### (75) in the context of proceedings carried out under this regulation , the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. while ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned , in particular , the right of access to the file and the right to be heard , it is essential that confidential information be protected. furthermore , while respecting the confidentiality of the information , the commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. finally , under certain conditions certain business records , such as communication between lawyers and their clients , may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met. ### (75) in the context of proceedings carried out under this regulation , the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. while ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned , in particular , the right of access to the file and the right to be heard , it is essential that confidential information be protected. furthermore , while respecting the confidentiality of the information , the commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. finally , under certain conditions certain business records , such as communication between lawyers and their clients , may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met. parties directly concerned by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 should be considered to have an interest and should therefore be able to be heard. where a procedure concerns products or services used by end consumers , the consumer associations should be considered to have a sufficient interest.


### (75) in the context of proceedings carried out under this regulation , the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. while ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned , in particular , the right of access to the file and the right to be heard , it is essential that confidential information be protected. furthermore , while respecting the confidentiality of the information , the commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. finally , under certain conditions certain business records , such as communication between lawyers and their clients , may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met. ### deleted


### (75) in the context of proceedings carried out under this regulation , the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. while ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned , in particular , the right of access to the file and the right to be heard , it is essential that confidential information be protected. furthermore , while respecting the confidentiality of the information , the commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. finally , under certain conditions certain business records , such as communication between lawyers and their clients , may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met. ### (75) in the context of proceedings carried out under this regulation , the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. while ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned , in particular , the right of access to the file and the right to be heard , it is essential that confidential information , be protected , while having due respect to the whistleblower directive. the undertaking should demonstrate a legitimate interest in what it claims as confidential information. it should be up to the commission to decide ultimately. furthermore , while respecting the confidentiality of the information , the commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. finally , under certain conditions certain business records , such as communication between lawyers and their clients , may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met.


### (77) the advisory committee established in accordance with regulation (eu) no 182//2011 should also deliver opinions on certain individual decisions of the commission issued under this regulation. in order to ensure contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty should be delegated to the commission to supplement this regulation. in particular , delegated acts should be adopted in respect of the methodology for determining the quantitative thresholds for designation of gatekeepers under this regulation and in respect of the update of the obligations laid down in this regulation where , based on a market investigation the commission has identified the need for updating the obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair. it is of particular importance that the commission carries out appropriate consultations and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of 13 april 201636. in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. ### (77) the advisory committee established in accordance with regulation (eu) no 182//2011 should also deliver opinions on certain individual decisions of the commission issued under this regulation. the commission should involve in this advisory committee third parties representing affected end users. in order to ensure contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty should be delegated to the commission to supplement this regulation. in particular , delegated acts should be adopted in respect of the methodology for determining the quantitative thresholds for designation of gatekeepers under this regulation and in respect of the update of the obligations laid down in this regulation where , based on a market investigation the commission has identified the need for updating the obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair. it is of particular importance that the commission carries out appropriate consultations and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of 13 april 201636. in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.


### (78) the commission should periodically evaluate this regulation and closely monitor its effects on the contestability and fairness of commercial relationships in the online platform economy , in particular with a view to determining the need for amendments in light of relevant technological or commercial developments. this evaluation should include the regular review of the list of core platform services and the obligations addressed to gatekeepers as well as enforcement of these , in view of ensuring that digital markets across the union are contestable and fair. in order to obtain a broad view of developments in the sector , the evaluation should take into account the experiences of member states and relevant stakeholders. the commission may in this regard also consider the opinions and reports presented to it by the observatory on the online platform economy that was first established by commission decision c(2018)2393 of 26 april 2018. following the evaluation , the commission should take appropriate measures. the commission should to maintain a high level of protection and respect for the common eu rights and values , particularly equality and non-discrimination , as an objective when conducting the assessments and reviews of the practices and obligations provided in this regulation. ### (78) the commission should periodically evaluate this regulation and closely monitor its effects on the contestability and fairness of commercial relationships in the online platform economy , in particular with a view to determining the need for amendments in light of relevant technological or commercial developments and according to article 294 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union. this evaluation should include the regular review of the list of core platform services and the obligations addressed to gatekeepers as well as enforcement of these , in view of ensuring that digital markets across the union are contestable and fair. in order to obtain a broad view of developments in the sector , the evaluation should take into account the experiences of member states and relevant stakeholders. the commission may in this regard also consider the opinions and reports presented to it by the observatory on the online platform economy that was first established by commission decision c(2018)2393 of 26 april 2018 or from any consumers’ right and fundamental right organisation. following the evaluation , the commission should take appropriate measures. the commission should to maintain a high level of protection and respect for the common eu rights and values , particularly equality and non-discrimination , as an objective when conducting the assessments and reviews of the practices and obligations provided in this regulation.


