### 4. welcomes the commission’s work on the annual rule of law report; notes , however , that it fails to encompass the areas of democracy and fundamental rights; reiterates the need for a comprehensive monitoring mechanism enshrined in a legal act binding parliament , the council and the commission to a transparent and regularised process , with clearly defined responsibilities , so that the protection and promotion of union values becomes a permanent and visible part of the union agenda; ### 4. welcomes the commission’s work on the annual rule of law report; notes , however , that it fails to encompass the areas of democracy and fundamental rights; also notes that the consultation process failed to ensure the protection of human rights defenders or actors contributing thereto , despite repeated calls from civil society organisations; underlines with concern that vulnerable groups continue not seeing their rights fully respected in some member states and are not fully protected from hate and discrimination , in disregard of article 2 teu and article 21 of the charter of fundamental rights of the european union; reiterates the need for a comprehensive monitoring mechanism to assess the respect of all aspects of democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights in all member states , enshrined in a legal act binding parliament , the council and the commission to a transparent and regularised process , with clearly defined responsibilities , so that the protection and promotion of democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights becomes a permanent and visible part of the union agenda;


### 4. welcomes the commission’s work on the annual rule of law report; notes , however , that it fails to encompass the areas of democracy and fundamental rights; reiterates the need for a comprehensive monitoring mechanism enshrined in a legal act binding parliament , the council and the commission to a transparent and regularised process , with clearly defined responsibilities , so that the protection and promotion of union values becomes a permanent and visible part of the union agenda; ### 4. welcomes the commission’s work on the annual rule of law report; notes , however , that it fails to encompass the areas of democracy and fundamental rights; underlines with concern that vulnerable groups , including women , roma and lgbti persons , continue not seeing their rights fully respected in some member states and are not fully protected from hate and discrimination , in disregard of union values as provided for in article 2 teu; reiterates the need for a comprehensive monitoring mechanism enshrined in a legal act binding parliament , the council and the commission to a transparent and regularised process , with clearly defined responsibilities , so that the protection and promotion of union values becomes a permanent and visible part of the union agenda;


### — having regard to the european convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms , the case law of the european court of human rights , the conventions , recommendations , resolutions and reports of the parliamentary assembly , the committee of ministers , the human rights commissioner and the venice commission of the council of europe , ### — having regard to the european convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms , the case law of the european court of human rights , the conventions , recommendations , resolutions and reports of the parliamentary assembly , the committee of ministers , the human rights commissioner , the european commission against racism and intolerance , the recently-formed steering committee on anti-discrimination , diversity and inclusion and the venice commission of the council of europe ,


### b. whereas the preceding decade has seen brazen attacks against union values in several member states; whereas international comparisons and parliament resolutions have evidenced considerable democratic backsliding in hungary and poland in particular; whereas parliament has been calling since 2016 for a comprehensive , preventive and evidence-based monitoring in this field via an eu mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights; ### b. whereas the preceding decade has seen brazen attacks against union values in several member states; whereas equality and non-discrimination are not being guaranteed and the rights of vulnerable groups are particularly disrespected , including women's rights , sexual and reproductive rights , the rights of lgbti people , ethnic and religious minorities , people with disabilities and elderly people; whereas international comparisons and parliament resolutions have evidenced considerable democratic backsliding in hungary and poland in particular; whereas the member states' emergency responses to the covid-19 pandemic have caused an unduly restriction on fundamental rights and have weakened the democratic checks and balances; whereas parliament has been calling since 2016 for a comprehensive , preventive and evidence-based monitoring in this field via an eu mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights;


### c. whereas breaches of the values referred to in article 2 teu weaken the cohesion of the european project , the rights of all union citizens and mutual trust among the member states; ### c. whereas breaches of the values referred to in article 2 teu weaken the rights , freedoms and equality of all union citizens and mutual trust among the member states;


### f. whereas any monitoring mechanism must closely involve stakeholders active in the protection and promotion of democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights , including civil society , council of europe and united nations bodies , the european union agency for fundamental rights , national human rights institutions , national parliaments and local authorities; ### f. whereas any monitoring mechanism must closely involve stakeholders active in the protection and promotion of democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights , including civil society , human rights defenders , council of europe and united nations bodies , the european union agency for fundamental rights , national human rights institutions , national parliaments and local authorities;


### 6. underlines that the annual monitoring cycle must contain country-specific recommendations , with timelines and targets for implementation , to be followed up in subsequent annual or urgent reports; stresses that failures to implement the recommendations must be linked to concrete union enforcement measures; ### 6. underlines that the annual monitoring cycle must contain country-specific recommendations , with timelines and targets for implementation , to be followed up in subsequent annual or urgent reports; stresses that failures to implement the recommendations must be linked to concrete union enforcement measures , in particular expedited infringement procedures and applications for interim measures before the court of justice , as well as budgetary tools;


### 7. points out that the mechanism should consolidate and supersede existing instruments , in particular the annual rule of law report , the commission’s rule of law framework , the council’s rule of law dialogue and the cooperation and verification mechanism (cvm) , while increasing complementarity and coherence with other available tools , including infringement procedures under article 7 teu , budgetary conditionality once in force , and the european semester; is of the opinion that the annual monitoring cycle can fulfil the objectives of the cvm for bulgaria and romania , thus contributing to equal treatment of all member states; considers that the three institutions should use the findings from the annual monitoring cycle in their assessment for the purposes of triggering article 7 teu and regulation (eu) 2020/xxxx of the european parliament and of the council on the protection of the union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the member states11 ; ### 7. points out that the mechanism should consolidate and supersede existing instruments , in particular the annual rule of law report , the commission’s rule of law framework , the council’s rule of law dialogue and the cooperation and verification mechanism (cvm) , provided that all the commitments under the cvm and the concerns raised by the parliament are satisfactorily and comprehensively addressed , in particular in the field of independence of the judiciary , fight against corruption and media freedom , while increasing complementarity and coherence with other available tools , including infringement procedures under article 7 teu and budgetary conditionality once in force; is of the opinion that the annual monitoring cycle can fulfil the objectives of the cvm for bulgaria and romania , thus contributing to equal treatment of all member states; considers that the three institutions should use the findings from the annual monitoring cycle as part of their assessment for the purposes of triggering article 7 teu and regulation (eu) 2020/xxxx of the european parliament and of the council on the protection of the union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the member states11 ;


### 8. recalls the indispensable role played by civil society , national human rights institutions and other relevant actors in all stages of the annual monitoring cycle , from providing input to facilitating implementation; points out that the accreditation status of national human rights institutions and the space for civil society may themselves serve as indicators for assessment purposes; considers that national parliaments must hold public debates and adopt positions on the outcome of the monitoring cycle; ### 8. recalls the indispensable role played by civil society , human rights defenders , equality bodies , national human rights institutions and other relevant actors in all stages of the annual monitoring cycle , from providing input to facilitating implementation and stresses the need to provide protection to reporting actors where necessary , as well as sufficient funding to provide the impartial and expert data that is needed to balance governments’ views; points out that the accreditation status of equality bodies , national human rights institutions and the space for civil society , as well as the protection provided to human rights defenders , may themselves serve as indicators for assessment purposes; considers that national parliaments must hold public debates and adopt positions on the outcome of the monitoring cycle;


### 8. recalls the indispensable role played by civil society , national human rights institutions and other relevant actors in all stages of the annual monitoring cycle , from providing input to facilitating implementation; points out that the accreditation status of national human rights institutions and the space for civil society may themselves serve as indicators for assessment purposes; considers that national parliaments must hold public debates and adopt positions on the outcome of the monitoring cycle; ### 8. recalls the indispensable role played by civil society , equality bodies and national human rights institutions and other relevant actors in all stages of the annual monitoring cycle , from providing input to facilitating implementation; points out that the accreditation status of equality bodies , national human rights institutions and the space for civil society , as well as the protection provided to human rights defenders , may themselves serve as indicators for assessment purposes; considers that national parliaments must hold public debates and adopt positions on the outcome of the monitoring cycle;


### 9. reaffirms the role of parliament , in accordance with article 7 teu , in monitoring compliance with union values; reiterates the call for parliament to be present in article 7 hearings when it is parliament that initiated the procedure; believes that the mechanism , underpinned by an interinstitutional agreement , will provide the necessary framework for better coordination; ### 9. reaffirms the role of parliament , in accordance with article 7 teu , in monitoring compliance with union values; reiterates the call for parliament to be present in article 7 hearings when it is parliament that initiated the procedure; calls on the council to keep parliament regularly informed and closely involved and to work in a transparent manner , to allow for meaningful participation and oversight by all european institutions and bodies and by civil society organisations; believes that the mechanism , underpinned by an interinstitutional agreement , will provide a framework for better coordination;


### 10. is of the view that , in the long-term , strengthening the union’s ability to promote and defend its constitutional core will require treaty change; looks forward to the reflection and conclusions of the conference on the future of europe in that regard; ### 10. is of the view that , in the long-term , strengthening the union’s ability to promote and defend democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights will require treaty change; looks forward to the reflection and conclusions of the conference on the future of europe in that regard;


### 11. strongly believes that addressing the crisis of union values , including through the proposed mechanism , is a precondition for re-establishing mutual trust among member states , thus enabling the union as a whole to sustain and further all common policies; ### 11. strongly believes that addressing the crisis of democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights , including through the proposed mechanism , is a precondition for re-establishing mutual trust among member states , thus enabling the union as a whole to sustain and further all common policies;


### 11. believes that addressing persisting gender and cultural gaps in the composition and structure of member states’ judicial systems is necessary to enhance their quality , effectiveness and independence. ### 11. believes that addressing persisting gender and cultural gaps in the composition and structure of member states’ judicial systems is necessary to enhance their quality , impartiality , effectiveness and independence.


