### 126. calls on the commission to follow up on its ambition of incentivising 75 % of european enterprises to take up cloud computing services , big data and ai by 2030 in order to remain globally competitive and reach climate neutrality; finds that the allocation of eur 2.07 billion in funding for digital infrastructure under the connecting europe facility (cef)45 is insufficient; ### 126. calls on the commission to follow up on its ambition of incentivising 75 % of european enterprises to take up cloud computing services , big data and ai by 2030 in order to remain globally competitive and reach climate neutrality; finds that the allocation of eur 2.07 billion in funding for digital infrastructure under the connecting europe facility (cef)45 is insufficient; stresses that the eu needs a more robust antitrust policy ; is of the opinion that gafam and other gatekeepers bundling their clouds with other services they provide , and pushing users to register and give up their data , are limiting consumer choice and imposing barriers to enter and hinder competition ; calls on the european commission to prevent gafam from locking in their ecosystems by pre-installing their services and to impose interoperability as per dma1a;


### 128. stresses that ai requires powerful hardware to make sophisticated algorithms useable , including high-performance and quantum computing and the iot; urges the maximisation of funding and research for such ai-enabled emerging technologies; finds that , similarly , nano-technologies and chips are essential to enabling ai to be embedded in , for example , medical devices , which also requires priority funding; ### 128. stresses that ai requires powerful hardware to make sophisticated algorithms useable , including high-performance and quantum computing ; urges the maximisation of funding and research for such ai-enabled emerging technologies; finds that , similarly , nano-technologies and chips are essential to enabling ai to be embedded in , for example , medical devices , which also requires priority funding and hence , that relocation of some of these companies to the eu is essential to ensure our strategic autonomy and deployment of ai;


### 129. highlights that a functioning and fast infrastructure for ai must be based on a fair , safe and high-quality foundation by avoiding gaps in digital high-speed connectivity , which requires 5g roll-out in all urban areas by 2030 , as well as ultra-fast broadband networks and spectrum policy with licence conditions that do not distort competition; urges member states to continue to implement the 5g toolbox , specifically enabling legislation related to the risk assessment of suppliers and service providers; calls for the broadband cost reduction directive to be put into practice to facilitate network deployment; ### 129. highlights that a functioning and fast infrastructure for ai must be based on a fair , safe and high-quality foundation by avoiding gaps in digital high-speed connectivity , as well as ultra-fast broadband networks and spectrum policy with licence conditions that do not distort competition; urges member states to continue to implement the common union toolbox for connectivity , specifically enabling legislation related to the risk assessment of suppliers and service providers; calls for the broadband cost reduction directive to be put into practice to facilitate network deployment; regrets that the commission has failed to conduct an ex-ante health and environmental impact assessment report on 5g so far , despite warnings being highlighted by many members in the scientific community ; points out that a broad and inclusive debate will ultimately contribute to creating trust among citizens regarding the actions towards continuous development of the mobile networks; calls for an eu communication strategy that provides eu citizens with reliable information as well as awareness raising campaigns regarding 5g and electromagnetic fields; stresses the importance of counteracting the spread of disinformation related to 5g networks , in particular to false claims that such networks are linked to covid-19;


### 130. calls on the commission to establish timetables and financial incentives for member states , cities , regions and industry , and to accelerate the administrative approval processes for 5g; supports the incentivisation of private investment in 5g roll-out; requests that in regions where roll-out is not carried out by the private sector , more funds are made available; calls for funding for broadband and connectivity projects under the multiannual financial framework , with easier access for local authorities to avoid the underutilisation of public funds; ### 130. calls on the commission to establish timetables and financial incentives for member states , cities , regions and industry; requests that in regions where roll-out is not carried out by the private sector , more funds are made available; calls for funding for broadband and connectivity projects under the multiannual financial framework , with easier access for local authorities to avoid the underutilisation of public funds;


### 131. calls on the commission to establish a precise strategy with a clear timetable for 6g roll-out to better prepare for the next wave of digital infrastructure , enabling europe to take the lead; ### deleted


### 137. encourages all member states to spend a significant proportion of their gdp on research into digital technologies , and for annual combined public and private investments in the eu to reach at least eur 20-25 billion; urges the continued strengthening of the horizon europe programme , notably its ai , data and robotics partnership and the european innovation council , and to expand the digital europe programme , whose allocated funding of eur 7.6 billion46 is insufficient to remain competitive; ### 137. encourages all member states to spend a significant proportion of their gdp on research into digital technologies , and for annual public investments in the eu to reach at least eur 20-25 billion; urges the continued strengthening of the horizon europe programme , notably its ai , data and robotics partnership and the european innovation council , and to expand the digital europe programme , whose allocated funding of eur 7.6 billion46 is insufficient to remain competitive;


### 139. encourages the creation of more chairs on ai at european universities as well as competitive salaries for ai research and the provision of more funding in order to properly train and retain the next generation of researchers and entrepreneurs and prevent brain drain to locations outside the eu; stresses the need to reduce the bureaucratic burden for university researchers in accessing funds and calls on the commission to provide tools to increase digital interconnectivity between universities; urges the development of cross-cutting networks for ai across european universities and research institutions; ### 139. encourages the creation of more chairs on ai at european universities as well as decent salaries for ai research and the provision of more public funding in order to properly train and retain current and the next generation of researchers and entrepreneurs and prevent brain drain to locations outside the eu; stresses the need for fundamental research and for university researchers to access easily funds and calls on the commission to provide tools to increase digital interconnectivity between universities within and across member states; urges the development of cross-cutting networks for ai across european universities and research institutions;


### 27. highlights that ai applications can bring environmental and economic benefits and strengthen predictive capabilities that contribute to the fight against climate change , to meeting the sustainable development goals (sdgs) and to achieving our target of becoming the first climate-neutral continent; finds that the use of ai has the potential to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by up to 4 % by 203022 ; underlines that ai systems themselves need to be designed sustainably to reduce resource usage and energy consumption , thereby limiting the risks to the environment; finds that it has been estimated that ict technologies are capable of reducing 10 times more greenhouse gas emissions than their own footprint23 ; ### 27. highlights that ai applications and digital public goods can bring environmental and economic benefits and strengthen predictive capabilities that contribute to the fight against climate change , to meeting the sustainable development goals (sdgs) and the european green deal objectives , and to achieving our target of becoming the first climate-neutral continent; finds that the use of ai has the potential to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by up to 4 % by 203022 ; underlines that ai systems themselves need to be designed sustainably to reduce resource usage and energy consumption , thereby limiting the risks to the environment; finds that it has been estimated that ict technologies are capable of reducing 10 times more greenhouse gas emissions than their own footprint23;


### 28. is concerned that only six member states have included a strong focus on ai applications in their efforts to meet the green deal objectives; finds that ai will produce information relevant to environmental planning , decision-making and the management and monitoring of the progress of environmental policies , for instance for cleaner air , where ai applications can monitor pollution and warn of hazards; highlights that ai and digital solutions have the potential to scale up resource-efficient solutions that would otherwise only be implemented in one company or sector; ### 28. is concerned that only six member states have included a strong focus on ai applications in their efforts to meet the green deal objectives; finds that ai can produce information relevant to environmental planning , decision-making and the management and monitoring of the progress of environmental policies , for instance for cleaner air;


### 29. emphasises the importance of ai in developing smart cities and smart villages to improve the technological resilience of infrastructures , building on local strengths and opportunities , including public transport , emergency assistance , waste management , urban planning , smart energy and resource optimisation; stresses that ai-based solutions can further assist in optimising architecture , construction and engineering processes to reduce emissions , construction time , costs and waste; finds that this is already a reality in countries such as china and malaysia , where large-scale urban ai systems manage the transport , energy and safety systems of several cities; ### 29. emphasises the importance of ai in developing smart cities and smart villages to improve the technological resilience of infrastructures , building on local strengths and opportunities , including public transport , emergency assistance , waste management , urban planning , smart energy and resource optimisation; stresses that ai-based solutions can further assist in optimising architecture , construction and engineering processes to reduce emissions , construction time , costs and waste; notes that smart cities can be beneficial if state and local governments empower their regulatory agencies to require companies to provide the data they need to make informed policy and monitor its impacts;


### 30. stresses that the energy transition will not take place without digitalisation , which will be achieved to a significant extent through ai; underlines that ai can monitor , optimise and reduce energy consumption and production , as well as support the integration of renewable energies into existing electricity grids; ### 30. underlines that ai can monitor , optimise and reduce energy consumption and production , as well as support the integration of renewable energies into existing electricity grids; underlines however that ai and digitalisation is no silver bullet , also implies huge impact in term of emissions and ecological footprint and can not replace a public-led transition to renewable energies and a prompt end to all fossil fuel exploration and production;


