### to that end , the commission shall , at the latest by [4 years after the date of transposition of this directive] , draw up a report identifying , analysing and evaluating those risks at union level. thereafter , the commission shall update its report every four years. the commission may update parts of the report more frequently , if appropriate. ### to that end , the commission shall , at the latest by [3 years after the date of transposition of this directive] , draw up a report identifying , analysing and evaluating those risks at union level. thereafter , the commission shall update its report every three years. the commission may update parts of the report more frequently , if appropriate.


### the most widespread means used to launder illicit proceeds , including , where available , those particularly used in transactions between member states and third countries , independently of the identification of a third country pursuant to section 2 of chapter iii of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final]; ### the most widespread means used to launder illicit proceeds , including , where available , those particularly used in transactions between member states and third countries , including the setting up of shell companies , trade mis-invoicing , and storing funds in lower tax jurisdictions , independently of the identification of a third country pursuant to section 2 of chapter iii of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final];


### 3. the commission shall make recommendations to member states on the measures suitable for addressing the identified risks. in the event that member states decide not to apply any of the recommendations in their national aml/cft regimes , they shall notify the commission thereof and provide a justification for such a decision. ### 3. the commission shall make recommendations to member states on the measures suitable for addressing the identified risks and deficiencies in their financial and legal structures , and make those recommendations available to the public. in the event that member states decide not to apply any of the recommendations in their national aml/cft regimes , they shall notify the commission thereof and provide a detailed justification for such a decision. the commission shall make the justifications available to the public.


### 3. the commission shall make recommendations to member states on the measures suitable for addressing the identified risks. in the event that member states decide not to apply any of the recommendations in their national aml/cft regimes , they shall notify the commission thereof and provide a justification for such a decision. ### 3. the commission shall make recommendations to member states on the measures suitable for addressing the identified risks. in the event that member states decide not to apply any of the recommendations in their national aml/cft regimes , they shall notify the commission thereof and provide a justification for such a decision. the commission's recommendations and the member states' decisions in response to the recommendations , including the justification in case of non-application , shall be made public.


### 4. by [3 years after the date of transposition of this directive] , amla shall issue an opinion addressed to the commission on the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the union. thereafter , amla shall issue an opinion every two years. ### 4. by [3 years after the date of transposition of this directive] , amla , after consultation of other union bodies , offices and agencies involved in the aml/cft framework such as europol , shall issue an opinion addressed to the commission on the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the union. thereafter , amla shall issue an opinion every two years. the opinions issued by amla shall be made public.


### 5. in conducting the assessment referred to in paragraph 1 , the commission shall organise the work at union level , shall take into account the opinions referred to in paragraph 4 and shall involve the member states' experts in the area of aml/cft , representatives from national supervisory authorities and fius , as well as amla and other union level bodies where appropriate. ### 5. in conducting the assessment referred to in paragraph 1 , the commission shall organise the work at union level and shall take into account the opinions referred to in paragraph 4 as well as those issued by member states' experts in the area of aml/cft , representatives from national supervisory authorities and fius , independent civil society and financial watchdogs as well as amla and other union level bodies where appropriate. the commission shall organise consultations and appropriate follow up with the entities listed in this paragraph.


### 6. within 2 years of the adoption of the report referred to in paragraph 1 , and every four years thereafter , the commission shall submit a report to the european parliament and to the council on the actions taken based on the findings of that report. ### 6. following the adoption of the report referred to in paragraph 1 , and the updates issued thereafter , the commission shall submit a report to the european parliament and to the council on the actions taken based on the findings of that report. the commission shall consult the european parliament and the council on any initiatives to reform aml/cft regulation at the union level.


### 1. each member state shall carry out a national risk assessment to identify , assess , understand and mitigate the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting it. it shall keep that risk assessment up to date and review it at least every four years. ### 1. each member state shall carry out a national risk assessment to identify , assess , understand and mitigate the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting it. it shall keep that risk assessment up to date and review it at least every three years.


### in the national risk assessment , member states shall describe the institutional structure and broad procedures of their aml/cft regime , including , inter alia , the fiu , tax authorities and prosecutors , as well as the allocated human and financial resources to the extent that this information is available. ### in the national risk assessment , member states shall describe the institutional structure and broad procedures of their aml/cft regime , including , inter alia , the fiu , tax authorities , prosecutors and whistleblower protection mechanisms , as well as the allocated human and financial resources to the extent that this information is available.


### in the national risk assessment , member states shall describe the institutional structure and broad procedures of their aml/cft regime , including , inter alia , the fiu , tax authorities and prosecutors , as well as the allocated human and financial resources to the extent that this information is available. ### in the national risk assessment , member states shall describe the institutional structure and broad procedures of their aml/cft regime , including , inter alia , the fiu , tax authorities and prosecutors , as well as the allocated human and financial resources and the extent of union and international cooperation.


### 5. member states shall make the results of their national risk assessments , including their updates , available to the commission , to amla and to the other member states. any member state may provide relevant additional information , where appropriate , to the member state carrying out the national risk assessment. a summary of the assessment shall be made publicly available. that summary shall not contain classified information. the information contained therein shall not permit the identification of any natural or legal person. ### 5. member states shall make the results of their national risk assessments , including their updates , available to the commission , to amla and to the other member states. any member state may provide relevant additional information , where appropriate , to the member state carrying out the national risk assessment. the assessment shall be made publicly available. however , the assessment made available to the public shall neither contain classified information nor information that permit the identification of any natural or legal person.


### data measuring the reporting , investigation and judicial phases of the national aml/cft regime , including the number of suspicious transaction reports made to the fiu , the follow-up given to those reports , the information on cross-border physical transfers of cash submitted to the fiu in accordance with article 9 of regulation (eu) 2018/1672 together with the follow-up given to the information submitted and , on an annual basis , the number of cases investigated , the number of persons prosecuted , the number of persons convicted for money laundering or terrorist financing offences , the types of predicate offences identified in accordance with article 2 of directive (eu) 2018/1673 of the european parliament and of the council45 where such information is available , and the value in euro of property that has been frozen , seized or confiscated; ### data measuring the reporting , investigation and judicial phases of the national aml/cft regime , including the number and value of transactions involved in suspicious transaction reports made to the fiu , the follow-up given to those reports , the information on cross-border physical transfers of cash submitted to the fiu in accordance with article 9 of regulation (eu) 2018/1672 together with the follow-up given to the information submitted and , on an annual basis , the number of cases investigated , the number of persons prosecuted , the number of persons convicted for money laundering or terrorist financing offences , the types of predicate offences identified in accordance with article 2 of directive (eu) 2018/1673 of the european parliament and of the council45 where such information is available , and the value in euro of property that has been frozen , seized or confiscated , broken down by types of offenses and types of property;


### if available , data identifying the number and percentage of reports resulting in further investigation , together with the annual report drawn up by fius pursuant to article 21; ### data identifying the number and percentage of reports resulting in further investigation , together with the annual report drawn up by fius pursuant to article 21;


### 5. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts laying down the methodology for the collection of the statistics referred to in paragraph 2 and the arrangements for their transmission to the commission and amla. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 54(2). ### 5. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts laying down the methodology for the collection of the statistics referred to in paragraph 2 and the arrangements for their transmission to the commission , amla and other union bodies , offices and agencies involved in the aml/cft framework. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 54(2).


### 6. the commission shall publish a biennial report summarising and explaining the statistics referred to in paragraph 2 , which shall be made available on its website. ### 6. the commission shall publish a biennial report summarising and explaining the statistics referred to in paragraph 2 , which shall be made available to the public on its website.


### 1. member states shall ensure that beneficial ownership information referred to in article 44 of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] and information on nominee arrangements referred to in article 47 of that regulation is held in a central register in the member state where the legal entity is incorporated or where the trustee or person holding an equivalent position in a similar legal arrangement is established or resides. such requirement shall not apply to companies listed on a regulated market that are subject to disclosure requirements equivalent to the requirements laid down in this directive or subject to equivalent international standards. ### 1. member states shall ensure that beneficial ownership information referred to in article 44 of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] and information on nominee arrangements referred to in article 47 of that regulation is held in a central register in the member state where the legal entity is incorporated or where the trustee or person holding an equivalent position in a similar legal arrangement is established or resides. such requirement shall apply to companies listed on a regulated market.