### 11. believes that addressing persisting gender and cultural gaps in the composition and structure of member states’ judicial systems is necessary to enhance their quality , effectiveness and independence. ### 11. believes that addressing persisting gender and cultural gaps in the composition and structure of member states’ judicial systems is necessary to enhance their quality , effectiveness and independence.


### proposal for an interinstitutional agreement on reinforcing union values ### proposal for an interinstitutional agreement on reinforcing democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights in the union


### c. whereas by improving transparency and accountability in the context of the discharge procedure , the democratic legitimacy of the union institutions is further strengthened; ### c. whereas transparency and accountability are key elements in the context of the discharge procedure in order to guarantee democratic legitimacy of the union institutions vis-à-vis union citizens


### 6. recognises a slight reduction in the carry-over rate , amounting to 9 ,8 % , from 2019 to 2020 (as compared to a carry-over of 10 ,7 % from 2018 to 2019 and 11 ,5 % from 2017 to 2018); reminds the council of the need to strengthen its efforts to avoid budget over-estimates; ### 6. recognises a slight reduction in the carry-over rate , amounting to 9 ,8 % , from 2019 to 2020 (as compared to a carry-over of 10 ,7 % from 2018 to 2019 and 11 ,5 % from 2017 to 2018); reminds the council of the need to strengthen its efforts to avoid budget over-estimates , reminding that carry-overs are exceptions to the principle of annuality and should reflect actual needs;


### 14. regrets that reporting by the council on measures taken to improve legislative transparency remains less than completely satisfactory and reiterates its call on the council to step up its transparency efforts by , inter alia , publishing council working documents in a machine-readable format , by recording and publishing member states’ positions and making available more trilogue documents; ### 14. regrets that reporting by the council on measures taken to improve legislative transparency remains less than completely satisfactory and reiterates its call on the council to step up its transparency efforts by , inter alia , publishing council working documents in a machine-readable format , by recording and publishing member states’ positions and making available more trilogue documents; strongly regrets that the council has not joined the transparency register scheme and calls on the council to refuse meetings with unregistered lobbies;


### 20. emphasises parliament's prerogative to grant discharge pursuant to articles 316 , 317 and 319 tfeu , in line with current interpretation and practice , namely to grant discharge in respect of each separate heading of the budget in order to maintain transparency and democratic accountability towards union taxpayers; ### 20. emphasises parliament's prerogative to grant discharge pursuant to articles 316 , 317 and 319 tfeu , in line with current interpretation and practice , namely to grant discharge in respect of each separate heading of the budget in order to maintain transparency and democratic accountability towards union taxpayers; recalls that parliament exercises its prerogatives in the discharge procedures towards all union institutions , bodies , offices and agencies and regrets that the council is the only one refusing to engage in loyal cooperation in respect of the respective prerogatives and roles;


### 21. considers that the lack of cooperation of the european council and the council with the discharge authority sends a negative signal to the citizens of the union; ### 21. considers that the lack of cooperation of the european council and the council with the discharge authority not only sends a negative signal to the citizens of the union but also expresses a lack of respect for parliament's role as guarantor of the transparency and democratic accountability of the union budget;


### 2. stresses that the sanitary crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic has revealed that its rules of procedure did not provide for all appropriate measures in order to facilitate the functioning of parliament in extraordinary circumstances; ### 2. stresses that the sanitary crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic has revealed that its rules of procedure require more developed procedures in order to ensure the unlimited functioning of parliament in different types of extraordinary circumstances;


### 3. takes note of the temporary measures adopted by its president and its governing bodies in order to cope with such extraordinary circumstances; underlines that those measures were needed to guarantee the continuity of parliament’s business , allowing parliament to carry out its legislative , budgetary and political control functions during the crisis; ### 3. underlines the importance of the temporary measures adopted , in compliance with the rule of law , by its president and its governing bodies in the current sanitary crisis , in order to cope with such extraordinary circumstances; stresses that there were no alternatives to those measures in order to guarantee the continuity of parliament’s business as required by the treaties , and that they allowed parliament to carry out its legislative , budgetary and political control functions during the crisis in accordance with the procedures provided for by the treaties;


### 4. recognises that those temporary measures were fully justified and ensured the validity of all votes taken during their period of application; ### 4. stresses that those temporary measures were fully justified and that they ensured the validity of all votes taken during their period of application;


### — having regard to rule 54 of its rules of procedure , ### — having regard to its rules of procedure , and in particular rule 54 thereof ,


### a. whereas the 2019 european elections registered the highest turnout of the any elections to the european parliament in the last 20 years , with 50.2 % , ( an increase of eight percentage points compared to 2014) , sending a positive signal that european citizens believe that many of their concerns can be addressed at eu level; ### a. whereas the 2019 european elections registered the highest turnout of the any elections to the european parliament in the last 20 years , with 50.2 % , (an increase of eight percentage points compared to 2014) , sending a positive signal that european citizens believe that many of their concerns can be addressed at eu level; whereas an election in which half the citizens voted is not satisfactory; whereas , moreover , that figure masks wide disparities between the member states; whereas only 18% of those surveyed thought their vote could 'change things'1 a; whereas , therefore , a higher turnout should not be the only criterion taken into account; whereas the election also reflects the disillusionment of part of the population with the european integration process and current eu policies;


### b. whereas the higher turnout was in part due to the increased participation of young people; ### b. whereas the higher turnout was in part due to the increased participation of young people , although people in the over-40 age group are still much more likely to vote; whereas more than 50% of young people vote out of a sense of civic duty and in response to the climate emergency1 a;


### c. whereas the higher turnout was ultimately linked to gains by eurosceptics , which should be considered as a warning for european integration , especially in several founding member states where far-right extremists and anti-european forces won the elections; ### c. whereas the higher turnout was ultimately linked to gains by eurosceptics , which should be considered as a warning for european integration , especially in several founding member states where the far right won the elections;


### d. whereas the higher turnout is also a sign that eu citizens want the eu to act swiftly and effectively on important matters such as climate change , migration , protection of fundamental rights and democratisation; ### d. whereas the higher turnout is also a sign that eu citizens want the eu to act swiftly , democratically and effectively on important matters such as social dumping , climate change , migration , protection of fundamental rights and democratisation;


### e. whereas gender equality among members of the european parliament has improved (41 % women in 2019 , up from 37 % in 2014); ### e. whereas gender equality among members of the european parliament has improved (41 % women in 2019 , up from 37 % in 2014); whereas this figure masks significant differences between member states and the many challenges still to be overcome if gender parity is to be achieved , including in parliament's committees; whereas only a few member states make it a requirement for political parties to have gender-balanced lists in which men and women alternate;


### f. whereas 15 member states still restrict voting rights for people with disabilities , thus preventing the meaningful participation and representation of these citizens in democratic processes; ### f. whereas 15 member states still restrict voting rights for people with disabilities , thus preventing the meaningful participation and representation of these citizens in democratic processes; whereas it is important to guarantee the right to vote in law and in practice; whereas , according to the eesc , by virtue of the laws in force in their countries some 800 000 eu citizens in 16 member states are denied the right to vote on the grounds of disability or mental health problems; whereas many people with disabilities want to vote at a polling station even if other voting arrangements more suited to their circumstances are available; whereas in 12 member states national rules do not make it possible to switch from the polling station assigned on the basis of place of residence to another which is more suitable in the light of a voter's disability; whereas , lastly , article 29 of the uncrpd explicitly stipulates that the states parties undertake to ensure that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an equal basis with others , directly or through freely chosen representatives;


