### 4. stresses that the current practice according to which the agency may only recruit the necessary staff for the implementation of a legal act once that act is in force stretches the agency’s core team capabilities and therefore carries the risk of preventing the agency from sustaining a good performance in its daily activities; notes that the court has identified a horizontal trend across agencies in the use of external staff hired in it consultancy roles; calls for the agency's dependence , as the agency responsible for large-scale it systems in the union , on external recruitment in this area to be addressed; calls , therefore , on the commission to allow for the front-loading of some of the staff foreseen in a proposal for a legal act to allow the agency to prepare the work required for the implementation of that legal act; ### 4. stresses that the current practice according to which the agency may only recruit the necessary staff for the implementation of a legal act once that act is in force stretches the agency’s core team capabilities and therefore carries the risk of preventing the agency from sustaining a good performance in its daily activities; notes that the court has identified a horizontal trend across agencies in the use of external staff hired in it consultancy roles; calls for the agency's dependence , as the agency responsible for large-scale it systems in the union , on external recruitment in this area to be addressed; calls , therefore , on the commission to allow for the front-loading of some of the staff foreseen in a proposal for a legal act to allow the agency to prepare the work required for the implementation of that legal act; urges further the agency to fulfil all posts with permanent staff;


### 3. notes that the court selected a sample of 45 transactions for the multiannual financial framework heading 5 “administration” of all union institutions and bodies; notes that the sample was designed to be representative of the range of spending under heading 5 , which represents 6 ,3 % of the union budget; notes that the court’s work indicates administrative expenditure as low risk; considers however the amount of transactions selected in relation to the “other institutions” as not sufficient and asks the court to increase the number of transactions to be examined by 10 % at least; ### 3. notes that the court selected a sample of 45 transactions for the multiannual financial framework heading 5 “administration” of all union institutions and bodies; notes that the sample was designed to be representative of the range of spending under heading 5 , which represents 6 ,3 % of the union budget; notes that the court’s work indicates administrative expenditure as low risk; considers however the amount of transactions selected in relation to the “other institutions” as not sufficient and asks the court to increase the number of transactions to be examined by 10 % at least; in this sense requests that the audit work for chapter 10 be more focused on issues of high relevance or even critical for the edps;


### 14. notes that the first action plan of the ethics officer was fully accomplished and that the second report foresees several measures such as the revision of the codes of conduct for the supervisors and staff , a revised decision on external activities and the possible adhesion to the new transparency register for union institutions , etc.; welcomes the awareness raising sessions in line with the ethics framework; asks for detailed information on the achievements related to the ethics framework to be presented in the next annual activity report; ### 14. notes that the first action plan of the ethics officer was fully accomplished and that the second report foresees several measures such as the revision of the codes of conduct for the supervisors and staff , a revised decision on external activities and the possible adhesion to the new transparency register for union institutions , etc.; invites the edps to implement such requests as soon as possible; welcomes the awareness raising sessions in line with the ethics framework; asks for detailed information on the achievements related to the ethics framework to be presented in the next annual activity report;


### (5) credit institutions will be required to put aside sufficient resources when new loans become non- performing , which should create appropriate incentives to address npls at an early stage and should prevent an excessive accumulation of them. where loans become non-performing , more efficient enforcement mechanisms for secured loans would allow credit institutions to enforce npls , subject to appropriate safeguards for borrowers. nevertheless , should npl stocks become too high – as it is currently the case for some credit institutions and some member states – credit institutions should be able to sell them in efficient , competitive and transparent secondary markets to other operators. competent authorities of credit institutions will guide them in this , based on their existing bank-specific , so-called pillar 2 , powers under regulation (eu) no 575/2013 of the european parliament and of the council27 (crr). where npls become a significant and broad-based problem , member states can set up national asset management companies or other alternative measures within the framework of current state aid and banks resolution rules. ### (5) credit institutions will be required to put aside sufficient resources when new loans become non- performing , which should create appropriate incentives to address npls at an early stage and should prevent an excessive accumulation of them. where loans become non-performing , more efficient enforcement mechanisms for secured loans would allow credit institutions to enforce npls , subject to appropriate safeguards for borrowers , including legal protection against evictions from primary residences. nevertheless , should npl stocks become too high – as it is currently the case for some credit institutions and some member states – credit institutions should be incentivised to work through the npls on a case-by-case basis. this directive does not express a preference for certain npl reduction tools over others , and the combination of tools or strategy reduction drivers for a given credit institution is the responsibility of , and chosen at the discretion of , its management. competent authorities of credit institutions will guide them in this , based on their existing bank-specific , so-called pillar 2 , powers under regulation (eu) no 575/2013 of the european parliament and of the council27 (crr). where npls become a significant and broad-based problem , member states can set up national asset management companies or other alternative measures within the framework of current state aid and banks resolution rules.


### (5) credit institutions will be required to put aside sufficient resources when new loans become non- performing , which should create appropriate incentives to address npls at an early stage and should prevent an excessive accumulation of them. where loans become non-performing , more efficient enforcement mechanisms for secured loans would allow credit institutions to enforce npls , subject to appropriate safeguards for borrowers. nevertheless , should npl stocks become too high – as it is currently the case for some credit institutions and some member states – credit institutions should be able to sell them in efficient , competitive and transparent secondary markets to other operators. competent authorities of credit institutions will guide them in this , based on their existing bank-specific , so-called pillar 2 , powers under regulation (eu) no 575/2013 of the european parliament and of the council27 (crr). where npls become a significant and broad-based problem , member states can set up national asset management companies or other alternative measures within the framework of current state aid and banks resolution rules. ### (5) credit institutions will be required to put aside sufficient resources when new loans become non- performing , which should create appropriate incentives to address npls at an early stage and should prevent an excessive accumulation of them. where loans become non-performing , more efficient mechanisms for secured loans would allow credit institutions to implement a holistic strategy that protects distressed borrowers and safeguards the sustainability of the banking system , subject to strong and effective safeguards for consumers. nevertheless , should npl stocks become too high – as it is currently the case for some credit institutions and some member states – credit institutions shall not be able to sell or transfer to third parties performing credit agreements concluded with consumers. where npls become a significant and broad-based problem , member states can set up national asset management companies or other alternative measures within the framework of current state aid and banks resolution rules.


### (6) this directive should enable credit institutions to better deal with loans once these become non-performing by improving conditions to either enforce the collateral used to secure the credit or to sell the credit to third parties. the introduction of accelerated collateral enforcement as a swift mechanism for the recovery of collateral value would reduce the costs for resolving npls and would hence support both credit institutions and purchasers of npls in recovering value. moreover , when credit institutions face a large build-up of npls and lack the staff or expertise to properly service them , one viable solution would be to either outsource the servicing of these loans to a specialised credit servicer or to transfer the credit agreement to a credit purchaser that has the necessary risk appetite and expertise to manage it. ### deleted


### (9) this directive should foster the development of secondary markets for npls in the union by removing impediments to the transfer of npls by credit institutions to non-credit institutions , while at the same time safeguarding consumers' rights. any proposed measure should also simplify and harmonise the authorisation requirements for credit servicers. this directive should therefore establish a union-wide framework for both purchasers and servicers of credit agreements issued by credit institutions. ### (9) this directive should regulate the development of secondary markets for npls in the union by posing safeguards and minimum requirements to the transfer of npls by credit institutions to non-credit institutions , while at the same time safeguarding consumers' rights. any proposed measure should also simplify and harmonise the authorisation requirements for credit servicers. this directive should therefore establish a union-wide framework for both purchasers and servicers of credit agreements issued by credit institutions , whereby credit servicers should obtain authorisation and be subject to the supervision of the member-state in which they operate; furthermore , this directive allows member-states to subject credit servicers and credit purchasers to stricter requirements.


### (9) this directive should foster the development of secondary markets for npls in the union by removing impediments to the transfer of npls by credit institutions to non-credit institutions , while at the same time safeguarding consumers' rights. any proposed measure should also simplify and harmonise the authorisation requirements for credit servicers. this directive should therefore establish a union-wide framework for both purchasers and servicers of credit agreements issued by credit institutions. ### (9) this directive should foster the development of secondary markets for npls in the union by removing impediments to the transfer of npls by credit institutions to non-credit institutions , while at the same time safeguarding consumers' rights , particularly legal protection for mortgage-holders against eviction from primary residences. any proposed measure should also simplify and harmonise the authorisation requirements for credit servicers. this directive should therefore establish a union-wide framework for both purchasers and servicers of credit agreements issued by credit institutions.


