### 19. is seriously concerned at the precarious situation of human rights defenders and deplores the fact that they are the victims of increasing violence , including targeted killings; underlines the particularly severe situation , further aggravated by covid-19 , of female , environmental , labour , environmental and indigenous human rights defenders; deplores the increased use of techniques such as harassment , criminalisation and defamation campaigns , arbitrary arrests and unlimited detention in inhumane conditions used to silence human rights defenders , often on the basis of ill-defined terrorism charges; reiterates its call to eu delegations and member states’ embassies in third countries to regularly visit activists in prison , monitor their trials and advocate their access to justice and protection; ### 19. is seriously concerned at the precarious situation of human rights defenders and deplores the fact that they are the victims of increasing violence , including targeted killings; underlines the particularly severe situation , further aggravated by covid-19 , of female , environmental , labour , environmental and indigenous human rights defenders; reiterates that human rights defenders are oftentimes the only interlocutors able to conduct on-site monitoring and human rights protection in territories with uncertain legal status , especially in frozen conflict areas , where both international community and the eu have limited engagement capacities; deplores the increased use of techniques such as harassment , criminalisation and defamation campaigns , arbitrary arrests and unlimited detention in inhumane conditions used to silence human rights defenders , often on the basis of ill-defined terrorism charges; reiterates its call to eu delegations and member states’ embassies in third countries to regularly visit activists in prison , monitor their trials and advocate their access to justice and protection;


### 19. is seriously concerned at the precarious situation of human rights defenders and deplores the fact that they are the victims of increasing violence , including targeted killings; underlines the particularly severe situation , further aggravated by covid-19 , of female , environmental , labour , environmental and indigenous human rights defenders; deplores the increased use of techniques such as harassment , criminalisation and defamation campaigns , arbitrary arrests and unlimited detention in inhumane conditions used to silence human rights defenders , often on the basis of ill-defined terrorism charges; reiterates its call to eu delegations and member states’ embassies in third countries to regularly visit activists in prison , monitor their trials and advocate their access to justice and protection; ### 19. is seriously concerned at the precarious situation of human rights defenders and deplores the fact that they are the victims of increasing violence , including targeted killings; underlines the particularly severe situation , further aggravated by covid-19 , of female , children , environmental , labour , and indigenous human rights defenders; deplores the increased use of techniques such as harassment , criminalisation and defamation campaigns , arbitrary arrests and unlimited detention in inhumane conditions used to silence human rights defenders , often on the basis of ill-defined terrorism charges; reiterates its call to eu delegations and member states’ embassies in third countries to regularly visit activists in prison , monitor their trials and advocate their access to justice and protection;


### 19. is seriously concerned at the precarious situation of human rights defenders and deplores the fact that they are the victims of increasing violence , including targeted killings; underlines the particularly severe situation , further aggravated by covid-19 , of female , environmental , labour , environmental and indigenous human rights defenders; deplores the increased use of techniques such as harassment , criminalisation and defamation campaigns , arbitrary arrests and unlimited detention in inhumane conditions used to silence human rights defenders , often on the basis of ill-defined terrorism charges; reiterates its call to eu delegations and member states’ embassies in third countries to regularly visit activists in prison , monitor their trials and advocate their access to justice and protection; ### 19. is seriously concerned at the precarious situation of human rights defenders and deplores the fact that they are the victims of increasing violence , including targeted killings; underlines the particularly severe situation , further aggravated by covid-19 , of female , environmental , labour , environmental and indigenous human rights defenders; deplores the increased use of techniques such as harassment , criminalisation and defamation campaigns , arbitrary arrests and unlimited detention in inhumane conditions used to silence human rights defenders , often on the basis of ill-defined terrorism charges; reiterates its call to eu delegations and member states’ embassies in third countries to regularly visit activists in prison , monitor their trials and advocate their access to justice and protection; further calls on the eu and its member states to develop a strategy for ambitious eu action to address the rising attacks against human rights defenders;


### 22. highlights the interdependence between human rights , a healthy environment and combating climate change , and welcomes the un’s call for global recognition of the right to a safe , clean , healthy and sustainable environment; underlines the vital role played by environmental human rights defenders and local and indigenous populations in preserving such an environment , despite the threats of violence that they often face from those responsible for , and profiting from , environmentally harmful practices; encourages the eu and the member states to promote the recognition of ecocide as an international crime under the rome statute of the icc , and requests that the commission study the relevance of ecocide to eu law and eu diplomacy; ### 22. highlights the interdependence between human rights , a healthy environment and combating climate change; underlines the vital role played by environmental human rights defenders and local and indigenous populations in preserving the environment , despite the threats of violence that they often face from those responsible for , and profiting from , environmentally harmful practices;


### 22. highlights the interdependence between human rights , a healthy environment and combating climate change , and welcomes the un’s call for global recognition of the right to a safe , clean , healthy and sustainable environment; underlines the vital role played by environmental human rights defenders and local and indigenous populations in preserving such an environment , despite the threats of violence that they often face from those responsible for , and profiting from , environmentally harmful practices; encourages the eu and the member states to promote the recognition of ecocide as an international crime under the rome statute of the icc , and requests that the commission study the relevance of ecocide to eu law and eu diplomacy; ### 22. is aware of the relationship between human rights , a healthy environment and combating climate change , and notes the un’s call for global recognition of the right to a safe , clean , healthy and sustainable environment; underlines the vital role played by environmental human rights defenders and local and indigenous populations in preserving such an environment , despite the threats of violence that they often face from those responsible for , and profiting from , environmentally harmful practices;