### 3. where no person is identified as beneficial owner pursuant to article 45(2) and (3) of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] , the central register shall include: ### 3. where no person is identified as beneficial owner pursuant to article 45(2) and (3) of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] , member states shall ensure that legal entities and legal arrangements identify the top 10 natural persons holding the majority of shares or voting rights.


### a statement accompanied by a justification , that there is no beneficial owner or that the beneficial owner(s) could not be identified and verified; ### deleted


### the details of the natural person(s) who hold the position of senior managing official(s) in the corporate or legal entity equivalent to the information required under article 44(1) , point (a) , of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final]. ### deleted


### 5. member states shall require that the beneficial ownership information held in the central registers is adequate , accurate and up-to-date. for that purpose , member state shall apply at least the following requirements: ### 5. member states shall require that the beneficial ownership information held in the central registers is relevant , adequate , accurate and up-to-date. for that purpose , member state shall apply at least the following requirements:


### competent authorities , if appropriate and to the extent that this requirement does not interfere unnecessarily with their functions , shall report to the entity in charge of the central registers any discrepancies they find between beneficial ownership information available in the central registers and the beneficial ownership information available to them. ### competent authorities shall report to the entity in charge of the central registers any discrepancies they find between beneficial ownership information available in the central registers and the beneficial ownership information available to them.


### 7. member states shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central registers takes appropriate actions to cease the discrepancies , including amending the information included in the central registers where the entity is able to identify and verify the beneficial ownership information. a specific mention of the fact that there are discrepancies reported shall be included in the central registers and visible at least to competent authorities and obliged entities. ### 7. member states shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central registers takes appropriate actions to cease the discrepancies and ensure up-to-date information , including amending the information included in the central registers where the entity is able to identify and verify the beneficial ownership information. a specific mention of the fact that there are discrepancies reported shall be included in the central registers and visible at least to competent authorities and obliged entities.


### 8. in the case of corporate and other legal entities , member states shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central beneficial ownership register is empowered to carry out checks , including on-site investigations at the premises or registered office of the legal entity , in order to establish the current beneficial ownership of the entity and to verify that the information submitted to the central register is accurate , adequate and up-to-date. the right of the central register to verify such information shall not be restricted , obstructed or precluded in any manner. ### 8. in the case of corporate and other legal entities , member states shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central beneficial ownership register is empowered to request information and carry out checks , including on-site investigations at the premises or registered office of the legal entity , in order to establish the current beneficial ownership of the entity and to verify that the information submitted to the central register is accurate , adequate and up-to-date. the right of the central register to verify such information shall not be restricted , obstructed or precluded in any manner.


### 8. in the case of corporate and other legal entities , member states shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central beneficial ownership register is empowered to carry out checks , including on-site investigations at the premises or registered office of the legal entity , in order to establish the current beneficial ownership of the entity and to verify that the information submitted to the central register is accurate , adequate and up-to-date. the right of the central register to verify such information shall not be restricted , obstructed or precluded in any manner. ### 8. in the case of corporate and other legal entities , member states shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central beneficial ownership register is empowered to carry out checks , including on-site investigations at the premises or registered office of the legal entity , in order to establish the current beneficial ownership of the entity and to verify that the information submitted to the central register is relevant , accurate , adequate and up-to-date. the right of the central register to verify such information shall not be restricted , obstructed or precluded in any manner.


### 9. member states shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central register is empowered to impose effective , proportionate and dissuasive measures or sanctions for failures to provide the register with accurate , adequate and up-to-date information about their beneficial ownership. ### 9. member states shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central register is adequately resourced and empowered to impose effective , proportionate and dissuasive measures or sanctions for failures to provide the register with accurate , adequate and up-to-date information about their beneficial ownership.


### 9. member states shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central register is empowered to impose effective , proportionate and dissuasive measures or sanctions for failures to provide the register with accurate , adequate and up-to-date information about their beneficial ownership. ### 9. member states shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central register is empowered to impose effective , proportionate and dissuasive measures or sanctions for failures to provide the register with relevant , accurate , adequate and up-to-date information about their beneficial ownership.


### 12. the information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be available through the national registers and through the system of interconnection of central beneficial ownership registers for at least five years and no more than 10 years after the corporate or other legal entity has been struck off from the register. ### 12. the information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be available through the national registers and through the system of interconnection of central beneficial ownership registers for at least five years after the corporate or other legal entity has been struck off from the register.


### 1. member states shall ensure that competent authorities have timely , unrestricted and free access to the information held in the interconnected central registers referred to in article 10 , without alerting the entity or arrangement concerned. ### 1. member states shall ensure that competent authorities have timely , unrestricted and free access to the information held in the interconnected central registers referred to in article 10 , without alerting the entity or arrangement concerned. that information shall also be made available to competent authorities as machine-readable data.


### 1. member states shall ensure that competent authorities have timely , unrestricted and free access to the information held in the interconnected central registers referred to in article 10 , without alerting the entity or arrangement concerned. ### 1. member states shall ensure that competent authorities have timely and free access to the information held in the interconnected central registers referred to in article 10 , without alerting the entity or arrangement concerned.


### 2. access to the central registers referred to in article 10 shall be granted to fius , supervisory authorities , public authorities with designated responsibilities for combating money laundering or terrorist financing , as well as tax authorities and authorities that have the function of investigating or prosecuting money laundering , its predicate offences and terrorist financing , tracing and seizing or freezing and confiscating criminal assets. self-regulatory bodies shall be granted access to the registers when performing supervisory functions. ### 2. access to the central registers referred to in article 10 shall be granted to fius , supervisory authorities , public authorities with designated responsibilities for combating money laundering or terrorist financing , as well as tax authorities and authorities that have the function of investigating or prosecuting money laundering , its predicate offences and terrorist financing , tracing and seizing or freezing and confiscating criminal assets. access by these authorities shall be granted to the extent necessary for the performance of tasks of these authorities for the purpose of the identification of money laundering and the financing of terrorism referred to article 1(b). self-regulatory bodies shall be granted access to the registers when performing supervisory functions.


### 12 specific access rules to beneficial ownership registers for the public ### 12 specific access rules to beneficial ownership registers for public interest purposes


### 1. member states shall ensure that any member of the general public has access to the following information held in the interconnected central registers referred to in article 10: ### 1. member states shall ensure that journalists , investigative bodies , ngos , researchers , members of regional and national parliaments , members of the european parliament and individuals who seek access to beneficial ownership registries for the purpose of identifying money laundering , financing of terrorism or corporate misconduct or for other public interest purposes have access to the following information held in the interconnected central registers referred to in article 10:


### in the case of legal entities , at least the name , the month and year of birth and the country of residence and nationality of the beneficial owner as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held; ### in the case of legal entities or legal arrangements , at least the name , the month and year of birth and the country of residence and nationality of the beneficial owners as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held , the date they became beneficial owners , their status as local or foreign politically exposed persons (pep) and the full ownership chain.


### in the case of legal entities , at least the name , the month and year of birth and the country of residence and nationality of the beneficial owner as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held; ### in the case of legal entities , at least the name , the month and year of birth and the country of residence and nationality of the beneficial owner as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held and , if applicable , the status as a domestic or foreign politically exposed person (pep) of the beneficial owner;


### in case of express trusts or similar legal arrangements , the name , the month and year of birth and the country of residence and nationality of the beneficial owner as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held , provided that a legitimate interest can be demonstrated. ### in case of express trusts or similar legal arrangements , the name , the month and year of birth and the country of residence and nationality of the beneficial owner as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held and , if applicable , the status as a domestic or foreign politically exposed person (pep) of the beneficial owner;


### in case of express trusts or similar legal arrangements , the name , the month and year of birth and the country of residence and nationality of the beneficial owner as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held , provided that a legitimate interest can be demonstrated. ### in case of express trusts or similar legal arrangements , the name , the month and year of birth and the country of residence and nationality of the beneficial owners as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held , the date they became beneficial owners and their status as local or foreign politically exposed persons (pep).


