a reasonable margin for importers to leverage their costs over the period of validity of the certificates whilst preserving the overall price transmission effect , ensuring that the environmental objective of the measure is preserved. ### (22) in order to address the risk that the carbon price may fluctuate too much , making it too uncertain for importers to plan the reduction of imported emissions , or that the carbon price may be too low to encourage the reduction of imported emissions , a new independent agency should be set up with a mandate to ensure the irreversible and gradual reduction of the union's imported emissions through a monopoly on the issuance of cbam certificates with a fixed price , the number of which decreases over time: the european central carbon authority. competent national authorities should sell cbam certificates to a limited number of importers. together with the european central carbon authority , they should form a european system of carbon authorities.


### (26) the product coverage of the cbam should reflect the activities covered by the eu ets as that scheme is based on quantitative and qualitative criteria linked to the environmental objective of directive 2003/87/ec and is the most comprehensive ghg emissions regulatory system in the union. ### (26) initially , the product coverage of the cbam should reflect the activities covered by the eu ets as that scheme is based on quantitative and qualitative criteria linked to the environmental objective of directive 2003/87/ec and is the most comprehensive ghg emissions regulatory system in the union.


### (26) the product coverage of the cbam should reflect the activities covered by the eu ets as that scheme is based on quantitative and qualitative criteria linked to the environmental objective of directive 2003/87/ec and is the most comprehensive ghg emissions regulatory system in the union. ### (26) in a first phase , the product coverage of the cbam should reflect the activities covered by the eu ets as that scheme is based on quantitative and qualitative criteria linked to the environmental objective of directive 2003/87/ec and is the most comprehensive ghg emissions regulatory system in the union.


### (34) however , aluminium products should be included in the cbam as they are highly exposed to carbon leakage. moreover , in several industrial applications they are in direct competition with steel products because of characteristics closely resembling those of steel products. inclusion of aluminium is also relevant as the scope of the cbam may be extended to cover also indirect emissions in the future. ### deleted


### (38) as importers of goods covered by this regulation should not have to fulfil their cbam obligations under this regulation at the time of importation , specific administrative measures should be applied to ensure that the obligations are fulfilled at a later stage. therefore , importers should only be entitled to import cbam goods after they have been granted an authorisation by competent authorities responsible for the application of this regulation. ### (38) as importers of goods covered by this regulation should not have to fulfil their cbam obligations under this regulation at the time of importation , specific administrative measures should be applied to ensure that the obligations are fulfilled at a later stage. therefore , importers should only be entitled to import cbam goods after they have been granted an authorisation by the cbam authority responsible for the application of this regulation.


### (43) cbam certificates differ from eu ets allowances for which daily auctioning is an essential feature. the need to set a clear price for cbam certificates makes a daily publication excessively burdensome and confusing for operators , as daily prices risk becoming obsolete upon publication. thus , the publication of cbam prices on a weekly basis would accurately reflect the pricing trend of eu ets allowances and pursue the same climate objective. the calculation of the price of cbam certificates should therefore be set on the basis of a longer timeframe (on a weekly basis) than in the timeframe established by the eu ets (on a daily basis). the commission should be tasked to calculate and publish that average price. ### (43) the need to set a clear price for cbam certificates makes a daily publication excessively burdensome and confusing for operators , as daily prices risk becoming obsolete upon publication. thus , the publication of cbam prices on a weekly basis is the most reasonable option. the european central carbon authority should be tasked to calculate , set and publish that average price.


### (43) cbam certificates differ from eu ets allowances for which daily auctioning is an essential feature. the need to set a clear price for cbam certificates makes a daily publication excessively burdensome and confusing for operators , as daily prices risk becoming obsolete upon publication. thus , the publication of cbam prices on a weekly basis would accurately reflect the pricing trend of eu ets allowances and pursue the same climate objective. the calculation of the price of cbam certificates should therefore be set on the basis of a longer timeframe (on a weekly basis) than in the timeframe established by the eu ets (on a daily basis). the commission should be tasked to calculate and publish that average price. ### (43) the need to set a clear price for cbam certificates makes a daily publication excessively burdensome and confusing for operators , as daily prices risk becoming obsolete upon publication. thus , the publication of cbam prices on a weekly basis is the most reasonable option. the commission should be tasked to calculate and publish that average price.