### (10) however , currently , credit purchasers and credit servicers cannot reap the benefits of the internal market due to barriers erected by divergent national legislations in the absence of a dedicated and coherent regulatory and supervisory regime. member states have very different rules for how non-credit institutions may acquire credit agreements from credit institutions. non-credit institutions which purchase credit issued by credit institutions are not regulated in some member states , while in others they are subject to various requirements , sometimes amounting to a requirement to obtain an authorisation of a credit institution. these differences of regulatory requirements have resulted in considerable obstacles to legally purchasing credit cross-border in the union mainly by increasing the compliance costs faced when seeking to purchase credit portfolios. as a result , credit purchasers operate in a limited number of member states , which has resulted in little competition in the internal market , as the number of interested credit purchasers remains low. this has led to an inefficient secondary market for npls. in addition , the essentially national markets for npls tend to remain of a small volume. ### deleted


### (15) the lack of competitive pressure on the market for purchasing credit and on the market for credit servicing activities results in credit servicing firms charging credit purchasers high fees for their services and leads to low prices on secondary markets for credit. this reduces incentives for credit institutions to offload their stock of npls. ### deleted


### (16) therefore , action at union level is necessary in order to address the position of credit purchasers and credit servicers in relation to credit originally granted by credit institutions. it is not proposed to cover credit originally issued by non-credit institutions or debt collection in general at this stage , as there is no evidence of macroeconomic relevance , misaligned incentives or ill-functioning markets for such an extended scope. ### (16) therefore , action at union level is necessary in order to address the protection of the borrowers as well as the sustainability of the banking system and the position of credit purchasers and credit servicers in relation to credit originally granted by credit institutions. it is not proposed to cover credit originally issued by non-credit institutions or debt collection in general at this stage , as there is no evidence of macroeconomic relevance , misaligned incentives or ill-functioning markets for such an extended scope.


### (17) although the purpose of this directive is to strengthen the credit institutions' capacity to deal with credit that has become non-performing or risks becoming non-performing , the secondary market for credit covers both performing and non-performing credit. actual market sales encompass credit portfolios , consisting of a mix of performing , under-performing and non-performing credit. the portfolios include credit that is both secured and unsecured and that is owed by consumers or businesses. where rules for the enforcement of credit differed for each type of credit or borrower , there would be additional costs to the packaging of those credit portfolios for sale. the provisions in this directive that target the development of the secondary market cover performing and non-performing credit in order to avoid a situation that these additional costs would discourage investor participation and fragment this emerging market. credit institutions will benefit from facing a larger investor base and more efficient credit servicers. similar benefits will accrue to asset management companies that are instrumental in some member states in marketing both non-performing and performing credit originated from credit institutions that had been resolved or been restructured or that have otherwise offloaded them from their balance sheets28 . ### (17) although the purpose of this directive is to protect consumers' rights and to strengthen the credit institutions' capacity to deal with credit that has become non-performing or risks becoming non-performing , the secondary market for credit covers both performing and non-performing credit. actual market sales encompass credit portfolios , consisting of heavily under-performing and non-performing credit. the portfolios include credit that is unsecured and that is owed by consumers or businesses. where rules for the enforcement of credit differed for each type of credit or borrower , there would be additional costs to the packaging of those credit portfolios for sale. the provisions in this directive that target the development of the secondary market cover non-performing credit in order to avoid a situation that these additional costs would result to a social crisis and at the same time discourage investor participation and fragment this emerging market.


### (18) the importance placed by the union legislature on the protection provided for consumers in directive 2014/17/eu of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive 2008/48/ec of the european parliament and of the council30 and council directive 93/13/eec31 means that the assignment of the creditor's rights under a credit agreement or of the agreement itself to a credit purchaser should not affect the level of protection granted by union law to consumers in any way. credit purchasers and credit servicers should therefore comply with union law as applicable to the initial credit agreement and the consumer should retain the same level of protection as provided under union law or as determined by union or national conflict of law rules regardless of the law applicable to the credit purchaser or credit servicer. ### (18) the importance placed by the union legislature on the protection provided for consumers in directive 2014/17/eu of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive 2008/48/ec of the european parliament and of the council30 and council directive 93/13/eec31 means that the assignment of the creditor's rights under a credit agreement or of the agreement itself to a credit purchaser should not affect the level of protection granted by national and union law to consumers in any way. credit purchasers and credit servicers should therefore comply with national and union law as applicable to the initial credit agreement and the consumer should retain the same level of protection as provided under national and union law regardless of the law applicable to the credit purchaser or credit servicer. national competent authorities must ensure that no borrower is worse off following the transfer of their credit agreement from a credit institution to a credit purchaser or credit servicer.


### (20) in order to ensure a high level of consumer protection , union and national law provide for a number of rights and safeguards related to credit agreements promised or granted to a consumer. those rights and safeguards apply in particular to the negotiation and conclusion of the credit agreement and to its performance or default thereof. this is notably the case in relation to long-term consumer credit agreements falling within directive 2014/17/eu , in respect of the right of the consumer to discharge fully or partially his obligations under a credit agreement prior to the expiry of that agreement or to be informed by means of the european standardised information sheet , where applicable , on the possible transfer of the credit agreement to a credit purchaser. borrower rights should also not be altered if the transfer of the credit agreement between a credit institution and a purchaser takes the form of contract novation. ### (20) in order to ensure a high level of consumer protection , union and national law provide for a number of rights and safeguards related to credit agreements that are not consumer loans , in particular those secured by the primary residential property. those rights and safeguards apply in particular to the negotiation and conclusion of the credit agreement and to its performance or default thereof. this is notably the case in relation to long-term consumer credit agreements falling within directive 2014/17/eu , in respect of the right of the consumer to discharge fully or partially his obligations under a credit agreement prior to the expiry of that agreement or to be informed by means of the european standardised information sheet , where applicable , however , a transfer of the credit agreement to a credit purchaser should not be allowed whatsoever as borrower rights should also not be altered under any circumstance or contract novation.


### (23) in order to allow existing credit purchasers and credit servicers to adapt to the requirements of the national provisions implementing this directive and , in particular , to allow credit servicers to be authorised , this directive will only apply to transfers of credit agreements that take place six months after the transposition deadline has expired. ### (23) in order to allow existing credit purchasers and credit servicers to adapt to the requirements of the national provisions implementing this directive and , in particular , to allow credit servicers to be authorised , this directive will only apply to transfers of credit agreements that take place six months after the transposition deadline has expired and only after the creditor has given to distressed borrowers the right to buy back their debt at the same price.


### (24) the authorisation of a credit servicer to provide credit servicing activities throughout the union should be subject to a uniform and harmonised set of conditions that should be applied in a proportionate manner by the competent authorities. to avoid a reduction in debtor or borrower protection and in order to promote trust , the conditions for granting and maintaining an authorisation as a credit servicer should ensure that credit servicers , persons who hold a qualifying holding in the credit servicer or who are part of the management of the service provider have a clean police record in relation to serious criminal offences linked to crimes against property , to crimes related to financial activities or to crimes against the physical integrity and that they are of good repute. similarly , these persons as well as the credit servicer should not be subject to an insolvency procedure or have not previously been declared bankrupt , unless they have been reinstated in accordance with national law. finally , to ensure compliance with debtor protection as well as personal data protection rules , it is necessary to require that appropriate governance arrangements and internal control mechanisms and recording and handling of complaints , are established and subject to supervision. moreover , credit servicers should be obliged to act fairly and with due consideration for the financial situation of the borrowers. where debt advice services facilitating debt repayment are available at national level , the credit servicers should consider referring borrowers to such services. ### (24) the authorisation of a credit servicer to provide credit servicing activities throughout the union should be subject to a uniform and harmonised set of conditions that should be applied in a proportionate manner by the competent authorities. to avoid a reduction in debtor or borrower protection and in order to promote trust , the conditions for granting and maintaining an authorisation as a credit servicer should ensure that credit servicers , persons who hold a qualifying holding in the credit servicer or who are part of the management of the service provider have a clean police record in relation to serious criminal offences linked to crimes against property , to crimes related to financial activities or to crimes against the physical integrity and that they are of good repute. similarly , these persons as well as the credit servicer should not be subject to an insolvency procedure or have not previously been declared bankrupt , unless they have been reinstated in accordance with national law. finally , to ensure compliance with debtor protection as well as personal data protection rules , it is necessary to require that appropriate governance arrangements and internal control mechanisms and recording and handling of complaints , are established and subject to supervision. moreover , credit servicers should be obliged to act fairly and with due consideration for the financial situation of the borrowers. in addition , when dealing with borrowers , credit servicers should follow minimum eu common standards as laid down in this directive and transposed by member states. where debt advice services facilitating debt repayment are available at national level , the credit servicers are obliged to refer borrowers to such services.


