### provide effective portability of data generated through the activity of a business user or end user and shall , in particular , provide tools for end users to facilitate the exercise of data portability , in line with regulation eu 2016/679 , including by the provision of continuous and real-time access ; ### provide effective portability of data generated through the activity of a business user or by goods and services provided by a provider of ancillary services of a gatekeeper or end user and shall , in particular , provide tools for end users to facilitate the exercise of data portability , in line with regulation eu 2016/679 , including by the provision of continuous and real-time access;


### provide to any third party providers of online search engines , upon their request , with access on fair , reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to ranking , query , click and view data in relation to free and paid search generated by end users on online search engines of the gatekeeper , subject to anonymisation for the query , click and view data that constitutes personal data; ### provide to any third party providers of online search engines , upon their request , with access on fair , reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to ranking , query , click and view data in relation to free and paid search generated by end users on online search engines of the gatekeeper , subject to anonymisation and continuous testing against re-identification for the query , click and view data that constitutes personal data;


### provide to any third party providers of online search engines , upon their request , with access on fair , reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to ranking , query , click and view data in relation to free and paid search generated by end users on online search engines of the gatekeeper , subject to anonymisation for the query , click and view data that constitutes personal data; ### deleted


### apply fair and non-discriminatory general conditions of access for business users to its software application store designated pursuant to article 3 of this regulation. ### apply fair and non-discriminatory general conditions of access for business users of its core platform , including its software application store , its digital voice assistant , its online search engine and its online social network designated pursuant to article 3 of this regulation.


### 2. for the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1 data that is not publicly available shall include any aggregated and non-aggregated data generated by business users that can be inferred from , or collected through , the commercial activities of business users or their customers on the core platform service of the gatekeeper. ### 2. for the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1 data that is not publicly available shall include any aggregated and non-aggregated data generated by business users or generated by goods and services produced , by a provider of ancillary services , for the account of the gatekeeper , that can be inferred from , or collected through , the commercial activities of business users or their customers on the core platform service , distribution , payment or any other ancillary service of the gatekeeper.


### 2. for the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1 data that is not publicly available shall include any aggregated and non-aggregated data generated by business users that can be inferred from , or collected through , the commercial activities of business users or their customers on the core platform service of the gatekeeper. ### 2. for the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1 data that is not publicly available shall include any aggregated and non-aggregated data generated by business users or generated by goods and services provided by a supplier to the gatekeeper’s ancillary services notably distribution , that can be inferred from , or collected through , the commercial activities of business users or their customers on the core platform , distribution or other ancillary service of the gatekeeper.


### 2. gatekeepers , undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned may submit their observations to the commission’s preliminary findings within a time limit which shall be fixed by the commission in its preliminary findings and which may not be less than 14 days. ### 2. gatekeepers , undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned and third parties having a legitimate interest may submit their observations to the commission’s preliminary findings within a time limit which shall be fixed by the commission in its preliminary findings and which may not be less than 14 days.


### 2. gatekeepers , undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned may submit their observations to the commission’s preliminary findings within a time limit which shall be fixed by the commission in its preliminary findings and which may not be less than 14 days. ### 2. gatekeepers , undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned as well as third parties affected by the conduct of the gatekeeper may submit their observations to the commission’s preliminary findings within a time limit which shall be fixed by the commission in its preliminary findings and which may not be less than 14 days.


### (29) designated gatekeepers should comply with the obligations laid down in this regulation in respect of each of the core platform services listed in the relevant designation decision. the mandatory rules should apply taking into account the conglomerate position of gatekeepers , where applicable. furthermore , implementing measures that the commission may by decision impose on the gatekeeper following a regulatory dialogue should be designed in an effective manner , having regard to the features of core platform services as well as possible circumvention risks and in compliance with the principle of proportionality and the fundamental rights of the undertakings concerned as well as those of third parties. ### (29) gatekeepers should comply with the obligations laid down in this regulation in respect of each of the core platform services listed in the relevant designation decision. the mandatory rules should apply taking into account the conglomerate position of gatekeepers , where applicable. furthermore , implementing measures that the commission may by decision impose on the gatekeeper following a regulatory dialogue should be designed in an effective manner , having regard to the features of core platform services as well as possible circumvention risks and in compliance with the principle of proportionality and the fundamental rights of the undertakings concerned as well as those of third parties.


### (29) designated gatekeepers should comply with the obligations laid down in this regulation in respect of each of the core platform services listed in the relevant designation decision. the mandatory rules should apply taking into account the conglomerate position of gatekeepers , where applicable. furthermore , implementing measures that the commission may by decision impose on the gatekeeper following a regulatory dialogue should be designed in an effective manner , having regard to the features of core platform services as well as possible circumvention risks and in compliance with the principle of proportionality and the fundamental rights of the undertakings concerned as well as those of third parties. ### (29) designated gatekeepers should comply with the obligations laid down in this regulation in respect of each of the core platform services listed in the relevant designation decision. the mandatory rules should apply taking into account the conglomerate position of gatekeepers , where applicable. furthermore , implementing measures that the commission may by decision impose on the gatekeeper following a regulatory dialogue should be designed in an effective manner , having regard to the features of core platform services as well as possible circumvention risks and in compliance with the principle of proportionality and the rights of the undertakings concerned as well as those of third parties.


### (52) gatekeepers may also have a dual role as developers of operating systems and device manufacturers , including any technical functionality that such a device may have. for example , a gatekeeper that is a manufacturer of a device may restrict access to some of the functionalities in this device , such as near-field-communication technology and the software used to operate that technology , which may be required for the effective provision of an ancillary service by the gatekeeper as well as by any potential third party provider of such an ancillary service. such access may equally be required by software applications related to the relevant ancillary services in order to effectively provide similar functionalities as those offered by gatekeepers. if such a dual role is used in a manner that prevents alternative providers of ancillary services or of software applications to have access under equal conditions to the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services , this could significantly undermine innovation by providers of such ancillary services as well as choice for end users of such ancillary services. the gatekeepers should therefore be obliged to ensure access under equal conditions to , and interoperability with , the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision of any ancillary services by the gatekeeper. ### (52) gatekeepers may also have a dual role as developers of operating systems and device manufacturers , including any technical functionality that such a device may have. for example , a gatekeeper that is a manufacturer of a device may restrict access to some of the functionalities in this device , such as near-field-communication technology and the software used to operate that technology , which may be required for the effective provision of an ancillary service by the gatekeeper as well as by any potential third party provider of such an ancillary service. such access may equally be required by software applications related to the relevant ancillary services in order to effectively provide similar functionalities as those offered by gatekeepers. if such a dual role is used in a manner that prevents alternative providers of ancillary services or of software applications to have access under equal conditions to the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services , this could significantly undermine innovation by providers of such ancillary services as well as choice for end users of such ancillary services. the gatekeepers should therefore be obliged to ensure access under equal conditions to , and interoperability and portability with , the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision of any ancillary services by the gatekeeper.


### (52) gatekeepers may also have a dual role as developers of operating systems and device manufacturers , including any technical functionality that such a device may have. for example , a gatekeeper that is a manufacturer of a device may restrict access to some of the functionalities in this device , such as near-field-communication technology and the software used to operate that technology , which may be required for the effective provision of an ancillary service by the gatekeeper as well as by any potential third party provider of such an ancillary service. such access may equally be required by software applications related to the relevant ancillary services in order to effectively provide similar functionalities as those offered by gatekeepers. if such a dual role is used in a manner that prevents alternative providers of ancillary services or of software applications to have access under equal conditions to the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services , this could significantly undermine innovation by providers of such ancillary services as well as choice for end users of such ancillary services. the gatekeepers should therefore be obliged to ensure access under equal conditions to , and interoperability with , the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision of any ancillary services by the gatekeeper. ### (52) gatekeepers may also have a dual role as developers of operating systems and device manufacturers , including any technical functionality that such a device may have. for example , a gatekeeper that is a manufacturer of a device may restrict access to some of the functionalities in this device , such as near-field-communication technology and the software used to operate that technology , which may be required for the effective provision of an ancillary service by the gatekeeper as well as by any potential third party provider of such an ancillary service. such access may equally be required by software applications related to the relevant ancillary services in order to effectively provide similar functionalities as those offered by gatekeepers. if such a dual role is used in a manner that prevents alternative providers of ancillary services or of software applications to have access under equal conditions to the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services , this could significantly undermine innovation by providers of such ancillary services as well as choice for end users of such ancillary services. the gatekeepers should therefore be obliged to ensure access under equal conditions to , and interoperability with , the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision of any ancillary services by the gatekeeper.