### 22. highlights the interdependence between human rights , a healthy environment and combating climate change , and welcomes the un’s call for global recognition of the right to a safe , clean , healthy and sustainable environment; underlines the vital role played by environmental human rights defenders and local and indigenous populations in preserving such an environment , despite the threats of violence that they often face from those responsible for , and profiting from , environmentally harmful practices; encourages the eu and the member states to promote the recognition of ecocide as an international crime under the rome statute of the icc , and requests that the commission study the relevance of ecocide to eu law and eu diplomacy; ### 22. highlights the interdependence between human rights , a healthy environment and combating climate change , and welcomes the un’s call for global recognition of the right to a safe , clean , healthy and sustainable environment; underlines the vital role played by environmental human rights defenders and local and indigenous populations in preserving such an environment , despite the threats of violence that they often face from those responsible for , and profiting from , environmentally harmful practices;


### 22. highlights the interdependence between human rights , a healthy environment and combating climate change , and welcomes the un’s call for global recognition of the right to a safe , clean , healthy and sustainable environment; underlines the vital role played by environmental human rights defenders and local and indigenous populations in preserving such an environment , despite the threats of violence that they often face from those responsible for , and profiting from , environmentally harmful practices; encourages the eu and the member states to promote the recognition of ecocide as an international crime under the rome statute of the icc , and requests that the commission study the relevance of ecocide to eu law and eu diplomacy; ### 22. highlights the linkage between human rights , a healthy environment and combating climate change , and welcomes the un’s call for global recognition of the right to a safe , clean , healthy and sustainable environment; underlines the vital role played by environmental human rights defenders and local and indigenous populations in preserving such an environment , despite the threats of violence that they often face from those responsible for , and profiting from , environmentally harmful practices; encourages the eu and the member states to take bold initiatives to fight the impunity of environmental crimes at the global level;


### 23. underlines the crucial importance of advancing women’s rights and welcomes the eu action plan on gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action 2021–2025 (gap iii) as a sign of the eu’s commitment in this field; commends the important role played by female civic activists in political , social and environmental movements , and deplores the fact that women often become targets of violence as a result of both their gender and their activities , even paying for them with their lives; ### 23. underlines the crucial importance of advancing women’s rights; commends the important role played by female political leaders and civic activists in political , social and environmental movements , and deplores the fact that women often become targets of violence as a result of both their gender and their activities , even paying for them with their lives;


### 23. underlines the crucial importance of advancing women’s rights and welcomes the eu action plan on gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action 2021–2025 (gap iii) as a sign of the eu’s commitment in this field; commends the important role played by female civic activists in political , social and environmental movements , and deplores the fact that women often become targets of violence as a result of both their gender and their activities , even paying for them with their lives; ### 23. underlines the crucial importance of advancing women’s rights and notes the eu action plan on gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action 2021–2025 (gap iii) as a sign of the eu’s commitment in this field; commends the important role played by female civic activists in political , social and environmental movements , and deplores the fact that women often become targets of violence as a result of both their sex and their activities , even paying for them with their lives;


### 24. deplores the fact that women continue to make up the majority of victims of gender-based violence , such as domestic violence and sexual violence and abuse , including female genital mutilation , and that they face discrimination in political and professional life , as well as in access to education and healthcare; stresses that the provision of care , protection and access to justice for victims of gender-based violence and trafficking has significantly decreased as a result of the pandemic , and calls for the eu to promote the development of emergency assistance plans and protocols both at un level and in partner countries , with the aim of adapting assistance programmes to the circumstances of the pandemic , its aftermath and future crises; ### 24. deplores the fact that women continue to make up the majority of victims of gender-based violence , such as domestic violence and sexual violence and abuse , including female genital mutilation , and that they face discrimination in political and professional life , as well as in access to education and healthcare; stresses that the provision of care , protection and access to justice for victims of gender-based violence and trafficking has significantly decreased as a result of the pandemic , and calls for the eu to promote the development of emergency assistance plans and protocols both at un level and in partner countries , with the aim of adapting assistance programmes to the circumstances of the pandemic , its aftermath and future crises; highlights the need to protect mothers in vulnerable situation , in particular single mothers and those who have a large family , to avoid poverty and social exclusion; and points out the need to create a social and economic environment and conditions that allows mothers to continue their professional development;


### 24. deplores the fact that women continue to make up the majority of victims of gender-based violence , such as domestic violence and sexual violence and abuse , including female genital mutilation , and that they face discrimination in political and professional life , as well as in access to education and healthcare; stresses that the provision of care , protection and access to justice for victims of gender-based violence and trafficking has significantly decreased as a result of the pandemic , and calls for the eu to promote the development of emergency assistance plans and protocols both at un level and in partner countries , with the aim of adapting assistance programmes to the circumstances of the pandemic , its aftermath and future crises; ### 24. deplores the fact that women continue to make up the majority of victims of gender-based violence , such as domestic violence and sexual violence and abuse , including female genital mutilation , and that they face discrimination in political and professional life , as well as in access to education and healthcare; stresses that the provision of care , protection and access to justice for victims of gender-based violence and trafficking has significantly decreased as a result of the pandemic , and calls for the eu to promote the development of emergency assistance plans and protocols both at un level and in partner countries , with the aim of adapting assistance programmes to the circumstances of the pandemic , its aftermath and future crises; denounces the exploitation of women through the practice of surrogacy;