### (34) third-country credit purchasers may make it harder for the union consumer to rely on their rights under union law and for the national authorities to supervise the enforcement of the credit agreement. credit institutions may also be discouraged from transferring such credit agreements to third-country credit purchasers because of the reputational risk involved. imposing an obligation on the representative of the third-country purchasers of consumer credit to appoint a credit institution or a credit servicer authorised in the union for servicing a credit agreement ensures that the same standards of consumers' rights are preserved after the transfer of the credit agreement. the credit servicer is under an obligation to respect the applicable union and national laws and the national authorities in individual member states should be given the necessary powers to effectively supervise its activity. ### (34) third-country credit purchasers may make it harder for the union consumer to rely on their rights under union law and for the national authorities to supervise the enforcement of the credit agreement. credit institutions may also be discouraged from transferring such credit agreements to third-country credit purchasers because of the reputational risk involved. as a result , both the credit purchasers and credit servicers operating in the union must be obliged to be authorised in the union to ensure that the same standards of consumers' rights are preserved after the transfer of the credit agreement. the credit purchaser and credit servicer are under an obligation to respect the applicable union and national laws and the national authorities in individual member states should be given the necessary powers to effectively supervise their activities.


### (8) 'credit servicer' means any natural or legal person , other than a credit institution or its subsidiaries , which carries out one or more of the following activities on behalf of a creditor: ### (8) ‘a business to business credit servicer’ means any natural or legal person , other than a credit institution or its subsidiaries , which carries out one or more of the following activities on behalf of a creditor of a business or professional borrower:


### handles borrowers' complaints. ### deleted


### are of sufficiently good repute; ### are of sufficiently good repute , according to article 135 of directive 2006/48/ce and article 13 of guideline: eba/cp/2013/03 eba consultation paper on draft guidelines for assessing the suitability of members of the management body and key function holders of a credit institution;


### 1. member states shall ensure that where a credit servicer uses a third party to perform activities that would normally be undertaken by that credit servicer ('credit service provider') , the credit servicer remains fully responsible for complying with all obligations under the national provisions transposing this directive. the outsourcing of those credit servicing activities shall be subject to the following conditions: ### 1. member states shall ensure that where a credit servicer uses a third party to perform activities that would normally be undertaken by that credit servicer ('credit service provider') , the credit servicer should be supervised by the same supervisory authorities the banking system of the member state has and remains fully responsible for complying with all obligations under the national provisions transposing this directive. the outsourcing of those credit servicing activities shall be subject to the following conditions:


### 1. member states shall ensure that the representative of a credit purchaser referred to in article 17(1) appoints a credit institution established in the union or its subsidiary established in the union or an authorised credit servicer to perform credit servicing activities in respect of credit agreements concluded with consumers. ### 1. member states shall ensure the direct regulation of credit purchasers operating in their jurisdiction by ensuring the national competent authorities are empowered to supervise , investigate and sanction the credit purchasers.


### 2. member states shall ensure that a credit purchaser is not subject to any additional requirements for the purchase of credit agreements other than as provided for by the national measures transposing this directive. ### deleted


### 2. member states shall ensure that a credit purchaser is not subject to any additional requirements for the purchase of credit agreements other than as provided for by the national measures transposing this directive. ### 2. member states shall ensure that a credit purchaser is subject to any necessary additional requirements for the purchase of credit agreements other than as provided for by the national measures transposing this directive.


### article 17 ### deleted


### 1. member states shall ensure that a credit purchaser or , where applicable , its representative designated in accordance with article 17 , communicates to the competent authorities of the member state where the credit purchaser or , where applicable its representative is domiciled or established that it intends to directly enforce a credit agreement by providing the following information: ### 1. member states shall ensure that a credit purchaser , entities or , where applicable , its representative designated in accordance with article 17 , shall be subject to the same rules , be it specialised credit servicers and banking institutions. moreover , it communicates to the competent authorities of the member state where the credit purchaser or , where applicable its representative is domiciled or established that it intends to directly enforce a credit agreement by providing the following information:


### 1. member states shall ensure that a credit purchaser or , where applicable , its representative designated in accordance with article 17 , communicates to the competent authorities of the member state where the credit purchaser or , where applicable its representative is domiciled or established that it intends to directly enforce a credit agreement by providing the following information: ### 1. member states shall ensure that a credit purchaser communicates to the competent authorities of the member state that it intends to directly enforce a credit agreement by providing the following information:


### a credit servicer's governance arrangements and internal control mechanisms fail to ensure respect for borrower rights and compliance with personal data protection rules; ### a credit purchaser or credit servicer's governance arrangements and internal control mechanisms fail to ensure respect for borrower rights and compliance with personal data protection rules;


### a credit servicer's policy is inadequate for the proper treatment of borrowers as set in article 5(1)(d); ### a credit purchaser or credit servicer's policy is inadequate for the proper treatment of borrowers as set in article 5(1)(d);


### a credit servicer's internal procedures fail to provide for the recording and handling of borrower complaints according to the obligations set in the national measures transposing this directive; ### a credit purchaser or credit servicer's internal procedures fail to provide for the recording and handling of borrower complaints according to the obligations set in the national measures transposing this directive;


### the identity of the credit servicer; ### the identity of the credit servicer and , where applicable , the credit purchaser it is providing the service to;


### 1. five years after the entry into force of this directive , the commission shall carry out an evaluation of this directive and present a report on the main findings to the european parliament , the council and the european economic and social committee. ### 1. two years after the entry into force of this directive , the commission shall carry out an evaluation of this directive and present a report on the main findings to the european parliament , the council and the european economic and social committee.


### 2. repeats its concern that cepol continues to suffer from a high staff turnover and a limited number of applications from member states other than that of its seat; reiterates its worries that this might impact the operations of the cepol; notes in that regard that the staff regulations offer the necessary flexibility for labour market conditions prevailing in the union to be taken into account when recruiting officials in order to address the specific needs of the institutions; calls on cepol and the commission to take measures to improve the situation; ### 2. repeats its concern that cepol continues to suffer from a high staff turnover and a limited number of applications from member states other than that of its seat; reiterates its worries that this might impact the operations of the cepol and the well-being of its staff; notes in that regard that the staff regulations offer the necessary flexibility for labour market conditions prevailing in the union to be taken into account when recruiting officials in order to address the specific needs of the institutions; calls on cepol and the commission to take measures to improve the situation;


### — having regard to its resolution of 16 january 2020 on ongoing hearings under article 7(1) of the teu regarding poland and hungary2 , ### — having regard to its resolutions of 16 january 2020 and 5 may 2022 on ongoing hearings under article 7(1) of the teu regarding poland and hungary2 ,


### 1. welcomes the fact that the court of auditors (the ‘court’) has declared the transactions underlying the annual accounts of the european border and coast guard agency (the ‘agency’) for the financial year 2019 to be legal and regular in all material aspects; notes that the budget of the agency was increased from eur 446 million to eur 495 million (+ 11 %); takes note of the increase in the agency's staff in 2020 from 749 to 1 234 (+ 64 ,8 %); ### 1. notes the fact that the court of auditors (the ‘court’) has declared the transactions underlying the annual accounts of the european border and coast guard agency (the ‘agency’) for the financial year 2019 to be legal and regular in all material aspects; notes that the budget of the agency was increased from eur 446 million to eur 495 million (+ 11 %); takes note of the increase in the agency's staff in 2020 from 749 to 1 234 (+ 64 ,8 %);


### 1. deeply regrets that the obligation included in regulation (eu) 2019/1896 to recruit at least 40 fundamental rights monitors by 5 december 2020 has still not been fulfilled; urges the european border and coast guard agency (the ‘agency’) to swiftly recruit the remaining fundamental rights monitors and to appoint them at ad level , as parliament and the commission have repeatedly called for; reminds the agency that that is one of seven conditions set by the parliament in its previous discharge reports; recognises the progress made by the agency in that respect; highlights however that the lack of fulfilment of those conditions increases the risk of refusal to grant discharge for the financial year 2020; ### 1. condemns that the obligation included in regulation (eu) 2019/1896 to recruit at least 40 fundamental rights monitors by 5 december 2020 has still not been fulfilled; highlights in this regard the concluding findings of the frontex scrutiny working group indicating that the executive director of the agency has caused a significant and unnecessary delay in the recruitment of fundamental rights monitors; urges the european border and coast guard agency (the ‘agency’) to swiftly recruit the remaining fundamental rights monitors and to appoint them at ad level , as parliament and the commission have repeatedly called for; reminds the agency that that is one of seven conditions set by the parliament in its previous discharge reports; recognises the progress made very recently by the agency in that respect;


### 1. grants/refuses to grant the executive director of the european border and coast guard agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the agency’s budget for the financial year 2020; ### 1. refuses to grant the executive director of the european border and coast guard agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the agency’s budget for the financial year 2020;