### (14) ‘ancillary service’ means services provided in the context of or together with core platform services , including payment services as defined in point 3 of article 4 and technical services which support the provision of payment services as defined in article 3(j) of directive (eu) 2015/2366 , fulfilment , identification or advertising services; ### (14) ‘ancillary service’ means services provided in the context of or together with core platform services , including retail activities and payment services as defined in point 3 of article 4 and technical services which support the provision of payment services as defined in article 3(j) of directive (eu) 2015/2366 , fulfilment , identification or advertising services;


### (14) ‘ancillary service’ means services provided in the context of or together with core platform services , including payment services as defined in point 3 of article 4 and technical services which support the provision of payment services as defined in article 3(j) of directive (eu) 2015/2366 , fulfilment , identification or advertising services; ### (14) ‘ancillary service’ means services provided in the context of or together with core platform services , including retailing activities , payment services as defined in point 3 of article 4 and technical services which support the provision of payment services as defined in article 3(j) of directive (eu) 2015/2366 , fulfilment , identification or advertising services;


### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users; and ### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users or for other end users to reach end users;


### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where the undertaking to which it belongs achieves an annual eea turnover equal to or above eur 6.5 billion in the last three financial years , or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking to which it belongs amounted to at least eur 65 billion in the last financial year , and it provides a core platform service in at least three member states; ### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where the undertaking to which it belongs achieves an annual eea turnover equal to or above eur 5 billion in the last three financial years , or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking to which it belongs amounted to at least eur 50 billion in the last financial year;


### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides a core platform service that has more than 45 million monthly active end users established or located in the union and more than 10 000 yearly active business users established in the union in the last financial year; ### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides a core platform service that has more than 22.5 million monthly active end users established or located in the union or more than 5 000 yearly active business users established in the union in the last financial year;


### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within three months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). ### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within 10 days after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b).


### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within three months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). ### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within 30 days after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b).


### 6. the commission may identify as a gatekeeper , in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 15 , any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1 , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2 , or has presented sufficiently substantiated arguments in accordance with paragraph 4. ### 6. the commission may identify as a gatekeeper , in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 15 , any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1 , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2.


### other structural market characteristics. ### other structural market characteristics , other relevant business or service characteristics , such as a conglomerate corporate structure or vertical integration of the undertaking providing core platform services , for instance allowing cross subsidisation or combination of data from different sources.


### where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper. ### deleted


### where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available. ### where the provider of a core platform service fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available.


### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; ### refrain from requiring business users or end users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification or payment service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;


### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; ### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with any ancillary service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;


### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; ### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an ancillary service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;


### 1. in respect of each of its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3(7) , a gatekeeper shall: ### 1. in respect of each of its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3(7) and its ancillary services , including distribution services , a gatekeeper shall:


### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of these business users , of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users; ### refrain from using , in competition with business users of its core platform services and providers of ancillary services , including distribution services , any data not publicly available which is generated through activities by those business users or providers , including by their end users , or provided by those business users or providers or by their end users;


### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of these business users , of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users; ### deleted


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking , display and other parameters and in access to and conditions of use of services , services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party , whether or not they belong to the same undertakings , compared to similar services or products of a third party and apply transparent , fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking;


