### 19. notes that between 2016 and 2020 , the number of irregularities reported related to the cohesion fund , the european regional development fund , the european social fund and the fisheries funds for the 2014-2020 programming period increased; stresses , however , that for all funds , and in particular the european regional development fund , as regards non-fraudulent irregularities , this increase was limited , highlighting an exceptional fall in the number of detected irregularities (and related financial amounts) in comparison to the previous programming period; ### 19. notes that between 2016 and 2020 , the number of irregularities reported related to the cohesion fund , the european regional development fund , the european social fund and the fisheries funds for the 2014-2020 programming period increased; stresses , however , that for all funds , and in particular the european regional development fund , as regards non-fraudulent irregularities , this increase was limited , highlighting an exceptional fall in the number of detected irregularities (and related financial amounts) in comparison to the previous programming period; takes note that covid 19 may bring new opportunities to fraudsters , with risks related to managing the emergency - requiring simplified procedures , which may be abused; the pressure on the authorities managing the eu funds , with delays and new stress factors that could benefit fraudsters , via among others inflated costs; emphasis that all these new risks posed by covid-19 outbreak require adaptation of the control strategies and more focus on prevention through specific mitigating measures and targeted actions to detect future irregularities and fraud;


### 26. regrets that little support has been given to member states in the first years of implementation of the cafs , as has also been pointed out by some delegations during debates in the council; reiterates that comprehensive and comparable data on the scale , nature and causes of fraud is essential to make even more meaningful the investigative actions by olaf and , since it has taken up operational activities , the eppo; ### 26. regrets that little support has been given to member states in the first years of implementation of the cafs , as has also been pointed out by some delegations during debates in the council; reiterates that comprehensive and comparable data on the scale , nature and causes of fraud is essential to make even more meaningful the investigative actions by olaf and , since it has taken up operational activities , the eppo; reminds that member states have a frontline responsibility for managing about 80% of the expenditure budget and for collecting almost all the revenue; highlights the important role members states therefore play in protecting the eu financial interests , with the key role played by the national anti-fraud strategies (nafss) , whose establishment should be a priorty in all member states;


### 27. notes that by the end of 2020 , 14 member states reported having adopted a nafs , up from 10 in 2019; notes , however , that these strategies vary in scope and depth and that some need to be updated; calls for more member states to adopt a nafs and to report it to the commission; ### 27. notes with concerns that by the end of 2020 , only 14 member states reported having adopted a nafs , which is anyhow up from 10 in 2019 , with 5 others considering adopting or preparing a nafs; notes , however , that these strategies vary in scope and depth and that some need to be updated; express concerns that some big countries in the eu do not have any nafs at all , including germany and spain; calls for more member states to adopt a nafs and to report it to the commission; stresses the importance of better coordinated , holistic anti-fraud efforts in member states with nafs to be updated to face the new risks posed by the covid-19 and the new ways of managing funds; calls on the commission to assess the nafss that have been adopted , to examine why member states are lagging behind in adopting them , and to push the remaining member states to progress with adoption; reminds that afcos should facilitates effective cooperation and exchange of information with olaf , but regrets that only in some member states they effectively coordinate the fight against fraud affecting the eu financial interests;


### 37. calls on olaf , the eppo , afcos , and the responsible eu agencies to keep strengthening the exchange of information , to reciprocate support and ensure complementarity in their operational activities as agreed in the established working arrangements and regulations; ### 37. calls on olaf , the eppo , afcos , and the responsible eu agencies to keep strengthening the exchange of information , to reciprocate support and ensure complementarity in their operational activities as agreed in the established working arrangements and regulations; highlights that the complex anti-fraud architecture in place requires close cooperation between the various players , at eu and national level; underlines that more efforts are needed to prevent and fight fraud , corruption and other illegal activities , including a closer cooperation with national authorities , between member states and within the eu level;


### 43. endorses the call of the commission for ‘european vision’ in cooperation between and the coordination of the actions of eu bodies and national authorities; believes that a more structured holistic approach is needed in order to avoid overlapping , to share and exchange information and to foster the integration of the several existing layers of the anti-fraud architecture and achieve a result that is bigger than the sum of its components; ### 43. endorses the call of the commission for ‘european vision’ in cooperation between and the coordination of the actions of eu bodies and national authorities; believes that a more structured holistic approach is needed in order to avoid overlapping , to share and exchange information and to foster the integration of the several existing layers of the anti-fraud architecture and achieve a result that is bigger than the sum of its components; underlines that improved transparency for beneficiaries of eu and national funding will also be important to cope with the new challenging international context;


### 15. underlines the significant support provided by the eib via the egf , which complements other actions taken at eu level to tackle the pandemic and post-pandemic crises; appreciates that this support acts as an incentive for financial intermediaries to lend more to companies and under better conditions , thereby helping businesses to access advantageous financing rapidly in order to overcome pandemic-related issues; ### 15. underlines the significant support provided by the eib via the egf , which complements other actions taken at eu level to tackle the pandemic and post-pandemic crises; appreciates that this support acts as an incentive for financial intermediaries to lend more to companies and under better conditions , thereby helping businesses to access advantageous financing rapidly in order to overcome pandemic-related issues; expresses concerns about the lack of transparency around the egf which may result in the almost impossibility to assess whether the fund has actually benefit the european economy;


### 37. welcomes the updated codes of conduct of the management committee and the eib board of directors of august 2021; welcomes the introduction of a longer cooling-off period for members of the management committee (24 months instead of 12) and for members of the board of directors (12 months instead of 6); ### 37. takes notes of the updated codes of conduct of the management committee and the eib board of directors of august 2021; welcomes the introduction of a longer cooling-off period for members of the management committee (24 months instead of 12) and for members of the board of directors (12 months instead of 6); regrets , however , that there is no provision excluding vice-presidents from overseeing operations in their countries of origin and insists that this be addressed in the next revision;


### 43. welcomes the adoption of the eib group’s revised transparency policy on 17 november 2021 following an extensive public consultation; notes that this policy lays down provisions for the proactive publication of information and documents and their disclosure upon request; ### 43. expresses concerns that the adoption of the eib group’s revised transparency policy on 17 november 2021 following an extensive public consultation does not respond to the european parliament’s and civil society organisations’s demands to step up its transparency policy in line with the best practices and standards employed by other financial institutions; notes that this policy does not lay down provisions for the proactive publication of information on the projects it finances , before a final decision is taken; reminds the importance of transparency on intermediaries , on the internal decision making procedures and on the environmental and human rights impact of the project including through their full implementation;


### 44. reiterates its call for more transparency and accountability to parliament; ### 44. reiterates its call for more transparency and accountability to parliament; reiterates in particular the importance of greater parliament scrutiny over decision of the eib board of directors with better transparency from the commission on the positions it takes in the eib board of directors; in this regards invites to considers the possibility for the parliament to have an observer status in the board’s meetings;


### 9. notes that , due to the covid-19 pandemic and the consequent travel restrictions , meetings from mid-march until mid-may 2020 were cancelled while starting from mid-may remote and hybrid meetings were organised; notes the decision of the committee’s bureau to establish a flat-rate remote meeting allowance for its members of eur 200 (compared to the standard flat-rate meeting allowance of eur 323) to cover the expenses incurred while preparing for and participating in meetings , provided that the member was effectively prevented from attending the meeting physically and that the attendance was authorised; observes that on 9 october 2020 the bureau established a similar remote allowance for experts and speakers; ### 9. notes that , due to the covid-19 pandemic and the consequent travel restrictions , meetings from mid-march until mid-may 2020 were cancelled while starting from mid-may remote and hybrid meetings were organised; regrets the decision of the committee’s bureau to establish a flat-rate remote meeting allowance for its members of eur 200 (compared to the standard flat-rate meeting allowance of eur 323) to cover the expenses incurred while preparing for and participating in meetings , provided that the member was effectively prevented from attending the meeting physically and that the attendance was authorised; observes that on 9 october 2020 the bureau established a similar remote allowance for experts and speakers;


### 32. acknowledges that the agreement between the european parliament and the european commission on the transparency register for organisations and self-employed individuals engaged in eu policy-making and policy implementation1 and the interinstitutional agreement of 20 may 2021 between the european parliament , the council of the european union and the european commission on a mandatory transparency register2 , while allowing the voluntary involvement of union institutions , bodies , offices and agencies , do not cover the activities of regional and local authorities and the associations representing them; objects , however , to the view of the committee that the use of the transparency register set up by those agreements has limited relevance and still deems the practical guide on the interaction of staff with external entities to be valid (dating back to 2018); encourages the committee to undertake actions to enhance the transparency of its interactions with interest representatives; ### 32. acknowledges that the agreement between the european parliament and the european commission on the transparency register for organisations and self-employed individuals engaged in eu policy-making and policy implementation and the interinstitutional agreement of 20 may 2021 between the european parliament , the council of the european union and the european commission on a mandatory transparency register , while allowing the voluntary involvement of union institutions , bodies , offices and agencies , do not cover the activities of regional and local authorities and the associations representing them; objects , however , to the view of the committee that the use of the transparency register set up by those agreements has limited relevance and still deems the practical guide on the interaction of staff with external entities to be valid (dating back to 2018); encourages the committee to undertake actions to enhance the transparency of its interactions with interest representatives; reiterates its call on the committee to join the interinstitutional agreement on a mandatory transparency register , recalling the importance of a high level of transparency with respect to lobbying meetings which might influence members and staff in their advisory role to the union institutions;