### i. whereas the outcome of the 2019 european elections fragmented political representation in parliament , leading to increased complexity in the decision-making process; ### i. whereas the outcome of the 2019 european elections fragmented political representation in parliament , leading to increased democracy , parliamentary dialogue and more meaningful negotiations , putting an end to the duopoly enjoyed by the two largest groups;


### i. whereas the outcome of the 2019 european elections fragmented political representation in parliament , leading to increased complexity in the decision-making process; ### i. whereas the outcome of the 2019 european elections fragmented political representation in parliament;


### k. whereas the spitzenkandidaten process has yet to be fully developed; whereas it lacks , among other things , the possibility for spitzenkandidaten to stand as official candidates in all member states on transnational lists , allowing all european voters to choose and vote for their preferred spitzenkandidat; whereas parliament raised this issue in its decision of 7 february 2018 on the revision of the framework agreement on relations between the european parliament and the european commission15 ; ### k. whereas the spitzenkandidaten process has to be fully reformed; whereas it lacks , among other things , the possibility for spitzenkandidaten to stand as official candidates in all member states on transnational lists , allowing all european voters to choose and vote for their preferred spitzenkandidat; whereas the spitzenkandidaten system and transnational lists should be open to coalitions of european political parties or movements , representing at least a quarter of member states , or even to mixed coalitions of political parties and movements as long as they share a common political programme and a common spitzenkandidat; whereas parliament raised this issue in its decision of 7 february 2018 on the revision of the framework agreement on relations between the european parliament and the european commission15 ;


### k. whereas the spitzenkandidaten process has yet to be fully developed; whereas it lacks , among other things , the possibility for spitzenkandidaten to stand as official candidates in all member states on transnational lists , allowing all european voters to choose and vote for their preferred spitzenkandidat; whereas parliament raised this issue in its decision of 7 february 2018 on the revision of the framework agreement on relations between the european parliament and the european commission15; ### k. whereas the spitzenkandidaten process has yet to be fully developed; whereas it lacks , among other things , the possibility for spitzenkandidaten to stand as official candidates in all member states on transnational lists , even if they do not belong to a european political party , but are supported by a grouping of parties or movements representing at least one-quarter of the member states , allowing all european voters to choose and vote for their preferred spitzenkandidat; whereas parliament raised this issue in its decision of 7 february 2018 on the revision of the framework agreement on relations between the european parliament and the european commission15;


### l. whereas the spitzenkandidaten system needs to be improved and formalised in the eu’s primary law after an in-depth institutional reflection; whereas this reflection should also include the de facto political role of the commission and its president and any related changes to the decision-making process of the union; ### l. whereas the spitzenkandidaten system needs to be overhauled and formalised in the eu treaties after an in-depth institutional reflection as part of the conference on the future of europe; whereas this reflection should also include the de facto political role of the commission and its president and the need for them to be accountable to voters and the european parliament and any related changes to the decision-making process of the union;


### m. whereas institutional improvements such as transnational lists , as acknowledged by parliament in its resolution of 7 february 2018 on the composition of the european parliament , or the transformation of the council into a second legislative chamber of the union , as proposed in its resolution of 16 february 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the european union , would radically transform the european elections into one true european election , as opposed to the collection of 27 separate national elections that it is today; ### m. whereas institutional improvements such as transnational lists , as acknowledged by parliament in its resolution of 7 february 2018 on the composition of the european parliament , or the transformation of the council into a second legislative chamber of the union , as proposed in its resolution of 16 february 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the european union , could radically transform the european elections into a key event , preceded by real debates and the presentation of contrasting visions for the future of the european integration process;


### n. whereas the intensified political exchanges in parliament have also highlighted the shortcomings of several standing procedures such as the hearings of commissioners-designate , with particular regard to the conditions for the legal assessment of their applications (e.g. declarations of financial interests); ### n. whereas the intensified political exchanges in parliament have also highlighted the shortcomings of several standing procedures such as the hearings of commissioners-designate , with particular regard to the conditions for the legal assessment of their applications (e.g. declarations of financial interests); whereas the college of commissioners should be appointed by means of an exemplary process , in keeping with the undertaking given in article 17 of the treaty on european union; whereas the current procedure for scrutinising the financial interests of commissioners-designate , which is carried out by the committee on legal affairs (juri) , makes it impossible to honour that undertaking; whereas in her mission letter commissioner jourova undertook to work with the european parliament and the council to set up an independent ethics watchdog for all the eu institutions; whereas the ethics watchdog must be set up in such a way as to provide sufficient guarantees of independence , starting with provision of the time and resources needed to exercise scrutiny , in keeping with the best practices employed in the member states;


### p. whereas the commission’s requests to social media platforms ahead of the elections created confusion and had unintended consequences such as the ban on europe-wide political advertisements , which is the only way for european political parties to advertise during european election campaigns; whereas especially on that matter , the institutions should develop an interinstitutional approach in order to have a positive impact on the security and stability of the electoral process; ### p. whereas the commission’s requests to social media platforms ahead of the elections created confusion and had unintended consequences such as the ban on europe-wide political advertisements , which is one of the ways for european political parties to advertise during european election campaigns; whereas especially on that matter , the institutions should develop an interinstitutional approach in order to have a positive impact on the security and stability of the electoral process;


### q. whereas european political parties and foundations are the primary facilitators of a successful european political debate , both during and beyond european elections; ### q. whereas european political parties and foundations are facilitators of a successful european political debate , both during and beyond european elections;


### 1. takes note of the higher turnout in the 2019 european elections; considers that this shows that an increasing proportion of citizens consider the eu to be the appropriate level at which to address the challenges of our time such as climate change and environmental concerns , social and gender inequalities , sustainable growth , and geopolitical concerns such as migration and foreign policy; urges all the european institutions , therefore , to take responsibility and to act upon the mandate they have been given , directly or indirectly , by the citizens; regrets both the lack of decisiveness by the council and the lack of clear intent to achieve solutions based on a common approach; ### 1. takes note of the higher turnout in the 2019 european elections; notes that there are significant disparities between member states; considers that this shows that an increasing proportion of citizens consider that the eu must address the challenges of our time and amend its treaties in order to tackle those challenges , such as climate change and environmental concerns , social and gender inequalities , sustainable growth , and geopolitical concerns such as migration and foreign policy; urges all the european institutions , therefore , to take responsibility and to act upon the mandate they have been given , directly or indirectly , by the citizens; regrets both the lack of decisiveness and transparency by the council and the lack of clear intent to achieve solutions based on a common approach;


### 2. welcomes the substantial increase of youth participation in the elections; reiterates its call on the council and the commission to take into account their concerns , which are critical for the lives of the next generations; ### 2. welcomes the substantial increase of youth participation in the elections; reiterates its call on the council and the commission to take into account their concerns , which are critical for the lives of the next generations , by means of public consultation procedures and the conference on the future of europe; calls for lots to be drawn in the young persons' agora to be held as part of the conference and for proper account to be taken of the results;


### 3. deplores the fact that the outcome of the elections did not lead to genuine gender balance in parliament; calls on the commission , in cooperation with parliament and other bodies such as the venice commission , to formulate recommendations to member states with a view to increasing the representation of women in the european parliament; ### 3. deplores the fact that the outcome of the elections did not lead to genuine gender balance in parliament; calls on the commission , in cooperation with parliament and other bodies such as the venice commission , to formulate recommendations to member states with a view to increasing the representation of women in the european parliament; calls on the member states to consider incorporating into their national electoral law a general requirement for political parties to have fully gender-balanced lists of candidates in which men and women alternate; calls , further , on those member states which have a preferential vote system to propose a preferential vote for an even number of candidates in order to guarantee parity;


### 5. is of the opinion that the reason why the spitzenkandidaten process failed to produce a president of the european commission after the 2019 elections is because no improvements were made to it following the experience of 2014; intends to strengthen the democratic process for choosing the commission president before the next european elections of 2024; ### 5. is of the opinion that the reason why the spitzenkandidaten process failed to produce a president of the european commission after the 2019 elections is because no improvements were made to it following the experience of 2014 stemming from the rejection by the european council; intends to strengthen the democratic process for choosing the commission president before the next european elections of 2024;


### 7. stresses that the election of the commission president depends on a majority of parliament’s members , which de facto requires the formation of a coalition; recommends that the election procedure be reversed so that parliament proposes and elects the president of the commission , after obtaining the consent of the european council; ### 7. stresses that the election of the commission president depends on a majority of parliament’s members , which de facto requires the formation of a coalition; recommends that article 17(1) of the treaty on european union be modified to reverse the election procedure so that parliament proposes and elects the president of the commission , after obtaining the consent of the european council;