### 25. regrets the fact that the overall progress in women’s rights is far below the un countries’ commitments included in the beijing convention in 1995 and is concerned at the trend of backsliding in progress achieved; in this regard , is extremely concerned about the deterioration of the right of every individual to have full control over matters related to their sexuality , as well as sexual and reproductive health and rights , without coercion and discrimination , in particular with regard to safe and free access to abortion; calls for the eu and its member states to promote sexual and reproductive health and rights as part of their international commitments and alignment with the sustainable development goals (sdgs); ### 25. reiterates its call for the eu and its member states to support high level of healthcare for pregnant women , safe births and maternal care in third countries; regrets the fact that the overall progress in women’s rights is far below the un countries’ commitments and is concerned at the trend of backsliding in progress achieved; in this regard , is extremely concerned about the deterioration of the right of the unborn child;


### 25. regrets the fact that the overall progress in women’s rights is far below the un countries’ commitments included in the beijing convention in 1995 and is concerned at the trend of backsliding in progress achieved; in this regard , is extremely concerned about the deterioration of the right of every individual to have full control over matters related to their sexuality , as well as sexual and reproductive health and rights , without coercion and discrimination , in particular with regard to safe and free access to abortion; calls for the eu and its member states to promote sexual and reproductive health and rights as part of their international commitments and alignment with the sustainable development goals (sdgs); ### 25. regrets the fact that the overall progress in women’s rights is far below the un countries’ commitments included in the beijing convention in 1995 and is concerned at the trend of backsliding in progress achieved; in this regard , is extremely concerned about the deterioration of the right of every individual to have full control over matters related to their sexuality;


### 25. regrets the fact that the overall progress in women’s rights is far below the un countries’ commitments included in the beijing convention in 1995 and is concerned at the trend of backsliding in progress achieved; in this regard , is extremely concerned about the deterioration of the right of every individual to have full control over matters related to their sexuality , as well as sexual and reproductive health and rights , without coercion and discrimination , in particular with regard to safe and free access to abortion; calls for the eu and its member states to promote sexual and reproductive health and rights as part of their international commitments and alignment with the sustainable development goals (sdgs); ### 25. regrets the fact that the overall progress in women’s rights is far below the un countries’ commitments included in the beijing convention in 1995 and is concerned at the trend of backsliding in progress achieved; in this regard , is concerned about the deterioration of the right of every individual to have full control over matters related to their sexuality , as well as sexual and reproductive health , without coercion and discrimination;


### 26. notes that in 2020 , the situation of the victims of trafficking , the majority of whom are women , has worsened considerably , since the covid-19 pandemic has left the victims of trafficking in an even more vulnerable position; welcomes the launch of the eu’s strategy on combating trafficking in human beings (2021–2025); underlines that the identification of the victims of trafficking has become even more complicated during the covid-19 pandemic , and therefore calls for the eu and its member states to intensify their efforts in international judicial and law enforcement cooperation to prevent trafficking and identify victims , avoiding their criminalisation , in close cooperation with the un office on drugs and crime , ngos and civil society organisations dedicated to the protection of victims; ### 26. notes that in 2020 , the situation of the victims of trafficking , the majority of whom are women , has worsened considerably , since the covid-19 pandemic has left the victims of trafficking in an even more vulnerable position; welcomes the launch of the eu’s strategy on combating trafficking in human beings (2021–2025); stresses in particular the need to increase the fight against organised crime groups that traffic people; underlines that the identification of the victims of trafficking has become even more complicated during the covid-19 pandemic , and therefore calls for the eu and its member states to intensify their efforts in international judicial and law enforcement cooperation to prevent trafficking and identify victims , avoiding their criminalisation , in close cooperation with the un office on drugs and crime , ngos and civil society organisations dedicated to the protection of victims;


### 26. notes that in 2020 , the situation of the victims of trafficking , the majority of whom are women , has worsened considerably , since the covid-19 pandemic has left the victims of trafficking in an even more vulnerable position; welcomes the launch of the eu’s strategy on combating trafficking in human beings (2021–2025); underlines that the identification of the victims of trafficking has become even more complicated during the covid-19 pandemic , and therefore calls for the eu and its member states to intensify their efforts in international judicial and law enforcement cooperation to prevent trafficking and identify victims , avoiding their criminalisation , in close cooperation with the un office on drugs and crime , ngos and civil society organisations dedicated to the protection of victims; ### 26. notes that in 2020 , the situation of the victims of trafficking , the majority of whom are women , has worsened considerably , since the covid-19 pandemic has left the victims of trafficking in an even more vulnerable position; welcomes the launch of the eu’s strategy on combating trafficking in human beings (2021–2025); underlines that the identification of the victims of trafficking has become even more complicated during the covid-19 pandemic , and therefore calls for the eu and its member states to intensify their efforts in international judicial and law enforcement cooperation to prevent trafficking and identify victims , avoiding their criminalisation , and provide them with the necessary health and psychological support in close cooperation with the un office on drugs and crime , ngos and civil society organisations dedicated to the protection of victims;