### 79. notes with concerns that 73 ,3 % of the contracts with member states were signed with only 2 national development agencies (the french afd and the german giz); while recognising the expertise of those 2 agencies , considers that union development policy cannot be reduced to the vision of only 2 member states; welcomes the efforts of the commission in that regard , including the preparation of a study to understand the strength of each partner in the members states in order to evaluate how they could better contribute in the future; asks the commission to provide the discharge authority with that report as soon as it is available; ### 79. notes with concern that 73 ,3% of the contracts with member states were signed with only two member states national development agencies (namely from france and germany) with the afd representing 67% of the contracts signed with french agencies , and giz representing 72% of the contracts signed with german agencies; while recognising the expertise of those two agencies , considers that union development policy cannot be reduced to the vision of only two member states; welcomes the efforts of the commission in that regard , including the preparation of a study to understand the strength of each partner in the members states in order to evaluate how they could better contribute in the future; asks the commission to provide the discharge authority with that report as soon as it is available;


### 12 welcomes the fact that the proportion of women in management positions continued to increase (from 39% in 2019 to 41% in 2020); ### 12 welcomes the fact that the proportion of women in management positions continued to increase (from 39% in 2019 to 41% in 2020); urges the court to continue in this direction.


### 34. welcomes the report to parliament’s committee on budgetary control regarding the prevention of conflict of interests of the members of the cjeu; notes with satisfaction that the system currently in place combines preventive mechanisms applicable both on a general basis and upon the assignment of cases; notes that the members’ declaration of interest assumes a prominent role in the prevention regime and welcomes the code of conduct adopted in 2021 that increased the content of the declaration of interest; highlights that the prevention regime applies both to the entire duration of the term of office and to the period following the term of office , and includes both a cooling off period of three years and a number of absolute incompatibilities with no temporal limitation; ### 34. welcomes the report to parliament’s committee on budgetary control regarding the prevention of conflict of interests of the members of the cjeu; notes with satisfaction that the system currently in place combines preventive mechanisms applicable both on a general basis and upon the assignment of cases; notes that the members’ declaration of interest assumes a prominent role in the prevention regime and welcomes the code of conduct adopted in 2021 that increased the content of the declaration of interest , but still regrets its self-declaratory nature; highlights that the prevention regime applies both to the entire duration of the term of office and to the period following the term of office , and includes both a cooling off period of three years and a number of absolute incompatibilities with no temporal limitation;


### 9 notes , however , that savings estimated at eur 8.5 million were made under the budget lines for translation and freelance interpreting , professional training , missions , cleaning and security and surveillance of buildings , furniture , protocol activities and salaries; ### 9 regrets , however , that savings estimated at eur 8.5 million were made under the budget lines for translation and freelance interpreting , professional training , missions , cleaning and security and surveillance of buildings , furniture , protocol activities and salaries;


### 28. notes that in the ast and ast/sc categories the percentage of women decreased to 65.35 % compared to 66.3 % in 2019; stresses that imbalances remained among the different grades , with women representing 66.2 % of staff in the lower grades (ast2 to ast9) but only 33.3 % in the higher grades (ast10 to ast11); points out the gender balance reached with regard to contract agents (59.4 %) and local agents (54.5 %) , while the majority of seconded national experts were men (75.2 %); ### 28. notes that in the ast and ast/sc categories the percentage of women decreased to 65.35 % compared to 66.3 % in 2019; regrets that imbalances remained among the different grades , with women representing 66.2 % of staff in the lower grades (ast2 to ast9) but only 33.3 % in the higher grades (ast10 to ast11); points out the gender balance reached with regard to contract agents (59.4 %) and local agents (54.5 %) , while the majority of seconded national experts were men (75.2 %);


### 48. notes that the eeas does not hold meetings with organisations and self-employed individuals qualified as lobbyists in line with article 11 teu; encourages the eeas to nevertheless explore the possibility of joining the union’s transparency register , on the basis of a service level agreement; ### 48. notes that the eeas does not hold meetings with organisations and self-employed individuals qualified as lobbyists in line with article 11 teu; strongly encourages the eeas to nevertheless explore the possibility of joining the union’s transparency register , on the basis of a service level agreement , in order to improve transparency by disclosing all meetings with all lobby organisations that try to influence the law-making and policy implementation processes of the union institutions; reiterates its disagreement with the eeas’ opinion that an obligation to record meetings with lobbyists in third countries would make it difficult for heads of union delegations to engage with the union's economic interests in third countries; believes that citizens should be allowed to know which organisations union ambassadors are meeting;


### 57. observes that not all member states have yet adopted a naf; believes that even in the member states where such strategies have been already adopted , the new anti-fraud landscape has created the need for a revision as the european prosecutor’s office has been operational since june 2021 and the rrf regulation was adopted in february 2021 , and there is the opportunity to reflect significant new risks , such as those associated with the covid-19 pandemic and the implementation of the recovery and resilience plans; ### 57. regrets that despite some improvements compared to 2020 , still 6 member states have not yet adopted a naf; believes that even in the member states where such strategies have been already adopted , the new anti-fraud landscape has created the need for a revision as the european prosecutor’s office has been operational since june 2021 and the rrf regulation was adopted in february 2021 , and there is the opportunity to reflect significant new risks , such as those associated with the covid-19 pandemic and the implementation of the recovery and resilience plans;


### 38. is of the opinion that the action of the eib audit committee is not alternative but complementary to that of the eca; deplores the fact that the tripartite agreement , which was renewed on 11 november 2021 by the eib , the commission and the eca , does not offer a satisfactory solution and that its renewal confirms the situation without any meaningful improvement; ### 38. is of the opinion that the action of the eib audit committee is not alternative but complementary to that of the eca; deplores the fact that the tripartite agreement , which was renewed on 11 november 2021 by the eib , the commission and the eca , does not offer a satisfactory solution and that its renewal confirms the situation without any meaningful improvement in particular in relation to the role of eca in term of auditing powers regarding activities of the eib;


### 2. adds that in the current eu political context , the term ‘oligarchy’ is being used as a way of pointing out the influence of the wealthy and powerful in politics and government , an influence that is typically used to benefit the few at the expense of the many; ### 2. adds that in the current eu political context , the term ‘oligarchy’ is being used as a way of pointing out the influence of the wealthy and powerful in politics and government , an influence that is typically used to benefit the few at the expense of the many; considers worryingly the increase of oligarch structures within the union , where a small group of politically influential , wealthy people control the states;


### 4. considers that promoting competition , enhancing transparency and assuring functional implementation of public procurement rules and free access to markets is fundamental to prevent oligarchs from seizing control of the economy and financial market , which would result in them self-reinforcing; ### 4. considers that effective anti-corruption policies and bodies , promoting competition , independent media and judiciary , enhancing transparency and assuring functional implementation of public procurement rules and free access to markets is fundamental to prevent oligarchs from seizing control of the economy and financial market , which would result in them self-reinforcing;


### 12. notes that the authority reported that it employs staff of 28 nationalities , of whom the authority reports that 49 % are female and 51 % are male; notes that 83 % of senior management is male and 17 % is female; ### 12. notes that the authority reported that it employs staff of 28 nationalities , of whom the authority reports that 49 % are female and 51 % are male; notes that 83 % of senior management is male and 17 % is female; is concerned by the lack of gender balance at the senior management and board management level , while welcoming the perfect balance in the overall staff; invites the authority to increase its effort to achieve a better gender balance at management level;


### 19. notes the inquiry of the ombudsman following the authority’s decision not to forbid its former executive director from taking up a role in a financial industry lobby and the inquiry’s conclusion that there was maladministration by the authority in not immediately withdrawing its executive director’s access to confidential information; notes the recommendations made by the ombudsman and the authority’s reply that the new staff policy addresses the recommendations; ### 19. welcomes the inquiry of the ombudsman following the authority’s decision not to forbid its former executive director from taking up a role in a financial industry lobby and the inquiry’s conclusion that there was maladministration by the authority in not immediately withdrawing its executive director’s access to confidential information; notes the recommendations made by the ombudsman and the authority’s reply that the new staff policy addresses the recommendations; requests the authority to report back to the parliament on the measures to avoid the repetition of such a situation; invites the agency to take seriously possible cases of revolving doors;


### 20. notes the eib group’s growing involvement in the agricultural sector; insists that eib financing needs to support a transition to land-based animal agriculture , with diets adapted to the animals’ natural needs , and a re-balancing of animal and crop productions and should avoid contributing to stocking densities exceeding the carrying capacity of the land; ### 20. notes the eib group’s growing involvement in the agricultural sector; insists that eib financing needs to support a new model of agriculture , more respectful of animal welfare , that should prevent caged farming for instance; support the re-balancing of animal and crop productions and should avoid contributing to stocking densities exceeding the carrying capacity of the land; promote sustainable farming and investing in rural communities.