### (44) in order to give the authorised declarants flexibility in complying with their cbam obligations and allow them to benefit from fluctuations in the price of eu ets allowances , the cbam certificates should be valid for a period of two years from the date of purchase. the authorised declarant should be allowed to re-sell to the national authority a portion of the certificates bought in excess. the authorised declarant should build up during the year the amount of certificates required at the time of surrendering , with thresholds set at the end of each quarter. ### (44) in order to give the authorised declarants flexibility in complying with their cbam obligations , the cbam certificates should be valid for a period of two years from the date of purchase. the authorised declarant should be allowed to re-sell to the national authority a portion of the certificates bought in excess. the authorised declarant should build up during the year the amount of certificates required at the time of surrendering , with thresholds set at the end of each quarter.


### (44) in order to give the authorised declarants flexibility in complying with their cbam obligations and allow them to benefit from fluctuations in the price of eu ets allowances , the cbam certificates should be valid for a period of two years from the date of purchase. the authorised declarant should be allowed to re-sell to the national authority a portion of the certificates bought in excess. the authorised declarant should build up during the year the amount of certificates required at the time of surrendering , with thresholds set at the end of each quarter. ### (44) in order to give the authorised declarants flexibility in complying with their cbam obligations and allow them to benefit from fluctuations in the price of eu ets allowances , the cbam certificates should be valid for a period of two years from the date of purchase. the authorised declarant should be allowed to re-sell to the cbam authority a portion of the certificates bought in excess. the authorised declarant should build up during the year the amount of certificates required at the time of surrendering , with thresholds set at the end of each quarter.


### (49) once third countries will be closely integrated into the union electricity market via market coupling , technical solutions should be found to ensure the application of the cbam to electricity exported from such countries into the customs territory of the union. if technical solutions cannot be found , third countries that are market coupled should benefit from a time limited exemption from the cbam until at the latest 2030 with regard solely to the export of electricity , provided that certain conditions are satisfied. however , those third countries should develop a roadmap and commit to implement a carbon pricing mechanism providing for an equivalent price as the eu ets , and should commit to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 [as well as?] to align with union legislation in the areas of environment , climate , competition and energy. that exemption should be withdrawn at any time if there are reasons to believe that the country in question does not fulfil its commitments or it has not adopted by 2030 an ets equivalent to the eu ets. ### (49) once third countries will be closely integrated into the union electricity market via market coupling , technical solutions should be found to ensure the application of the cbam to electricity exported from such countries into the customs territory of the union. if technical solutions cannot be found , third countries that are market coupled should benefit from a time limited exemption from the cbam until at the latest 2030 with regard solely to the export of electricity , provided that certain conditions are satisfied. however , those third countries should develop a roadmap and commit to implement a carbon pricing mechanism providing for an equivalent price to the price paid by the eu’s domestic producers , and should commit to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 [as well as?] to align with union legislation in the areas of environment , climate , competition and energy. that exemption should be withdrawn at any time if there are reasons to believe that the country in question does not fulfil its commitments.


### (49) once third countries will be closely integrated into the union electricity market via market coupling , technical solutions should be found to ensure the application of the cbam to electricity exported from such countries into the customs territory of the union. if technical solutions cannot be found , third countries that are market coupled should benefit from a time limited exemption from the cbam until at the latest 2030 with regard solely to the export of electricity , provided that certain conditions are satisfied. however , those third countries should develop a roadmap and commit to implement a carbon pricing mechanism providing for an equivalent price as the eu ets , and should commit to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 [as well as?] to align with union legislation in the areas of environment , climate , competition and energy. that exemption should be withdrawn at any time if there are reasons to believe that the country in question does not fulfil its commitments or it has not adopted by 2030 an ets equivalent to the eu ets. ### (49) once third countries will be closely integrated into the union electricity market via market coupling , technical solutions should be found to ensure the application of the cbam to electricity exported from such countries into the customs territory of the union. if technical solutions cannot be found , third countries that are market coupled should benefit from a time limited exemption from the cbam until at the latest 2030 with regard solely to the export of electricity , provided that certain conditions are satisfied. however , those third countries should develop a roadmap and commit to implement a explicit carbon pricing mechanism providing for an equivalent price to the price paid by the eu's domestic producers , and should commit to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 [as well as?] to align with union legislation in the areas of environment , climate , competition and energy. that exemption should be withdrawn at any time if there are reasons to believe that the country in question does not fulfil its commitments.