### 5. member states shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws , regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. this is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests , in compliance with union law. in particular , nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing obligations , which are compatible with union law , on undertakings , including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this regulation in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition. ### 5. member states shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws , regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. this shall not affect rules pursuing other legitimate public interests , in compliance with union law. in particular , nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing obligations , which are compatible with union law , on undertakings , including providers of core platform services , in order to protect consumers , fight against acts of unfair competition , protect and foster media freedom , pluralism of media and opinions , respect for multilingualism and ‘cultural exception’ and support other legitimate public interests.


### 1. a provider of core platform services shall be designated as gatekeeper if: ### 1. a provider of core platform services shall be designated as gatekeeper if two of the following criteria apply:


### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (c) where the thresholds in point (b) were met in each of the last three financial years. ### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (c) where the thresholds in point (b) were met in each of the last two financial years.


### 6. this regulation is without prejudice to the application of articles 101 and 102 tfeu. it is also without prejudice to the application of: national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements , decisions by associations of undertakings , concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; national competition rules prohibiting other forms of unilateral conduct insofar as they are applied to undertakings other than gatekeepers or amount to imposing additional obligations on gatekeepers; council regulation (ec) no 139/200438 and national rules concerning merger control; regulation (eu) 2019/1150 and regulation (eu) …./.. of the european parliament and of the council39. ### 6. this regulation is without prejudice to the application of articles 101 and 102 tfeu. it must not undermine the application of national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements , decisions by associations of undertakings , concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; council regulation (ec) no 139/200438 and national rules concerning merger control; regulation (eu) 2019/1150 and regulation (eu) …./.. of the european parliament and of the council39. this regulation shall not prevent member states from imposing other obligations on gatekeepers.


### online intermediation services; ### online intermediation services , including digital voice assistants , marketplaces and application stores;


### online intermediation services; ### online intermediation services , including online retail services;


### where the gatekeeper presents such sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that it does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1 , the commission shall apply paragraph 6 to assess whether the criteria in paragraph 1 are met. ### where the gatekeeper presents such sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that it does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1 , the commission shall apply paragraph 6 to assess whether the criteria in paragraph 1 are met nonetheless.


### 1. the commission may upon request or its own initiative reconsider , amend or repeal at any moment a decision adopted pursuant to article 3 for one of the following reasons: ### 1. based on substantiated argumentation made public , the commission may upon request or its own initiative reconsider , amend or repeal at any moment a decision adopted pursuant to article 3 for one of the following reasons:


### in assessing the request , the commission shall take into account , in particular , the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the grounds in paragraph 2 as well as the effects on the gatekeeper concerned and on third parties. the suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the commission in order to ensure a fair balance between the goals pursued by the grounds in paragraph 2 and the objectives of this regulation. such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the commission pursuant to paragraph 1. ### in assessing the request , the commission shall take into account , in particular , the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the grounds in paragraph 2 as well as the effects on the gatekeeper concerned and on third parties. the suspension , limited in time , may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the commission in order to ensure a fair balance between the goals pursued by the grounds in paragraph 2 and the objectives of this regulation. such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the commission pursuant to paragraph 1.


### 2. on-site inspections may also be carried out with the assistance of auditors or experts appointed by the commission pursuant to article 24(2). ### 2. on-site inspections must be carried out with the assistance of auditors or experts appointed by the commission pursuant to article 24(2) , with at least one expert in the field of consumers' rights. the member states may recommend experts from their national authorities


### 2. the actions pursuant to paragraph 1 may include the appointment of independent external experts and auditors to assist the commission to monitor the obligations and measures and to provide specific expertise or knowledge to the commission. ### 2. the actions pursuant to paragraph 1 may include the appointment of independent external experts and auditors to be embedded within the gatekeeper and to assist the commission to monitor the obligations and measures and to provide specific expertise or knowledge to the commission.


### 2. the actions pursuant to paragraph 1 may include the appointment of independent external experts and auditors to assist the commission to monitor the obligations and measures and to provide specific expertise or knowledge to the commission. ### 2. the actions pursuant to paragraph 1 must include the appointment of independent external experts and auditors including from competent independent national authorities , according to article 32 , or consumers' right organisations , to be granted full access within the gatekeeper and to assist the commission to monitor the obligations and measures and to provide specific expertise or knowledge to the commission. such actions may include , inter alia , access to algorithms , in order to ensure compliance with articles 5 and 6.


### 2. member states shall submit evidence in support of their request. ### 2. the member state , or any legal person able to demonstrate a legitimate interest in representing business users or consumers , shall submit evidence in support of its request.


### 2. this regulation shall apply from six months after its entry into force. ### 2. this regulation shall apply from three months after its entry into force.


### (18) a sustained market capitalisation of the provider of core platform services at or above the threshold level over three or more years should be considered as strengthening the presumption that the provider of core platform services has a significant impact on the internal market. ### (18) a sustained market capitalisation of the provider of core platform services at or above the threshold level over two years should be considered as strengthening the presumption that the provider of core platform services has a significant impact on the internal market.


### (18) a sustained market capitalisation of the provider of core platform services at or above the threshold level over three or more years should be considered as strengthening the presumption that the provider of core platform services has a significant impact on the internal market. ### (18) a sustained market capitalisation of the provider of core platform services at or above the threshold level over three years should be considered as strengthening the presumption that the provider of core platform services has a significant impact on the internal market.


### (23) providers of core platform services which meet the quantitative thresholds but are able to present sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that , in the circumstances in which the relevant core platform service operates , they do not fulfil the objective requirements for a gatekeeper , should not be designated directly , but only subject to a further investigation. the burden of adducing evidence that the presumption deriving from the fulfilment of quantitative thresholds should not apply to a specific provider should be borne by that provider in its assessment , the commission should take into account only the elements which directly relate to the requirements for constituting a gatekeeper , namely whether it is an important gateway which is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market with an entrenched and durable position , either actual or foreseeable. any justification on economic grounds seeking to demonstrate efficiencies deriving from a specific type of behaviour by the provider of core platform services should be discarded , as it is not relevant to the designation as a gatekeeper. the commission should be able to take a decision by relying on the quantitative thresholds where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission. ### (23) providers of core platform services which meet the quantitative thresholds but are able to present sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that , in the circumstances in which the relevant core platform service operates , they do not fulfil the objective requirements for a gatekeeper , should not be designated directly , but only subject to a further investigation. the burden of adducing evidence that the presumption deriving from the fulfilment of quantitative thresholds should not apply to a specific provider should be borne by that provider in its assessment , the commission should take into account only the elements which directly relate to the requirements for constituting a gatekeeper , namely whether it is an important gateway which is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market with an entrenched and durable position , either actual or foreseeable. any justification on economic grounds seeking to demonstrate efficiencies deriving from a specific type of behaviour by the provider of core platform services should be discarded , as it is not relevant to the designation as a gatekeeper. the commission should designate the gatekeeper where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission.


### (23) providers of core platform services which meet the quantitative thresholds but are able to present sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that , in the circumstances in which the relevant core platform service operates , they do not fulfil the objective requirements for a gatekeeper , should not be designated directly , but only subject to a further investigation. the burden of adducing evidence that the presumption deriving from the fulfilment of quantitative thresholds should not apply to a specific provider should be borne by that provider in its assessment , the commission should take into account only the elements which directly relate to the requirements for constituting a gatekeeper , namely whether it is an important gateway which is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market with an entrenched and durable position , either actual or foreseeable. any justification on economic grounds seeking to demonstrate efficiencies deriving from a specific type of behaviour by the provider of core platform services should be discarded , as it is not relevant to the designation as a gatekeeper. the commission should be able to take a decision by relying on the quantitative thresholds where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission. ### (23) in its quantitative and qualitative assessment , the commission should take into account the elements which relate to the requirements for constituting a gatekeeper , namely whether it is an important gateway which is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market with an entrenched and durable position , either actual or foreseeable. any justification on economic grounds seeking to demonstrate efficiencies deriving from a specific type of behaviour by the provider of core platform services should be discarded , as it is not relevant to the designation as a gatekeeper. the commission should be able to take a decision by relying on the quantitative thresholds where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission.