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### deleted


### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users; ### refrain from restricting or limiting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users;


### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users; ### refrain from technical and non-technical tactics to restrict end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users;


### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users; ### refrain in any form from restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users and providers of core and ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any services;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users , end users and providers of services to have , to the fullest extent technically supported , access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any core and ancillary services by providing complete and accurate information , while guaranteeing a high level of security and personal data protection;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users , end users and providers of ancillary or core services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary or core services;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users , end users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary or core services;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of non-personal data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide , in full compliance with the gdpr , business users the possibility to obtain the consent of the data subject , allowing to the business users the access to and use of the personal data where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service ;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ### provide business users and providers of ancillary services , including distribution services , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services and ancillary services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent from the gatekeeper or directly from the relevant business user as set out in article 11(2) in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### deleted


### 1. the measures implemented by the gatekeeper to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. the gatekeeper shall ensure that these measures are implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety. ### 1. the measures implemented by the gatekeeper to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. the gatekeeper must demonstrate compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 shall ensure that these measures are implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety.


### 1. the measures implemented by the gatekeeper to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. the gatekeeper shall ensure that these measures are implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety. ### 1. the gatekeeper shall ensure that the measures implemented to comply with article 5 and 6 are implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety.


### 1. the measures implemented by the gatekeeper to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. the gatekeeper shall ensure that these measures are implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety. ### 1. the gatekeeper shall ensure that the measures to comply with articles 5 and 6 are effectively implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety.


### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. ### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within three months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 and make that decision public.


### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. ### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt and publish such a decision within three months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , where the commission has issued at least three non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of five years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this article. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , where the commission has issued at least two non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of five years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this article.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , where the commission has issued at least three non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of five years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this article. ### deleted


### 3. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , where the commission has issued at least three non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of five years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this article. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , where the commission has issued at least three non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of five years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this article. this circumstance shall be considered as an aggravating factor when setting fines and penalties.


### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 24 months from the opening of the market investigation. ### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within six months from the opening of the market investigation.


### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 24 months from the opening of the market investigation. ### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 12 months from the opening of the market investigation.


### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 24 months from the opening of the market investigation. ### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 12 months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. the commission shall adopt a non-compliance decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) where it finds that a gatekeeper does not comply with one or more of the following: ### 1. the commission shall , within six month from opening a proceeding according to article 18 , adopt a non-compliance decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) where it finds that a gatekeeper does not comply with one or more of the following:


### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision. ### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within two month and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision.


### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision. ### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within six months and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision.


### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 25 , the commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper , intentionally or negligently , fails to comply with: ### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 25 , the commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year or structural and equally effective behavioural remedies where it finds that the gatekeeper , intentionally or negligently , fails to comply with:


### 1. the powers conferred on the commission by articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a three year limitation period. ### 1. the powers conferred on the commission by articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a five year limitation period.


### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to article 7 , article 8(1) , article 9(1) , articles 15 , 16 , 22 , 23 , 25 and 26 and article 27(2) , the commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned the opportunity of being heard on: ### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to article 7 , article 8(1) , article 9(1) , articles 15 , 16 , 22 , 23 , 25 and 26 and article 27(2) , the commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned and third parties having a legitimate interest the opportunity of being heard on:


### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to article 7 , article 8(1) , article 9(1) , articles 15 , 16 , 22 , 23 , 25 and 26 and article 27(2) , the commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned the opportunity of being heard on: ### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to article 7 , article 8(1) , article 9(1) , articles 15 , 16 , 22 , 23 , 25 and 26 and article 27(2) , the commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned , including third parties affected by the conduct of the gatekeeper concerned , the opportunity of being heard on:


### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to article 7 , article 8(1) , article 9(1) , articles 15 , 16 , 22 , 23 , 25 and 26 and article 27(2) , the commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned the opportunity of being heard on: ### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to article 7 , article 8(1) , article 9(1) , articles 15 , 16 , 22 , 23 , 25 and 26 and article 27(2) , the commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned as well as third parties affected by the conduct of the gatekeeper the opportunity of being heard on:


### 1. the commission shall be assisted by the digital markets advisory committee. that committee shall be a committee within the meaning of regulation (eu) no 182/2011. ### 1. the commission shall be assisted by the digital markets advisory committee. that committee shall consist of representatives of the european data protection board , as well as of representatives of the competent authorities of the member states for competition , electronic communications , audio-visual services , electoral oversight , and consumer protection and be a committee within the meaning of regulation (eu) no 182/2011.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. where one or more member states , or any legal person able to demonstrate a legitimate interest in representing business users or consumers , requests the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 , 16 and 17 because it considers that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , or that a gatekeeper is not complying with the obligations laid down in article 5 and 6 of this regulation , or that one or more services should be added to the list of core platform services , the commission shall within three months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation and must substantiate any decision not to open an investigation.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. when one or more designated authorities of the member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 , 16 or 17 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper that there are new core platform services and practices to be added , or that a gatekeeper is violating their obligations under articles 5 and 6 , or that there is a situation of (systemic) non-compliance , the commission shall within three months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. if the commission decides not to open an investigation , the commission shall publish the respective reasons.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. when one or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , or that a gatekeeper is violating their obligations under articles 5 and 6 , or because they have information according to which there are reasonable grounds to add new services and new practices. on that basis , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 , 16 and 17 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , does not comply with this regulation or its new services and practices need to be examined , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. when one or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 , 16 or 17 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , does not comply with this regulation or its new services and practices need to be examined , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation.


### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. ### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should not be permitted to combine the personal data of end users or business users generated by a core or ancillary service with data from a gatekeeper or a third-party service.


### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. ### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a not personalised alternative. the options should be presented in an equally appealing way to the end user. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner.


### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. ### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering , by default and as first option , a not personalised model. these options should be presented in an equally appealing way to the end user. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner.


### (38) to prevent further reinforcing their dependence on the core platform services of gatekeepers , the business users of these gatekeepers should be free in promoting and choosing the distribution channel they consider most appropriate to interact with any end users that these business users have already acquired through core platform services provided by the gatekeeper. conversely , end users should also be free to choose offers of such business users and to enter into contracts with them either through core platform services of the gatekeeper , if applicable , or from a direct distribution channel of the business user or another indirect distribution channel such business user may use. this should apply to the promotion of offers and conclusion of contracts between business users and end users. moreover , the ability of end users to freely acquire content , subscriptions , features or other items outside the core platform services of the gatekeeper should not be undermined or restricted. in particular , it should be avoided that gatekeepers restrict end users from access to and use of such services via a software application running on their core platform service. for example , subscribers to online content purchased outside a software application download or purchased from a software application store should not be prevented from accessing such online content on a software application on the gatekeeper’s core platform service simply because it was purchased outside such software application or software application store. ### (38) to prevent further reinforcing their dependence on the core platform services of gatekeepers , the business users of these gatekeepers should be free in promoting and choosing the distribution channel they consider most appropriate to interact with any end users that these business users have already acquired through core platform services provided by the gatekeeper. conversely , end users should also be free to choose offers of such business users and to enter into contracts with them either through core platform services of the gatekeeper , if applicable , or from a direct distribution channel of the business user or another indirect distribution channel such business user may use. this should apply to the promotion of offers and conclusion of contracts between business users and end users. moreover , the ability of end users to freely acquire digital content and services , subscriptions , features or other items outside the core platform services of the gatekeeper should not be blocked or restricted , including by the use of technical means. in particular , it should be avoided that gatekeepers restrict end users from access to and use of such legally acquired services via hardware components or a software application running on their core platform service. for example , access to online content purchased outside a software application download or purchased from a software application store should not be prevented on a software application on the gatekeeper’s core platform service simply because it was purchased outside such software application or software application store.


### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service. ### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users , including for ancillary services. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform or transactions on its ancillary service , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users or to its providers , and at the same time offers services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users or its providers. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service or with the provider of an ancillary service.


### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service. ### (43) a gatekeeper should not have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. the gatekeeper should not take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service.


### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service. ### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper should not take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service.


### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. ### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace , or products or services to which users are directed following a voice request by the end user to a digital voice assistant. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.


### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. ### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control or with which they have entered into particular cooperation agreements or which they prefer due to other reasons unrelated to their service’s actual relevance , which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which may be considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. such preferential or embedded display of a separate online intermediation service should constitute a favouring irrespective of whether the information or results within the favoured groups of specialised results may also be provided by competing services and are as such ranked in a non-discriminatory way. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace or products or services to which users are directed following a voice request by an end user to a digital voice assistant. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.


### (49) in such situations , the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including display , rating , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34 ### (49) in such situations , the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including display , rating , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu)2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34


### (49) in such situations , the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including display , rating , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34 ### (49) in such situations of a conflict of interest , the gatekeeper should not partly or entirely embed such distinct product or service in online search engines results or groups of results. however , it can rank its products or services , provided that it does not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it either controls or cooperates with or prefers for any other reason. in particular , where a gatekeeper’s online search engine results page includes the ranking of separate products or services , third parties should be afforded equal opportunity to rank their product or service in the same format and on the same terms and conditions. should this take place in exchange for remuneration , to avoid any conflict of interest , the gatekeeper’s separate product or service should be treated as a separate commercial entity and should be commercially viable as a stand-alone service , offered outside of the gatekeeper’s core platform service. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair and the gatekeeper's own products or services do not have more access to information about the ranking or any other competition-relevant aspects than products or services of third parties. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including display , rating , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. such an equivalent effect can for instance be achieved by ad formats that are used by users in a similar manner to the gatekeeper's or third parties' online intermediation services , or that benefit the gatekeeper in a similar manner to the preferential treatment in ranking itself (e.g. in terms of financial gains , user access/traffic or data access). the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34


### (50) gatekeepers should not restrict or prevent the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. this would allow more providers to offer their services , thereby ultimately providing greater choice to the end user. gatekeepers should ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and shall not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to consumers , including by means of pre-installation , as well as the improvement of the offering to end users , such as price reductions or increased quality , should not be construed as constituting a prohibited barrier to switching. ### (50) gatekeepers should not restrict or prevent the free choice of end users by preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. this would allow more providers to offer their services , thereby ultimately providing greater choice to the end user. gatekeepers should ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and shall not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to consumers , including by means of pre-installation , as well as the improvement of the offering to end users , such as price reductions or increased quality , should not be construed as constituting a prohibited barrier to switching.


### (51) gatekeepers can hamper the ability of end users to access online content and services including software applications. therefore , rules should be established to ensure that the rights of end users to access an open internet are not compromised by the conduct of gatekeepers. gatekeepers can also technically limit the ability of end users to effectively switch between different internet access service providers , in particular through their control over operating systems or hardware. this distorts the level playing field for internet access services and ultimately harms end users. it should therefore be ensured that gatekeepers do not unduly restrict end users in choosing their internet access service provider. ### (51) gatekeepers can hamper the ability of end users to access online content and services including software applications. therefore , rules should be established to ensure that the rights of end users to access an open internet are not compromised by the conduct of gatekeepers. gatekeepers can also technically limit the ability of end users to effectively switch between different internet access service providers , in particular through their control over operating systems or hardware. this distorts the level playing field for internet access services and ultimately harms end users. it should therefore be ensured that gatekeepers do not restrict end users in choosing their internet access service provider.


### (60) in exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public morality , public health or public security , the commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. the regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability. ### (60) in exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public health or public security , the commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. the regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability.


### (60) in exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public morality , public health or public security , the commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. the regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability. ### deleted


### (60) in exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public morality , public health or public security , the commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. the regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability. ### (60) in exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public interest , such as public health or public security , the commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. the regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability.