### 1. notes the resignation of the executive director of the agency on 28 april 2022 and the appointment by the management board of an executive director ad interim as of 1 july 2022; notes the vacancy notice for a new executive director of the agency published on 21 june 2022; calls on the management board of the agency to appoint an executive director as soon as possible; ### 1. notes the resignation of the executive director of the agency on 28 april 2022 and his former head of cabinet following the release of the olaf report; deplores the absence of disciplinary proceedings against them despite the recommendations of olaf in this regard; condemns the lies of its former executive director to the european parliament at different occasions; welcomes the appointment by the management board of an executive director ad interim as of 1 july 2022; notes the vacancy notice for a new executive director of the agency published on 21 june 2022; calls on the management board of the agency to appoint an executive director as soon as possible who should be strongly committed to ensure the respect of fundamental rights in all activities of the agency;


### 1. grants the executive director of the european border and coast guard agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the agency’s budget for the financial year 2020 / postpones its decision on granting the executive director of the european border and coast guard agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the agency for the financial year 2020; ### 1. postpones its decision on granting the executive director of the european border and coast guard agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the agency for the financial year 2020;


### 1. approves the closure of the accounts of the european border and coast guard agency for the financial year 2020 / postpones the closure of the accounts of the european border and coast guard agency for the financial year 2020; ### 1. postpones the closure of the accounts of the european border and coast guard agency for the financial year 2020;


### 2. notes the ongoing actions of the agency on the observations of the court; calls on the agency to continue undertaking corrective actions , including the adoption and implementation of a sensitive posts policy in line with its own internal control standards , drafting a business continuity plan and obtaining the approval of its management board , addressing the risk of double funding from the internal security fund and addressing the level of carry-overs; calls on the agency to step up its efforts into reaching the required occupancy levels laid down in the staff establishment plan; welcomes the corrective steps taken by the agency to address the issue of reimbursements to cooperating countries without the necessary supporting documentation; ### 2. notes the ongoing actions of the agency on the observations of the court; calls on the agency to continue undertaking corrective actions , including the adoption and implementation of a sensitive posts policy in line with its own internal control standards , drafting a business continuity plan and obtaining the approval of its management board , addressing the risk of double funding from the internal security fund and addressing the high level of carry-overs; calls on the agency to step up its efforts into reaching the required occupancy levels laid down in the staff establishment plan; welcomes the corrective steps taken by the agency to address the issue of reimbursements to cooperating countries without the necessary supporting documentation;


### 2. regrets that the call to suspend the agency’s support for return-related operations from hungary for as long as , and as concluded by the court of justice of the european union , the return decisions issued by the hungarian authorities are incompatible with directive 2008/115/ec and the charter of fundamental rights of the european union has not been fulfilled; is deeply concerned that the agency’s management board has still not adopted a detailed procedure for the implementation of article 46 of regulation (eu) 2019/1896 , especially in the light of developments in greece; ### 2. regrets that the call to suspend the agency’s support for return-related operations from hungary for as long as , and as concluded by the court of justice of the european union , the return decisions issued by the hungarian authorities are incompatible with directive 2008/115/ec and the charter of fundamental rights of the european union has not been fulfilled; calls on the agency to suspend those operations in hungary immediately; is deeply concerned that the agency’s management board has still not adopted a detailed procedure for the implementation of article 46 of regulation (eu) 2019/1896 , especially in the light of developments in lithuania , latvia and greece;


### 2. welcomes the briefing note on ‘actions taken by frontex management during transition period’ that was sent to the committee on budgetary control on 27 june 2022 that informs the discharge authority on the measures taken by the interim management of the agency , in anticipation of the appointment of a new executive director; calls on the interim management and on the to be appointed executive director to continue with pro-actively informing the discharge authority on its response to its observations and recommendations; ### 2. notes the briefing note on ‘actions taken by frontex management during transition period’ that was sent to the committee on budgetary control on 27 june 2022 that informs the discharge authority on the measures taken by the interim management of the agency , in anticipation of the appointment of a new executive director; calls on the interim management and on the to be appointed executive director to continue with pro-actively informing the discharge authority on its response to its observations and recommendations;


### 2. notes the court’s remark that , for the financial planning of its return operations , the agency relies on estimates provided by the cooperating countries and that complete and timely availability of this information is crucial; notes the court’s observation that in 2020 in one case a national authority included two previously unannounced return operations , totalling eur 355 000 , in a grant agreement at the financial closure of the action , resulting in a sudden budgetary deficit for the agency , that forced the agency to make an ex-post budgetary commitment , contravening the agency’s financial regulation; acknowledges the dependence of the agency on cooperating countries and calls on the agency to be more strict in setting and enforcing standards related to completeness and timeliness for the receipt of information related to financial planning of operations , including the return operations; ### 2. notes the court’s remark that , for the financial planning of its return operations , the agency relies on estimates provided by the cooperating countries and that complete and timely availability of this information is crucial; notes the court’s observation that in 2020 in one case a national authority included two previously unannounced return operations , totalling eur 355 000 , in a grant agreement at the financial closure of the action , resulting in a sudden budgetary deficit for the agency; stresses that such returns should not have been supported by the agency , as it was contravening the agency’s financial regulation; condemns that the agency decided instead to make an ex-post budgetary amendment in violation of its financial regulation; calls on the agency to comply in the future and refuse support to member states if this would result in a breach of its regulation;


### 3. recalls of the fact that the european anti-fraud office has initiated an investigation on the agency; underlines that the outcome of the investigation was still pending by early december 2021; reminds that the ombudsman conducted two own-initiative inquiries into the complaints mechanism of the agency and on the compliance by the agency with its fundamental rights obligations; reiterates the concern on the findings of the court in its special report 08/2021 entitled ‘frontex's support to external border management: not sufficiently effective to date’; further recalls of the outcome of the parliament’s frontex scrutiny working group and the conclusions of the 13 internal inquiries by its management board; welcomes the agency’s report on the implementation of the conclusions of the extraordinary management board meeting of 6 october 2021 which reflects the 71 recommendations received from the aforementioned reports and audits; notes that the agency implemented 59 of those actions; calls on the agency to take all necessary measures towards implementing all the remaining recommendations and to report to the discharge authority over the progress achieved; ### 3. recalls of the fact that the european anti-fraud office has initiated an investigation on the agency over allegations of harassment , misconduct and migrant pushbacks; underlines that the outcome of the investigation was still pending by early december 2021; reminds that the ombudsman conducted two own-initiative inquiries into the complaints mechanism of the agency and on the compliance by the agency with its fundamental rights obligations; recalls that on 15 june 2021 , the ombudsman concluded that there had been delay on the part of the agency in implementing the important changes introduced by regulation (eu) 2019/18961a; notes that based on the inquiry , the ombudsman issued nine suggestions for improvement to the agency; reiterates the concern on the findings of the court in its special report 08/2021 entitled ‘frontex's support to external border management: not sufficiently effective to date’; recalls that this report revealed that the agency’s activities were not sufficiently developed to provide an effective support to member states and schengen associated countries and that the agency did not provide information about the impact or cost of its activities; further recalls of the outcome of the parliament’s frontex scrutiny working group , which has identified deficiencies – among others – in the agency’s mechanisms to monitor , report and assess fundamental rights situations , and has made recommendations for improvement; highlights the personal responsibility of the executive director in relation to those deficiencies; recalls also the conclusions of the 13 internal inquiries by the management board of the agency; welcomes the agency’s report on the implementation of the conclusions of the extraordinary management board meeting of 6 october 2021 which reflects the 71 recommendations received from the aforementioned reports and audits; notes that the agency implemented 59 of those actions; calls urgently on the agency to take all necessary measures towards implementing all the remaining recommendations and to report to the discharge authority over the progress achieved;


### 3. welcomes the decision to partially grant access to the report of the european anti-fraud office (olaf) on the investigation conducted with respect to the activities of the agency , to the members of parliament’s committee on budgetary control and committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs; regrets the long delay taken towards granting that access; is profoundly concerned about the findings of that investigation; expresses its utter disappointment in the behaviour and actions described in the findings presented; recommends , given those findings , to parliament’s committee on budgetary control not to grant discharge for the financial year 2020; ### 3. welcomes the decision to partially grant access to the first report of the european anti-fraud office (olaf) on part of its investigations conducted with respect to the activities of the agency , to the members of parliament’s committee on budgetary control and committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs; regrets the long delay taken towards granting that access that hampered members scrutiny of the agency; is profoundly concerned about the findings of that investigation that looked notably at the handling of reports of fundamental rights incidents including push-backs; expresses its utter condemnation of the behaviour and actions described in the findings presented; deeply regrets that the agency has seen its budget expanded in the last years from eur 118 million in 2011 to an annual average of eur 900 million for the 2021-2027 period despite serious concerns over the lack of implementation of its regulation , its management , and fundamental rights violations , now all confirmed by the findings of the olaf report; highlights that the parliament should not have increased the budget nor granted discharge to the agency in the previous years and should not grant discharge for the financial year 2020; calls on the new interim executive director , the deputy eds and the fundamental rights officer to urgently be granted access to the report in light of its crucial importance for their work; reiterates its call for public access to the olaf investigation in light of its public interest;