### (49) once third countries will be closely integrated into the union electricity market via market coupling , technical solutions should be found to ensure the application of the cbam to electricity exported from such countries into the customs territory of the union. if technical solutions cannot be found , third countries that are market coupled should benefit from a time limited exemption from the cbam until at the latest 2030 with regard solely to the export of electricity , provided that certain conditions are satisfied. however , those third countries should develop a roadmap and commit to implement a carbon pricing mechanism providing for an equivalent price as the eu ets , and should commit to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 [as well as?] to align with union legislation in the areas of environment , climate , competition and energy. that exemption should be withdrawn at any time if there are reasons to believe that the country in question does not fulfil its commitments or it has not adopted by 2030 an ets equivalent to the eu ets. ### (49) once third countries will be closely integrated into the union electricity market via market coupling , technical solutions should be found to ensure the application of the cbam to electricity exported from such countries into the customs territory of the union. if technical solutions cannot be found , third countries that are market coupled should benefit from a time limited exemption from the cbam until at the latest 2030 with regard solely to the export of electricity , provided that certain conditions are satisfied. however , those third countries should develop a roadmap and commit to implement a carbon pricing mechanism providing for an equivalent price to the price paid by the eu's domestic producers , and should commit to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 [as well as?] to align with union legislation in the areas of environment , climate , competition and energy. that exemption should be withdrawn at any time if there are reasons to believe that the country in question does not fulfil its commitments.


### (53) in light of the above , a dialogue with third countries should continue and there should be space for cooperation and solutions that could inform the specific choices that will be made on the details of the design of the measure during the implementation , in particular during the transitional period. ### (53) in light of the above , a dialogue with third countries should continue and there should be space for cooperation with a view to establishing a new international economic order based on the principles of equity , sovereign equality , interdependence , common interest , cooperation and solidarity among all states.


### (54) the commission should strive to engage in an even handed manner and in line with the international obligations of the eu , with the third countries whose trade to the eu is affected by this regulation , to explore possibilities for dialogue and cooperation with regard to the implementation of specific elements of the mechanism set out this regulation and related implementing acts. it should also explore possibilities for concluding agreements to take into account their carbon pricing mechanism. ### (54) the commission should strive to engage in an even handed manner and in line with the international obligations of the eu , with the third countries whose trade to the eu is affected by this regulation , to explore possibilities for dialogue and cooperation with regard to the implementation of specific elements of the mechanism set out this regulation and related implementing acts.


### (54) the commission should strive to engage in an even handed manner and in line with the international obligations of the eu , with the third countries whose trade to the eu is affected by this regulation , to explore possibilities for dialogue and cooperation with regard to the implementation of specific elements of the mechanism set out this regulation and related implementing acts. it should also explore possibilities for concluding agreements to take into account their carbon pricing mechanism. ### (54) the commission should strive to engage in an even handed manner and in line with the international obligations of the eu , with the third countries whose trade to the eu is affected by this regulation , to explore possibilities for dialogue and cooperation with regard to the implementation of specific elements of the mechanism set out in this regulation and related implementing acts , as well as alternative approaches aimed at addressing the objectives of this regulation , including common product carbon requirements.


### 1. this regulation establishes a carbon border adjustment mechanism (the ‘cbam’) for addressing greenhouse gas emissions embedded in the goods referred to in annex i , upon their importation into the customs territory of the union , in order to prevent the risk of carbon leakage. ### 1. this regulation establishes a carbon border adjustment mechanism (the ‘cbam’) for addressing greenhouse gas emissions embedded in the goods referred to in annex i , upon their importation into the customs territory of the union , in order to help to progressively reduce the eu’s imported emissions , reduce its overall carbon footprint and prevent the risk of any carbon leakage.


### 1. this regulation establishes a carbon border adjustment mechanism (the ‘cbam’) for addressing greenhouse gas emissions embedded in the goods referred to in annex i , upon their importation into the customs territory of the union , in order to prevent the risk of carbon leakage. ### 1. this regulation establishes a carbon border adjustment mechanism (the ‘cbam’) for addressing greenhouse gas emissions embedded in the goods referred to in annex i , upon their importation into the customs territory of the union , in order to help to progressively reduce the eu's imported emissions , reduce its overall carbon footprint and prevent the risk of any carbon leakage.


### 1. this regulation establishes a carbon border adjustment mechanism (the ‘cbam’) for addressing greenhouse gas emissions embedded in the goods referred to in annex i , upon their importation into the customs territory of the union , in order to prevent the risk of carbon leakage. ### 1. this regulation establishes a carbon border adjustment mechanism (the ‘cbam’) for addressing greenhouse gas emissions embedded in the goods referred to in annex i , upon their importation into the customs territory of the union , in order to progressively reduce the union's imported emissions , reduce its overall carbon footprint , prevent any risk of carbon leakage and incentivize emissions reductions in sectors covered by this regulation in third countries and within the union.


### 2. the cbam complements the system established for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the union by directive 2003/87/ec by applying an equivalent set of rules to imports into the customs territory of the union of goods referred to in article 2. ### 2. the cbam complements the eu’s regulatory framework for achieving its goal of reducing greenhouse gases by 2030 and its goal of climate neutrality in every economic sector by 2050 at the latest by applying , initially , a set of rules equivalent to those established for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the union by directive 2003/87/ec to imports into the customs territory of the union of goods referred to in article 2.