### 27. reiterates its call to enhance its due diligence at project level to identify and address human rights related risks in all its activities and throughout the lifespan of its projects including by allowing for the suspension of disbursements in the case of serious violations of human rights or environmental and social standards , and to ensure that complaints mechanisms are easily accessible timely and effective; asks to report to the parliament and the board of governors about this by the end of 2021; ### 27. calls on the eib to further improve human rights policies and make these a priority , the eib should enhance its due diligence at project level to identify and address human rights related risks in all its activities and throughout the lifespan of its projects. recommends that the eib adopt a do-no-harm approach on this matter.


### c. whereas public knowledge about the spending of union funds is essential for the acceptance of this spending and is also crucial in order to ensure accountability and ensure better control of spending including avoidance of misuse and of conflicts of interests; ### c. whereas public knowledge and full transparency about the spending of union funds is essential for the acceptance of this spending and is also crucial in order to ensure accountability and ensure better control of spending including avoidance of misuse , corruption , fraud and of conflicts of interests;


### 8. underlines that transparency about final beneficiaries will ensure that auditing , control and discharge authorities in national administrations , the commission , the council and the parliament will have much better and more accurate possibilities to ensure that money is being spent efficiently according to rules and policy ambitions; ### 8. underlines that transparency about final beneficiaries will ensure that auditing , control and discharge authorities in national administrations , the commission , the council and the parliament will have much better and more accurate possibilities to ensure that money is being spent efficiently or to carry out recoveries in the event of fraud according to rules and policy ambitions;


### 10. considers that the present situation where it is impossible to get a reasonably complete picture about who is receiving how much from especially shared management funds is unacceptable and needs to be changed as soon as possible to increase the efficiency of union funds; ### 10. considers that the present situation where it is impossible to get a reasonably complete picture about who is receiving how much from especially shared management funds is unacceptable and needs to be changed as soon as possible to increase transparency and efficiency of union funds;


### 16. underlines that in situations where the direct recipient is a company which is owned by another company , it should be ensured that it is possible to identify the owners of the second company also , and that this obligation should continue to apply no matter how many companies are involved; ### 16. underlines that in situations where the direct recipient is a company which is owned by another company , it should be ensured that it is possible to identify the owners of the second company also , and that this obligation should continue to apply no matter how many companies are involved; considers therefore that it is necessary to have unique identification numbers set up for beneficiaries by parent companies , so that every subsidiary has a subsequent number , allowing to really know where money goes;


### 17. notes that this obligation to identify the owner should as a minimum apply whenever any natural or legal person owns more than 30% of the company in question; ### 17. notes that this obligation to identify the owner should as a minimum apply whenever any natural or legal person owns more than 25%10a of the company in question;


### where the recipient of funds is a legal person , information shall be published on persons and entities holding more than 30% ownership of that entity. ### where the recipient of funds is a legal person , information shall be published on persons and entities holding more than 25% ownership of that entity;


### 12. regrets that the bureau of the committee in 2020 adopted a decision allowing for the reimbursement of expenses for remote participation in cases where a member was prevented from travelling to brussels as a result of covid-19 related issues. ### 12. regrets that the bureau of the committee in 2020 adopted a decision allowing for the reimbursement of expenses for remote participation in cases where a member was prevented from travelling to brussels as a result of covid-19 related issues; expresses serious concerns that this decision is not understandable for the public and may undermine citizens' trust in the committee;


### 42. welcomes the fact that the committee continues to promote respect in the workplace with the aim of ensuring that all staff are familiar with the current ethical framework; notes that a wide-ranging awareness-raising campaign started in 2019 , called respect@work and which takes on board a number of proposals from the report of the european ombudsman on dignity at work in the eu institutions and agencies (si/2/2018/amf); welcomes the fact that the network of confidential counsellors was reinforced; notes that following a decision of the european ombudsman the committee adopted its guidelines on managing conflicts of interest of staff in the performance of their duties and provided relevant information to all staff; notes that the guidelines are intended to serve as a practical handbook for staff in cases where they need to perform overlapping duties , such as management duties in parallel with staff representation activities; ### 42. welcomes the fact that the committee continues to promote respect in the workplace with the aim of ensuring that all staff are familiar with the current ethical framework; notes that a wide-ranging awareness-raising campaign started in 2019 , called respect@work and which takes on board a number of proposals from the report of the european ombudsman on dignity at work in the eu institutions and agencies (si/2/2018/amf); welcomes the fact that the network of confidential counsellors was reinforced; notes that following a decision of the european ombudsman the committee adopted its guidelines on managing conflicts of interest of staff in the performance of their duties and provided relevant information to all staff; notes that the guidelines are intended to serve as a practical handbook for staff in cases where they need to perform overlapping duties , such as management duties in parallel with staff representation activities; invites the committee to go further with the measures to respond to the ombudsman’s report;


### 43. requests the committee to report on any achievements related to the european ombudsman’s recommendation such as the guidelines on external activities; notes that in 2019 the european ombudsman published her report on the publication of information in relation to former senior staff so as to enforce the one year lobbying and advocacy ban (si/2/2017/nf) and that the committee was examining the possibility of revising its decision on external activities; ### 43. requests the committee to report on any achievements related to the european ombudsman’s recommendation such as the guidelines on external activities; notes that in 2019 the european ombudsman published her report on the publication of information in relation to former senior staff so as to enforce the one year lobbying and advocacy ban (si/2/2017/nf) and that the committee was examining the possibility of revising its decision on external activities; invites the committee to take this opportunity to reinforce its system to avoid any potential case of conflict of interests;


### 49. acknowledges that the committee is well aware of the political impact of the refusal of the 2018 discharge and is striving to further strengthen its capacity to tackle harassment situations; notes that a detailed action plan will be endorsed at the latest by the end of 2020; agrees that the committee continues to raise staff and management awareness through better targeted internal communication; ### 49. acknowledges that the committee is well aware of the political impact of the refusal of the 2018 discharge and is striving to further strengthen its capacity to tackle harassment situations; notes that a detailed action plan will be endorsed at the latest by the end of 2020; agrees that the committee continues to raise staff and management awareness through better targeted internal communication; but expect far more than that in its actions;


### 8. appreciates the fact that the court will look into the suggestion of the 2018 discharge resolution that an independent annual report on the union institutions should be presented as part of the reflections on the court’s strategy for the 2021-2025 period , which should be adopted by the end of 2020; ### 8. appreciates the fact that the court will look into the suggestion of the 2018 discharge resolution that an independent annual report on the union institutions should be presented as part of the reflections on the court’s strategy for the 2021-2025 period , which should be adopted by the end of 2020; in this regard reiterates the need for a deeper examination by the court of each and every institutions in order to allow parliament to fulfil its duties as discharge authority;


### 13. is concerned about the decrease in the number of female directors from 30 % in 2018 to 20 % in 2019 and in the number of female heads of unit from 39 % in 2018 to 35 % in 2019; notes , however , the slight increase in female court members from 21 % in 2018 to 26 % in 2019; underlines the commitment of parliament’s committee on budgetary control to support the nomination process for court members in order to increase the share of women (seven women and 20 men were members in 2019); ### 13. is concerned about the decrease in the number of female directors from 30 % in 2018 to 20 % in 2019 and in the number of female heads of unit from 39 % in 2018 to 35 % in 2019; notes , however , the slight increase in female court members from 21 % in 2018 (six out of 28 members) to 25% in 2019 (seven out of 28 members); underlines the commitment of parliament’s committee on budgetary control to support the nomination process for court members in order to increase the share of women , recalling the invitation to member states to more actively encourage women to apply for these kinds of positions; reiterates that the council should always present at least two candidates , one female and one male , during the appointment procedure;


### 39. notes that members are authorised to use official vehicles in the performance of official duties; notes that the use of official cars for other journeys is additional to the performance of such duties and that since 1 january 2017 , the costs and kilometres related to the use of official cars have decreased significantly; notes that new rules entered into force on 1 january 2020 and introduced a monthly eur 100 contribution for the non-official use of the vehicles as well as a liability on the part of the members and the secretary-general for certain costs and charges; ### 39. notes that members are authorised to use official vehicles in the performance of official duties; notes that the use of official cars for other journeys is additional to the performance of such duties and that since 1 january 2017 , the costs and kilometres related to the use of official cars have decreased significantly; notes that new rules entered into force on 1 january 2020 and introduced a monthly eur 100 contribution for the non-official use of the vehicles as well as a liability on the part of the members and the secretary-general for certain costs and charges; reiterates its opinion that the use of official vehicles for private use should not take place under any circumstance , considering that this practice may harm the reputation of the court and , in general , of the union institutions