### 31. highlights that the growing complexity of an energy transition system , with increased volatile renewable generation and changes in load management , makes increasing automated control necessary for energy supply security; stresses that ai benefits for supply security , especially in the operation , monitoring , maintenance and control of water , gas and electricity networks , must be taken into account in the regulation of these networks; ### deleted


### 32. finds that ai and other digital solutions for mobility and transport have the potential to reduce traffic flows and enhance road safety , by greatly increasing the efficiency of access to transport systems through , for example , autonomous vehicles and optimised public transport planning , thus reducing the environmental footprint of the transport sector , travel times and costs; ### 32. finds that ai and other digital applications for mobility and transport have the potential to reduce traffic flows and enhance road safety;


### 33. believes that ai can have a transformative role in the agricultural sector when it comes to tackling food security issues , enabling the emergence of new harvesting methods and harvest prediction , novel approaches to food processing and retail , agricultural resource management and input efficiency , as well as improved land management and the optimisation of food supply chains; stresses that agriculture is a key sector in which ai can help to cut emissions and the use of pesticides , fertilisers , chemicals and water; further stresses that ai can contribute to the restoration of biodiversity and prevent deforestation by monitoring endangered species and tracking deforestation activities through smart forests; ### 33. believes that ai can have a transformative role in the agricultural sector when it comes to tackling food security issues , enabling the emergence of new harvesting methods and harvest prediction , novel approaches to food processing and retail , agricultural resource management and input efficiency , as well as improved land management and the optimisation of food supply chains; stresses that agriculture is a key sector in which ai can help to cut emissions and the use of pesticides , fertilisers , chemicals and water; warns that these actions will not of themselves be sufficient to reach green deal targets related to agriculture and food1a;


### 34. stresses that ai contributes to a circular economy through increased production output and quality , reduced maintenance costs , better use and the ethical sourcing of raw materials , and reduced waste; highlights that ai has the potential to automatically provide businesses with detailed insight into their emissions , including value chains , and forecast future emissions , thus helping to adjust and achieve individual emission targets; underlines that digital tools help businesses to implement the necessary steps towards more sustainable conduct , especially small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) which do not otherwise have the resources to do so; ### deleted


### 36. is concerned that the global community does not seem likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; ### 36. believes democratic countries should jointly shape the international debate , work together towards ambitious minimum standards , and thereby promote fundamental rights , multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage;


### 37. observes that chinese nationals have assumed leadership positions in the international organization for standardization , the international electrotechnical commission and the international telecommunication union , the three largest and best-established standard-setting organisations in the world , while the chinese government has also signed standards and cooperation agreements with 52 other countries through its belt and road initiative; warns that since several of their promoted standards , including on ai technologies and in particular in relation to government surveillance and individual liberties , are not in line with eu values , the chinese standard offensive poses a crucial geopolitical challenge for the eu , while also giving china a first-mover advantage in economic terms; ### 37. observes that the chinese government has also signed standards and cooperation agreements with 52 other countries through its belt and road initiative; warns that several of their promoted standards , including on ai technologies and in particular in relation to government surveillance and individual liberties , are not in line with human rights and eu values;


### 39. notes that the use of ai systems in defence-related developments is considered a game changer in military operations; states that the key advantage lies in the potential to engage in armed conflicts with a reduced risk of physical harm to one’s own military personnel and as a means to reduce military response time; ### deleted


### 40. is concerned about military research and technological developments relating to lethal offensive weapon systems without human oversight that are pursued in countries such as russia and china with little regard for the risk to humanity; observes that such lethal offensive weapon systems are already used in military conflicts; warns that even non-state armed groups could soon equip drones with ai software for navigation and facial recognition and thus turn them into cheap lethal offensive weapons capable of acting entirely without human oversight; ### 40. notes that china , israel , russia , south korea , the united kingdom , and the united states are investing heavily in the development of various autonomous weapons systems , while australia , turkey , and other countries are also making investments1a; is concerned about military research and technological developments relating to lethal offensive weapon systems without human oversight that are pursued in countries such as israel and its harpy loitering munition widely exported , russia and china with little regard for the risk to humanity; observes that such lethal offensive weapon systems are already used in military conflicts; warns that even non-state armed groups could soon equip drones with ai software for navigation and facial recognition and thus turn them into cheap lethal offensive weapons capable of acting entirely without human oversight;


### 42. illustrates that ai technologies could also help perpetrators by simplifying the use of very sophisticated cyberattacks , such as through ai-powered malware , identity theft using biometric data or adversarial ai that causes other ai systems to misinterpret input; points , in particular , to the rise in deepfakes , which already lead to doubts about the authenticity of all digital content , including genuinely authentic videos; warns that deepfakes could contribute to a broad climate of public mistrust in ai , as well as a deeper socio-political polarisation within our societies; ### deleted


### 43. elaborates that the internet of things , as well as the fact that ai systems nowadays run a significant amount of key critical infrastructure , such as energy grids , the food chain , the atm network and hospital logistics , has created a massive ai cybersecurity threat; predicts that states will focus more and more on protecting their it logistics and care delivery as a domestic asset , which could in turn create the temptation to invoke ‘ai autarchy’; ### 43. elaborates that the internet of things , as well as the fact that ai systems nowadays run a significant amount of key critical infrastructure , such as energy grids , the food chain , the atm network and hospital logistics , has created a massive ai cybersecurity threat given the single point of failure , inherent in centralized structures ; predicts that states will focus more and more on protecting their it logistics and care delivery as a domestic asset , which could in turn create the temptation to invoke ‘ai autarchy’;


### 44. explains that the high level of accuracy that ai can achieve may pose security risks , as it can induce humans to place such confidence in ai as to trust it more than their own judgment; notes that experiments have shown that this can elevate the level of autonomy of ai beyond the supporting role for which it was originally designed and means that humans miss opportunities to gain experience and refine their skills and knowledge of ai systems; observes that this type of ai overuse has , for example , been cited as a major factor in several aircraft crashes25 ; ### 44. explains that the high level of accuracy that ai can achieve may pose security risks , as it can induce humans to place such confidence in ai as to trust it more than their own judgment; notes that experiments have shown that this can elevate the level of autonomy of ai beyond the supporting role for which it was originally designed and means that humans are likely to fail in supervising ai; observes that this type of ai overuse has , for example , been cited as a major factor in several aircraft crashes25 ; stresses hence the necessity of human control and transparency and explainability of algorithms so as to maintain human oversight;


### 45. highlights however that ai’s core characteristics also make the technology an ideal tool to enhance security; specifies that it can be used to synthesise large amounts of data , perform behavioural analysis of network activities and detect specific patterns; stresses that these elements would allow for better prediction and assessment of the threat level , faster decision-making processes , improved reactivity and the more effective securing of endpoint devices; ### deleted


### 46. underlines , in particular , the potential inherent in enabling law enforcement agencies to proactively assess and predict ai misuse , as well as to counter it effectively by using ai technologies themselves; underlines that such ai-supported law enforcement activities do , however , require clear transparency rules , highly skilled employees and access to large amounts of relevant data; ### deleted


### 63. acknowledges at the same time that the very same ai technologies used to address fundamental societal problems and achieve important public policy goals could also pose crucial ethical and legal questions; notes that there have already been documented instances which have led to serious wrongdoing within the eu; notes that in practice , member states rely heavily on the police to collect data , but also on private entities whose activities are often not supervised and who regularly sell the collected and highly sensitive data to other third parties; clarifies that this practice runs counter to european values and undermines the high level of fundamental rights in the eu , in particular the right to privacy; ### 63. stresses that ai technologies when used in the context of policing , could pose unprecedented risks to human autonomy , privacy , the presumption of innocence , fair trials and the right to good administration; notes that there have already been documented instances which have led to serious wrongdoing within the eu; clarifies that the use of ai in such context runs counter to european fundamental rights and values and undermines the high level of fundamental rights in the eu , in particular the right to privacy;


### 64. stresses that many authoritarian regimes apply ai systems to control , spy on , monitor and rank their citizens; believes that any form of unrestricted normative citizen scoring on a large scale by public authorities , especially within the field of law enforcement and the judiciary , leads to the loss of autonomy and is not in line with european values; highlights past cases of eu companies having sold biometric systems which would be illegal to use within the eu to authoritarian regimes in non-eu countries; ### 64. stresses that many authoritarian regimes apply ai systems to control , spy on , monitor and rank their citizens; believes that any form of normative citizen scoring on a large scale , especially within the field of law enforcement and the judiciary , leads to the loss of autonomy and is not in line with european values; highlights past cases of eu companies having sold biometric systems which would be illegal to use within the eu to authoritarian regimes in non-eu countries;