### 2. member states may choose to make beneficial ownership information held in their central registers available to the public on the condition of authentication using electronic identification means and relevant trust services as set out in regulation (eu) 910/2014 of the european parliament and of the council46 and the payment of a fee , which shall not exceed the administrative costs of making the information available , including costs of maintenance and developments of the register. ### 2. member states shall make the information referred to in paragraph 1 available to the public through online access and without requiring the payment of any fees. however , member states shall prohibit the use and processing of that information for commercial purposes.


### 2. member states may choose to make beneficial ownership information held in their central registers available to the public on the condition of authentication using electronic identification means and relevant trust services as set out in regulation (eu) 910/2014 of the european parliament and of the council46 and the payment of a fee , which shall not exceed the administrative costs of making the information available , including costs of maintenance and developments of the register. ### 2. member states may choose to make beneficial ownership information held in their central registers available to the persons and entities referred to in paragraph 1 on the condition of authentication using electronic identification means and relevant trust services as set out in regulation (eu) 910/2014 of the european parliament and of the council.46


### in exceptional circumstances to be laid down in national law , where the access referred to in articles 11(3) and 12(1) would expose the beneficial owner to disproportionate risk of fraud , kidnapping , blackmail , extortion , harassment , violence or intimidation , or where the beneficial owner is a minor or otherwise legally incapable , member states may provide for an exemption from such access to all or part of the personal information on the beneficial owner on a case-by-case basis. member states shall ensure that those exemptions are granted upon a detailed evaluation of the exceptional nature of the circumstances. rights to an administrative review of the decision granting an exemption and to an effective judicial remedy shall be guaranteed. a member state that has granted exemptions shall publish annual statistical data on the number of exemptions granted and reasons stated and report the data to the commission. ### access to beneficial ownership registries shall not be given for any other purposes than for identifying money laundering and terrorist financial risks at union and member state level and in subsidiaries located in third countries and for exposing issues related to public interest. any further processing for incompatible purposes shall be prohibited.


### exemptions granted pursuant to this article shall not apply to the obliged entities referred to in article 3 , point (3)(b) , of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] that are public officials. ### deleted


### 1. member states shall put in place centralised automated mechanisms , such as a central registers or central electronic data retrieval systems , which allow the identification , in a timely manner , of any natural or legal persons holding or controlling payment accounts and bank accounts identified by iban , as defined by regulation (eu) no 260/2012 of the european parliament and of the council47 , and safe-deposit boxes held by a credit institution within their territory. ### 1. member states shall put in place centralised automated mechanisms , such as a central registers or central electronic data retrieval systems , which allow the identification , in a timely manner , of any natural or legal persons holding or controlling payment accounts , bank accounts identified by iban , as defined by regulation (eu) no 260/2012 of the european parliament and of the council47 , securities accounts and safe-deposit boxes held by a credit institution within their territory.


### for the customer-account holder and any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer: the name , complemented by either the other identification data required under article 18(1) of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] or a unique identification number; ### for the customer-account and securities-account holder and any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer: the name , complemented by either the other identification data required under article 18(1) of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] or a unique identification number;


### for the beneficial owner of the customer-account holder: the name , complemented by either the other identification data required under article 18(1) of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] or a unique identification number; ### for the beneficial owner of the customer-account or securities-account holder: the name , complemented by either the other identification data required under article 18(1) of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] or a unique identification number;


### 4. member states may require other information deemed essential for fius and other competent authorities for fulfilling their obligations under this directive to be accessible and searchable through the centralised mechanisms. ### deleted


### the other information that member states consider essential for fius and other competent authorities pursuant to paragraph 4 shall not be accessible and searchable through the single access point interconnecting the centralised automated mechanisms. ### deleted


### the common criteria according to which beneficial ownership information is available through the system of interconnection of registers , depending on the level of access granted by member states; ### the common criteria according to which beneficial ownership information is available through the system of interconnection of registers;


### the payment modalities where access to beneficial ownership information is subject to the payment of a fee according to article 12(2) taking into account available payment facilities such as remote payment transactions. ### deleted


### 3 real estate registers ### 3 asset registers and unexplained wealth orders


### 1. each member state shall establish an fiu in order to prevent , detect and effectively combat money laundering and terrorist financing. ### 1. each member state shall establish an fiu in order to prevent , detect and effectively combat money laundering and terrorist financing. with respect to money laundering , the fius shall operate on the basis of proportionality , prioritising the detection and combating of larger and complex schemes of money laundering associated with criminal organisations.


### 7. each member states shall ensure that its fiu is able to make arrangements or engage independently with other domestic competent authorities pursuant to article 45 on the exchange of information. ### 7. each member states shall ensure that its fiu is able to make arrangements or engage independently with other domestic competent authorities and with union bodies , offices and agencies involved in the aml/cft framework , pursuant to article 45 on the exchange of information.


### 1. member states shall ensure that their fius have: ### 1. member states shall ensure that their fius have to the extent necessary for the performance of their tasks:


### immediate and , with the exception of point (ii) , direct access to at least the following financial information: ### access to the following financial information:


### (vi) information on securities; ### (vi) information on securities including from central securities depositories (csd);


### immediate and , with the exception of point (xiv) , direct access to at least the following administrative information: ### access to the following administrative information:


### direct or indirect access to the following law enforcement information: ### access to the following law enforcement information in accordance with article 8 of directive (eu) 2019/1153 of the european parliament and of the council1a:


### direct or indirect access to the following law enforcement information: ### access to the following law enforcement information:


### any type of information or data which is already held by competent authorities in the context of preventing , detecting , investigating or prosecuting criminal offences; ### information or data which is already held by competent authorities in the context of preventing , detecting , investigating or prosecuting criminal offences , insofar as that information or data is relevant to the fiu to fulfil its obligations under this directive;


### (ii) any type of information or data which is held by public authorities or by private entities in the context of preventing , detecting , investigating or prosecuting criminal offences and which is available to competent authorities without the taking of coercive measures under national law. ### (ii) information or data which is held by public authorities or by private entities in the context of preventing , detecting , investigating or prosecuting criminal offences , insofar as that information or data is relevant to the fiu to fulfil its obligations under this directive , and which is available to competent authorities without the taking of coercive measures under national law.


### the information referred to in point (c) may include criminal records , information on investigations , information on the freezing or seizure of assets or on other investigative or provisional measures and information on convictions and on confiscations. ### the information referred to in point (c) may include criminal records , information on investigations , information on the freezing or seizure of assets or on other investigative or provisional measures and information on convictions and on confiscations. where there are objective grounds for assuming that the provision of such information would have a negative impact on ongoing investigations or analyses , or , in exceptional circumstances , where disclosure of the information would be clearly disproportionate to the legitimate interests of a natural or legal person or irrelevant with regard to the purposes for which it has been requested , the law enforcement authority shall be under no obligation to comply with the request for information.


### 1. member states shall ensure that fius respond in a timely manner to reasoned requests for information by other competent authorities in their respective member state or union authorities competent for investigating or prosecuting criminal activities when such requests for information are motivated by concerns relating to money laundering , its predicate offences or terrorist financing or when this information is necessary for the competent authority to perform its tasks under this directive. the decision on conducting the dissemination of information shall remain with the fiu. ### 1. member states shall ensure that fius respond in a timely manner to reasoned requests for information by other competent authorities in their respective member state or union authorities competent for investigating or prosecuting criminal activities when such requests for information are motivated by concerns relating to money laundering , its predicate offences or terrorist financing. the decision on conducting the dissemination of information shall remain with the fiu.


### where there are objective grounds for assuming that the provision of such information would have a negative impact on ongoing investigations or analyses , or , in exceptional circumstances , where disclosure of the information would be clearly disproportionate to the legitimate interests of a natural or legal person or irrelevant with regard to the purposes for which it has been requested , the fiu shall be under no obligation to comply with the request for information. ### where there are objective grounds for assuming that the provision of such information would have a negative impact on ongoing investigations or analyses , or , in exceptional circumstances , where disclosure of the information would be clearly disproportionate to the legitimate interests of a natural or irrelevant with regard to the purposes for which it has been requested , the fiu shall be under no obligation to comply with the request for information.