### (64) the commission should investigate and assess whether additional behavioural , or , where appropriate , structural remedies are justified , in order to ensure that the gatekeeper cannot frustrate the objectives of this regulation by systematic non-compliance with one or several of the obligations laid down in this regulation , which has further strengthened its gatekeeper position. this would be the case if the gatekeeper’s size in the internal market has further increased , economic dependency of business users and end users on the gatekeeper’s core platform services has further strengthened as their number has further increased and the gatekeeper benefits from increased entrenchment of its position. the commission should therefore in such cases have the power to impose any remedy , whether behavioural or structural , having due regard to the principle of proportionality. structural remedies , such as legal , functional or structural separation , including the divestiture of a business , or parts of it , should only be imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. changes to the structure of an undertaking as it existed before the systematic non-compliance was established would only be proportionate where there is a substantial risk that this systematic non-compliance results from the very structure of the undertaking concerned. ### (64) the commission should investigate and assess whether structural remedies or equally effective behavioural are justified , in order to ensure that the gatekeeper cannot frustrate the objectives of this regulation by non-compliance with one or several of the obligations laid down in this regulation , which has further strengthened its gatekeeper position. this would be the case if the gatekeeper’s size in the internal market has further increased , economic dependency of business users and end users on the gatekeeper’s core platform services has further strengthened as their number has further increased and the gatekeeper benefits from increased entrenchment of its position. the commission should therefore in such cases have the power to impose any remedy , whether behavioural or structural , having due regard to the principle of proportionality.


### (64) the commission should investigate and assess whether additional behavioural , or , where appropriate , structural remedies are justified , in order to ensure that the gatekeeper cannot frustrate the objectives of this regulation by systematic non-compliance with one or several of the obligations laid down in this regulation , which has further strengthened its gatekeeper position. this would be the case if the gatekeeper’s size in the internal market has further increased , economic dependency of business users and end users on the gatekeeper’s core platform services has further strengthened as their number has further increased and the gatekeeper benefits from increased entrenchment of its position. the commission should therefore in such cases have the power to impose any remedy , whether behavioural or structural , having due regard to the principle of proportionality. structural remedies , such as legal , functional or structural separation , including the divestiture of a business , or parts of it , should only be imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. changes to the structure of an undertaking as it existed before the systematic non-compliance was established would only be proportionate where there is a substantial risk that this systematic non-compliance results from the very structure of the undertaking concerned. ### (64) the commission should investigate and assess whether structural remedies or equally effective behavioural are justified , in order to ensure that the gatekeeper cannot frustrate the objectives of this regulation by systematic non-compliance with one or several of the obligations laid down in this regulation , which has further strengthened its gatekeeper position. this would be the case if the gatekeeper’s size in the internal market has further increased , economic dependency of business users and end users on the gatekeeper’s core platform services has further strengthened as their number has further increased and the gatekeeper benefits from increased entrenchment of its position. having due regard to the principle of proportionality , the commission can impose any remedy , whether behavioural or structural. structural remedies , such as legal , functional or structural separation , including the divestiture of a business , or parts of it , should be imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy.


### (67) where , in the course of a proceeding into non-compliance or an investigation into systemic non-compliance , a gatekeeper offers commitments to the commission , the latter should be able to adopt a decision making these commitments binding on the gatekeeper concerned , where it finds that the commitments ensure effective compliance with the obligations of this regulation. this decision should also find that there are no longer grounds for action by the commission. ### deleted


### (67) where , in the course of a proceeding into non-compliance or an investigation into systemic non-compliance , a gatekeeper offers commitments to the commission , the latter should be able to adopt a decision making these commitments binding on the gatekeeper concerned , where it finds that the commitments ensure effective compliance with the obligations of this regulation. this decision should also find that there are no longer grounds for action by the commission. ### (67) where , in the course of a proceeding into non-compliance or an investigation into systemic non-compliance , a gatekeeper offers commitments to the commission , the latter should be able to adopt a decision making these commitments binding on the gatekeeper concerned , where it finds that the commitments ensure effective compliance with the obligations of this regulation.


### (59) as an additional element to ensure proportionality , gatekeepers should be given an opportunity to request the suspension , to the extent necessary , of a specific obligation in exceptional circumstances that lie beyond the control of the gatekeeper , such as for example an unforeseen external shock that has temporarily eliminated a significant part of end user demand for the relevant core platform service , where compliance with a specific obligation is shown by the gatekeeper to endanger the economic viability of the union operations of the gatekeeper concerned. ### deleted


### (63) following a market investigation , an undertaking providing a core platform service could be found to fulfil all of the overarching qualitative criteria for being identified as a gatekeeper. it should then , in principle , comply with all of the relevant obligations laid down by this regulation. however , for gatekeepers that have been designated by the commission as likely to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in the near future , the commission should only impose those obligations that are necessary and appropriate to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves an entrenched and durable position in its operations. with respect to such emerging gatekeepers , the commission should take into account that this status is in principle of a temporary nature , and it should therefore be decided at a given moment whether such a provider of core platform services should be subjected to the full set of gatekeeper obligations because it has acquired an entrenched and durable position , or conditions for designation are ultimately not met and therefore all previously imposed obligations should be waived. ### (63) following a market investigation , an undertaking providing a core platform service could be found to fulfil all of the overarching qualitative criteria for being identified as a gatekeeper. it should then comply with all of the relevant obligations laid down by this regulation. however , for gatekeepers that have been designated by the commission as likely to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in the near future , the commission should only impose those obligations that are necessary and appropriate to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves an entrenched and durable position in its operations. with respect to such emerging gatekeepers , the commission should take into account that this status is temporary , and that a decision should be taken as soon as possible , according to article 33 , whether such a provider of core platform services should be subjected to the full set of gatekeeper obligations because it has acquired an entrenched and durable position , or conditions for designation are ultimately not met and therefore all previously imposed obligations should be waived.


### 5. in specifying the measures under paragraph 2 , the commission shall ensure that the measures are effective in achieving the objectives of the relevant obligation and proportionate in the specific circumstances of the gatekeeper and the relevant service. ### 5. in specifying the measures under paragraph 2 , the commission shall ensure that the measures are effective in achieving the objectives of the relevant obligation of the gatekeeper and the relevant service.


### 2. the commission may only impose structural remedies pursuant to paragraph 1 either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the gatekeeper concerned than the structural remedy. ### deleted


### 4. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , where its impact on the internal market has further increased , its importance as a gateway for business users to reach end users has further increased or the gatekeeper enjoys a further entrenched and durable position in its operations. ### 4. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , where its impact on the internal market has further increased , especially in new segments of the market , its importance as a gateway for business users to reach end users has further increased or the gatekeeper enjoys a further entrenched and durable position in its operations.


### 4. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , where its impact on the internal market has further increased , its importance as a gateway for business users to reach end users has further increased or the gatekeeper enjoys a further entrenched and durable position in its operations. ### 4. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , where its impact on the internal market has further increased , its importance as a gateway for business users to reach end users has further increased , especially in new segments of the market , or the gatekeeper enjoys a further entrenched and durable position in its operations.


### 6. the commission may at any time during the market investigation extend its duration where the extension is justified on objective grounds and proportionate. the extension may apply to the deadline by which the commission has to issue its objections , or to the deadline for adoption of the final decision. the total duration of any extension or extensions pursuant to this paragraph shall not exceed six months.the commission may consider commitments pursuant to article 23 and make them binding in its decision. ### 6. the commission may at any time during the market investigation extend its duration where the extension is justified on objective grounds and proportionate. the extension may apply to the deadline by which the commission has to issue its objections , or to the deadline for adoption of the final decision. the total duration of any extension or extensions pursuant to this paragraph shall not exceed three months.