### 40. appreciates the fact that , in the light of the obligations of the members to attend all meetings of the court , of the chambers and of the administrative committee to which they belong , an attendance register is kept by the court’s secretariat; notes that it reflects the presence and absence of members and shows also which absences are considered as excused by the president; notes that the attendance register is part of the court’s rules implementing its rules of procedure; ### 40. notes that , in light of the obligations of the members to attend all meetings of the court , of the chambers and of the administrative committee to which they belong , an attendance register is kept by the court’s secretariat; notes that it reflects the presence and absence of members and shows also which absences are considered as excused by the president; notes that the attendance register is part of the court’s rules implementing its rules of procedure;


### 43. calls on the court to provide information on any decisions taken related to the process of reviewing and amending the code of conduct for its members; supports the conclusions of the peer review with respect to the need to introduce regular updates of declarations , which would increase their reliability; is in agreement that the ethics committee plays a crucial role to the extent that the president and the members may seek its advice on any question pertaining to ethics and on the interpretation of the code of conduct; notes , moreover , that the committee is entrusted with approving any external activity undertaken by the members , including former members who intend to carry out an activity in the year after they leave the court , which is an efficient tool in ensuring the absence of conflicts of interest. ### 43. calls on the court to provide information on any decisions taken related to the process of reviewing and amending the code of conduct for its members; supports the conclusions of the peer review with respect to the need to introduce regular updates of declarations , which would increase their reliability; nevertheless reiterates its concern that the declarations of interest are of a self-declaratory nature and that , given the current legal framework , neither the court nor its ethics committee have any investigation powers to ensure the veracity and the exhaustiveness of the declared data; calls on the court to ensure that members submit declarations of interest instead of declarations of the absence of conflicts of interest; underlines that the current procedures , including those of the ethics committee , need to be reinforced to ensure the absence of conflict of interests; is in agreement that the ethics committee plays a crucial role to the extent that the president and the members may seek its advice on any question pertaining to ethics and on the interpretation of the code of conduct; notes , moreover , that the committee is entrusted with approving any external activity undertaken by the members , including former members who intend to carry out an activity in the year after they leave the court , but this cannot be considered in itself an effective instrument to ensure the absence of conflict of interest as already underlined in last year's discharge resolution;


### 19. is concerned that the cjeu was not able to provide information about its internal procedures related to ‘revolving doors’ for senior members of staff; recalls the request from parliament’s committee on budgetary control and the initiative of the ombudsman in 2018 on how to best implement the provisions laid down in the staff regulations on ‘revolving doors’; ### 19. is concerned that the cjeu was not able to provide information about its internal procedures related to ‘revolving doors’ for senior members of staff; recalls the request from parliament’s committee on budgetary control to establish and publish strict rules in this regard without delay; and the initiative of the ombudsman in 2018 on how to best implement the provisions laid down in the staff regulations on ‘revolving doors’;


### 8. notes the upward trend with regard to the proportion of women reaching management positions with 30 ,3 % (or 81 positions) compared to 27 ,1 % in 2018 and 24 ,5 % in 2017; takes also note of the increasing trend of the share of women posted as heads of delegation from 19 ,5 % in 2015 to 27 ,7 % in 2019 (or 38 postings out of 137); reiterates its support for the eeas in continuing its efforts with member states to introduce more women candidates; notes that overall women represented 47 ,7 % of eeas staff; recalls that gender balance should also be considered with regard to the eu special representatives , two out of eight eu special representatives being women; ### 8. notes the upward trend with regard to the proportion of women reaching management positions with 30 ,3 % (or 81 positions) compared to 27 ,1 % in 2018 and 24 ,5 % in 2017; takes also note of the increasing trend of the share of women posted as heads of delegation from 19 ,5 % in 2015 to 27 ,7 % in 2019 (or 38 postings out of 137); reiterates its support for the eeas in continuing its efforts with member states to introduce more women candidates; notes that overall women represented 47 ,7 % of eeas staff; recalls that gender balance should also be considered with regard to the eu special representatives , only two out of eight eu special representatives being women;


### 4. stresses the need to fight foreign propaganda and to expose disinformation and malicious foreign influence; underlines the importance of the eeas strategic communication task force and calls for the broadening of its mandate , including in relation to state sponsored disinformation originating in china , and providing it with further necessary financial and human resources; ### 4. stresses the need to fight foreign propaganda and to expose disinformation and malicious foreign influence; underlines the importance of the eeas strategic communication task force and calls for the broadening of its mandate , including in relation to china-sponsored disinformation , and providing it with further necessary financial and human resources;


### 28. welcomes the successful completion , in 2019 , of new working environments for members in brussels and strasbourg; commends the fact that the refurbishment of all members' offices in brussels (1 personal office permember + 2 staff offices) and in strasbourg (1 personal office + 1 staff office) was carried out in record time and ahead of schedule , as well as coming in under the works budget amount allocated to it , and that new furniture equipment , including integrated it solutions has been installed at a lower cost than originally foreseen; notes with satisfaction that the revised office allocation plan for members and political groups was based on the most efficient use of available office space; ### 28. welcomes the successful completion , in 2019 , of new working environments for members in brussels and strasbourg; commends the fact that the refurbishment of all members' offices in brussels (1 personal office permember + 2 staff offices) and in strasbourg (1 personal office + 1 staff office) was carried out in record time and ahead of schedule , as well as coming in under the works budget amount allocated to it , and that new furniture equipment , including integrated it solutions has been installed at a lower cost than originally foreseen; notes that the revised office allocation plan for members and political groups was based on the most efficient use of available office space; regrets that this principle has lead to some political groups to have their members scattered in different buildings and floors with no logical connection , breaking the unity of political groups; also regrets that the distribution of offices to political groups has pushed some to relocate to external buildings no longer connected to the main parliament activities and thus creating a structural isolation of the staff from its own members; takes note that trèves 1 building is poor in services and priority should be given to find solutions to connect it to the main buildings;


### f. whereas systematic and institutionalised cases of corruption in certain member states seriously harm the union’s financial interests while also representing a threat to the rule of law; ### f. whereas systematic and institutionalised cases of corruption in certain member states seriously harm the union’s financial interests while also representing a threat to democracy , fundamental rights and the rule of law; also reminds of the detrimental impact of corruption on the trust of citizens on the institutions;


### 2. notes that the total number of fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities reported in 2019 amounted to 11 726 cases overall , and involved a value of approximately eur 1.6 billion , representing a decrease of 34 % with respect to the previous year; notes in this respect that the data regarding the number of cases and the value involved for each year are continuously assessed and updated and should be considered into a 5-year average perspective at least; ### 2. notes that the total number of fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities reported in 2019 amounted to 11 726 cases overall 2% fewer than in 2018) , and involved a value of approximately eur 1.6 billion , representing a decrease of 34 % with respect to the previous year; notes in this respect that the data regarding the number of cases and the value involved for each year are continuously assessed and updated and should be considered into a long term perspective;


### 4. notes that the number of fraudulent irregularities reported in 2019 (939 cases) and their related financial amounts (approximately eur 461.4 million) decreased significantly compared to 2018; notes that in 2019 , 514 irregularities reported as fraudulent relating to expenditure represented 0.3% of 2019 payments , and 425 reported as fraudulent on revenue corresponded to 0.3% of gross amount of traditional own resources collected for 2019; ### 4. notes that the number of fraudulent irregularities reported in 2019 (939 cases - 8% of all irregularities) ) and their related financial amounts (approximately eur 461.4 million - 28% of all financial amounts affected by irregularities) decreased significantly compared to 2018; notes that in 2019 , 514 irregularities reported as fraudulent relating to expenditure represented 0.3% of 2019 payments , and 425 reported as fraudulent on revenue corresponded to 0.3% of gross amount of traditional own resources collected for 2019;