### 1. member states shall ensure that fius are empowered to take urgent action , directly or indirectly , where there is a suspicion that a transaction is related to money laundering or terrorist financing , to suspend or withhold consent to a transaction that is proceeding. such suspension shall be imposed on the obliged entity within 48 hours of receiving the suspicious transaction report in order to analyse the transaction , confirm the suspicion and disseminate the results of the analysis to the competent authorities. member states shall ensure that subject to national procedural safeguards , the transaction is suspended for a period of a maximum of 15 calendar days from the day of the imposition of such suspension to the obliged entity. ### 1. member states shall ensure that fius are empowered to take urgent action , where there is a suspicion that a transaction is related to money laundering or terrorist financing , to suspend or withhold consent to a transaction that is proceeding. such suspension shall be imposed on the obliged entity within 48 hours of receiving the suspicious transaction report in order to analyse the transaction , confirm the suspicion and disseminate the results of the analysis to the competent authorities. member states shall ensure that subject to national procedural safeguards , the transaction is suspended for a period of a maximum of 15 calendar days from the day of the imposition of such suspension to the obliged entity.


### the fiu shall be empowered to impose such suspension , directly or indirectly , at the request of an fiu from another member state for the periods and under the conditions specified in the national law of the fiu receiving the request. ### the fiu shall be empowered to impose such suspension , at the request of an fiu from another member state for the periods and under the conditions specified in the national law of the fiu receiving the request.


### fius shall disseminate the report to obliged entities. such report shall be made public within four months of its dissemination , except for the elements of the report which contain classified information. the information contained therein shall not permit the identification of any natural or legal person. ### fius shall disseminate the report to obliged entities. such report shall be made public within four months of its dissemination. the information contained therein shall not permit the identification of any natural or legal person.


### member states shall ensure that fius cooperate with each other and with their counterparts in third countries to the greatest extent possible , regardless of their organisational status. ### member states shall ensure that fius cooperate with each other and with their counterparts in third countries to the greatest extent possible , regardless of their organisational status. member states shall provide their fius with adequate financial , human and technical resources in order to ensure effective and efficient cooperation.


### member states shall ensure that fius cooperate with each other and with their counterparts in third countries to the greatest extent possible , regardless of their organisational status. ### member states shall ensure that fius cooperate with each other and with their counterparts in third countries to the greatest extent possible.


### 5. member states shall ensure that the fiu to whom the request is made is required to use the whole range of its available powers which it would normally use domestically for receiving and analysing information when it replies to a request for information referred to in paragraph 1 from another fiu. ### 5. member states shall ensure that the fiu to whom the request is made is allowed to use the whole range of its available powers which it would normally use domestically for receiving and analysing information when it replies to a request for information referred to in paragraph 1 from another fiu.


### 6. member states shall ensure that where an fiu is requested to provide information pursuant to paragraph 1 , it shall respond to the request as soon as possible and in any case no later than seven days after the receipt of the request. in exceptional , duly justified cases , this time limit may be extended to a maximum of 14 calendar days. where the requested fiu is unable to obtain the requested information , it shall inform the requesting fiu thereof. ### 6. member states shall ensure that where an fiu is requested to provide information pursuant to paragraph 1 , it shall respond to the request as soon as possible and in any case no later than five days after the receipt of the request. in exceptional , duly justified cases , this time limit may be extended to a maximum of 10 calendar days. where the requested fiu is unable to obtain the requested information , it shall inform the requesting fiu thereof.


### 7. member states shall ensure that in exceptional , justified and urgent cases and , by way of derogation from paragraph 6 , where pursuant to paragraph 1 an fiu is requested to provide information which is either held in a database or registry directly accessible by the requested fiu or which is already in its possession , the requested fiu shall provide that information no later than 24 hours after the receipt of the request. ### 7. member states shall ensure that in justified and urgent cases and , by way of derogation from paragraph 6 , where pursuant to paragraph 1 an fiu is requested to provide information which is either held in a database or registry directly accessible by the requested fiu or which is already in its possession , the requested fiu shall provide that information no later than 24 hours after the receipt of the request.


### a request for the setting up of a joint analysis team may be made by any of the fius concerned. ### a request for the setting up of a joint analysis team may be made by any of the fius concerned or by amla.


### differences between national law definitions of predicate offences shall not impede the ability of fius to provide assistance to another fiu and shall not limit the exchange , dissemination and use of information pursuant to articles 24 , 26 and 27. ### minor differences between national law definitions of predicate offences shall not impede the ability of fius to provide assistance to another fiu and shall not limit the exchange , dissemination and use of information pursuant to articles 24 , 26 and 27.


### 3. in the case of the obliged entities referred to in article 3 , points (3)(a) , (b) and (d) , of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] , member states may allow the function referred to in paragraph 1 of this article to be performed by self-regulatory bodies , provided that those self-regulatory bodies have the powers referred to in paragraph 5 of this article and have adequate financial , human and technical resources to perform their functions. member states shall ensure that staff of those bodies are of high integrity and appropriately skilled , and that they maintain high professional standards , including standards of confidentiality , data protection and standards addressing conflicts of interest. ### 3. in the case of the obliged entities referred to in article 3 , points (3)(a) , (b) and (d) , of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] , member states may allow the function referred to in paragraph 1 of this article to be performed by self-regulatory bodies , provided that those self-regulatory bodies have the powers referred to in paragraph 5 of this article and have adequate financial , human and technical resources to perform their functions. member states shall ensure that staff of those bodies are of high integrity and appropriately skilled. supervisors shall maintain high professional standards , including standards of confidentiality , data protection and standards addressing conflicts of interest.


### 6. member states shall ensure that financial supervisors and supervisors in charge of gambling operators have powers additional to those referred to in paragraph 5 , including the power to investigate the business premises of the obliged entity without prior announcement where the proper conduct and efficiency of inspection so require , and that they have all the necessary means to carry out such investigation. ### 6. member states shall ensure that financial supervisors , supervisors of crypto-asset service providers and supervisors in charge of gambling operators have powers additional to those referred to in paragraph 5 , including the power to investigate the business premises of the obliged entity without prior announcement where the proper conduct and efficiency of inspection so require , and that they have all the necessary means to carry out such investigation.


### 1. member states shall ensure that supervisors apply a risk-based approach to supervision. to that end , member states shall ensure that they: ### 1. member states shall ensure that supervisors:


### 1. member states may authorise financial supervisors to conclude cooperation agreements providing for collaboration and exchanges of confidential information with their counterparts in third countries. such cooperation agreements shall comply with applicable data protection rules for data transfers and be concluded on the basis of reciprocity and only if the information disclosed is subject to a guarantee of professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to that referred to in article 50(1). confidential information exchanged in accordance with those cooperation agreements shall be used for the purpose of performing the supervisory tasks of those authorities only. ### 1. member states may authorise financial supervisors to conclude cooperation agreements providing for collaboration and exchanges of confidential information with their counterparts in third countries. such cooperation agreements shall comply with applicable data protection rules , be concluded on the basis of reciprocity and subject to a guarantee of professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to that referred to in article 50(1). confidential information exchanged in accordance with those cooperation agreements shall be used for the purpose of performing the supervisory tasks of those authorities only.


### where the information exchanged originates in another member state , it shall only be disclosed with the explicit consent of the financial supervisor which shared it and , where appropriate , solely for the purposes for which that supervisor gave its consent. ### where the information exchanged originates in another member state , it shall only be disclosed for the purposes for which that supervisor gave its consent.


### 2. for the purposes of paragraph 1 , amla may lend such assistance as may be necessary to assess the equivalence of professional secrecy requirements applicable to the third country counterpart. ### 2. for the purposes of paragraph 1 , amla shall lend such assistance as may be necessary to assess the equivalence of professional secrecy requirements applicable to the third country counterpart.