### 66. points out that digital platforms are also used to spread disinformation , acting as networks for propaganda , trolling and harassment with the aim of undermining electoral processes; stresses that machine learning enables in particular the targeted use of personal data to create personalised and convincing messages for potential voters , who are often completely unaware that the content has been created or manipulated through the use of ai; ### 66. points out that digital platforms are also used to spread disinformation , acting as networks for propaganda , trolling and harassment with the aim of reducing public participation and undermining trust in democracy , in particular through casting doubt on electoral processes; stresses that machine learning enables in particular the targeted use of personal data to create personalised and convincing messages for potential voters , who are often completely unaware that the content has been created specifically for their manipulation;


### 67. underlines that ai could , however , also be used to reduce anti-democratic and unethical activities on platforms and as a means to stop the distribution of fake news; notes that the effective use of ai for this purpose has so far been prevented by strongly diverging definitions of hate speech among member states and the lack of consensus on how to harness ai to effectively filter out illegal and harmful content; explains that it is also problematic that divisive language leads to greater user engagement , which is why removal of such language would be in direct conflict with the platform’s business model , based on maximising user engagement; ### deleted


### 68. stresses that bias in ai systems often occurs due to a lack of diverse and high-quality training data , for instance where data sets are used which do not sufficiently cover discriminated groups , or where the task definition or requirement setting themselves were biased; notes that bias can also arise due to a limited volume of training data , which can result from overly strict data protection provisions , or where a biased ai developer has compromised the algorithm; points out that some biases in the form of reasoned differentiation are , on the other hand , also intentionally created in order to improve the ai’s learning performance under certain circumstances; ### deleted


### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; concludes that there is therefore no such thing as a completely impartial and objective algorithm; ### deleted


### 70. believes that that the adoption of ai , if combined with the necessary support infrastructure and training , can substantially increase productivity , innovation , growth and job creation , with expectations of labour productivity set to increase by 11-37 %26 by 2035; ### 70. believes that the adoption of ai , needs to be combined with the necessary regulation , support infrastructure , education and training to increase productivity in all its dimensions , both capital and labour productivity , innovation , sustainable growth and a labour market bounded by the respect and promotion of the highest standards on labour rights , especially as regard to the co-decision and strong involvement of workers in the implementation of the algorithm which is the digital translation of the internal functioning of a company;


### 71. stresses that although ai may replace some tasks , including mundane , labour-intensive or dangerous tasks , it will create new , higher value-added employment; stresses that ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27 ; stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai is augmenting high-skill occupations and replacing low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be prepared for; ### 71. stresses that although ai may create new , higher value-added employment , ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27;


### 72. highlights that ai implementation also represents an opportunity for significant cultural change within organisations , including improved workplace safety , better work-life balance and more effective training and guidance; is of the opinion that human-empowering ai applications could also create new job opportunities , in particular for those who , because of natural restrictions such as disabilities or living circumstances , were initially bound to less qualified jobs; ### 72. highlights that ai implementation also represents an opportunity for significant cultural change within organisations , including improved workplace safety , reduced working time , better work-life balance , the right to disconnect and more effective training and guidance; is of the opinion that human-empowering ai applications could also create new job opportunities , in particular for those who , because of natural restrictions such as disabilities or living circumstances , were initially bound to less qualified jobs;


### 73. is concerned about ai-fuelled surveillance in the workplace and teleworking environment , as well as in the school environment , in the light of the fundamental right to privacy , data protection and the human dignity of the worker , as well as the fundamental rights of children; ### 73. condemns ai-fuelled surveillance in the workplace and teleworking environment , as well as in the school environment , in the light of the fundamental right to privacy , data protection and the human dignity of the worker , social and labour rights , as well as the fundamental rights of children; notes that trade unions and work representatives should be directly involved in co-designing and introducing technologies within a workplace , new technology and ai should be included in a workplace after a proper exercise of information and consultation rights of workers and should not be used to decrease worker’s rights and conditions;


### 75. stresses that more than 70 % of businesses report a lack of staff with adequate digital and ai skills as an obstacle to investment; is concerned that as of 2019 , there were 7.8 million ict specialists in the eu , with a prior annual growth rate of 4.2 % , which is far short of the 20 million experts that are needed for key areas such as data analysis , as projected by the commission; is concerned about the extensive gender gap in this area , with only one in six ict specialists and one in three science , technology , engineering and mathematics (stem) graduates being female29 ; ### 75. underlines that to reap the full benefits of digitalisation , the union must address digital literacy and skills for all; stresses that more than 70 % of businesses report a lack of staff with adequate digital and ai skills as an obstacle to investment; is concerned that as of 2019 , there were 7.8 million ict specialists in the eu , with a prior annual growth rate of 4.2 % , which is far short of the 20 million experts that are needed for key areas such as data analysis , as projected by the commission; is concerned about the extensive gender gap in this area , with only one in six ict specialists and one in three science , technology , engineering and mathematics (stem) graduates being female29 ; calls on the commission and the member states to align the measures shaping the eus digital transition with the union’s goals on gender equality; calls on the commission and the member states to provide appropriate funding to programmes aimed at attracting women to study and work in ict and stem , to develop strategies aimed at increasing women’s digital inclusion , in fields relating to stem , ai and the research and innovation sector , and to adopt a multi-level approach to address the gender gap at all levels of education and employment in the digital sector;


### 76. notes that there are a number of transversal obstacles that the eu needs to overcome in order to achieve a widespread use of ai and to fully harness its benefits; states that in particular , legal uncertainty , insufficient digital infrastructure and a lack of ai skills can be observed as barriers to the successful application of ai in all fields analysed; ### 76. notes that there are a number of transversal obstacles that the eu needs to overcome in order to achieve a widespread use of ai and to fully harness its benefits for the society as a whole; observes that self-regulation by online platforms have proven to be insufficient and inefficient to meaningfully manage illegal and harmful content and in protecting users’ fundamental rights , a clear regulation for ai is required based on transparency , auditability and accountability , human intervention and fundamental rights; notes that insufficient , unsustainable digital infrastructure and a lack of ai skills can be observed as barriers to the successful application of trustworthy ai in all fields analysed;


### 77. concludes from the case studies examined , furthermore , that it is not specific ai technologies themselves that are risky , but certain use cases; points in particular to dual-use ai systems such as drones , the uses of which can vary drastically from consumer recreation to warfare , with the worst-case scenario being swarms of inexpensive , armed microdrones used to kill specific human targets; ### 77. concludes from the case studies examined , furthermore , that it is not specific ai technologies themselves that are risky , but certain use cases; calls for a eu - wide ban on the deployment of live facial recognition systems for law enforcement and on the use of automated recognition in public spaces of other human features , such as gaits , dna , voice , and other biometric and behavioural signals;


### 78. states that while it is important to examine and categorise potential risks posed by ai , the case studies illustrated that ai technologies also enable us to apply , in most cases , very effective counter measures that are able to mitigate or eliminate the very same risks; underlines that , as ai is still in its early stages of development within a wider context of emerging technologies , its real potential can still only be imagined; stresses that the promise and potential benefits of ai in economic and societal terms appear to be tremendous; ### 78. states that it is important to examine and categorise potential risks posed by ai , recognises that the case studies illustrated that ai technologies also enable us to apply , in most cases , very effective counter measures that are able to mitigate or eliminate the very same risks; underlines that , as ai is still in its early stages of development within a wider context of emerging technologies , its real potential can still only be imagined while some of its risks are already very tangible;


### 79. observes fierce ai competition that involves not only the two frontrunners , the us and china , but also countries such as canada , india , israel , japan , russia , south korea and the uk; underlines that the previous chapter has already indicated that the eu is so far struggling to meet its aspiration30 of becoming a global leader in ai; ### deleted


### 79. observes fierce ai competition that involves not only the two frontrunners , the us and china , but also countries such as canada , india , israel , japan , russia , south korea and the uk; underlines that the previous chapter has already indicated that the eu is so far struggling to meet its aspiration30 of becoming a global leader in ai; ### 79. underlines that current digital world champions , such as gafam and chinese giants , have all benefited from the support of the american administration and the chinese state , respectively through massive tax exemptions and subsidies;


### 80. examines in the following the eu’s global competitiveness with regard to ai by comparing it with that of china and the us , focusing on three core elements: regulatory approach , market situation and investments; ### deleted


### 81. notes that the us refrains from introducing horizontal legislation in the digital field , while focusing instead on sector-specific laws and private sector innovation , in particular among its tech giants and leading universities; observes that the us approach on ai up to 2019 can therefore be summarised as providing legal guidance to businesses , investing in research projects and removing barriers to innovation; ### 81. notes that the us invests massively in sector-specific laws and private sector innovation , in particular among its tech giants and leading universities;