### 8. considers that the outcome of the european elections has reinforced the political dimension of the election of the european commission , and therefore the need for more accurate and objective scrutiny of the declarations of interests of the commissioners-designate; calls for the creation of an independent body , endowed with the appropriate means , to have this scrutiny included in its responsibilities; ### 8. considers that the outcome of the european elections has reinforced the political dimension of the election of the european commission , and therefore the need for more accurate and objective scrutiny of the declarations of interests of the commissioners-designate; calls for the creation of an independent body , endowed with the appropriate investigative resources and sufficient time , to have this mandatory scrutiny included in its responsibilities , drawing on the best practices employed in the member states;


### 9. regrets that the attribution of portfolios in the commission follows solely a logic where national interests take priority over the european common interest; ### 9. regrets that the attribution of portfolios in the commission follows solely a logic where deals between the largest political parties take priority over the european common interest;


### 11. believes that granting european voters a second vote for transnational lists in a joint european constituency , drawn up by european political parties and movements , would elevate the european elections above purely national campaigns based on national interests , particularly if such lists were headed by the respective spitzenkandidaten; ### 11. believes that granting european voters a second vote for transnational lists in a joint european constituency , drawn up by european political parties and movements , would enhance democratic debate and the significance of the election , particularly if such lists were headed by the respective spitzenkandidaten;


### 12. points out that the proposed changes to the eu’s primary law within this report , which reflect the increased political role of the commission within the eu framework , should also include the individual and collective responsibility of the commission towards parliament and the council , as well as the transformation of the council into a second legislative chamber of the union; ### 12. points out that the proposed changes to the eu treaties within this report , which reflect the increased political role of the commission within the eu framework , should also include the individual and collective responsibility of the commission towards parliament and the council , as well as the transformation of the council into a second legislative chamber of the union;


### 14. takes note of the efforts by the commission and other institutions to tackle foreign interference during the electoral campaign; points out , nevertheless , that the financial and human resources needed to counter these attacks on european democracy , including at national level , are many times superior to the combined designated european resources; urges the commission and the member states to raise significantly the financing they make available for the fight against foreign interference; ### 14. takes note of the efforts by the commission and other institutions to tackle foreign interference during the electoral campaign; points out , nevertheless , that the financial and human resources needed to counter these attacks on european democracy , including at national level , are many times superior to the combined designated european resources; urges the commission and the member states to raise significantly the financing they make available to their national authorities for the fight against foreign interference; stresses that priority must be given to improving the education children receive from a young age in media use and civics , in society as a whole and in schools , in order to develop people's ability to think critically and identify unsubstantiated information and links to verifiable information;


### 15. urges the commission and the council to consider , in accordance with the work of parliament’s special committee on foreign interference and disinformation , the urgent creation of a european organisation dedicated to the fight against foreign interference; encourages the commission and the council to work much more closely with parliament on these matters , as the protection of our democratic institutions is a core competence of the european parliament; ### 15. urges the commission and the council to consider , in accordance with the work of parliament’s special committee on foreign interference and disinformation , the urgent creation of a european organisation dedicated to the fight against foreign interference; encourages the commission and the council to work much more closely with parliament on these matters , as the protection of our democratic institutions is a core competence of the european parliament; emphasises that setting up eu agencies to address every new problem which arises is not a panacea and that in this instance urging gafam to introduce safeguards , for example in the form of transparency labels , would be much more effective;


### 18. considers that the outcome of the european elections is a clear signal for an in-depth institutional reflection that will allow citizens , civil society and their representatives to shape the future of the union; calls , therefore , on all institutional partners to assume their responsibility and deliver an ambitious conference on the future of europe; ### 18. considers that the outcome of the european elections is a clear signal for an in-depth institutional reflection that will allow citizens , civil society and their representatives , through national democratic consultation processes , to shape the future of the union; calls , therefore , on all institutional partners to assume their responsibility and deliver an ambitious conference on the future of europe and leave open all options for addressing the crucial challenges facing the eu , such as social dumping , inequality and climate change;


### 7. recalls its revised rules of procedure according to which members are invited to adopt the systematic practice of only meeting interest representatives that have registered in the transparency register; also recalls that members are invited to publish online all scheduled meetings with interest representatives falling under the scope of the transparency register , while rapporteurs , shadow rapporteurs and committee chairs are obliged , for each report , to publish online all scheduled meetings with interest representatives falling under the scope of the transparency register; ### 7. recalls its revised rules of procedure according to which members are invited to adopt the systematic practice of only meeting interest representatives that have registered in the transparency register; regrets that members are not required to publish online all scheduled meetings with interest representatives falling under the scope of the transparency register and calls upon the parliament to make it mandatory for each member to publish their meetings; welcomes that rapporteurs , shadow rapporteurs and committee chairs are obliged , for each report , to publish online all scheduled meetings with interest representatives falling under the scope of the transparency register;


### 14. recalls that the revision of regulation (ec) no 1049/2001 has been blocked since 2012 , and takes note of the commission’s intention to withdraw this proposal; ### 14. recalls that the revision of regulation (ec) no 1049/2001 has been blocked since 2012 , and regrets the commission’s intention to withdraw this proposal; urges all the involved parties to unblock and continue the work on the revision;


### 18. takes note of the fact that parliament has seen a significant increase in applications requesting public access to the multi-column documents discussed in trilogue meetings following the judgment of the general court in the de capitani case5 , and notes with satisfaction that since the judgment , parliament has disclosed all the multi-column documents to which access was requested under regulation (ec) no 1049/2001; ### 18. takes note of the fact that parliament has seen a significant increase in applications requesting public access to the multi-column documents discussed in trilogue meetings following the judgment of the general court in the de capitani case5 , and notes with satisfaction that since the judgment , parliament has disclosed all the multi-column documents to which access was requested under regulation (ec) no 1049/2001; welcomes this fact since the openness of the legislative process contributes to conferring greater legitimacy on the institutions in the eyes of eu citizens;


### 19. underlines that the court ruling in the de capitani case in march 2018 states that the institutions’ views reflected in the ‘four-column’ documents did not fall under a general presumption of non-disclosure; notes that the sensitive nature of the subject matter reflected in the trilogue documents was not in itself considered to constitute sufficient grounds for refusing access to the public; ### 19. underlines that the court ruling in the de capitani case in march 2018 states that the institutions’ views reflected in the ‘four-column’ documents did not fall under a general presumption of non-disclosure; notes that the sensitive nature of the subject matter reflected in the trilogue documents was not in itself considered to constitute sufficient grounds for refusing access to the public; notes that access to documents relating to ongoing trilogues must in principle be granted on specific request , unless the institution proves that it is reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical that full access to the documents at issue is likely to undermine , specifically and actually , the decision-making process;


### a. whereas according to article 42(2) of the teu , the common security and defence policy (csdp) includes the progressive framing of a common eu defence policy , which could lead to common defence being put in place; ### a. whereas according to article 42(2) of the teu , the common security and defence policy (csdp) includes the progressive framing of a common eu defence policy , which could lead to common defence being put in place , but does not require such a common eu defence policy;


### c. whereas article 1(b) of protocol 10 states that the member states are to ‘have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups , targeted combat units for the missions planned , structured at a tactical level as a battle group , with support elements including transport and logistics , capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in article 43 of the treaty on european union , within a period of five to 30 days , in particular in response to requests from the united nations organisation , and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 days’; whereas article 1(b) needs to be revised in order to respond to the challenging geopolitical environment; whereas the member states are still far from achieving this goal; ### c. whereas article 1(b) of protocol 10 states that the member states are to ‘have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups , targeted combat units for the missions planned , structured at a tactical level as a battle group , with support elements including transport and logistics , capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in article 43 of the treaty on european union , within a period of five to 30 days , in particular in response to requests from the united nations organisation , and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 days’; whereas the battlegroups have never been deployed since their establishment in 2007 , owing to opposition on the part of member states and the complexity of their implementation and funding , which is at odds with the original objective of speed and efficiency;


### d. whereas the three-fold level of ambition under the eu global strategy in the field of security and defence covers securing external borders , countering hybrid threats and fighting against terrorism; whereas no member state can protect itself alone , since security and defence threats faced by the eu , and which are targeted against its citizens and territory , are a joint threat and cannot be addressed by one single member state on its own; whereas an effective eu system for addressing burden-sharing would be advantageous for the eu’s overall level of security and defence; ### deleted