### 3. calls on the executive management of the agency to continue with the implementation of the agency’s mandate; recalls remarks made in the meeting of the committee on budgetary control on 13 july 2022 that the fast growing pace imposed by the new mandate of the agency caused difficulties that were , with hind sight , underestimated , leading to delays in recruitment in particular; ### 3. calls on the executive management of the agency to ensure the implementation of the agency’s mandate fully complies with fundamental rights; considers that the agency’s management board has failed in its mission to uphold respect for fundamental rights by not acting , and thereby bears also the responsibility for the deterioration of fundamental rights standards of the agency; calls on the management board and the commission to ensure that the agency stops being involved in covering up fundamental rights violations;


### 4. welcomes the agency’s efforts following parliament’s resolution of 29 april 2021 with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the european border and coast guard agency for the financial year 2019 , namely: (1) the recruitment of the fundamental rights officer , who took office on 1 june 2021 , and the appointment of the first 20 fundamental rights monitors; regrets the fact that 15 of those appointments were made at ast level; reiterates that regulation (eu) 2019/1896 provides for the recruitment of at least 40 fundamental rights monitors by 5 december 2020; urges the agency to swiftly recruit the remaining 20 fundamental rights monitors and to appoint them at ad level; deeply regrets the delay in the recruitment of the fundamental rights monitors and recalls that this poses a serious risk to operations and reputation of the agency; welcomes the cooperation between the agency and the european union agency for fundamental rights towards completing the recruitment of the reminding fundamental rights monitors; (2) the appointment of the three deputy executive directors in 2021; and (3) the update of the standard operating procedure for serious incident reporting in may 2021; ### 4. welcomes the agency’s efforts following parliament’s resolution of 29 april 2021 with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the european border and coast guard agency for the financial year 2019 , namely: (1) the recruitment of the fundamental rights officer , who took office on 1 june 2021 , and the appointment of the first 20 fundamental rights monitors; regrets the fact that 15 of those appointments were made at ast level; reiterates that regulation (eu) 2019/1896 provides for the recruitment of at least 40 fundamental rights monitors by 5 december 2020; urges the agency to swiftly recruit the remaining 20 fundamental rights monitors and to appoint them at ad level; deeply regrets the delay in the recruitment of the fundamental rights monitors and recalls that this poses a serious risk to operations and reputation of the agency; notes that parliament has been calling for years for those posts to be filled as soon as possible in order to comply with the legal obligation set out in regulation (eu) 2019/1896; underlines that the executive director of the agency declared in front of parliament's committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs that those posts would be filled before the end of 2021; welcomes the cooperation between the agency and the european union agency for fundamental rights towards completing the recruitment of the reminding fundamental rights monitors; (2) the appointment of the three deputy executive directors in 2021; and (3) the update of the standard operating procedure for serious incident reporting in may 2021;


### 4. welcomes the appointment of the interim executive director on 1 july 2022; ### 4. welcomes the appointment of the interim executive director on 1 july 2022; calls urgently on the agency's management board to grant her as well as the fro access to the olaf report to ensure a correct implementation of the agency's budget and regulation in the future;


### 5. calls on the agency to swiftly adopt a detailed procedure for the implementation of article 46 of regulation (eu) 2019/1896 and to suspend the agency's operations supporting return-related operations from hungary as long as , and as concluded by the court of justice of the european union , the return decisions issued by the hungarian authorities are incompatible with directive 2008/115/ec and the charter of fundamental rights of the european union; ### 5. regrets that it has to be repeated and calls on the agency to immediately adopt a detailed procedure for the implementation of article 46 of regulation (eu) 2019/1896 and to suspend the agency's operations supporting return-related operations from hungary as long as , and as concluded by the court of justice of the european union , the return decisions issued by the hungarian authorities are incompatible with directive 2008/115/ec and the charter of fundamental rights of the european union;


### 5. welcomes the acknowledgement by the acting executive director of the standing problems of the agency and the commitments she made in her presentation in parliament’s committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs on 30 may 2022 , which included commitments to ensure that the agency fully implements its mandate and operates in full respect of the rule of law and fundamental rights , to change the organisational culture of the agency , including to make sure people are not afraid to speak up about possible wrongdoings , to organise a dialogue with the members of staff , to encourage delegation of powers and to build relationships of trust with other institutions and the public; expects decisive steps to fulfil those commitments; notes with concern the statements of the acting executive director about the demotivation and distress of the staff; expects a detailed strategy to tackle that issue; ### 5. welcomes the acknowledgement by the acting executive director of the standing problems of the agency and the commitments she made in her presentation in parliament’s committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs on 30 may 2022 , which included commitments to ensure that the agency fully implements its mandate and operates in full respect of the rule of law and fundamental rights , to change the organisational culture of the agency , including to make sure people are not afraid to speak up about possible wrongdoings , to organise a dialogue with the members of staff , to encourage delegation of powers and to build relationships of trust with other institutions and the public; welcomes also her commitment to transparency; expects decisive steps to fulfil those commitments; notes the statements of the acting executive director about the demotivation and distress of the staff; expects a detailed strategy to tackle all the issues that appear to have become structural over the years;


### 5. welcomes the report of the agency on the implementation of the seven conditions formulated for the 2019 discharge of the agency; notes that five of the seven conditions are reported as being implemented by the agency; regrets to note that two conditions still have not been fully met; ### 5. notes the report of the agency on the implementation of the seven conditions formulated for the 2019 discharge of the agency; notes that five of the seven conditions are reported as being implemented by the agency; regrets to note that two conditions still have not been fully met;


### 6. calls on the management board and commission to recruit a new executive director as soon as possible. ### 6. considers that the agency's management board has failed in its mission to uphold the respect for fundamental rights by not acting , and thereby bears responsibility for the deterioration of fundamental rights standards of the agency; calls on the management board and the commission to ensure that the agency stops being involved and/or covering up fundamental rights violations , and to recruit a new executive director as soon as possible who should be strongly committed to ensure the respect of fundamental rights in all activities of the agency.


### 6. notes that one of the conditions not yet met is the recruitment of 40 fundamental rights monitors (frms) , as on 1 june 2022 , 31 frms were in service , with three more to take office on 1 september 2022 , more than one and a half year after the deadline set in the agency’s founding regulation (5 december 2020); notes that the agency now strives to have 46 frms; notes the explanation provided by the agency that the delay was due to lengthy recruitment procedures in union institutions; ### 6. notes that one of the conditions not yet met is the recruitment of at least 40 fundamental rights monitors (frms) , as on 1 june 2022 , 31 frms were in service , with three more to take office on 1 september 2022 , more than one and a half year after the deadline set in the agency’s founding regulation (5 december 2020); notes that the agency now strives to have 46 frms; notes the explanation provided by the agency that the delay was due to lengthy recruitment procedures in union institutions; highlights in this regard the concluding findings of the frontex scrutiny working group indicating that the executive director of the agency has caused a significant and unnecessary delay in the recruitment of frms; urges the agency to swiftly recruit frms and to appoint them at ad level , as parliament and the commission have repeatedly called for;


### a. whereas the european ombudsman published its decision in oi/4/2021/mhz on how the european border and coast guard agency (the ‘agency’) complies with its fundamental rights obligations and ensures accountability in relation to its enhanced responsibilities; ### a. whereas the european ombudsman has held a series of inquiries regarding the european border and coast guard agency’s (the ‘agency’) compliance with its fundamental rights obligations and accountability in relation to its enhanced responsibilities in the cases oi/5/2020/mhz and oi/4/2021/mhz and made a series of recommendations to the agency;


### a. whereas , according to its statement of revenue and expenditure1 , the final budget of the european border and coast guard agency (the ‘agency’) for the financial year 2020 was eur 364 432 655 , representing an increase of 10 ,40 % compared to 2019; whereas the agency’s budget derives mainly from the union budget; ### a. whereas , according to its statement of revenue and expenditure1 , the final budget of the european border and coast guard agency (the ‘agency’) for the financial year 2020 was eur 364 432 655 , representing an increase of 10 ,40 % compared to 2019; whereas the agency’s budget derives mainly from the union budget; whereas the agency has seen its budget expanded in the last years from eur 118 million in 2011 to an annual average of eur 900 million for the 2021-2027 period despite serious concerns over the lack of implementation of its regulation , its management , and fundamental rights violations;