### 82. stresses that the 2019 american ai initiative act ushered in a slight realignment , as besides redirecting funding , retraining workers and strengthening digital infrastructure , the us government announced the development of common standards for trustworthy ai; notes , however , that the resulting 10 principles were very broadly formulated in order to allow each government agency to create sector-specific regulations; expects that although the administration of president biden plans to bring forward a new bill of rights to limit ai harms in 2022 , the us approach will remain market-driven , aiming to avoid regulatory overreach; ### 82. stresses that the 2019 american ai initiative act ushered in a realignment , as besides redirecting funding , retraining workers and strengthening digital infrastructure , the us administration announced the development of common standards for trustworthy ai; commends that although the administration of president biden plans to bring forward a new bill of rights to limit ai harms in 2022;


### 84. observes that on the global stage , china actively promotes international ai partnership as a way to export its own ai-based government surveillance practices , social scoring system and censorship strategies; emphasises that heavy investment abroad under the digital silk road initiative are also used as a means to spread chinese ai globally and to bring other countries under chinese influence; concludes that the chinese approach is therefore built upon deploying ai domestically as well as exporting ai technologies that follow predetermined standards that are in line with the ideology of the chinese communist party; ### deleted


### 86. emphasises that central to the eu regulatory approach is a strong attention to ethical considerations in line with core human rights values and democratic principles; underlines that the commission thereby hopes to achieve another gdpr-like ‘brussels effect’ , meaning that the eu’s regulatory and market power leads to a competitive edge in ai; states that establishing the world’s first regulatory framework for ai could indeed leverage a first-mover advantage in setting international ai standards based on european values , as well as successfully exporting ‘trustworthy ai’ around the world; ### 86. underlines , in the face of this fierce competition , that the eu should have an ambitious development plan for a human centric european ai , based on fundamental rights and european values ; emphasises that central to the eu regulatory approach is a strong attention to ethical considerations in line with core human rights values and democratic principles; underlines that the commission thereby hopes to achieve another gdpr-like ‘brussels effect’ , meaning that the eu’s regulatory and market power leads to a competitive edge in ai; states that establishing the world’s first regulatory framework for ai could indeed leverage a first-mover advantage in setting international ai standards based on fundamental rights , european values , human-driven and ethical ai , as well as successfully exporting ‘trustworthy ai’ around the world;


### 87. is aware that that the vast majority of the 100 leading ai companies globally are domiciled in the us , whereas only three chinese companies and four eu companies fall into this category34 ; notes that the us also leads in the total number of ai start-ups , hosting 40 % of all new ai companies , followed by the eu with 22 % and china with 11 %35 ; ### 87. is aware that that the vast majority of the 100 leading ai companies globally are domiciled in the us , whereas only three chinese companies and four eu companies fall into this category34; notes that the us also leads in the total number of ai start-ups , hosting 40 % of all new ai companies , followed by the eu with 22 % and china with 11 %35; draws attention to the american administration’s massive tax exemptions and subsidies that have enabled this market uptake; concludes that only public authorities have the means to undertake a large-scale social transition to a digitalised economy;


### 90. underlines that while the us and china each have a unified digital market with a coherent set of rules , the eu’s digital single market is still fragmented and features many barriers; stresses that the development of ai products and services is further slowed down by the existence of 27 different national ai strategies and the fact that the eu’s ai assets such as talent , capital and research are spread widely across the continent; ### deleted


### 92. notes that the insufficient legal certainty for ai companies is further exacerbated by the fact that common standards and norms are missing in some sectors , while others are compromised by overregulation or the presence of legislative proposals that have been pending for long periods of time without being adopted; highlights as an example the fact that eu ai developers face a data challenge that neither their us nor chinese counterparts do; observes that they often do not have enough high-quality data to train their algorithms , struggle with strict data protection rules and are affected by a lack of sectoral data spaces and cross-sectoral interoperability , as well as constraints on cross-border data flows; ### 92. notes that the insufficient legal certainty for ai companies is further exacerbated by the fact that common standards and norms are missing in some sectors; highlights as an example the fact that eu ai developers often do not have enough high-quality data to train their algorithms and are affected by a lack of sectoral data spaces and cross-sectoral interoperability; is concerned about the insufficient level of personal data protection enforcement especially on international data transfers and recalls to suspend the us - eu privacy shield as found by the court of justice in schrems ii; notes that , no sustainable single mechanism to guarantee the legal transfer of commercial personal data between the eu and the us has withstood a legal challenge at the cjeu;


### 93. points out that although private investments in the eu ai industry are rising strongly , with eur 3.4 billion invested in 2018 , the investment gap compared with the us (eur 31 billion) and china (eur 21 billion) has grown further37 ; states that the us is also leading in venture capital and private equity funding , which is particularly important for ai start-ups , with eur 12.3 billion , against eur 4.8 billion for china and eur 1.2 billion for the eu; notes that as a consequence , many european ai entrepreneurs are crossing the atlantic to scale up their businesses in the us; ### 93. regrets that european companies and governments were underinvesting in ai and blockchain as compared to leading regions; notes that of the eur 25 billion total investment in these technologies each year , the us and china account for more than 80% , while the eu’s share only amounts to 7% or about eur 1.75 billion 1a; points out that although private investments in the eu ai industry are rising strongly , with eur 3.4 billion invested in 2018 , the investment gap compared with the us (eur 31 billion) and china (eur 21 billion) has grown further37;


### 95. stresses that ai companies within the eu have problems finding qualified employees as 42 % of the eu population lacks basic digital skills40 ; points out that the eu also struggles with ai-relevant university degrees , as the number of bachelor’s degrees awarded in ict is decreasing while the number of postgraduate degrees awarded is 50 % lower than in the us; underlines that the eu also faces a cybersecurity skills gap , with more than 350.000 experts needed; recognises that us and increasingly also chinese companies have a clear advantage in attracting and retaining ai talent from the rest of the world; ### 95. stresses that ai companies within the eu have problems finding qualified employees as 42 % of the eu population lacks basic digital skills40 ; points out that the eu also struggles with ai-relevant university degrees , as the number of bachelor’s degrees awarded in ict is decreasing while the number of postgraduate degrees awarded is 50 % lower than in the us; underlines that the eu also faces a cybersecurity skills gap , with more than 350.000 experts needed; recognises that us and increasingly also chinese companies have a clear advantage in attracting and retaining ai talent from the rest of the world; recalls therefore the need to address the gender gap in stem in which women are still under-represented; calls on the commission and the member states to provide appropriate funding to programmes aimed at attracting women to study and work in stem , to develop strategies aimed at increasing women’s digital inclusion , in fields relating to stem , ai and the research and innovation sector , and to adopt a multi-level approach to address the gender gap at all levels of education and employment in the digital sector;


### 98. concludes that the us is still the overall leader in ai as it is ahead in almost every category , in particular when it comes to market power , investment , ai talent , research and infrastructure; highlights , however , that china , which five years ago was still significantly lagging behind the us in all indicators , is now quickly catching up in almost every category; notes that china could in fact achieve its goal of becoming the global leader in ai by 2030 or even earlier; recognises that both countries have the advantage of a unified single market , greater flexibility in digital governance and stronger political commitment to remaining a leader in ai; ### deleted


### 99. stresses that the eu is behind the us and china in virtually every category and that despite its current measures , it is losing further ground; notes that the eu is , however , ahead on regulatory approaches; points out that a viable eu strategy for becoming more competitive on ai would be to quadruple efforts to catch up when it comes to ai research and innovation , skills , infrastructure and investment , while at the same time trying to create a first-mover advantage by establishing a future-oriented and innovation-friendly regulatory framework for ai development and use; ### deleted


### 100. underlines that the eu’s efforts to strengthen its global ai footprint were severely set back by brexit , as the uk was one of the leading eu countries in ai with london as one of the eu’s most important ai hubs , home to 1.000 ai companies , 35 tech hubs and reputed research centres such as the alan turing institute; ### deleted


### 101. concludes that the eu is currently on the losing side , far from fulfilling its aspiration of becoming a global leader in ai; maintains that there is still a small window of opportunity to change this situation , even though it will close very soon; states that the special committee therefore proposes to swiftly implement the following eu roadmap for ai; ### deleted


### 101. concludes that the eu is currently on the losing side , far from fulfilling its aspiration of becoming a global leader in ai; maintains that there is still a small window of opportunity to change this situation , even though it will close very soon; states that the special committee therefore proposes to swiftly implement the following eu roadmap for ai; ### 101. stresses that the union’s legal obligations and ethical principles for the development , deployment and use of these technologies could make europe a world leader in the artificial intelligence sector and should therefore be promoted worldwide by cooperating with international partners while continuing the critical and ethics-based dialogue with third countries that have alternative models of artificial intelligence regulation , development and deployment models1a;