### 18. notes that regarding the common agricultural policy (cap) , detections of irregularities were concentrated in a few member states in particular for fraudulent irregularities , suggesting that different approaches to the use of criminal law to protect the eu budget or reporting practices concerning suspected fraud could be significant factors leading to differences among member states; notes , that in 2019 , the overall financial amounts were relatively stable , but amounts with respect to direct support increased whereas rural development decreased; notes in particular that in the area of direct support , most detections indicated the use of falsified documents or requests for aid , and that in rural development , many detections were related to implementation; notes that the creation of artificial conditions for receiving financial support is a common type of fraud in direct support; notes that there was a strong decrease in fraudulent irregularities in rural development , due to the decline in detections related to pp 2007-2013 , in line with the programming lifecycle , and a slow start of detections related to pp 2014-2020 , and that more fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities were still detected in rural development than in direct support; however market measures recorded the highest fraud detection rate (fdr) , at 0.87% , more than four-times that of rural development with regard to fraudulent irregularities and , whereas for non-fraudulent irregularities represented nearly double irregularities detection rate (idr) of that of rural development; moreover , notes from the courts of auditors’ annual report 2017 that the manner in which expenditure is disbursed has an impact on the risk of error , and that in particular errors were confined mainly to cost reimbursements , whereas the error rate for entitlement payments was below the materiality threshold of 2 %; ### 18. notes that regarding the common agricultural policy (cap) , detections of irregularities were concentrated in a few member states in particular for fraudulent irregularities , suggesting that different approaches to the use of criminal law to protect the eu budget or reporting practices concerning suspected fraud could be significant factors leading to differences among member states; notes , that in 2019 , the overall financial amounts were relatively stable , but amounts with respect to direct support increased whereas rural development decreased; notes in particular that in the area of direct support , most detections indicated the use of falsified documents or requests for aid , and that in rural development , many detections were related to implementation; is worried that the creation of artificial conditions for receiving financial support is a common type of fraud in direct support indicating a modus operandi in the fraudulent irregularities touching upon ethics and integrity; notes that there was a strong decrease in fraudulent irregularities in rural development , due to the decline in detections related to pp 2007-2013 , in line with the programming lifecycle , and a slow start of detections related to pp 2014-2020 , and that more fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities were still detected in rural development than in direct support; however market measures recorded the highest fraud detection rate (fdr) , at 0.87% , more than four-times that of rural development with regard to fraudulent irregularities and , whereas for non-fraudulent irregularities represented nearly double irregularities detection rate (idr) of that of rural development; moreover , notes from the courts of auditors’ annual report 2017 that the manner in which expenditure is disbursed has an impact on the risk of error , and that in particular errors were confined mainly to cost reimbursements , whereas the error rate for entitlement payments was below the materiality threshold of 2 %;


### 19. notes the complexity of the analysis on cohesion policy’s data and the different phases of pps 2007-2013 , notes that the financial amounts reported are significantly lower than the exceptional year of 2018 but on average are trending upwards for the cohesion fund; underlines the importance of cooperation with the judicial authorities and considers the need for closer attention to the unexpected downturn of fraudulent irregularities as well as non-fraudulent , excluding ‘exceptional’ cases , for pp 2014-2020 in 2019 of the financial amounts involved in fraudulent irregularities for all funds and in particular regarding the erdf; notes , moreover , the member states’ different reporting patterns in terms of their tendency to detect fraudulent irregularities with high financial amounts involved; ### 19. notes the complexity of the analysis on cohesion policy’s data and the different phases of pps 2007-2013 , notes that the financial amounts reported are significantly lower than the exceptional year of 2018 but on average are trending upwards for the cohesion fund; underlines the importance of cooperation with the judicial authorities and considers the need for closer attention to the unexpected downturn of fraudulent irregularities as well as non-fraudulent , excluding ‘exceptional’ cases , for pp 2014-2020 in 2019 of the financial amounts involved in fraudulent irregularities for all funds and in particular regarding the erdf; notes with concern , moreover , the member states’ different reporting patterns in terms of their tendency to detect fraudulent irregularities with high financial amounts involved;


### 23. stresses the importance of prioritising the development and establishment of national anti-fraud strategies (nafss) by all member states , also in the light of the new challenges of the covid-19 crisis and the recovery and resilience plans; calls on member states who have not yet adopted a nafs to do so without delay; ### 23. stresses the importance of prioritising the development and establishment of national anti-fraud strategies (nafss) by all member states , also in the light of the new challenges of the covid-19 crisis and the recovery and resilience plans; is extremely worried that a total of 16 member states do not have any nafs in place with only four considering adopting or preparing a new nafs; calls on member states who have not yet adopted a nafs to do so without delay;


### 6. notes that the agency had been using interim workers to perform long-term tasks to make up for shortages for directly employed staff members; ### 6. notes with concern that the agency had been using interim workers to perform long-term tasks to make up for shortages for directly employed staff members;


### 24. takes the opportunity to congratulate the ombudsman on the opening of an investigation (oi/2/2017) on the transparency of the council’s legislative work in 2017 in order to allow citizens to more easily follow the legislative process of the union; welcomes the recent positive echoing by the ombudsman of the new transparency steps taken by the council , for example by proactively publishing progress reports on negotiations on draft laws , a development which is in line with proposals made by the ombudsman as a result of her inquiries; ### 24. takes the opportunity to congratulate the ombudsman on the opening of an investigation (oi/2/2017) on the transparency of the council’s legislative work in 2017 in order to allow citizens to more easily follow the legislative process of the union; takes note of the recent positive echoing by the ombudsman of the new transparency steps taken by the council , for example by proactively publishing progress reports on negotiations on draft laws , a development which is in line with proposals made by the ombudsman as a result of her inquiries and encourages the council to continue its efforts to improve legislative transparency , particularly by recording and publishing member state positions and making available more trilogue documents;


### 41. welcomes the start of a dialogue with different stake-holders in order to review the current internal decision no 362/2010 of 29 november 2010 concerning psychological and sexual harassment at work on the basis of a new proposal for a changed framework to combat harassment with the aim of broadening the scope of the matter by including prevention measures and conflict resolution means , as well as reinforcing the principle of zero tolerance towards harassment , including various courses on preventing harassment; ### 41. welcomes the start of a dialogue with different stake-holders in order to review the current internal decision no 362/2010 of 29 november 2010 concerning psychological and sexual harassment at work on the basis of a new proposal for a changed framework to combat harassment with the aim of broadening the scope of the matter by including prevention measures and conflict resolution means , as well as reinforcing the principle of zero tolerance towards harassment , including various courses on preventing harassment; calls on the committee to establish a new framework on harassment as soon as possible and to report back on its follow-up actions to parliament;


### (2) the system established by regulation (ec) no 182/2011 has , overall , proven to work well in practice and struck an appropriate institutional balance as regards the roles of the commission and the other actors involved. that system should therefore continue to function unchanged except for certain targeted amendments concerning specific aspects of procedure at the level of the appeal committee. these amendments are intended to ensure wider political accountability and ownership of politically sensitive implementing acts without , however , modifying the legal and institutional responsibilities for implementing acts as organised by regulation (eu) no 182/2011. ### (2) the system established by regulation (ec) no 182/2011 has , overall , proven to work well in practice with some limitations and struck an appropriate institutional balance as regards the roles of the commission and the other actors involved. that system should therefore continue to function unchanged except for certain targeted amendments concerning specific aspects of procedure at the level of the appeal committee whose functioning is unsatisfactory. these amendments are intended to ensure wider political accountability and ownership of politically sensitive implementing acts without , however , modifying the legal and institutional responsibilities for implementing acts as organised by regulation (eu) no 182/2011.


### (4) experience has shown that , in the vast majority of cases , the appeal committee repeats the outcome of the examination committee and results in no opinion being delivered. the appeal committee has therefore not helped in providing clarity on member state positions. ### (4) experience has shown that , in the vast majority of cases , the appeal committee repeats the outcome of the examination committee and results in no opinion being delivered. the appeal committee has therefore not performed its function in providing clarity on member state positions.


### (7) while the commission is empowered to decide in such cases , due to the particular sensitivity of the issues at stake , member states should also fully assume their responsibility in the decision-making process. this , however , is not the case when member states are not able to reach a qualified majority , due to , amongst others , a significant number of abstentions or non-appearances at the moment of the vote. ### (7) while the commission is empowered to decide in such cases , due to the particular sensitivity of the issues at stake a "no opinion" should mean that the authorisation cannot be granted , member states must fully assume their responsibility in the decision-making process. this , however , is currently not the case when member states are not able to reach a qualified majority , due to , amongst others , a significant number of abstentions or non-appearances at the moment of the vote.


### (8) in order to increase the added value of the appeal committee its role should therefore be strengthened by providing for the possibility of holding a further meeting of the appeal committee whenever no opinion is delivered. the appropriate level of representation at the further meeting of the appeal committee should be ministerial level , to ensure a political discussion. to allow the organisation of such a further meeting the timeframe for the appeal committee to deliver an opinion should be extended. ### (8) in order to increase the added value of the appeal committee its role should therefore be strengthened by providing for the possibility of holding a further meeting of the appeal committee whenever no opinion is delivered. the appropriate level of representation at the further meeting of the appeal committee should be ministerial level , to ensure a political discussion. to allow the organisation of such a further meeting the timeframe for the appeal committee to deliver an opinion should be extended while respecting the need for timely decision-making.


