### 1. recalls that european values and fundamental rights must be the basis of european security policies , ensuring respect for the principles of necessity , proportionality and legality and safeguarding accountability and judicial redress , while enabling effective protection of individuals , particularly the most vulnerable; recalls , further , that these principles should be at the core of the development of digitalisation in the area of justice and security and the development of the interoperability framework for the many systems in justice and security , including borders; ### 1. recalls that eu fundamental rights and data protection compliance must be the basis of european security policies , ensuring compliance with the principles of necessity , proportionality and legality and guaranteeing accountability and judicial redress , while ensuring effective protection of individuals and their fundamental rights , particularly the most vulnerable; recalls , further , that the compliance with these rights and principles including the right to privacy and eu data protection requirements should be at the core of the development of digitalisation in the area of justice and security and the development of the interoperability framework;


### 2. recommends that the commission follow the council’s approach and duly take into account the difference between judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation , on the one hand , and border management on the other hand; ### 2. recommends that the commission duly takes into account the difference between judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation , on the one hand , and border management on the other hand;


### 3. recommends that the commission ensure access to interpol’s different databases on the basis of the needs and scope of competences of the different eu agencies; recalls that interpol’s databases contain millions of records with information that could directly help to combat appalling crimes , such as child sexual exploitation , on which interpol’s database holds more than 2.7 million images and videos and of which the database has helped identify 23 564 victims worldwide; ### 3. recommends that the commission ensure access to interpol’s different databases for purposes strictly linked to the performance of their tasks as regulated in their respective current regulations; recommends that the agreement should clearly set out which eu agencies should have access rights for which of their specific tasks;


### 4. recommends that the commission provide during the negotiations on controlled access to interpol’s databases by eu member states and eu agencies the necessary safeguards and guarantees to ensure full compliance with the eu data protection framework and fundamental rights; stresses that the agreement should at least provide the safeguards already provided by the europol regulation; ### 4. recommends that the commission guarantees during the negotiations on controlled access to interpol’s databases by eu member states and eu agencies the necessary safeguards and guarantees to ensure full compliance with the eu data protection framework and fundamental rights; stresses that the agreement should not undermine the level of protection set out in the eu data protection framework as well as the relevant regulations of the eu agencies , in particular the europol , eurojust and eppo regulations;


### 6. recommends the adoption of the safeguards and guarantees needed to authorise the european travel information and authorisation system (etias) central unit established within frontex and eu member states to access interpol’s sltd and tdawn databases via the esp , as well as of the safeguards and guarantees needed to efficiently implement the revised visa information system regulation that authorises eu member states to access interpol’s sltd and tdawn databases via the esp when examining applications for visas or residence permits , in full compliance with eu data protection requirements and with fundamental rights; ### 6. insists on the adoption of the safeguards and guarantees needed to authorise the european travel information and authorisation system (etias) central unit established within frontex and eu member states to access interpol’s sltd and tdawn databases via the esp , as well as of the safeguards and guarantees needed to efficiently implement the revised visa information system regulation that authorises eu member states to access interpol’s sltd and tdawn databases via the esp when examining applications for visas or residence permits , in full compliance with eu data protection requirements and with fundamental rights; insists that , in case of a hit , no information is to be shared with the interpol or the owner of the data inserted in interpol and recalls that , as foreseen in the etias and vis regulations , until this is agreed and practically guaranteed , the two systems will not be checking against the interpol databases;


### 7. recommends that the commission ensure that the level of personal data protection and the protection of individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms currently guaranteed under eu primary and secondary law is maintained in exchanges of personal data with interpol; the commission’s negotiation strategy should not lead to a weakening of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons , and in particular of their rights to data protection and to privacy; ### 7. insists that the commission has to ensure compliance with eu data protection standards , and individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under eu primary and secondary law in processing personal data within the framework of the agreement with interpol; the commission’s negotiation strategy should guarantee that there is no weakening of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons , and in particular of their rights to data protection and to privacy as guaranteed in eu primary and secondary law;


### 8. recommends that the commission guarantee that the transfer of personal data is adequate , relevant and limited to what is necessary for the purpose for which it has been transferred; ### 8. recommends that the commission guarantees that in the case the agreement could provide a legal basis for transfer of personal data to interpol , the agreement would be legally binding and enforceable against all parties to the agreement and that it includes the necessary data protection safeguards as set out in article 46 , 4 , 5 and 10 of regulation (eu) 2018/1725; that the transfer of personal data is adequate , relevant and limited to what is necessary for the purpose for which it has been transferred; and that data subjects are ensured enforceable and effective rights;


### 9. recommends that the commission guarantee that the processing of data is limited to what is necessary in individual cases for the purposes of the agreement and that any further data processing incompatible with the initial purpose is prohibited; the agreement has to clearly indicate that decisions based solely on the automated processing of personal information without human involvement are not allowed; ### 9. recommends that the commission guarantee that the processing of data is limited in time and to what is strictly necessary in individual cases for the specific purposes of the agreement and that any further data processing incompatible with the initial purpose and extension of data retention period are prohibited; the agreement has to clearly indicate that decisions based solely on the automated processing of personal information without human involvement are not allowed;


### 10. recommends that the commission ensure an oversight system for the use by interpol of personal data collected by consulting eu systems; ### 10. recommends that the commission ensures the establishment of a monitoring system , including of the processing of data by interpol under this agreement; and that the commissions ensures provisions on the obligation of interpol to notify in the event of a personal data breach or a security incident relating to the interpol data or the databases;


### 11. recommends that the commission guarantee that data is not retained for longer than is necessary for the purpose for which it was transferred; in this context the agreement has to provide rules on storage , including storage limitation , on review , correction and deletion of personal data; ### 11. recommends that the commission guarantee that data is not retained for longer than is necessary for the purpose for which it was transferred; in this context the agreement has to provide that the rules on storage , including storage limitation , on review , correction and deletion of personal data are clear , specific to each case and in line with the current relevant eu legislation;


### 12. recommends that the commission ensure the rights to administrative and judicial redress for any person whose data are processed under this agreement and that it guarantee effective remedies; ### 12. recommends that the commission ensure enforceable and effective rights to administrative and judicial redress for all data subjects meaning any person whose data is processed under this agreement guaranteeing effective remedies;


### 13. stresses that cooperation and information sharing are important tools to combat crime and terrorism and pursue justice , but they need to be targeted and used with common safeguards and checks; underscores that they should address fundamental rights challenges in particular by enhancing data quality , mitigating bias , detecting errors and avoiding any form of discrimination in the decision-making process; ### 13. stresses that cooperation and information sharing are important tools , but they need to be targeted and used in full compliance with fundamental rights and with oversight; underscores that there are various fundamental rights challenges in this regard , in particular by enhancing data quality , mitigating discriminatory biases , detecting errors and avoiding any form of discrimination in the decision-making process;


### 14. recommends that particular attention should be paid to fundamental rights challenges and the necessity of adequate mitigating measures and non-discrimination mechanisms as well as enhanced data quality and protection with a view to the establishment of frameworks for interoperability between eu information systems and future interoperability with the non-eu systems and databases in the fields of police and judicial cooperation , asylum and migration , as well as integrated borders management and visas , providing a pivotal legislative framework for current and future developments in the eu’s digital infrastructure; ### 14. recommends that particular attention should be paid to fundamental rights challenges and the necessity of adequate mitigating measures and non-discrimination mechanisms as well as enhanced data quality and protection with a view to concluding an agreement with interpol;


### 15. recommends that in view of the rules governing access to data and information sharing in the different eu systems and databases , the terms of the future cooperation agreement with interpol should provide the safeguards and guarantees needed to give controlled access to interpol’s databases via the esp by member states and eu agencies as required to carry out their tasks , in line with their access rights and eu or national law covering such access and in full compliance with eu data protection requirements and fundamental rights; ### 15. recommends that in view of the rules governing access to data and information sharing in the different eu systems and databases , the terms of the future cooperation agreement with interpol should provide the safeguards and guarantees needed to give controlled access to interpol’s databases via the esp by member states and recommends that the agreement should clearly set out which eu agencies should have access rights for which of their specific tasks , in line with their mandates and current access rights in accordance with the existing eu or national law covering such access and in full compliance with eu data protection requirements and fundamental rights;