### (79) the objective of this regulation is to ensure a contestable and fair digital sector in general and core platform services in particular , with a view to promoting innovation , high quality of digital products and services , fair and competitive prices , as well as a high quality and choice for end users in the digital sector. this cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states , but can only , by reason of the business model and operations of the gatekeepers and the scale and effects of their operations , be fully achieved at union level. the union may adopt measures , in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union. in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. ### (79) the objective of this regulation is to ensure a contestable and fair digital sector in general and core platform services in particular , avoid lock-in effects , with a view to promoting innovation , high quality of digital products and services , fair and competitive prices , as well as data protection , transparency , user informed and free choice and interoperability in order to guarantee a level playing field and consumer welfare , a high quality and transparent choice for end users in the digital sector. this cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states , but can only , by reason of the business model and operations of the gatekeepers and the scale and effects of their operations , be fully achieved at union level. the union may adopt measures , in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union. in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.


### 1. this regulation lays down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present. ### 1. this regulation lays down harmonised rules ensuring contestable , sustainable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers prevent with their monopolistic ecosystems a level playing field.


### 1. this regulation lays down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present. ### 1. this regulation lays down harmonised rules ensuring a level playing field and contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present.


### 5. member states shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws , regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. this is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests , in compliance with union law. in particular , nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing obligations , which are compatible with union law , on undertakings , including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this regulation in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition. ### 5. nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing obligations , which are compatible with union law , on undertakings , including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this regulation in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition.


### 6. this regulation is without prejudice to the application of articles 101 and 102 tfeu. it is also without prejudice to the application of: national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements , decisions by associations of undertakings , concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; national competition rules prohibiting other forms of unilateral conduct insofar as they are applied to undertakings other than gatekeepers or amount to imposing additional obligations on gatekeepers; council regulation (ec) no 139/200438 and national rules concerning merger control; regulation (eu) 2019/1150 and regulation (eu) …./.. of the european parliament and of the council39 . ### 6. this regulation is without prejudice to the application of articles 101 and 102 tfeu. it is also without prejudice to the application of: national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements , decisions by associations of undertakings , concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; national competition rules prohibiting other forms of unilateral conduct including additional obligations on gatekeepers; council regulation (ec) no 139/200438 and national rules concerning merger control; regulation (eu) 2019/1150 and regulation (eu) …./.. of the european parliament and of the council39 .


### 6. this regulation is without prejudice to the application of articles 101 and 102 tfeu. it is also without prejudice to the application of: national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements , decisions by associations of undertakings , concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; national competition rules prohibiting other forms of unilateral conduct insofar as they are applied to undertakings other than gatekeepers or amount to imposing additional obligations on gatekeepers; council regulation (ec) no 139/200438 and national rules concerning merger control; regulation (eu) 2019/1150 and regulation (eu) …./.. of the european parliament and of the council39 . ### 6. this regulation is without prejudice to the application of articles 101 and 102 tfeu. it is also without prejudice to the application of: national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements , decisions by associations of undertakings , concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; national competition rules prohibiting other forms of unilateral conduct , including additional obligations on gatekeepers; council regulation (ec) no 139/200438 and national rules concerning merger control; regulation (eu) 2019/1150 and regulation (eu) …./.. of the european parliament and of the council39 .


### (18) ‘ranking’ means the relative prominence given to goods or services offered through online intermediation services or online social networking services , or the relevance given to search results by online search engines , as presented , organised or communicated by the providers of online intermediation services or of online social networking services or by providers of online search engines , respectively , whatever the technological means used for such presentation , organisation or communication; ### (18) ‘ranking’ means the relative prominence given to goods or services , or the relevance given to search results , as presented , organised or communicated by service providers , whatever the technological means used for such presentation , organisation or communication;


### refrain from preventing or restricting business users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers; ### refrain from preventing or restricting business users or end users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers;


### refrain from preventing or restricting business users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers; ### refrain from preventing or restricting business users , providers of ancillary services of the gatekeeper , end users or third parties having a legitimate interest from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers;