### 7. notes that the second condition not yet met is the call on the agency to suspend its support-related activities in hungary , in accordance with article 46 of regulation (eu) 2019/18961 ; notes that the agency , instead of suspending the support-related activities , rather takes additional safeguarding measures to get assurance from the hungarian authorities that fundamental rights have been respected , and monitors this closely; notes that the agency’s fundamental rights officers recommend partially suspending return operations and additional safeguards when conductions return operations; ### 7. notes that the second condition not yet met is the call on the agency to suspend its support-related activities in hungary , in accordance with article 46 of regulation (eu) 2019/18961 ; notes that the agency , instead of suspending the support-related activities , rely on the assurance from the hungarian authorities that fundamental rights have been respected; notes that the agency’s fundamental rights officers recommend partially suspending return operations; highlights the serious risks of fundamental rights violations in this regard given the overall rule of law situation in hungary and reiterates its call to suspend return operations in hungary;


### 7. notes that the agency implemented two rapid border interventions at the external land and maritime borders of greece with turkey that required deployment of technical equipment from the rapid reaction equipment and technical equipment pools , as well as human resources; ### 7. notes that the agency implemented two rapid border interventions at the external land and maritime borders of greece with turkey that required deployment of technical equipment from the rapid reaction equipment and technical equipment pools , as well as human resources; expresses concerns that in both operational areas , there have been consistent and numerous reports of push-backs; stresses the high risk in this regard of the agency being complicit of fundamental rights violations , notably through its key role of detection of irregular crossings;


### 8. concludes that the agency has implemented most of the conditions formulated by the discharge authority in a satisfactory manner; calls nevertheless on the agency to adopt promptly a detailed procedure for the implementation of article 46 of regulation (eu) 2019/1896 , in line with the recommendations made by the agency’s fundamental rights officer in its annual report for 2022; ### 8. calls on the agency to adopt promptly a detailed procedure for the implementation of article 46 of regulation (eu) 2019/1896 , in line with the recommendations made by the agency’s fundamental rights officer in its annual report for 2022; urges the agency to implement correctly article 46 of regulation (eu) 2019/1896; notes in this regard with concern that the agency , despite reports by the fundamental rights officer that lithuanian laws were incompatible with the union and international law , which was confirmed by the court of justice of european union in its judgment on 30 june 2022 , failed to act in accordance with article 46 of regulation (eu) 2019/1896 , and has led the agency's staff to being complicit in fundamental rights violations; regrets that even after the court of justice of european union judgement , article 46 of regulation (eu) 2019/1896 was not invoked and operational redeployment was justified only on the basis of operational needs; calls for a suspension of the agency's operations in lithuania and latvia until their laws are in line with the union acquis;


### 8. notes that the agency’s surveillance aircraft services performed a total of 1 068 missions in 2020 out of which 1030 were surveillance flights and 38 related to fishery control; ### 8. notes that the agency’s surveillance aircraft services performed a total of 1 068 missions in 2020 out of which 1030 were surveillance flights and 38 related to fishery control; highlights that the information gathered during these surveillance flights has enabled different stakeholders to conduct push-backs in violation of union and international law; stresses in this regard the incident of 18-19 april 2020; notes that during that night , as described in the final report of the frontex management board working group , “a frontex surveillance aircraft observed a rubber boat in greek territorial waters. the rubber boat was empty and being towed by a hellenic coast guard vessel towards turkish territorial waters. approximately 20-30 people were on board the hellenic coast guard vessel that was towing the rubber boat. after some time , these people were retransferred onto the rubber boat at the greek-turkish border. afterwards , the hellenic coast guard left the location;”


### 9. notes that olaf and the agency’s management board have made an anonymised version of the olaf final report on the agency’s activities available to the members of the committee on budgetary control and the committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs; recalls that having access to that report was deemed necessary by the discharge authority to take a fully informed decision on the 2020 discharge; ### 9. notes that olaf and the agency’s management board have made an anonymised version of the olaf final report on the agency’s activities available to the members of the committee on budgetary control and the committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs; recalls that having access to that report was deemed necessary by the discharge authority to take a fully informed decision on the 2020 discharge; regrets the long delay taken towards granting access that hampered members' scrutiny of the agency; is profoundly concerned about the findings of that investigation that looked notably at the handling of reports of fundamental rights incidents including push-backs; expresses its utter condemnation of the behaviour and actions described in the findings presented;


### 9. notes that the agency’s assets in maritime operations have helped to rescue more than 3 408 migrants during patrolling activities , which also resulted in the detection of 790 facilitators , four traffickers of human beings and a wide variety of other types of cross-border crimes , such as smuggling of illegal goods and substances (1 463 litres of alcohol , 4 013 pieces of ammunition , approximately 361 kilogrammes of cocaine , more than 144 tonnes of hashish and marijuana , and 40 kilogrammes of heroin); ### 9. notes that the agency’s assets in maritime operations have helped to rescue more than 3 408 migrants during patrolling activities , which also resulted in the detection of 790 facilitators , four traffickers of human beings and a wide variety of other types of cross-border crimes , such as smuggling of illegal goods and substances (1 463 litres of alcohol , 4 013 pieces of ammunition , approximately 361 kilogrammes of cocaine , more than 144 tonnes of hashish and marijuana , and 40 kilogrammes of heroin); notes however the unfair prosecution of asylum seekers on the grounds of “facilitating illegal entry” , that has led many of them to be arrested without legal assistance , excessive pre-trial detention , lack of translations and representation by unprepared lawyers; stresses for example the case of an asylum seeker , sentenced in greece for 142 years for facilitating illegal entry , despite being forced to drive at gunpoint by the turkish trafficker;


### 10. notes that the serious concerns raised on the basis of the partial presentation of findings from the final report in the committee on budgetary control meeting of 28 february 2022 are indeed confirmed in the final report; notes from the statements of the chair of the agency’s management board in the committee on budgetary control meeting of 13 july 2022 that actions have been taken in follow-up to olaf’s conclusions in the final report; notes the comments from the chair of the agency’s management board , and the commission’s deputy director-general for migration and home affairs that the report shows the failings of the individuals concerned , and that there is no structural issue; ### 10. notes that the serious concerns raised by some members over the years and at the partial presentation of findings from the final report in the committee on budgetary control meeting of 28 february 2022 are indeed confirmed in the final report; points that two additional olaf final reports are expected to be presented in 2022 in relation to this agency; calls for immediate access of members to these additional reports when they will be finalised to ensure members' scrutiny as well as of all executive staff of the agency that need to access the report to ensure a correct implementation of the agency's budget in the future; notes from the statements of the chair of the agency’s management board in the committee on budgetary control meeting of 13 july 2022 that some actions have been taken in follow-up to olaf’s conclusions in the final report; highlights nevertheless that further actions need to be taken to address all the issues raised by this olaf final report; notes the comments from the chair of the agency’s management board , and the commission’s deputy director-general for migration and home affairs that the report shows the failings of the individuals concerned , and that there is no structural issue; awaits further olaf final reports to understand the depth of the problem;


### 10. notes that the agency’s return operations , despite being impacted by the restrictions of the covid-19 pandemic , continued with 21 member states taking part as either organisers or participants in return operations by charter flights coordinated and co-financed by the agency , with overall 7952 persons handed over , reaching 28 third countries of return , significant lower numbers than in 2019; notes that voluntary returns made up for 18 % of all supported flights; notes that 26 member states carried out returns by scheduled flights with the agency’s support , returning 3981 third country nationals to 83 countries of return , with among the returnees 2173 (55 %) unescorted and 1532 (38%) returning in a voluntary manner; ### 10. notes that the agency’s return operations , despite being impacted by the restrictions of the covid-19 pandemic , continued with 21 member states taking part as either organisers or participants in return operations by charter flights coordinated and co-financed by the agency , with overall 7952 persons handed over , reaching 28 third countries of return , significant lower numbers than in 2019; notes that voluntary returns made up for 18 % of all supported flights; notes that 26 member states carried out returns by scheduled flights with the agency’s support , returning 3981 third country nationals to 83 countries of return , with among the returnees 2173 (55 %) unescorted and 1532 (38%) returning in a voluntary manner; recalls the call of the fswg to suspend the agency's support for return-related operations from hungary as long as , and as concluded by the court of justice of the european union , the return decisions issued by the hungarian authorities are incompatible with directive 2008/115/ec and the charter of fundamental rights of the european union and notes the continued support of the agency despite this call and concerns expressed by the commission;


### 11. calls on the agency’s management board and executive management to carefully re-assess the content of the olaf final report and to address any issues that potentially do have a structural character; calls in particular to review issues potentially related to the balance between border control and fundamental rights , and on sharing of information within the agency and between the agency and the parliament; ### 11. calls on the agency’s management board and executive management to carefully re-assess the content of the olaf final report and to address any issues that potentially do have a structural character; calls in particular to review the conclusions on incidents examined by the management board in relation to their compliance with fundamental rights in light of the reported concealing of information to the management board as reported by the media , and on sharing of information within the agency and between the agency and the parliament;