### 18. recalls that according to the eu’s current legislative framework , the transfer of data from the eu to third countries and international organisations is allowed only if the recipients of this information are able to guarantee an adequate level of personal data protection; recommends in this context that in the absence of an adequacy decision on interpol , the agreement should constitute the legal basis allowing the transfer of personal data to interpol , provided that it is legally binding and enforceable against all parties to the agreement and that it includes appropriate data protection safeguards; ### 18. recalls that according to the eu’s current legislative framework , the transfer of personal data from the eu to a third county or an international organisation may only take place where the commission has decided that the third country , a territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country , or the international organisation in question ensures an adequate level of protection; recommends in this context that in the absence of an adequacy decision regarding interpol , the agreement could constitute the legal basis for the transfer of personal data to interpol , provided that it is legally binding and enforceable against all parties to the agreement and that it includes neccesary data protection safeguards; as set out in article 46 , 4 , 5 and 10 of regulation (eu) 2018/1725;


### 19. recommends limiting the application of derogations for onward transfers to the cases already allowed for eu agencies and bodies concerned when transferring personal data; ### 19. recommends limiting the application of derogations for onward transfers to the cases already allowed for eu agencies and bodies concerned when transferring personal data; recalls that it must be ensured that the specific requirements set up under the regulations establishing the concerned eu agency or office are respected;


### 20. recommends that the agreement ensure that transfers must be necessary for the purposes specified in the agreement , namely prevention , investigation , detection or prosecution of criminal offences , safeguarding against threats to public security and protecting external borders; ### 20. recommends that the agreement ensure that transfers must be necessary for the purposes specified in the agreement;


### 21. recommends that the agreement explicitly lay down that personal data transferred by the eu to interpol will not be used to request , hand down or execute a death penalty or any form of cruel and inhuman treatment; ### 21. recommends that the agreement explicitly lay down that personal data transferred by eu member states or eu agencies to interpol will be subject to confidentiality obligations and will not be used to request , hand down or execute a death penalty or any form of cruel and inhuman treatment;


### 22. stresses , with a view to future cooperation , that despite recent reforms transparency remains a challenge both at the individual and the organisational level in interpol , as does a lack of available statistical information on the operation of its notices systems; encourages the commission , therefore , to take actions to ensure that interpol further develops the legal framework and substantive tools allowing consistent and transparent processing of requests , reviews , challenges , corrections and deletions; ### 22. stresses , with a view to future cooperation , that strong concerns and challenges remain regarding the lack of transparency of procedures both at the individual and the organisational level in interpol , such as lack of available statistical information on the operation of its red notices and diffusions systems; calls on the commission , therefore , to take actions to ensure that interpol develops the legal framework and substantive tools such as vetting procedures for red notices and diffusions allowing consistent and transparent processing of requests , reviews , challenges , corrections and deletions;


### russia ### deleted


### 24. notes the announcement by interpol’s secretary-general that it would implement enhanced monitoring measures to identify and prevent further abuse of interpol’s systems by russia; remains concerned , however , that monitoring alone will not fully mitigate the risks of russian abuse; stresses , therefore , that given the current special circumstances interpol should take immediate and firm measures to exclude the russian federation from the organisation; ### 24. notes the announcement by interpol’s secretary-general that it would implement enhanced monitoring measures to identify and prevent further abuse of interpol’s systems by russia;


### 25. recommends providing for the possibility of suspending or terminating the agreement in cases of breaches of its provisions on personal data by one of the parties , specifying that personal data falling within the scope of the agreement transferred prior to its suspension or termination may continue to be processed in accordance with the terms of the agreement; ### 25. strongly recommends providing the possibility of suspending or terminating the agreement in cases of breaches of its provisions on personal data by one of the parties , specifying that personal data falling within the scope of the agreement transferred prior to its suspension or termination may continue to be processed in accordance with the terms of the agreement;


### (7) to combat terrorism effectively , efficient exchange of information for investigation or prosecution of terrorist offences between competent authorities and union agencies is crucial. it is essential to have the most complete and updated information possible. the persistence of the terrorist threat and the complexity of the phenomenon raise the need for an ever greater exchange of information. ### (7) to combat terrorism effectively , efficient exchange of information for investigation or prosecution of terrorist offences between competent authorities and union agencies is crucial. it is essential to have the most complete and updated information possible.


### (11) directive (eu) 2017/541 of the european parliament and of the council34 is the reference point for national authorities to define terrorist offences as implemented in national law. ### deleted


### (12) for the identification of cross-links between terrorism investigations and judicial proceedings against suspects of terrorist offences , reliable identification data is crucial. due to the uncertainties regarding alphanumerical data especially for third country nationals , it should be possible to exchange biometric data. due to the sensitive nature of biometric data and the impact processing of biometric data has on the respect for private and family life and the protection of personal data , as enshrined in articles 7 and 8 of the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , a strict necessity test should be applied by the competent authorities and eurojust in each case. ### (12) for the identification of cross-links between terrorism investigations and judicial proceedings against suspects of terrorist offences , reliable identification data is crucial. due to the uncertainties regarding alphanumerical data especially for third country nationals , it should be possible to provide to eurojust biometric data , provided such data has been collected in accordance with national law in the context of criminal proceedings and in full respect of the procedural rights set out in directives 2010/64/eu , 2012/13/eu , 2013/48/eu , 2016/343 , 2016/800 and 2016/1919 of the european parliament and of the council. due to the sensitive nature of biometric data and the impact processing of biometric data has on the respect for private and family life and the protection of personal data , as enshrined in articles 7 and 8 of the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , a strict necessity and proportionality test should be applied by the competent national authorities and eurojust in each case.


### (16) for the purposes of exchanging and processing sensitive data between competent national authorities and eurojust for protecting such data against unauthorised disclosure and cyber attacks , and without prejudice to future technological developments , secure communication channels , such as the secure communication connections referred to in article 9 of council decision 2008/976/jha35 or the decentralised it system as defined in regulation (eu) […/…] of the european parliament and of the council36 [regulation on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation] should be used. in order to exchange data securely and protect the integrity of the communication and data exchange , the case management system should be connected to such secure communication systems and meet high cybersecurity standards. ### (16) for the purposes of exchanging and processing personal data related to suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings between competent national authorities and eurojust and for protecting such data , which by nature is sensitive , against unauthorised disclosure and cyber attacks , and without prejudice to future technological developments , secure communication channels , such as the secure communication connections referred to in article 9 of council decision 2008/976/jha35 or the decentralised it system as defined in regulation (eu) […/…] of the european parliament and of the council36 [regulation on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation] should be used. in order to exchange data securely and protect the integrity of the communication and data exchange , the case management system should be connected to such secure communication systems and meet high cybersecurity standards.


### (18) the transmission of unstructured data makes manual intervention necessary , creates additional administrative burden , and reduces the quality of the results of cross-checking. therefore , national competent authorities should transmit the data in a structured manner while respecting minimal interoperability requirements as defined in the european interoperability framework39 . in addition , the transfer of data should be automated as much as possible to lessen the administrative burden of national authorities and to ensure the necessary data is provided regularly and quickly. ### (18) the transmission of unstructured data makes manual intervention necessary , creates additional administrative burden , and reduces the quality of the results of cross-checking. therefore , competent national authorities should transmit the data in a structured manner while respecting minimal interoperability requirements as defined in the european interoperability framework39 . in addition , the transfer of data should be automated to lessen the administrative burden of national authorities and to ensure the necessary data is provided regularly and quickly. transfer of sensitive data related to suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings should not be fully automated , but subject to a transmission mode which is , at least partly , human controlled. for the purpose of data transfers under this regulation , human control in the transmission mode should entail the verification of the quality and quantity of data to be transferred and of the transfer of data having been authorised by competent national authorities as well as the verification of necessity and proportionality requirements. the national authorities competent for the transfer of information should be responsible for the accuracy and legality of the acquisition of the information provided to eurojust.