### issue instructions to a self-regulatory body for the purpose of remedying a failure to perform its functions under article 29(1) or to comply with the requirements of paragraph 6 of that article , or to prevent any such failures. when issuing such instructions , the authority shall consider any relevant guidance it provided or that has been provided by amla. ### issue instructions to a self-regulatory body for the purpose of remedying a failure to perform its functions under article 29(1) or to comply with the requirements of paragraph 5 and 6 of that article , or to prevent any such failures. when issuing such instructions , the authority shall consider any relevant guidance it provided or that has been provided by amla.


### 3. in the event of a breach of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] , member states shall ensure that where obligations apply to legal persons , administrative sanctions and measures can be applied to the senior management and to other natural persons who under national law are responsible for the breach. ### 3. in the event of a breach of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] , member states shall ensure that where obligations apply to legal persons , administrative sanctions and measures can be applied separately and individually , to the legal person as a whole , its senior management and to other natural persons who under national law are responsible for the breach.


### member states shall ensure that where supervisors identify breaches which are subject to criminal sanctions , they inform the authorities competent for investigating and prosecuting criminal activities in a timely manner. ### member states shall ensure that where supervisors identify breaches which are likely subject to criminal sanctions , they inform the authorities competent for investigating and prosecuting criminal activities in a timely manner.


### section 1 of chapter ii (internal controls). ### chapter ii (internal controls).


### 2. member states shall ensure that in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 , the maximum pecuniary sanctions that can be applied amount at least to twice the amount of the benefit derived from the breach where that benefit can be determined , or at least eur 1 000 000. ### 2. member states shall ensure that in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 , the maximum pecuniary sanctions that can be applied to legal persons amount to at least eur 2 000 000 or at least 8 % of the total annual turnover , whichever is higher , and to natural persons at least to twice the amount of the benefit derived from the breach where that benefit can be determined , or at least eur 2 000 000.


### 2. member states shall ensure that in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 , the maximum pecuniary sanctions that can be applied amount at least to twice the amount of the benefit derived from the breach where that benefit can be determined , or at least eur 1 000 000. ### 2. member states shall ensure that in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 the maximum pecuniary sanctions that can be applied to legal persons amount at least to eur 10 000 000 or 10% of the total annual turnover , whichever is higher , and to natural persons at least to twice the amount of the benefit derived , or at least eur 5 000 000.


### 3. member states shall ensure that , by way of derogation from paragraph 2 , where the obliged entity concerned is a credit institution or financial institution , the following sanctions can also be applied: ### 3. member states shall ensure that , by way of derogation from paragraph 2 , where the obliged entity concerned is a credit institution , financial institution or large corporate entity , the following sanctions can also be applied:


### in the case of a legal person , maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least eur 10 000 000 or 10 % of the total annual turnover according to the latest available accounts approved by the management body; where the obliged entity is a parent undertaking or a subsidiary of a parent undertaking which is required to prepare consolidated financial accounts in accordance with article 22 of directive 2013/34/eu of the european parliament and of the council49 , the relevant total annual turnover shall be the total annual turnover or the corresponding type of income in accordance with the relevant accounting regime according to the last available consolidated accounts approved by the management body of the ultimate parent undertaking; ### in the case of a legal person , maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least eur 10 000 000 or 10 % of the total global annual turnover according to the latest available accounts approved by the management body , whichever is higher; where the obliged entity is a parent undertaking or a subsidiary of a parent undertaking which is required to prepare consolidated financial accounts in accordance with article 22 of directive 2013/34/eu of the european parliament and of the council49 , the relevant total global annual turnover shall be the total annual turnover or the corresponding type of income in accordance with the relevant accounting regime according to the last available consolidated accounts approved by the management body of the ultimate parent undertaking;


### in the case of a legal person , maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least eur 10 000 000 or 10 % of the total annual turnover according to the latest available accounts approved by the management body; where the obliged entity is a parent undertaking or a subsidiary of a parent undertaking which is required to prepare consolidated financial accounts in accordance with article 22 of directive 2013/34/eu of the european parliament and of the council49 , the relevant total annual turnover shall be the total annual turnover or the corresponding type of income in accordance with the relevant accounting regime according to the last available consolidated accounts approved by the management body of the ultimate parent undertaking; ### in the case of a legal person , maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least eur 10 000 000 or 15 % of the total global annual turnover according to the latest available accounts approved by the management body , whichever is higher; where the obliged entity is a parent undertaking or a subsidiary of a parent undertaking which is required to prepare consolidated financial accounts in accordance with article 22 of directive 2013/34/eu of the european parliament and of the council49 , the relevant total annual turnover shall be the total annual turnover or the corresponding type of income in accordance with the relevant accounting regime according to the last available consolidated accounts approved by the management body of the ultimate parent undertaking;


### in the case of a natural person , maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least eur 5 000 000 or , in the member states whose currency is not the euro , the corresponding value in the national currency on [please insert the date of entry into force of this directive]. ### in the case of a natural person , maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least eur 5 000 000 or , in the member states whose currency is not the euro , the corresponding value in the national currency on the date that the fine is issued.


### 1. member states shall ensure that a decision imposing an administrative sanction or measure for breach of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] against which there is no appeal shall be published by the supervisors on their official website immediately after the person sanctioned is informed of that decision. the publication shall include at least information on the type and nature of the breach and the identity of the persons responsible. member states shall not be obliged to apply this subparagraph to decisions imposing measures that are of an investigatory nature. ### 1. member states shall ensure that a decision imposing an administrative sanction or measure for breach of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] shall be published by the supervisors on their official website immediately after the person sanctioned is informed of that decision. the publication shall include at least information on the type and nature of the breach and the identity of the persons responsible. member states shall not be obliged to apply this subparagraph to decisions imposing measures that are of an investigatory nature.


### where the publication of the identity of the persons responsible as referred to in the first subparagraph or the personal data of such persons is considered by the supervisors to be disproportionate following a case-by-case assessment , or where publication jeopardises the stability of financial markets or an on-going investigation , supervisors shall: ### where the publication of the identity of the persons responsible as referred to in the first subparagraph or the personal data of such persons is considered by the supervisors to be disproportionate following a case-by-case assessment , supervisors shall:


### not publish the decision to impose an administrative sanction or measure at all in the event that the options set out in points (a) and (b) are considered insufficient to ensure one of the following: ### deleted


### 2. where member states permit publication of decisions against which there is an appeal , supervisors shall also publish , immediately , on their official website such information and any subsequent information on the outcome of such appeal. moreover , any decision annulling a previous decision to impose an administrative sanction or a measure shall also be published. ### 2. where supervisors publish decisions against which there is an appeal , supervisors shall also publish , immediately , on their official website such information and any subsequent information on the outcome of such appeal. moreover , any decision annulling a previous decision to impose an administrative sanction or a measure shall also be published.


### specific procedures for the receipt of reports on breaches and their follow-up; ### specific procedures for the receipt of reports on breaches by both anonymous and non-anonymous individuals and their follow-up;


### appropriate protection for employees or persons in a comparable position , of obliged entities who report breaches committed within the obliged entity; ### appropriate protection as well as access to legal and financial advice for employees , board members , shareholders , contractors , subcontractors , suppliers , trainees and former workers of obliged entities who report breaches committed within the obliged entity;


### 3. member states shall ensure that individuals , including employees and representatives of the obliged entity who report potential or actual breaches of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] internally or to the fiu , are legally protected from being exposed to threats , retaliatory or hostile action , and in particular from adverse or discriminatory employment actions. ### 3. member states shall ensure that individuals referred to in article 2(b) who report potential or actual breaches of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] internally or to the fiu , civil society organisations and organisations acting in the public interest are legally protected from being exposed to threats , retaliatory or hostile action , and in particular from adverse or discriminatory employment actions.


### member states shall ensure that individuals who are exposed to threats , hostile actions , or adverse or discriminatory employment actions for reporting potential or actual breaches of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] internally or to the fiu are entitled to present a complaint in a safe manner to the respective competent authorities. without prejudice to the confidentiality of information gathered by the fiu , member states shall also ensure that such individuals have the right to effective remedy to safeguard their rights under this paragraph. ### member states shall ensure that individuals who are exposed to threats , hostile actions , or adverse or discriminatory employment actions for reporting potential or actual breaches of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] internally or to the fiu are entitled to present a complaint in a safe manner to the respective competent authorities. without prejudice to the confidentiality of information gathered by the fiu , member states shall also ensure that such individuals have the right to effective remedy to safeguard their rights under this paragraph and to full reparation of damages through financial compensation and non-financial remedies.