### 2. the cbam complements the system established for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the union by directive 2003/87/ec by applying an equivalent set of rules to imports into the customs territory of the union of goods referred to in article 2. ### 2. the cbam complements the eu's regulatory framework for achieving its goal of reducing greenhouse gases by 2030 and its goal of climate neutrality in every economic sector by 2050 at the latest by applying , initially , a set of rules equivalent to those established for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the union by directive 2003/87/ec by applying an equivalent set of rules to imports into the customs territory of the union of goods referred to in article 2.


### 3. the mechanism will progressively become an alternative to the mechanisms established under directive 2003/87/ec to prevent the risk of carbon leakage , notably the allocation of allowances free of charge in accordance with article 10a of that directive. ### 3. the mechanism will progressively , and by 2030 at the latest , become an alternative to the mechanisms established under directive 2003/87/ec to prevent the risk of carbon leakage , notably the allocation of allowances free of charge in accordance with article 10a of that directive.


### the eu ets established pursuant to directive 2003/87/ec applies to that country or territory or an agreement has been concluded between that third country or territory and the union fully linking the eu ets and the third country or territory emission trading system; ### the eu ets established pursuant to directive 2003/87/ec applies to that country or territory or an agreement has been concluded between that third country or territory and the union that provides a carbon pricing mechanism similar or equivalent to the eu ets;


### (11) ‘competent authority’ means the authority , designated by each member state in accordance with article 11 of this regulation; ### (11) ‘cbam authority’ means the authority , designated by each member state in accordance with article 11 of this regulation;


### (16) ‘embedded emissions’ mean direct emissions released during the production of goods , calculated pursuant to the methods set out in annex iii; ### (16) ‘embedded emissions’ mean direct and indirect emissions released during the production of goods and its upstream products applying the principles laid out in articles 7 and 8 , calculated pursuant to the methods set out in annex iii;


### goods shall only be imported into the customs territory of the union by a declarant that is authorised by the competent authority in accordance with article 17 (‘authorised declarant’). ### goods shall only be imported into the customs territory of the union by a declarant that is authorised by the cbam authority in accordance with article 17 (‘authorised declarant’).


### information necessary to demonstrate the declarant’s financial and operational capacity to fulfil its obligations under this regulation and , if decided by the competent authority on the basis of a risk assessment , supporting documents confirming that information , such as the profit and loss account and the balance sheet for up to the three last financial years for which the accounts were closed; ### information necessary to demonstrate the declarant’s financial and operational capacity to fulfil its obligations under this regulation and , if decided by the cbam authority on the basis of a risk assessment , supporting documents confirming that information , such as the profit and loss account and the balance sheet for up to the three last financial years for which the accounts were closed;


### 5. the authorised declarant shall inform the competent authority without delay of any changes of the information provided under paragraph 3 , arising after the decision was taken , which may influence the decision taken pursuant to article 17 or content of the authorisation in accordance with article 17. ### 5. the authorised declarant shall inform the cbam authority without delay of any changes of the information provided under paragraph 3 , arising after the decision was taken , which may influence the decision taken pursuant to article 17 or content of the authorisation in accordance with article 17.


### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts , concerning the standard format of the application and the delays and procedure to be followed by the competent authority when processing applications for authorisation in accordance with paragraph 1 and the rules for identification by the competent authority of the declarants for the importation of electricity. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(2). ### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts , concerning the standard format of the application and the delays and procedure to be followed by the cbam authority when processing applications for authorisation in accordance with paragraph 1 and the rules for identification by the cbam authority of the declarants for the importation of electricity. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(2).


### 1. by 31 may of each year , each authorised declarant shall submit a declaration (‘cbam declaration’) , for the calendar year preceding the declaration , to the competent authority. ### 1. by 31 may of each year , each authorised declarant shall submit a declaration (‘cbam declaration’) , for the calendar year preceding the declaration , to the cbam authority.


### 4. the authorised declarant shall keep records of the information required to calculate the embedded emissions in accordance with the requirements laid down in annex iv. those records shall be sufficiently detailed to enable verifiers accredited pursuant to article 18 to verify the embedded emissions in accordance with article 8 and annex v and to enable the competent authority to review the cbam declaration in accordance with article 19(1). ### 4. the authorised declarant shall keep records of the information required to calculate the embedded emissions in accordance with the requirements laid down in annex iv. those records shall be sufficiently detailed to enable verifiers accredited pursuant to article 18 to verify the embedded emissions in accordance with article 8 and annex v and to enable the cbam authority to review the cbam declaration in accordance with article 19(1).