### 6. the commission may at any time during the market investigation extend its duration where the extension is justified on objective grounds and proportionate. the extension may apply to the deadline by which the commission has to issue its objections , or to the deadline for adoption of the final decision. the total duration of any extension or extensions pursuant to this paragraph shall not exceed six months.the commission may consider commitments pursuant to article 23 and make them binding in its decision. ### 6. the commission may at any time during the market investigation extend its duration where the extension is justified on objective grounds and proportionate. the extension may apply to the deadline by which the commission has to issue its objections , or to the deadline for adoption of the final decision. the total duration of any extension or extensions pursuant to this paragraph shall not exceed three months. the commission may consider commitments pursuant to article 23 and make them binding in its decision , without prejudice to compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6.


### article 23 ### deleted


### commitments made legally binding pursuant to article 23. ### deleted


### fines ### fines and remedies


### however , the commission shall not require payment pursuant to the second or the third subparagraph from undertakings which show that they have not implemented the infringing decision of the association and either were not aware of its existence or have actively distanced themselves from it before the commission started investigating the case. ### deleted


### cloud computing services; ### cloud computing services , including business to business cloud;


### 4. the commission shall , without undue delay and at the latest 60 days after receiving the complete information referred to in paragraph 3 , designate the provider of core platform services that meets all the thresholds of paragraph 2 as a gatekeeper , unless that provider , with its notification , presents sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that , in the circumstances in which the relevant core platform service operates , and taking into account the elements listed in paragraph 6 , the provider does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1. ### 4. the commission shall , without undue delay and at the latest 30 days after receiving the complete information referred to in paragraph 3 , designate the provider of core platform services that meets all the thresholds of paragraph 2 as a gatekeeper , unless that provider , with its notification , presents sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that , in the circumstances in which the relevant core platform service operates , and taking into account the elements listed in paragraph 6 , the provider does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1.


### the size , including turnover and market capitalisation , operations and position of the provider of core platform services; ### the size , including turnover and market capitalisation , operations and position of the provider of core platform services taking into account any intended concentration notified in line with article 12(1);


### the number of business users depending on the core platform service to reach end users and the number of end users; ### the number of business users or other end users depending on the core platform service to reach end users and the number of end users;


### it has a significant impact on the internal market; ### it has a significant impact on the internal market , including in facilitating public debate;


### (35) the obligations laid down in this regulation are necessary to address identified public policy concerns , there being no alternative and less restrictive measures that would effectively achieve the same result , having regard to need to safeguard public order , protect privacy and fight fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices. ### (35) the obligations laid down in this regulation are necessary to address identified public policy concerns , there being no alternative and less restrictive measures that would effectively achieve the same result , having regard to need to safeguard public order , protect privacy and fight fraudulent and deceptive commercial or manipulative practices.


### online search engines; ### online search engines and browsers;


### public health; ### deleted


### public security. ### deleted


### 2. where the opinion of the committee is to be obtained by written procedure , that procedure shall be terminated without result when , within the time-limit for delivery of the opinion , the chair of the committee so decides or a simple majority of committee members so request. ### 2. the chair of the committee shall endeavour to find solutions which command the widest possible support within the committee. the chair shall inform the committee of the manner in which the discussions and suggestions for amendments have been taken into account , in particular as regards those suggestions which have been largely supported within the committee. in duly justified cases , the chair may obtain the committee’s opinion by written procedure , in which case , this exceptional procedure shall be terminated without result when , within the time-limit for delivery of the opinion , the chair of the committee so decides or a simple majority of committee members so request.


### (10) the commission , in cooperation with the cooperation group , may issue guidelines on the implementation of the criteria applicable to micro and small enterprises. ### (10) smes represent , in the european context , a huge percentage of the industrial/business market and , given the new practices in the sector , increasingly digitised , they face specific and worrying cybersecurity challenges. limited cyber knowledge , lack of cybersecurity , high cost of cybersecurity solutions are some of these challenges for which smes need increased protection. member states should therefore , and on the basis of this directive , plan and implement national cybersecurity strategies to make available all existing or to be created means to technically support smes so they will be able to detect , prevent and react to cyberattacks or cyber threats. the commission , directly or through enisa , in cooperation with the cooperation group , will issue guidelines on the implementation of the criteria applicable to micro and small enterprises.


### (25) as regards personal data , csirts should be able to provide , in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council19 as regards personal data , on behalf of and upon request by an entity under this directive , a proactive scanning of the network and information systems used for the provision of their services. member states should aim at ensuring an equal level of technical capabilities for all sectorial csirts. member states may request the assistance of the european union agency for cybersecurity (enisa) in developing national csirts. ### (25) as regards personal data , csirts should be able to provide , in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council19 as regards personal data , on behalf of and upon request by an entity under this directive , a proactive scanning of the network and information systems used for the provision of their services. member states should aim at ensuring an equal level of technical capabilities for all sectorial csirts. member states may request the assistance of the european union agency for cybersecurity (enisa) in developing national csirts. with regard to personal data , all entities , public and/or private , which , due to a reported incident or a detected cybersecurity threat , wish to access or legitimately access personal data shall proceed in absolute accordance with the general data protection regulation.


### (34) the cooperation group should remain a flexible forum and be able to react to changing and new policy priorities and challenges while taking into account the availability of resources. it should organize regular joint meetings with relevant private stakeholders from across the union to discuss activities carried out by the group and gather input on emerging policy challenges. in order to enhance cooperation at union level , the group should consider inviting union bodies and agencies involved in cybersecurity policy , such as the european cybercrime centre (ec3) , the european union aviation safety agency (easa) and the european union agency for space programme (euspa) to participate in its work. ### (34) the cooperation group should remain a flexible forum and be able to react to changing and new policy priorities and challenges while taking into account the availability of resources. it should organize regular joint meetings with relevant private stakeholders from across the union to discuss activities carried out by the group and gather input on emerging policy challenges. in order to enhance cooperation at union level , the group should consider inviting union bodies and agencies involved in cybersecurity policy , such as the european cybercrime centre (ec3) , the european union agencies responsible for safe transport (easa , efsa , era) and the european union agency for space programme (euspa) to participate in its work.


### a potential disruption of the service provided by the entity could have an impact on public safety , public security or public health; ### a potential disruption of the service provided by the entity could have repercussions on the provision of public services , particularly health , education , transport security or public order;


### [...] ### deleted


### 2. member states shall ensure that the exchange of information takes place within trusted communities of essential and important entities. such exchange shall be implemented through information sharing arrangements in respect of the potentially sensitive nature of the information shared and in compliance with the rules of union law referred to in paragraph 1. ### 2. member states shall ensure that the exchange of information takes place within trusted communities of essential and important entities. such exchange shall be implemented through information sharing arrangements in respect of the potentially sensitive nature of the information shared and in compliance with the rules of union law referred to in paragraph 1. any such information shared shall be subject to freedom of information requests by the public.


### (3) network and information systems have developed into a central feature of everyday life with the speedy digital transformation and interconnectedness of society , including in cross-border exchanges. that development has led to an expansion of the cybersecurity threat landscape , bringing about new challenges , which require adapted , coordinated and innovative responses in all member states. the number , magnitude , sophistication , frequency and impact of cybersecurity incidents are increasing , and present a major threat to the functioning of network and information systems. as a result , cyber incidents can impede the pursuit of economic activities in the internal market , generate financial losses , undermine user confidence and cause major damage to the union economy and society. cybersecurity preparedness and effectiveness are therefore now more essential than ever to the proper functioning of the internal market. ### (3) network and information systems have developed into a central feature of everyday life with the speedy digital transformation and interconnectedness of society , including in cross-border exchanges and mobility. that development has led to an expansion of the cybersecurity threat landscape , bringing about new challenges , which require adapted , coordinated and innovative responses in all member states. the number , magnitude , sophistication , frequency and impact of cybersecurity incidents are increasing , and present a major threat to the functioning of network and information systems. as a result , cyber incidents can harm the wellbeing of our society and impede the pursuit of economic activities in the internal market , generate financial losses , undermine user confidence , causing major damage to the union economy. cybersecurity preparedness and effectiveness are therefore now more essential than ever to the safeguarding of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the eu and the proper functioning of the internal market.