### (9) the voting rules for the appeal committee should be changed in order to reduce the risk of no opinion being delivered and to provide an incentive for member state representatives to take a clear position. to this end only member states which are present or represented , and which do not abstain , should be considered as participating member states for the calculation of the qualified majority. in order to ensure that the voting outcome is representative a vote should only be considered valid if a simple majority of the member states are participating members of the appeal committee. if the quorum is not reached before expiry of the time-limit for the committee to take a decision , it will be considered that the committee delivered no opinion , as is the case today. ### deleted


### (11) transparency on the votes of member state representatives at the appeal committee level should be increased and the individual member state representatives' votes should be made public. ### (11) transparency on the votes of member state representatives at the appeal committee level should be increased and the individual member state representatives' votes and attendance at the appeal committee should be made public.


### in paragraph 1 , the following second subparagraph is added: ### deleted


### the voting results including , in the case of the appeal committee , the votes expressed by the representative of each member state; ; ### the voting results including , in the case of the appeal committee , the votes expressed by the representative and the attendance at the appeals committee of each member state and the written rational for the decisions taken;


### (3) in a number of specific cases , regulation (eu) no 182/2011 provides for referral to the appeal committee. in practice , the appeal committee has been seized in cases where no qualified majority , either in favour or against , was attained within the committee in the context of the examination procedure and thus no opinion was delivered. in the majority of cases this happened in relation to genetically modified organisms and genetically modified food and feed and plant protection products. ### (3) in a number of specific cases , regulation (eu) no 182/2011 provides for referral to the appeal committee. in practice , the appeal committee has abdicated its responsibilities in cases where no qualified majority , either in favour or against , was attained within the committee in the context of the examination procedure and thus no opinion was delivered. in the majority of cases this happened in relation to genetically modified organisms and genetically modified food and feed and plant protection products.


### b. whereas litigation funders involved in legal proceedings act in their own economic interest , rather than in the interest of claimants; whereas they can seek to control the litigation and demand an outcome that pays them the greatest return3 ; ### b. whereas commercial litigation funders involved in legal proceedings mostly act in their own economic interest , rather than in the interest of claimants or the general interest; whereas they can seek to control the litigation and demand an outcome that pays them the greatest return3 ;


### d. whereas litigation funders seem to argue that only they can provide access to justice , there are in fact other ways to seek redress , such as mediation , adr/odr , the ombudsman or through grievance systems managed by companies; whereas , those solutions could result in faster and more adequate compensation for claimants; ### d. whereas litigation funders seem to argue that only they can provide access to justice , there may be other ways to seek redress , such as mediation , adr/odr or the ombudsman; whereas , those solutions could result in faster and more adequate compensation for claimants;


### 10. considers that there should be transparency regarding the involvement of litigation funding in legal proceedings , including obligations for claimants and their lawyers to disclose funding agreements to courts and defendants. notes that , currently , courts or administrative authorities and defendants are often not aware that a claim is funded by a commercial actor. points out that this can also hinder a court or administrative authority in properly considering costs issues and in ensuring that awards compensate claimants adequately; ### 10. considers that there should be supervision by public authorities regarding the involvement of litigation funding in legal proceedings , including obligations for claimants and their lawyers to disclose funding agreements to courts. notes that , currently , courts or administrative authorities are often not aware that a claim is funded by a commercial actor. points out that this can also hinder a court or administrative authority in properly considering costs issues and in ensuring that awards compensate claimants adequately;


### 11. is of the opinion that supervisory authorities , and courts and administrative authorities were appropriate in accordance with national procedural law , should have the powers to facilitate the enforcement of legislation adopted to achieve the goals set out above; recommends the establishment of a complaints system. considers that supervisory authorities , and courts and administrative authorities where appropriate in accordance with national procedural law , should have the powers to address abusive practices by authorised litigation funders; ### 11. is of the opinion that supervisory authorities , and courts and administrative authorities were appropriate in accordance with national procedural law , should have the powers to facilitate the enforcement of legislation adopted to achieve the goals set out above. considers that supervisory authorities , and courts and administrative authorities where appropriate in accordance with national procedural law , should have the powers to address abusive practices by authorised litigation funders;


### (1) third-party litigation funding is a commercial practice which is quickly developing into a litigation services market without any proper legislative framework being in place at union level. despite the fact that litigation funders are regularly established and operating in various member states , domestically or across borders , they have so far been subject to different national rules and practices. diverging rules and practices in member states are likely to constitute an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market. a lack of clarity on the terms on which commercial third party litigation funders (‘litigation funders’) may operate , in particular taking into account that litigation funders can easily be attracted by cross-border cases , is not compatible with the proper functioning of the internal market. divergences in the legal framework applicable in each member state entail a risk of forum shopping by litigation funders , which could be influenced by the favourability of certain national rules concerning their establishment , the law applicable to funding agreements and national procedural rules. ### (1) third-party litigation funding is a commercial practice which is quickly developing into a litigation services market. despite the fact that litigation funders are regularly established and operating in various member states , domestically or across borders , they have so far been subject to different national rules and practices.


### (2) union law seeks to ensure a balance between access to justice and providing appropriate safeguards to those engaged in proceedings , to prevent their wish to access justice from being unjustly exploited. when litigation funders provide financing for legal proceedings in exchange for a share of any compensation awarded , a material risk of injustice can arise. that risk includes litigation funders being able to take advantage of claimants , or those they represent , including where relevant consumers whose interests are represented by qualified entities , to serve their own purposes and to maximise their own return , thus leaving claimants or intended beneficiaries materially disadvantaged. the risks can be particularly acute where those expecting to benefit from litigation are consumers , who might welcome the involvement of a litigation funder ready to pay for proceedings , without appreciating that their interests could be subverted in favour of the litigation funder’s own interests. ### (2) union law seeks to ensure a balance between access to justice and providing appropriate safeguards to those engaged in proceedings. when litigation funders provide financing for legal proceedings in exchange for a share of any compensation awarded , a material risk of injustice can arise. that risk includes litigation funders being able to take advantage of claimants , or those they represent , to serve their own purposes and to maximise their own return , thus leaving claimants or intended beneficiaries materially disadvantaged.


### (3) as the internal market facilitates increasing cross-border trade , as disputes are increasingly cross-border , and as the activities of litigation funders are global in nature , the risk of material divergences in member state approaches to safeguards and the protections necessary with regard to third party funding is acute. voluntary approaches have not been successful or subscribed to by the majority of the industry , and , in any event , non-legislative measures would not be appropriate in light of such material risks , including to consumers. ### (3) as the internal market facilitates increasing cross-border trade , as disputes are increasingly cross-border , and as the activities of litigation funders are global in nature , the risk of material divergences in member state approaches to safeguards and the protections necessary with regard to third party funding is acute. voluntary approaches have not been successful or subscribed to by the majority of the industry , and , in any event , non-legislative measures would not be appropriate in light of such material risks.


### (4) this directive aims to regulate third-party litigation funding , a commercial practice whereby third-party entities not directly involved in a dispute invest for profit in legal proceedings , typically in exchange for a percentage of any settlement or award. third-party litigation funding does not include provision of funds to sponsor litigation on a charitable or donated basis , or similar activities carried out on a pro bono publico basis. this directive also aims to lay down safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest , abusive litigation as well as the disproportionate allocation of monetary awards to litigation funders. ### (4) this directive aims to regulate third-party litigation funding , a commercial practice whereby third-party entities not directly involved in a dispute invest for profit in legal proceedings , typically in exchange for a percentage of any settlement or award. third-party litigation funding does not include provision of funds to sponsor litigation on a charitable or donated basis , or similar activities carried out on a pro bono publico basis. this directive aims to preserve funding and access to justice for victims of violations of human rights , workers’ rights , consumers’ rights and the protection of the environment. this directive also aims to lay down safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest , abusive litigation as well as the disproportionate allocation of monetary awards to litigation funders.


### (9) supervisory authorities within the union granting authorisations to conduct third-party litigation funding activities should be empowered to require that litigation funders comply with minimum criteria laid down by this directive. such criteria should include provisions relating to governance , transparency , capital adequacy , and observance of a fiduciary duty to claimants and intended beneficiaries. supervisory authorities should be empowered to make any necessary orders , including the power to receive from litigation funders applications for authorisation and to decide upon them , to gather any necessary information , grant , deny or withdraw any authorisation or to impose any condition , restriction or penalty upon any litigation funder , as well as to investigate any complaint against any litigation funder conducting activities within their jurisdiction. ### (9) supervisory authorities within the union granting authorisations to conduct third-party litigation funding activities should be empowered to require that litigation funders comply with minimum criteria laid down by this directive. such criteria should include provisions relating to governance , transparency , capital adequacy , and observance of a fiduciary duty to claimants and intended beneficiaries. supervisory authorities should be empowered to make any necessary orders , including the power to receive from litigation funders applications for authorisation and to decide upon them , to gather any necessary information , grant , deny or withdraw any authorisation or to impose any condition , restriction or penalty upon any litigation funder , as well as to investigate on any litigation funder conducting activities within their jurisdiction.