### 103. calls on the commission to propose only legislative acts in the form of regulations for new digital laws in areas such as ai , as the digital single market needs to undergo a process of genuine harmonisation; is convinced that due to rapid technological development , digital legislation should always be swiftly adaptable , principle-based and future-proof , while adopting a risk-based approach; stresses , furthermore , the importance of legal certainty and , consequently , the need for robust , practical and unambiguous applicability criteria , definitions and obligations in all legal texts; ### 103. calls on the commission to propose only legislative acts in the form of regulations for new digital laws in areas such as ai , as the digital single market needs to undergo a process of genuine harmonisation; is convinced that due to rapid technological development , digital legislation should always be swiftly adaptable , based on the union values of fundamental rights and future-proof ; stresses , furthermore , the importance of legal certainty and , consequently , the need for robust , practical and unambiguous applicability criteria , definitions and obligations in all legal texts;


### 140. calls on the commission to improve knowledge transfer between ai research and the business world by setting up business networks , regulatory sandboxes and contact points with legal personnel and business consultants in universities; ### deleted


### 140. calls on the commission to improve knowledge transfer between ai research and the business world by setting up business networks , regulatory sandboxes and contact points with legal personnel and business consultants in universities; ### 140. notes with concerns that regulatory sandboxes could lower regulatory barriers , as private entities processing personal data will not be obliged to comply with all the applicable data protection requirements when testing their ai systems ; warns that regulatory sandboxes are the best way for the industry lobby to introduce the use of high-risk ai systems;


### 141. stresses the need to accelerate knowledge transfer in the eu from research and science to ai applications in industry and the public sector; recommends the creation of a dedicated public-private partnership (ppp) on ai; calls on the commission to establish european ai data centres , jointly developed by government and industry and using strong encryption to protect the stored data in an appropriate manner; stresses the need to support the development of large-scale testing sites for ai; calls on the commission to provide financial incentives at eu level to launch pilot projects in member states; ### 141. stresses the need to accelerate knowledge transfer in the eu from research and science to ai applications in industry and the public sector; calls on the commission to establish european ai data centres , jointly developed by government and industry and using strong encryption to protect the stored data in an appropriate manner; stresses the need to support the development of large-scale testing sites for ai; calls on the commission to provide financial incentives at eu level to launch pilot projects in member states;


### 142. supports strongly the establishment of an ai lighthouse under the horizon europe framework , which would be the continent’s pioneering centre of excellence for ai research and development; notes , however , that the eu and the member states should commit to a long-term and much more substantial investment plan in the region of eur 1 billion per year over the next 10 years; adds that the ai lighthouse would be an excellent place to create regulatory sandboxes , meaning time- and space-limited areas for experimenting with , testing and finessing specific ai applications that carry some risk but also have high potential for public good; ### 142. supports strongly the establishment of an ai lighthouse under the horizon europe framework , which would be the continent’s pioneering centre of excellence for ai research and development; notes , however , that the eu and the member states should commit to a long-term and much more substantial investment plan in the region of eur 1 billion per year over the next 10 years;


### 144. proposes to scale up and align existing mission such as ellis , platforms such as claire and flagship projects such as humane ai and ai4eu with the goal of promoting ambitious , collaborative and eu-wide research and development goals as well as projects; explains that a single ai mission with clear milestones and regular evaluation would attract the most talented researchers , bringing them together to address the biggest scientific questions in ai; ### 144. proposes to scale up and align existing eu missions with the goal of promoting ambitious , collaborative and eu-wide research and development goals as well as projects; explains that a single ai mission with clear milestones and regular evaluation would attract the most talented researchers , bringing them together to address the biggest scientific questions in ai;


### 145. proposes that on top of the suggested ai training , the eu and its member states should create awareness raising campaigns , including public discussions at local level , as an additional means to reach , inform and empower citizens to understand better the capabilities , limitations and impacts of ai; ### 145. proposes that on top of the suggested ai training , the eu and its member states should create awareness raising campaigns , including public discussions at local level , as an additional means to reach , inform and empower citizens to understand better the capabilities , risks and impacts of ai;


### 146. calls on member states to deliver on the tallinn declaration on egovernment and put mechanisms in place to provide borderless , interoperable , personalised , user-friendly , and end-to-end digital public services based on ai to all individuals and businesses at all levels of public administration; is of the opinion that the objective should be to increase the number of people that use egovernment services , with a focus on ai , to up to 80 % of all eu citizens over the next five years; ### 146. calls on member states to deliver on the tallinn declaration on egovernment and put mechanisms in place to provide borderless , interoperable , personalised , user-friendly , and end-to-end digital public services to all individuals and businesses at all levels of public administration; is of the opinion that the objective should be to increase the number of people that use egovernment services , with a focus on ai , to up to 80 % of all eu citizens over the next five years while keeping current level of human resources and counters;


### 147. calls for human-centred design and an evidence-based approach to ai in health that focuses on patient-oriented and high-quality digital healthcare and that seeks consumer and user feedback throughout the development process; calls on the commission to set the global tone on cutting-edge healthcare and well-being , placing the benefits of ai at the centre of policy-making; urges the prioritisation of funding , the setting of strategic goals , the fostering of cooperation and the adoption of ai applications in healthcare as a critical sector; ### 147. calls for human-centred design and an evidence-based approach to ai in health that focuses on patient-oriented with the ultimate human oversight and decision-making and high-quality digital healthcare and that seeks consumer and user feedback throughout the development process; calls on the commission to set the global tone on cutting-edge healthcare and well-being , placing the benefits of ai at the centre of policy-making; urges the prioritisation of funding , the setting of strategic goals , the fostering of cooperation and the adoption of ai applications in healthcare as a critical sector;


### 148. is convinced that the eu should implement an ambitious digital industrial strategy with a focus on ai , that attempts to reduce the eu’s dependence on non-european hardware , software and services while establishing sound ethical , technological and security standards for those elements that are not produced in the eu or where the purchasing of imports makes more sense from an economic point of view; declares that this approach does not aim to make the eu protectionist , but to strengthen its role as a champion of international cooperation and trade; ### 148. is convinced that the eu should implement an ambitious digital industrial strategy with a focus on ai , that attempts to reduce the eu’s dependence on non-european hardware , software and services while establishing sound ethical , technological and security standards for those elements that are not produced in the eu or where the purchasing of imports makes more sense from an economic point of view; recommends therefore the creation of a european buy act compelling public procurement to a minimum threshold of european hardware and software as well as digital materials , devices or services as a whole;


### 150. points out that the eu should forge a strong international core value-based technology alliance , working together with like-minded partners in order to overcome regulatory divergence in the fields of privacy rights , data flows or competition rules and to remedy strategic vulnerabilities by building on each other’s assets and pooling resources in areas where it is mutually beneficial to do so; ### 150. points out that the eu should forge a strong international rights-based technology alliance , working together with like-minded partners in order to preserve governments’ right to regulate ai development and maintain data ownership and to remedy strategic vulnerabilities by building on each other’s assets and pooling resources in areas where it is mutually beneficial to do so;


### 151. considers it to be of paramount importance for the safety and security of citizens that law enforcement agencies are well advanced in ai development , making full use of the potential of digital technologies to prevent and investigate serious crimes through real-time facial recognition in select locations; underlines that diligently developed algorithms for crime prevention and investigation , based on highly qualitative data , may provide a higher level of efficiency , neutrality and legal certainty than human law enforcement agents , and should thus be promoted; ### deleted


### 151. considers it to be of paramount importance for the safety and security of citizens that law enforcement agencies are well advanced in ai development , making full use of the potential of digital technologies to prevent and investigate serious crimes through real-time facial recognition in select locations; underlines that diligently developed algorithms for crime prevention and investigation , based on highly qualitative data , may provide a higher level of efficiency , neutrality and legal certainty than human law enforcement agents , and should thus be promoted; ### 151. calls for an eu - wide ban on the deployment of live facial recognition systems for law enforcement and on the use of automated recognition in public spaces of other human features , biometric and behavioural signals;


### 151. considers it to be of paramount importance for the safety and security of citizens that law enforcement agencies are well advanced in ai development , making full use of the potential of digital technologies to prevent and investigate serious crimes through real-time facial recognition in select locations; underlines that diligently developed algorithms for crime prevention and investigation , based on highly qualitative data , may provide a higher level of efficiency , neutrality and legal certainty than human law enforcement agents , and should thus be promoted; ### 151. calls on the commission , to implement , through legislative and non-legislative means , and if necessary through infringement proceedings , a ban on any processing of biometric data , including facial images , for law enforcement purposes that leads to mass surveillance in publicly accessible spaces; calls further on the commission to stop funding biometric research or deployment or programmes that are likely to result in indiscriminate mass surveillance in public spaces;