### article 21 ### deleted


### (23) ‘public administration entity’ means an entity in a member state that complies with the following criteria: ### (23) ‘public administration entity’ means an entity in a member state that has legal personality and complies with some of the following criteria:


### it has legal personality; ### deleted


### a list of the various authorities and actors involved in the implementation of the national cybersecurity strategy; ### a list of the various authorities and actors involved in the implementation of the national cybersecurity strategy , including trade unions and other focused on workers' protection;


### electrochemical performance and durability parameters for portable batteries of general use ### electrochemical performance and durability parameters for portable batteries of general use including non-rechargeable portable batteries of general use


### air; ### air; (including , but not limited to air pollution);


### water; ### water; (including but not limited to water contamination , access to water , water usage and depletion);


### soil; ### soil; (including but not limited to soil contamination , soil erosion and land degradation);


### biodiversity; ### biodiversity; (including but not limited to damage to habitats , wildlife , flora and ecosystem services);


### community life. ### community life , including that of indigenous people;


### recycling of 65 % by average weight of lithium-based batteries; ### recycling of 70 % by average weight of lithium-based batteries;


### recycling of 70 % by average weight of lithium-based batteries. ### recycling of 90 % by average weight of lithium-based batteries.


### 1. no later than 1 january 2026 , all recycling processes shall achieve the following levels of materials recovery: ### 1. no later than 1 january 2025 , all recycling processes shall achieve the following levels of materials recovery:


### 90 % for cobalt; ### 95 % for cobalt;


### 90 % for copper; ### 95 % for copper;


### 35 % for lithium; ### 70 % for lithium;


### 90 % for nickel. ### 95 % for nickel.


### 95 % for cobalt; ### 98 % for cobalt;


### 95 % for copper; ### 98 % for copper;


### 70 % for lithium; ### 90 % for lithium;


### 95 % for nickel. ### 98 % for nickel.


### the requirement for a maximum life cycle carbon footprint threshold in the first subparagraph shall apply as of 1 july 2027 for electric vehicle batteries and for rechargeable industrial batteries. ### the requirement for a maximum life cycle carbon footprint threshold in the first subparagraph shall apply as of 1 july 2026 for electric vehicle batteries and for rechargeable industrial batteries.


### the commission shall , no later than 1 july 2026 , adopt a delegated act in accordance with article 73 to supplement this regulation by determining the maximum life cycle carbon footprint threshold referred to in the first subparagraph. in preparing that delegated act , the commission shall take into account the relevant essential elements set out in annex ii. ### the commission shall , no later than 1 july 2025 , adopt a delegated act in accordance with article 73 to supplement this regulation by determining the maximum life cycle carbon footprint threshold referred to in the first subparagraph. in preparing that delegated act , the commission shall take into account the relevant essential elements set out in annex ii.


### 1. from 1 january 2027 , industrial batteries , electric vehicle batteries and automotive batteries with internal storage and a capacity above 2 kwh that contain cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel in active materials shall be accompanied by technical documentation containing information about the amount of cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel recovered from waste present in active materials in each battery model and batch per manufacturing plant. ### 1. from 1 january 2027 , industrial batteries , electric vehicle batteries and automotive batteries that contain cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel in active materials shall be accompanied by technical documentation containing information about the amount of cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel recovered from waste present in active materials in each battery model and batch per manufacturing plant.


### 2. from 1 january 2030 , industrial batteries , electric vehicle batteries and automotive batteries with internal storage and a capacity above 2 kwh that contain cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel in active materials shall be accompanied by technical documentation demonstrating that those batteries contain the following minimum share of cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel recovered from waste present in active materials in each battery model and batch per manufacturing plant: ### 2. from 1 january 2027 , industrial batteries , electric vehicle batteries and automotive batteries with internal storage and a capacity above 2 kwh that contain cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel in active materials shall be accompanied by technical documentation demonstrating that those batteries contain the following minimum share of cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel recovered from waste present in active materials in each battery model and batch per manufacturing plant:


### 2. from 1 january 2030 , industrial batteries , electric vehicle batteries and automotive batteries with internal storage and a capacity above 2 kwh that contain cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel in active materials shall be accompanied by technical documentation demonstrating that those batteries contain the following minimum share of cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel recovered from waste present in active materials in each battery model and batch per manufacturing plant: ### 2. from 1 january 2030 , industrial batteries , electric vehicle batteries and automotive batteries that contain cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel in active materials shall be accompanied by technical documentation containing information about the exact chemistry used in the battery , as well as demonstrating that those batteries contain the following minimum share of cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel recovered from waste batteries present in active materials in each battery model and batch per manufacturing plant:


### 3. from 1 january 2035 , industrial batteries , electric vehicle batteries and automotive batteries with internal storage and a capacity above 2 kwh that contain cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel in active materials shall be accompanied by a technical documentation demonstrating that those batteries contain the following minimum share of cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel recovered from waste present in active materials in each battery model and batch per manufacturing plant: ### 3. from 1 january 2035 , industrial batteries , electric vehicle batteries and automotive batteries that contain cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel in active materials shall be accompanied by a technical documentation demonstrating that those batteries contain the following minimum share of cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel recovered from waste present in active materials in each battery model and batch per manufacturing plant:


### 3. from 1 january 2035 , industrial batteries , electric vehicle batteries and automotive batteries with internal storage and a capacity above 2 kwh that contain cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel in active materials shall be accompanied by a technical documentation demonstrating that those batteries contain the following minimum share of cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel recovered from waste present in active materials in each battery model and batch per manufacturing plant: ### 3. from 1 january 2035 , industrial batteries , electric vehicle batteries and automotive batteries with internal storage and a capacity above 2 kwh that contain cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel in active materials shall be accompanied by a technical documentation demonstrating that those batteries contain the following minimum share of cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel recovered from waste batteries present in active materials in each battery model and batch per manufacturing plant:


### 4. where justified and appropriate due to the availability of cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel recovered from waste , or the lack thereof , the commission shall be empowered to adopt , by 31 december 2027 , a delegated act in accordance with article 73 , to amend the targets laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3. ### 4. where justified and appropriate due to the availability of cobalt , lead , lithium or nickel recovered from waste , or the lack thereof , in line with technical and scientific progress , the commission shall be empowered to adopt , by 31 december 2027 , a delegated act in accordance with article 73 , to amend the targets laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3.


### performance and durability requirements for portable batteries of general use ### performance and durability requirements for portable batteries and batteries from light means of transportation


### 1. from 1 january 2027 , portable batteries of general use shall meet the values for the electrochemical performance and durability parameters set out in annex iii as laid down in the delegated act adopted by the commission pursuant to paragraph 2. ### 1. from 1 january 2027 , portable batteries and batteries from light means of transportation shall meet the values for the electrochemical performance and durability parameters set out in annex iii as laid down in the delegated act adopted by the commission pursuant to paragraph 2.


### 1. from 1 january 2027 , portable batteries of general use shall meet the values for the electrochemical performance and durability parameters set out in annex iii as laid down in the delegated act adopted by the commission pursuant to paragraph 2. ### 1. from 1 january 2027 , portable batteries shall meet the values for the electrochemical performance and durability parameters based on measured capacity set out in annex iii as laid down in the delegated act adopted by the commission pursuant to paragraph 2.


### 2. by 31 december 2025 , the commission shall adopt a delegated act in accordance with article 73 to supplement this regulation by establishing minimum values for the electrochemical performance and durability parameters laid down in annex iii that portable batteries of general use shall attain. ### 2. by 31 december 2025 , the commission shall adopt a delegated act in accordance with article 73 to supplement this regulation by establishing minimum values for the electrochemical performance and durability parameters based on measured capacity laid down in annex iii that portable batteries shall attain.