### 27. reiterates its call for the eu and its member states to step up their efforts to eliminate all forms of abuse against children; welcomes the new eu strategy on the rights of the child adopted by the commission , but stresses that children continue to be victims of violence , early and forced marriage , sexual abuse , including genital mutilation , trafficking , child labour and recruitment as child soldiers , and that they suffer from a lack of access to education and healthcare , and from malnutrition and poverty , in particular in humanitarian crises and armed conflicts; stresses that 2021 is the international year for the elimination of child labour; calls for the streamlining of the rights of the child and the children and armed conflicts (caac) agenda in all the eu’s external policies; calls on the member states to uphold their responsibilities with regard to the protection of foreign fighters’ children who are eu citizens; ### 27. reiterates its call for the eu and its member states to step up their efforts to eliminate all forms of abuse against children; welcomes the new eu strategy on the rights of the child adopted by the commission , but stresses that children continue to be victims of violence , early and forced marriage , forced conversion , child pornography and paedophilia , sexual abuse , including genital mutilation , trafficking , child labour and recruitment as child soldiers , and that they suffer from a lack of access to education and healthcare , and from malnutrition and poverty , in particular in humanitarian crises and armed conflicts; stresses that 2021 is the international year for the elimination of child labour; calls for the streamlining of the rights of the child and the children and armed conflicts (caac) agenda in all the eu’s external policies; calls on the member states to uphold their responsibilities with regard to the protection of foreign fighters’ children who are eu citizens; calls for the full respect of the right of children to be educated and taught in accordance with the religious , philosophical or pedagogical tenets or their parents , as expressed by article 14.3 of the eu charter of fundamental rights;


### 27. reiterates its call for the eu and its member states to step up their efforts to eliminate all forms of abuse against children; welcomes the new eu strategy on the rights of the child adopted by the commission , but stresses that children continue to be victims of violence , early and forced marriage , sexual abuse , including genital mutilation , trafficking , child labour and recruitment as child soldiers , and that they suffer from a lack of access to education and healthcare , and from malnutrition and poverty , in particular in humanitarian crises and armed conflicts; stresses that 2021 is the international year for the elimination of child labour; calls for the streamlining of the rights of the child and the children and armed conflicts (caac) agenda in all the eu’s external policies; calls on the member states to uphold their responsibilities with regard to the protection of foreign fighters’ children who are eu citizens; ### 27. reiterates its call for the eu and its member states to step up their efforts to eliminate all forms of abuse against children; welcomes the new eu strategy on the rights of the child adopted by the commission , but stresses that children continue to be victims of violence , early and forced marriage , sexual abuse , including genital mutilation , trafficking , prostitution , pornography , child labour and recruitment as child soldiers , and that they suffer from a lack of access to education and healthcare , and from malnutrition and poverty , in particular in humanitarian crises and armed conflicts; stresses that 2021 is the international year for the elimination of child labour; calls for the streamlining of the rights of the child and parental rights and the children and armed conflicts (caac) agenda in all the eu’s external policies; calls on the member states to uphold their responsibilities with regard to the protection of foreign fighters’ children who are eu citizens;


### (6) specific money laundering and terrorist financing threats , risks and vulnerabilities affecting certain economic sectors at national level diminish in distinct manners member states ability to contribute to the integrity and soundness of the union financial system. as such , it is appropriate to allow member states , upon identification of such sectors and specific risks to decide to apply aml/cft requirements to additional sectors than those covered by regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation]. with a view to preserving the effectiveness of the internal market and the union aml/cft system , the commission should be able , with the support of amla , to assess whether the intended decisions of the member states to apply aml/cft requirements to additional sectors are justified. in cases where the best interests of the union would be achieved at union level as regards specific sectors , the commission should inform that member state that it intends to take action at union level instead and the member state should abstain from taking the intended national measures. ### (6) specific money laundering and terrorist financing threats , risks and vulnerabilities affecting certain economic sectors at national level diminish in distinct manners member states ability to contribute to the integrity and soundness of the union financial system. as such , it is appropriate to allow member states , upon identification of such sectors and specific risks to apply aml/cft requirements to additional sectors than those covered by regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation]. with a view to preserving the effectiveness of the internal market and the union aml/cft system , the commission should be able , with the support of amla , to assess whether the decisions of the member states to apply aml/cft requirements to additional sectors are justified. in cases where the best interests of the union would be achieved at union level as regards specific sectors , the commission should inform that member state that it intends to take action at union level instead and the member state should abstain from taking the intended national measures.


### (7) in light of the specific anti-money laundering vulnerabilities that have been witnessed in the electronic money issuing , the payment services and the crypto-assets service providing industry , it should be possible for member states to require that those providers established on their territory in forms other than a branch and the head office of which is situated in another member state appoint a central contact point. such a central contact point , acting on behalf of the appointing institution , should ensure the establishments' compliance with aml/cft rules. ### (7) in light of anti-money laundering vulnerabilities related to electronic money issuing , the payment services and the crypto-assets service providing industry , it should be possible for member states to require that those providers established on their territory in forms other than a branch and the head office of which is situated in another member state appoint a central contact point. such a central contact point , acting on behalf of the appointing institution , should ensure the establishments' compliance with aml/cft rules.


### (12) the member states remain the best placed to identify , assess , understand and decide how to mitigate risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting them directly. therefore , each member state should take the appropriate steps in an effort to properly identity , assess and understand its money laundering and terrorist financing risks , as well as risks of non-implementation and evasion of targeted financial sanctions and to define a coherent national strategy to put in place actions to mitigate those risks. such national risk assessment should be updated regularly and should include a description of the institutional structure and broad procedures of the member state's aml/cft regime , as well as the allocated human and financial resources to the extent that this information is available. ### (12) the member states remain the best placed to identify , assess , understand and decide how to mitigate risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting them directly. therefore , each member state should take the appropriate steps in an effort to properly identity , assess and understand its money laundering and terrorist financing risks , as well as risks of non-implementation and evasion of targeted financial sanctions and to define a coherent national strategy to put in place actions to mitigate those risks. such national risk assessment should be updated regularly and should include a description of the institutional structure and broad procedures of the member state's aml/cft regime , as well as the allocated human and financial resources to the extent that this information is available. such national risk assessment should be made available , when appropriate , to the public.