### 153. urges member states to pursue an active policy of european cyber diplomacy by denouncing and attributing foreign-supported ai-powered cyberattacks , while leveraging the full toolbox of eu diplomacy; advises that this should include diplomatic responses , the termination of financial aid and sanctions against those countries or proxies that engage in malicious cyber activities or that sponsor cybercrimes; believes that the eu , in close cooperation with nato , should consider using ai to execute cyber counter-strikes against repeat offenders; ### 153. urges member states to pursue an active policy of european cyber diplomacy by denouncing and attributing foreign-supported ai-powered cyberattacks , while leveraging the full toolbox of eu diplomacy; advises that this should include diplomatic responses , the termination of financial aid and sanctions against those countries or proxies that engage in malicious cyber activities or that sponsor cybercrimes;


### 154. notes that exclusive military and national security uses of ai should be exempt from civilian ai legislation , since overregulation in the field of security and defence could pre-emptively restrict the eu’s capacity to innovate and deploy ai technologies , placing it at a disadvantage to its adversaries that do not have such constraints; ### deleted


### 5. conclusion: an urgent call for action! ### 5. conclusion: an urgent call for regulation!


### 155. believes that the ongoing digital transformation , where ai plays the key role , has triggered a global tech race that will determine the future political and economic power status of the european union; urgently stresses that the eu is so far falling further and further behind in this race with the result that current technological standards are being actively developed and determined outside of europe , presenting an existential threat to our democracy and prosperity; concludes that in order to remain both competitive and a global power , the eu needs to become a global leader in ai; ### 155. believes that the ongoing digital transformation , where ai plays the key role , has triggered a global tech race for two visions or more of progress , a surveillance capitalism versus technology for the greater good of humankind and will determine the future political and economic power status of the european union and the future path of the union when it comes to fundamental rights; urgently stresses that the eu is so far falling further and further behind in this race with the result that current technological standards are being actively developed and determined outside of europe , presenting an existential threat to our democracy and prosperity; concludes that in order to remain both competitive and a global power , the eu needs to become a global leader in ai;


### 156. highlights that ai , while often portrayed as an unpredictable threat , is in reality a powerful digital tool that is already a game changer in core fields that bring benefits for the good of society , including in our aspirations to combat climate change , provide innovate healthcare , revolutionise employment , strengthen our security and democratic systems and boost our competitiveness on a global scale; stresses that these benefits should guide and inform regulation and public communication on ai; ### 156. highlights that ai , can represent a threat if not carefully regulated , while it can also be a powerful digital tool that bring benefits for the good of society , including in our aspirations to combat climate change , provide innovate healthcare , revolutionise employment , strengthen our security and democratic systems and boost our competitiveness on a global scale; stresses that these benefits should guide and inform regulation and public communication on ai;


### 157. highlights further that the eu , with its regulatory and market powers , has the potential to shape the international debate on ai and to push for common standards for the ethics-driven , sustainable and trustworthy development and use of this technology , fully in line with european principles and values; highlights , however , that the window of opportunity for consolidating such a distinctive european approach to ai on the international stage is closing fast , which is why the eu needs to join forces and agree on a joint ai strategy , including a balanced regulatory framework , very soon; ### 157. highlights further that the eu , with its regulatory and market powers , has the potential to shape the international debate on ai and to push for common standards for the rights-based , sustainable and trustworthy development and use of this technology , fully in line with european fundamental rights , principles and values; highlights , however , that the window of opportunity for consolidating such a distinctive european approach to ai on the international stage is closing fast , which is why the eu needs to join forces and agree on a joint ai strategy , including a balanced regulatory framework , very soon;


### 158. stresses that currently , the eu does not meet any of the preconditions that would allow us to fully capture the potential of ai , especially compared to the ai frontrunners china and the us; finds that a lack of legal certainty , access to and sharing of high-quality data , harmonised rules and standards , funding , research , skills and infrastructure for core technologies , as well as high regulatory burdens , have led to a situation in which the eu’s competitiveness is constantly decreasing; is convinced that only by executing a bold and comprehensive eu roadmap for ai will the eu manage to catch up; states that parliament needs an ad hoc digital committee with legislative powers in order to be able to respond effectively to these horizontal challenges , ; notes that as long as this committee is not established , clear competences among existing committees need to be defined in order to enable them to follow up effectively on all specific parts of this roadmap; ### 158. finds that a lack of legal certainty , harmonised rules and standards , funding , research , skills and infrastructure for core technologies , have led to a situation in which the eu’s competitiveness is constantly decreasing; is convinced that only by executing a bold and comprehensive eu roadmap for ai will the eu manage to catch up;


### 159. concludes that it is the eu’s responsibility to quickly set up a favourable regulatory environment for ai that provides for swift digital law-making , effective governance and balanced ethical standards , while at the same time preventing overregulation and giving enough leeway for innovation; urges that the adequate development and training of ai will require better access to high-quality data , common standards and incentives for voluntary data sharing; calls on its committees on legal affairs (juri) , internal market and consumer protection (imco) , industry , research and energy (itre) , civil liberties , justice and home affairs (libe) , and constitutional affairs (afco) to ensure that these goals are met; ### 159. concludes that it is the eu’s responsibility to quickly set up a favourable regulatory environment for ai that provides for swift digital law-making , effective governance and strong ethical and fundamental rights standards; urges that the adequate development and training of ai will require better access to high-quality data , common standards and incentives for voluntary data sharing;


### 160. concludes that our digital ambitions in fields such as ai can only be achieved through a fully integrated and fully harmonised digital single market that promotes cross-border exchange and that guarantees that the same rules and standards apply to all ai researchers and companies across the eu; stresses in this regard that the eu also needs to target abuses of market power in order to level the playing field; calls on the economic and monetary affairs (econ) , imco and juri committees to guarantee this; ### deleted


### 161. concludes that ai systems require robust infrastructure and connectivity; stresses that digital green infrastructure which is in line with the green deal will target all sectors , including agriculture , electricity , housing , transport , businesses , value chains and the circular economy; stresses that ai will not , however , be functional without strong deployment of broadband , fibre , edge nodes and 5g , or if key emerging technologies such as quantum computing are not made a priority; calls on the environment , public health and food safety (envi) , agriculture and rural development (agri) , regional development (regi) , transport and tourism (tran) , itre , econ and imco committees to follow up on these points; ### deleted


### 161. concludes that ai systems require robust infrastructure and connectivity; stresses that digital green infrastructure which is in line with the green deal will target all sectors , including agriculture , electricity , housing , transport , businesses , value chains and the circular economy; stresses that ai will not , however , be functional without strong deployment of broadband , fibre , edge nodes and 5g , or if key emerging technologies such as quantum computing are not made a priority; calls on the environment , public health and food safety (envi) , agriculture and rural development (agri) , regional development (regi) , transport and tourism (tran) , itre , econ and imco committees to follow up on these points; ### 161. calls for the promotion of open source platforms , run directly by farmers , organising mutual aid and the sharing of good practices between farmers , and directly linking producers and consumers of foodstuffs in the framework of short circuits;


### 162. concludes that in order to promote innovation in ai , it is necessary to provide eu citizens with the means to acquire digital skills; stresses that in order to increase digital literacy and resilience and to combat the digital divide among citizens in the digital age , digital and ai education needs to start at an early stage and remain available at all levels of employment; finds that initiatives to establish ai ecosystems of excellence , to increase the pool of ai talent in the eu and to combat brain drain are of vital importance; calls on the culture and education (cult) , employment and social affairs (empl) and itre committee to focus their resources on these fields; ### deleted


### 163. concludes that in order to build trust in ai among citizens , public services and their administrative structures need to lead by example; stresses that the eu needs to accelerate the uptake of ai in egovernance in order to facilitate the secure use of ai in public administrations and to strengthen democratic structures as well as the eu’s core ethical principles; stresses furthermore that ai in the healthcare sector , if provided with the means to securely access patients’ data , will revolutionise healthcare systems; calls on the envi , itre , juri and libe committees to monitor and accelerate these developments; ### deleted


### 164. concludes that the eu’s ai strategy should not overlook military and security considerations that arise with the global deployment of ai technologies; stresses that international cooperation with like-minded partners needs to be increased in order to safeguard our ethical principles and values but also to protect our continent against new technological threats; finds that our entire security system is affected by the digital transformation; urges the eu , therefore , to come up with new policy responses and tactics; calls on the foreign affairs (afet) , international trade (inta) and libe committees , and the subcommittee on security and defence (sede) to develop effective responses; ### deleted