### in preparing the delegated act referred to in the first subparagraph , the commission shall consider the need to reduce the life cycle environmental impact of portable batteries of general use and take into consideration relevant international standards and labelling schemes. the commission shall also ensure that the provisions laid down by that delegated act do not have a significant negative impact on the functionality of those batteries or the appliances into which those batteries are incorporated , the affordability and the cost for end-users and the industry’s competitiveness. no excessive administrative burden shall be imposed on manufacturers of the batteries and the appliances concerned. ### in preparing the delegated act referred to in the first subparagraph , the commission shall consider the need to reduce the life cycle environmental impact of portable batteries of general use and take into consideration relevant international standards and labelling schemes. the commission shall also ensure that the provisions laid down by that delegated act do not have a significant negative impact on the affordability and the cost for end-users.


### 3. by 31 december 2030 , the commission shall assess the feasibility of measures to phase out the use of non-rechargeable portable batteries of general use in view of minimising their environmental impact based on the life cycle assessment methodology. to that end , the commission shall submit a report to the european parliament and to the council and consider taking the appropriate measures , including the adoption of legislative proposals. ### 3. by 31 december 2025 , the commission shall assess the feasibility of measures to phase out the use of non-rechargeable portable batteries of general use in view of minimising their environmental impact based on the life cycle assessment methodology. to that end , the commission shall submit a report to the european parliament and to the council and consider taking the appropriate measures , including the adoption of legislative proposals.


### 3. by 31 december 2030 , the commission shall assess the feasibility of measures to phase out the use of non-rechargeable portable batteries of general use in view of minimising their environmental impact based on the life cycle assessment methodology. to that end , the commission shall submit a report to the european parliament and to the council and consider taking the appropriate measures , including the adoption of legislative proposals. ### 3. by 31 december 2025 , the commission shall assess the feasibility of measures to phase out the use of non-rechargeable portable batteries of general use in view of minimising their environmental impact based on the life cycle assessment methodology. the commission shall assess incentives to reduce the use of non-rechargeable portable batteries of general use such as levies and deposit schemes. to that end , the commission shall submit a report to the european parliament and to the council and consider taking the appropriate measures , including the adoption of legislative proposals.


### removability and replaceability of portable batteries ### removability , replaceability and reuse of portable batteries


### 6. the economic operator referred to in paragraph 1 shall make available to its immediate downstream purchasers all information gained and maintained pursuant to its supply chain due diligence policies with due regard for business confidentiality and other competitive concerns. ### 6. the economic operator referred to in paragraph 1 shall make available to its immediate downstream purchasers all information gained and maintained pursuant to its value chain due diligence policies with due regard for business confidentiality and other competitive concerns.


### the economic operator referred to in paragraph 1 shall on an annual basis , publicly report as widely as possible , including on the internet , on its supply chain due diligence policies. that report shall contain the steps taken by that economic operator to comply with the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 , including findings of significant adverse impacts in the risk categories listed in annex x , point 2 , and how they have been addressed , as well as a summary report of the third-party verifications carried out in accordance with point 4 , including the name of the notified body , with due regard for business confidentiality and other competitive concerns. ### the economic operator referred to in paragraph 1 shall on an annual basis , publicly report as widely as possible , including on the internet , on its value chain due diligence policies. that report shall contain the steps taken by that economic operator to comply with the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 , including findings of significant adverse impacts in the risk categories listed in annex x , point 2 , and how they have been addressed , as well as a summary report of the third-party verifications carried out in accordance with point 4 , including the name of the notified body , with due regard for business confidentiality and other competitive concerns.


### 4. producers or , where appointed in accordance with article 47(2) , producer responsibility organisations acting on their behalf , shall attain , and maintain durably , at least the following collection targets of waste portable batteries , calculated as percentages of the portable batteries , excluding batteries from light means of transport , made available on the market for the first time in a member state by the respective producer or collectively by the producers covered by a producer responsibility organisation: ### 4. producers or , where appointed in accordance with article 47(2) , producer responsibility organisations acting on their behalf , shall attain , and maintain durably , at least the following collection targets of waste portable batteries , calculated as percentages of the portable batteries made available on the market for the first time in a member state by the respective producer or collectively by the producers covered by a producer responsibility organisation:


### 45 % by 31 december 2023 ; ### 55 % by 31 december 2023 ;


### 70 % by 31 december 2030. ### 85 % by 31 december 2030.


### where waste industrial batteries require prior dismantling at the premises of private , non-commercial users , the obligation of the producer to take back those batteries shall include covering the costs of dismantling and collecting waste batteries at the premises of those users. ### where waste industrial batteries require prior dismantling at the premises of private , non-commercial users , the obligation of the producer or , where appointed in accordance with article 47(2) , extended producer responsibility organisations , to take back those batteries shall include covering the costs of dismantling and collecting waste batteries at the premises of those users.


### 1. all waste batteries collected shall enter a recycling process. ### 1. all waste batteries collected shall enter a preparation for reuse , repurposing , or when this is no longer possible a recycling process.


### 3. the recycling efficiencies and the recovery of materials laid down in parts b and c of annex xii shall be calculated in accordance with the rules laid down in an implementing act adopted pursuant to paragraph 4. ### 3. the recycling efficiencies and the recovery of materials laid down in parts b and c of annex xii shall be calculated in accordance with the rules laid down in an implementing act adopted pursuant to paragraph 4. these rules shall ensure that the definition and calculation of recycling ‘output fraction’ excludes energy recovery and losses during the refining and transformation processes.


### 4. the commission shall , by 31 december 2023 , adopt an implementing act to establish detailed rules regarding the calculation and verification of recycling efficiencies and recovery of materials. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 74(3). ### 4. the commission shall , by 31 december 2023 , adopt an implementing act to establish detailed rules regarding the calculation and verification of recycling efficiencies and recovery of materials including other rare earths and critical raw materials not already listed in annex xii. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 74(3).


### 5. the commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts , in accordance with article 73 , to amend the minimum levels of recovered materials for waste batteries laid down in annex xii , parts b and c , in light of technical and scientific progress and emerging new technologies in waste management. ### 5. the commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts , in accordance with article 73 , to amend the list of materials and minimum levels of recovered materials for waste batteries laid down in annex xii , parts b and c , in light of technical and scientific progress and emerging new technologies in waste management.


### 1. independent operators shall be given access to the battery management system of rechargeable industrial batteries and electric vehicle batteries with internal storage with a capacity above 2 kwh , on equal terms and conditions , for the purpose of assessing and determining the state of health and remaining lifetime of batteries , according to the parameters laid down in annex vii. ### 1. independent operators shall be given access to the battery management system of rechargeable industrial batteries and electric vehicle batteries , on equal terms and conditions , for the purpose of assessing and determining the state of health and remaining lifetime of batteries , according to the parameters laid down in annex vii.


### (60) some of the raw materials in question , such as cobalt , lithium and natural graphite , are considered as critical raw materials for the eu38 and their sustainable sourcing is required for the eu battery ecosystem to perform adequately. ### (60) some of the raw materials in question , such as antimony , cobalt , lithium natural graphite , and other rare earths are considered as critical raw materials for the eu38 and their sustainable sourcing is required for the eu battery ecosystem to perform adequately.


### (64) when putting in place a risk-based due diligence policy , it should be based on internationally recognised due diligence principles in the ten principles of the united nations global compact40 , the guidelines for social life cycle assessment of products41 , the ilo tripartite declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and social policy42 , and the oecd due diligence guidance for responsible business conduct (rbc)43 , which reflect a common understanding amongst governments and stakeholders , and should be tailored to the specific context and circumstances of each economic operator. in relation to the extraction , processing and trading of natural mineral resources used for battery production , the oecd due diligence guidance for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas44 (‘oecd due diligence guidance’) represents a long-standing effort by governments and stakeholders to establish good practice in this area. ### (64) when putting in place a risk-based due diligence policy , it should be based on internationally recognised due diligence principles in the ten principles of the united nations global compact40 , the un guiding principles on business and human rights40a , the guidelines for social life cycle assessment of products41 , the ilo tripartite declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and social policy42 , and the oecd due diligence guidance for responsible business conduct (rbc)43 , which reflect a common understanding amongst governments and stakeholders , and should be tailored to the specific context and circumstances of each economic operator. in relation to the extraction , processing and trading of natural mineral resources used for battery production , the oecd due diligence guidance for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas44 (‘oecd due diligence guidance’) represents a long-standing effort by governments and stakeholders to establish good practice in this area.