### refrain from preventing or restricting business users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers; ### refrain from preventing or restricting business or end users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers;


### refrain from preventing or restricting business users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers; ### refrain from preventing or restricting business users , end users or supplier to the gatekeeper’s ancillary service from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers;


### refrain from requiring business users or end users to subscribe to or register with any other core platform services identified pursuant to article 3 or which meets the thresholds in article 3(2)(b) as a condition to access , sign up or register to any of their core platform services identified pursuant to that article; ### refrain from requiring business users or end users to subscribe to or register with any other core platform services identified pursuant to article 3 or which meets the thresholds in article 3(2)(b) , or with any ancillary services as a condition to access , sign up or register to any of their core platform services identified pursuant to that article;


### provide advertisers and publishers to which it supplies advertising services , upon their request , with information concerning the price paid by the advertiser and publisher , as well as the amount or remuneration paid to the publisher , for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper. ### provide advertisers , publishers and third parties having a legitimate interest , upon request and for each advertising service , with all non-personal information so that they can verify the performance and scope of the service ordered;


### provide advertisers and publishers to which it supplies advertising services , upon their request , with information concerning the price paid by the advertiser and publisher , as well as the amount or remuneration paid to the publisher , for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper. ### provide advertisers and publishers to which it supplies advertising services , upon their request , with information concerning all non-price criteria in the auction process , the price paid by the advertiser and publisher , as well as the amount or remuneration paid to the publisher , for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper.


### provide advertisers and publishers to which it supplies advertising services , upon their request , with information concerning the price paid by the advertiser and publisher , as well as the amount or remuneration paid to the publisher , for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper. ### provide advertisers and publishers to which it supplies advertising services , upon their request , with free of charge , high-quality , granular , effective , continuous and real-time access , equivalent to that conferred upon the gatekeeper itself , to information on the visibility and availability of advertisement portfolio as well as pricing conditions concerning the bids placed by advertisers and advertising intermediaries , the price paid by the advertiser and publisher , as well as the amount and remuneration paid to the publisher , for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper.


### allow end users to un-install any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service without prejudice to the possibility for a gatekeeper to restrict such un-installation in relation to software applications that are essential for the functioning of the operating system or of the device and which cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third-parties; ### allow end users and device manufacturers to un-install any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service without prejudice to the possibility for a gatekeeper to restrict such un-installation in relation to software applications that are essential for the functioning of the operating system or of the device and which cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third-parties;


### allow end users to un-install any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service without prejudice to the possibility for a gatekeeper to restrict such un-installation in relation to software applications that are essential for the functioning of the operating system or of the device and which cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third-parties; ### deleted


### allow the installation and effective use of third party software applications or software application stores using , or interoperating with , operating systems of that gatekeeper and allow these software applications or software application stores to be accessed by means other than the core platform services of that gatekeeper. the gatekeeper shall not be prevented from taking proportionate measures to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper; ### allow the installation and effective use of third party software applications or software application stores using , or interoperating with , operating systems of that gatekeeper and allow these software applications or software application stores to be accessed by means other than the core platform services of that gatekeeper. the gatekeeper shall not be prevented from taking proportionate measures to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper.


### provide advertisers and publishers , upon their request and free of charge , with access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the ad inventory; ### provide advertisers and publishers , upon their request a continuous , real-time and free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and provide for full disclosure and transparency of the parameters and data used for decision making , execution and measurement of the intermediation services.


### provide effective portability of data generated through the activity of a business user or end user and shall , in particular , provide tools for end users to facilitate the exercise of data portability , in line with regulation eu 2016/679 , including by the provision of continuous and real-time access ; ### provide effective portability of data generated through the activity of a business user or end user and shall , in particular , provide tools for end users to facilitate the effective exercise of the personal data relating to her or him , including personal data generated through her or his activity as end-user of platform services in accordance with article 20 of regulation 2016/679 , including by the provision of continuous and real-time access ;