### 1. to the extent that it is strictly necessary for the purposes of this directive , competent authorities may process special categories of personal data referred to in article 9(1) of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences referred to in article 10 of that regulation subject to appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subject and the following additional safeguards: ### 1. to the extent that it is strictly necessary for the purposes of this directive , member states may provide that competent authorities may process personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences referred to in article 10 of that regulation subject to appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subject and the following additional safeguards:


### technical and organisational measures shall be in place to ensure the security of the data to high technological standards. ### deleted


### 2. the safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 shall also apply to the processing for the purposes of this directive of special categories of data referred to in article 10(1) of regulation (eu) 2018/1725 and personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences referred to in article 11 of that regulation by union institutions , agencies or bodies. ### 2. the safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 shall also apply to the processing by union institutions , agencies or bodies for the purposes of this directive personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences referred to in article 11 of regulation (eu) 2018/1725.


### [...] ### deleted


### obliged entities shall take measures to ensure that employees , managers or agents who report breaches pursuant to the first subparagraph are protected against retaliation , discrimination and any other unfair treatment. ### obliged entities shall take measures to ensure that employees , managers , agents , board members , shareholders , contractors , subcontractors , suppliers and trainees who report breaches pursuant to the first subparagraph are legally protected in accordance with directive (eu) 2019/1937 of the european parliament and of the council1a from being exposed to threats , retaliatory or hostile action and , in particular , adverse or discriminatory employment actions.


### obliged entities shall take measures to ensure that employees , managers or agents who report breaches pursuant to the first subparagraph are protected against retaliation , discrimination and any other unfair treatment. ### obliged entities shall take measures to ensure that employees , managers , agents , shareholders , contractors , subcontractors , suppliers and trainees who report breaches pursuant to the first subparagraph are legally protected in accordance with directive (eu) 2019/1937 of the european parliament and of the council1a from being exposed to threats , retaliatory or hostile action and , in particular , adverse or discriminatory employment actions.


### 3. providers of gambling services shall apply customer due diligence upon the collection of winnings , the wagering of a stake , or both , when carrying out transactions amounting to at least eur 2 000 or the equivalent in national currency , whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in linked transactions. ### 3. providers of gambling services shall apply customer due diligence upon the collection of winnings , the wagering of a stake , or both , when carrying out transactions amounting to at least eur 2 000 or the equivalent in national currency or , in the case of online gambling services , transactions amounting to at least eur 500 or the equivalent in national currency , whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in linked transactions. providers of online gambling services shall apply customer due diligence measures each time a customer opens a gambling account with that provider.


### 3. by [2 years after the date of application of this regulation] , amla shall issue guidelines on the risk variables and risk factors to be taken into account by obliged entities when entering into business relationships or carrying out occasional transactions. ### 3. by [2 years after the date of application of this regulation] , amla , after consulting with europol , shall issue guidelines on the risk variables and risk factors to be taken into account by obliged entities when entering into business relationships or carrying out occasional transactions.


### 1. where an obliged entity is unable to comply with the customer due diligence measures laid down in article 16(1) , it shall refrain from carrying out a transaction or establishing a business relationship , and shall terminate the business relationship and consider filing a suspicious transaction report to the fiu in relation to the customer in accordance with article 50. ### 1. where an obliged entity is unable to comply with the customer due diligence measures laid down in article 16(1) , it shall refrain from carrying out a transaction or establishing a business relationship , and shall terminate the business relationship and file a suspicious transaction report to the fiu in relation to the customer in accordance with article 50.


### (iv) the usual place of residence or , if there is no fixed residential address with legitimate residence in the union , the postal address at which the natural person can be reached and , where possible , the occupation , profession , or employment status and the tax identification number; ### (iv) the usual place of residence or , if there is no fixed residential address in the union , the postal address at which the natural person can be reached and , where possible , the occupation or profession , and the tax identification number;


### (iii) the names of the legal representatives as well as , where available , the registration number , the tax identification number and the legal entity identifier. obliged entities shall also verify that the legal entity has activities on the basis of accounting documents for the latest financial year or other relevant information; ### (iii) the names of the legal representatives as well as , where applicable , the registration number , the tax identification number and the legal entity identifier. obliged entities shall also verify that the legal entity has activities on the basis of accounting documents for the latest financial year or other relevant information;


### where , after having exhausted all possible means of identification pursuant to the first subparagraph , no natural person is identified as beneficial owner , or where there is any doubt that the person(s) identified is/are the beneficial owner(s) , obliged entities shall identify the natural person(s) holding the position(s) of senior managing official(s) in the corporate or other legal entity and shall verify their identity. obliged entities shall keep records of the actions taken as well as of the difficulties encountered during the identification process , which led to resorting to the identification of a senior managing official. ### where , after having exhausted all possible means of identification pursuant to the first subparagraph , no natural person is identified as beneficial owner , or where there is any doubt that the person(s) identified is/are the beneficial owner(s) , obliged entities shall identify the natural person(s) holding the position(s) of senior managing official(s) in the corporate or other legal entity and shall verify their identity. obliged entities shall also identify the 10 natural persons holding the majority of shares or voting rights or , where the size of the entity in question does not allow for the identification of 10 natural persons , they shall identify all natural persons holding shares or voting rights , and shall verify their identity. obliged entities shall keep records of the actions taken as well as of the difficulties encountered during the identification process and shall file a suspicious transaction report to the fiu in accordance with article 50.


### where , after having exhausted all possible means of identification pursuant to the first subparagraph , no natural person is identified as beneficial owner , or where there is any doubt that the person(s) identified is/are the beneficial owner(s) , obliged entities shall identify the natural person(s) holding the position(s) of senior managing official(s) in the corporate or other legal entity and shall verify their identity. obliged entities shall keep records of the actions taken as well as of the difficulties encountered during the identification process , which led to resorting to the identification of a senior managing official. ### where , after having exhausted all possible means of identification pursuant to the first subparagraph , no natural person is identified as beneficial owner , or where there is any doubt that the person(s) identified is/are the beneficial owner(s) , obliged entities shall identify the top 10 natural person(s) holding the majority of shares or voting rights in the corporate or other legal entity and shall verify their identity. obliged entities shall keep records of the actions taken as well as of the difficulties encountered during the identification process and shall file a suspicious transaction report to the fiu in accordance with article 50.


### the frequency of updating customer information pursuant to the first sub-paragraph shall be based on the risk posed by the business relationship. the frequency of updating of customer information shall in any case not exceed five years. ### the frequency of updating customer information pursuant to the first sub-paragraph shall be based on the risk posed by the business relationship.


### the requirements that apply to obliged entities pursuant to article 16 and the information to be collected for the purpose of performing standard , simplified and enhanced customer due diligence pursuant to articles 18 and 20 and articles 27(1) and 28(4) , including minimum requirements in situations of lower risk; ### the requirements that apply to obliged entities pursuant to article 16 , including minimum requirements in situations of lower risk;


### the list of attributes which electronic identification means and relevant trust services referred to in article 18(4) , point (b) , must feature in order to fulfil the requirements of article 16 , points (a) , (b) and (c) in case of standard , simplified and enhanced customer diligence. ### deleted


### 1. third countries with significant strategic deficiencies in their national aml/cft regimes shall be identified by the commission and designated as ‘high-risk third countries’. ### 1. the commission shall identify third countries with significant strategic deficiencies in their national aml/cft regimes. for the purposes of establishing whether a third country has significant strategic deficiencies in its national aml/cft regime , the commission shall consider any relevant assessments by the independent advisory board under article -23(2) and shall use the ml/tf risk indicators referred to in article -23(2) to assess whether the third country would meet the criteria set out in article 25(2). where the commission assesses that a third country would not meet those criteria , it shall designate it as a ‘high-risk third country’. the commission shall make its assessments of such third countries publicly available.