### 3. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts concerning the principles of verification referred to in paragraph 1 as regards the possibility to waive the obligation for the verifier to visit the installation where relevant goods are produced and the obligation to set thresholds for deciding whether misstatements or non-conformities are material and concerning the supporting documentation needed for the verification report. ### 3. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 28 supplementing this regulation concerning the principles of verification referred to in paragraph 1 as regards the possibility to waive the obligation for the verifier to visit the installation where relevant goods are produced and the obligation to set thresholds for deciding whether misstatements or non-conformities are material and concerning the supporting documentation needed for the verification report.


### 2. the authorised declarant shall keep records of the documentation , certified by an independent person , required to demonstrate that the declared embedded emissions were subject to a carbon price in the country of origin of the goods and keep evidence of the proof of the actual payment for that carbon price which should not have been subject to an export rebate or any other form of compensation on exportation. ### 2. the authorised declarant shall keep records of the documentation , certified by an independent person , required to demonstrate that the declared embedded emissions were subject to an explicit carbon price in the country of origin of the goods and keep evidence of the proof of the actual payment for that carbon price which should not have been subject to an export rebate or any other form of compensation on exportation.


### 1. the commission shall , upon request by an operator of an installation located in a third country , register the information on that operator and on its installation in a central database referred to in article 14(4). ### 1. the commission shall , upon request by an operator of an installation located in a third country , register the information on that operator and on its installation in a central public database referred to in article 14(4).


### 6. the records referred to in paragraph 5 , point (c) , shall be sufficiently detailed to enable the verification in accordance with paragraph 5 , point (b) , and to enable any competent authority to review , in accordance with article 19(1) , the cbam declaration made by an authorised declarant to whom the relevant information was disclosed in accordance with paragraph 8. ### 6. the records referred to in paragraph 5 , point (c) , shall be sufficiently detailed to enable the verification in accordance with paragraph 5 , point (b) , and to enable the cbam authority to review and verify , in accordance with article 19(1) , the cbam declaration made by an authorised declarant to whom the relevant information was disclosed in accordance with paragraph 8.


### 1. each member state shall designate the competent authority to carry out the obligations under this regulation and inform the commission thereof. ### 1. the european central carbon authority and competent national authorities shall form the european system of carbon authorities (‘esca’).


### 1. each member state shall designate the competent authority to carry out the obligations under this regulation and inform the commission thereof. ### 1. the commission shall appoint the cbam authority to perform the obligations under this regulation.


### the commission shall make available to the member states a list of all competent authorities and publish this information in the official journal of the european union. ### each member state shall designate the competent authority to carry out the obligations under this regulation and inform the commission thereof.


### the commission shall make available to the member states a list of all competent authorities and publish this information in the official journal of the european union. ### deleted


### article 12 ### deleted


### all information acquired by the competent authority in the course of performing its duty which is by its nature confidential or which is provided on a confidential basis shall be covered by an obligation of professional secrecy. such information shall not be disclosed by the competent authority without the express permission of the person or authority that provided it. it may be shared with customs authorities , the commission and the european public prosecutors office and shall be treated in accordance with council regulation (ec) no 515/97. ### all information acquired by the cbam authority in the course of performing its duty which is by its nature confidential or which is provided on a confidential basis shall be covered by an obligation of professional secrecy. such information shall not be disclosed by the competent authority without the express permission of the person or authority that provided it. it may be shared with customs authorities , the commission and the european public prosecutors office and shall be treated in accordance with council regulation (ec) no 515/97.


### national registries and central database ### cbam registry and central database


### 1. the competent authority of each member state shall establish a national registry of declarants authorised in that member state in the form of a standardised electronic database containing the data regarding the cbam certificates of those declarants , and to provide for confidentiality in accordance with the conditions set out in article 13. ### 1. the cbam authority shall establish a public cbam registry of all declarants authorised in the form of a standardised electronic database containing the data regarding the cbam certificates of each declarant , and to provide for confidentiality in accordance with the conditions set out in article 13.


### the number , the price of sale , the date of purchase , the date of surrender , or the date of re-purchase , or that of the cancellation by the competent authority , of cbam certificates for each authorised declarant. ### the number , the price of sale , the date of purchase , the date of surrender , or the date of re-purchase , or that of the cancellation by the cbam authority , of cbam certificates for each authorised declarant.


### 3. the information in the database referred to in paragraph 2 shall be confidential. ### 3. the information in the database referred to in paragraph 2 shall be confidential other than the names of the authorized declarants and of the operator and of the third country installations included in the database which shall be accessible to the public.