### (22) investigations and prosecutions in terrorism cases are often impeded by the lack of information exchange between national investigation and prosecution authorities. in order to be able to cross check new terrorist investigations also with previous investigations and establish potential links , it is necessary to store the data on any previous investigations , not only on convictions and to extend the time limits for storing data in the european judicial counter-terrorism register. however , it is necessary to ensure that such data is processed for prosecution purposes only. the information may not be used for anything else but identifying links with ongoing investigations and prosecutions and for the support of those investigations and prosecutions. ### (22) investigations and prosecutions in terrorism cases could be impeded by the lack of information exchange between national investigation and prosecution authorities. in order to be able to cross check new terrorist investigations with previous investigations and identify potential links , it might be necessary to store the data on previous investigations and convictions related to terrorist cases. it should be possible to extend the time limits for storing data in the european judicial counter-terrorism register on a case by case basis to the extent that such extension is necessary and proportionate for the purpose of ongoing operational activities. data on previous investigations and convictions should be retained and processed for purposes related to cross-checking links with other investigations and prosecutions only. information on previous investigations or prosecution related to persons who are not guilty , acquitted or otherwise rehabilitated should not be stored beyond the time that is necessary to perform the cross-checking and should be deleted if links between judicial proceedings are not identified. the information may not be used for anything else but identifying links with ongoing investigations and prosecutions and for the support of those investigations and prosecutions.


### 2a. each member state shall designate a competent national authority as eurojust national correspondent for terrorism matters. this national correspondent for terrorism matters shall be a judicial or other competent authority. where the national legal system requires , more than one authority can be designated. the national correspondent for terrorism matters shall have access to all relevant information in accordance with article 21a(1). it shall be competent to collect such information and to send it to eurojust.; ### 2a. each member state shall designate a competent national authority as eurojust national correspondent for terrorism matters. this national correspondent for terrorism matters shall be a judicial or other competent authority. where the national legal system requires , more than one authority can be designated. the national correspondent for terrorism matters shall have access to all relevant information in accordance with article 21a(1). it shall be competent to collect information about investigations and prosecution of terrorist offences , including those which ended in an acquittal or which were concluded in another way , judicial decisions such as pre-trial detention or opening of court proceedings , and judicial cooperation requests or identified links with other jurisdictions , to send such information to eurojust and to carry out necessity and proportionality assessments. before sending information to eurojust , the national correspondent shall obtain authorisation from the responsible national authority to verify the quality and quantity of information to be transferred , and to assess the necessity and proportionality of the transfers of information , where the responsible national authority is different from the national correspondent;


### 3. the competent national authorities shall transmit the information in accordance with articles 21 and 21a to eurojust in a semi-automated manner from national registers and in a structured way determined by eurojust. ### 3. the competent national authorities shall transmit the information to eurojust in accordance with articles 21 and 21a in a semi-automated manner , subject to human control , from national registers and in a structured way determined by eurojust. operational personal data shall only be transmitted to the extent that that transmission is necessary and proportionate and subject to authorisation by competent national authorities on a case-by-case basis.


### 4. in the performance of their duties , national members may process personal data on the individual cases , on which they are working , in accordance with this regulation or other applicable instruments. ### 4. in the performance of their duties , national members may process personal data on the individual cases , on which they are working , in accordance with this regulation or other applicable instruments. information on previous investigations and convictions related to terrorist cases may be processed by national members , on a case by case basis , to the extent that such processing is necessary and proportionate to the purpose of identifying links with ongoing investigations and prosecutions and for the support of those investigations and prosecutions.


### 2. the national member shall decide , on a case-by-case basis , whether to keep access to the information restricted or to give access to it or to parts of it to other national members , to liaison prosecutors seconded to eurojust , to authorised eurojust staff or to any other person working on behalf of eurojust who has received the necessary authorisation from the administrative director. ### 2. the national member shall decide , on a case-by-case basis , whether to keep access to the information restricted or to give access to it or to parts of it to other national members , to liaison prosecutors seconded to eurojust , to authorised eurojust staff or to any other person working on behalf of eurojust who has received the necessary authorisation from the administrative director. decisions by the national members to give access to information transmitted in accordance with articles 21 and 21a to other national members , to liaisons prosecutors seconded to eurojust , to authorised eurojust staff or to any other person working on behalf of eurojust shall be made on a case by case basis , and access shall only be given to the extent such access is necessary and proportionate to the purpose of identifying links with ongoing investigations and prosecutions and for the support of those investigations and prosecutions. the decision to disclose information shall be communicated to the competent national authority and shall be included in the case file. unless such communication would jeopardise the investigation or prosecution , the decision of the national member to disclose information shall also be communicated to the suspects and to accused persons.


### eurojust may continue to process the operational personal data referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph also after the proceedings have been concluded under the national law of the member state concerned , even in case of an acquittal. where the proceedings did not result in a conviction , processing of personal data may only take place in order to identify links with other ongoing or concluded investigations and prosecutions as referred to in article 23(2) , point (c).; ### eurojust may continue to process the operational personal data referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph also after the proceedings have been concluded under the national law of the member state concerned , even in case of an acquittal. where the proceedings did not result in a conviction , processing of personal data may only take place in order to identify links with other ongoing or concluded investigations and prosecutions as referred to in article 23(2) , point (c). if links between judicial proceedings are not identified , information related to a person which is acquitted or to proceedings that ended on grounds that do not imply that person's guilt should be deleted.


### 5 years after the date on which the judicial decision of the last of the member states concerned by the investigation or prosecution became final , 3 years in case of an acquittal.; ### 2 years after the date on which the judicial decision of the last of the member states concerned by the investigation or prosecution became final , 1 year in case of an acquittal or a final decision of non-prosecution; where the investigation or prosecution has resulted in a final verdict of not guilty or acquittal , operational personal data in relation to that investigation shall be removed;


### if operational personal data referred to in article 27(4) are stored for a period exceeding five years , the edps shall be informed thereof. ### if operational personal data referred to in article 27(4) are stored for a period exceeding two years , or for a period exceeding one year in case of an acquittal or a final decision of non-prosecution , the edps shall be informed thereof.


### — photographs.. ### — photographs , that have been collected in accordance with national law during criminal proceedings.


### (3) kuwait and qatar present low risks of irregular migration to the union and issue biometric passports in line with standards of the international civil aviation organisation. security cooperation with those countries has intensified in recent years. as regards economic interests , kuwait and qatar are important economic partners for the union , in particular in the area of energy. although challenges remain in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms , kuwait and qatar have undergone societal transformations and improvements regarding women’s rights , labour rights and freedom of religion and interfaith dialogue and are expected to continue making progress and reforms. the long-term benefits of visa-free travel to the eu can reinforce positive trends in these areas. ### (3) according to the commission’s assessment , kuwait and qatar fulfil the criteria set out in regulation (eu) 2018/1806 , allowing their inclusion on the list of countries whose nationals are exempt from the visa requirement , and both countries also issue biometric passports in line with standards of the international civil aviation organisation. however , there is a key obligation to take into consideration human rights and fundamental freedoms as part of the case-by-case assessment of criteria leading to a determination of the third countries whose nationals are exempt from the visa requirement in article 1 of regulation (eu) 2018/1806 , and the situation regarding rights and freedoms in both countries is extremely poor. as outlined in the commission’s assessment (commission’s staff working document on the fulfilment by kuwait and qatar of the criteria listed in article 1 of regulation (eu)2018/1806) , in the eeas 2021 eu annual report on human rights and democracy in the world (country reports) and in numerous ngos’ reports , extremely serious concerns and challenges exist in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms in kuwait and qatar. in qatar in particular , grave rights abuses in regard to migrant workers employed to build infrastructure for the 2022 world cup , including abuses that have led to thousands of deaths , have been reported and verified , and will be the subject of particular focus when the world cup begins in november 2022.


