### 10. notes with concern that , according to the court’s report , mistakes in procurement and contract management were made , that the centre accepted the change in the execution of a contract without properly documenting whether the alternative proposed by the contractor was at least equivalent to the solution proposed in the tender and that the centre did not amend the framework contract concluded with that contractor in order to include such change; ### 10. notes with concern that , according to the court’s report , mistakes in procurement and contract management were made , that the centre accepted the change in the execution of a contract without properly documenting whether the alternative proposed by the contractor was at least equivalent to the solution proposed in the tender and that the centre did not amend the framework contract concluded with that contractor in order to include such change; notes that the centre formalised its guidelines on contract management to complement the training given to contract managers , the workflow and the controls in place;


### 4. notes with concern that the berec office does not share resources with other agencies , due to its limited own resources as stated by the berec office; notes with concern that the berec office has not been able to find a partner for the provision of the internal control coordinator and security officer functions; notes that the berec office started a joint project , signed in 2019 , for sharing it infrastructure with several joint undertakings; ### 4. notes with concern that the berec office does not share resources with other agencies , due to its limited own resources as stated by the berec office; notes with concern that the berec office has not been able to find a partner for the provision of the internal control coordinator and security officer functions; notes that the berec office started a joint project , signed in 2019 , for sharing it infrastructure with several joint undertakings; welcomes that joint project and urges the berec office to further explore possible ways of outsourcing its tasks and collaborating on overlapping tasks with other union agencies , offices and bodies;


### c. whereas the sustainable development goals (sdgs) are core objectives to be pursued in cooperation instruments; ### c. whereas the sustainable development goals (sdgs) are core objectives to be pursued in cooperation instruments in both the public and private sector;


### e. whereas the alignment of union development cooperation with partner countries’ own development priorities is a key element of the 2030 agenda for sustainable development; ### e. whereas the alignment of union development cooperation with partner countries’ own development priorities is a key element of the 2030 agenda for sustainable development; whereas cultural and linguistic affinities between member states and partner countries may encourage adherence to the sdgs set out in the 2030 agenda;


### f. whereas policy coherence and complementarity of various external policies should be carefully looked at , especially when several policies are being implemented in a single partner country , with the view to promoting synergies and trade-offs between existing policies and to avoiding as much as possible unnecessary administrative burden; ### f. whereas policy coherence and complementarity of various external policies should be carefully looked at , especially when several policies are being implemented in a single partner country , with the view to promoting cooperation between the public and private sectors , encouraging synergies and trade-offs between existing policies and avoiding as much as possible unnecessary administrative burden;


### effectiveness of the monitoring and assurance systems ### transparency and effectiveness of the monitoring and assurance systems


### 14. notes that the court found that the commission and its implementing partners committed more errors in transactions relating to programme estimates , grants , contribution agreements with international organisations and delegation agreements with member states’ cooperation agencies than they did with other forms of support , such as those covering works , supply and service contracts; notes that of the 65 transactions of that type examined by the court , 25 (38 %) contained quantifiable errors , which accounted for 71 ,7 % of the estimated level of error; calls on the commission to enhance its risk-based approach and invest control capacity in areas that are more error prone; ### 14. notes that the court found that the commission and its implementing partners committed more errors in transactions relating to programme estimates , grants , contribution agreements with international organisations and delegation agreements with member states’ cooperation agencies than they did with other forms of support , such as those covering works , supply and service contracts; notes that of the 65 transactions of that type examined by the court , 25 (38 %) contained quantifiable errors , which accounted for 71 ,7 % of the estimated level of error; calls on the commission to publish comprehensive , updated and detailed information regarding funded projects and recipients , enhance its risk-based approach and invest control capacity in areas that are more error prone;


### 15. notes the court’s observation , as in previous years , that the frequency of identified errors , including some contained in final claims which had been subject to ex-ante external audits and expenditure verifications , points to weaknesses in those checks; notes that this is not only problematic in terms of the effectiveness of the checks but also in terms of the efficiency of the management and control system because the checks performed did not prevent or correct the error; calls on dg intpa to continue efforts to improve the assessment of both effectiveness and efficiency of its control system by identifying key performance indicators for both , to set realistic and ambitious targets and to monitor and improve its control system; ### 15. notes the court’s observation , as in previous years , that the frequency of identified errors , including some contained in final claims which had been subject to ex-ante external audits and expenditure verifications , points to weaknesses in those checks; notes that this is not only problematic in terms of the effectiveness of the checks but also in terms of the efficiency of the management and control system because the checks performed did not prevent or correct the error; calls on dg intpa to continue efforts to improve the assessment of both effectiveness and efficiency of its control system by identifying key performance indicators for both , to set realistic and ambitious targets and to monitor and improve its control system; calls , furthermore , on the commission to set up a platform covering edf-funded projects by country , focusing on the final recipients , general and specific project goals and , above all , their practical results in terms of the desired increase in development indices;


### 27. notes that , in terms of relative contribution to the sdgs , budget support programmes strongly contribute to sdg 16 (peace , justice and governance) , sdg 17 (partnerships) , sdg 5 (gender equality) and sdg 1 (no poverty); welcomes the strong multi-dimensional scope of budget support programmes; ### 27. notes that , in terms of relative contribution to the sdgs , budget support programmes strongly contribute to sdg 16 (peace , justice and governance) , sdg 17 (partnerships) , sdg 5 (gender equality) and sdg 1 (no poverty); welcomes the strong multi-dimensional scope of budget support programmes and considers that they should support entrepreneurship and private initiative in order to leverage economic and social development as advocated in sdg 9 ( build resilient infrastructure , promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation) and 17 (strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development);


### 29. welcomes the results achieved as regards the intention for inclusive public policies to promote shared growth and to help tackle social or geographical disparities (sdg 10) , where statistics indicate that the income share of the bottom 40 % of the population in countries receiving union budget support increased from 15.6 % to 17.4 % of gross national income between 2004 and 2019 , while it decreased slightly in other developing or emerging countries; ### 29. welcomes the results achieved as regards the intention for inclusive public policies to promote shared growth and to help tackle social or geographical disparities (sdg 10) , where statistics indicate that the income share of the bottom 40 % of the population in countries receiving union budget support increased from 15.6 % to 17.4 % of gross national income between 2004 and 2019 , while it decreased slightly in other developing or emerging countries; considers it also essential to raise awareness among local interlocutors about the growing importance of private partners in economic , social and territorial development;


### 32. calls for close monitoring and thorough policy dialogue with partner countries regarding objectives , progress towards agreed results and performance indicators; calls once more on the commission to better define and measure expected development impact and , especially , to improve the control mechanism with regard to the conduct of the beneficiary state in the areas of corruption , respect for human rights , good governance and democracy; remains deeply concerned about the use that could be made of union budget support in recipient countries where there is no or only limited democratic control; ### 32. calls for close monitoring and thorough policy dialogue with partner countries regarding objectives , progress towards agreed results and performance indicators; calls once more on the commission to better define and measure expected development impact and , especially , to improve the control mechanism with regard to the conduct of the beneficiary state in the areas of corruption , respect for human rights , good governance and democracy; stresses the need to include the private sector in this strategic dialogue; remains deeply concerned about the use that could be made of union budget support in recipient countries where there is no or only limited democratic control;


### (2) the system established by regulation (ec) no 182/2011 has , overall , proven to work well in practice and struck an appropriate institutional balance as regards the roles of the commission and the other actors involved. that system should therefore continue to function unchanged except for certain targeted amendments concerning specific aspects of procedure at the level of the appeal committee. these amendments are intended to ensure wider political accountability and ownership of politically sensitive implementing acts without , however , modifying the legal and institutional responsibilities for implementing acts as organised by regulation (eu) no 182/2011. ### (2) while the system established by regulation (ec) no 182/2011 has , overall , proven to work well in practice and struck an appropriate institutional balance as regards the roles of the commission and the other actors involved , it has not effectively provided any concrete added value in the form of a better decision-making process , having encountered a number of regulatory hitches regarding the functioning of the appeal committee. the key components of that system should therefore continue to function unchanged except for certain necessary targeted amendments concerning specific aspects of procedure at the level of the appeal committee. these amendments are intended to ensure wider political accountability and ownership of politically sensitive implementing acts without , however , modifying the legal and institutional responsibilities for implementing acts as organised by regulation (eu) no 182/2011.


### (2) the system established by regulation (ec) no 182/2011 has , overall , proven to work well in practice and struck an appropriate institutional balance as regards the roles of the commission and the other actors involved. that system should therefore continue to function unchanged except for certain targeted amendments concerning specific aspects of procedure at the level of the appeal committee. these amendments are intended to ensure wider political accountability and ownership of politically sensitive implementing acts without , however , modifying the legal and institutional responsibilities for implementing acts as organised by regulation (eu) no 182/2011. ### (2) the system established by regulation (ec) no 182/2011 has , overall , proven to work well in practice and struck an appropriate institutional balance as regards the roles of the commission and the other actors involved , although some minor hitches have been experienced in the workings of the appeal committee. it follows that the key components of that system should therefore continue to function unchanged except for certain targeted amendments concerning specific aspects of procedure at the level of the appeal committee. these amendments are intended to ensure wider political accountability and ownership of politically sensitive implementing acts as well as an evidence-based approach that does not undermine confidence in eu risk assessors or their scientific integrity , without , however , modifying the legal and institutional responsibilities for implementing acts as organised by regulation (eu) no 182/2011.


### (4) experience has shown that , in the vast majority of cases , the appeal committee repeats the outcome of the examination committee and results in no opinion being delivered. the appeal committee has therefore not helped in providing clarity on member state positions. ### (4) experience has shown that , in the vast majority of cases , the appeal committee repeats the outcome of the examination committee and results in no opinion being delivered. the appeal committee has therefore not helped in providing clarity on member state positions and so far has provided only limited added value , leaving the commission to decide on behalf of the member states in a 'no opinion' situation.


### (4) experience has shown that , in the vast majority of cases , the appeal committee repeats the outcome of the examination committee and results in no opinion being delivered. the appeal committee has therefore not helped in providing clarity on member state positions. ### (4) experience has shown that , in the vast majority of cases , the appeal committee repeats the outcome of the examination committee and results in no opinion being delivered. the appeal committee has therefore not helped in providing clarity on member state positions , leaving it to the commission’s discretion to decide on behalf of the member states in a 'no opinion' situation.


### (5) regulation (eu) no 182/2011 provides that the commission may in such cases adopt the draft implementing act , thus giving the commission discretion. ### (5) regulation (eu) no 182/2011 provides that the commission may in such cases adopt the draft implementing act , thus giving the commission discretion regarding the need to ensure the effective implementation of the legislation.


### (5) regulation (eu) no 182/2011 provides that the commission may in such cases adopt the draft implementing act , thus giving the commission discretion. ### (5) regulation (eu) no 182/2011 provides that the commission may in such cases adopt the draft implementing act , thus giving the commission discretion when it comes to ensuring the effective implementation of the legislation.


### (7) while the commission is empowered to decide in such cases , due to the particular sensitivity of the issues at stake , member states should also fully assume their responsibility in the decision-making process. this , however , is not the case when member states are not able to reach a qualified majority , due to , amongst others , a significant number of abstentions or non-appearances at the moment of the vote. ### (7) while the commission is empowered to decide in such cases , due to the particular sensitivity of the issues at stake , member states should also fully assume their responsibility in the decision-making process. this , however , is not the case when member states are not able to reach a qualified majority.


### (8) in order to increase the added value of the appeal committee its role should therefore be strengthened by providing for the possibility of holding a further meeting of the appeal committee whenever no opinion is delivered. the appropriate level of representation at the further meeting of the appeal committee should be ministerial level , to ensure a political discussion. to allow the organisation of such a further meeting the timeframe for the appeal committee to deliver an opinion should be extended. ### (8) in order to increase the added value of the appeal committee its role should therefore be strengthened by providing for the possibility of holding a further high-level meeting of the appeal committee whenever no opinion is delivered. the appropriate level of representation at the further meeting of the appeal committee should therefore be ministerial level , to ensure a political discussion. to allow the organisation of such a further meeting the timeframe for the appeal committee to deliver an opinion should be extended albeit for a reasonable period only.


### (10) the commission should have the possibility , in specific cases , to ask the council to indicate its views and orientation on the wider implications of the absence of an opinion , including the institutional , legal , political and international implications. the commission should take account of any position expressed by the council within 3 months after the referral. in duly justified cases , the commission may indicate a shorter deadline in the referral. ### (10) the commission should have the possibility , in specific cases , to ask the council to indicate its views and orientation on the wider implications of the absence of an opinion , including the institutional , legal , political and international implications. the commission should take account of any position expressed by the council within 3 months after the initial referral. or , failing that no more than one month after the referral. in duly justified cases , the commission may indicate a shorter deadline in the referral.


### (10) the commission should have the possibility , in specific cases , to ask the council to indicate its views and orientation on the wider implications of the absence of an opinion , including the institutional , legal , political and international implications. the commission should take account of any position expressed by the council within 3 months after the referral. in duly justified cases , the commission may indicate a shorter deadline in the referral. ### (10) the commission should have the possibility , in specific cases , to ask the council and parliament to indicate their views and respective orientation on the wider implications of the absence of an opinion , including the institutional , legal , political and international implications. the commission should take account of any position expressed by the co-legislators within 3 months after the referral. in duly justified cases , the commission may indicate a shorter deadline in the referral.


### "where no opinion is delivered in the appeal committee pursuant to the second subparagraph of article 6(3) , the chair may decide that the appeal committee shall hold a further meeting , at ministerial level. in such cases the appeal committee shall deliver its opinion within 3 months of the initial date of referral. "; ### "where no opinion is delivered in the appeal committee pursuant to the second subparagraph of article 6(3) , the chair or a simple majority of the member states may decide that the appeal committee shall hold a further meeting , at ministerial level. in such cases the appeal committee shall deliver its opinion within no more than 3 months of the initial date of referral.";


### "where no opinion is delivered in the appeal committee pursuant to the second subparagraph of article 6(3) , the chair may decide that the appeal committee shall hold a further meeting , at ministerial level. in such cases the appeal committee shall deliver its opinion within 3 months of the initial date of referral. "; ### "where no opinion is delivered in the appeal committee pursuant to the second subparagraph of article 6(3) , the chair or a simple majority of member state representatives may decide that the appeal committee shall hold a further meeting , at ministerial level. in such cases the appeal committee shall deliver its opinion within no more than 3 months of the initial date of referral.";


### "3a. where no opinion is delivered in the appeal committee , the commission may refer the matter to the council for an opinion indicating its views and orientation on the wider implications of the absence of opinion , including the institutional , legal , political and international implications. the commission shall take account of any position expressed by the council within 3 months after the referral. in duly justified cases , the commission may indicate a shorter deadline in the referral. ### "3a. where no opinion is delivered in the appeal committee , the commission may refer the matter to the council for an opinion indicating its views and orientation on the wider implications of the absence of opinion , including the institutional , legal , political and international implications. the commission shall take account of any position expressed by the council within 3 months after the initial referral or , where that is not possible , no more than one month after the referral. in duly justified cases , the commission may indicate a shorter deadline in the referral.


### amendment ### "3a. where no opinion is delivered in the appeal committee , the commission may refer the matter to the council for an opinion indicating its views and orientation on the wider implications of the absence of opinion , including the institutional , legal , political and international implications. the commission shall take account of any position expressed by the council within 3 months after the referral. in duly justified cases , the commission may indicate a shorter deadline in the referral.";


### 3a. where no opinion is delivered in the appeal committee , the commission may refer the matter to the council for an opinion indicating its views and orientation on the wider implications of the absence of opinion , including the institutional , legal , political and international implications. the commission shall take account of any position expressed by the council within 3 months after the referral. in duly justified cases , the commission may indicate a shorter deadline in the referral. ### 3a. where no opinion is delivered in the appeal committee , the commission may refer the matter to the council and parliament for an opinion indicating their views and respective orientation on the wider implications of the absence of opinion , including the institutional , legal , political and international implications. the commission shall take account of any position expressed by the council and parliament within 3 months after the referral. in duly justified cases , the commission may indicate a shorter deadline in the referral.


### “(e) the voting results including , in the case of the appeal committee , the votes expressed by the representative of each member state; ### "(e) the voting results including , in the case of the appeal committee , the votes expressed by the representative of each member state , explanations of vote , abstentions and absences;


### "(e) the voting results including , in the case of the appeal committee , the votes expressed by the representative of each member state; ### "(e) the voting results including , in the case of the appeal committee , the votes expressed by the representative of each member state , explanations of vote , abstentions and absences;


### (2) esap is to be established in accordance with regulation (eu) xxx/xxx of the european parliament and of the council [esap regulation]19in order to enable an easy access to data for decision makers in the economy and society to make sound decisions that serve the efficient functioning of the market. rolling out common european data spaces in crucial sectors , including the financial sector , would serve that purpose. the financial world is expected to undergo a digital transformation in the coming years , and the union should support this , in particular by promoting data-driven finance. furthermore , putting sustainable finance at the heart of the financial system is a key means to achieving a green transition of the union economy. for the green transition to succeed through sustainable finance , it is essential that information related to the sustainability of businesses is easily accessible to investors so that they are better informed when making decisions about investments. for those purposes , public access to financial and non-financial information on natural or natural persons required to make information public , or submitting financial and sustainability-related information about their economic activities to a collection body on a voluntary basis (‘entities’) needs to be improved. an efficient means to do so at union level is to establish a centralised platform , esap , giving electronic access to all relevant information. ### (2) esap is to be established in accordance with regulation (eu) xxx/xxx of the european parliament and of the council [esap regulation]19 in order to enable an easy access to data for decision makers in the economy and society to make sound decisions that serve the efficient functioning of the market. rolling out common european data spaces in crucial sectors , especially the financial sector , would serve that purpose. the financial world is expected to undergo a digital transformation in the coming years , and the union should support this , in particular by promoting data-driven finance. furthermore , putting sustainable finance at the heart of the financial system is a key means to achieving a green transition of the union economy , ensuring that no individuals or places are left behind. for the green transition to succeed through sustainable finance , it is essential that information related to the sustainability of businesses is easily accessible to investors so that they are better informed when making decisions about investments. for those purposes , public access to financial and non-financial information on natural or natural persons required to make information public , or wishing to submit financial and/or sustainability-related information about their economic activities to a collection body on a voluntary basis (‘entities’) needs to be improved. an efficient means to do so at union level is to establish a centralised platform , esap , giving electronic access to all relevant information to be made available in accordance with all eu legal provisions.


### (2) esap is to be established in accordance with regulation (eu) xxx/xxx of the european parliament and of the council [esap regulation]19 in order to enable an easy access to data for decision makers in the economy and society to make sound decisions that serve the efficient functioning of the market. rolling out common european data spaces in crucial sectors , including the financial sector , would serve that purpose. the financial world is expected to undergo a digital transformation in the coming years , and the union should support this , in particular by promoting data-driven finance. furthermore , putting sustainable finance at the heart of the financial system is a key means to achieving a green transition of the union economy. for the green transition to succeed through sustainable finance , it is essential that information related to the sustainability of businesses is easily accessible to investors so that they are better informed when making decisions about investments. for those purposes , public access to financial and non-financial information on natural or natural persons required to make information public , or submitting financial and sustainability-related information about their economic activities to a collection body on a voluntary basis (‘entities’) needs to be improved. an efficient means to do so at union level is to establish a centralised platform , esap , giving electronic access to all relevant information. ### (2) esap is to be established in accordance with regulation (eu) xxx/xxx of the european parliament and of the council [esap regulation]19 in order to enable an easy access to data for decision makers in the economy and society to make sound decisions that serve the efficient functioning of the market. rolling out common european data spaces in crucial sectors , including the financial sector , would serve that purpose. the financial world is expected to undergo a digital transformation in the coming years , and the union should support this , in particular by promoting data-driven finance. ensuring easier access to public information is also crucial to increasing opportunities for small and medium business growth , visibility , and innovation. this includes easier access to voluntary information. furthermore , putting sustainable finance at the heart of the financial system is a key means to achieving a green transition of the union economy. for the green transition to succeed through sustainable finance , it is essential that information related to the sustainability of businesses is easily accessible to investors so that they are better informed when making decisions about investments. for those purposes , public access to financial and non-financial information on natural or natural persons required to make information public , or submitting financial and sustainability-related information about their economic activities to a collection body on a voluntary basis (‘entities’) needs to be improved. an efficient means to do so at union level is to establish a centralised platform , esap , giving electronic access to all relevant information.


### (3) esap should provide the public with an easy centralised access to information about entities and their products in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability that entities and authorities are required to publish in accordance with a number of directives in that field . in any case , any natural or legal person may submit information about its economic activities of relevance to financial services , or to capital markets or concerning sustainability to a collection body with a view to making that information accessible on esap in accordance with article 3 of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [esap regulation]. ### (3) esap should provide the public with an easy centralised access to information about entities and their products in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability that entities and authorities are required to publish in accordance with a number of directives in that field ,without jeopardising the commercial status of that entity. in any case , any natural or legal person may submit information about its economic activities of relevance to financial services , or to capital markets or concerning sustainability to a collection body with a view to making that information accessible on esap in accordance with article 3 of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [esap regulation] and provided that this does not create a competitive imbalance or disadvantage on the internal market.


### (3) esap should provide the public with an easy centralised access to information about entities and their products in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability that entities and authorities are required to publish in accordance with a number of directives in that field . in any case , any natural or legal person may submit information about its economic activities of relevance to financial services , or to capital markets or concerning sustainability to a collection body with a view to making that information accessible on esap in accordance with article 3 of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [esap regulation]. ### (3) esap should provide the public with an easy centralised access to information about entities and their products in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability that entities and authorities are required to publish in accordance with a number of directives in that field , according to a file-once principle and without entailing any additional reporting requirements beyond those specified by law. in any case , any natural or legal person may submit information about its economic activities of relevance to financial services , or to capital markets or concerning sustainability to a collection body with a view to making that information accessible on esap in accordance with article 3 of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [esap regulation].


### (5) for the functioning of esap , collection bodies should be designated to collect from the relevant entities the information in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability. in the absence of a collection body already established under union law , member states shall designate one of the officially appointed mechanisms established under directive 2004/109/ec of the european parliament and of the council20 to collect and store the information , and notify the european securities and markets authority (esma) accordingly. that officially appointed mechanism should act as a collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) of regulation (eu) xxxx/xxx [esap regulation] and should carry out the specific tasks set out in that regulation. where a european supervisory authority or a competent authority is required under union law to draw-up and publish on its website information on the relevant entities and their financial products in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability , that authority should act as a collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) of regulation (eu) xxxx/xxx [esap regulation]. that authority should publish information in a data extractable format , include the names and , where available , the legal entity identifier of the entity , and specify the type of information. ### (5) for the functioning of esap , collection bodies should be designated to collect from the relevant entities the information in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability. in the absence of a collection body already established under union law , member states shall designate at least one of the officially appointed mechanisms established under directive 2004/109/ec of the european parliament and of the council20 to collect and store the information , and notify the european securities and markets authority (esma) accordingly. that officially appointed mechanism should act as a collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) of regulation (eu) xxxx/xxx [esap regulation] and should carry out the specific tasks set out in that regulation. where a european supervisory authority or a competent authority is required under union law to draw-up and publish on its website information on the relevant entities and their financial products in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability , that authority should act as a collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) of regulation (eu) xxxx/xxx [esap regulation]. that authority should publish information in a data extractable format , include the names and , where available , the legal entity identifier of the entity , and specify the type of information.


### — regulation (eu) no 648/2012 on otc derivatives , central counterparties and trade repositories25 ; ### deleted


### — regulation (eu) no 909/2014 on improving securities settlement in the european union and on central securities depositories32 ; ### deleted


### — regulation (eu) 2021/23 on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties43 , ### deleted


### from 1 january 2026 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in article 5(3) , article 8d(2) , article 11(2) , article 11a(1) , article 11a(2) , article 18(3) , article 24(5) , and article 36d(1) , the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be esma. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the name , where available , and the legal entity identifier of the credit rating agency as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation. ### from 1 january 2026 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in article 5(3) , article 8d(2) , article 11(2) , article 11a , article 18(3) , article 24(5) , and article 36d(1) , the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be esma. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the name , where available , and the legal entity identifier of the credit rating agency as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation.


### [...] ### deleted


### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall designate one of the officially appointed mechanisms referred to in article 21(2) of directive 2004/109/ec as the collection body defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] and notify esma thereof. ### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall designate at least one collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] and notify esma of the designation.


### from 1 january 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in articles 17(1) and 19(3) , the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be the relevant officially appointed mechanism. ### from 1 january 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in articles 17(1) and 19(3) , member states shall designate at least one collection body as defined in article 2 , point(2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] and notify esma of the designation.


### 1. from 1 january 2026 , when making public the key information document pursuant to article 5(1) , the priips manufacturer shall submit that key information document to the relevant collection body referred to in paragraph 3 of this article at the same time for accessibility of such information on esap established under regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] of the european parliament and of the council*. ### 1. from 1 january 2026 , when making public the key information document pursuant to article 5(1) , and when publishing information about past performance pursuant to article 8(3) of commission delegated regulation (eu) 2017/653 , the priips manufacturer shall submit that key information document and , where applicable , information on past performance to the relevant collection body referred to in paragraph 3 of this article at the same time for accessibility of such information on esap established under regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] of the european parliament and of the council*.


### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the key information document referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall designate one of the officially appointed mechanisms referred to in article 21(2) of directive 2004/109/ec as the collection body defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] and notify esma thereof. ### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the key information document referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall designate at least one collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] and notify esma of the designation.


### 3. for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 , the collection body defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be esma. ### 3. for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 , the collection body defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be the national competent authority.


### from 1 january 2024 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in articles 25(1) , article 25(4) , and article 26(2) , the collection body defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be esma. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the names and , where available , the legal entity identifier of the issuer or , where applicable , the offeror as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation. ### from 1 january 2024 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in articles 25(1) , article 25(4) , and article 26(2) , the collection body defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be the national competent authority. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the names and , where available , the legal entity identifier of the issuer or , where applicable , the offeror as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation.


### (2) esap is to be established in accordance with regulation (eu) xxx/xxx of the european parliament and of the council [esap regulation]19in order to enable an easy access to data for decision makers in the economy and society to make sound decisions that serve the efficient functioning of the market. rolling out common european data spaces in crucial sectors , including the financial sector , would serve that purpose. the financial world is expected to undergo a digital transformation in the coming years , and the union should support this , in particular by promoting data-driven finance. furthermore , putting sustainable finance at the heart of the financial system is a key means to achieving a green transition of the union economy. for the green transition to succeed through sustainable finance , it is essential that information related to the sustainability of businesses is easily accessible to investors so that they are better informed when making decisions about investments. for those purposes , public access to financial and non-financial information on natural or legal persons required to make information public , or submitting financial and sustainability-related information about their economic activities to a collection body on a voluntary basis (‘entities’) needs to be improved. an efficient means to do so at union level is to establish a centralised platform , esap , giving electronic access to all relevant information. ### (2) esap is to be established in accordance with regulation (eu) xxx/xxx of the european parliament and of the council [esap regulation]19 in order to enable an easy access to data for decision makers in the economy and society to make sound decisions that serve the efficient functioning of the market. rolling out common european data spaces in crucial sectors , especially the financial sector , would serve that purpose. the financial world is expected to undergo a digital transformation in the coming years , and the union should support this , in particular by promoting data-driven finance. furthermore , putting sustainable finance at the heart of the financial system is a key means to achieving a green transition of the union economy , ensuring that no individuals or places are left behind. for the green transition to succeed through sustainable finance , it is essential that information related to the sustainability of businesses is easily accessible to investors so that they are better informed when making decisions about investments. for those purposes , public access to financial and non-financial information on natural or legal persons required to make information public , or wishing to submit financial and/or sustainability-related information about their economic activities to a collection body on a voluntary basis (‘entities’) needs to be improved. an efficient means to do so at union level is to establish a centralised platform , esap , giving electronic access to all relevant information to be made available in accordance with all eu legal provisions.


### (2) esap is to be established in accordance with regulation (eu) xxx/xxx of the european parliament and of the council [esap regulation]19 in order to enable an easy access to data for decision makers in the economy and society to make sound decisions that serve the efficient functioning of the market. rolling out common european data spaces in crucial sectors , including the financial sector , would serve that purpose. the financial world is expected to undergo a digital transformation in the coming years , and the union should support this , in particular by promoting data-driven finance. furthermore , putting sustainable finance at the heart of the financial system is a key means to achieving a green transition of the union economy. for the green transition to succeed through sustainable finance , it is essential that information related to the sustainability of businesses is easily accessible to investors so that they are better informed when making decisions about investments. for those purposes , public access to financial and non-financial information on natural or legal persons required to make information public , or submitting financial and sustainability-related information about their economic activities to a collection body on a voluntary basis (‘entities’) needs to be improved. an efficient means to do so at union level is to establish a centralised platform , esap , giving electronic access to all relevant information. ### (2) esap is to be established in accordance with regulation (eu) xxx/xxx of the european parliament and of the council [esap regulation]19 in order to enable an easy access to data for decision makers in the economy and society to make sound decisions that serve the efficient functioning of the market. rolling out common european data spaces in crucial sectors , including the financial sector , would serve that purpose. the financial world is expected to undergo a digital transformation in the coming years , and the union should support this , in particular by promoting data-driven finance. ensuring easier access to public information is also crucial to increasing opportunities for small and medium business growth , visibility , and innovation. this includes easier access to voluntary information. furthermore , putting sustainable finance at the heart of the financial system is a key means to achieving a green transition of the union economy. for the green transition to succeed through sustainable finance , it is essential that information related to the sustainability of businesses is easily accessible to investors so that they are better informed when making decisions about investments. for those purposes , public access to financial and non-financial information on natural or legal persons required to make information public , or submitting financial and sustainability-related information about their economic activities to a collection body on a voluntary basis (‘entities’) needs to be improved. an efficient means to do so at union level is to establish a centralised platform , esap , giving electronic access to all relevant information.


### (3) esap should provide the public with an easy centralised access to information about entities and their products in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability that authorities and entities are required to publish in accordance with a number of directives in that field. in any case , any entity may submit information about its economic activities of relevance to financial services , or to capital markets or concerning sustainability to a collection body with a view to making that information accessible on esap in accordance with article 3 of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [esap regulation]. ### (3) esap should provide the public with an easy centralised access to information about entities and their products in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability that authorities and entities are required to publish in accordance with a number of directives in that field without , however , jeopardising the commercial status of that entity. in any case , any entity may submit information about its economic activities of relevance to financial services , or to capital markets or concerning sustainability to a collection body with a view to making that information accessible on esap in accordance with article 3 of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [esap regulation] and provided that this does not create a competitive imbalance or disadvantage on the internal market.


### (3) esap should provide the public with an easy centralised access to information about entities and their products in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability that authorities and entities are required to publish in accordance with a number of directives in that field. in any case , any entity may submit information about its economic activities of relevance to financial services , or to capital markets or concerning sustainability to a collection body with a view to making that information accessible on esap in accordance with article 3 of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [esap regulation]. ### (3) esap should provide the public with an easy centralised access to information about entities and their products in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability that authorities and entities are required to publish in accordance with a number of directives in that field , according to a file-once principle and without entailing any additional reporting requirements beyond those specified by law. in any case , any entity may submit information about its economic activities of relevance to financial services , or to capital markets or concerning sustainability to a collection body with a view to making that information accessible on esap in accordance with article 3 of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [esap regulation].


### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of paragraph 1 , member states shall designate one of the officially appointed mechanisms as defined in article 21 , point (2) of directive 2004/109/ec as the collection body defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] and notify esma thereof. ### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of paragraph 1 , member states shall designate at least one collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] and notify esma of the designation.


### 2. by 31 december 2024 , for the purposes of paragraph 1 , member states shall designate one of the officially appointed mechanisms referred to in article 21 , point (2) of directive 2004/109/ec as the collection body defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] and notify esma thereof. ### 2. by 31 december 2024 , for the purposes of paragraph 1 , member states shall designate at least one collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] and notify esma of the designation.


### (5) for the functioning of esap , collection bodies should be designated to collect from the entity the information in relation to financial services capital markets and sustainability. in the absence of a collection body already established under union law , member states shall designate one of the officially appointed mechanism established under directive 2004/109/ec of the european parliament and of the council20 to collect and store the information , and notify the european securities and markets authority (esma) accordingly. that officially appointed mechanism should act as a collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) of regulation (eu) xxxx/xxx [esap regulation] and should carry out the specific tasks set out in that regulation. where a european supervisory authority or a competent authority is required under union law to draw-up and publish on its website information on the entities and their financial products in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability , that authority should act as a collection body as defined article 2 , point (2) of regulation (eu) xxxx/xxx [esap regulation]. that authority should publish the information in a data extractable format , include the names and , where available , the legal entity identifier of the entity , and specify the type of information. ### (5) for the functioning of esap , collection bodies should be designated to collect from the entity the information in relation to financial services capital markets and sustainability. in the absence of a collection body already established under union law , member states shall designate at least one of the officially appointed mechanism established under directive 2004/109/ec of the european parliament and of the council20 to collect and store the information , and notify the european securities and markets authority (esma) accordingly. that officially appointed mechanism should act as a collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) of regulation (eu) xxxx/xxx [esap regulation] and should carry out the specific tasks set out in that regulation. where a european supervisory authority or a competent authority is required under union law to draw-up and publish on its website information on the entities and their financial products in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability , that authority should act as a collection body as defined article 2 , point (2) of regulation (eu) xxxx/xxx [esap regulation]. that authority should publish the information in a data extractable format , include the names and , where available , the legal entity identifier of the entity , and specify the type of information.


### — directive 2014/59/eu establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms33 ; ### deleted


### 3. by 31 december 2024 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall designate one of the officially appointed mechanisms referred to in article 21 , point (2) of directive 2004/109/ec as the collection body defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] and notify esma thereof. ### 3. by 31 december 2024 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall designate at least one collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] and notify esma of the designation.


### 1. from 1 january 2026 , member states shall ensure that , when making public any information pursuant to article 51(1) and article 256(1) of this directive , insurance or reinsurance undertakings submit at the same time that information to the relevant collection body referred to in paragraph 3 of this article for accessibility on esap established under regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] of the european parliament and of the council*. ### 1. from 1 january 2026 , member states shall ensure that , when making public any quantitative information pursuant to article 51(1) and article 256(1) of this directive , as defined in the implementing regulation (eu) 2015/2452 of 2 december 2015 laying down implementing technical standards with regard to the procedures , formats and templates of the solvency and financial condition report in accordance with directive 2009/138/ec of the european parliament and of the council , as well as any qualitative information pursuant to article 51(1) and article 256(1) of this directive , insurance or reinsurance undertakings submit at the same time that information to the relevant collection body referred to in paragraph 3 of this article for accessibility on esap established under regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] of the european parliament and of the council*.


### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to under paragraph 1 , member states shall designate one of the officially appointed mechanisms referred to in article 21 , point (2) of directive 2004/109/ec as the collection body defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] and notify esma thereof. ### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to under paragraph 1 , member states shall designate at least one collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] and notify esma of the designation.


### [...] ### deleted


### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 member states shall designate one of the officially appointed mechanisms referred to in article 21 , point (2) of directive 2004/109/ec as the collection body defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] and notify esma thereof. ### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 member states shall designate at least one collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] and notify esma of the designation.


### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall designate one of the officially appointed mechanisms referred to in article 21 , point (2) of directive 2004/109/ec as the collection body defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] and notify esma thereof. ### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall designate at least one collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] and notify esma of the designation.


### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall designate one of the officially appointed mechanisms referred to in article 21 , point (2) of directive 2004/109/ec as the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] and notify esma thereof. ### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall designate at least one collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] and notify esma of the designation.


### a. whereas third party litigation funding (tplf) is a growing practice whereby commercial investors (‘litigation funders’) who are not a party to a dispute invest in legal proceedings and pay legal and other expenses , in exchange for a share of any eventual award; whereas tplf does not only occur in collective redress cases but also in arbitration and insolvency proceedings; ### a. whereas third party litigation funding (tplf) is a growing practice in countries such as australia , the usa , canada , the united kingdom and , more recently , certain eu member states , whereby commercial investors (‘litigation funders’) who are not a party to a dispute invest in legal proceedings and pay legal and other expenses , in exchange for a share of any eventual award or settlement received by the funded applicant; whereas tplf does not only occur in collective redress cases but also in individual cases , especially arbitration and insolvency proceedings;


### b. whereas litigation funders involved in legal proceedings act in their own economic interest , rather than in the interest of claimants; whereas they can seek to control the litigation and demand an outcome that pays them the greatest return3; ### b. whereas litigation funders involved in legal proceedings act in their own economic interest and , generally speaking , not in the interest of claimants who represent the injured party; whereas they can seek to control the litigation and demand an outcome that pays them the greatest return3; whereas it is essential to guarantee adequate damages for victims;


### g. whereas the current regulatory vacuum enables litigation funders to operate in secrecy , with the result that courts can , on occasion , make awards to claimants without realising that a large majority of the award will subsequently be redirected to litigation funders; whereas the lack of transparency can also mean that even the potential beneficiaries have little or no knowledge about the distribution of awards or the funding agreements , in particular in members states with an opt-out system; ### g. whereas the current regulatory vacuum enables litigation funders to operate in secrecy , with the result that courts can , on occasion , make awards to claimants without realising that a large majority of the award will subsequently be redirected to litigation funders at the expense of claimants; whereas the lack of transparency can also mean that even the potential beneficiaries have little or no knowledge about the distribution of awards or the funding agreements , in particular in members states with an opt-out system; whereas , in the absence of harmonised regulation at eu level , there is a risk of fragmentation and regulatory imbalances in the area of litigation funding;


### 2. firmly believes that in order to ensure that justice systems prioritise redress for victims of injustice , and not the interests of investors who may seek commercial opportunity from disputes , a regulatory regime addressing key issues relevant to litigation funding , including transparency , fairness , and proportionality , is necessary; ### 2. firmly believes that in order to ensure that justice systems prioritise the interests of injured parties , redress for victims of injustice , and not the interests of investors who may seek commercial opportunity from disputes , a harmonised regulatory regime addressing key issues relevant to litigation funding , including transparency , fairness , and proportionality , is necessary;


### 4. recommends the establishment of a system of authorisation for litigation funders , permitting the introduction of corporate governance requirements and supervisory powers to protect claimants , and to ensure that funding is only provided by entities that are committed to complying with minimum standards in terms of transparency , governance and capital adequacy , and observing a fiduciary relationship vis-à-vis claimants and intended beneficiaries; ### 4. recommends the establishment of a system of authorisation for litigation funders , permitting the introduction of corporate governance and confidentiality requirements and supervisory powers to protect claimants , and to ensure that funding is only provided by entities that are committed to complying with minimum standards in terms of transparency , governance and capital adequacy , and observing a fiduciary relationship vis-à-vis claimants and intended beneficiaries; stresses the need to ensure that this system does not create excessive administrative burdens for member states;


### 6. underlines that conflicts of interest may arise where there are relationships between litigation funders , qualified entities , law firms , aggregators , including claims-collection and award-distribution-platforms , and other actors who may be involved in claims. notes that there is a trend of an increasingly close cooperation , with , for example , litigation funders agreeing to finance law firms across a series of future cases (portfolio funding)7. recommends that safeguards are adopted to prevent such conflicts , set out claimants’ rights and to require that details of relationships between litigation funders and the other involved parties are disclosed; ### 6. underlines that conflicts of interest may arise where there are relationships between litigation funders , qualified entities , law firms , aggregators , including claims-collection and award-distribution-platforms , and other actors who may be involved in claims. notes that there is a trend of an increasingly close cooperation , with , for example , litigation funders agreeing to finance law firms across a series of future cases (portfolio funding)7. recommends that safeguards are adopted to prevent such conflicts , ensuring for example that the funder is known at least to the other party as well as to the arbitrators/court; recommends also that safeguards are adopted to set out claimants’ rights and to require that details of relationships between litigation funders and the other involved parties are disclosed; stresses the need also to ensure the confidentiality of the information relating to the dispute , especially in arbitration proceedings , as the funder should not have access to the data in the file without the written consent of the parties;


### 7. believes that litigation funders should not be permitted to abandon funded parties in litigation , except in restricted and well-defined circumstances , leaving claimants solely responsible for all costs of the litigation , which may have only been pursued due to the involvement of the funder; ### 7. believes that litigation funders should not be permitted to abandon funded parties in litigation , except in exceptional , restricted , strictly regulated and well-defined circumstances , leaving claimants solely responsible for all costs of the litigation , which may have only been pursued due to the involvement of the funder , thereby making it harder to guarantee access to justice for the applicants;


### 11. is of the opinion that supervisory authorities , and courts and administrative authorities were appropriate in accordance with national procedural law , should have the powers to facilitate the enforcement of legislation adopted to achieve the goals set out above; recommends the establishment of a complaints system. considers that supervisory authorities , and courts and administrative authorities where appropriate in accordance with national procedural law , should have the powers to address abusive practices by authorised litigation funders; ### 11. is of the opinion that supervisory authorities , and courts and administrative authorities were appropriate in accordance with national procedural law , should have the powers to facilitate the enforcement of legislation adopted to achieve the goals set out above; recommends the establishment of a complaints system that does not give rise to significant costs and administrative burdens for member states. considers that supervisory authorities , and courts and administrative authorities where appropriate in accordance with national procedural law , should have the powers to address abusive practices by authorised litigation funders;


### (1) third-party litigation funding is a commercial practice which is quickly developing into a litigation services market without any proper legislative framework being in place at union level. despite the fact that litigation funders are regularly established and operating in various member states , domestically or across borders , they have so far been subject to different national rules and practices. diverging rules and practices in member states are likely to constitute an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market. a lack of clarity on the terms on which commercial third party litigation funders (‘litigation funders’) may operate , in particular taking into account that litigation funders can easily be attracted by cross-border cases , is not compatible with the proper functioning of the internal market. divergences in the legal framework applicable in each member state entail a risk of forum shopping by litigation funders , which could be influenced by the favourability of certain national rules concerning their establishment , the law applicable to funding agreements and national procedural rules. ### 1. third-party litigation funding is a commercial practice which is quickly developing into a litigation services market without any proper harmonised legislative framework being in place at union level. despite the fact that litigation funders are regularly established and operating in various member states , domestically or across borders , they have so far been subject to different national rules and practices on the single market , where the existence of generally fragmented rules and even a legislative vacuum in this area frequently encourages such clandestine practices. diverging rules and practices in member states are likely to constitute an obstacle to the proper functioning of the internal market. a lack of clarity on the terms on which commercial third party litigation funders (‘litigation funders’) may operate , in particular taking into account that litigation funders can easily be attracted by cross-border cases , is not compatible with the proper functioning of the internal market. divergences in the legal framework applicable in each member state entail a risk of forum shopping by litigation funders , which could be influenced by the favourability of certain national rules concerning their establishment , the law applicable to funding agreements and national procedural rules.


### (4) this directive aims to regulate third-party litigation funding , a commercial practice whereby third-party entities not directly involved in a dispute invest for profit in legal proceedings , typically in exchange for a percentage of any settlement or award. third-party litigation funding does not include provision of funds to sponsor litigation on a charitable or donated basis , or similar activities carried out on a pro bono publico basis. this directive also aims to lay down safeguards to prevent conflicts of interest , abusive litigation as well as the disproportionate allocation of monetary awards to litigation funders. ### 4. this directive aims to regulate third-party litigation funding , a commercial practice whereby third-party entities not directly involved in a dispute invest for profit in legal proceedings , typically in exchange for a percentage of any settlement or award. third-party litigation funding does not include provision of funds to sponsor litigation on a charitable or donated basis , or similar activities carried out on a pro bono publico basis. this directive also aims to lay down safeguards , on the one hand , to ensure efficient access to justice and the protection of the interests of the parties to the dispute and , on the other hand , to prevent conflicts of interest , abusive litigation as well as the disproportionate allocation of monetary awards to litigation funders.


### (9) supervisory authorities within the union granting authorisations to conduct third-party litigation funding activities should be empowered to require that litigation funders comply with minimum criteria laid down by this directive. such criteria should include provisions relating to governance , transparency , capital adequacy , and observance of a fiduciary duty to claimants and intended beneficiaries. supervisory authorities should be empowered to make any necessary orders , including the power to receive from litigation funders applications for authorisation and to decide upon them , to gather any necessary information , grant , deny or withdraw any authorisation or to impose any condition , restriction or penalty upon any litigation funder , as well as to investigate any complaint against any litigation funder conducting activities within their jurisdiction. ### (9) supervisory authorities within the union granting authorisations to conduct third-party litigation funding activities should be empowered to require that litigation funders comply with minimum criteria laid down by this directive. such criteria should include provisions relating to confidentiality , governance , transparency of funding agreements , capital adequacy , and observance of a fiduciary duty to claimants and intended beneficiaries. supervisory authorities should be empowered to make any necessary orders , including the power to receive from litigation funders applications for authorisation and to decide upon them , to gather any necessary information , grant , deny or withdraw any authorisation or to impose any condition , restriction or penalty upon any litigation funder , as well as to investigate any complaint against any litigation funder conducting activities within their jurisdiction.


### (11) litigation funders should be required to commit to being bound to a duty to act fairly , transparently and in the best interests of claimants and intended beneficiaries of claims. a lack of a requirement to place the interests of claimants and intended beneficiaries ahead of a litigation funder’s own interests creates the risk of proceedings being directed in a manner that ultimately serves the interests of the litigation funder , rather than those of the claimant. ### (11) litigation funders should be required to commit to being bound to a duty to act fairly , transparently efficiently and in the best interests of claimants and intended beneficiaries of claims while respecting existing eu confidentiality rules. a lack of a requirement to place the interests of claimants and intended beneficiaries ahead of a litigation funder’s own interests creates the risk of proceedings being directed in a manner that ultimately serves the interests of the litigation funder , rather than those of the claimant.


### (13) this directive should regulate the activities of litigation funders , but should be without prejudice to any other regulatory obligations or regimes that may apply. ### (13) this directive should regulate the activities of litigation funders , but should be without prejudice to any other regulatory obligations or regimes that may apply , respecting the legal traditions of the member states , their autonomy and their decisions regarding on the appropriateness of regulating litigation funding in their national legal systems.


### (22) the adequacy of supervision of litigation funders and third-party funding agreements cannot be ensured absent obligations on litigation funders to be transparent regarding their activities. this includes transparency vis-à-vis courts or administrative authorities , defendants and claimants , and therefore obligations should apply to disclose third party funding agreements in full to courts or administrative authorities and defendants , subject to appropriate limitations to protect any necessary confidentiality. ### (22) the adequacy of supervision of litigation funders and third-party funding agreements cannot be ensured absent obligations on litigation funders to be transparent regarding their activities. this includes transparency vis-à-vis courts or administrative authorities , defendants and claimants , and therefore obligations should apply to disclose third party funding agreements in full to courts or administrative authorities and defendants or other parties to the dispute , subject to appropriate limitations to protect any necessary confidentiality.


### (28) additional conditions should be put in place to ensure that litigation funders do not influence the decisions of claimants in the course of proceedings in a manner that would benefit the litigation funder itself. in particular , litigation funders should not direct or influence decisions on how cases are pursued , which interests are prioritised , or whether or not claimants should accept any particular outcome , award or settlement. ### (28) additional conditions should be put in place to ensure that litigation funders do not influence the decisions of claimants in the course of proceedings in a manner that would benefit the litigation funder itself at the expense of the claimant. in particular , litigation funders should not direct or influence decisions on how cases are pursued , which interests are prioritised , or whether or not claimants should accept any particular outcome , award or settlement.


### (33) the objectives of this directive , namely to ensure the harmonisation of member states’ rules applicable to litigation funders and their activities , and thus to ensure that common minimum standards for the protection of the rights of funded claimants and intended beneficiaries in proceedings financed wholly or in part by third-party funding agreements apply in all member states , cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states as litigation funders operate in multiple member states and are subject to different national rules and practices , but can rather , by reason of the scale of the emerging market of third-party litigation funding , the need to avoid diverging rules and practices that are likely to constitute an obstacle to the proper functioning of the internal market and the need to avoid ‘forum shopping’ by litigation funders seeking to optimise national rules , be better achieved at union level. the union may thus adopt measures , in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union. in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. ### (33) the objectives of this directive , namely to ensure the harmonisation of member states’ rules applicable to litigation funders and their activities , and thus to ensure that common minimum standards for the protection of the rights of funded claimants and intended beneficiaries in proceedings financed wholly or in part by third-party funding agreements apply in all member states in which litigation funding is regulated , cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states as litigation funders operate in multiple member states and are subject to different national rules and practices , but can rather , by reason of the scale of the emerging market of third-party litigation funding , the need to avoid diverging rules and practices that are likely to constitute an obstacle to the proper functioning of the internal market and the need to avoid ‘forum shopping’ by litigation funders seeking to optimise national rules , be better achieved at union level. the union may thus adopt measures , in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union. in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.


### 1. member states may determine in accordance with national law whether third party funding agreements can be offered in relation to proceedings within their member state , or for the benefit of claimants or intended beneficiaries resident within their member state. ### 1. member states may determine in accordance with national law whether third party funding agreements can be offered in relation to legal or arbitration proceedings within their member state , or for the benefit of claimants or intended beneficiaries resident within their member state.


### 2. where such activities are permitted , member states shall create a system for the authorisation of the activities of litigation funders within their member state. that system shall include designating an independent supervisory authority tasked with granting or withdrawing authorisations for litigation funders and supervising the activities of litigation funders. ### 2. where such activities are permitted , member states shall create a system for the authorisation of the activities of litigation funders within their member state. that system shall include delegation of powers to an independent supervisory department or authority tasked with granting or withdrawing authorisations for litigation funders and supervising the activities of litigation funders.


### (1) the union needs to adequately and comprehensively address digital risks to all financial entities stemming from an increased use of information and communication technology (ict) in the provision and consumption of financial services. ### (1) the union needs to adequately and comprehensively address digital risks to all financial entities stemming from an increased use of information and communication technology (ict) in the provision and consumption of financial services , ensuring further support to the potential of digital finance in terms of innovation and competition.


### (3) at union level the requirements related to ict risk for the financial sector are currently spread over directives 2006/43/ec ,18 2009/66/ec ,19 2009/138/ec ,20 2011/61/ec ,21 eu/2013/36 ,22 2014/65/eu ,23 (eu) 2015/2366 ,24 (eu) 2016/234125 of the european parliament and of the council and are diverse and occasionally incomplete. in some cases , ict risk has only been implicitly addressed as part of the operational risk , whereas in others it has not been addressed at all. this should be remedied by aligning regulation (eu) xx/20xx of the european parliament and of the council26 [dora] and those acts. this directive puts forward a set of amendments that appear necessary to bring legal clarity and consistency in relation to the application by financial entities that are authorised and supervised in accordance with those directives of various digital operational resilience requirements that are necessary in the pursuit of their activities , thus guaranteeing the smooth functioning of the internal market. ### (3) at union level the requirements related to ict risk for the financial sector are currently spread over directives 2006/43/ec ,18 2009/66/ec ,19 2009/138/ec ,20 2011/61/ec ,21 eu/2013/36 ,22 2014/65/eu ,23 (eu) 2015/2366 ,24 (eu) 2016/234125 of the european parliament and of the council and are diverse and occasionally incomplete. the existing norms are not fully harmonised and it is necessary to ensure the avoidance of over-regulation and to guarantee the adequacy of the norms with regard to the reality in the field , which is constantly evolving. in some cases , ict risk has only been implicitly addressed as part of the operational risk , whereas in others it has not been addressed at all. this should be remedied by aligning regulation (eu) xx/20xx of the european parliament and of the council26 [dora] and those acts. this directive puts forward a set of amendments that appear necessary to bring legal clarity and consistency in relation to the application by financial entities that are authorised and supervised in accordance with those directives of various digital operational resilience requirements that are necessary in the pursuit of their activities , thus guaranteeing the smooth functioning of the internal market.


### (6) currently , the definition of ‘financial instrument’ in directive 2014/65/eu does not explicitly include financial instruments issued using a class of technologies which support the distributed recording of encrypted data (distributed ledger technology , “dlt”). in order to ensure that such financial instruments can be traded on the market under the current legal framework , the definition in directive 2014/65/eu should be amended to include them. ### (6) currently , the definition of ‘financial instrument’ in directive 2014/65/eu does not explicitly include financial instruments issued using a class of technologies which support the distributed recording of encrypted data (distributed ledger technology , “dlt”) , thus not reflecting the reality of the market . in order to ensure that such financial instruments can be traded on the market under the current legal framework , in order to avoid any potential risk due to non-regulation , the definition in directive 2014/65/eu should be amended to include them.


### (7) in particular , in order to allow for the development of crypto-assets that would qualify as financial instruments and dlt , while preserving a high level of financial stability , market integrity , transparency and investor protection , it would be beneficial to create a temporary regime for dlt market infrastructures. this temporary legal framework should allow competent authorities to temporarily permit dlt market infrastructures to operate under an alternative set of requirements with regard to access to them compared to those otherwise applicable under the union financial services legislation that could prevent them from developing solutions for the trading and settlement of transactions of crypto-assets that would qualify as financial instruments. this legal framework should be temporary in order to enable the european supervisory authorities (esas) and the national competent authorities to gain experience on the opportunities and specific risks created by crypto-assets traded on those infrastructures. this directive is consequently accompanying regulation [on a pilot regime for market infrastructures based on distributed ledger technology] by supporting this new union regulatory framework on dlt market infrastructures with a targeted exemption from specific provisions of union financial services legislation applying to activities and services in relation to financial instruments as defined in point (15) of article 4(1) of directive 2014/65/eu that would otherwise not offer the full flexibility required when deploying solutions in the trading and post trading stages of transactions involving crypto-assets. ### (7) in particular , in order to allow for the development of crypto-assets that would qualify as financial instruments and dlt , while preserving a high level of financial stability , market integrity , transparency and investor and consumer protection , it would be beneficial to create a temporary regime for dlt market infrastructures. this temporary legal framework should allow competent authorities to temporarily permit dlt market infrastructures to operate under an alternative set of requirements with regard to access to them compared to those otherwise applicable under the union financial services legislation that could prevent them from developing solutions for the trading and settlement of transactions of crypto-assets that would qualify as financial instruments. this legal framework should be temporary in order to enable the european supervisory authorities (esas) and the national competent authorities to gain experience on the opportunities and specific risks created by crypto-assets traded on those infrastructures but should not set any limits on innovation. this directive is consequently accompanying regulation [on a pilot regime for market infrastructures based on distributed ledger technology] by supporting this new union regulatory framework on dlt market infrastructures with a targeted exemption from specific provisions of union financial services legislation applying to activities and services in relation to financial instruments as defined in point (15) of article 4(1) of directive 2014/65/eu that would otherwise not offer the full flexibility required when deploying solutions in the trading and post trading stages of transactions involving crypto-assets.


### (7) in particular , in order to allow for the development of crypto-assets that would qualify as financial instruments and dlt , while preserving a high level of financial stability , market integrity , transparency and investor protection , it would be beneficial to create a temporary regime for dlt market infrastructures. this temporary legal framework should allow competent authorities to temporarily permit dlt market infrastructures to operate under an alternative set of requirements with regard to access to them compared to those otherwise applicable under the union financial services legislation that could prevent them from developing solutions for the trading and settlement of transactions of crypto-assets that would qualify as financial instruments. this legal framework should be temporary in order to enable the european supervisory authorities (esas) and the national competent authorities to gain experience on the opportunities and specific risks created by crypto-assets traded on those infrastructures. this directive is consequently accompanying regulation [on a pilot regime for market infrastructures based on distributed ledger technology] by supporting this new union regulatory framework on dlt market infrastructures with a targeted exemption from specific provisions of union financial services legislation applying to activities and services in relation to financial instruments as defined in point (15) of article 4(1) of directive 2014/65/eu that would otherwise not offer the full flexibility required when deploying solutions in the trading and post trading stages of transactions involving crypto-assets. ### (7) in particular , in order to allow for the development of crypto-assets that would qualify as financial instruments and dlt , while preserving a high level of financial stability , market integrity , transparency and investor protection , it would be beneficial to create a temporary regime for dlt market infrastructures. this temporary legal framework should allow competent authorities to temporarily permit dlt market infrastructures to operate under an alternative set of requirements with regard to access to them compared to those otherwise applicable under the union financial services legislation that could prevent them from developing solutions for the trading and settlement of transactions of crypto-assets that would qualify as financial instruments. this legal framework should be temporary in order to enable the european supervisory authorities (esas) and the national competent authorities to gain experience on the opportunities and specific risks related to crypto-assets traded on those infrastructures. the experience gained with the pilot regime is intended to identify possible practical proposals for a suitable regulatory framework in order to make targeted adjustments to existing union law regulating the issuance , safekeeping and asset servicing , trading and settlement of financial instruments based on dlt. this directive is consequently accompanying regulation [on a pilot regime for market infrastructures based on distributed ledger technology] by supporting this new union regulatory framework on dlt market infrastructures with a targeted exemption from specific provisions of union financial services legislation applying to activities and services in relation to financial instruments as defined in point (15) of article 4(1) of directive 2014/65/eu that would otherwise not offer the full flexibility required when deploying solutions in the trading and post trading stages of transactions involving crypto-assets.


### a statutory auditor or an audit firm shall have sound administrative and accounting procedures , internal quality control mechanisms , effective procedures for risk assessment , and effective control and safeguard arrangements in order to manage its ict systems and tools in accordance with article 6 of regulation (eu) 2021/xx [dora] of the european parliament and of the council*. ### a statutory auditor or an audit firm shall have sound administrative and accounting procedures , internal quality control mechanisms , effective procedures for risk assessment , and effective control and safeguard arrangements for information processing systems. those internal quality control mechanisms shall be designed to ensure compliance with decisions and procedures at all levels of the audit firm or of the working structure of the statutory auditor. a statutory auditor or an audit firm , which is not a micro , small or medium-sized enterprise as defined in article 2 of the annex to recommendation 2003/361 , shall , in addition , manage its ict systems and tools in accordance with article 6 of regulation(eu) 2021/xx [dora] of the european parliament and of the council*.


### has sound administrative and accounting procedures and control and safeguard arrangements for electronic data processing , including information and communication technology systems that are set up and managed in accordance with article 6 of regulation (eu) 2021/xx of the european parliament and of the council* [dora] , as well as adequate internal control mechanisms including rules for personal transactions by its employees or for the holding and management of investments in financial instruments in order to invest on its own account and ensuring , at least , that each transaction involving the ucits may be reconstructed according to its origin , the parties to it , its nature , and the time and place at which it was effected and that the assets of the ucits managed by the management company are invested according to the fund rules or the instruments of incorporation and the legal provisions in force; ### has sound administrative , operational and accounting procedures and control and safeguard arrangements for electronic data processing , including information and communication technology systems that are set up and managed in accordance with article 6 of regulation (eu) 2021/xx of the european parliament and of the council* [dora] , as well as adequate internal control mechanisms including rules for personal transactions by its employees or for the holding and management of investments in financial instruments in order to invest on its own account and ensuring , at least , that each transaction involving the ucits may be reconstructed according to its origin , the parties to it , its nature , and the time and place at which it was effected and that the assets of the ucits managed by the management company are invested according to the fund rules or the instruments of incorporation and the legal provisions in force;


### (8) a dlt multilateral trading facility should be a multilateral system , operated by an investment firm or a market operator authorised under directive 2014/65/eu , that has received a specific permission under regulation (eu) xx/20xx of the european parliament and of the council27 [proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime on dlt market infrastructure]. dlt multilateral trading facilities should be subject to all the requirements applicable to a multilateral trading facility under that directive , except if it were to be granted an exemption by its national competent authority in accordance with this directive. one potential regulatory barrier to the development of a multilateral trading facility for transferable securities issued on a dlt could be the obligation of intermediation set out in directive 2014/65/eu. a traditional multilateral trading facility can only admit as members and participants investment firms , credit institutions and other persons who have a sufficient level of trading ability and competence and who dispose of appropriate organisational arrangements and resources. a dlt multilateral trading facility should be allowed to request a derogation from such an obligation so that is can provide retail investors with easy access to the trading venue , provided that adequate safeguards are in place in terms of investor protection. ### (8) a dlt multilateral trading facility should be a multilateral system , operated by an investment firm or a market operator authorised under directive 2014/65/eu , that has received a specific permission under regulation (eu) xx/20xx of the european parliament and of the council27 [proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime on dlt market infrastructure]. dlt multilateral trading facilities should be subject to all the requirements applicable to a multilateral trading facility under that directive , except if it were to be granted an exemption by its national competent authority in accordance with this directive. one potential regulatory barrier to the development of a multilateral trading facility for transferable securities issued on a dlt could be the obligation of intermediation set out in directive 2014/65/eu. a traditional multilateral trading facility can only admit as members and participants investment firms , credit institutions and other persons who have a sufficient level of trading ability and competence and who dispose of appropriate organisational arrangements and resources. for the purpose of ensuring high levels of market integrity , investor protection and financial stability , the dlt transferable securities admitted to trading on a dlt multilateral trading facility should remain subject to the provisions prohibiting market abuse in regulation (eu) no 596/2014 (the market abuse regulation). a dlt multilateral trading facility should be allowed to request a derogation from such an obligation so that is can provide retail investors with easy access to the trading venue , provided that adequate safeguards are in place in terms of investor protection.