### 4. the commission shall establish a central database accessible to the public containing the names , addresses and contact details of the operators and the location of installations in third countries in accordance with article 10(2). an operator may choose not to have its name , address and contact details accessible to the public. ### 4. the commission shall adopt implementing acts concerning the infrastructure and specific processes of the cbam registry and the electronic database containing the information referred to in paragraph 2. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(2).


### article 15 ### deleted


### 1. the commission shall act as central administrator to maintain an independent transaction log recording the purchase of cbam certificates , their holding , surrender , re-purchase and cancellation and ensure coordination of national registries. ### 1. the european central carbon authority shall act as central administrator to maintain an independent transaction log recording the purchase of cbam certificates , their holding , surrender , re-purchase and cancellation and ensure coordination of national registries.


### (2) the paris agreement33 , adopted in december 2015 under the united nations framework convention on climate change (‘unfccc’) entered into force in november 2016. the parties to the paris agreement , in its article 2 , have agreed to hold the increase in the global average temperature well below 2°c above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°c above pre-industrial levels. ### (2) the paris agreement33 , adopted in december 2015 under the united nations framework convention on climate change (‘unfccc’) entered into force in november 2016. in its 2021 report on the physical science basis , the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) has underlined that most of widespread and rapid changes to earth's oceans , ice and land surface caused by global warming are irreversible on human timescales and that exceeding 2°c of global warming will cause heat extremes to reach critical tolerance thresholds for agriculture and human health. stabilizing the climate will require strong , rapid , and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and reaching net zero co2 emissions. by adopting the glasgow climate pact , its parties have recognized the urgency to act to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°c above pre-industrial levels.


### (30) the use of the first criterion allows listing the following industrial sector in terms of cumulated emissions: iron and steel , refineries , cement , organic basic chemicals , and fertilisers. ### (30) the following industrial sector should be included in the initial scope of this regulation: iron and steel , refineries , cement , aluminium , organic basic chemicals , hydrogen , polymers ('plastics') and fertilisers.


### (31) however , certain sectors listed in commission delegated decision (eu) 2019/708 should not at this stage be addressed in this regulation , due to their particular characteristics. ### deleted


### (32) in particular , organic chemicals are not included in the scope of this regulation due to technical limitations that do not allow to clearly define the embedded emissions of imported goods. for these goods the applicable benchmark under the eu ets is a basic parameter , which does not allow for an unambiguous allocation of emissions embedded in individual imported goods. a more targeted allocation to organic chemicals will require more data and analysis. ### deleted


### (40) an authorised declarant should be allowed to claim a reduction in the number of cbam certificates to be surrendered corresponding to the carbon price already paid for those emissions in other jurisdictions. ### (40) an authorised declarant should be allowed to claim a reduction in the number of cbam certificates to be surrendered corresponding to the explicit carbon price already paid for those emissions in other jurisdictions.


### 2. the cbam complements the system established for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the union by directive 2003/87/ec by applying an equivalent set of rules to imports into the customs territory of the union of goods referred to in article 2. ### 2. the cbam complements the union's regulatory framework for achieving its goal of reducing greenhouse gases by 2030 and its goal of climate neutrality in every economic sector by 2050 at the latest by applying , initially , a set of rules equivalent to those established for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the union by directive 2003/87/ec by applying an equivalent set of rules to imports into the customs territory of the union of goods referred to in article 2.


### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts in order to determine the conditions for applying the cbam to goods referred to in paragraph 2. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(2). ### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 28 in order to supplement this regulation by setting out the conditions for applying the cbam to goods referred in paragraph 2.


### (15) ‘direct emissions’ mean emissions from the production processes of goods over which the producer has direct control; ### (15) ‘direct emissions’ mean emissions from the production processes of goods over which the producer has direct control , including emissions from the production of heating and cooling consumed during the production processes;


### (28) ‘indirect emissions’ mean emissions from the production of electricity , heating and cooling , which is consumed during the production processes of goods. ### (28) ‘indirect emissions’ mean greenhouse gas emissions from the production processes of electricity , heating and cooling , which is consumed during the production processes of goods.


### 5. the authorised declarant shall keep those records of information referred to in paragraph 4 , including the report of the verifier , until the end of the fourth year after the year in which the cbam declaration has been or should have been submitted. ### 5. the authorised declarant shall keep those records of information referred to in paragraph 4 , including the report of the verifier , until the end of the fourth year after the year in which the cbam declaration has been or should have been submitted. those records shall be sufficiently detailed to enable the accredited verifiers to verify the embedded emissions in accordance with article 8 and to enable the cbam authority to review the cbam declaration in accordance with article 19(1). those records shall be kept for the period during which the cbam authority may review the cbam declaration as referred to in article 19(1).