### f. whereas pesco’s long-term vision is to achieve a coherent full-spectrum force package available to the member states; whereas pesco should enhance the eu’s capacity to act as an international security provider in order to protect eu citizens and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending; whereas the cost of non-europe in security and defence is estimated to be more than eur 100 billion per year; ### f. whereas pesco’s long-term vision is to achieve a coherent full-spectrum force package available to the member states;


### f. whereas pesco’s long-term vision is to achieve a coherent full-spectrum force package available to the member states; whereas pesco should enhance the eu’s capacity to act as an international security provider in order to protect eu citizens and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending; whereas the cost of non-europe in security and defence is estimated to be more than eur 100 billion per year; ### f. whereas pesco’s long-term vision is to deliver better interoperability and to achieve a coherent full-spectrum force package available to the member states , and whereas pesco should enhance the eu’s capacity to act as an international security provider in order to protect eu citizens and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending; whereas the cost of non-europe in security and defence is estimated to be more than eur 100 billion per year;


### g. whereas the covid-19 pandemic has shown the consequences of the eu not having enough competence when it comes to health care; whereas , by the same analogy , it would make sense to establish an eu common defence strategy in order to be able to respond to an attack on the eu’s borders and territories; whereas pesco constitutes an important step towards achieving the objective of a common defence; ### g. whereas the covid-19 pandemic has shown the need for the eu to urgently focus on resourcing and supporting health systems across the bloc which have been undermined by years of neoliberal policy;


### g. whereas the covid-19 pandemic has shown the consequences of the eu not having enough competence when it comes to health care; whereas , by the same analogy , it would make sense to establish an eu common defence strategy in order to be able to respond to an attack on the eu’s borders and territories; whereas pesco constitutes an important step towards achieving the objective of a common defence; ### g. whereas the covid-19 pandemic has shown the consequences of austerity policies and of the eu not having enough competence when it comes to health care; whereas , by the same analogy , it would make sense to establish an eu common defence strategy in order to be able to respond to an attack on the eu’s borders and territories; whereas pesco constitutes an important step towards achieving the objective of a common defence;


### h. whereas according to council decision 2017/2315 , establishing pesco enhanced defence capabilities of the member states will also benefit nato , while strengthening the european pillar within the alliance and responding to repeated calls for stronger transatlantic burden-sharing; ### deleted


### h. whereas according to council decision 2017/2315 , establishing pesco enhanced defence capabilities of the member states will also benefit nato , while strengthening the european pillar within the alliance and responding to repeated calls for stronger transatlantic burden-sharing; ### h. whereas establishing pesco in order to enhance the defence capabilities of the member states disregards the eu’s outmoded alignment with nato;


### i. whereas pesco creates a binding framework between the pms , which committed themselves to jointly investing , planning , developing and operating defence capabilities within union framework in a permanent and structured manner by subscribing to 20 binding commitments in five areas set by the teu; whereas these commitments should constitute a move from mere defence cooperation towards the integration of member states’ defence forces; whereas despite these binding commitments , no effective compliance mechanism for pesco is in place; ### i. whereas pesco creates a binding framework between the pms , which committed themselves to jointly investing , planning , developing and operating defence capabilities within union framework in a permanent and structured manner by subscribing to 20 binding commitments in five areas set by the teu; whereas the commitments under the pesco framework will further militarise the eu; whereas the enthusiasm of many pms for pesco is limited , as exemplified by the lack of progress to date in significantly embedding pesco into national defence planning processes;


### j. whereas the pms do not pay enough attention to the 20 binding commitments to which they have subscribed , and not enough progress has been achieved with regard to significantly embedding pesco into national defence planning processes; ### deleted


### k. whereas pesco was originally conceived as an avant-garde , comprising the member states willing and able to upgrade their cooperation in defence to a new level of ambition; whereas the fact that there are 25 pms means that pesco is at risk of being constrained by the ‘lowest common denominator’ approach; ### deleted


### l. whereas work on the first three waves of pesco projects has led to the pms proposing 47 projects; whereas the current list of projects lacks coherence , strategic ambition and does not adequately address priority shortfalls as identified by the pms; whereas one of these projects has been stopped in order to avoid unnecessary duplication; whereas other projects did not make sufficient progress or are at risk of being stopped , and around 30 projects are still in the ideation and preparatory phase; ### l. whereas work on the first three waves of pesco projects has led to the pms proposing 47 projects; whereas the current list of projects lacks coherence; whereas one of these projects has been stopped in order to avoid unnecessary duplication; whereas other projects did not make much progress or are at risk of being stopped , and around 30 projects are still in the ideation and preparatory phase;


### m. whereas only the most strategic pesco projects , such as eufor crisis response operation core (eufor croc) have the potential to decisively contribute to the creation of a coherent full spectrum force package; ### m. whereas the most far-reaching pesco projects , such as eufor crisis response operation core (eufor croc) , have been driven by certain member states , and whereas many other member states have serious doubts about the desirability of both the pesco project and the goal of creating a european army;


### n. whereas major european defence projects such as the future air combat system (fcas) and the main ground combat system (mgcs) currently remain outside the scope of pesco; whereas their integration within the remit of pesco would provide for sufficient strategic focus; ### deleted


### o. whereas it is crucial to fill the capability gaps identified in the capability development plan (cdp) , and by the coordinated annual defence on review (card); ### deleted


### p. whereas only some of the current pesco projects do sufficiently address the most obvious capability gaps or already sufficiently take into account high impact capacity goals (hicg) deriving from the capability development plan (cdp) , and should be considered as a priority; ### deleted


### q. whereas the consistency between pesco , card , national implementation plans (nips) and the cdp has to be further improved; ### deleted


### r. whereas the nato defence planning process (ndpp) drives defence national planning processes in most cases; ### deleted


### r. whereas the nato defence planning process (ndpp) drives defence national planning processes in most cases; ### r. whereas , regrettably , the nato defence planning process (ndpp) all too often drives defence national planning processes;


### s. whereas interactions between member states’ national priorities , eu priorities and nato priorities should be synchronised at the earliest possible convenience; whereas pesco can be an effective tool in order to achieve eu and nato targets simultaneously; ### deleted


### s. whereas interactions between member states’ national priorities , eu priorities and nato priorities should be synchronised at the earliest possible convenience; whereas pesco can be an effective tool in order to achieve eu and nato targets simultaneously; ### s. whereas the eu should act as an autonomous power on the international stage; whereas pesco should enable the eu to extricate itself from nato;


### t. whereas in conjunction with the eu global strategy , a specific defence and security strategy , such as the eu security and defence white book suggested in numerous parliament reports , could facilitate a shared understanding of current and future challenges and provide important guidance to pesco and the cdp deriving from an understanding of strategic ambitions and actions to be taken in the long run; ### t. whereas in conjunction with the eu global strategy , a specific defence and security strategy , such as the eu security and defence white book suggested in numerous parliament reports , will face resistance from member states suspicious of further defence integration;


### u. whereas currently , pesco projects are dependent on the 25 participating member states’ financial contributions; whereas it is expected that , as a result of the covid-19 pandemic , national defence budgets will suffer reductions; whereas paradoxically , several of the currently 47 pesco projects , if funded accordingly , could strengthen member states’ preparedness , should another massive public health crisis occur: military mobility – a flagship pesco project – , the european medical command and many other projects in areas related to logistics and transportation , health care , disaster relief and the fight against malicious cyber activities; whereas cutting funding for the strategic capabilities that the eu and its member states currently lack would also weaken their ability to jointly act against future pandemics; ### u. whereas currently , pesco projects are dependent on the 25 participating member states’ financial contributions; whereas it is expected that , as a result of the covid-19 pandemic , national defence budgets will , rightly , suffer reductions as public funds are directed to where they are needed; whereas a joint and coordinated approach to a second wave or to future pandemics will not be best achieved through defence strategy , projects or funding;


### v. whereas the prospect of co-financing certain pesco projects via the future european defence fund (edf) has led pms to multiply their proposals , and despite the fact that this has encouraged exchanges and cooperation , not all proposals necessarily have the eu’s best strategic interest in mind; ### v. whereas the prospect of co-financing certain pesco projects via the future european defence fund (edf) has led pms to multiply their proposals , and not all proposals necessarily have the eu’s best strategic interest in mind; whereas this is evidence that many pms are already chafing against the pesco straitjacket;


### w. whereas the participation of third countries in individual pesco projects might be in the strategic interest of the european union , particularly in case of the united kingdom; ### deleted


### x. whereas , with regard to the current role of the political and security committee (psc) in the context of pesco and capability development , parliament has already requested that ‘the mandate of the psc referred to in article 38 teu needs to be interpreted narrowly’; ### deleted