### (4) consequently , nationals of those countries should be exempt from the visa requirement for stays of no more than 90 days in any 180-day period , and references to those countries should be transferred to annex ii to regulation (eu) 2018/1806. ### deleted


### (5) the exemption from the visa requirement for nationals of kuwait and qatar is without prejudice to the application of eu restrictive measures adopted on the basis of article 29 teu and article 215 tfeu. ### deleted


### (6) the exemption from the visa requirement for nationals of kuwait and qatar should not apply until bilateral agreements on visa waiver between the union and kuwait and qatar have been concluded , in order notably to ensure full reciprocity is maintained. ### deleted


### (7) regulation (eu) 2018/1806 should therefore be amended accordingly , ### deleted


### (8) this regulation constitutes a development of provisions of the schengen acquis in which ireland does not take part , in accordance with council decision 2002/192/ec7 . ireland is therefore not taking part in the adoption of this regulation and is not bound by it or subject to its application. ### deleted


### (9) as regards iceland and norway , this regulation constitutes a development of provisions of the schengen acquis within the meaning of the agreement concluded by the council of the european union and the republic of iceland and the kingdom of norway concerning the association of those two states with the implementation , application and development of the schengen acquis , which fall within the area referred to in point b of article 1 , of council decision 1999/437/ec8 . ### deleted


### (10) as regards switzerland , this regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the schengen acquis within the meaning of the agreement between the european union , the european community and the swiss confederation on the swiss confederation's association with the implementation , application and development of the schengen acquis , which fall within the area referred to in point b of article 1 , of decision 1999/437/ec , read in conjunction with article 3 of council decision 2008/146/ec9 . ### deleted


### (11) as regards liechtenstein , this regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the schengen acquis within the meaning of the protocol signed between the european union , the european community , the swiss confederation and the principality of liechtenstein on the accession of the principality of liechtenstein to the agreement between the european union , the european community and the swiss confederation on the swiss confederation's association with the implementation , application and development of the schengen acquis , which fall within the area referred to in point b of article 1 , of decision 1999/437/ec read in conjunction with article 3 of council decision 2011/350/eu10 , ### deleted


### (12) this regulation constitutes an act building upon , or otherwise relating to , the schengen acquis within , respectively , the meaning of article 3(1) of the 2003 act of accession , article 4(1) of the 2005 act of accession and article 4(1) of the 2011 act of accession. ### deleted


### article 1 ### deleted


### regulation (eu) 2018/1806 is amended as follows: ### deleted


### article 2 ### deleted


### (2) easy access to data is important in order for decision makers in the economy and society to make sound decisions that serve the efficient functioning of the market. rolling out common european data spaces in crucial sectors , including the financial sector , would serve that purpose. the financial sector is undergoing a digital transformation , which is expected to continue in the coming years , and the union should support that transformation , in particular by promoting data-driven finance. furthermore , putting sustainable finance at the heart of the financial system is a key means to achieving a green transition of the economy of the union. for the green transition to succeed through sustainable finance , it is essential that information related to the sustainability of businesses is easily accessible to investors so that they are better informed when making decisions about investments. for those purposes , public access to entities’ information such as companies , businesses , financial institutions , financial and non-financial information needs to be improved. an efficient means to do so at union level is to establish a centralised platform , a european single access point (“esap”) , giving electronic access to all relevant information. ### deleted


### (16) in order for the information to be comparable over time , users should have access to past information. it is therefore necessary to require esap to provide access to information for a reasonable period of time , to the extent compatible with other applicable provisions of union law. for that purpose , esma should ensure that no personal data are made accessible for longer than necessary as provided for under union law. in order to enable esma and the collection bodies to prepare the operation of esap , esap should only provide access to the information submitted as from 1 january 2024. ### (16) in order for the information to be comparable over time , users should have access to past information. it is therefore necessary to require esap to provide access to information for a reasonable period of time , to the extent compatible with other applicable provisions of union law. for that purpose , esma should ensure that no personal data are made accessible for longer than necessary as provided for under union law. in order to enhance the operation of esap , esap should also provide access to the information submitted before 1 january 2024 , when available. moreover , esap should start collecting information and historical data released prior to its establishment , regarding financial and sustainability-related data that have already been collected and published for several years before its establishment and could provide useful information to investors and authorities interested in analysing trends and developments in financial and sustainability-related data.


### 2. esap shall not provide access to information submitted before 1 january 2024. ### 2. when available , esap shall provide access to information submitted before 1 january 2024. esap shall also start collecting information and historical data released prior to its establishment , regarding financial and sustainability-related data.


### ensure that no personal data are included , except where the personal data constitute a necessary element of the information about its economic activities. ### ensure that no personal data are included , except where the personal data constitute a necessary element of the information about its economic activities , in line with the principle of data minimisation


### ensure that the information referred to in article 1(1) remains available to esap for at least 10 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). personal data in the information submitted pursuant to article 1(1) shall not be retained and made available for longer than 5 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). ### ensure that the information referred to in article 1(1) remains available to esap for at least 10 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). personal data in the information submitted pursuant to article 1(1) shall not be retained and made available for longer than necessary and in any event not for longer than 5 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a).


### ensure that the information referred to in article 1(1) remains available to esap for at least 10 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). personal data in the information submitted pursuant to article 1(1) shall not be retained and made available for longer than 5 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). ### ensure that the information referred to in article 1(1) remains available to esap for at least 10 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a).


### ensure that the information referred to in article 1(1) remains available to esap for at least 10 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). personal data in the information submitted pursuant to article 1(1) shall not be retained and made available for longer than 5 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). ### ensure that the information referred to in article 1(1) remains available to esap for at least 20 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). personal data in the information submitted pursuant to article 1(1) shall not be retained and made available for longer than 5 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a).


### 4. entities shall ensure the accuracy of the information they submit to the collection bodies. ### 4. entities shall ensure and be accountable for the accuracy of the information they submit to the collection bodies.


### 4. for the purposes of paragraph 2 , second subparagraph , esma may develop draft implementing technical standards to determine the nature and extent of the specific services for which fees may be charged and to determine the associated fee structure. ### 4. for the purposes of paragraph 2 , second subparagraph , esma may develop draft implementing technical standards to determine the nature and extent of the specific services for which fees may be charged to commercial users and to determine the associated fee structure.


### (12) esap should provide users with access to information for free and without discrimination and should make it possible for those users to search , access and download the information through esap. however , taking into account the need to protect esma from an excessive financial burden in relation to costs incurred for serving the needs of intensive users , if any , esma should have the ability to generate revenues. therefore , by way of derogation from the principle that information should be accessible free of charge , esma should be allowed to impose fees for those specific services , including for services with high maintenance costs due to searches for very large volumes of information or to frequent access to esap. any fees imposed should , however , not exceed the cost of the service provided. ### (12) esap should provide users with access to information for free and without discrimination and should make it possible for those users to search , access and download the information through esap. however , taking into account the need to protect esma from an excessive financial burden in relation to costs incurred for serving the needs of intensive users , if any , esma should have the ability to generate revenues. therefore , by way of derogation from the principle that information should be accessible free of charge , esma should be allowed to impose fees exclusively to commercial users for those specific services , including for services with high maintenance or support costs due to searches for very large volumes of information or to frequent access to esap. any fees imposed should , however , be kept to the minimum level and , in any case , not exceed the cost of the service provided. the subsequent revenues should be allocated to contributing to the overall functioning of esap. retail investors , academia , social partners and civil society organisations should not be subject to any fees.


### (17) to ensure a smooth processing of the information received or drawn-up by the collection bodies and made available to esap , it is necessary to lay down certain requirements specifying the format and the metadata of that information and which collection bodies should collect such information. in order to ensure the quality of the information submitted to esap by the collection bodies , it is also necessary to define the characteristics of the automated validations to be carried out on each information reaching the collection bodies , and the characteristics of the qualified electronic seal to be attached to that information by the entities. to ensure the use and re-use of data on esap , a list of the designated open standard licences would need to be defined. to facilitate the searching , finding , retrieving of the data in a timely manner , the characteristics of the application programming interface and the metadata to be implemented will also need to be designed. additional requirements as regards efficient search functions will need to be implemented such as the specific legal entity identifier , the classification of the type of information , and the categories of the size of the entities. to that purpose , the joint committee of the european supervisory authorities should develop draft implementing technical standards. additionally , esma might develop draft implementing technical standards to determine the nature and extent of the specific services for which fees may be charged and the associated fee structure. the commission should be empowered to adopt those implementing technical standards by means of implementing acts pursuant to article 291 tfeu and in accordance with article 15 of regulation (eu) no 1093/2010 of the european parliament and of the council30 , no 1094/2010 of the european parliament and of the council31 and no 1095/2010 of the european parliament and of the council32 . ### (17) to ensure a smooth processing of the information received or drawn-up by the collection bodies and made available to esap , it is necessary to lay down certain requirements specifying the format and the metadata of that information and which collection bodies should collect such information. in order to ensure the quality of the information submitted to esap by the collection bodies , it is also necessary to define the characteristics of the automated validations to be carried out on each information reaching the collection bodies , and the characteristics of the qualified electronic seal to be attached to that information by the entities. to ensure the use and re-use of data on esap , a list of the designated open standard licences would need to be defined. to facilitate the searching , finding , retrieving of the data in a timely manner , the characteristics of the application programming interface and the metadata to be implemented will also need to be designed. additional requirements as regards efficient search functions will need to be implemented such as the specific legal entity identifier , the classification of the type of information , and the categories of the size of the entities. to that purpose , the joint committee of the european supervisory authorities should develop draft implementing technical standards. additionally , esma might develop draft implementing technical standards to determine the nature and extent of the specific services for which fees may be charged to commercial users and the associated fee structure. the commission should be empowered to adopt those implementing technical standards by means of implementing acts pursuant to article 291 tfeu and in accordance with article 15 of regulation (eu) no 1093/2010 of the european parliament and of the council30 , no 1094/2010 of the european parliament and of the council31 and no 1095/2010 of the european parliament and of the council32 .