### the implementing acts referred to in the first subparagraph shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(2). ### deleted


### carbon price paid in a country of origin ### explicit carbon price paid in a country of origin


### 1. an authorised declarant may claim in its cbam declaration a reduction in the number of cbam certificates to be surrendered in order for the carbon price paid in the country of origin for the declared embedded emissions to be taken into account. ### 1. an authorised declarant may claim in its cbam declaration a reduction in the number of cbam certificates to be surrendered in order for the explicit carbon price paid in the country of origin for the declared embedded emissions to be taken into account.


### 2. the request for registration referred to in paragraph 1 shall include the following information to be included in the database upon registration: ### 2. the request for registration referred to in paragraph 1 shall include the following information to be included in the public database upon registration:


### 2. each authorised declarant shall be granted access to its account in the registry. ### 2. each authorised declarant shall be granted access to its account in the cbam registry.


### for those calendar weeks in which there are no auctions scheduled on the common auction platform , the price of cbam certificates shall be the average price of the closing prices of eu ets allowances of the last week in which auctions on the common auction platform took place. ### deleted


### 1. welcomes the update of the industrial strategy; stresses that for the green deal to be a true growth strategy , reduce dependencies and maintain a level playing field for european industry during the transition , it needs to be accompanied by ambitious industrial policy; ### 1. notes the update of the industrial strategy; stresses that for the green deal to truly address the climate emergency , it needs to be accompanied by ambitious industrial policy addressing the social emergency;


### 2. considers it regrettable that the eu multiannual financial framework and nextgenerationeu did not provide any specific funding for the tourism industry; ### 2. considers it regrettable that the eu multiannual financial framework and nextgenerationeu did not provide any specific funding for the tourism industry; takes the view that public investment by the eu and member states is key to reviving productive sectors and developing mobility , in particular by encouraging high-quality tourism and transport-related industry , and altering mobility patterns;


### 2. underlines that the eu cannot be dependent on non-eu countries for products and technologies that are essential to our economy and for our society of the future; stresses that the eu needs to regain a strong position in crucial global value chains and secure the supply of critical materials in times of crisis; ### 2. underlines that for essential and strategic products and technologies the eu needs to build and guarantee a strong public industrial basis in line with ambitious public social and climate planning; highlights that in a global economy , economic interdependence is inevitable; stresses therefore that fair trade , equal partnerships and cooperation for mutual benefit with third countries are essential;


### 3. calls on the commission to support smes and micro-businesses (including artisans) in the tourism sector , by fostering innovative initiatives , simplifying bureaucracy and encouraging education and training (mainly on new digital skills) , to stimulate new tourism offerings in terms of destinations and experiences; ### 3. calls on the commission to support smes and micro-businesses (including artisans) in the tourism sector , by encouraging education and training (mainly on new digital skills) , and by guaranteeing rights , decent working conditions and proper wages for workers in this sector , without any seasonal variations; emphasises the importance of fostering innovative initiatives to stimulate new tourism offerings in terms of destinations and experiences , helping to enhance the value of regional products and local traditions;


### 3. calls on the commission to present clear transition pathways for the industrial ecosystem as soon as possible , including by identifying the needs for a successful transition in terms of infrastructure , technologies and skills; calls on the commission to ensure consistency and coordination across all initiatives , objectives , funding and regulatory instruments that will support industry through the transitions; calls for annual monitoring and reporting on the competitiveness and resilience of our industrial ecosystems and on the progress made on the transition pathways , so that instruments can be adapted swiftly when needed; ### 3. calls on the commission to present clear transition pathways for the industrial ecosystem as soon as possible , including by identifying the needs for a successful transition in terms of infrastructure , technologies and skills; calls on the commission to ensure consistency and coordination across all initiatives , objectives , funding and regulatory instruments that will make industry an asset for the social and climate transitions; calls for annual monitoring and reporting on the resilience of industrial ecosystems and their contribution to - and progress made on - the transition pathways , so that regulations can be adapted swiftly whenever needed to reach social and environmental objectives;


### 4. calls on the commission to include the tourism industry in the eu data strategy and to support the establishment of data spaces that will benefit the sector by creating a framework for improved data sharing; in this context , invites the commission to harmonise data collection rules on tourism statistics; ### 4. calls on the commission to include the tourism industry in the eu data strategy and to support the establishment of data spaces that will benefit the sector by creating a public framework for improved data sharing; in this context , invites the commission to harmonise data collection rules on tourism statistics;