### (12) the member states remain the best placed to identify , assess , understand and decide how to mitigate risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting them directly. therefore , each member state should take the appropriate steps in an effort to properly identity , assess and understand its money laundering and terrorist financing risks , as well as risks of non-implementation and evasion of targeted financial sanctions and to define a coherent national strategy to put in place actions to mitigate those risks. such national risk assessment should be updated regularly and should include a description of the institutional structure and broad procedures of the member state's aml/cft regime , as well as the allocated human and financial resources to the extent that this information is available. ### (12) the member states remain the best placed to identify , assess , understand and decide how to mitigate risks of money laundering and terrorist financing , as well as how to fight money laundering and terrorism financing , affecting them directly. therefore , each member state should take the appropriate steps in an effort to properly identity , assess and understand its money laundering and terrorist financing risks , as well as risks of non-implementation and evasion of targeted financial sanctions and to define a coherent national strategy to put in place actions to mitigate those risks. such national risk assessment should be updated regularly and should include a description of the institutional structure and broad procedures of the member state's aml/cft regime , as well as the allocated human and financial resources to the extent that this information is available.


### (14) in addition , to identify , understand , manage and mitigate risks at union level to an even greater degree , member states should make available the results of their risk assessments to each other , to the commission and to amla. ### (14) in addition , to identify , understand , manage and mitigate risks at union level to an even greater degree , member states should make available the results of their risk assessments to each other , to the commission and to amla. when appropriate , this risk assessment should be made public. in order to respect privacy and protect personal data , the results of risk assessments should only be made available to the extent that the data provided is the minimum level of data necessary for the carrying out of aml/cft duties.


### (19) with a view to enhancing transparency in order to combat the misuse of legal entities , member states should ensure that beneficial ownership information is stored in a central register located outside the company , in full compliance with union law. member states can , for that purpose , use a central database , which collects beneficial ownership information , or the business register , or another central register. member states may decide that obliged entities are responsible for filling in the register. member states should make sure that in all cases that information is made available to competent authorities and fius and is provided to obliged entities when they take customer due diligence measures. ### (19) with a view to enhancing transparency in order to combat the misuse of legal entities , member states should ensure that beneficial ownership information is stored in a central register located outside the company , in full compliance with union law. member states can , for that purpose , use a central database , which collects beneficial ownership information , or the business register , or another central register. member states may decide that obliged entities are responsible for filling in the register. member states should make sure that in all cases that information is made available to competent authorities and fius and is provided to obliged entities when they take customer due diligence measures. account should be taken of the specific legal concept of the trust in common law jurisdictions and the fact that the beneficial owner may not always be identifiable , particularly in the case of secret , half-secret , resulting , or purpose/charitable trusts or that the number of beneficial owners may be so extensive that maintaining a full and complete register may not be feasible.


### (22) the accuracy of data included in the beneficial ownership registers is fundamental for all of the relevant authorities and other persons allowed access to that data , and to make valid , lawful decisions based on that data. therefore , where sufficient reasons arise , after careful analysis by the registrars , to doubt the accuracy of the beneficial ownership information held by the registers , legal entities and legal arrangements should be required to provide additional information on a risk-sensitive basis. in addition , it is important that member states entrust the entity in charge of managing the registers with sufficient powers to verify beneficial ownership and the veracity of information provided to it , and to report any suspicion to their fiu. such powers should extend to the conduct of inspections at the premises of the legal entities. ### (22) the accuracy of data included in the beneficial ownership registers is fundamental for all of the relevant authorities and other persons allowed access to that data , and to make valid , lawful decisions based on that data. therefore , member states should ensure that , at the time of submission of the beneficial ownership information and on a regular basis thereafter , that that information is adequate , accurate and up to date. member states should ensure that entities in charge of central registers have at their disposal state-of-the-art technology to carry out automated verifications in a manner that safeguards fundamental rights and avoids discriminatory outcomes. in addition , where sufficient reasons arise , after careful analysis by the registrars , to doubt the accuracy of the beneficial ownership information held by the registers , legal entities and legal arrangements should be required to provide additional information on a risk-sensitive basis. in addition , it is important that member states entrust the entity in charge of managing the registers with sufficient powers to verify beneficial ownership and the veracity of information provided to it , and to report any suspicion to their fiu. such powers should extend to the conduct of inspections at the premises of the legal entities and , where applicable , to obliged entities , in accordance with national law , with particular regard being had to provisions governing protection of confidentiality. similarly , such powers should extend to representatives of foreign legal persons and foreign legal arrangements in the union , where there are such representatives.


### (22) the accuracy of data included in the beneficial ownership registers is fundamental for all of the relevant authorities and other persons allowed access to that data , and to make valid , lawful decisions based on that data. therefore , where sufficient reasons arise , after careful analysis by the registrars , to doubt the accuracy of the beneficial ownership information held by the registers , legal entities and legal arrangements should be required to provide additional information on a risk-sensitive basis. in addition , it is important that member states entrust the entity in charge of managing the registers with sufficient powers to verify beneficial ownership and the veracity of information provided to it , and to report any suspicion to their fiu. such powers should extend to the conduct of inspections at the premises of the legal entities. ### (22) the accuracy of data included in the beneficial ownership registers is fundamental for all of the relevant authorities and other persons allowed access to that data , and to make valid , lawful decisions based on that data. member states should therefore ensure that the data entered into the beneficial ownership registers is reliable and up-to-date. therefore , where sufficient reasons arise , after careful analysis by the registrars , to doubt the accuracy of the beneficial ownership information held by the registers , legal entities and legal arrangements should be required to provide additional information on a risk-sensitive basis. in addition , it is important that member states entrust the entity in charge of managing the registers with sufficient powers to verify beneficial ownership and the veracity of information provided to it , and to report any suspicion to their fiu. such powers should extend to the conduct of inspections at the premises of the legal entities. should the data in the register be incomplete or inaccurate , this should not compromise the validity of transactions concluded based on this data.