### provide the collection body with its legal entity identifier as specified pursuant to article 7(4); ### provide the collection body with its legal entity identifier as specified pursuant to article 7(4) , and where applicable , the legal identifier of the group it belongs to and the legal identifiers of its own subsidiaries;


### 2. the joint committee of the european supervisory authorities shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify all of the following: ### 2. the joint committee of the european supervisory authorities and the european financial reporting advisory group (efrag) shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify all of the following:


### esma may , however , charge fees for specific services that involve searches for a very large volume of information or for frequently updated information. those fees shall not exceed the cost incurred by esma for the provision of the service. ### deleted


### esma may , however , charge fees for specific services that involve searches for a very large volume of information or for frequently updated information. those fees shall not exceed the cost incurred by esma for the provision of the service. ### esma may , however , charge fees exclusively to commercial users for specific services that involve high maintenance or support costs due to searches for a very large volume of information or for frequently updated information. those fees shall be kept to the minimum and , in any case , not exceed the cost incurred by esma for the provision of the service. the relevant revenue shall be allocated to contributing to the overall functioning of esap. retail investors , academia , social partners and civil society organisations shall not be subject to fees.


### 1. esma shall , in close cooperation with the european banking authority (eba) and the european insurance and occupational pensions authority (eiopa): ### 1. esma shall , in close cooperation with the european banking authority (eba) , the european network of supervisory authorities for corporate sustainability due diligence and the european insurance and occupational pensions authority (eiopa):


### 1. esma , in close cooperation with the eba and eiopa , shall monitor the functioning of esap based on at least the qualitative and quantitative indicators laid down in paragraph 2 , and shall publish an annual report about the functioning of esap. ### 1. esma , in close cooperation with the eba , the european network of supervisory authorities for corporate sustainability due diligence and eiopa , shall monitor the functioning of esap based on at least the qualitative and quantitative indicators laid down in paragraph 2 , and shall publish an annual report about the functioning of esap.


### (15) in order to build and maintain public trust in esap and to protect each entity from undue alteration of its information , esap should ensure data integrity and credibility of the source of the information submitted to the collection bodies. therefore , information submitted by the entities should include a qualified electronic seal attached to the information submitted as defined in article 3(20) , of regulation (eu) no 910/2014 of the european parliament and of the council29 . a specific legal entity identifier may be a mandatory attribute of that certificate. that seal or signature acquired by esap should be made available to users. ### (15) in order to build and maintain public trust in esap and to protect each entity from undue alteration of its information , esap should ensure data integrity and credibility of the source of the information submitted to the collection bodies. therefore , information submitted by the entities should include a qualified electronic seal attached to the information submitted as defined in article 3(20) , of regulation (eu) no 910/2014 of the european parliament and of the council29 . a specific legal entity identifier (lei) should be a mandatory attribute of that certificate across the union , ranking above any other generic identifier for the entities concerned by various union directives and regulations , since this would facilitate not only the identification of these entities but also the accuracy , searchability , retrieval , use and interoperability of the information provided to esap. that seal or signature acquired by esap should be made available to users. in the absence of a lei , alternative means of efficiently ensuring a unique identification of the entities concerned should be defined , such as a reference to a set of national and industry identifiers commonly used , and thus widely available in the member states , that is published and maintained by the ecb.


### 1. denounces the existence of a shadowy offshore financial system with offices all over the world , which is allowing enrichment at the public’s expense; ### 1. denounces the existence of a shadowy offshore financial system with offices all over the world , which is allowing enrichment at the public’s expense; regrets that , despite a decade of tax scandals and legislative reforms in the eu , the pandora papers reveal that there has been insufficient progress at global level to rein in corporate secrecy and offshore tax evasion and avoidance; recalls that corporate ownership secrecy is used to hide personal financial interests;


### a. whereas the pandora papers were a massive data leak , which the international consortium of investigative journalists began publishing on 3 october 2021 , documenting the beneficial owners of corporate entities established in secrecy jurisdictions; ### a. whereas the pandora papers were a massive data leak , which the international consortium of investigative journalists began publishing on 3 october 2021 , documenting the beneficial owners of corporate entities established in secrecy jurisdictions; whereas the data leak reportedly concerns more than 330 politicians and public officials from almost 100 countries , including 35 current or former heads of state or government;


### 3. considers that tax avoidance by multinationals and the existence of tax havens offering no or extremely low effective tax rates are heavily detrimental to the fair collection of tax in countries in the global south; ### 3. considers that tax avoidance by multinationals and the existence of tax havens offering no or extremely low effective tax rates are heavily detrimental to the fair collection of tax in countries in the global south; stresses that tax evasion causes developing countries to lose more money each year than the total amount of aid they receive and represents another way of extracting resources from the global south to the richest countries , deepening the gap between the two and the processes of global south impoverishment;


### 12. ‘border surveillance’ means the surveillance of borders between crossing points and of border crossing points outside fixed opening hours , including preventative measures to detect and prevent unauthorised border crossings or the circumvention of border checks. ### 12. 'border surveillance’ means the surveillance of borders between border crossing points and the surveillance of border crossing points outside the fixed opening hours , in order to prevent persons from circumventing border check


### 27. ‘instrumentalisation of migrants’ refers to a situation where a third country instigates irregular migratory flows into the union by actively encouraging or facilitating the movement of third country nationals to the external borders , onto or from within its territory and then onwards to those external borders , where such actions are indicative of an intention of a third country to destabilise the union or a member state , where the nature of such actions is liable to put at risk essential state functions , including its territorial integrity , the maintenance of law and order or the safeguard of its national security; ### deleted


### 4. in a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants , member states may limit the number of border crossing points as notified pursuant to paragraph 1 or their opening hours where the circumstances so require. ### deleted


### 1. the main purpose of border surveillance shall be to detect and prevent unauthorised border crossings , to counter cross-border criminality and to take measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally. ### 1. the main purpose of border surveillance shall be to detect unauthorised border crossings and to counter cross-border criminality.


### 2. the border guards shall use stationary or mobile units to carry out border surveillance. ### 2. the border guards shall use stationary or mobile units to carry out border surveillance.


### 3. surveillance between border crossing points shall be carried out by border guards whose numbers and methods shall be adapted to existing or foreseen risks and threats. it shall involve frequent and sudden changes to surveillance periods and other methods or techniques , so that unauthorised border crossings are effectively detected or prevented. ### 3. surveillance between border crossing points shall be carried out by border guards whose numbers and methods shall be adapted to existing or foreseen risks and threats , including the risk to life and the need for emergency health care of vulnerable groups. border guards shall be effectively trained , including to assess vulnerabilities , and their actions monitored by independent fundamental rights monitors to ensure they abide by eu and international fundamental rights obligations , including the access to international protection at eu's external and internal borders. it shall involve frequent and sudden changes to surveillance periods and other methods or techniques , so that unauthorised border crossings are effectively detected.