### 164. concludes that the eu’s ai strategy should not overlook military and security considerations that arise with the global deployment of ai technologies; stresses that international cooperation with like-minded partners needs to be increased in order to safeguard our ethical principles and values but also to protect our continent against new technological threats; finds that our entire security system is affected by the digital transformation; urges the eu , therefore , to come up with new policy responses and tactics; calls on the foreign affairs (afet) , international trade (inta) and libe committees , and the subcommittee on security and defence (sede) to develop effective responses; ### 164. calls for a total ban on all autonomous weapons systems , regardless of the degree of automation , enshrined in international law , for example in the un convention on conventional weapons (ccw) or in a newly drafted convention banning these weapons; further calls for an end to all research into the gradual automation of weapons systems;


### 7. underlines that the average payment time in 2021 continued the downward trend observed since 2020 , showing a reduction of approximately one day in comparison with 2020 to 24 ,63 days; appreciates that the average time for payment of invoices relating to external translation , representing 75 % of the total number of invoices paid and for which the contractual time limit is 60 days , was 27 ,48 days , while the average period for payment of other invoices , for which the contractual time limit for payment is 30 days , was 18 ,92 days; ### 7. praise the court for the average payment time which in 2021 continued the downward trend observed since 2020 , showing a reduction of approximately one day in comparison with 2020 to 24 ,63 days; appreciates that the average time for payment of invoices relating to external translation , representing 75 % of the total number of invoices paid and for which the contractual time limit is 60 days , was 27 ,48 days , while the average period for payment of other invoices , for which the contractual time limit for payment is 30 days , was 18 ,92 days;


### 30. welcomes the adoption of the new code of conduct for members of the court of justice and the general court that entered into force on 7 october 2021; observes that it brings specific focus on members’ declarations of interest , on their periodic update at every change of situation and at least every three years , and on their publication on the curia website , starting from end of 2021; stresses that the prevention of conflicts of interest is specifically targeted by the new provisions and agrees with the cjeu that the strict approach embraced is designed to strengthen public confidence in the independence of the union’s judiciary; ### 30. welcomes the adoption of the new code of conduct for members of the court of justice and the general court that entered into force on 7 october 2021; observes that it brings specific focus on members’ declarations of interest , - which regretfully continue to have self declaration nature- , on their periodic update at every change of situation and at least every three years , and on their publication on the curia website , starting from end of 2021; stresses that the prevention of conflicts of interest is specifically targeted by the new provisions and agrees with the cjeu that the strict approach embraced is designed to strengthen public confidence in the independence of the union’s judiciary;


### 11. welcomes the fact that the proportion of women in managerial posts (40% in 2021) has continued to remain at a high level; notes as well that despite a slight decrease in 2021 , the occupancy rate of women in management posts has shown a clear upward trend since 2018 (41% in 2020 , 39% in 2019 and 37.5% in 2018). ### 11. welcomes the fact that the proportion of women in managerial posts (40% in 2021) has continued to remain at a high level; notes as well that despite a slight decrease in 2021 , the occupancy rate of women in management posts has shown a clear upward trend since 2018 (41% in 2020 , 39% in 2019 and 37.5% in 2018); notes , however , the still existing imbalanced situation in terms of women’s representation among the judges of both the court of justice and the general court; exhorts , once again , the members of the council to address this situation by actively promoting gender parity in the appointment of judges , in line with the principles enshrined in article 8 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union and article 23 of the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , and with the commitments taken under regulations (eu , euratom) 2015/24221a and (eu , euratom) 2019/6291b of the european parliament and of the council.


### 20. acknowledges that , in accordance with article 118(9) of the financial regulation , “the reports and findings of the internal auditor , as well as the report of the union institution concerned , shall be accessible to the public after validation by the internal auditor of the action taken for their implementation”; calls on the internal auditor to regularly report to the committee on budgetary control on the annual audit activities carried out; ### 20. acknowledges that , in accordance with article 118(9) of the financial regulation , “the reports and findings of the internal auditor , as well as the report of the union institution concerned , shall be accessible to the public after validation by the internal auditor of the action taken for their implementation” which in practice is translated into a delay in publication of several years after all recommendations have been implemented; calls on the bureau to make sure that members have access to the internal report at least in view of the discharge procedure; requests a publication of the report in a more expedite way reminding that a validation of recommendations does not require all recommendations to be fully implemented; calls on the internal auditor to regularly report to the committee on budgetary control on the annual audit activities carried out;


### 61. stresses that transparency , accountability , and integrity are essential ethics principles within the union institutions and particularly parliament as house of the european democracy; recalls that unethical behaviours must be prevented , persecuted and condemned for significantly damage the credibility and legitimacy of the union and constitute a serious threat to democracy and public trust; recalls the court’s conclusions and recommendations in its special report 13/2019 on the ethnical frameworks of union institutions , as well as parliament’s resolution of 16 september 2021 on strengthening transparency and integrity in the union institutions by setting up an independentunion ethics body; ### 61. stresses that transparency , accountability , and integrity are essential ethics principles within the union institutions and particularly parliament as house of the european democracy; recalls that unethical behaviours must be prevented , persecuted and condemned for significantly damage the credibility and legitimacy of the union and constitute a serious threat to democracy and public trust; recalls the court’s conclusions and recommendations in its special report 13/2019 on the ethical frameworks of union institutions , as well as parliament’s resolution of 16 september 2021 on strengthening transparency and integrity in the union institutions by setting up an independent union ethics body and parliament’ resolution of 15 december 2022 on suspicions of corruption from qatar and the broader need for transparency and accountability in the european institutions;


### 78. recalls that the union , and therefore parliament too , is legally committed to providing accessible information and communication under the united nations convention on the rights of persons with disabilities; calls therefore on parliament’s administration to develop specific initiatives to ensure more and better accessibility to its documents and debates , with a particular focus on the state of the union debate , building on examples like the interpretation in international sign of the commission’s weekly college read outs; notes that directorate-general for translation is developing a tool that is able to automatically transcribe and translate parliamentary multilingual debates in real time , so that all citizens have equal access to information in their language; requests an update on the project and an analysis on its implementation and total cost; ### 78. recalls that the union , and therefore parliament too , is legally committed to providing accessible information and communication under the united nations convention on the rights of persons with disabilities; calls therefore on parliament’s administration to develop specific initiatives to ensure more and better accessibility to its documents and debates , with a particular focus on the state of the union debate as well as the "this is europe" plenary debates , building on examples like the interpretation in international sign of the commission’s weekly college read outs; reiterates its long-standing request to the secretary-general to analyse the feasibility of international sign language interpretation for all plenary debates and to implement without delay this request; believes moreover that plenary sessions retransmission in the sign languages used in each member state would increase participation of persons with disabilities in the eu democratic process; notes that directorate-general for translation is developing a tool that is able to automatically transcribe and translate parliamentary multilingual debates in real time , so that all citizens have equal access to information in their language; requests an update on the project and an analysis on its implementation and total cost;


### 81. questions the bureau decision of 4 july 2022 to create a directorate-general for parliamentary democracy partnerships (dg papa) in view of the fact that its future responsibilities are already carried out by other services and that it will require additional administrative staff; is of the opinion that the regrouping of services in dg papa is , however , a unique opportunity for a thorough evaluation of the need , efficiency and cost of the activities carried out , as well as of their visibility and engagement vis-à-vis the members; ### deleted


### 45. notes that the eeas does not have a direct role in eu legislation , however , has an important role for instance regarding decisions concerning sanctions and the negotiation of international trade agreements , which have a considerable regulatory impact; would therefore find it relevant if the eeas could join the eu transparency register on the basis of a service-level-agreement; ### 45. notes that the eeas does not have a direct role in eu legislation , however , has an important role for instance regarding decisions concerning sanctions and the negotiation of international trade agreements , which have a considerable regulatory impact; would therefore find it extremely relevant for the eeas to join the eu transparency register on the basis of a service-level-agreement; invites the eeas to publish all meetings with lobby organisations of all types , including those of heads of union delegations , in order to improve transparency;


### 14. notes that public access to documents represents a major priority for the ombudsman and accounts for up to one in four inquiries; furthermore notes , that public access to documents includes how the union administration deals with text and instant messages and timely access to documents; is looking forward to learning more about how the ombudsman may advise union institutions and bodies on how to put systems in place in order to enhance the handlings of access to documents; asks the ombudsman to provide feedback on the new commission it tool in this area (ease - electronic access to european commission documents); ### 14. notes that public access to documents represents a major priority for the ombudsman and accounts for up to one in four inquiries; furthermore notes , that public access to documents includes how the union administration deals with text and instant messages and timely access to documents; supports the ombudsman call for eu access to document law to be modernised and more in line with citizen’s rights and is looking forward to learning more about how the ombudsman may advise union institutions and bodies on how to put systems in place in order to enhance the handlings of access to documents; asks the ombudsman to provide feedback on the new commission it tool in this area (ease - electronic access to european commission documents);