### (22) the accuracy of data included in the beneficial ownership registers is fundamental for all of the relevant authorities and other persons allowed access to that data , and to make valid , lawful decisions based on that data. therefore , where sufficient reasons arise , after careful analysis by the registrars , to doubt the accuracy of the beneficial ownership information held by the registers , legal entities and legal arrangements should be required to provide additional information on a risk-sensitive basis. in addition , it is important that member states entrust the entity in charge of managing the registers with sufficient powers to verify beneficial ownership and the veracity of information provided to it , and to report any suspicion to their fiu. such powers should extend to the conduct of inspections at the premises of the legal entities. ### (22) the accuracy of data included in the beneficial ownership registers is fundamental for all of the relevant authorities and other persons allowed access to that data , and to make valid , lawful decisions based on that data. therefore , where sufficient reasons arise , after careful analysis by the registrars , to doubt the accuracy of the beneficial ownership information held by the registers , legal entities and legal arrangements should be required to provide additional information on a risk-sensitive basis. in addition , it is important that member states entrust the entity in charge of managing the registers with sufficient powers and resources to verify beneficial ownership and the veracity of information provided to it , and to report any suspicion to their fiu. such powers should extend to the conduct of inspections at the premises of the legal entities. member states should ensure that entities in charge of the central registers verify , at the time of submission of the beneficial ownership information , that the given information is accurate.


### (22) the accuracy of data included in the beneficial ownership registers is fundamental for all of the relevant authorities and other persons allowed access to that data , and to make valid , lawful decisions based on that data. therefore , where sufficient reasons arise , after careful analysis by the registrars , to doubt the accuracy of the beneficial ownership information held by the registers , legal entities and legal arrangements should be required to provide additional information on a risk-sensitive basis. in addition , it is important that member states entrust the entity in charge of managing the registers with sufficient powers to verify beneficial ownership and the veracity of information provided to it , and to report any suspicion to their fiu. such powers should extend to the conduct of inspections at the premises of the legal entities. ### (22) the accuracy of data included in the beneficial ownership registers is fundamental for all of the relevant authorities and other persons allowed access to that data , and to make valid , lawful decisions based on that data. therefore , where sufficient reasons arise , after careful analysis by the registrars , and taking account of the specific concept of the trust in common law jurisdictions , to doubt the accuracy of the beneficial ownership information held by the registers , legal entities and legal arrangements should be required to provide additional information on a risk-sensitive basis. in addition , it is important that member states entrust the entity in charge of managing the registers with sufficient powers to verify beneficial ownership and the veracity of information provided to it , and to report any suspicion to their fiu. such powers should extend to the conduct of inspections at the premises of the legal entities.


### (35) moreover , with the aim of ensuring a proportionate and balanced approach and to guarantee the rights to private life and personal data protection , it should be possible for member states to provide for exemptions to the disclosure of the personal information on the beneficial owner through the registers of beneficial ownership information and to access to such information , in exceptional circumstances , where that information would expose the beneficial owner to a disproportionate risk of fraud , kidnapping , blackmail , extortion , harassment , violence or intimidation. it should also be possible for member states to require online registration in order to identify any person who requests information from the register , as well as the payment of a fee for access to the information in the register. ### (35) moreover , with the aim of ensuring a proportionate and balanced approach and to guarantee the rights to private life and personal data protection , it should be possible for member states to provide for exemptions to the disclosure of the personal information on the beneficial owner through the registers of beneficial ownership information and to access to such information , in exceptional circumstances , where that information would expose the beneficial owner to a disproportionate risk of fraud , kidnapping , blackmail , extortion , harassment , violence or intimidation. it should also be possible for member states to require online registration in order to identify any person who requests information from the register , as well as the payment of a proportionate and adequate fee for access to the information in the register.


### (40) in order to respect privacy and protect personal data , the minimum data necessary for the carrying out of aml/cft investigations should be held in centralised automated mechanisms for bank and payment accounts , such as registers or data retrieval systems. it should be possible for member states to determine which data it is useful and proportionate to gather , taking into account the systems and legal traditions in place to enable the meaningful identification of the beneficial owners. when transposing the provisions relating to those mechanisms , member states should set out retention periods equivalent to the period for retention of the documentation and information obtained within the application of customer due diligence measures. it should be possible for member states to extend the retention period on a general basis by law , without requiring case-by-case decisions. the additional retention period should not exceed an additional five years. that period should be without prejudice to national law setting out other data retention requirements allowing case-by-case decisions to facilitate criminal or administrative proceedings. access to those mechanisms should be on a need-to-know basis. ### (40) in order to respect privacy and protect personal data , the minimum data necessary for the carrying out of aml/cft investigations should be held in centralised automated mechanisms for bank and payment accounts , such as registers or data retrieval systems. it should be possible for member states to determine which data it is useful and proportionate to gather , taking into account the systems and legal traditions in place to enable the meaningful identification of the beneficial owners. when transposing the provisions relating to those mechanisms , member states should set out retention periods equivalent to the period for retention of the documentation and information obtained within the application of customer due diligence measures. it should be possible for member states , when necessary , to extend the retention period on a general basis by law , without requiring case-by-case decisions. the additional retention period should not exceed an additional five years. that period should be without prejudice to national law setting out other data retention requirements allowing case-by-case decisions to facilitate criminal or administrative proceedings. access to those mechanisms should be on a need-to-know basis.