### 4. surveillance shall be carried out by stationary or mobile units which perform their duties by patrolling or stationing themselves at places known or perceived to be sensitive , the aim of such surveillance being to prevent unauthorised border crossings or apprehend individuals crossing the border illegally. surveillance may also be carried out by technical means , including electronic means , equipment and surveillance systems. ### 4. surveillance shall be carried out by stationary or mobile units which perform their duties by patrolling or stationing themselves at places known or perceived to be sensitive , the aim of such surveillance being to apprehend individuals crossing the border irregularly , referring them to other authorities , including emergency health care and asylum authorities. surveillance shall be conducted in accordance with the prohibitions , safeguards and transparency obligations laid down in the regulation (eu) .../... of the european parliament and of the council laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (artificial intelligence act) and amending certain union legislative acts. remote biometric identification systems as well as long-range acoustic devices shall be prohibited.


### 5. in a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants , the member state concerned shall intensify border surveillance as necessary in order to address the increased threat. in particular , the member state shall enhance , as appropriate , the resources and technical means to prevent an unauthorised crossing of the border. ### deleted


### 6. without prejudice to the support that the european border and coast guard agency may provide to the member states , in the event of a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants , the agency may carry out a vulnerability assessment as provided for in articles 10(1) , point (c) , and article 32 of regulation (eu) 2019/1896 of the european parliament and council57 , with a view to providing the necessary support to the member state concerned. ### deleted


### 7. the commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 37 concerning additional measures governing surveillance , including the development of standards for border surveillance , in particular the use of surveillance and monitoring technologies at the external borders , taking into account the type of borders , the impact levels attributed to each external border section in accordance with article 34 of the regulation (eu) 2019/1896 and other relevant factors. ### 7. the commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 37 concerning additional measures governing surveillance , including the development of standards for border surveillance , in particular the use of surveillance and monitoring technologies at the external borders , in accordance with the prohibitions , safeguards and transparency obligations laid down in the regulation (eu) .../... of the european parliament and of the council laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (artificial intelligence act) taking into account the type of borders , the impact levels attributed to each external border section in accordance with article 34 of the regulation (eu) 2019/1896 and other relevant factors. remote biometric identification systems as well as long-range acoustic devices shall be prohibited.


### 2. the council , on the basis of a proposal by the commission , may adopt an implementing regulation , providing for temporary restrictions on travel to the member states. ### 2. the council , on the basis of a proposal by the commission , and after having consulted the european parliament , may adopt an implementing regulation , providing for temporary restrictions on travel to the member states.


### ii) are based on general information and experience of the competent authorities regarding possible threats to public security or public policy and aim , in particular , to: ### ii) are based on substantiated police evidence and data regarding possible threats to public security or public policy and aim , in particular , to:


### — combat irregular residence or stay , linked to irregular migration; or ### deleted


### iii) are devised and executed in a manner clearly distinct from systematic checks on persons at the external borders , including where they are conducted at transport hubs or directly on board of passenger services and when they are based on risk analysis; ### iii) are devised and executed in a manner clearly distinct from systematic checks on persons at the external borders. checks which target individuals based on racial , ethnic , national or religious characteristics , including when conducted at transport hubs or directly on board of passenger services , and when they are based on risk analysis , amount to racial profiling and are therefore unlawful ;


### e) checks for security purposes of passenger data against relevant databases on persons traveling in the area without controls at internal borders which can be carried out by the competent authorities under the applicable law. ### deleted


### (6) the following article 23a is inserted: ### deleted


### activities relating to terrorism or organised crime; ### a direct and immediate threat of acts of terrorism , which is based on substantiated police evidence and data;


### a situation characterised by large scale unauthorised movements of third-country nationals between the member states , putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border control; ### deleted


### 3. where the same threat continues to persist , border controls at internal borders may be prolonged in accordance with articles 25a , 28 or 29. ### deleted


### 2. the member state shall , at the same time as reintroducing border control under paragraph 1 , notify the commission and the other member states of the reintroduction of border controls , in accordance with article 27(1). ### 2. the member state shall , at the same time as reintroducing border control under paragraph 1 , notify the commission , the european parliament , and the other member states of the reintroduction of border controls , in accordance with article 27(1).


### 5. for the purposes of paragraph 4 , and without prejudice to article 27a(4) , border control at internal borders may be reintroduced for a period of up to six months. where the serious threat to public policy or internal security persists beyond that period , the member state may prolong the border control at internal borders for renewable periods of up to six months. ### 5. for the purposes of paragraph 4 , and without prejudice to article 27a(4) , border control at internal borders may be reintroduced as a last resort measure and for a limited period of up to two months. where the serious threat to public policy or internal security persists beyond that period , the member state may prolong the border control at internal borders for renewable periods of up to two months.


### 6. the period referred to in paragraph 5 shall not include periods referred to in paragraph 3. ### deleted


### the likely impact of such a measure on: ### whether measures other than the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders are likely to sufficiently remedy the threat to public policy or internal security;


### 2. where a member states decides to prolong the border control at internal borders pursuant to article 25a(5) , it shall also assess in detail whether the objectives pursued by such prolongation could be attained by: ### 2. where a member states decides to prolong the border control at internal borders pursuant to article 25a(5) , it shall carry out a risk assessment which should reassess the criteria laid down in paragraph 1 and assess in detail whether the objectives pursued by such prolongation could be attained by:


### b) the use of the procedure as referred to in article 23a; ### deleted


### 2. where border controls have been in place for six months in accordance with article 25a(4) , any subsequent notification for the prolongation of such controls shall include a risk assessment. the risk assessment shall present the scale and anticipated evolution of the identified serious threat , in particular how long the identified serious threat is expected to persist and which sections of the internal borders may be affected , as well as information regarding coordination measures with the other member states impacted or likely to be impacted by such measures. ### 2. where border controls have been in place for two months in accordance with article 25a(4) , any subsequent notification for the prolongation of such controls shall include a risk assessment in accordance with article 26(2). the risk assessment shall present the scale and anticipated evolution of the identified serious threat , in particular how long the identified serious threat is expected to persist and which sections of the internal borders may be affected , as well as information regarding coordination measures with the other member states impacted or likely to be impacted by such measures.


### 3. where the reintroduction of border controls or its prolongation refers to large scale unauthorised movements referred to in article 25(1) point (b) , the risk assessment shall also provide information on the scale and trends of such unauthorised movements , including any information obtained from the relevant eu agencies in line with their respective mandates and data analysis from relevant information systems. ### deleted


### 4. the member state concerned shall upon request by the commission , provide any further information , including on the coordination measures with the member states affected by the planned prolongation of border control at internal borders as well as further information needed to assess the possible use of measures referred to in article 23 and 23a . ### 4. the member state concerned shall upon request by the commission , provide any further information , including on the coordination measures with the member states affected by the planned prolongation of border control at internal borders as well as further information needed to assess the possible use of measures referred to in article 23.


### the consultation shall concern in particular the identified threat to public policy or internal security , the relevance of the intended reintroduction of border controls taking into account the appropriateness of alternative measures , as well as the ways of ensuring implementation of the mutual cooperation between the member states in relation to the reintroduced border controls. ### the consultation shall concern in particular the identified threat to public policy or internal security , the proportionality and necessity of the intended reintroduction of border controls , including by taking into account the appropriateness of alternative measures , as well as the ways of ensuring implementation of the mutual cooperation between the member states in relation to the reintroduced border controls.


### 3. following receipt of notifications submitted in relation to a prolongation of border control at the internal border under article 25a(4) which leads to the continuation of border controls at internal borders for eighteen months in total , the commission shall issue an opinion on necessity and proportionality of such internal border controls. ### 3. following receipt of notifications submitted in relation to a prolongation of border control at the internal border under article 25a(4) which leads to the continuation of border controls at internal borders for four months in total , the commission shall issue an opinion on necessity and proportionality of such internal border controls.


### 5. where a member state considers that there are exceptional situations justifying the continued need for internal border controls in excess of the maximum period referred to in article 25(5) , it shall notify the commission in accordance with article 27(2). the new notification from the member state shall substantiate the continued threat to public policy or internal security , taking into account the opinion of the commission given pursuant to paragraph 3. the commission shall issue a follow up opinion. ### deleted


### 1. where the commission , establishes that the same serious threat to internal security or public policy affects a majority of member states , putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border , it may , make a proposal to the council to adopt an implementing decision authorising the reintroduction of border controls by member states where the available measures referred to in articles 23 and 23a are not sufficient to address the threat. ### 1. where the commission , establishes that a particularly serious threat to internal security or public policy affects a majority of member states at the same time , in such a way as to put at immediate risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border , it may , make a proposal to the council to adopt ‒ after having consulted european parliament ‒ an implementing decision authorising the reintroduction of border controls by member states where the available measures referred to in articles 23 are not sufficient to address the threat.