### y. whereas the governance of pesco is led by pms , and therefore eventually leads to the insufficient coordination and overall consistency of the projects; whereas this should constitute grounds for the extension of the mandate of the pesco secretariat; ### y. whereas the governance of pesco is led by pms , and therefore eventually leads to the insufficient coordination and overall consistency of the projects; whereas this should constitute grounds for questioning the wisdom and utility of the entire project;


### define the union’s strategic vision , by , inter alia , implementing the level of ambition defined by the 2016 eu global strategy in the ongoing work of the strategic compass and , strengthen pesco’s operational dimension; ### deleted


### prepare , on the basis of the results of the discussion on the strategic compass , a fully-fledged eu security and defence white book; ### deleted


### encourage the pms to switch from a strictly national focus on defence to a european one and to undertake structured efforts to increase the use of european collaborative approach as a priority , as no individual pms alone has the potential to address identified capacity shortfalls; ### deleted


### encourage the pms to switch from a strictly national focus on defence to a european one and to undertake structured efforts to increase the use of european collaborative approach as a priority , as no individual pms alone has the potential to address identified capacity shortfalls; ### encourage the pms to link their national focus on defence to a european one and to undertake structured efforts to increase the use of european collaborative approach , as no individual pms alone has the potential to address identified capacity shortfalls;


### maintain the eu’s budgetary ambition for the strengthening of defence capabilities , notably thought the sufficient financing of edf in the upcoming mff; ### deleted


### ensure that pesco is effectively used as an instrument to reach eu defence integration as a common goal , in line with the ambition for greater eu strategic autonomy; ### deleted


### ensure that the funding of pesco projects by the edf is focused on a limited set of strategic key projects , in line with the hcig of the cdp , in order to maximise its impact; ### deleted


### ensure that pesco is treated as a union institutions sui generis , as is the case with the european external action service (eeas) , which would require amending the financial regulation8 in order to include pesco , with a specific section in the union budget; recognise that parliament , jointly with the council , exercises legislative and budgetary functions , as well as functions of political control and consultation as laid down in the treaties; ### deleted


### incorporate directly into the pesco project cycle the link between pesco and edidp/edf; impose the documentation of each project , before selection on the budgetary side; ### deleted


### focus pesco efforts on projects with a strategic and integrative dimension , such as eufor croc , and link those to other pesco projects in order to create additional synergies and effects of scale; ### deleted


### ensure that future key land , sea , air and other platforms for the armed forces of the member states are brought under pesco or are at least closely connected to it; ### deleted


### consider , as part of the reform of the eu battlegroup system , to bring it under pesco in order to increase its operational capacity , modularity and agility; ### deleted


### group pesco projects into capability clusters and make a distinction between strategically relevant and other projects; ### deleted


### promote compliance with the 20 pesco commitments by establishing clearer definition of compliance benchmarks , and by ensuring that future project proposals must address a specific cdp priority; ensure that any reviews of project progress should be based on clear and transparent criteria; ensure that such criteria serve as benchmark for all member states participating in pesco projects; ### deleted


### use the synergies between the pesco project cycle and other defence capability processes such as card , hlg and edf in order to enable more mature and well-documented projects to be submitted; allow projects to be submitted outside the cycle in order to enable the synchronised implementation of several european initiatives , including the edf; ### deleted


### consider giving cdp a more binding character; ### deleted


### define an effective and strong project steering committee , reaffirm the central role of the pesco secretariat as a single point of contact for all projects and invite the secretariat to carry out regular situation points on the progress of projects for the benefit of all the stakeholders , including parliament , via information collected member state(s) in charge of project coordination; ### deleted


### clarify the role of the political and security committee in the pesco process , which is not provided for by the teu , and ensure , in this context , the central role played by the european union military committee (eumc) in the provision of ad hoc military advice to the vice-president of the commission / high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy; ### deleted


### involve the eumc in the work of defining a full spectrum force package; ### deleted


### establish an eu council on defence based on the existing eda ministerial steering board and the pesco format of eu defence ministers , in order to guarantee the prioritisation of resources , and the effective cooperation and integration among the member states; ### deleted


### clarify or define the link between the governance of pesco and that of the edf and to involve parliament in the ex-post control process when it comes to edf funding of pesco projects; ### deleted


### consider , as requested by some of the pms , to change the cycle of submission of pesco projects in order to potentially achieve increased focus , maturity and structure of such projects; ### deleted


### clarify the rules governing third-party participation in pesco , taking into consideration the importance of eu decision-making autonomy and full reciprocity , with a case-by-case approach considered to be most beneficial for the eu; ### deleted


### clarify the rules governing third-party participation in pesco , taking into consideration the importance of eu decision-making autonomy and full reciprocity , with a case-by-case approach considered to be most beneficial for the eu; ### ensure that third-party participation in pesco does not weaken eu decision-making and strategic autonomy;


### 1. grants the secretary-general of the council discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the european council and of the council for the financial year 2018 / postpones its decision on granting the secretary-general of the council discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the european council and of the council for the financial year 2018; ### 1. postpones its decision on granting the secretary-general of the council discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the european council and of the council for the financial year 2018;


### 4. recalls that , pursuant to the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) and the financial regulation , parliament is the only discharge authority of the union , however , in full acknowledgment of the council’s role as an institution giving recommendations on the discharge procedure; ### 4. recalls that , pursuant to the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) and the financial regulation , parliament is the only discharge authority of the union , however , in full acknowledgment of the council’s role as an institution giving recommendations on the discharge procedure; in this regard , asks the council to give discharge recommendations with respect to the other union institutions


### 14. insists that the combined efforts on achieving an inter-institutional agreement on a mandatory transparency register for lobbyists is inevitable to enhance openness of union decision-making process and accountability of the union institutions; calls on the council to continue taking part in the discussions regarding the establishment of a common register together with parliament , which agreed to restart the negotiations on march 2020 , and the commission in order to make it de facto mandatory for lobbyists to register if they want meetings with union decision-makers; ### 14. insists that the combined efforts on achieving an inter-institutional agreement on a mandatory transparency register for lobbyists is inevitable to enhance openness of union decision-making process and accountability of the union institutions; again strongly regrets that the council has not joined the transparency register scheme and calls on the council to refuse meetings with unregistered lobbyists; calls on the council to continue taking part in the discussions regarding the establishment of a common register together with parliament , which agreed to restart the negotiations on march 2020 , and the commission in order to make it de facto mandatory for lobbyists to register if they want meetings with union decision-makers;


### 15. notes that related to the proposal for a new interinstitutional agreement on a mandatory transparency register for interest representatives covering the parliament , the council and the commission two negotiating rounds took place in 2018 under the bulgarian presidency and one in 2019 under the romanian presidency; calls on the council to follow-up negotiations to reach a successful outcome which will finally include the council in the registry; ### 15. notes that related to the proposal for a new interinstitutional agreement on a mandatory transparency register for interest representatives covering the parliament , the council and the commission two negotiating rounds took place in 2018 under the bulgarian presidency and one in 2019 under the romanian presidency; regrets that the council has still not joined the transparency register despite all these negotiations; calls on the council to follow-up negotiations to reach a successful outcome which will finally include the council in the registry; calls on all presidency trios to lead by good example by refusing meetings with unregistered lobbyists , proactively publishing the lobby meetings of permanent representation staff , and by proactively publishing the lobby meetings of national ministers that deals with union matters;


### 3. notes that the court selected a sample of 45 transactions from the multiannual financial framework (mmf) heading 5 “administration” of all union institutions and bodies; notes that the sample was designed to be representative of the range of spending under heading 5 , which represents 6 ,3 % of the union budget; notes that the court’s work indicates administrative expenditure as low risk; considers , however , the amount of transactions selected in relation to the “other institutions” as not sufficient and asks the court to increase the number of transactions to be examined by 10 % at least; ### 3. notes that the court selected a sample of 45 transactions from the multiannual financial framework (mmf) heading 5 “administration” of all union institutions and bodies; notes that the sample was designed to be representative of the range of spending under heading 5 , which represents 6 ,3 % of the union budget; notes that the court’s work indicates administrative expenditure as low risk; considers , however , the amount of transactions selected in relation to the “other institutions” as not sufficient and asks the court to increase the number of transactions to be examined by 10 % at least; requests that the audit work related to chapter 10 be more focused on issues of high relevance or even critical for the council;