### 3. for the purposes of paragraph 2 , the commission shall take into account calls for the application of enhanced due diligence measures and additional mitigating measures (‘countermeasures’) by international organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing , as well as relevant evaluations , assessments , reports or public statements drawn up by them. ### 3. for the purposes of paragraph 2 , the commission shall work together with the independent advisory board and take into consideration calls for the application of enhanced due diligence measures and additional mitigating measures (‘countermeasures’) by independent civil society organisations , academia , union institutions , bodies , offices and agencies involved in the aml/cft framework , international organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing , as well as relevant evaluations , assessments , reports or public statements drawn up by them.


### 1. third countries with compliance weaknesses in their national aml/cft regimes shall be identified by the commission. ### 1. the commission shall identify third countries with compliance weaknesses in their national aml/cft regimes. for the purposes of establishing whether a third country has compliance weaknesses in its national aml/cft regime , the commission shall follow the relevant assessments of the independent advisory board referred to in article -23(2).


### 3. the commission , when drawing up the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 2 shall take into account information on jurisdictions under increased monitoring by international organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing , as well as relevant evaluations , assessments , reports or public statements drawn up by them. ### 3. the commission , when drawing up the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 2 shall work together with the independent advisory board and take into account information on jurisdictions under increased monitoring by independent civil society organisations , academia , union institutions and bodies involved in the aml/cft framework , international organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing , as well as relevant evaluations , assessments , reports or public statements drawn up by them.


### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 60 identifying third countries that pose a specific and serious threat to the financial system of the union and the proper functioning of the internal market other than those covered by articles 23 and 24. ### 1. the commission shall identify third countries that pose a specific and serious threat to the financial system of the union and the proper functioning of the internal market other than those covered by articles 23 and 24.


### 2. the commission , when drawing up the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 1 , shall take into account in particular the following criteria: ### 2. the commission , when drawing up the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 1a , shall take into account , in particular , any assessments by the independent advisory board under article -23(2) identifying third countries as posing a specific and serious threat to the financial system of the union and the following criteria:


### 3. for the purposes of determining the level of threat referred to in paragraph 1 , the commission may request amla to adopt an opinion aimed at assessing the specific impact on the integrity of the union’s financial system due to the level of threat posed by a third country. ### 3. the commission may request amla to adopt an opinion aimed at assessing the specific impact on the integrity of the union’s financial system due to the level of threat posed by a third country.


### 4. the commission , when drawing up the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 1 , shall take into account in particular relevant evaluations , assessments or reports drawn up by international organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing. ### 4. the commission , when drawing up the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 1a , shall take into account in particular relevant evaluations from independent civil society organisations , independent academia , union institutions and bodies involved in the aml/cft framework , assessments or reports drawn up by international organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing.


### 1. by [3 years from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , amla shall adopt guidelines defining the money laundering and terrorist financing trends , risks and methods involving any geographical area outside the union to which obliged entities are exposed. amla shall take into account , in particular , the risk factors listed in annex iii. where situations of higher risk are identified , the guidelines shall include enhanced due diligence measures that obliged entities shall consider applying to mitigate such risks. ### 1. by [3 years from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , amla shall , in cooperation with the independent advisory board , adopt guidelines defining the money laundering and terrorist financing trends , risks and methods involving any geographical area outside the union to which obliged entities are exposed. amla shall take into account , in particular , the assessments provided by the independent advisory board and the risk factors listed in annex iii. where situations of higher risk are identified , the guidelines shall include enhanced due diligence measures that obliged entities shall consider applying to mitigate such risks.


### obtain additional information on the customer and the beneficial owner(s); ### obtain additional information on the customer and the beneficial owner(s); such information shall be relevant , accurate , and limited to what is strictly necessary for the scrutiny required;


### specific provisions regarding politically exposed persons ### specific provisions regarding politically exposed persons and high-net-worth individuals


### 1. in addition to the customer due diligence measures laid down in article 16 , obliged entities shall have in place appropriate risk management systems , including risk-based procedures , to determine whether the customer or the beneficial owner of the customer is a politically exposed person. ### 1. in addition to the customer due diligence measures laid down in article 16 , obliged entities shall have in place appropriate risk management systems , including risk-based procedures , to determine whether the customer or the beneficial owner of the customer is a politically exposed person or a high-net-worth individual.


### 2. with respect to transactions or business relationships with politically exposed persons , obliged entities shall apply the following measures: ### 2. with respect to transactions or business relationships with politically exposed persons or high-net-worth individuals , obliged entities shall apply the following measures:


### obtain senior management approval for establishing or continuing business relationships with politically exposed persons; ### obtain senior management approval for establishing or continuing business relationships with politically exposed persons or high-net-worth individuals;


### take adequate measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds that are involved in business relationships or transactions with politically exposed persons; ### take adequate measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds that are involved in business relationships or transactions with politically exposed persons or high-net-worth individuals;


### the level of risk associated with a particular category of politically exposed person , their family members or persons known to be close associates , including guidance on how such risks are to be assessed after the person no longer holds a prominent public function for the purposes of article 35. ### the level of risk associated with a particular category of politically exposed person or high-net-worth individual , their family members or persons known to be close associates , including guidance on how such risks are to be assessed after the person no longer holds a prominent public function for the purposes of article 35.


### the drawing up and approval of the obliged entity’s policies , controls and procedures to comply with the requirements of this regulation; ### the approval of the obliged entity’s policies , controls and procedures to comply with the requirements of this regulation;


### the identification of criteria for the detection of suspicious or unusual transactions and activities; ### deleted


### the reporting of suspicious activities or threshold-based declarations to the fiu pursuant to article 50. ### deleted


### 1. in case of corporate entities , the beneficial owner(s) as defined in article 2(22) shall be the natural person(s) who control(s) , directly or indirectly , the corporate entity , either through an ownership interest or through control via other means. ### 1. in case of corporate entities , the beneficial owner or owners as defined in article 2(22) shall be the natural person or persons who own , control or benefit from , directly or indirectly , the corporate entity , either through an ownership interest or through control via other means.


### 1. in case of corporate entities , the beneficial owner(s) as defined in article 2(22) shall be the natural person(s) who control(s) , directly or indirectly , the corporate entity , either through an ownership interest or through control via other means. ### 1. in case of corporate entities , the beneficial owner(s) as defined in article 2(22) shall be the natural person(s) who own(s) , control(s) or benefit(s) from directly or indirectly , the corporate entity , either through an ownership interest or through control via other means.


### (14) directive (eu) 2015/849 set out to mitigate the money laundering and terrorist financing risks posed by large cash payments by including persons trading in goods among obliged entities when they make or receive payments in cash above eur 10 000 , whilst allowing member states to introduce stricter measures. such approach has shown to be ineffective in light of the poor understanding and application of aml/cft requirements , lack of supervision and limited number of suspicious transactions reported to the fiu. in order to adequately mitigate risks deriving from the misuse of large cash sums , a union-wide limit to large cash transactions above eur 10 000 should be laid down. as a consequence , persons trading in goods should no longer be subject to aml/cft obligations. ### deleted


### (53) considering that there may be changes in the aml/cft frameworks of those third countries or in their implementation , for example as result of the country’s commitment to address the identified weaknesses or of the adoption of relevant aml/cft measures to tackle them , which could change the nature and level of the risks emanating from them , the commission should regularly review the identification of those specific enhanced due diligence measures in order to ensure that they remain proportionate and adequate. ### (53) considering that there may be changes in the aml/cft frameworks of those third countries or in their implementation , for example as result of the country’s commitment to address the identified weaknesses or of the adoption of relevant aml/cft measures to tackle them , which could change the nature and level of the risks emanating from them , the commission should regularly review the identification of those specific enhanced due diligence measures in order to ensure that they remain proportionate and adequate. the commission should publish such reviews so that they are open to public scrutiny.