### 43. is aware that the committee’s regulation no 3/2021 provides for the payment of a flat-rate remote meeting allowance for members of the committee , duly mandated alternates and rapporteurs’ experts and speakers invited to attend remote or hybrid meetings , with the aim of compensating the general expenses incurred for preparing for and participating in such meetings; understands that the same framework sets , as in 2020 and for the whole of 2021 , the criteria for payment and verification , quantifying the allowance at eur 200 per day and stipulating that to qualify for the allowance , members must sign a declaration of participation and submit it to the members' financial service , enabling in this way the administration to verify the attendance of the person in question; points out , however , that in accordance with the more recent decision no 15/2022 on the application of extraordinary measures during the covid-19 pandemic , the meetings of the committee’s bodies currently take all place in person; ### 43. regrets that the committee’s regulation no 3/2021 provides for the payment of a flat-rate remote meeting allowance for members of the committee , duly mandated alternates and rapporteurs’ experts and speakers invited to attend remote or hybrid meetings , with the aim of compensating the general expenses incurred for preparing for and participating in such meetings; understands that the same framework sets , as in 2020 and for the whole of 2021 , the criteria for payment and verification , quantifying the allowance at eur 200 per day and stipulating that to qualify for the allowance , members must sign a declaration of participation and submit it to the members' financial service , enabling in this way the administration to verify the attendance of the person in question; points out , however , that in accordance with the more recent decision no 15/2022 on the application of extraordinary measures during the covid-19 pandemic , the meetings of the committee’s bodies currently take all place in person;


### 13. underlines that between april and june 2021 several meetings of the budget committee of the council discussed the proposal by the committee for a specific allowance for remote attendance of committee meetings; notes that the proposal by the committee’s caf , supported by the committee’s quaestors and approved by the council quantifies the allowance for remote participation to eur 145 , which is half the allowance stipulated in the council decision 2013/471 , applicable as per 1 july 2021 and limited to the period where there are travel difficulties caused by the covid-19 pandemic; notes that the reimbursement requires a check of attendance at the meeting or event for each participant via a variety of methods such as signature lists , electronic connection reports , screen shots or other reports showing interventions made , and only based on that information can a reimbursement take place; highlights that in the event of remote attendance , only the reduced allowance is paid and no other reimbursements (such as for travel costs or travel allowances) are made after a check of the specific declaration that the member , in fact , did attend the meeting and that no other third-party contribution has been received; ### 13. underlines that between april and june 2021 several meetings of the budget committee of the council discussed the proposal by the committee for a specific allowance for remote attendance of committee meetings; notes that the proposal by the committee’s caf , supported by the committee’s quaestors and approved by the council quantifies the allowance for remote participation to eur 145 , which is half the allowance stipulated in the council decision 2013/471 , applicable as per 1 july 2021 and limited to the period where there are travel difficulties caused by the covid-19 pandemic; notes that the reimbursement requires a check of attendance at the meeting or event for each participant via a variety of methods such as signature lists , electronic connection reports , screen shots or other reports showing interventions made , and only based on that information can a reimbursement take place; highlights that in the event of remote attendance , only the reduced allowance is paid and no other reimbursements (such as for travel costs or travel allowances) are made after a check of the specific declaration that the member , in fact , did attend the meeting and that no other third-party contribution has been received;considers nevertheless this reduced allowance to be of difficult understanding for the public opinion and could lead to a reputational damage for the committee;


### 41. notes that a revised decision on procedures for preventing and dealing with psychological and sexual harassment at work (decision 090/22a) was prepared and discussed in 2021 , to be adopted in march 2022; observes that this is part of a wider action plan on ethics adopted in january 2021 , based on the recommendations of a joint working group comprised of staff and administration representatives; ### 41. notes that a revised decision on procedures for preventing and dealing with psychological and sexual harassment at work (decision 090/22a) was prepared and discussed in 2021 , to be adopted in march 2022; observes that this is part of a wider action plan on ethics adopted in january 2021 , based on the recommendations of a joint working group comprised of staff and administration representatives; reiterates its regret on the slow adoption of such a new decision , which unfortunately does not include specific procedure for harassment involving a member and an official (within the definition of decision 090/22 a) with the consequence that no uniform procedures for dealing with cases of harassment is applied , leading to victims being treated differently; calls on the committee to immediately provide for a specific procedure that will grant everyone proper and long due protection against harassment;


### 47. notes that , to date , the settlement agreements related to european anti-fraud office (olaf) case oc/2018/0666/a1 have finally been fully implemented with all staff members concerned; notes that , as regards the former committee member identified by olaf as a victim of serious misconduct , following talks in march 2021 an agreement was found about the ways to remedy the issue , centred on the strengthening the committee’s code of conduct , strengthening the ethical framework , giving priority to finding fair settlements and providing public apologies to victims; ### 47. notes that , to date , the settlement agreements related to european anti-fraud office (olaf) case oc/2018/0666/a1 have finally been fully implemented with all staff members concerned; but regrets the slow reaction by the commitee in concluding and implementing the settlements; notes that , as regards the former committee member identified by olaf as a victim of serious misconduct , following talks in march 2021 an agreement was found about the ways to remedy the issue , centred on the strengthening the committee’s code of conduct , strengthening the ethical framework , giving priority to finding fair settlements and providing public apologies to victims;


### 48. welcomes that , on 13 april 2022 , the committee’s president made a public statement , published on the committee’s website , addressing her official apology on behalf of the committee to all the victims , both members of staff and the former member , in the case in question; ### 48. welcomes that , on 13 april 2022 , the committee’s president made a public statement , published on the committee’s website , addressing her official apology on behalf of the committee to all the victims , both members of staff and the former member , in the case in question; reiterates its concern that the committee's secretary-general still refuses to admit the internal shortcomings and responsibilities , leading to a breach of duty of care towards the staff of the committee;


### 51. deeply regrets that parliament’s unambiguous calls for an external investigation specifically to review the committee’s hr procedures and the effectiveness thereof , with a focus on addressing harassment claims and ensuring the well-being of the staff are still ignored; believes that it is material to guarantee the well-being of the staff and to effectively prevent further cases , as those occurred; ### 51. deeply regrets that parliament’s unambiguous calls for an external investigation specifically to review the committee’s hr procedures and the effectiveness thereof , with a focus on identifying possible responsibility of the administrative hierarchy in addressing harassment claims and ensuring the well-being of the staff are still ignored; believes that it is material to guarantee the well-being of the staff and to effectively prevent further cases , as those occurred;


### 28. regrets that the court keeps a reputation of being a historically male-dominated institution; remarks with concern that 13 member states have never sent a woman to the court; calls on the president of the court to encourage the national authorities entrusted with the presentation of the candidates to present candidates of different genders with the aim of achieving a reasonable gender balance across the members of the court; ### 28. regrets that the court keeps a reputation of being a historically male-dominated institution; remarks with concern that 13 member states have never sent a woman to the court; calls on the president of the court to encourage the national authorities entrusted with the presentation of the candidates to present candidates of different genders with the aim of achieving at least a reasonable gender balance across the members of the court;


### 37. reminds the experience learnt from the irregularities committed previously by karel pinxten when he was member of the court with respect to whom no action could be undertaken to comprehensively remedy the financial and reputational prejudice given to the court and to the union as a whole , because no legal basis exists to recover mr pinxten’s salary for days of absence in the course of missions outside the performance of his duties and for other unjustified absences; stresses that , as indicated by the court of justice in its judgement of 30 september 20211 , his misbehaviour was favoured by the vagueness of the internal rules and allowed by the shortcomings of the controls put in place; acknowledges the actions undertaken by the court in this matter , by cooperating with european anti-fraud office (olaf) , waiving immunities and bringing to successful conclusion the procedure under article 286(6) tfeu; is aware of the court’s determination to prevent similar cases from arising in the future and for this reason is committed to support and work with the court in the necessary adjustment to its internal rules; ### 37. reminds the experience learnt from the irregularities committed previously by karel pinxten when he was member of the court with respect to whom no action could be undertaken to comprehensively remedy the financial and reputational prejudice given to the court and to the union as a whole , because no legal basis exists to recover mr pinxten’s salary for days of absence in the course of missions outside the performance of his duties and for other unjustified absences; stresses that , as indicated by the court of justice in its judgement of 30 september 20211 , his misbehaviour was favoured by the vagueness of the internal rules and allowed by the shortcomings of the controls put in place; acknowledges the actions undertaken by the court in this matter , by cooperating with european anti-fraud office (olaf) , waiving immunities and bringing to successful conclusion the procedure under article 286(6) tfeu; is aware of the court’s determination to prevent similar cases from arising in the future and for this reason is committed to support and work with the court in the necessary adjustment to its internal rules; in order to implement high standard of behaviour required of persons holding high office with the eu institutions;