### 7. notes that appropriations carried over from 2018 to 2019 amounted to a total of eur 56 599 584 , equivalent to 10 ,7 % (compared to eur 60 576 175 or 11 ,5 % in 2017) , coming mainly from categories such as computer systems (eur 18 ,3 million) , buildings (eur 16 ,0 million) and interpretation (eur 11 ,9 million); takes note of the cancelled appropriations in 2018 of eur 46 348 862 (compared to eur 35 025 789 in 2017); calls on the council to strengthen its efforts to avoid budget over-estimates; ### 7. notes that appropriations carried over from 2018 to 2019 amounted to a total of eur 56 599 584 , equivalent to 10 ,7 % (compared to eur 60 576 175 or 11 ,5 % in 2017) , coming mainly from categories such as computer systems (eur 18 ,3 million) , buildings (eur 16 ,0 million) and interpretation (eur 11 ,9 million); reminds the council that carry-overs are exceptions to the principle of annuality and should reflect actual needs; takes note of the cancelled appropriations in 2018 of eur 46 348 862 (compared to eur 35 025 789 in 2017); calls on the council to strengthen its efforts to avoid budget over-estimates;


### 18. asks the council to strengthen its efforts to make the legislative process more traceable and reader friendly , to centre transparency around milestones in the legislative process and to normalise the publication of member states inputs (statements , proposals for amendments) into legislative debates; acknowledges the council’s efforts to improve transparency with ongoing changes to its website and the activities of its internal transparency team; encourages the council to introduce further measures in order to reach a successful transparency policy allowing the public to follow the union legislative process with greater ease; ### 18. asks the council to strengthen its efforts to make the legislative process more traceable and reader friendly , to centre transparency around milestones in the legislative process and to normalise the publication of member states inputs (statements , proposals for amendments) into legislative debates; acknowledges the council’s efforts to improve transparency with ongoing changes to its website and the activities of its internal transparency team; notes , however , that national parliamentarians , through the conference of parliamentary committees for union affairs of parliaments of the european union (cosac) forum , have repeatedly expressed their concern that the secrecy in the council prevents national parliaments from fulfilling their monitoring and scrutinising role with respect to their governments' union law-making; encourages the council to introduce further measures in order to reach a successful transparency policy allowing the public to follow the union legislative process with greater ease such as the formal minute-taking of all council preparatory bodies , to include full reporting of all discussions including of member state contributions , and the prompt publication of such minutes;


### 24. notes the lack of cooperation form the council in the discharge procedure which has resulted in parliament’s refusal to grant discharge to the secretary-general of the council since the financial year 2009; ### 24. notes the lack of cooperation from the council in the discharge procedure which has resulted in parliament’s refusal to grant discharge to the secretary-general of the council since the financial year 2009;


### 41. welcomes the commission’s proposal of june 2017 to create a european defence fund (edf) , which would foster cooperation between member states and support the european defence industry; notes that this proposal is the first initiative for which community funds are to be used in direct support of defence projects; recognises that this is a major step forward for european defence , from both a political and an industrial perspective; notes that the edf could finance structural projects such as the future european aircraft or tank or a european anti-missile defence capability; notes that the 2019 work programme for the preparatory action will focus on electromagnetic spectrum dominance and future disruptive defence technologies , two key areas for maintaining europe’s technological independence in the long term; welcomes , also , the adoption by the commission in march 2019 of the first european defence industrial development programme (edidp) and the publication of nine calls for proposals for 2019 , including for the eurodrone , which is a key capability for europe’s strategic autonomy; points out that 12 further calls for proposals will follow in 2020 , covering priority areas in all domains (air , land , sea , cyber and space); notes the link between the procurement decisions taken today by the member states and the prospects for industrial and technological cooperation under the edf; ### 41. rejects the commission’s proposal of june 2017 to create a european defence fund (edf) , which would foster cooperation between member states and support the european defence industry; notes that this proposal is the first initiative for which community funds are to be used in direct support of defence projects; notes that the 2019 work programme for the preparatory action will focus on electromagnetic spectrum dominance and future disruptive defence technologies; rejects , also , the adoption by the commission in march 2019 of the first european defence industrial development programme (edidp) and the publication of nine calls for proposals for 2019 , including for the eurodrone; points out that 12 further calls for proposals will follow in 2020 , covering areas in all domains (air , land , sea , cyber and space); notes the link between the procurement decisions taken today by the member states and the prospects for industrial and technological cooperation under the edf; recalls that the setting-up of the new heading v on security and defence , the eu defence research programme , european defence fund and military mobility clearly violate the provisions laid down in article 41(2)teu which states that any expenditure arising from actions having military or defence implications must not be charged to the union budget; denounces and deeply deplores the unprecedented speed with which the eu is being militarised; emphasises that it is empirically proven that the most effective method of preserving and promoting peace and stability is to focus on poverty eradication , unconditional humanitarian aid , sustainable and fair economic development , stopping global tax regimes from facilitating corruption , peaceful and diplomatic conflict resolution , disarmament , demobilisation of troops and reintegration programmes;


### 42. welcomes the effective implementation of permanent structured cooperation (pesco) as an important step towards closer cooperation in security and defence among member states; stresses that this provision , introduced in the 2009 lisbon treaty (article 46 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union) , is legally binding and includes a set of ambitious commitments to enable european countries wishing to do so to move ahead faster on common defence projects; recognises the role that pesco can play in structuring european demand; notes that a significant number of edidp-eligible projects are being developed within the pesco framework and may also benefit from higher rates of subsidy; supports full consistency between pesco projects and the edf; ### 42. strongly rejects the implementation of permanent structured cooperation (pesco) as a step towards the founding of the eu defence union; stresses that this provision , introduced in the 2009 lisbon treaty (article 46 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union) , is legally binding and includes a set of commitments which will further militarise the eu; warns in this regard that with pesco the existing unanimity rule in the council concerning csdp decisions will be annulled;


### (5) the electoral procedure related to municipal elections falls within the competences of the member states that organise them reflecting their specific traditions and in accordance with international and european standards. in line with international covenant on civil and political rights as well as the law of the european convention on human rights , member states should not only recognise and respect the right of union citizens to vote and to stand as a candidate but also ensure easy access to their electoral rights by removing as many obstacles to their participation in elections as possible. ### (5) the electoral procedure related to municipal elections falls within the competences of the member states that organise them reflecting their specific traditions and in accordance with international and european standards. in line with international covenant on civil and political rights as well as the law of the european convention on human rights , member states should not only recognise and respect the right of union citizens to vote and to stand as a candidate but also ensure easy access to their electoral rights by removing obstacles to their participation in elections.


### (8) in order to facilitate the exercise by union citizens of their right to vote and to stand as a candidate in their country of residence , such citizens should be entered on the electoral roll in sufficient time in advance of polling day. the formalities applicable to their registration should be as simple as possible. it should be sufficient for the union citizens concerned to produce a valid identity card and a formal declaration that include elements evidencing their entitlement to participate in the elections. once registered , non-national union citizens should remain on the electoral roll under the same conditions as union citizens who are nationals of the member state concerned , for as long as they satisfy the conditions for exercising the right to vote. additionally , union citizens should provide the competent authorities with contact information , enabling those authorities to keep them informed on a regular basis. ### (8) in order to facilitate the exercise by union citizens of their right to vote and to stand as a candidate in their country of residence , such citizens should be entered on the electoral roll in sufficient time in advance of polling day. they should ideally be entered automatically on the electoral roll upon registration for residence. these citizens should be able to receive information in parallel regarding this automatic registration , notably on the fact that it implies deregistration from the electoral roll of their place of origin. alternatively , the country of residence should be able to allow the non-national union citizens to decide and inform the authorities in due time. in both cases , the formalities applicable to their registration should be as simple as possible. it should be sufficient for the union citizens concerned to produce a valid identity card and a formal declaration that include elements evidencing their entitlement to participate in the elections. once registered , non-national union citizens should remain on the electoral roll under the same conditions as union citizens who are nationals of the member state concerned , for as long as they satisfy the conditions for exercising the right to vote. additionally , union citizens should provide the competent authorities with contact information , enabling those authorities to keep them informed on a regular basis.


### (16) the lack of adequate information , in the context of electoral procedures , affects citizens in the exercise of their electoral rights as part of their rights as union citizens. it also affects the capacity of competent authorities to exercise their rights and to deliver on their obligations. member states should be required to designate authorities with special responsibilities for providing appropriate information to union citizens on their rights under article 20(2) , point (b) , and article 22(1) tfeu and the national rules and procedures regarding participation in and the organization of municipal elections. in order to ensure the effectiveness of communications , information should be provided in clear and comprehensible terms. ### (16) the lack of adequate information , in the context of electoral procedures , affects citizens in the exercise of their electoral rights as part of their rights as union citizens. it also affects the capacity of competent authorities to exercise their rights and to deliver on their obligations. member states should be required to designate authorities with special responsibilities for providing appropriate information to union citizens on their rights under article 20(2) , point (b) , and article 22(1) tfeu and the national rules and procedures regarding participation in and the organization of municipal elections. in order to ensure the effectiveness of communications , information should be provided in clear and comprehensible terms on a regular basis and ahead of elections. member states should provide appropriate information to union citizens on the right to vote , including technical arrangements in place for citizens with disabilities , the administrative steps to exercise that right as well as the nature of the political system and traditions.