### (65) detailed rules should be laid down to identify the beneficial owners of corporate and other legal entities and to harmonise definitions of beneficial ownership. while a specified percentage shareholding or ownership interest does not automatically determine the beneficial owners , it should be one factor among others to be taken into account. member states should be able , however , to decide that a percentage lower than 25% may be an indication of ownership or control. control through ownership interest of 25% plus one of the shares or voting rights or other ownership interest should be assessed on every level of ownership , meaning that this threshold should apply to every link in the ownership structure and that every link in the ownership structure and the combination of them should be properly examined. ### (65) detailed rules should be laid down to identify the beneficial owners of corporate and other legal entities and to harmonise definitions of beneficial ownership. while a specified percentage shareholding or ownership interest does not automatically determine the beneficial owners , it should be one factor among others to be taken into account. member states should be able , however , to decide that a percentage lower than 5% may be an indication of ownership or control. control through ownership interest of 5% of the shares or voting rights or other ownership interest should be assessed on every level of ownership , meaning that this threshold should apply to every link in the ownership structure and that every link in the ownership structure and the combination of them should be properly examined.


### (66) a meaningful identification of the beneficial owners requires a determination of whether control is exercised via other means. the determination of control through an ownership interest is necessary but not sufficient and it does not exhaust the necessary checks to determine the beneficial owners. the test on whether any natural person exercises control via other means is not a subsequent test to be performed only when it is not possible to determine an ownership interest. the two tests , namely that of control through an ownership interest and that of control via other means , should be performed in parallel. control through other means may include the right to appoint or remove more than half of the members of the board of the corporate entity; the ability to exert a significant influence on the decisions taken by the corporate entity; control through formal or informal agreements with owners , members or the corporate entities , as well as voting arrangements; links with family members of managers or directors or those owning or controlling the corporate entity; use of formal or informal nominee arrangements. ### (66) a meaningful identification of the beneficial owners requires a determination of whether control is exercised via other means. the determination of control through an ownership interest is necessary but not sufficient and it does not exhaust the necessary checks to determine the beneficial owners. the test on whether any natural person exercises control via other means is not a subsequent test to be performed only when it is not possible to determine an ownership interest. the two tests , namely that of control through an ownership interest and that of control via other means , should be performed in parallel. control through other means may include the right to appoint or remove any member of the board of the corporate entity; the ability to exert a significant influence on the decisions taken by the corporate entity; control through formal or informal agreements with owners , members or the corporate entities , as well as voting arrangements; links with family members of managers or directors or those owning or controlling the corporate entity; use of formal or informal nominee arrangements; or the possibility to use the power of attorney to manage or dispose of the corporate entity’s assets or income , particularly its bank or financial accounts.


### (70) underpinning an effective framework on beneficial ownership transparency is the knowledge by corporate and other legal entities of the natural persons who are their beneficial owners. thus , all corporate and other legal entities in the union should obtain and hold adequate , accurate and current beneficial ownership information. that information should be retained for five years and the identity of the person responsible for retaining the information should be reported to the registers. that retention period is equivalent to the period for retention of the information obtained within the application of aml/cft requirements , such as customer due diligence measures. in order to ensure the possibility to cross-check and verify information , for instance through the mechanism of discrepancy reporting , it is justified to ensure that the relevant data retention periods are aligned. ### (70) underpinning an effective framework on beneficial ownership transparency is the knowledge by corporate and other legal entities of the natural persons who are their beneficial owners. thus , all corporate and other legal entities in the union should obtain and hold adequate , accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information. that information should be retained for five years and the identity of the person responsible for retaining the information should be reported to the registers. that retention period is equivalent to the period for retention of the information obtained within the application of aml/cft requirements , such as customer due diligence measures. in order to ensure the possibility to cross-check and verify information , for instance through the mechanism of discrepancy reporting , it is justified to ensure that the relevant data retention periods are aligned.


### (71) corporate and other legal entities should take all necessary measures to identify their beneficial owners. there may however be cases where no natural person is identifiable who ultimately owns or exerts control over an entity. in such exceptional cases , provided that all means of identification are exhausted , the senior managing officials can be reported when providing beneficial ownership information to obliged entities in the course of the customer due diligence process or when submitting the information to the central register. corporate and legal entities should keep records of the actions taken in order to identify their beneficial owners , especially when they rely on this last resort measure , which should be duly justified and documented. ### (71) corporate and other legal entities should take all necessary measures to identify their beneficial owners. there may however be cases where no natural person is identifiable who ultimately owns or exerts control over an entity. in such exceptional cases , corporate and legal entities should identify the top 10 natural persons holding the majority of shares or voting rights. corporate and legal entities should keep records of the actions taken in order to identify their beneficial owners , especially when they rely on this last resort measure , which should be duly justified and documented.


### (94) the use of large cash payments is highly vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing; this has not been sufficiently mitigated by the requirement for traders in goods to be subject to anti-money laundering rules when making or receiving cash payments of eur 10 000 or more. at the same time , differences in approaches among member states have undermined the level playing field within the internal market to the detriment of businesses located in member states with stricter controls. it is therefore necessary to introduce a union-wide limit to large cash payments of eur 10 000. member states should be able to adopt lower thresholds and further stricter provisions. ### (94) the ability to have access to and use cash as a form of payment is a fundamental freedom. the rights to respect for private and family life and to the protection of personal data are enshrined in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union. imposing any form of cash limitation threshold risks discriminating against people dependent on cash such as the unbanked , people living in remote areas , the elderly and people on the margins of administrative or financial inclusion. in its report of 12 june 2018 on restrictions on payments in cash , the commission found that the large majority of consultation respondents were clearly opposed to any restrictions on cash payments and recognised that it could significantly impact certain economic sectors and many small and medium-sized enterprises. a study by a private contractor , referenced in the report , concluded that cash payment restrictions would have little positive impact on terrorism financing or tax fraud , and the commission concluded that the impact of such restrictions on the fight against money laundering could not be precisely quantified. the efficiency of introducing any form of cash limitation threshold has also been contested , with research suggesting that a total elimination of cash would result in a marginal impact on the shadow economy and no impact on the supervision of the profits of multinational corporations that deprive states of billions of euro in tax revenue.


### (95) the commission should assess the costs , benefits and impacts of lowering the limit to large cash payments at union level with a view to levelling further the playing field for businesses and reducing opportunities for criminals to use cash for money laundering. this assessment should consider in particular the most appropriate level for a harmonised limit to cash payments at union level considering the current existing limits to cash payments in place in a large number of member states , the enforceability of such a limit at union level and the effects of such a limit on the legal tender status of the euro. ### deleted


### the measures to be applied by obliged entities to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing; ### the measures to be applied by obliged entities to prevent and uncover money laundering and terrorist financing;


### measures to limit the misuse of bearer instruments. ### measures to limit and uncover the misuse of bearer instruments;


### (1) ‘money laundering’ means the conduct as set out in article 3 , paragraphs 1 and 5 of directive (eu) 2018/1673 including aiding and abetting , inciting and attempting to commit that conduct , whether the activities which generated the property to be laundered were carried out on the territory of a member state or on that of a third country. knowledge , intent or purpose required as an element of that conduct may be inferred from objective factual circumstances; ### (1) ‘money laundering’ means the conduct as set out in article 3(1) , (2) , (3) , point (c) , and 5 of directive (eu) 2018/1673 including aiding and abetting , inciting and attempting to commit that conduct , whether the activities which generated the property to be laundered were carried out on the territory of a member state or on that of a third country. knowledge , intent or purpose required as an element of that conduct may be inferred from objective factual circumstances;


### (2) ‘terrorist financing’ means the conduct set out in article 11 of directive (eu) 2017/541 including aiding and abetting , inciting and attempting to commit that conduct , whether carried out on the territory of a member state or on that of a third country. knowledge , intent or purpose required as an element of that conduct may be inferred from objective factual circumstances; ### (2) ‘terrorist financing’ means the conduct set out in article 11 of directive (eu) 2017/541 , whether carried out on the territory of a member state or on that of a third country;


### (22) ‘beneficial owner’ means any natural person who ultimately owns or controls a legal entity or express trust or similar legal arrangement , as well as any natural person on whose behalf or for the benefit of whom a transaction or activity is being conducted; ### (22) ‘beneficial owner’ means any natural person who ultimately owns , controls or benefits from a legal entity or express trust or similar legal arrangement , as well as any natural person on whose behalf or for the benefit of whom a transaction or activity is being conducted;