### (11) litigation funders should be required to commit to being bound to a duty to act fairly , transparently and in the best interests of claimants and intended beneficiaries of claims. a lack of a requirement to place the interests of claimants and intended beneficiaries ahead of a litigation funder’s own interests creates the risk of proceedings being directed in a manner that ultimately serves the interests of the litigation funder , rather than those of the claimant. ### (11) litigation funders should be required to commit to being bound to a duty to act fairly , transparently and in the best interests of claimants and intended beneficiaries of claims. a lack of a requirement to place the interests of claimants and intended beneficiaries ahead of a litigation funder’s own interests creates the risk of proceedings being directed in a manner that ultimately infringes on the rights of claimants.


### (13) this directive should regulate the activities of litigation funders , but should be without prejudice to any other regulatory obligations or regimes that may apply. ### (13) this directive should regulate the activities of litigation funders , but should be without prejudice to any other regulatory obligations or regimes that may apply , including regulations on financial services.


### (18) courts or administrative authorities should be empowered to ensure the provision of sufficient disclosure of relevant information on all third-party litigation funding activity relevant to the legal proceedings under their responsibility. ### (18) courts or administrative authorities should be empowered to access relevant information on all third-party litigation funding activity relevant to the legal proceedings under their responsibility.


### (19) courts or administrative authorities should be empowered , where a third-party funding agreement is relevant to the case before them , either upon request by a party to the proceedings to review the agreement , or following an action brought before them against the administrative decision of a supervisory authority which has become final , to deal with such a case in a way which allows them to assess whether this directive is complied with. ### (19) courts or administrative authorities should be empowered , where a third-party funding agreement is relevant to the case before them to deal with such a case in a way which allows them to assess whether this directive is complied with.


### (22) the adequacy of supervision of litigation funders and third-party funding agreements cannot be ensured absent obligations on litigation funders to be transparent regarding their activities. this includes transparency vis-à-vis courts or administrative authorities , defendants and claimants , and therefore obligations should apply to disclose third party funding agreements in full to courts or administrative authorities and defendants , subject to appropriate limitations to protect any necessary confidentiality. ### (22) the adequacy of supervision of litigation funders and third-party funding agreements cannot be ensured absent obligations on litigation funders to be transparent with claimants and public authorities regarding their activities. this includes transparency vis-à-vis courts or administrative authorities and claimants , and therefore obligations should apply to disclose third party funding agreements in full to courts or administrative authorities , subject to appropriate limitations to protect any necessary confidentiality.


### (23) in proceedings to which a third-party funding agreement applies , the relevant court or administrative authority should assess upon request by a party to the proceedings whether that agreement complies with this directive and whether claimants and those they represent , including consumers , are protected. ### (23) in proceedings to which a third-party funding agreement applies , the relevant court or administrative authority should be empowered to assess whether that agreement complies with this directive and whether claimants and those they represent , including consumers , are protected.


### this directive is aimed at harmonising the rules of member states applicable to third-party litigation funders (‘litigation funders’) and their authorised activities , and also at protecting funded claimants and intended beneficiaries , including where relevant those whose interests are represented by qualified entities , in proceedings financed wholly or in part by third-party litigation funding. it lays down safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest , abusive litigation as well as the disproportionate allocation of monetary awards to litigation funders. ### this directive is aimed at harmonising the rules of member states applicable to third-party litigation funders (‘litigation funders’) and their authorised activities , in order to provide a supportive framework , similar to the ones in place for financial services , that also protects funded claimants and intended beneficiaries , including where relevant those whose interests are represented by qualified entities , in proceedings financed wholly or in part by third-party litigation funding. it lays down safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest , abusive litigation as well as the disproportionate allocation of monetary awards to litigation funders


### this directive is aimed at harmonising the rules of member states applicable to third-party litigation funders (‘litigation funders’) and their authorised activities , and also at protecting funded claimants and intended beneficiaries , including where relevant those whose interests are represented by qualified entities , in proceedings financed wholly or in part by third-party litigation funding. it lays down safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest , abusive litigation as well as the disproportionate allocation of monetary awards to litigation funders. ### this directive is aimed at harmonising the rules of member states applicable to third-party litigation funders (‘litigation funders’) and their authorised activities , and also at protecting funded claimants and intended beneficiaries , including where relevant those whose interests are represented by qualified entities , in proceedings financed wholly or in part by third-party litigation funding. it prohibits third-party funding of investment arbitration proceedings. it lays down safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest , abusive litigation as well as the disproportionate allocation of monetary awards to litigation funders.


### 2. member states shall ensure that supervisory authorities are empowered to verify whether litigation funders would be able to maintain access at all times to the minimum liquidity required to pay in full all foreseeable adverse costs in all proceedings they have funded. members states shall ensure that their courts or administrative authorities can request litigation funders to provide security for costs in the forms admitted by national law , should a defendant so request based on reasoned specific concerns. ### 2. member states shall ensure that supervisory authorities are empowered to verify whether litigation funders would be able to maintain access at all times to the minimum liquidity required to pay in full all foreseeable adverse costs in all proceedings they have funded. members states shall ensure that their courts or administrative authorities can request litigation funders to provide security for costs in the forms admitted by national law.


### 2. member states shall ensure that a complaints procedure before supervisory authorities is available for any natural or legal person who wishes to raise concerns regarding the compliance of a litigation funder with its obligations under this directive and the applicable national law. ### deleted


### assess at least every year whether an authorised litigation funder continues to comply with the criteria for authorisation referred to in article 5(1) and ensure that such authorisation is withdrawn if it no longer complies with one or more of those criteria. ### assess at least every year whether an authorised litigation funder continues to comply with the criteria for authorisation referred to in article 5(1) and ensure that such authorisation is withdrawn if it no longer complies with one or more of those criteria. before withdrawing the authorisation of a public interest litigation funder , it shall also refrain from withdrawing the authorisation if this would affect current or potential claimants' capacity to engage in public interest litigation.


### assess at least every year whether an authorised litigation funder continues to comply with the criteria for authorisation referred to in article 5(1) and ensure that such authorisation is withdrawn if it no longer complies with one or more of those criteria. ### assess at least every year whether an authorised litigation funder continues to comply with the criteria for authorisation referred to in article 5(1) and ensure that such authorisation is withdrawn if it no longer complies with one or more of those criteria. before withdrawing the authorisation of a public interest litigation funder , it shall grant it sufficient time to take the necessary steps in order to comply with the requirements of this directive.


### under the system referred to in article 9 , receive and investigate complaints in relation to the conduct of a litigation funder and the compliance of such litigation funder with the provisions laid down in chapter iv of this directive and any other applicable requirements under national law. ### deleted


### investigations and complaints ### investigations


### 1. member states shall ensure that a complaints system is in place that allows for the reception and investigation of complaints as referred to in article 8 , paragraph 2. ### deleted


### 2. under the complaints system referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall ensure that supervisory authorities are empowered to assess whether a litigation funder is in compliance with any obligations or conditions associated with its authorisation , with the provisions of this directive and with any other applicable requirements under national law. ### 2. member states shall ensure that supervisory authorities are empowered to assess whether a litigation funder is in compliance with any obligations or conditions associated with its authorisation , with the provisions of this directive and with any other applicable requirements under national law.