### 2. the decision shall cover a period of up to six months and may be renewed , upon proposal from the commission , for further periods of up to six months as long as the threat persists , taking into account the review referred to in paragraph 5. ### 2. the decision shall cover a period of up to two months and may be renewed no more than two times , upon proposal from the commission , for further periods of up to two months , taking into account the review referred to in paragraph 5. the maximum duration of the internal border controls on the basis of the particularly serious threat identified shall not exceed 6 months.


### 3. where member states reintroduce or prolong border controls because of the threat referred to in paragraph 1 , those controls shall , as of the entry into force of the council decision , be based on that decision. ### deleted


### 5. the commission shall review the evolution of the identified threat as well as the impact of the measures adopted in accordance with the council decision referred to in paragraph 1 , with a view to assess whether the measures remain justified. ### 5. the commission shall review the evolution of the identified threat as well as the impact of the measures adopted in accordance with the council decision referred to in paragraph 1 , with a view to assessing whether the measures remain justified and to proposing the lifting of internal border control as soon as possible.


### 6. member states shall immediately notify the commission and the other member states in the council of a reintroduction of border controls in accordance with the decision referred to in paragraph 1. ### 6. member states shall immediately notify the commission , the european parliament , and the other member states in the council of a reintroduction of border controls in accordance with the decision referred to in paragraph 1


### 7. the commission may issue a recommendation indicating other measures as referred to in articles 23 and 23a that could complement internal border controls or be more suitable to address the identified threat to internal security or public policy as referred to in paragraph 1. ### 7. the commission may issue a recommendation indicating other measures as referred to in articles 23 that could complement internal border controls or be more suitable to address the identified threat to internal security or public policy as referred to in paragraph 1.


### 2. where a member state notifies the commission and the other member states of the reintroduction of border controls in accordance with article 27(1) , it shall at the same time inform the european parliament and the council of the following: ### 2. where a member state notifies the commission and the other member states of the reintroduction of border controls in accordance with article 27(1) , it shall at the same time provide the notification to the european parliament and the council of the following:


### a) the details of the internal borders where border control is to be reintroduced; ### deleted


### c) the names of the authorised crossing-points; ### deleted


### d) the date and duration of the planned reintroduction; ### deleted


### e) where appropriate , the measures to be taken by the other member state. ### deleted


### member states shall not be required to provide all the information referred to in the paragraph 2 in cases justified on public security grounds. ### deleted


### 2. without prejudice to the first paragraph 1 , where border controls are prolonged as referred to in article 25a(5) , the member state concerned shall submit a report at the expiry of twelve months and every twelve months thereafter if border control is exceptionally maintained. ### 2. without prejudice to the first paragraph 1 , where border controls are prolonged as referred to in article 25a(5) , the member state concerned shall submit a report at the expiry of four months if border control is exceptionally maintained.


### 3. the report shall outline , in particular , the initial and follow-up assessment of the necessity of border controls and the respect of the criteria referred to in articles 26 , the operation of the checks , the practical cooperation with neighbouring member states , the resulting impact on the movement of persons in particular in the cross-border regions , the effectiveness of the reintroduction of border control at internal borders , including an ex-post assessment of the proportionality of the reintroduction of border control. ### 3. the report shall outline , in particular , the initial and follow-up assessment of the necessity of border controls and the respect of the criteria referred to in articles 26 , the operation of the checks , the practical cooperation with neighbouring member states , the resulting impact on the movement of persons in particular in the cross-border regions , the effectiveness of the reintroduction of border control at internal borders , including an ex-post assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the reintroduction of border control.


### 6. the commission shall present to the european parliament and to the council , at least annually , a report on the functioning of the area without internal border control entitled (‘state of schengen report’). the report shall include a list of all decisions to reintroduce border control at internal borders taken during the relevant year. it shall also include information on the trends within the schengen area as regards the unauthorised movements of third country nationals , taking into account available information from the relevant union agencies , data analysis from relevant information systems and an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the reintroductions of border controls in the period covered by that report. ### 6. the commission shall present to the european parliament and to the council , at least annually , a report on the functioning of the area without internal border control entitled (‘state of schengen report’). the report shall include a list of all decisions to reintroduce border control at internal borders taken during the relevant year. the report shall pay particular attention to the border controls that have been in place for longer than four months , and shall include an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the reintroductions of border controls in the period covered by that report and its impact on fundamental rights , including the principle of non-discrimination. the report shall also cover the reporting obligations resulting from article 20 of the schengen evaluation mechanism.


### [...] ### deleted


### article 2 ### deleted


### article 3 ### deleted


### having regard to the treaty on the functioning of the european union , and in particular article 77(2)(b) and (e) and article 79(2)(c) thereof , ### having regard to the treaty on the functioning of the european union , and in particular article 77(2)(b) and (e) thereof ,


### (2) regulation (eu) 2016/399 of the european parliament and of the council of 9 march 2016 (“schengen borders code”)42 lays down rules governing the movement of persons to and from the area without controls at internal borders (the “schengen area”) as well as between the member states that participate in the schengen area. ### (2) regulation(eu) 2016/399 of the european parliament and of the council of 9 march 2016(“schengen borders code”)42 provides for the absence of border control of persons crossing the internal borders of the member states of the union and lays down rules governing border control of persons crossing the external borders the member states of the union.


### (3) in recent years , the schengen area has been subject to unprecedented challenges , which by their nature were not confined to the territory of any single member state. such challenges underscored the fact that the preservation of public order and security in the schengen area is a shared responsibility requiring joined and coordinated action between member states and at union level. they also highlighted gaps in the existing rules governing the functioning of the schengen area both at external and internal borders and the need to create a stronger and more robust framework allowing for a more effective response to challenges faced by the schengen area. ### (3) in recent years , many member states have resorted to internal border control to address challenges , which by their nature were not confined to the territory of any single member state. in an area of freedom , security and justice , the preservation of public order and security in the schengen area is a shared responsibility requiring joined and coordinated action at union level and between member states on the basis that this area of freedom , security and justice remains free of internal border controls , and the reintroduction of internal border controls should remain exceptional and strictly controlled. the reintroduction of internal border controls should be decided only as a last resort , in agreement between the member states concerned , for a strictly limited period of time , renewable on an exceptional basis and insofar as such controls are necessary and proportionate to the serious threats to public order or internal security which have been invoked by the requesting state , identified and verified. such checks must be suspended immediately if it is found that the grounds invoked by the requesting state are not convincing or have not been respected. controls of migrants in an irregular situation should never , per se , be a ground.


### (4) border control at external borders is in the interest not only of the member state at whose external borders it is carried out but of all member states which have abolished internal border control and the union as a whole. member states are required to ensure high standards in management of their external borders , including through enhanced cooperation between border guards , police , customs and other relevant authorities. the union provides active support through the provision of financing support by the agencies , the european border and coast guard in particular and management of the schengen evaluation mechanism. the rules applicable to external borders need to be reinforced in order to better respond to new challenges that have recently emerged at the external borders. ### (4) border control at external borders in full compliance with fundamental rights is in the interest not only of the member state at whose external borders it is carried out but of the union as a whole and of all its member states , in particular those which have abolished internal border control. member states are required to ensure high standards in management of their external borders , including through enhanced cooperation between border guards , police , customs and other relevant authorities. the union provides active support through the provision of financing support by the agencies and management of the schengen evaluation mechanism.