### (65) according to the oecd due diligence guidance45 , due diligence is an on-going , proactive and reactive process through which companies can ensure that they respect human rights and do not contribute to conflict.46 . risk-based due diligence refers to the steps companies should take to identify and address actual or potential risks in order to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts associated with their activities or sourcing decisions a company can assess risk posed by its activities and relationships and adopt risks mitigating measures in line with relevant standards provided under national and international law , recommendations on responsible business conduct by international organisations , government-backed tools , private sector voluntary initiatives and a company's internal policies and systems. this approach also helps to scale the due diligence exercise to the size of the company's activities or supply chain relationships. ### (65) according to the oecd due diligence guidance45 , due diligence is an on-going , proactive and reactive process through which companies can ensure that they respect human rights and do not contribute to conflict.46 . risk-based due diligence refers to the steps companies should take to identify and address actual or potential risks in order to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts associated with their activities or sourcing decisions a company can assess risk posed by its activities and relationships and adopt risks mitigating measures in line with relevant standards provided under national and international law , recommendations on responsible business conduct by international organisations , government-backed tools , private sector voluntary initiatives and a company's internal policies and systems. this approach also helps to scale the due diligence exercise to the size of the company's activities or supply chain relationships. due diligence requirements apply to any economic operator that places batteries on the european market including online platforms.


### (66) mandatory supply chain due diligence policies should be adopted or modified and address , at least , the most prevalent social and environmental risk categories. this should cover the current and foreseeable impacts , on one hand , on social life , in particular human rights , human health and safety as well as occupational health and safety and labour rights , and , on the other hand , on the environment , in particular on water use , soil protection , air pollution and biodiversity , including community life. ### (66) mandatory supply chain due diligence policies should be adopted or modified and address , at least , the most prevalent social and environmental risk categories , including substantiated enforcement and penalty mechanisms , as well as access justice and remedy for affected communities in case of misconduct. this should cover the current and foreseeable impacts , on one hand , on social life , in particular human rights , human health and safety as well as occupational health and safety and labour rights , and , on the other hand , on the environment , in particular on water use , soil protection , air pollution and biodiversity , including community life.


### — is not designed for industrial purposes; and ### deleted


### (9) ‘light means of transport’ means wheeled vehicles that have an electric motor of less than 750 watts , on which travellers are seated when the vehicle is moving and that can be powered by the electric motor alone or by a combination of motor and human power; ### (9) ‘light means of transport’ means wheeled vehicles that have an electric motor of less than 750 watts , and that can be powered by the electric motor alone or by a combination of motor and human power. for the purpose of this regulation light means of transport are treated as portable batteries unless otherwise specified;


### 39 obligation for economic operators that place rechargeable industrial batteries and electric-vehicle batteries with internal storage and a capacity above 2 kwh on the market to establish supply chain due diligence policies ### 39 obligation for economic operators including online platforms that place batteries on the market to establish supply chain due diligence policies


### 1. as of [12 months after the entry into force of the regulation] the economic operator that places rechargeable industrial batteries and electric-vehicle batteries with internal storage and a capacity above 2 kwh on the market shall comply with the supply chain due diligence obligations set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 of this article and shall keep documentation demonstrating its respective compliance with those obligations , including the results of the third-party verification carried out by notified bodies. ### 1. as of [12 months after the entry into force of the regulation] the economic operator that places batteries on the market shall comply with the supply chain due diligence obligations set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 of this article and shall keep documentation demonstrating its respective compliance with those obligations , including the results of the third-party verification carried out by notified bodies.


### incorporate in its supply chain policy standards consistent with the standards set out in the model supply chain policy in annex ii to the oecd due diligence guidance; ### incorporate in its supply chain policy standards consistent with the standards set out in the model supply chain policy in annex ii to the oecd due diligence guidance and the un guiding principles on business and human rights;


### the requirements set out in the current point (d) may be implemented through participation in industry-led schemes. ### the requirements set out in the current point (d) may be implemented through participation in industry-led schemes , if they can prove they meet all the requirements established under art. 39 , including third-party verification.


### establish a grievance mechanism as an early-warning risk-awareness system or provide such mechanism through collaborative arrangements with other economic operators or organisations , or by facilitating recourse to an external expert or body , such as an ombudsman. ### establish a grievance mechanism as an early-warning risk-awareness system or provide such mechanism including remedy for affected communities in case of misconduct , through collaborative arrangements with other economic operators or organisations , or by facilitating recourse to an external expert or body , such as an ombudsman.


### (iii) implementing the risk management plan , monitoring and tracking performance of risk mitigation efforts , reporting back to senior management designated for this purpose and considering suspending or discontinuing engagement with a supplier after failed attempts at mitigation , based on relevant contractual arrangements in line with the second subparagraph to paragraph 2 above; ### (iii) implementing the risk management plan , monitoring and tracking performance of risk mitigation efforts , reporting back in a clear and understandable manner to potentially affected groups and other relevant stakeholders including trade union representatives and senior management designated for this purpose and considering suspending or discontinuing engagement with a supplier after failed attempts at mitigation , based on relevant contractual arrangements in line with the second subparagraph to paragraph 2 above;


### 2. acknowledges the added value of the tsd in improving the safety of children and ensuring an equal level of protection across the single market , compared to the previous directive , and its role in providing legal certainty and a level playing field for businesses; ### 2. acknowledges the added value of the tsd in improving the safety of children and ensuring an equal level of protection across the single market , compared to the previous directive , and its role in providing legal certainty and a level playing field for businesses; underlines however that a revision of the toy safety directive is urgently needed to take into account aspects of globalisation and digitalisation which has led to new risks for consumers.


### – having regard to the european union charter of fundamental rights , in particular article 17 thereof , ### – having regard to the european union charter of fundamental rights , in particular article 8 , 11 and 17 thereof ,


### 1. supports the commission in the implementation of its intellectual property action plan of november 2020 , as strong , robust ipr protection at national , european and international level which enables return on investment is particularly important for the economic recovery from covid-19 as well as the creation of a digital and globally competitive sustainable economy in europe; ### 1. acknowledges the commission in the implementation of its intellectual property action plan of november 2020 , as strong , robust ipr protection at national , european and international level which enables return on investment is particularly important for the economic recovery from covid-19 as well as the creation of a digital and globally competitive sustainable economy and respect for the gdpr in europe;


### 3. is convinced that support for smes , including financial and non-financial measures , is the right way to provide them with better access to iprs and that the union’s financial instruments are of the utmost importance in this context; calls on the commission and the euipo , therefore , to continue implementing ip management support measures for smes in the context of the economic recovery , including the provision of one-stop shop access to information and related services and advice about ip; ### 3. is convinced that support for smes , including financial and non-financial measures , is the right way to provide them with better access to iprs and that the union’s financial and legal instruments are of the utmost importance in this context; calls on the commission and the euipo , therefore , to continue implementing ip management support measures for smes , microenterprises and ngos in the context of the economic recovery , including the provision of one-stop shop access to information and related services and advice about ip;


### 4. stresses that the unitary patent package (upp) , which includes the european patent with unitary effect (unitary patent) and the unified patent court (upc) , will make patent protection and dispute settlement across europe less complex , less costly and more efficient; asks the participating member states which have not yet done so , therefore , to conclude the ratification of the agreement on a unified patent court (upca) , as well as the protocol to the upca on provisional application (ppa) , as soon as possible , or by other means to declare that they are bound to the ppa in order to allow for a rapid entry into operation of the upp; ### 4. stresses that the unitary patent package (upp) , which includes the european patent with unitary effect (unitary patent) and the unified patent court (upc) , will make patent protection and dispute settlement across europe less complex , less costly and more accessible; asks the participating member states which have not yet done so , therefore , to conclude the ratification of the agreement on a unified patent court (upca) , as well as the protocol to the upca on provisional application (ppa) , as soon as possible , or by other means to declare that they are bound to the ppa in order to allow for a rapid entry into operation of the upp;