### (40) in order to respect privacy and protect personal data , the minimum data necessary for the carrying out of aml/cft investigations should be held in centralised automated mechanisms for bank and payment accounts , such as registers or data retrieval systems. it should be possible for member states to determine which data it is useful and proportionate to gather , taking into account the systems and legal traditions in place to enable the meaningful identification of the beneficial owners. when transposing the provisions relating to those mechanisms , member states should set out retention periods equivalent to the period for retention of the documentation and information obtained within the application of customer due diligence measures. it should be possible for member states to extend the retention period on a general basis by law , without requiring case-by-case decisions. the additional retention period should not exceed an additional five years. that period should be without prejudice to national law setting out other data retention requirements allowing case-by-case decisions to facilitate criminal or administrative proceedings. access to those mechanisms should be on a need-to-know basis. ### (40) in order to respect privacy and protect personal data , the minimum data necessary for the carrying out of aml/cft investigations should be held in centralised automated mechanisms for bank and payment accounts , such as registers or data retrieval systems. it should be possible for member states to determine which data it is useful and proportionate to gather , taking into account the systems and legal traditions in place to enable the meaningful identification of the beneficial owners. when transposing the provisions relating to those mechanisms , member states should set out retention periods equivalent to the period for retention of the documentation and information obtained within the application of customer due diligence measures. it should be possible for member states to extend the retention period on a case-by-case basis. the additional retention period should not exceed an additional three years. that period should be without prejudice to national law setting out other data retention requirements allowing case-by-case decisions to facilitate criminal or administrative proceedings. access to those mechanisms should be on a need-to-know basis.


### (44) real estate is an attractive commodity for criminals to launder the proceeds of their illicit activities , as it allows obscuring the true source of the funds and the identity of the beneficial owner. proper and timely identification of natural or legal person owning real estate by fius and other competent authorities is important both for detecting money laundering schemes as well as for freezing and confiscation of assets. it is therefore important that member states provide fius and competent authorities with access to information which allows the identification in a timely manner of natural or legal person owning real estate and information relevant for the identification of the risk and suspicion of the transaction. ### (44) real estate is an attractive commodity for criminals to launder the proceeds of their illicit activities , as it allows obscuring the true source of the funds and the identity of the beneficial owner. proper and timely identification of natural or legal person owning real estate by fius and other competent authorities is important both for detecting money laundering schemes as well as for freezing and confiscation of assets. it is therefore important that member states provide fius and competent authorities with access to information which allows the identification in a timely manner of natural or legal person owning real estate and information relevant for the identification of the risk and suspicion of the transaction. member states shall decide whether to provide the information through a centralised or decentralised access point and whether to link the information via a system to be operated by the commission.


### (44) real estate is an attractive commodity for criminals to launder the proceeds of their illicit activities , as it allows obscuring the true source of the funds and the identity of the beneficial owner. proper and timely identification of natural or legal person owning real estate by fius and other competent authorities is important both for detecting money laundering schemes as well as for freezing and confiscation of assets. it is therefore important that member states provide fius and competent authorities with access to information which allows the identification in a timely manner of natural or legal person owning real estate and information relevant for the identification of the risk and suspicion of the transaction. ### (44) real estate is an attractive commodity for criminals to launder the proceeds of their illicit activities , as it allows obscuring the true source of the funds and the identity of the beneficial owner. proper and timely identification of natural or legal person owning real estate by fius and other competent authorities is important both for detecting money laundering schemes as well as for freezing and confiscation of assets. it is therefore important that member states provide fius and competent authorities with access to information held in centralised or decentralised registers which allows the identification in a timely manner of natural or legal person owning real estate and information relevant for the identification of the risk and suspicion of the transaction.


### (45) all member states have , or should , set up operationally independent and autonomous fius to collect and analyse the information which they receive with the aim of establishing links between suspicious transactions and underlying criminal activity in order to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing. the fiu should be the single central national unit responsible for the receipt and analysis of suspicious transaction reports , reports on cross-border physical movements of cash and on payments in cash above a certain threshold as well as other information relevant to money laundering , its predicate offences or terrorist financing submitted by obliged entities. operational independence and autonomy of the fiu should be ensured by granting the fiu the authority and capacity to carry out its functions freely , including the ability to take autonomous decisions as regards analysis , requests and dissemination of specific information. in all cases , the fiu should have the independent right to forward or disseminate information to competent authorities. the fiu should be provided with adequate financial , human and technical resources , in a manner that secures its autonomy and independence and enables it to exercise its mandate effectively. the fiu should be able to obtain and deploy the resources needed to carry out its functions , on an individual or routine basis , free from any undue political , government or industry influence or interference , which might compromise its operational independence. ### (45) all member states have , or should , set up operationally independent and autonomous fius to collect and analyse the information which they receive with the aim of establishing links between suspicious transactions and underlying criminal activity in order to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing. the fiu should be the single central national unit responsible for the receipt and analysis of suspicious transaction reports , reports on cross-border physical movements of cash and on payments in cash above a certain threshold as well as other information relevant to money laundering , its predicate offences or terrorist financing submitted by obliged entities , in compliance with existing legal provisions , such as directive (eu) 2019/1153 laying down rules facilitating the use of financial and other information for the prevention , detection , investigation or prosecution of certain criminal offences , and repealing council decision 2000/642/jha , operational independence and autonomy of the fiu should be ensured by granting the fiu the authority and capacity to carry out its functions freely , including the ability to take autonomous decisions as regards analysis , requests and dissemination of specific information. in all cases , the fiu should have the independent right to forward or disseminate information to competent authorities. the fiu should be provided with adequate financial , human and technical resources , in a manner that secures its autonomy and independence and enables it to exercise its mandate effectively. the fiu should be able to obtain and deploy the resources needed to carry out its functions , on an individual or routine basis , free from any undue political , government or industry influence or interference , which might compromise its operational independence.