### 12. recalls the european ombudsman’s decision in its own initiative enquiry on fundamental rights obligations; notes its conclusion that the agency should ensure a more proactive approach to transparency , including publishing documents that are needed to understand the respective roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in its operations; notes that the agency cannot share information of a tactical nature that could be abused for human trafficking or other illegal activities; calls on the agency to sensibly implement the ombudsman’s recommendations; ### 12. recalls the european ombudsman’s decision in its own initiative enquiry on fundamental rights obligations; notes its conclusion that the agency should ensure a more proactive approach to transparency , including publishing documents that are needed to understand the respective roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in its operations; notes that the agency cannot share information of a tactical nature that could be abused for human trafficking or other illegal activities; calls on the agency to implement the ombudsman’s recommendations;


### 13. recalls that the agency reported to have been notified of 17 cases of alleged harassment in 2020; notes from the agency’s follow-up to the first 2020 discharge report that two of those 17 cases were opened as informal procedures under the agency’s manual of procedures for confidential counsellors while the other 15 cases were closed without further follow-up; welcomes the statements of the acting executive director in the meeting of the committee on budgetary control that the agency remains vigilant in this area and that additional measures have been taken , such as the re-opening of a closed case regarding the suicide of the staff member , to make sure all cases are properly treated; ### 13. recalls that the agency reported to have been notified of 17 cases of alleged sexual harassment in 2020; notes from the agency’s follow-up to the first 2020 discharge report that only two of those 17 cases were opened as informal procedures under the agency’s manual of procedures for confidential counsellors; deplores the fact that the other 15 cases were closed without further follow-up; welcomes the statements of the acting executive director in the meeting of the committee on budgetary control that the agency remains vigilant in this area and that additional measures have been taken , such as the re-opening of a closed case regarding the suicide of the staff member related to alleged practices of sexual harassment , to make sure all cases are properly treated; calls on the executive director to conduct a full and detailed investigation about this particularly severe and worrying case , to keep the discharge authority informed about the results of this investigation and to fully cooperate with criminal investigation authorities in the process; calls on the executive director to conduct a thorough investigation into the implementation of existing procedures against sexual harassment , to report back to the discharge authority about the findings and to present a detailed action plan with measures ensuring zero tolerance towards sexual harassment in both its administrative and operational activities;


### 13. recalls the discharge authority’s concern about the recruitment of the agency’s fundamental rights monitors in the appropriate grades; calls on the agency to swiftly complete the ongoing recruitment procedures and work on embedding the work of the fro into the operational procedures of the agency; ### 13. recalls the discharge authority’s concern about the absence of recruitment of the agency’s fundamental rights monitors by the deadline of 5 december 2020 set by regulation (eu) 2019/1896 and the lack of progress on the appointment of the first 20 fundamental rights monitors afterwards in the appropriate grades; calls on the agency to swiftly recruit the remaining 20 fundamental rights monitors and to appoint them at ad level; underlines the personal responsibility of the executive director in delaying this process in violation of the agency’s regulation;


### 14. commends the staff of the agency , that has been through a very difficult period , facing challenges about which the acting executive director made statements in the meeting of the committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs of 30 may 2022; calls on the executive management of the agency and on the management board to continue with making the agency a safe place to work; takes courage from the statements that many staff members reported wrongdoings they witnessed to their superiors and calls on the agency to make sure that all signals about professional misconduct are taken serious , and properly followed-up; ### 14. commends the staff of the agency , that has been through a very difficult period , facing challenges about which the acting executive director made statements in the meeting of the committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs of 30 may 2022; points in particular towards the treatment of the former fro whose work has been hampered over the years by the former executive management of the agency , as reported by the media; calls on the executive management of the agency and on the management board to continue with making the agency a safe place to work; takes courage from the statements that many staff members reported wrongdoings they witnessed to their superiors and calls on the agency to make sure that all signals about professional misconduct are taken serious , and properly followed-up;


### c. whereas since december 2019 the agency has been implementing a new mandate with an essential scale-up that is significant in terms of missions and staff , that requires an adequate budget; ### c. whereas since december 2019 the agency has been implementing a new mandate ; whereas the ‘court’ in its special report 08/2021 stressed that when this new mandate was adopted , no prior assessment had fed into it and that the agency had not yet implemented the requirements of its 2016 mandate;


### 16. recalls that the european anti-fraud office opened an investigation in 2019 involving the agency; reiterates its call on the agency to fully cooperate with olaf and to keep the discharge authority informed on any developments that are relevant for the discharge procedure; ### 16. recalls that the european anti-fraud office opened an investigation in 2019 over allegations of harassment , misconduct and migrant pushbacks involving the agency; reiterates its call on the agency to fully cooperate with olaf and to keep the discharge authority informed on any developments that are relevant for the discharge procedure; notes that olaf closed part of its investigations into the handling of fundamental rights incidents including push-backs on february 15 , 2022 and that two other investigations are still ongoing; calls on olaf and frontex management board to make the full report available to members of the european parliament from the budgetary control committee and committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs in light of the high relevance for their scrutiny role; stresses that the discharge of the agency can not be granted without access to these crucial findings;


### 22. recalls the discharge authority’s remarks in the 2019 discharge regarding transparency and interest representation for the agency; notes that the agency implemented a new process to increase transparency and equal opportunities by streamlining industry dialogues; notes that all industry meetings (i-days) were organised online with presentation of more than 60 solutions by 50 companies , with the participation of 430 representatives of the agency , member states and union partners , as well as international organisations; notes that the agency , in addition to the i-days , organised an online demonstration of technological solutions relevant for the implementation of entry-exit-system back-to-back with the international conference on biometrics for borders , showcasing over 100 solutions , with 23 industry presentations to over 470 conference attendees; calls on the agency to comply with the highest standards as regards transparency and to keep its online transparency register up-to-date; ### 22. recalls the discharge authority’s concerns in the 2019 discharge regarding transparency and interest representation for the agency; notes that the agency implemented a new process to increase transparency; notes that all industry meetings (i-days) were organised online with presentation of more than 60 solutions by 50 companies , with the participation of 430 representatives of the agency , member states and union partners , as well as international organisations; notes that the agency , in addition to the i-days , organised an online demonstration of technological solutions back-to-back with the international conference on biometrics for borders , showcasing over 100 solutions , with 23 industry presentations to over 470 conference attendees; notes that very few meetings appear however to be registered in the newly established transparency register; calls on the agency to comply with the highest standards as regards transparency and to keep its online transparency register up-to-date;


### 31. notes that the european ombudsman handled 13 cases that relate to the agency , six on public access to documents , six on human resources management and one related to fundamental rights; notes that the ombudsman did not provide recommendations in six cases , that the implementation of four recommendations is ongoing and that in three cases the recommendation has already been implemented; ### 31. recalls that on 15 june 2021 , the european ombudsman concluded that there had been delay on the part of the agency in implementing the important changes introduced by regulation (eu) 2019/1896; notes that the european ombudsman handled 13 cases that relate to the agency , six on public access to documents , six on human resources management and one related to fundamental rights; notes that the ombudsman did not provide recommendations in six cases , that the implementation of four recommendations is ongoing and that in three cases the recommendation has already been implemented;


### 5. notes the order of the european data protection supervisor (edps) issued in january 2022 to the agency to erase data concerning individuals with no established link to a criminal activity (‘data subject categorisation’ or ‘dsc’); notes that the order concerned large and complex datasets owned by member states and operational partners which are provided to the agency in connection with investigations supported within its mandate; notes that the agency proactively requested the edps for guidance in april 2019; acknowledges that the decision of the edps highlights that it is not possible for the agency , when receiving large datasets , to ascertain that all information contained in those large datasets complies with the dsc assignment; ### 5. notes that on 30 april 2019 , the european data protection supervisor (edps) decided to open an own initiative inquiry on the use of big data analytics by the agency for purposes of strategic and operational analysis (case 2019-0370); further notes that in line with regulation (eu) 2016/7941a , the edps has the task of supervising the lawfulness of personal data processing by the agency as of 1 may 2017; notes that in the context of its inquiry , the edps admonished the agency in september 2020 for the continued storage of large volumes of data with no data subject categorisation , where no link to criminal activity can be established , thereby posing a risk to individuals’ fundamental rights; reminds that while some measures have been put in place by the agency since then , the agency has not complied with the requests of the edps to define an appropriate data retention period to filter and to extract the personal data permitted for analysis under regulation (eu) 2016/794; highlights that this means that the agency was keeping this data for longer than necessary , contrary to the principles of data minimisation and storage limitation enshrined in regulation (eu) 2016/794; further notes that on 21 december 2021 , the edps decided to order the agency , in accordance with article 43(3) , point (e) , of regulation (eu) 2016/794 , to erase data concerning individuals with no established link to a criminal activity within six months , concluding the inquiry launched in 2019;