### (5) the covid-19 pandemic has reinforced the need for the union to be better prepared to respond to crisis situations at the external borders related to situations of diseases with an epidemic potential that are a threat to public health. the covid-19 pandemic has shown that threats to public health can require uniform rules concerning travel restrictions for travel into the european union by third country nationals. the adoption of inconsistent and divergent measures at the external borders to address such threats negatively affects the functioning of the entire schengen area , reduces predictability for third-country travellers and people-to-people contacts with third countries. to prepare the schengen area for future challenges of a comparable scale related to threats to public health , it is necessary to establish a new mechanism which should allow for a timely adoption and lifting of coordinated measures at union level. the new procedure at the external border should be applied in a situation of an infectious disease with epidemic potential as identified by the european centre for disease prevention and control or the commission. this mechanism should complement the procedures proposed to be established in the proposal for a regulation of the european parliament and of the council on serious cross-border threats to health43 , notably in case of the recognition of a public health emergency , and the revised mandate of the european centre for disease control.44 ### (5) the covid-19 pandemic has shown that threats to public health can require uniform rules concerning travel restrictions for travel into the european union by third country nationals. the adoption of inconsistent and divergent measures at the external borders to address such threats negatively affects the functioning of the entire schengen area , reduces predictability for third-country travellers and people-to-people contacts with third countries. to prepare the schengen area for future challenges of a scale comparable to the covid-19 pandemic , a new mechanism should be established which would allow for a timely adoption and lifting of coordinated measures at union level. the new procedure at the external border should be applied where the european centre for disease prevention and control has identified an infectious disease with epidemic potential. this mechanism should complement the procedures proposed to be established in the proposal for a regulation of the european parliament and of the council on serious cross-border threats to health43 , notably in case of the recognition of a public health emergency , and the revised mandate of the european centre for disease control.44


### (6) the mechanism should provide for the adoption by the council , upon a proposal by the commission , of a regulation setting out restrictions on travel , including restrictions on entry and any other necessary measures for travel into the european union , and the conditions for lifting them. in view of the politically sensitive nature of such measures which concern the right to enter the territory of member states , implementing powers should be conferred on the council to adopt such a regulation , acting on a proposal from the commission. ### (6) this union-level mechanism should provide for the adoption by the council , upon a proposal by the commission , and after having consulted the european parliament , of a regulation setting out restrictions on travel , including restrictions on entry and any other necessary measures for travel into the european union , and the conditions for lifting those restrictions and other measures. in view of the politically sensitive nature of such measures which concern the right to enter the territory of member states , implementing powers should be conferred on the council to adopt such a regulation , acting on a proposal from the commission , and after having consulted the european parliament.


### (7) importantly , in line with the applicable obligations under union and international law , union citizens and third-country nationals who , under agreements between the union and its member states , on the one hand , and those third countries , on the other hand , enjoy rights of free movement equivalent to those of union citizens , as well as their respective family members should always be permitted to enter the union. residents in the union should also always be permitted to return to the union. the act should contain all necessary elements to ensure that restrictions on travel are effective , targeted , non-discriminatory and proportionate to the evolving epidemiological situation. it should specify , where relevant , any categories of travellers whose travel should be exempted from restrictions on entry. in addition , or alternatively , the act should specify any geographical areas or third countries from which travel may be subject to specific measures , based on an objective methodology and criteria applicable thereto that should include , in particular , the epidemiological situation. the act could specify the conditions under which travel may be permitted such as testing , quarantine , self-isolation or any other appropriate measures , such as the need to fill in a passenger locator form or other contact tracing tool and having regard , in particular , to any union systems developed to facilitate travel under safe conditions , such as digital certification systems. where appropriate , the instrument could also set up a mechanism allowing to take additional measures in case the epidemiological situation dramatically worsens in one or more geographical areas. ### (7) importantly , in line with the applicable obligations under union and international law , union citizens and third-country nationals who , under agreements between the union and its member states , on the one hand , and those third countries , on the other hand , enjoy rights of free movement equivalent to those of union citizens , as well as their respective family members should always be permitted to enter the union. similarly , in accordance with union and international law , those persons seeking asylum shall not be prohibited from entering the union. residents in the union should also always be permitted to return to the union. the act should contain all necessary elements to ensure that restrictions on travel are effective , targeted , non-discriminatory and proportionate to the evolving epidemiological situation. it should specify , where relevant , any categories of travellers whose travel should be exempted from restrictions on entry. in addition , or alternatively , the act should specify any geographical areas or third countries from which travel may be subject to specific measures , based on an objective methodology and criteria applicable thereto that should derive from the epidemiological situation. the act could specify the conditions under which travel may be permitted such as testing , quarantine ,self-isolation or any other appropriate measures , such as the need to fill in a passenger locator form or other contact tracing tool and having regard , in particular , to any union systems developed to facilitate travel under safe conditions , such as digital certification systems.


### (8) it is also necessary to reinforce the rules and safeguards in union law in order to allow member states to act swiftly to counter instances of instrumentalisation of migrants. such instrumentalisation should be understood as referring to a situation where a third country instigates irregular migratory flows to the union by actively encouraging or facilitating the arrival of third country nationals to the external borders of the member states , where such actions indicate an intention to destabilise the union as a whole or a member state and where the nature of such actions is liable to put at risk essential state functions , including its territorial integrity , the maintenance of law and order or the safeguard of its national security. ### deleted


### (9) instrumentalisation of migrants can refer to situations where irregular travel of third country nationals has been actively encouraged or facilitated by a third country onto its own territory to reach the external border of the member states but can equally refer to the active encouragement or facilitation of irregular travel of third country nationals already present in that third country. instrumentalisation of migrants may also entail the imposition of coercive measures , intended to prevent the third country nationals from leaving the border areas of the instrumentalising third country , in a direction other than through a member state. ### deleted


### (10) the union should mobilise all tools from its toolbox of diplomatic , financial and operational measures to support the member states confronted with instrumentalisation. diplomatic efforts by the union or the member state concerned , should be given priority as the means of addressing the phenomenon of instrumentalisation. this may be supplemented , where appropriate , by the imposition of restrictive measures by the union. ### deleted


### (11) at the same time , in addition to these measures , it is equally necessary to further reinforce the current rules in relation to external border controls and border surveillance. to further assist the member state facing an instrumentalisation of migrants , regulation (eu) xxx/xxx complements the rules on border control by providing for specific measures in the area of asylum and return , while respecting the fundamental rights the individuals concerned and in particular by ensuring the respect of the right to asylum and providing the necessary assistance by the un agencies and other relevant organisations. ### deleted


### (12) in particular , in a situation of instrumentalisation , it should , where necessary , be possible for the member state concerned , to limit border traffic to the minimum by closing some border crossing points , while guaranteeing genuine and effective access to international protection procedures. any such decision should take into account whether the european council has acknowledged that the union or one or more of its member states are facing a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants. furthermore , any such limitations should take full account of the rights of union citizens , third country nationals who are beneficiaries of the right of free movement pursuant an international agreement and third-country nationals who are long-term residents under national or union law or are holders of long-term visas , as well as their respective family members. such limitations should also be applied in a manner that ensures respect for obligations related to access to international protection , in particular the principle of non-refoulement. ### deleted


### (13) the european border and coast guard agency assists member states with implementing the operational aspects of external border management , including information exchange , the provision of equipment , capacity building and training to national border guards , targeted information and risk analysis , as well as the deployment of the standing corps. the agency’s new mandate offers considerable opportunities to support border control activities , including screening and return operations and a launch of rapid border intervention and/or return intervention at the request and on the territory of the host member state concerned. ### (13) in light of the findings and the recommendations of the european parliament frontex scrutiny working group , the frontex consultative forum , the european anti-fraud office , and the eu ombudsman , any action undertaken by the european border and coast guard agency to assist member states with implementing the operational aspects of external border management should be adequately monitored in order to ensure compliance with fundamental rights obligations. special efforts should be undertaken in order to ensure adequate access to effective complaint mechanisms in the context of all activities implemented by the european border and coast guard agency.


### (14) by virtue of article 41(1) of regulation (eu) 2019/1896 , the executive director of the european border and coast guard agency is required to recommend to a member state that it request the agency to initiate , carry out or adjust the agency’s support , in order to address identified threats and challenges at the external borders , where the conditions laid down in that provision are met. in particular , the need for agency support may become apparent in situations where the european border and coast guard agency has carried out a dedicated vulnerability assessment in connection with the instrumentalisation of migrants. on the basis of the results of such a vulnerability assessment or where a critical impact level is attributed to one or more external border sections and taking into account the relevant elements in the member state's contingency plans , the agency's risk analysis and the analysis layer of the european situational picture , the executive director should recommend to the member state concerned to request that the agency initiate , carry out or adjust the agency’s support in accordance with article 41(1) of regulation (eu) 2019/1896. this competence of the executive director is without prejudice to the general support that the agency may be providing to the member states. ### deleted