### (23) data regarding the exercise of rights and the application of this directive can be useful in the identification of measures necessary to ensure the effective exercise of union citizens’ electoral rights. in order to improve the collection of data for municipal elections , it is necessary to introduce regular monitoring and reporting of implementation by member states , which should include , besides statistical data , information on the measures taken to support participation in elections of non-national union citizens. the commission should assess the application of the directive , including any changes in the electorate that have taken place since its entry into force and submit a report in this connection to the european parliament and to the council. ### (23) data regarding the exercise of rights and the application of this directive can be useful in the identification of measures necessary to ensure the effective exercise of union citizens’ electoral rights. in order to improve the collection of data for municipal elections , it is necessary to introduce regular monitoring and reporting of implementation by member states , which should include , besides statistical data , information on the measures taken to support participation in elections of non-national union citizens as well as technical arrangements in place for citizens with disabilities and possibilities of voting by way of advance physical voting or proxy voting. the commission should assess the application of the directive , including any changes in the electorate that have taken place since its entry into force and submit a report in this connection to the european parliament and to the council.


### 2. calls on the ombudsman to notify parliament if she intends to depart from the text approved by parliament; ### 2. calls on the ombudsman to notify parliament if there is evidence from practical experience , of a need to revise the text approved by parliament;


### 1. considers that article 21(2) teu should be modified to include the concepts of ‘strategic sovereignty’ and ‘strategic autonomy’ in the list of objectives of the cfsp; ### 1. considers that article 21(2) teu should be modified to include the concepts of ‘strategic sovereignty’ and ‘strategic autonomy’ in the list of objectives of the cfsp; underlines further that this concept means true autonomy for the union's cfsp , where the eu is not complementary to nato's policy but applying its own foreign and security policy;


### 5. calls for the development of more integrated cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy with external alliances such as the north atlantic treaty organization and external like-minded countries , in particular the us , the uk and canada. ### 5. calls for good cooperation with external partners and at un level in view of promoting dialogue , peace and a rules-based international order.


### 2. urges the member states to make use of article 31(2) of the treaty on european union (teu) , which allows the council to take certain decisions by qualified majority in common foreign and security policy (cfsp) matters; calls on the member states to make full use of the passerelle clause contained in article 31(3) teu; ### 2. urges the member states to make use of article 31(2) of the treaty on european union (teu) , which allows the council to take certain decisions by qualified majority in common foreign and security policy (cfsp) matters; calls on the member states to make full use of the passerelle clause contained in article 31(3) teu; recommends , in view of the revision of the treaties , to introduce codecision between council and parliament in cssp matters ;


### 6. reiterates the need for parliament to play a more prominent role in the definition , democratic scrutiny , supervision and evaluation of the csdp; calls , in that regard , on the vp/hr to give full effect to parliament’s right of information under article 36 teu; ### 6. reiterates the need for parliament to play a more prominent role in the definition , democratic scrutiny , supervision and evaluation of the csdp , under ordinary legislative procedure , especially in view of the revision of the treaties and its article 45 governing the rules for the european defense agency ; calls , in that regard , on the vp/hr to give full effect to parliament’s right of information under article 36 teu;


### 13. expresses deep concern about developments in the sahel region and the recent coups d’état in the region; condemns the increasing presence of the kremlin-backed wagner group in the sahel; firmly believes that the latter’s involvement in west africa runs counter to the objective of bringing peace , security and stability to the region; acknowledges that the various international missions have not yet achieved their primary goal of lasting peace in the region and that a reflection process on the mandates and roles of international missions and policies is therefore needed; expresses similar concern over the increased presence and activity of islamist terrorist groups , in particular al-qaeda , daesh and al-shabaab in the middle east and africa; ### 13. expresses deep concern about developments in the sahel region and the recent coups d’état in the region; condemns all foreign interference and exploitation in the sahel; firmly believes that such interference and exploitation in west africa runs counter to the objective of bringing peace , security and stability to the region; notes with deep concern that the various international missions have not yet come anywhere close to achieving their stated goal of lasting peace in the region and that an urgent revision of the mandates and roles of international missions and policies is therefore needed; expresses similar concern over the increased presence and activity of islamist terrorist groups , in particular al-qaeda , daesh and al-shabaab in the middle east and africa;


### 14. supports the review and reinforcement of all csdp missions and operations by providing them with more robust and flexible mandates; stresses the need to strengthen their resilience and effectiveness by enabling them to better address hybrid security challenges , such as through better cooperation with other eu actors and like-minded partners outside the eu; ### deleted


### 19. stresses that eu sovereignty in the field of security and defence means the development , coordination and deployment of strategic capabilities , an efficient division of labour between the member states and the eu’s ability to decide and act autonomously , in line with its own interests , principles and values; stresses that this approach reinforces cooperation with partners , in particular within the framework of nato; welcomes in this regard the commission president’s announcement that the eu and nato will present a joint declaration on cooperation by the end of 2021; welcomes the discussion on an ‘initial entry force’ as presented by the vp/hr; ### 19. stresses that eu sovereignty in the field of security and defence means the development , coordination and deployment of strategic capabilities , an efficient division of labour between the member states and the eu’s ability to decide and act autonomously , in line with its own interests , principles and values; stresses that this approach is incompatible with being a member of a 'brain dead' nato;


### 19. stresses that eu sovereignty in the field of security and defence means the development , coordination and deployment of strategic capabilities , an efficient division of labour between the member states and the eu’s ability to decide and act autonomously , in line with its own interests , principles and values; stresses that this approach reinforces cooperation with partners , in particular within the framework of nato; welcomes in this regard the commission president’s announcement that the eu and nato will present a joint declaration on cooperation by the end of 2021; welcomes the discussion on an ‘initial entry force’ as presented by the vp/hr; ### 19. stresses that eu sovereignty in the field of security and defence means the development , coordination and deployment of strategic capabilities , an efficient division of labour between the member states and the eu’s ability to decide and act autonomously , in line with its own interests , principles and values; reaffirms that in order to do this , it must build a new strategy overcoming atlantist visions of our common interest and our allies;


### a. whereas according to several eurobarometer surveys , a large proportion of eu citizens are not satisfied with the way democracy works in the eu and tend to distrust the eu institutions; whereas not only is this perception present at eu level , but also at national level; ### a. whereas it is the aim to continuously improve the way in which democracy works in the eu , several eurobarometer surveys show that citizens are not satisfied with the way democracy works and tend to distrust the eu institutions; whereas not only is this perception present at eu level , but also at national level;


### 26. condemns the malicious acts committed against member states; insists that the union and the member states react firmly and in coordination against any new malicious , illegal or destabilising activity; calls on the union to work towards the creation of a legal instrument to respond to hybrid threats and to develop a comprehensive cyber capacity; calls for a revision of the cyber-defence policy framework in order to increase the prevention and deterrence capacity of the union and its member states; ### 26. condemns the malicious acts committed against member states; insists that the union and the member states react firmly and in coordination against any new malicious , illegal or destabilising activity; calls on the union to work towards the creation of a legal instrument to respond to hybrid threats and to develop a comprehensive cyber capacity; calls for a revision of the cyber-defence policy framework in order to increase the prevention and deterrence capacity of the union and its member states; is concerned , in this regard , at the dependence of the union and its member states on foreign tools for ensuring their cyber-security;


### 1. stresses the need to strengthen democratic scrutiny of the european union’s economic governance instruments; calls on the commission and the council to respond to that need , in particular through closer and ex ante involvement of the european parliament , the national parliaments , the social partners and civil society; ### 1. stresses the need to strengthen democratic scrutiny of the european union’s economic governance instruments; regrets that these instruments lack transparency despite having a major impact on the lives of european citizens; takes the view that the implementation of the economic dialogue needs to be scrupulously reviewed so as to ensure that there is proper parliamentary scrutiny; calls on the commission and the council to respond to that need , in particular through closer and ex ante involvement of the european parliament at all stages of the procedures , the national parliaments , the social partners and civil society and that a real public debate is held on the occasion of the conference on the future of europe;