### 6. notes that , since the request for guidance from the agency , the edps has been in a dialogue with the agency about the matter , that it set up a dedicated action plan and that the agency has been given 12 months to implement the order to proceed with dsc for all datasets existing on the day of the decision of the edps and six months from the date of reception of new datasets; notes the agency's stated commitment to the highest standards of data protection , noting that regulation (eu) 2016/794 does not contain an explicit provision regarding a maximum time period to determine the dsc and that the decision of the edps will impact the agency's ability to analyse complex and large datasets at the request of the union's law enforcement organisations since the agency's support frequently entails a period longer than six months , as illustrated by some of the agency’s most prominent cases in recent years; calls on the agency and the legislator , where appropriate , to find ways to comply with and address the edps' concerns; ### 6. notes that , since the request for guidance from the agency , the edps has been in a dialogue with the agency about the matter , that it set up a dedicated action plan and that the agency has been given 12 months to implement the order to proceed with dsc for all datasets existing on the day of the decision of the edps and six months from the date of reception of new datasets;


### — having regard to the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , and in particular articles 7 and 8 thereof , ### — having regard to the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , and in particular articles 7 , 8 and 52 thereof ,


### a. whereas present-day terrorism and organised crime are becoming increasingly dynamic , complex , globalised , mobile and mainly transnational phenomena , which require a robust response and more effective , coordinated eu cooperation with international law enforcement authorities and bodies such as the international criminal police organization (interpol); whereas the 2020 eu security union strategy calls on the member states to step up cooperation between the eu and interpol , as this is essential to enhancing cooperation and information exchange; ### a. whereas the 2020 eu security union strategy calls on the member states to step up cooperation between the eu and interpol;


### b. whereas international cooperation is a main component of effective law enforcement and judicial cooperation , especially if it involves the processing and sharing of personal data; whereas bilateral agreements with key partners play an important role in obtaining information and evidence from beyond the eu; ### b. whereas international cooperation is a main component of effective law enforcement and judicial cooperation , whereas bilateral agreements with key partners play an important role in obtaining information and evidence from beyond the eu;


### c. whereas interpol is one of the largest inter-governmental criminal police organisations and has an important role to play all over the world; whereas the commission , on behalf of the eu , is seeking reinforced cooperation with interpol , including access to interpol databases and the strengthening of operational and strategic cooperation: whereas it is paramount to ensure that measures are put in place to guarantee the integrity and correctness of data in practice; ### c. whereas interpol is one of the largest inter-governmental criminal police organisations; whereas the commission , on behalf of the eu , is seeking reinforced cooperation with interpol , including access to interpol databases and the strengthening of operational cooperation: whereas it is paramount to ensure that all cooperation and exchange of data , respect fundamental rights , including the right to data protection and privacy , and that all the necessary measures are put in place to guarantee the integrity and correctness of the used data;


### d. whereas the eu and interpol already have long-standing cooperation in a range of law enforcement-related areas through the operational implementation of the eu policy cycle - empact (european multidisciplinary platform against criminal threats) and by supporting the activities of member states in cooperation with eu agencies , such as the eu agency for law enforcement cooperation (europol) , the european border and coast guard agency (frontex) , the eu agency for law enforcement training (cepol) , the european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction (emcdda) , the eu agency for the operational management of large-scale it systems in the area of freedom , security and justice (eu-lisa) , on the basis of agreements or working arrangements; whereas on 5 november 2001 , europol and interpol signed an operational agreement followed by a memorandum of understanding allowing the transfer of personal data through their respective liaison officers; whereas on 27 may 2009 frontex signed a working agreement with interpol establishing a framework for cooperation with the objective of facilitating the prevention , detection and combating of cross-border crime and improving border security to combat illegal immigration , people smuggling and trafficking in human beings; ### d. whereas the eu and interpol already have long-standing cooperation in a range of law enforcement-related areas through the operational implementation of the eu policy cycle - empact (european multidisciplinary platform against criminal threats) and by supporting the activities of member states in cooperation with eu agencies , such as the eu agency for law enforcement cooperation (europol) , the european border and coast guard agency (frontex) , the eu agency for law enforcement training (cepol) , the european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction (emcdda) , the eu agency for the operational management of large-scale it systems in the area of freedom , security and justice (eu-lisa) , on the basis of agreements or working arrangements; whereas on 5 november 2001 , europol and interpol signed an operational agreement followed by a memorandum of understanding allowing the transfer of personal data through their respective liaison officers; whereas on 27 may 2009 frontex signed a working agreement with interpol;


### e. whereas interpol’s 19 databases , which include potentially valuable information , are directly accessible by eu member states as member countries of interpol , while eu agencies such as frontex , the eu agency for criminal justice cooperation (eurojust) and the european public prosecutor’s office (eppo) currently do not have any access to these databases – either directly or on a ‘hit/no hit’ basis – due to the lack of an agreement with interpol , which is required for this purpose under interpol’s rules on the processing of data; ### e. whereas interpol’s 19 databases , are directly accessible by eu member states as member countries of interpol , while eu agencies such as frontex , the eu agency for criminal justice cooperation (eurojust) and the european public prosecutor’s office (eppo) currently do not have any access to these databases – either directly or on a ‘hit/no hit’ basis – due to the lack of an agreement with interpol;


### f. whereas current cooperation between the eu and interpol should be stepped up and extended to new areas; whereas procedures should be improved , accelerated and streamlined to address a series of indispensable operational needs in order to facilitate swift access to information related to counter-terrorism including interpol notices containing information on terrorists in order to increase cooperation to counter shared threats such as terrorism , organised crime , cybercrime , child sexual abuse and trafficking in human beings; ### f. whereas in the cooperation between the eu and interpol procedures should be improved , and streamlined;


### h. whereas the new agreement should establish a modern and coherent framework for the eu’s agencies’ cooperation with interpol , taking into account the latest developments in combating terrorism and cross-border , transnational , serious and organised crime; whereas the agreement should respond to current operational needs , as well as to the eu’s latest data protection regime and provide the legal basis for the exchange of operational information and access to relevant interpol databases; ### h. whereas the new agreement and cooperation should be based on the already existing mandate and modalities of existing relevant eu regulations and respective agencies mandate;


### j. whereas according to the negotiation mandate the new agreement should regulate cooperation between europol , the eppo , eurojust and frontex and provide direct access by these agencies and member states for the performance of their tasks to two of interpol’s databases - the stolen and lost travel document (sltd) and travel document associated with notices (tdawn) databases via the european search portal (esp) , in compliance with eu data protection requirements and with fundamental rights; ### j. whereas according to the negotiation mandate the new agreement should regulate cooperation between europol , the eppo , eurojust and frontex and provide direct access by these agencies and member states for purposes strictly linked to the performance of their tasks as regulated in their respective current regulations to two of interpol’s databases - the stolen and lost travel document (sltd) and travel document associated with notices (tdawn) databases via the european search portal (esp) , in compliance with eu data protection requirements and with respect of fundamental rights;


### k. whereas international organisations continue to report abuses by some states of interpol’s notice system in order to persecute national human rights defenders , civil society activists and journalists in violation of international standards on human rights; whereas according to reports by international actors , interpol has significantly reformed and strengthened its red notices review processes , as well as its support systems for national central bureaus in member countries , reformed the setup and functioning of the commission for the control of files , enforcing its complaints mechanism , appointed a data protection officer and implemented a learning and knowledge-sharing programme; ### k. whereas international organisations and non-governmental organisations continue to report abuses by some member countries of interpol’s notice system in order to persecute national human rights defenders , civil society activists and journalists in violation of international standards on human rights; whereas according to reports by international actors , interpol has presented some efforts to reform its red notices review processes , as well as its support systems for national central bureaus in member countries , to reform the setup and functioning of the commission for the control of files , to enforce its complaint mechanism and has appointed a data protection officer and started the implementation of a learning and knowledge-sharing programme;


### l. whereas russia still remains a member of interpol and whereas cooperation with the european union and interpol members is based on trust; whereas trust between parties relies on the swift tackling of misuse of interpol notices by countries seeking to use interpol systems for political ends; whereas , in this context , interpol’s systems must respect human rights and the rule of law , and uphold its commitments on political , religious or military abuse; ### l. whereas cooperation with the european union and interpol members is based on trust; whereas trust between parties relies on the swift tackling of misuse of interpol notices by countries seeking to use interpol systems for political ends; whereas , in this context , interpol’s systems must respect human rights and the rule of law , and uphold its commitments on prohibiting political , religious or military abuse;