### investigate complaints received from any natural or legal person; ### deleted


### 2. member states shall ensure that courts or administrative authorities are empowered , upon request by a party to the proceedings , where that party has justified doubts in respect of the compliance of such third party funding agreement with this directive and any other applicable national law in accordance with article 16. ### deleted


### 3. where paragraph 2 applies , in accordance with national procedural law , subject to the applicable union and national rules on confidentiality , member states shall ensure , if requested by the defendant , that the court or administrative authority is able to require the claimants or their representatives to provide the defendant with a copy of any third-party funding agreement used to support the proceedings. the court or administrative authority may permit certain information , which could confer a tactical advantage to a defendant to be redacted from the third-party funding agreement prior to disclosure to the defendant. ### deleted


### to make orders or give directions that are binding on a litigation funder , such as requiring the litigation funder to provide the funding as agreed in the relevant third-party funding agreement or requiring the litigation funder to make changes in respect of the relevant funding and , if necessary , rejecting the legal standing of the funded claimant , in particular , when the action is brought by a qualified entity , in accordance with article 10 , paragraph 4 , of directive (eu) 2020/1828 of the european parliament and of the council; ### to make orders or give directions that are binding on a litigation funder , such as requiring the litigation funder to provide the funding as agreed in the relevant third-party funding agreement or requiring the litigation funder to make changes in respect of the relevant funding


### 19. reiterates that asylum seekers , refugees and migrants are particularly vulnerable to trafficking and that special attention should be given to the trafficking of women , children and other vulnerable groups; highlights that there are vulnerabilities and risks at the different stages in the migration process prior to migration itself , en route to the eu , at the destination and on return22 ; ### 19. reiterates that special attention should be given to the trafficking of women , children and other vulnerable groups; highlights that there are vulnerabilities and risks at the different stages in the migration process prior to migration itself , en route to the eu , at the destination and on return22 ;


### 23. calls on the member states to step up their efforts to early identify potential victims , in particular within migration flows and hotspots; calls on the member states to provide adequate resources for specialised facilities for unaccompanied minors and female victims of trafficking; calls on the member states to provide adequate resources for specialised facilities for the detention of unaccompanied minors and of female victims of trafficking; ### 23. calls on the member states to step up their efforts to early identify potential victims , in particular within migration flows and hotspots; highlights that potential victims should be provided without delay with protection and access to a safe place where the potential victim could be provided with information and legal aid; calls on the member states to provide adequate resources for specialised facilities for unaccompanied minors and female victims of trafficking and ensure sufficient places in shelters;


### 23. calls on the member states to step up their efforts to early identify potential victims , in particular within migration flows and hotspots; calls on the member states to provide adequate resources for specialised facilities for unaccompanied minors and female victims of trafficking; ### 23. calls on the member states to step up their efforts to early identify potential victims , in particular within migration flows and hotspots; highlights that potential victims identified should be provided with protection and an access to a safe place where they could be provided with information; calls on the member states to provide adequate resources for specialised facilities for unaccompanied migrant children , separated children and female victims of trafficking and ensure sufficient places in shelters;


### 24. notes that the migration policies of member states , geared towards fighting irregular migration , can have a ‘chilling effect’ among vulnerable migrants and give perpetrators additional leverage to exploit victims with an irregular status24 ; calls on the member states to decouple migration enforcement actions from law enforcement activities; ### 24. notes that the migration policies of member states , geared towards fighting irregular migration , can have a ‘chilling effect’ among vulnerable migrants and give perpetrators additional leverage to exploit victims with an irregular status24 ; calls on the member states to decouple migration enforcement actions from law enforcement activities; stresses that safe reporting and effective complaint mechanisms should be established for all vulnerable persons;


### 24. notes that the migration policies of member states , geared towards fighting irregular migration , can have a ‘chilling effect’ among vulnerable migrants and give perpetrators additional leverage to exploit victims with an irregular status24 ; calls on the member states to decouple migration enforcement actions from law enforcement activities; ### 24. notes that the migration policies of member states , geared towards fighting irregular migration , can have a ‘chilling effect’ among undocumented migrants or migrants with a precarious status dependent on their employer and give perpetrators additional leverage to exploit victims with an irregular or precarious status24 ; calls on the member states to decouple migration enforcement actions from law enforcement activities;


### 28. notes that children in migration , and , in particular , unaccompanied migrant children , continue to be at higher risk of trafficking and exploitation along migration routes en route to and within the eu; ### 28. notes that children in migration , and , in particular , unaccompanied migrant children , continue to be at high risk of violence and exploitation along migration routes en route to and within the eu; notes that girls are at risk of sexual exploitation and gender based violence throughout the migration routes , condemns that some member states have been using detention as a “protection” for unaccompanied minors , including in police cells; recalls that detention can never be in the best interests of the child and the need to member states to provide non-custodial child-friendly accommodation;


### 28. notes that children in migration , and , in particular , unaccompanied migrant children , continue to be at higher risk of trafficking and exploitation along migration routes en route to and within the eu; ### 28. notes that children in migration , and , in particular , unaccompanied and separated migrant children continue to be at higher risk of trafficking and exploitation along migration routes en route to and within the eu;


### 29. notes the low number of prosecutions and convictions for the crime of trafficking; urges the member states to take measures to improve the investigation of trafficking cases and to put in place strong criminal sanctions for crimes of human trafficking; ### 29. notes the low number of prosecutions and convictions for the crime of trafficking; urges the member states to take measures to improve the quality of the investigation of trafficking cases and to put in place strong criminal sanctions for the crime of human trafficking;


### 30. points out that not all member states have introduced legislation relevant to article 18 of the anti-trafficking directive27 ; notes that the differing legal landscapes on criminalising the use of services exacted from victims may hamper efforts to reduce demand; reiterates its call on the member states to establish the act of knowingly using the services of victims of human trafficking as a criminal offence; ### 30. points out that not all member states have introduced legislation relevant to article 18 of the anti-trafficking directive27 ; notes that the differing legal landscapes on criminalising the use of services exacted from victims may hamper efforts to reduce demand; regrets that prosecution and conviction levels for use of victims’ services and sexual exploitation in the eu is low; reiterates its call on the member states to establish the act of using the services of victims of human trafficking as a criminal offence;


### 31. calls on the member states to adopt clear provisions on the non-prosecution or non-punishment of thb victims and on decoupling protection from cooperation with law enforcement agencies; ### 31. calls on the member states to adopt clear provisions on the non-prosecution or non-punishment of thb victims and on decoupling victim protection from cooperation with law enforcement agencies; calls also on the member states to take the necessary measures to ensure that assistance and support for a victim are not made conditional on the victim’s willingness to cooperate in the criminal investigation , prosecution or trial in accordance with article 11 of the anti-trafficking directive;


### 31. calls on the member states to adopt clear provisions on the non-prosecution or non-punishment of thb victims and on decoupling protection from cooperation with law enforcement agencies; ### 31. deplores the fact that victims are still often subject to criminal charges and convictions for offences they have been compelled to commit , often in relation to the illegal entry into a member state’s territory , which is often inherent to being trafficked; calls on the member states to adopt clear provisions on the non-prosecution or non-punishment of thb victims and on decoupling protection from cooperation with law enforcement agencies;


### 32. stresses the importance of financial investigation and ‘following the money’ as a key strategy for investigating and prosecuting the organised crime networks that profit from thb; calls on the commission to assess and promote the use of existing judicial and police cooperation , and the available tools; ### 32. stresses the importance of financial investigation and ‘following the money’ as a key strategy for investigating and prosecuting the organised crime networks that profit from thb; calls on the member states to launch financial investigations and work with money laundering specialist when starting a new trafficking investigation; calls on member sates stresses to strengthen cooperation in freezing and confiscating the assets of individuals involved in trafficking and providing compensation to victims; calls on the commission to assess and promote the use of existing judicial and police cooperation , and the available tools;


### 32. stresses the importance of financial investigation and ‘following the money’ as a key strategy for investigating and prosecuting the organised crime networks that profit from thb; calls on the commission to assess and promote the use of existing judicial and police cooperation , and the available tools; ### 32. stresses the importance of financial investigation and ‘following the money’ as a key strategy for investigating and prosecuting the organised crime networks that profit from thb , as well as to confiscate the proceeds of thb in order to ensure that ‘crime does not pay’; urges member states to use confiscated proceeds to support victims’ assistance and protection , including compensation of victims , as stressed by recital 13 of the thb directive; calls on the commission to assess and promote the use of existing judicial and police cooperation , and the available tools;


### 33. recalls the role of eu agencies in the early identification of victims and the fight against thb; calls for more resources for the justice and home affairs (jha) agencies to enable their staff to be trained and capacity-building instruments to be developed in the area of detecting victims , including the appointment of gender-trained agency officers , especially in the member states faced with increased mixed migratory flows; calls on the commission to develop guidelines to mainstream gender expertise in the activities of law enforcement authorities across the eu; ### 33. recalls the role of eu agencies in the early identification of victims and the fight against thb; calls for more resources for the justice and home affairs (jha) agencies to enable their staff to be trained and capacity-building instruments to be developed in the area of detecting victims , including the appointment of gender-trained agency officers , especially in the member states faced with increased mixed migration flows; calls on the commission to develop guidelines to mainstream gender and human rights expertise in the activities of law enforcement authorities across the eu;


### 33. recalls the role of eu agencies in the early identification of victims and the fight against thb; calls for more resources for the justice and home affairs (jha) agencies to enable their staff to be trained and capacity-building instruments to be developed in the area of detecting victims , including the appointment of gender-trained agency officers , especially in the member states faced with increased mixed migratory flows; calls on the commission to develop guidelines to mainstream gender expertise in the activities of law enforcement authorities across the eu; ### 33. recalls the role of eu agencies in the early identification of victims and the fight against thb; calls for the justice and home affairs (jha) agencies to enable their staff to be trained and capacity-building instruments to be developed in the area of detecting victims , including the appointment of gender-trained agency officers , especially in the member states faced with increased mixed migratory flows; calls on the commission to develop guidelines to mainstream gender expertise in the activities of law enforcement authorities across the eu;