### 12. asks the commission to further investigate , together with the relevant stakeholders , the requirements for an independent system of third-party essentiality checks by identifying the demand for , assessing the impact of and defining the role that resources such as emerging technologies like ai and/or technical expertise contributed by the epo could play in that context , and to use the knowledge gained as input for the legislative initiative on sep envisaged for the beginning of 2022; ### 12. asks the commission to further investigate , together with the relevant stakeholders , including civil society actors , the requirements for an independent system of third-party essentiality checks by identifying the demand for , assessing the impact of and defining the role that resources such as emerging technologies like ai and/or technical expertise contributed by the epo could play in that context , and to use the knowledge gained as input for the legislative initiative on sep envisaged for the beginning of 2022;


### 16. welcomes the commission’s willingness to revise union legislation on design protection to better support the transition to the digital and green economy and calls on the commission to update the registration procedure to allow for new forms of design to be protected in an easy and less burdensome way; ### 16. welcomes the commission’s willingness to revise union legislation on design protection to better support the transition to the digital , sustainable and green economy and calls on the commission to update the registration procedure to allow for new forms of design to be protected in an easy and less burdensome way;


### 20. highlights that in 2016 , up to 6.8 % of eu imports , or a value of eur 121 billion , were fake goods and that ipr infringement entails a low level of risk in terms of both the likelihood of detection and the punishment if detected; urges the member states to develop effective and dissuasive sanctions to fight counterfeiting and piracy; ### 20. highlights that in 2016 , up to 6.8 % of eu imports , or a value of eur 121 billion , were fake goods and that ipr infringement entails a low level of risk in terms of both the likelihood of detection and the punishment if detected; urges the member states to develop effective and dissuasive sanctions to fight counterfeiting and piracy; such sanctions cannot be subject to strictly profit-making considerations and should include the limitation of the hazardous nature of the products made available to the public;


### 26. suggests that an ip coordinator be established at european level in order to ensure a holistic and coordinated approach to eu ip policy and enhance cooperation between the different national ip authorities , the directorates-general of the commission and other bodies in charge of ipr , such as the epo , euipo and wipo; ### 26. suggests that an ip coordinator be established at european level in order to ensure a holistic and coordinated approach to eu ip policy and enhance cooperation between the different national ip authorities , the directorates-general of the commission and other bodies in charge of ipr , such as the epo , euipo , wipo and relevant civil society actors;


### e. whereas the current commission has not yet come forward with a comprehensive legislative package addressing failures in the exercise of the core freedoms of the single market beyond enforcement , other than digital initiatives; whereas parliament and council failed to adopt the core initiatives of the 2016 services package; ### e. whereas the current commission has not yet come forward with a comprehensive legislative package addressing failures in the exercise of the core freedoms of the single market beyond enforcement , other than digital initiatives;


### g. whereas thecovid-19 crisis has been a shock both to production and consumption , and has reshaped domestic and cross-border activities; whereas some of these effects may be temporary , but others will have lasting consequences on the shape and needs of the single market; ### g. whereas the covid-19 crisis has been a shock both to production and consumption and shed light on an exacerbated existing shortcomings in the protection of posted workers and has reshaped domestic and cross-border activities; whereas some of these effects may be temporary , but others will have lasting consequences on the shape and needs of the single market;


### 1. welcomes the single market governance package of march 2020 , which aims to improve the implementation and enforcement of european legislation; considers that it is only a partial answer to the deficiencies hampering the proper functioning of the common market; ### 1. takes note of the single market governance package of march 2020 , which aims to improve the implementation and enforcement of european legislation; considers that it is only a partial answer to the deficiencies hampering the proper functioning of the common market , especially regarding the goals of the paris agreement and the european pillar of social rights;


### 2. underlines that the single market remains the european union’s greatest achievement; urges the commission , therefore , to refocus resources at issues plaguing the single market , in particular non-tariff barriers (ntbs) , which continue to limit opportunities for consumers and businesses; ### 2. underlines that the single market remains one of the european union’s greatest achievement; urges the commission , therefore , to refocus resources on the proper functioning of the single market and the protection of public policy interests;


### 3. underlines that the achievement of the objectives in the green deal and european digital agendas is based on the effective functioning of the single market , which is a key enabler of market efficiency and innovation and tool for modernising european economies; believes , therefore , that the single market’s shortcomings deserve at least the same level of attention as the green deal and the european digital agenda; reaffirms its own commitment to developing and safeguarding a robust , consumer- and business-friendly internal market; ### 3. underlines that the achievement of the objectives in the green deal and european digital agendas is related to the effective functioning of the single market , which is a key enabler of innovation and a tool for modernising european economies; reaffirms its own commitment to developing and safeguarding a robust , consumer- , worker- , business- and environment-friendly internal market supporting a socio-ecological just transition;


### 5. acknowledges that certain ntbs can be justified and originate from multi-level governance; urges the member states , where such ntbs are absolutely essential , to ensure their proportionality and strict alignment with legitimate public policy objectives; ### 5. acknowledges that non-tariff measures can be justified and originate from multi-level governance; urges the member states to ensure their proportionality and strict alignment with legitimate public policy objectives; considers it therefore necessary to highlight that only unjustified , disproportionate and discriminatory ntbs need to be addressed while clearly acknowledging that member states may use overriding reasons relating to the public interest for the protection of their domestic market and thus cannot be addressed as ntbs;


### 6. points out that the commission and stakeholders have identified a group of key barriers to cross-border activities , among them: ### 6. while member states may use overriding reasons relating to the public interest for the protection of their domestic markets , the commission and stakeholders raise concerns in view of unjustified barriers to cross-border activities , among them:


### a) regulatory disparities and inconsistent implementation of eu law , which force companies to commit resources to the laborious process of analysing provisions that are harmonised at eu level , diverting investments away from activities that create jobs or support growth; ### a) unjustified and disproportionate regulatory disparities and inconsistent implementation of eu law , which force companies to commit resources to the laborious process of analysing provisions that are harmonised at eu level , diverting investments away from activities that create jobs or support growth;


### c) additional technical requirements adopted at the national level and implemented beyond the requirements set by european law (gold-plating); ### deleted


### 7. emphasises that the ntbs severely impact the services sector and thereby other segments of the economy underpinned by the services sector; highlights that in its report , the commission was able to identify 24 specific restrictions across 13 sectors which breach rules established by the services directive , including some which are discriminatory or are requirements on establishment or nationality4 ; ### 7. emphasises that the ntbs severely impact the services sector and thereby other segments of the economy underpinned by the services sector; highlights that in its report , the commission was able to identify 24 specific restrictions across 13 sectors which breach rules established by the services directive , including some which are discriminatory or are requirements on establishment or nationality4 ; whereas a focus solely on restriction neglects the necessity to ensure a good quality of services striving for sustainable and inclusive growth guaranteeing social rights , workers’ rights , consumer and environmental protection and access to health and safety;


### 8. recalls that a considerable number of problems with the cross-border provision of services stem from administrative practices introduced by the country of destination , and not from incompatibility with eu law; ### 8. recalls that a considerable number of challenges with the cross-border provision of services stem from a lack of information and support in relation to administrative practices introduced by the country of destination with a view to ensure the effective monitoring of compliance with and enforcement of applicable rights and obligations;


### 9. recognises the insufficient use of the notification procedure under the services directive; calls on the commission to reflect on improving this framework , possibly by means of a new initiative which would increase clarity and transparency on the measures that need to be notified , while remaining cautious in order to not undermine the services directive and avoiding the situation which led to the withdrawal of the previous proposal; ### 9. recognises the insufficient use of the notification procedure under the services directive; calls on the commission to reflect on improving this framework , while remaining cautious in order to not undermine the services directive and to fully respect member states´ right to take measures related to public interest objectives;


### 12. considers that mutual recognition of professional qualification is seriously affected by administrative barriers imposed by member states; ### 12. recalls that the professional qualifications directive is built on the principle of equal treatment and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality;