### 6. calls for the appropriate use of the ndici-global europe to contribute to reducing migration flows by stimulating economic growth and development in third countries; ### 6. calls for the appropriate use of the ndici-global europe to contribute to reducing migration flows by addressing root causes of migration and stimulating economic growth and development in third countries;


### 7. requests the commission to include in its proposal a framework for talent partnerships between member states and third countries , tailored to the situation of the third country in question , which should include vocational training programmes based on skills , in particular aptitude tests , workplace observation and simulations , and that member states could opt into on a voluntary basis; calls on the commission to ensure that the framework allows for parliament to be able to fully exercise its scrutiny and evaluation role; ### 7. requests the commission to include in its proposal a framework for talent partnerships between member states and third countries , tailored to the situation and the benefit of sending and receiving countries , which should include vocational training programmes based on skills , in particular aptitude tests , workplace observation and simulations , and that member states could opt into on a voluntary basis; calls on the commission to ensure that the framework allows for parliament to be able to fully exercise its scrutiny and evaluation role;


### 7. stresses the need to involve all stakeholders in europe and partner countries in the definition and evaluation of new and existing legal migration strategies; highlights the importance of religious entities , which play a key role in partner countries , including in conflict resolution. ### 7. stresses the need to involve all stakeholders in europe and partner countries in the definition and evaluation of new and existing legal migration strategies; underlines the importance of considering migration in a more comprehensive and systematic way; points out that migration and asylum should be taken into account in all areas of the union’s external policies such as development aid and economic cooperation;


### 8. notes that the objective of directive 2011/98/eu to simplify and harmonise the rules concerning permits currently applicable in the member states has not been fully achieved with some of the provisions being implemented in different ways across union; requests the commission to take the necessary steps to ensure that the member states implement that directive fully; further considers that that directive should be amended to allow applications for a single permit to be lodged from within both a member state and a third country , and , in order to further simplify and harmonise the rules , to clearly regulate the procedure for obtaining an entry visa so as to avoid applicants having to submit the documents needed to obtain a single permit twice , and calls on the commission to include such amendments in its proposal; ### 8. notes that the objective of directive 2011/98/eu to simplify and harmonise the rules concerning permits currently applicable in the member states has not been fully achieved with some of the provisions being implemented in different ways across union; requests the commission to take the necessary steps to ensure that the member states implement that directive fully; further considers that that directive should be further simplified and harmonised and properly implemented by member states and regulate appropriately the procedure for obtaining an entry visa so as to avoid applicants having to submit the documents needed to obtain a single permit twice;


### 9. requests that the commission includes in its proposal the establishment of a transnational advisory service network , to be managed by the commission , for legally migrating third-country workers , with each member state designating a lead authority to process applications and to coordinate the advice and information provided to third-country nationals applying for work in the union; insists that the lead authorities should be responsible for the sharing of information among member states on third-country workers and should act as contact points for the talent pool; asks that the lead authorities be responsible also for close coordination with one another with regard to applications lodged for a single permit to reside and work in accordance with directive 2011/98/eu in order to avoid double submissions; ### 9. requests that the commission includes in its proposal the establishment of a transnational advisory service network , to be managed by the commission , for legally migrating third-country workers , with each member state designating a lead authority to process applications and to coordinate the advice and information provided to third-country nationals applying for work in the union; insists that the lead authorities should be responsible for the sharing of information among member states on third-country workers and should act as contact points for the talent pool; asks that the lead authorities be responsible also for close coordination with one another with regard to applications lodged for a single permit to reside and work in accordance with directive 2011/98/eu in order to avoid double submissions; points out the need to facilitate the gathering of data , statistics and evidence as well as information-sharing between member states to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the acquis;


### 10. calls on the commission to include in its proposal an amendment to directive 2014/36/eu to allow holders of work permits under that directive a period of three months to seek new employment after having left their previous employer without having their work permit revoked; ### 10. calls on the commission to include in its proposal an amendment to directive 2014/36/eu to allow for member states to renew work permits , for the purposes of seasonal work , from a pool of seasonal workers created for this purpose , which should be extended for a period of up to 5 years;


### 11. requests the commission to include in its proposal an amendment to directive 2009/52/ec to adapt its scope to include exploited legally residing third-country nationals working in the union; ### 11. requests the commission to put forward a proposal to amend directive 2009/52/ec in order to put in place additional eu-wide measures to combat pull factors created by employers who employ illegal migrants. is of the view that the existence of illegal migration in the labour market undermines the public support for legal labour immigration;


### 11. requests the commission to include in its proposal an amendment to directive 2009/52/ec to adapt its scope to include exploited legally residing third-country nationals working in the union; ### 11. requests the commission to include in its proposal an amendment to directive 2009/52/ec to adapt its scope to include exploited legally residing third-country nationals working in the union by conditions that affect workers’ health and safety and are offending against human dignity;


### 12. is of the view that directive 2003/109/ec should be amended to allow third-country nationals who are long-term residents of a member state to reside permanently within another member state from the day their permit is issued on terms similar to the terms applicable to union citizens and to reduce the number of years of residence required to acquire union long-term residence status from five to three years; calls on the commission to include those amendments in its proposal; ### 12. is of the view that directive 2003/109/ec , which is currently under-used and does not provide an effective right to intra-eu mobility , should be reviewed in order to create a true eu long-term residence status , in particular by strengthening the right of long-term residents to move and work in other member states;


### 13. is of the view that sufficient funding for the proposals set out in this report is required and considers that the financial implications of the requested proposal should be covered by the relevant union budgetary allocation; ### 13. is of the view that if additional funding for the proposals set out in this report is required it should be covered by the relevant union budgetary allocation;


### - it is a pressing need for the union to improve its attractiveness for all skilled third-country workers , not only for highly-skilled workers. with the revision of the directive (eu) [eu blue card] , the union has taken further steps to achieve that goal for highly-skilled third-country workers. however , it is imperative to achieve that goal for low- and medium-skilled third-country workers in order to fill vacancies and improve matching on the member states’ labour markets , further enhancing the union’s economic competitiveness. ### - given the demographic challenges and the global competition for talent , it is a pressing need for the union to particularly improve its attractiveness for highly skilled labour to the eu; with the revision of the directive (eu) [eu blue card] , the union has taken significant steps to achieve that goal for highly-skilled third-country workers. however , in order to fill vacancies , it is imperative to improve matching on labour markets needs , determined by member states , to further enhance the union’s economic competitiveness.


### - to properly address that issue , the european parliament calls on the commission to , within the legislative act to be adopted , include provisions setting up an admission scheme with conditions of entry and residence for low- and medium-skilled third-country workers. the scheme should include the creation of a framework within which third-country workers are able to have their skills and qualifications properly recognised and validated for use on the member states’ labour markets. ### deleted


### recommendation 8 (on amending the directive 2009/52/ec to include legally residing third-country nationals ### recommendation 8 (on amending the directive 2009/52/ec to further prevent the exploitation of illegal labour migrants


### - directive 2009/52/ec contains several tools that can be used to support irregularly staying third-country nationals working within the union. the fact that it only covers irregularly staying third-country workers is , however , a substantial flaw. while regularly staying third-country workers enjoy a higher level of protection , mainly by virtue of their legal right to stay within the union , as well as through other means , they too can be exploited and remain more vulnerable than union citizens. consequently , the european parliament sees a need to amend directive 2009/52/ec to make it applicable to all third-country nationals working in the union. ### - directive 2009/52/ec should be amended with the ambition to put in place additional eu-wide measures to combat pull factors created by employers who employ illegal labour migrants. in order to develop , and to gain support for , the union's common policy on legal labour migration , efforts must be made to further curb illegal labour migration. any new eu measures against employers' abuse of legal labour migrants should be addressed separately , and not within the framework of directive 2009/52/ec.


### c. whereas civic space refers to the legal and political framework in which people and groups can meaningfully participate in the political , economic , social and cultural life of their societies , exercising the right to express views , assemble , associate and engage in dialogue with one another and with authorities; ### c. whereas civic space refers to the legal and political framework in which people and groups can meaningfully participate in the political , economic , social and cultural life of their societies , exercising the right to express views , the right to information , assemble , associate and engage in dialogue with one another and with authorities;


### 1. asserts the crucial role played by csos in the realisation of eu values and fundamental rights , and the implementation of eu policies and strategies; stresses their key contribution to informed public debate , articulating aspirations present in society , giving a voice to vulnerable and marginalised people , providing expertise in policy-making , promoting active citizenship and acting as schools of democracy; ### 1. asserts the crucial role played by csos in the realisation of eu values and fundamental rights , and the implementation of eu policies and strategies; stresses their key contribution to informed public debate , articulating aspirations present in society , giving a voice to vulnerable and marginalised people , providing expertise in policy-making , holding authorities and public institutions accountable , monitoring use of public funds , promoting active citizenship and acting as schools of democracy;


### 1. notes with deep concern the overall shrinking of space for civil society in the eu , which represents a serious threat to democracy and fundamental rights and has worsened during the covid-19 crisis; ### 1. stresses the importance of creating favourable conditions for the development of civil society in the eu , as the shrinking of space for civil society in the eu would represent a serious threat to democracy and fundamental rights; points out that during the covid-19 crisis the position of many civil society actors has deteriorated;


### 1. notes with deep concern the overall shrinking of space for civil society in the eu , which represents a serious threat to democracy and fundamental rights and has worsened during the covid-19 crisis; ### 1. notes with deep concern the overall shrinking of space for civil society in some members states , which represents a serious threat to democracy and fundamental rights;


### 2. emphasises that for civil society organisations to thrive , civic space must be an enabling and safe environment free from undue interference , intimidation , harassment and chilling effects; ### 2. emphasises that for civil society organisations to have an independent and critical voice of society , transparent funding mechanisms as well as civil dialogue mechanisms must be established at all levels in order to ensure that citizens and their representative associations can participate effectively. civil societies should operate in an enabling and safe environment free from undue interference , intimidation , harassment and chilling effects;;


### 2. emphasises that for civil society organisations to thrive , civic space must be an enabling and safe environment free from undue interference , intimidation , harassment and chilling effects; ### 2. emphasises that for civil society organisations to thrive , civic space must be an enabling and safe environment free from undue interference , intimidation , harassment and chilling effects , such as slapps , incitement to hatred and/or violence against rights defenders and organisations , and the creation of legal or administrative hurdles affecting their daily operations;


### 2. emphasises that for civil society organisations to thrive , civic space must be an enabling and safe environment free from undue interference , intimidation , harassment and chilling effects; ### 2. emphasises that for civil society organisations to thrive , civic space must be an enabling and safe environment free from undue interference , intimidation , harassment and chilling effects and that the responsibility to maintain a favourable environment for civil society lies with member states;


### 2. underlines that the main responsibility for this regression lies with member states; ### deleted


### 2. underlines that the main responsibility for this regression lies with member states; ### 2. underlines that the responsibility to establish and maintain a favourable environment for civil society and public participation lies with member states;


### 2. underlines that the main responsibility for this regression lies with member states; ### 2. underlines that the responsibility for the positive development of civil society in the eu lies with member states and the eu institutions;


### 3. condemns all attempts by member states to control civil society actors and discriminate between them on a political basis , including by over-regulating the sector; ### 3. condemns all actions by member states to control , intimidate or deter civil society actors and discriminate between them on a political basis; calls on the member states to pinpoint tools with which to promote and foster civil society action , particularly in the context of the covid-19 pandemic; urges the member states to avoid over-regulating the sector in national legislation;


### 3. condemns all attempts by member states to control civil society actors and discriminate between them on a political basis , including by over-regulating the sector; ### 3. calls on member states to refrain from excessive control of civil society actors , over-regulation and discriminatory practices in the sector;


### 4. strongly condemns , in particular , the adoption by hungarian and polish authorities of acts that restrict the access of non-governmental organisations to funding and that target lgbtiq+ persons and activists; ### 4. strongly condemns , in particular , the adoption by certain members states of acts that restrict the access of non-governmental organisations to funding and that target a wide range of civil society activities;


### 5. welcomes the commission’s acknowledgement of the importance of civil society in a number of eu policies and strategies; stresses , however , that the fragmented nature of this approach results in little effective improvement of the situation of csos on the ground; ### 5. welcomes the commission’s acknowledgement of the importance of civil society in a number of eu policies and strategies including through the 1.55 billion eur that has been allocated under the citizenship , equality , rights and values programme; stresses , however , that the fragmented nature of this approach results in little effective improvement of the situation of csos on the ground;


### 5. deplores the insufficient efforts of member states to facilitate and guarantee access to stable long-term funding for civil society actors; ### 5. deplores the insufficient efforts of some member states to facilitate and guarantee access to stable long-term funding for civil society actors;


### 5. deplores the insufficient efforts of member states to facilitate and guarantee access to stable long-term funding for civil society actors; ### 5. calls on the member states to step up their efforts to facilitate and guarantee access to stable long-term funding for civil society actors;


### 6. urges the commission , therefore , to adopt a comprehensive civil society strategy that integrates all existing tools , fills monitoring , support and protection gaps , and gives genuine political recognition to the crucial role played by csos in the realisation of eu values and policies; ### 6. urges the commission , therefore , to adopt a comprehensive civil society strategy that integrates all existing tools , fills monitoring , support and protection gaps , and gives genuine political recognition to the crucial role played by csos in the realisation of eu values and policies; considers that the strategy should outline a set of concrete measures that will ensure consistent access of csos to policy debates and legislative process on union level , as well as to monitoring of implementation of union policies and the union budget;


### 6. urges the commission , therefore , to adopt a comprehensive civil society strategy that integrates all existing tools , fills monitoring , support and protection gaps , and gives genuine political recognition to the crucial role played by csos in the realisation of eu values and policies; ### 6. urges the commission to adopt a comprehensive civil society strategy that integrates all existing tools , fills monitoring , support and protection gaps , and gives genuine political recognition to the crucial role played by csos in the realisation of eu values and policies; calls , for the commission to explore initiatives to strengthen the support networks available to csos , particularly in contexts where it is under threat;


### 6. condemns the severe restrictions imposed by member states on the right to protest , the disproportionate use of violence by public authorities , and the arbitrary arrests of protesters; ### 6. condemns the severe restrictions imposed by some member states on freedom of speech , freedom of assembly and association the disproportionate use of violence by public authorities , and the arbitrary arrests of protesters;


### 6. condemns the severe restrictions imposed by member states on the right to protest , the disproportionate use of violence by public authorities , and the arbitrary arrests of protesters; ### 6. considers that democracy and a healthy civil society require the guaranteed exercise of the right of assembly and avoidance of the disproportionate use of violence by public authorities against protesters;


### 7. underlines that civil society actors are increasingly subjected to targeted violence , whether by police forces or private parties; ### 7. underlines that civil society actors in some member states are increasingly subjected to harassment , threats , smear campaigns , acts of intimidation and violence;


### 7. underlines that civil society actors are increasingly subjected to targeted violence , whether by police forces or private parties; ### 7. expresses concern at cases in which civil society actors are being subjected to violence , whether by police forces or private parties;


### 8. considers that the contribution of csos to the single market and the social economy , as well as their role in the realisation of eu values and policies , is a strong argument for removing the barriers to their operations at eu level; calls on the commission , therefore , to propose legislation to approximate member state laws in this regard; ### 8. considers that the contribution of csos to the internal market and the economy , as well as their role in the realisation of eu values and policies , is a strong argument for removing the barriers to their operations at eu level; calls on the commission , therefore , to adequately respond with legislative measures in order to reach this objective;


### 8. condemns the increasing criminalisation and judicial harassment of civil society actors; is concerned about the growing use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (slapps) by powerful public and private actors , and strongly recommends the adoption of an anti-slapps directive protecting all parties legitimately engaging in public participation; ### 8. condemns the increasing criminalisation and judicial harassment of civil society actors; is concerned about the growing use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (slapps) as a way to silence and intimidate independent media and journalists and civil society; urgently calls the commission to present proposals for binding union legislation on common and effective safeguards for victims of slapps across the union , including through a directive establishing minimum standards for protection against slapps;


### 8. condemns the increasing criminalisation and judicial harassment of civil society actors; is concerned about the growing use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (slapps) by powerful public and private actors , and strongly recommends the adoption of an anti-slapps directive protecting all parties legitimately engaging in public participation; ### 8. condemns cases of criminalisation and harassment of civil society actors; is concerned about the growing use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (slapps) by powerful public and private actors , and strongly recommends the adoption of an anti-slapps directive;


### 9. calls on the commission to include a systematic civic space check in its impact assessments in order to prevent planned legislation from having negative effects on civic space; ### 9. calls on the commission to include a systematic civic space check in its impact assessments providing clearer criteria for what constitutes an enabling space for civil society in order to prevent planned legislation from having negative effects on civic space;


### 9. supports the commission in launching infringement procedures against member states that unduly restrict the freedoms of assembly and association; ### 9. supports the commission in launching infringement procedures against member states that unduly and disproportionately restrict the freedoms of assembly and association;


### 10. calls on the member states to limit peaceful assemblies only if strictly necessary and in a proportionate way; condemns any unnecessary use of force against protesters , as well as their criminalisation and surveillance; calls on the commission to issue guidelines for the protection of freedom of peaceful assembly; ### 10. calls on the member states to limit peaceful assemblies only if strictly necessary in accordance with applicable law and in a proportionate way; condemns any unnecessary use of force against protesters , as well as their criminalisation and surveillance; calls on the commission to issue guidelines for the protection of freedom of peaceful assembly;


### 10. supports the creation of an eu alert mechanism for attacks on civil society; ### 10. supports the creation of a comprehensive european strategy on civil society , acknowledging its vital role in promotion and application of european values that could include an eu alert mechanism for attacks on civil society;


### 10. supports the creation of an eu alert mechanism for attacks on civil society; ### 10. supports the creation of an eu alert mechanism that allows attacks on civil society to be reported and protection against such attacks to be sought;


### 10. supports the creation of an eu alert mechanism for attacks on civil society; ### 10. supports the creation and balanced and proportional functioning of an eu alert mechanism for attacks on civil society;


### 11. denounces the extreme inequality in access to information and decision-makers between industry representatives on the one hand , and civil society actors on the other , including within the eu institutions; ### 11. calls for equal access to information and decision-makers to be ensured , both at member state and eu level;


### 11. denounces the extreme inequality in access to information and decision-makers between industry representatives on the one hand , and civil society actors on the other , including within the eu institutions; ### 11. underlines that access to information of public interest should be ensured for all civil society actors , including by the eu institutions;


### 12. deplores the growing concentration of media ownership at the expense of plurality , independence and fair public representation of the ideas and actions of civil society organisations. ### 12. calls on the member states to ensure and maintain the independence of media from political and economic pressure , and to guarantee media pluralism and ensure transparency of media ownership; recalls that independent and responsible journalism as well as access to pluralistic information are key pillars of democracy and the actions and inputs by civil society are vital for any democracy to thrive;


### 12. deplores the growing concentration of media ownership at the expense of plurality , independence and fair public representation of the ideas and actions of civil society organisations ### 12. deplores the growing concentration of media ownership at the expense of plurality , independence and space for the presentation of the ideas and actions of civil society organisations.


### 14. calls for the setting up of an eu alert mechanism allowing csos and human rights defenders to register attacks and seek support; ### 14. notes that the union currently lacks efficient procedures to provide an adequate response when csos report that democratic standards and civic space in member states are under threat; supports the creation of a comprehensive european strategy on civil society , acknowledging its vital role in promotion and application of european values that could include an eu alert mechanism for attacks on civil society;


### 15. urges the commission to propose a comprehensive set of measures and recommendations to ensure long-term financing for csos; stresses the importance of securing complementary sources of funding; emphasises that public funding should cover all types of civil society activities; ### 15. urges the commission to propose a comprehensive set of measures and recommendations to ensure adequate and enabling long-term financing for csos; stresses the importance of securing complementary sources of funding , from both local and national sources , as this will enable these organisations to be resilient against any potential government restrictions on external funding; emphasises that public funding should cover all types of civil society activities which promote and protect the values of our union;


### 17. welcomes the adoption with an increased budget of the citizens , equality , rights and values programme; calls on the commission to actively consult csos in the definition of work programmes and funding mechanisms so as to ensure transparency , flexibility and user-friendliness; welcomes re-granting mechanisms in the union values strand; ### 17. welcomes the adoption of the citizens , equality , rights and values programme with an increased budget of 1 ,55 billion eur for the 2021 - 2027 period , as a meaningful response to the challenges faced by the civil society in the eu and a first step towards creating a more systemic framework of assistance for union’s csos; calls on the commission to actively consult csos in the definition of work programmes and funding mechanisms so as to ensure transparency , flexibility and user-friendliness; welcomes re-granting mechanisms in the union values strand;


### 18. urges the commission to ensure that eu funds are only awarded to organisations that are strictly independent from any government and fully adhere to eu values; ### 18. urges the commission to ensure that eu funds allocated to csos are only awarded to organisations that are strictly independent from any government and fully adhere to eu values;


### 20. calls for an eu-level definition of the concept of public benefit , as that would boost cross-border donations insofar as it would enable mutual recognition of public benefit status and equal treatment in terms of the related advantages; ### deleted


### — having regard to the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , particularly articles 7 , 8 , 47 , and 52 , ### — having regard to the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , particularly articles 7 , 8 , 16 , 47 , and 52 ,


### — having regard to regulation (eu) 2016/679 , the general data protection regulation (gdpr)7 ; ### — having regard to regulation (eu) 2016/679 , the general data protection regulation (gdpr)7 , in particular chapter v thereof;


### a. whereas the court of justice of the eu (ecj) in the “schrems i” judgment pointed out that indiscriminate access by intelligence authorities to the content of electronic communications violates the essence of the right to confidentiality of communications as provided in article 7 of the charter; ### a. whereas the court of justice of the eu (ecj) in the “schrems i” judgment invalidated the commission decision on the safe harbour based on the finding pointed out that indiscriminate access by intelligence authorities to the content of electronic communications violates the essence of the right to confidentiality of communications as provided in article 7 of the charter;


### b. whereas the court in the “schrems ii” judgment pointed out that the united states (us) do not provide sufficient legal remedies for non-us persons against the mass surveillance , and that this violates the essence of the right to a legal remedy as provided in article 47 of the charter; ### b. whereas the court of justice of the eu (ecj) in the “schrems ii” judgment confirmed the general validity of standard contractual clauses (scc); whereas the ecj in the same ruling invalidated the commission decision on the privacy shield based on the finding that the united states (us) does not provide sufficient legal remedies for non-us persons against indiscriminate access , and that this violates the essence of the right to a legal remedy as provided in article 47 of the charter;


### c. whereas in its resolution of 25 october 2018 , the european parliament had already called on the commission to suspend the privacy shield; ### c. whereas in its resolution of 25 october 2018 , the european parliament , pointing to the failure of the us to meet the deadline of 1 september 2018 to be fully compliant with the privacy shield , had already called on the commission to suspend the privacy shield until the us authorities comply with its terms;


### 1. takes note of the ecj ruling of 16 july 2020 , in which the court upheld the validity of decision 2010/87 on standard contractual clauses (sccs) deeming them an effective mechanism to ensure compliance with the level of protection provided in eu law; notes further that the court invalidated the commission decision 2016/1250 on the adequacy of the protection provided by the eu-us privacy shield; ### 1. takes note of the ecj ruling of 16 july 2020 , in which the court upheld the validity of decision 2010/87 on standard contractual clauses (sccs) , the most widely used mechanism for international data transfers , deeming them an effective mechanism to ensure compliance with the level of protection provided in eu law; notes further that the court invalidated the commission decision 2016/1250 on the adequacy of the protection provided by the eu-us privacy shield;


### 2. believes that the ecj ruling has significant implications for adequacy decisions concerning third countries; reaffirms the need for legal clarity and certainty; ### 2. believes that the ecj ruling , while focusing on the level of data protection afforded to data subjects in the eu whose data were transferred to the us under the privacy shield mechanism , also has implications for adequacy decisions concerning other third countries; reaffirms the need for legal clarity and certainty as the ability to transfer personal data across borders has become increasingly important for all types of companies that deliver goods and services internationally;


### 3. is concerned that the whole “schrems ii” case was started by the irish data protection commissioner , instead taking a decision within its powers pursuant to article 58 gdpr; shows deep concern that several complaints against breaches of the gdpr filed on 25th may 2018 , have not yet been decided by the irish data protection commissioner , which is the lead authority for these cases; strongly condemns the attempt of the irish data protection authority to shift the costs of the judicial procedure to maximilian schrems , which would have created a massive chilling effect; calls on the commission to start infringement procedures against ireland for not properly enforcing the gdpr; ### 3. recalls that the “schrems ii” case was lodged by the irish data protection commissioner (dpc) who made use of the legal avenue established by the ecj in the ‘schrems i’ judgment that allows data protection authorities (dpas) to bring concerns about the validity of a commission implementing decision to the attention of a national judge in view of triggering a reference for preliminary ruling to the ecj;


### 4. urges the commission to publish further guidance on international data transfers for companies , in particular for smes , including on the additional safeguards required for transfers using sccs; ### 4. notes that the commission and the edpb are currently preparing further guidance on international data transfers for companies , in particular for smes , including a checklist for the assessment of transfers , tools to address risks such as government access to data , and information on the additional safeguards required by the ecj for transfers using sccs;


### 3. deplores the fact that eurojust was faced with a decrease in its budget from eur 47 to 44 million (-6.38%) and a slight increase in staff from 238 to 239 (+0.4%) despite a 17% increase in workload compared to 2018; reminds that the workload is expected to increase further due to the new mandate which entered into force in 20191 ; further recalls that the number of coordination centres held in 2019 increased from 17 to 20 (+19%) , demonstrating the popularity and utility of this operational tool; stresses the essential role that eurojust plays in the union security chain and maintains that its budget should match its tasks and priorities in order to enable it to fulfil its mandate; ### 3. deplores the fact that eurojust was faced with a decrease in its budget from eur 47 to 44 million (-6.38%) and a slight increase in staff from 238 to 239 (+0.4%) despite a 17% increase in workload compared to 2018; highlights the continuous increase in total number of cases supported by eurojust in the past five years and stresses the recent trend of cases referred to eurojust becoming more and more complex and requiring support over longer periods; highlights that working together through eurojust in 2019 , national judicial and law enforcement authorities brought trade in illicit drugs worth eur 2.7 billion to a halt , and about eur 2 billion in criminal assets were seized or frozen; reminds that the workload is expected to increase further due to the new mandate which entered into force in 20191 ; further recalls that the number of coordination centres held in 2019 increased from 17 to 20 (+19%) , demonstrating the popularity and utility of this operational tool; stresses the essential role that eurojust plays in the union security chain and maintains that its budget should match its tasks and priorities in order to enable it to fulfil its mandate , also in the view of an effective cooperation with the european public prosecutor’s office;


### 1. grants/refuses to grant the executive director of the european border and coast guard agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the agency’s budget for the financial year 2019; ### 1. refuses to grant the executive director of the european border and coast guard agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the agency’s budget for the financial year 2019;


### 1. approves the closure of the accounts of the european border and coast guard agency for the financial year 2019 / points out that a proposal to close the accounts of the european border and coast guard agency for the financial year 2019 must be submitted at a subsequent part-session; ### 1. points out that a proposal to close the accounts of the european border and coast guard agency for the financial year 2019 must be submitted at a subsequent part-session;


### 3. welcomes the finding by the court that the simplified financing scheme , in place since early 2018 , covering the deployment of human resources , seems to be contributing to a reduced administrative workload , increased simplification and better monitoring of grants; regrets , however , the finding by the court that reimbursements of equipment-related expenditure (some 35 % of the agency’s operational expenditure in 2018 , amounting to eur 64 million) are still based on actual cost and as such , more prone to errors and that the intention to move to a unit cost-based scheme for reimbursements for this type of cost , has so far , been unsuccessful in its current form; notes the court’s finding that the agency has taken steps to improve the ex-ante verifications and that the agency re-introduced ex post verifications on reimbursements in 2019 , in line with the court’s recommendations made in previous years; ### 3. welcomes the finding by the court that the simplified financing scheme , in place since early 2018 , covering the deployment of human resources , seems to be contributing to a reduced administrative workload , increased simplification and better monitoring of grants; regrets , however , the finding by the court that reimbursements of equipment-related expenditure (some 35 % of the agency’s operational expenditure in 2018 , amounting to eur 64 million) are still based on actual cost and as such , more prone to errors and that the intention to move to a unit cost-based scheme for reimbursements for this type of cost , has so far , been unsuccessful in its current form; notes the court’s finding that the agency has taken steps to improve the ex-ante verifications and that the agency re-introduced ex post verifications on reimbursements in 2019 , in line with the court’s recommendations made in previous years; calls on the member states to ensure that their respective border agencies submit the correct documentation to frontex for actual costs incurred within the time period stipulated in grant agreements;


### 4. recalls the finding of the court of auditors (the ‘court’) regarding financing agreements that reimbursements were still based on actual costs instead of on unit costs , and the associated issues identified with supporting evidence; recalls that this issue was also identified in the discharge for 2018; notes from the agency’s follow-up report that the agency has piloted the unit cost approach for heavy equipment and an analysis was made on the use of unit costs for the deployment of human resources and light technical equipment; notes that the pilot projects for heavy equipment revealed that the unit cost approach would increase the total costs , as the financial consequences of unpredictable events such as weather conditions , repairs and days needed for transfer of the asset , that are now reimbursable on the basis of presented evidence , would need to be factored into the unit cost; calls on the court the examine the unit cost approach piloted by the agency and inform the discharge authority if this approach is indeed not suited for heavy equipment; ### 4. recalls the finding of the court of auditors (the ‘court’) regarding financing agreements that reimbursements were still based on actual costs instead of on unit costs , and the associated issues identified with supporting evidence; recalls that this issue was also identified in the discharge for 2018; notes from the agency’s follow-up report that the agency has piloted the unit cost approach for heavy equipment and an analysis was made on the use of unit costs for the deployment of human resources and light technical equipment; notes that the pilot projects for heavy equipment revealed that the unit cost approach would increase the total costs , as the financial consequences of unpredictable events such as weather conditions , repairs and days needed for transfer of the asset , that are now reimbursable on the basis of presented evidence , would need to be factored into the unit cost; notes that the agency concluded that moving to unit-based reimbursement is not feasible due to lack of interest from member states; insists that unnecessary bureaucratic burden needs to be avoided; calls on the court to examine the unit cost approach piloted by the agency , particularly with a view to cooperation required by member states , and inform the discharge authority if this approach is indeed not suited for heavy equipment;


### 4. recalls the finding of the court of auditors (the ‘court’) regarding financing agreements that reimbursements were still based on actual costs instead of on unit costs , and the associated issues identified with supporting evidence; recalls that this issue was also identified in the discharge for 2018; notes from the agency’s follow-up report that the agency has piloted the unit cost approach for heavy equipment and an analysis was made on the use of unit costs for the deployment of human resources and light technical equipment; notes that the pilot projects for heavy equipment revealed that the unit cost approach would increase the total costs , as the financial consequences of unpredictable events such as weather conditions , repairs and days needed for transfer of the asset , that are now reimbursable on the basis of presented evidence , would need to be factored into the unit cost; calls on the court the examine the unit cost approach piloted by the agency and inform the discharge authority if this approach is indeed not suited for heavy equipment; ### 4. recalls the finding of the court of auditors (the ‘court’) regarding financing agreements that reimbursements were still based on actual costs instead of on unit costs , and the associated issues identified with supporting evidence; recalls that this issue was also identified in the discharge for 2018; notes from the agency’s follow-up report that the agency has piloted the unit cost approach for heavy equipment with two member states and an analysis was made on the use of unit costs for the deployment of human resources and light technical equipment; notes that in the pilot projects for heavy equipment the unit cost approach increased the total costs , as the financial consequences of unpredictable events such as weather conditions , repairs and days needed for transfer of the asset , that are now reimbursable on the basis of presented evidence , would need to be factored into the unit cost; calls on the court the examine the unit cost approach piloted by the agency and inform the discharge authority if this approach is indeed not suited for heavy equipment;


### 5. notes that regulation (eu) 2019/1896 of the european parliament and of the council2 was adopted on 13 november 2019 and entered into force on 4 december 2019 , with extended mandate and resources including the creation of the standing corps with executive powers; ### 5. notes that regulation (eu) 2019/1896 of the european parliament and of the council2 was adopted on 13 november 2019 and entered into force on 4 december 2019 , with extended mandate and resources including the creation of the standing corps with executive powers; notes that the agency had to implement major internal restructurings and faced the challenge of designing new tasks in order to fulfil the provisions of the new mandate; notes that the agency was faced with an unforeseen reduction in the number of administrators to be employed in 2020 that led to adjustments in the agency’s establishment plan; is concerned by the length of the ongoing discussion between the agency and the commission concerning those adjustments; calls on the commission and the agency to quickly find an adequate solution to ensure a proper and timely implementation of the agency's new mandate;


### 5. reiterates its call on the agency to review its mechanisms concerning the construction payments and to ensure compliance with the principles of sound financial management; ### 5. takes note of the agency's reply to the discharge authority on the review of its mechanisms concerning the construction payments and the call to ensure compliance with the principles of sound financial management; acknowledges that the agency reported that a mechanism to prevent unchecked pre-financing payments has been implemented throughout the financial circuit; notes that the agency ensured that all project managers , operational and financial actors dealing with hq facilities have been instructed not to approve and not to launch such payments and that financial verifiers have been instructed to reject such payments and advise the authorising officers to reject as well;


### 10. notes that the commission and the agency accepted or partially accepted , all recommendations of the court and calls on the budgetary authority to look into the possibility to put a part of the agency’s future budget appropriations in a reserve that can be made available when milestones in the implementation of the court’s recommendations are met; ### 10. notes that the commission and the agency accepted or partially accepted , all recommendations of the court;


### 10. notes that the commission and the agency accepted or partially accepted , all recommendations of the court and calls on the budgetary authority to look into the possibility to put a part of the agency’s future budget appropriations in a reserve that can be made available when milestones in the implementation of the court’s recommendations are met; ### 10. notes that the commission and the agency accepted or partially accepted , all recommendations of the court and calls on the budgetary authority to look into the possibility to put a part of the agency’s future budget appropriations in a reserve that can be made available when the following conditions are met:


### 11. recalls the confirmation of the european anti-fraud office (‘olaf’) of an ongoing olaf investigation involving the agency; reiterates its call on the agency to fully cooperate with olaf and to keep the discharge authority informed on any developments; ### 11. recalls the confirmation of the european anti-fraud office (‘olaf’) of an ongoing olaf investigation involving the agency; reiterates its call on the agency to continue to fully cooperate with olaf and to keep the discharge authority informed on any developments; underlines that the report has not been finalised yet and that conclusions should not be drawn prematurely for the financial year 2019;


### 13. acknowledges the agency’s existing measures and ongoing efforts to secure transparency , prevention and management of conflicts of interest , and whistleblower protection; notes that the whistleblowing policy was adopted on 18 july 2019 and entered into force on 1 august 2019; notes that not all management board member cvs and declarations of interest are published on the agency’s website; calls on the agency , with the aim of increasing transparency , to publish the cvs and declarations of interest for all members of its management board , the executive director , and the deputy executive director; ### 13. notes the deficiency of the agency’s existing measures and ongoing efforts to secure transparency , prevention and management of conflicts of interest , and whistleblower protection; notes that the whistleblowing policy was adopted on 18 july 2019 and entered into force on 1 august 2019; notes that not all management board member cvs and declarations of interest are published on the agency’s website; calls on the agency , with the aim of increasing transparency , to publish the cvs and declarations of interest for all members of its management board , the executive director , and the deputy executive director;


### 13. recalls the establishment of the frontex scrutiny working group by parliament’s committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs; notes that the frontex scrutiny working group published its report on the fact-finding investigation on frontex concerning alleged fundamental rights violations on 14 july 2021; notes that the frontex scrutiny working group found no proof of the agency’s involvement in alleged illegal pushbacks; ### 13. recalls the establishment of the frontex scrutiny working group (fswg) by parliament’s committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs; notes that the fswg published its report on the fact-finding investigation on frontex concerning alleged fundamental rights violations on 14 july 2021; notes that the fswg did not find conclusive evidence on the direct performance of pushbacks and/or collective expulsions by frontex , but concluded that frontex found evidence supporting allegations of fundamental rights violations in member states with which it had a joint operation , but failed to adequately address these violations; notes that the fswg found deficiencies in frontex’s mechanisms to monitor , report and assess fundamental rights situations and developments and deficiencies in cooperation with member states; highlights the concern of the fswg over the lack of cooperation of the executive director to ensure compliance with the fundamental rights provisions of the regulation (eu) 2019/1896; calls on the agency to act on the recommendations of the fswg without delay;


### 13. recalls the establishment of the frontex scrutiny working group by parliament’s committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs; notes that the frontex scrutiny working group published its report on the fact-finding investigation on frontex concerning alleged fundamental rights violations on 14 july 2021; notes that the frontex scrutiny working group found no proof of the agency’s involvement in alleged illegal pushbacks; ### 13. recalls the establishment of the frontex scrutiny working group by parliament’s committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs; notes that the frontex scrutiny working group published its report on the fact-finding investigation on frontex concerning alleged fundamental rights violations on 14 july 2021; notes that the frontex scrutiny working group found no proof of the agency’s involvement in alleged illegal pushbacks; notes that the frontex scrutiny working group identified gaps in the framework of cooperation with member states , which may hamper the fulfilment of frontex’s fundamental rights obligations , and highlighted the responsibility of the member states and the commission , also outside their role in the management board; emphasises that the agency's staff needs legal clarity , particularly during high-risk missions at sea and that the commission and the member states need to ensure legal standards and clarity on the implementation of the regulation (eu) 2019/1896 regarding various situations during missions;


### 6. notes the court’s special report 08/2021 entitled ‘frontex’s support to external border management: not sufficiently effective to date’; notes the court’s conclusion that the agency’s support to member states and schengen associated countries in fighting against illegal immigration and cross-border crime is not sufficiently effective and that the agency has not fully implemented its mandate under regulation (eu) 2016/16243 ; notes further that the court highlighted risks related to the agency’s mandate under regulation (eu) 2019/18964 ; ### 6. notes the court’s special report 08/2021 entitled ‘frontex’s support to external border management: not sufficiently effective to date’; notes the court’s conclusion that the agency’s support to member states and schengen associated countries in fighting against illegal immigration and cross-border crime is not sufficiently effective and that the agency has not fully implemented its mandate under regulation (eu) 2016/16243since it has not taken the measures necessary to adapt its organisation to address that mandate; notes further that the court highlighted significant risks related to the agency’s mandate under regulation (eu) 2019/18964 ;


### 6. notes the court’s special report 08/2021 entitled ‘frontex’s support to external border management: not sufficiently effective to date’; notes the court’s conclusion that the agency’s support to member states and schengen associated countries in fighting against illegal immigration and cross-border crime is not sufficiently effective and that the agency has not fully implemented its mandate under regulation (eu) 2016/16243 ; notes further that the court highlighted risks related to the agency’s mandate under regulation (eu) 2019/18964 ; ### 6. notes the court’s special report 08/2021 entitled ‘frontex’s support to external border management: not sufficiently effective to date’; notes the court’s conclusion that the agency’s support to member states and schengen associated countries in fighting against illegal immigration and cross-border crime is not sufficiently effective and that the agency has not fully implemented its mandate under regulation (eu) 2016/16243 ; notes further that the court highlighted risks related to the agency’s mandate under regulation (eu) 2019/18964; reminds that the agency’s mandates from 2016 and 2019 partially overlap , which contributed to the risks to the implementation of the mandate identified by the court;


### 7. notes the court’s conclusion that although a functional information exchange framework is in place to support the fight against illegal immigration , it did not function well enough to provide accurate , complete and up-to-date situational awareness of the union’s external borders; notes that the agency dispatches timely and relevant migration information about the situation at the external borders and provides information about specific events; notes , however , some drawbacks as far as external border control is concerned , such as the lack of information , technical standards for border control equipment , a common catalogue for cross-border crime reporting , and near-real-time information about the situation at the union’s air borders , and delays in updating the common integrated risk analysis model; ### 7. notes the court’s conclusion that although a functional information exchange framework is in place to support the fight against illegal immigration , it did not function well enough to provide accurate , complete and up-to-date situational awareness of the union’s external borders; notes that the agency dispatches timely and relevant migration information about the situation at the external borders and provides information about specific events; notes , however , some drawbacks as far as external border control is concerned , such as the lack of information , technical standards for border control equipment , a common catalogue for cross-border crime reporting , and near-real-time information about the situation at the union’s air borders , and delays in updating the common integrated risk analysis model; underlines that the latter observation cannot be solely attributed to the agency , but needs to be remedied jointly with member states and the commission;


### 7. notes the court’s conclusion that although a functional information exchange framework is in place to support the fight against illegal immigration , it did not function well enough to provide accurate , complete and up-to-date situational awareness of the union’s external borders; notes that the agency dispatches timely and relevant migration information about the situation at the external borders and provides information about specific events; notes , however , some drawbacks as far as external border control is concerned , such as the lack of information , technical standards for border control equipment , a common catalogue for cross-border crime reporting , and near-real-time information about the situation at the union’s air borders , and delays in updating the common integrated risk analysis model; ### 7. notes the court’s conclusion that although a functional information exchange framework is in place to support the fight against illegal immigration , it did not function well enough to provide accurate , complete and up-to-date situational awareness of the union’s external borders; notes that the agency dispatches timely and relevant migration information about the situation at the external borders and provides information about specific events; is concerned , however , by serious drawbacks undermining complete situational awareness at the union external border , such as the lack of information , technical standards for border control equipment , a common catalogue for cross-border crime reporting , and near-real-time information about the situation at the union’s air borders , and delays in updating the common integrated risk analysis model;


### 14. notes that the agency’s fundamental rights officer took office on 1 june 2021; notes the statements of the agency’s executive director that the recruitment of a first batch of 20 fundamental rights monitors is completed , with the fundamental rights monitors starting their training from 1 june 2021 , and that the appointment of a second batch of 20 fundamental rights monitors is ongoing; further notes the statement that of those 20 fundamental right monitors , five have been appointed at ad level and fifteen at ast level; reiterates that regulation (eu) 2019/1896 provides for the recruitment of at least 40 fundamental rights monitors and insists that the agency swiftly appoints the remaining 20 fundamental rights monitors; notes the agency’s statement that those remaining 20 fundamental rights monitors will be recruited from an established ad 7 reserve list , once additional ad7 posts have been allocated to the agency; ### 14. strongly disapproves of the delay in appointing the fundamental rights officers and the fundamental rights monitors , especially in light of the extension of the cabinet of the executive management of frontex; notes that the agency’s fundamental rights officer took office on 1 june 2021; notes the statements of the agency’s executive director that the recruitment of a first batch of 20 fundamental rights monitors is completed , with the fundamental rights monitors starting their training from 1 june 2021 , and that the appointment of a second batch of 20 fundamental rights monitors is ongoing; further notes the statement that of those 20 fundamental right monitors , five have been appointed at ad level and fifteen at ast level; is concerned that this lower ranking might affect the effectiveness of the monitors; reiterates that regulation (eu) 2019/1896 provides for the recruitment of at least 40 fundamental rights monitors by 5 december 2020; is deeply concerned that this obligation remains unfulfilled and insists that the agency swiftly appoints the remaining 20 fundamental rights monitors at ad grade; notes the agency’s statement that those remaining 20 fundamental rights monitors will be recruited from an established ad 7 reserve list , once additional ad7 posts have been allocated to the agency;


### 14. notes that the agency’s fundamental rights officer took office on 1 june 2021; notes the statements of the agency’s executive director that the recruitment of a first batch of 20 fundamental rights monitors is completed , with the fundamental rights monitors starting their training from 1 june 2021 , and that the appointment of a second batch of 20 fundamental rights monitors is ongoing; further notes the statement that of those 20 fundamental right monitors , five have been appointed at ad level and fifteen at ast level; reiterates that regulation (eu) 2019/1896 provides for the recruitment of at least 40 fundamental rights monitors and insists that the agency swiftly appoints the remaining 20 fundamental rights monitors; notes the agency’s statement that those remaining 20 fundamental rights monitors will be recruited from an established ad 7 reserve list , once additional ad7 posts have been allocated to the agency; ### 14. notes that the agency’s fundamental rights officer took office on 1 june 2021; underlines that the agency’s establishment plan was cut from 377 ad posts to 275 ad posts in 2020; acknowledges that this has had an effect on the whole personnel structure including the recruitment of the 40 fundamental rights monitors; notes the statements of the agency’s executive director that the recruitment of a first batch of 20 fundamental rights monitors is completed , with the fundamental rights monitors starting their training from 1 june 2021 , and that the appointment of a second batch of 20 fundamental rights monitors is ongoing; further notes the statement that of those 20 fundamental right monitors , five have been appointed at ad 7 level and fifteen at ast 4 level; reiterates that regulation (eu) 2019/1896 provides for the recruitment of at least 40 fundamental rights monitors and insists that the agency swiftly appoints the remaining 20 fundamental rights monitors; notes the agency’s statement that those remaining 20 fundamental rights monitors will be recruited from an established ad 7 reserve list , once additional ad7 posts have been allocated to the agency; recalls that the correction coefficient for staff in warsaw , poland , was 71.1 for 2019; acknowledges that lower salaries can have a negative impact on european applicants , and may contribute to frontex’ general difficulties in recruiting;


### 1. reiterates that the application of the rule of law conditionality regulation cannot be subject to the adoption of guidelines , and urges the commission to avoid any further delay in its application; ### 1. reiterates that the legal effectiveness of the rule of law conditionality regulation , as of 1 january 2021 , cannot be subject to the adoption of guidelines , and calls on the commission to publish these guidelines as soon as possible in view of avoiding any further delay in its application in terms of concrete actions; urges the commission to immediately start preliminary investigations on any potential individual or systemic breach of the principles of the rule of law in the member states that affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the union budget , or the protection of the financial interests of the union in a sufficiently direct way.


### 1. takes note of the commission’s intention to develop guidelines for the application of the regulation; reiterates once again its view that the text of the regulation is clear and does not require any additional interpretation in order to be applied; ### 1. takes note of the commission’s intention to develop guidelines for the application of the regulation; reiterates once again its view that the text of the regulation is clear and does not require any additional interpretation in order to be applied; acknowledges that methodological standards should be clarified in a timely manner;


### 2. highlights that guidelines are not legally binding; notes that the commission is deviating from its usual practice of drafting guidelines for the application of a legal act only in cases where the actual implementation of the act over a certain period of time shows the need for guidance; ### 2. highlights that guidelines are not legally binding; notes that the commission is deviating from its usual practice of drafting guidelines for the application of a legal act only in cases where the actual implementation of the act over a certain period of time shows the need for guidance; is concerned that breaches in some member states are already fully advanced , therefore strongly urges the commission to swiftly take all necessary preparations and actions without any undue delay;


### 4. urges the commission to avoid any further delay in the application of the regulation and to investigate swiftly and thoroughly any potential breaches of the principles of the rule of law in the member states that affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the union in a sufficiently direct way; reiterates that the situation in some member states already warrants immediate investigation under the regulation; ### 4. urges the commission to avoid any delay in the application of the regulation and to investigate swiftly and thoroughly any potential breaches of the principles of the rule of law in the member states that affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the union in a sufficiently direct way; reiterates that the situation in some member states already warrants immediate investigation under the regulation;


### 5. asks the commission to report to parliament on a quarterly or semi-annual basis regarding new and ongoing cases under investigation , starting as soon as possible with the first cases; ### 5. asks the commission to report to parliament on a quarterly or semi-annual basis regarding new and ongoing cases under investigation , starting as soon as possible with the first cases; calls on the commission to start its reporting on the first cases under investigation to parliament by october 2021 the latest;


### 7. draws particular attention to the list of indicative breaches of the principles of the rule of law laid down in article 3 of the regulation; calls on the commission to investigate potential occurrences of the breaches included in that list in the member states , while pointing out that other practices or omissions by public authorities may also be relevant; ### 7. draws particular attention to the list of indicative breaches of the principles of the rule of law laid down in article 3 of the regulation; calls on the commission to investigate potential occurrences of the breaches included in that list in the member states , while pointing out that other practices or omissions by public authorities may also be relevant; notes that the commission’s annual rule of law report from 2020 already contains indications of breaches in several member states that may be relevant for triggering the regulation;


### 8. recalls that identification of breaches of the principles of the rule of law requires objective , impartial , fair and thorough qualitative assessment by the commission , taking into account relevant information from available sources and recognised institutions; ### 8. recalls that identification of breaches of the principles of the rule of law requires objective , impartial , fair and thorough qualitative assessment by the commission , taking into account relevant information from available sources and recognised institutions , including specifically the parliament; calls on the commission to provide information on how it will collect , analyse and evaluate this information when building cases;


### 11. recalls that measures under the regulation are necessary in particular in cases where other procedures set out in sector-specific or financial legislation would not allow the union budget to be protected more effectively; stresses that this does not mean that the regulation is to be considered as a ‘last resort’ , but rather that the commission can use a wide range of procedures to protect the union’s financial interests , to be chosen on a case-by-case basis depending on their efficiency and effectiveness; ### 11. recalls that measures under the regulation are necessary in particular in cases where other procedures set out in sector-specific or financial legislation would not allow the union budget to be protected more effectively; stresses that this does not mean that the regulation is to be considered as a ‘last resort’ , but rather that the commission can use a wide range of procedures to protect the union’s financial interests , to be chosen on a case-by-case basis depending on their efficiency and effectiveness; calls on the commission to explain the modus operandi as well as procedural and technical standards regarding the examination procedure to determine in which circumstances the general regime of conditionality will be applied when sector specific measures or measures laid down in the financial regulation have proven to be of no avail;


### 13. underlines that ‘systemic’ breaches , for instance those affecting the functioning of the justice system , the independence of judges or the neutrality of public authorities , have in general a clear indirect impact on the proper management , spending and control of union funds; ### 13. underlines that ‘systemic’ breaches , for instance those affecting the functioning of the justice system , the independence of judges or the neutrality of public authorities , have in general a clear indirect impact on the proper management , spending and control of union funds; calls on the commission to clarify how it will select and determine the measures in cases of systemic breaches;


### 15. recalls that the council is bound to act upon any proposal of the commission to adopt appropriate measures under the regulation within a period of one month , which may be extended by a maximum of two additional months in exceptional circumstances; ### 15. recalls that the council is bound to act upon any proposal of the commission to adopt appropriate measures under the regulation within a period of one month , which may be extended by a maximum of two additional months in exceptional circumstances; calls on the commission to provide information on how it will ensure a harmonised approach and coherent application of the budget conditionality across all its directorates-general;


### 17. recalls that , unless the decision adopting the measures states otherwise , the imposition of appropriate measures under the regulation does not affect the obligations of member states towards final recipients or beneficiaries , including the obligation to make payments; ### 17. recalls that , unless the decision adopting the measures states otherwise , the imposition of appropriate measures under the regulation does not affect the obligations of member states towards legitimate final recipients or beneficiaries , including the obligation to make payments;


### 18. calls on the commission to implement article 5(4) of the regulation and swiftly set up a website or internet portal with information and guidance for the benefit of final recipients or beneficiaries and with adequate tools for them to inform the commission about any breach of the legal obligation to continue making payments after measures pursuant to this regulation are adopted , such as a simple and structured complaint form; ### 18. calls on the commission to implement article 5(4) of the regulation and swiftly set up a website or internet portal with information and guidance for the benefit of final recipients or beneficiaries and with adequate tools for them to inform the commission about any breach of the legal obligation to continue making payments after measures pursuant to this regulation are adopted , such as a simple and structured complaint form; calls on the commission to explain how it will implement an efficient and effective compliant mechanism for applicants , recipients and beneficiaries;


### 19. stresses that , in shared management , measures under the regulation cannot be considered to affect the availability of funding for payments to beneficiaries; recalls also that member states concerned by those measures must regularly report to the commission on compliance with their obligations towards final recipients or beneficiaries; ### 19. stresses that , in shared management , measures under the regulation cannot be considered to affect the availability of funding for payments to legitimate beneficiaries; recalls also that member states concerned by those measures must regularly report to the commission on compliance with their obligations towards legitimate final recipients or beneficiaries;


### 20. calls on the commission to analyse all information at its disposal and do its utmost to ensure that any amount due from government entities or member states is in fact paid to final recipients or beneficiaries , which may entail recovering payments that have been made or making financial corrections by reducing union support to programmes in line with applicable sector-specific and financial rules; ### 20. calls on the commission to analyse all information at its disposal , including the use of all digital tracking tools , and do its utmost to ensure that any amount due from government entities or member states is in fact paid to legitimate final recipients or beneficiaries , which may entail recovering payments that have been made or making financial corrections by reducing union support to programmes in line with applicable sector-specific and financial rules;


### d. whereas the existence of cbi/rbi schemes affects all member states; whereas the operation of a cbi/rbi scheme by an individual member state thus generates significant externalities on other member states; whereas those externalities warrant regulation by the union; ### d. whereas the existence of cbi/rbi schemes affects all member states; whereas the operation of a cbi/rbi scheme by an individual member state may generate adverse externalities on other member states; whereas those externalities warrant regulation by the union;


### g. whereas the operation of cbi schemes lead to the commodification of union citizenship; whereas such commodification of rights is not compatible with union values , in particular equality; ### g. whereas the operation of cbi schemes lead to the commodification of union citizenship; whereas such commodification of rights violates union values , in particular equality;


### i. whereas bulgaria , cyprus , estonia , greece , ireland , italy , latvia , luxembourg , malta , the netherlands , portugal and spain currently operate rbi schemes with minimum investment levels ranging from eur 60 000 (latvia) to eur 1 250 000 (the netherlands); ### i. whereas bulgaria , cyprus , estonia , greece , ireland , italy , latvia , luxembourg , malta , the netherlands , portugal and spain currently operate rbi schemes with minimum investment levels ranging from eur 60 000 (latvia) to eur 1 250 000 (the netherlands); whereas attracting investment is a natural and vital method of maintaining well functioning economies of member states , but as such should not pose legal and security risks to union citizens;


### m. whereas cbi/rbi schemes pose a wide range of risks that include corruption , money laundering , security threats and tax avoidance; whereas those risks cannot be properly assessed because of a lack of transparency and are currently not sufficiently managed , resulting in weak vetting and a lack of due diligence with respect to applicants under cbi/rbi schemes in member states; ### m. whereas cbi/rbi schemes may pose a wide range of risks that include corruption , money laundering , security threats and tax avoidance; whereas those risks are currently not sufficiently managed , resulting in weak vetting and a lack of due diligence with respect to applicants under cbi/rbi schemes in member states; whereas all the resulting risks should be properly assessed , and transparency with regard to the implementation and consequences of the schemes should be increased;


### n. whereas cbi/rbi schemes tend to be located in member states that are particularly prone to risks related to financial secrecy , such as tax avoidance and money laundering , and corruption; whereas financial secrecy impedes the transparency of cbi/rbi schemes and disrupts trust among member states; ### n. whereas some cbi/rbi schemes are located in member states that are particularly prone to risks related to financial secrecy , such as tax avoidance and money laundering , and corruption; whereas financial secrecy impedes the transparency of cbi/rbi schemes and disrupts trust among member states;


### 1. considers that schemes granting nationality or residence primarily on the basis of a financial investment (cbi/rbi schemes) , also known as ‘golden passports’ or ‘golden visas’ , are objectionable from an ethical and legal point of view; ### 1. considers that schemes granting nationality primarily on the basis of a financial investment , also known as ‘golden passports’ pose several serious legal and security risks for union citizens;


### 6. believes that the advantageous conditions and fast-track procedures set for investors under cbi/rbi schemes , when compared to the conditions and procedures for other third-country nationals wishing to obtain international protection , residence or citizenship , are discriminatory , lack fairness and undermine the integrity of the union asylum and migration acquis; ### 6. believes that the advantageous conditions and fast-track procedures set for investors under cbi/rbi schemes , when compared to the conditions and procedures for other third-country nationals wishing to obtain international protection , residence or citizenship could contribute to undermining the integrity of the union asylum and migration acquis;


### 9. considers that the role of intermediaries in developing and promoting cbi/rbi schemes , as well as in preparing individual applications , often in the absence of transparency or accountability , represents a conflict of interest prone to abuse and therefore requires a strict and binding regulation of such intermediaries , beyond mere self-regulation and codes of conduct; ### 9. considers that the role of intermediaries in developing and promoting rbi schemes , as well as in preparing individual applications , often in the absence of transparency or accountability , represents a potential conflict of interest and therefore requires a strict framework for such intermediaries , beyond mere self-regulation and codes of conduct; asks for the cessation of the services of intermediaries in case of cbi schemes;


### 10. deplores the lack of comprehensive security checks , vetting procedures and due diligence in member states that have cbi/rbi schemes in place; regrets that member states do not always consult the available union databases and do not exchange information on the outcome of such checks and procedures , allowing for successive applications across the union; ### 10. deplores the lack of comprehensive security checks , vetting procedures and due diligence in member states that have cbi/rbi schemes in place; calls on the member states to consult the available union databases and to exchange information on the outcome of such checks and procedures in order to prevent successive applications for cbi/rbi schemes across the union;


### 11. regrets that the group of experts on investor citizenship and residence schemes , composed of member state representatives , has not agreed on a common set of security checks as it was mandated to do by the end of 2019; finds that that shows the limits of adopting an intergovernmental approach as regards the matter and underlines the need for union action; ### 11. regrets that the group of experts on investor citizenship and residence schemes , composed of member state representatives , has not agreed on a common set of security checks as it was mandated to do by the end of 2019;


### 13. is concerned that where continuous and effective physical residence is not enforced by member states , third-country nationals could obtain long-term residence status under the long-term residence directive without five years of continuous and legal residence , which is a requirement under that directive; ### 13. calls on the member states to effectively enforce the necessary physical residence for third-country nationals wishing to obtain long-term residence status under the long-term residence directive;


### 15. considers that union anti-money laundering law is a crucial element to counter the risks posed by cbi/rbi schemes; welcomes the fact that the commission’s package of legislative proposals of 20 july 2021 on anti-money laundering and on countering the financing of terrorism addresses rbi schemes , most notably by promoting the inclusion of intermediaries on the list of obliged entities; considers , however , that gaps will still remain , such as the fact that public entities that process cbi/rbi applications will not be included on the list of obliged entities; ### 15. considers that union anti-money laundering law is a crucial element to counter the risks posed by cbi/rbi schemes; welcomes the fact that the commission’s package of legislative proposals of 20 july 2021 on anti-money laundering and on countering the financing of terrorism addresses rbi schemes , most notably by promoting the inclusion of intermediaries on the list of obliged entities;


### 17. notes that a risk stems from third countries that have cbi schemes and that benefit from visa-free travel to the union19 because third-country nationals can purchase citizenship of that third country with the sole purpose of being able to enter the union without any additional screening; stresses that risks are exacerbated for union candidate countries that have cbi/rbi schemes20 because the expected benefits of future union membership may be a factor; ### 17. notes that a risk stems from third countries that have cbi schemes and that benefit from visa-free travel to the union19 because third-country nationals can purchase citizenship of that third country with the sole purpose of being able to enter the union without any additional screening; stresses that risks are exacerbated for union candidate countries that have cbi/rbi schemes20 because the expected benefits of future union membership may be a factor; in this regard , welcomes the decision of the montenegrin government to discontinue its investor citizenship scheme and underlines the importance of phasing out the investor citizenship scheme in montenegro fully and effectively as soon as possible;


### 19. believes that , as cbi/rbi schemes constitute free riding and produce severe consequences for the union and the member states , a financial contribution to the union budget is warranted , also as a concrete expression of solidarity following from , inter alia , article 80 tfeu; requests , therefore , that the commission , in 2022 , on the basis of article 311 tfeu , submit a proposal for the establishment of a new category of the union’s own resources , consisting of a ‘cbi & rbi adjustment mechanism’ that would place a levy of 50 % on the investments made in member states as part of cbi/rbi schemes; ### 19. believes that , as cbi/rbi schemes produce serious consequences for the union and the member states , a financial contribution to the union budget could be warranted , also as a concrete expression of solidarity following from , inter alia , article 80 tfeu; asks the commission to consider a proposal for the establishment of a new category of the union’s own resources , consisting of a mechanism that would place a levy on the investments made in member states as part of cbi/rbi schemes;


### 20. considers that the contribution of the cbi/rbi schemes to the member states’ real economy is limited and does not sufficiently add to job creation and growth because considerable amounts of investment are made directly into the real estate market or into funds; considers that the large investments associated with cbi/rbi schemes could impact financial stability , particularly in small member states where inflows could represent a large share of gdp or foreign investment21 ; requests that the commission submit , in 2022 , on the basis of article 79(2) and articles 80 , 82 , 87 and 114 tfeu , a proposal for an act that would include union-level rules on investments under rbi schemes in order to strengthen their added value to the real economy and provide links to the priorities for the economic recovery of the union; ### 20. considers that the cbi/rbi schemes should seek to bring greater and measurable added value to the member states’ economy in terms of job creation , innovation and growth; considers that the large investments associated with cbi/rbi schemes could impact financial stability , particularly in small member states where inflows could represent a large share of gdp or foreign investment21 ;


### 21. requests that the commission submit , in 2022 , on the basis of article 79(2) and articles 80 , 82 , 87 and 114 tfeu a proposal for an act that would comprehensively regulate various aspects of rbi schemes with the aim of harmonising standards and procedures and strengthening the fight against organised crime , money laundering , corruption and tax evasion , covering , inter alia , the following elements: ### 21. asks that the commission submit , in 2022 , on the basis of article 79(2) and articles 80 , 82 , 87 and 114 tfeu a proposal for an act that would comprehensively regulate various aspects of rbi schemes with the aim of harmonising standards and procedures and strengthening the fight against organised crime , money laundering , corruption and tax evasion , covering , inter alia , the following elements:


### increased due diligence and rigorous background checks; ### increased due diligence and rigorous background checks , including of the family members of applicants;


### the regulation and limitation of the activities of intermediaries; ### the regulation and limitation of the activities of intermediaries and , in the case of cbi schemes , the cessation of their services;


### 22. requests that the commission include in its proposal targeted revisions of existing union legal acts that could help to dissuade member states from establishing harmful rbi schemes , such as further strengthening legal acts in the field of anti-money laundering , and targeted changes to the long-term residence directive; ### 22. asks the commission to help to dissuade member states from establishing harmful rbi schemes by strengthening legal acts in the field of anti-money laundering and in the long-term residence directive;


### 23. requests that the commission exert as much pressure as possible to ensure that third countries that have cbi/rbi schemes in place and that benefit from visa free travel under annex ii to regulation (eu) 2018/1806 abolish their cbi schemes and reform their rbi schemes to bring them in line with union law and standards and that the commission submit , in 2022 , on the basis of article 77(2) , point (a) , tfeu , a proposal for an act that would amend regulation (eu) 2018/1806 in that regard; requests that specific attention in that regard be paid to candidate countries and proposes that it be included in the accession criteria; ### 23. urges the commission to ensure that third countries that have cbi/rbi schemes in place and that benefit from visa free travel under annex ii to regulation (eu) 2018/1806 abolish their cbi schemes and reform their rbi schemes to bring them in line with union law and standards and that the commission submit , in 2022 , on the basis of article 77(2) , point (a) , tfeu , a proposal for an act that would amend regulation (eu) 2018/1806 in that regard; notes that under the revised union enlargement methodology issues linked to cbi/rbi schemes are considered to be complex and dealt with across various negotiating clusters and chapters; underlines the importance of gradual and diligent alignment to union law applicable to such schemes by candidate and potential candidate countries; stresses that continuous monitoring under the visa liberalisation process is key;


### 24. reminds the commission president of her commitment to parliament’s right of initiative and of her pledge to follow up on parliament’s own-initiative legislative reports , contained in the political guidelines for the next european commission 2019-2024; expects , therefore , the commission to follow up on this resolution with concrete legislative proposals; ### 24. reminds the commission of the repeated commitment to follow up on parliament’s own-initiative legislative reports , contained in the political guidelines for the next european commission 2019-2024;


### 25. considers that any financial implications of the requested proposals will be positive; ### deleted


### — a union-wide notification and quota system for the maximum number of citizenships to be acquired under cbi schemes across the member states should be established with the number to be gradually lowered each year , reaching zero in 2025 , thereby leading to the complete phasing out of cbi schemes. such a gradual phasing out will allow those member states maintaining cbi schemes to find alternative means to attract investment and sustain their public finances. such a phasing out is in line with the previous position of parliament expressed in several resolutions and is necessary in light of the profound challenge that cbi schemes pose to the principle of sincere cooperation under the treaties (article 4(3) teu). ### — a union-wide monitoring system for the number of citizenships to be acquired under cbi schemes across the member states should be established with the numbers to be gradually lowered each year , reaching zero in 2025 , thereby leading to the complete phasing out of cbi schemes. such a gradual phasing out will allow those member states maintaining cbi schemes to find alternative means to attract investment and sustain their public finances. such a phasing out is in line with the previous position of parliament expressed in several resolutions and is necessary in light of the profound challenge that cbi schemes pose to the principle of sincere cooperation under the treaties (article 4(3) teu).


### proposal 2: a comprehensive regulation covering all rbi schemes in the union ### proposal 2: a comprehensive legal framework covering all rbi schemes in the union


### — to address the specificities and widespread occurrence of rbi schemes across the member states , a dedicated union legal framework in the form of a regulation is necessary. such a regulation will ensure union harmonisation , limit the risks posed by rbi schemes and make rbi schemes subject to union monitoring , thereby enhancing transparency and governance. the regulation is also meant to discourage member states from establishing harmful rbi schemes. ### — to address the specificities and widespread occurrence of rbi schemes across the member states , a dedicated union legal framework is needed. such a legal framework will ensure proper data and information collection on rbi schemes , limit the risks posed by rbi schemes and make rbi schemes subject to union monitoring , thereby enhancing transparency and governance. that legal framework is also meant to discourage member states from establishing harmful rbi schemes.


### — the regulation should contain union-level standards and procedures for increased due diligence and rigorous background checks for applicants. a proposal for a regulation is more than warranted , especially in light of the fact that the group of experts on investor citizenship and residence schemes never made any progress as regards those elements. in particular , all applicants must be structurally crosschecked against all relevant national , union (sis , vis , ecris-tcn , etias) and international (interpol) databases by the member state authorities. there should also be an independent verification of documents submitted , a full background check of all police records and involvement in previous and current civil and criminal litigation , in-person interviews with the applicants and a thorough verification of how the applicant’s wealth was accumulated and its relation to the reported income. ### — the legal framework should contain union-level standards and procedures for increased due diligence and rigorous background checks for applicants. in particular , all applicants must be structurally crosschecked against all relevant national and international databases by the member state authorities. there should also be an independent verification of documents submitted , a full background check of all police records and involvement in previous and current civil and criminal litigation and a thorough verification of how the applicant’s wealth was accumulated and its relation to the reported income.


### — an important element of the regulation should be the regulation of intermediaries. the following should be included: ### — an important element of the legal framework should be the requirements for intermediaries. the following should be included:


### a union-level licensing procedure for intermediaries containing a thorough procedure with due diligence and auditing of the intermediary company , its owners and its related companies. the license should be subject to renewal every second year and be featured in a public union register for intermediaries. where intermediaries are involved in applications , member states should only be allowed to process such applications when prepared by union-licensed intermediaries. applications for licensing should be made to the commission , to be supported by the relevant union agencies , in particular the european border and coast guard agency (frontex) and the european union agency for law enforcement cooperation (europol) , in carrying out the checks and procedure. ### a union-level licensing procedure for intermediaries containing a thorough procedure with due diligence and auditing of the intermediary company , its owners and its related companies should be considered. the license should be subject to renewal and be featured in a public union register for intermediaries.


### specific rules for the activities of intermediaries. that should include detailed rules concerning the background checks , due diligence and security checks that the intermediaries are to carry out on applicants , including the obligation for them to contract independent third parties to verify those checks. ### specific rules for the activities of intermediaries. that should include detailed rules concerning the background checks , due diligence and security checks that the intermediaries are to carry out on applicants.


### a union-wide ban on marketing practices for rbi schemes. that should include prohibiting intermediaries processing applications under rbi schemes from using the union flag on any materials , website or documents. ### deleted


### anti-corruption measures to be adopted within the intermediary , including on appropriate staff remuneration , the two-person rule (that every step is checked by at least two persons) and provisions for a second opinion when preparing applications and carrying out checks on applications , and a rotation of staff members across the countries of origin of applicants under rbi schemes. ### anti-corruption measures and best due diligence practices to be followed by the intermediaries;


### a ban on combining the consultation of governments on the establishment and maintenance of rbi schemes with their involvement in the preparation of applications. such a combination creates a conflict of interest and provides the wrong incentives. consequently , a ban on public affairs lobbying or consulting is required for intermediaries and for affiliated industry representation organisations. furthermore , intermediaries should not be allowed themselves to implement rbi schemes for member state authorities. intermediaries should only be allowed to act as intermediaries in individual applications and only when being approached by individual applicants. ### clear and transparent rules on combining the consultation of governments on the establishment and maintenance of rbi schemes with their involvement in the preparation of applications. such a combination may create a conflict of interest and provide the wrong incentives. consequently , a regulation on public affairs lobbying or consulting is required for intermediaries and for affiliated industry representation organisations.