### 4. notes that the eu is outperformed by other economic powers in research and development (r&d) expenditures as a percentage of gdp; reiterates the importance of an ambitious level of investment in r&d regrets that the target of 3 % of gdp investments in r&d has still not been achieved in the vast majority of member states; ### 4. notes that the eu is outperformed by other economic powers in research and development (r&d) expenditures as a percentage of gdp; reiterates the importance of an ambitious level of investment in r&d is concerned about a lack of fair return on public investment; regrets the continuous decline in efficiency of the current innovation system due in part to data silos and the fragmentation of knowledge; calls on the commission to promote and support open science partnerships as a mechanism to reverse this decline and promote innovation , avoiding restrictive forms of intellectual property to facilitate use and sharing;


### 5. calls on the commission to facilitate multimodal journey planning and ticketing through digital services while better regulating the activity of online booking platforms and booking platform intermediaries; calls for the eu framework for short-term rentals to be strengthened and for new policies to be implemented with a view to enhancing transparency; ### 5. calls on the commission to help facilitate multimodal journey planning and ticketing through digital services and regulate the activity of online booking platforms and booking platform intermediaries; calls for the regulations on short-term rentals to be strengthened and for new policies to be implemented with a view to enhancing transparency in order to help prevent property speculation;


### 7. welcomes the commission’s announcement issuing guidance on public procurement; stresses that public procurement is an essential instrument for national and economic security and for supporting the uptake of and demand for clean products; calls , in this regard , on the commission to review public procurement and competition rules where needed; ### 7. welcomes the commission’s announcement issuing guidance on public procurement; stresses that public procurement is an important instrument of industrial policy and should serve social and environmental development objectives; calls , in this regard , on the commission to review public procurement and competition rules;


### 10. stresses the need for regulatory stability and predictability; calls on the commission to include roadmaps in the transition pathways to reduce administrative burdens for european businesses , especially smes , by at least 30 %; stresses the ‘one in , one out’ principle; ### 10. stresses the need for regulatory stability and predictability; calls on the commission to guarantee fair taxation , tackle tax evasion , including by supporting a global financial register and a harmonised 25% minimum effective tax rate on big multinational companies;


### 11. underlines the regional dimension of industrial policy and the role of regional smart specialisation strategies; calls on the commission to include instruments to increase the use of ‘made in eu’ at a regional level; ### 11. underlines the regional dimension of industrial policy in terms of employment , economic and industrial development throughout the territory of member states; calls on the commission to support the equal development of eu territories within the union , and guarantee a strong public industrial basis and production in line with ambitious social and climate planning;


### 12. calls on the commission to stimulate the production of affordable and abundant renewable and low-carbon energy; calls on the commission to increase the coordination of the planning and financing for needed electricity , energy , hydrogen , co2 and heating/cooling infrastructure; ### 12. calls on the commission to guarantee the production of affordable renewable energy , notably through the promotion of massive public investment plans; calls therefore on the commission to increase the coordination of the planning and financing for energy efficiency and renewable energy , notably green hydrogen; notes that public subsidies for investments in fossil gas , low-carbon energy and gray hydrogen are incompatible with union climate objectives , including the paris agreement;


### 17. is strongly concerned about unfair competition , investments and takeovers by non-eu state-financed companies on the single market , especially in strategic sectors; calls on the commission to analyse and prevent this interference; ### 17. considers that certain strategic sectors are too important to be left to the market or in the hands of a few multinational corporations; calls on the commission to offer a comprehensive assessment of sectors concerned and potential remedies;


### — having regard to the july 2021 update to france’s indo-pacific strategy entitled ‘the indo-pacific region: a priority for france’ , ### deleted


### (6) whilst always acting within the framework of international law , it is essential that the union possess an appropriate instrument to deter and counteract economic coercion by third countries in order to safeguard its rights and interests and those of its member states. this is particularly the case where third countries take measures affecting trade or investment that interfere in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act by the union or a member state. such measures affecting trade or investment may include not only actions taken on , and having effects within , the territory of the third country , but also actions taken by the third country , including through entities controlled or directed by the third country and present in the union , that cause harm to economic activities in the union. ### (6) whilst always acting within the framework of international law , it is essential that the union possess an appropriate instrument to deter and counteract economic coercion by third countries in order to safeguard its rights and interests and those of its member states. this is particularly the case where third countries take measures affecting trade or investment that interfere in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act by the union or a member state. such measures affecting trade or investment may include not only actions taken on , and having effects within , the territory of the third country , but also actions taken by the third country , including through entities controlled or directed by the third country and present in the union , that cause harm to economic activities in the union , as well as extraterritorial sanctions to deter european economic actors from operating in target countries , and which , because of their significant extraterritorial dimension , affect eu businesses and individuals , and ultimately the sovereignty of the european union's choices