### (48) the vast majority of fius have been granted the power to take urgent action and suspend or withhold consent to a transaction in order to analyse it , confirm the suspicion and disseminate the results of the analytical activities to the competent authorities. however , there are certain variations in relation to the duration of the postponement powers across the different member states , with an impact not only on the postponement of activities that have a cross-border nature through fiu-to-fiu cooperation , but also on individuals’ fundamental rights. furthermore , in order to ensure that fius have the capacity to promptly restrain criminal funds or assets and prevent their dissipation , also for seizure purposes , fius should be granted the power to suspend the use of a bank or payment account in order to analyse the transactions performed through the account , confirm the suspicion and disseminate the results of the analysis to the competent authorities. given that postponement powers have an impact on the right to property , the preservation of affected persons’ fundamental rights should be guaranteed. ### (48) the vast majority of fius have been granted the power to take urgent action and suspend or withhold consent to a transaction in order to analyse it , confirm the suspicion and disseminate the results of the analytical activities to the competent authorities. however , there are certain variations in relation to the duration of the postponement powers across the different member states , with an impact not only on the postponement of activities that have a cross-border nature through fiu-to-fiu cooperation , but also on individuals’ fundamental rights. furthermore , in order to ensure that fius have the capacity to promptly restrain criminal funds or assets and prevent their dissipation , also for seizure purposes , fius should be granted the power to suspend , for the necessary and adequate period of time , the use of a bank or payment account in order to analyse the transactions performed through the account , confirm the suspicion and disseminate the results of the analysis to the competent authorities. given that postponement powers have an impact on the right to property , the preservation of affected persons’ fundamental rights should be guaranteed.


### (51) fius should use secure facilities , including protected channels of communication , to cooperate and exchange information amongst each other. in this respect , a system for the exchange of information between fius of the member states (‘fiu.net’) should be set up. the system should be managed and hosted by amla. the fiu.net should be used by fius to cooperate and exchange information amongst each other and may also be used , where appropriate , to exchange information with fius of third countries and with other authorities and union bodies. the functionalities of the fiu.net should be used by fius to their full potential. those functionalities should allow fius to match their data with data of other fius in an anonymous way with the aim of detecting subjects of the fiu's interests in other member states and identifying their proceeds and funds , whilst ensuring full protection of personal data. ### (51) fius should use secure facilities , including protected channels of communication , to cooperate and exchange information amongst each other. in this respect , a fully encrypted , safe and secure system for the exchange of information between fius of the member states (‘fiu.net’) should be set up. the system should be managed and hosted by amla. the fiu.net should be the only system used by fius to cooperate and exchange information amongst each other and may also be used , where appropriate , to exchange information with fius of third countries and with other authorities and union bodies. the functionalities of the fiu.net should be used by fius to their full potential. those functionalities should allow fius to match their data with data of other fius in an anonymous way with the aim of detecting subjects of the fiu's interests in other member states and identifying their proceeds and funds , whilst ensuring full protection of personal data.


### (54) the movement of illicit money traverses borders and may affect different member states. the cross-border cases , involving multiple jurisdictions , are becoming more and more frequent and increasingly significant , also due to the activities carried out by obliged entities on a cross-border basis. in order to deal effectively with cases that concern several member states , fius should be able to go beyond the simple exchange of information for the detection and analysis of suspicious transactions and activities and share the analytical activity itself. fius have reported certain important issues which limit or condition the capacity of fius to engage in joint analysis. carrying out joint analysis of suspicious transactions and activities will enable fius to exploit potential synergies , to use information from different sources , to obtain a full picture of the anomalous activities and to enrich the analysis. fius should be able to conduct joint analyses of suspicious transactions and activities and to set up and participate in joint analysis teams for specific purposes and limited period with the assistance of amla. the participation of third parties may be instrumental for the successful outcome of joint analyses. therefore , fius may invite third parties to take part in the joint analysis where such participation would fall within the respective mandates of those third parties. ### (54) the movement of illicit money traverses borders and may affect different member states. the cross-border cases , involving multiple jurisdictions , are becoming more and more frequent and increasingly significant , also due to the activities carried out by obliged entities on a cross-border basis. in order to deal effectively with cases that concern several member states , fius should be able to go beyond the simple exchange of information for the detection and analysis of suspicious transactions and activities and share the analytical activity itself. fius have reported certain important issues which limit or condition the capacity of fius to engage in joint analysis. carrying out joint analysis of suspicious transactions and activities will enable fius to exploit potential synergies , to use information from different sources , to obtain a full picture of the anomalous activities and to enrich the analysis. fius should be able to conduct joint analyses of suspicious transactions and activities and to set up and participate in joint analysis teams for specific purposes and limited period with the assistance of amla. the participation of third parties may be instrumental for the successful outcome of joint analyses. therefore , fius may invite , when necessary and adequate , third parties to take part in the joint analysis where such participation would fall within the respective mandates of those third parties.


### (55) effective supervision of all obliged entities is essential to protect the integrity of the union financial system and of the internal market. to this end , member states should deploy effective and impartial aml/cft supervision and set forth the conditions for effective , timely and sustained cooperation between supervisors. ### (55) effective supervision of all obliged entities is essential to protect the integrity of the union financial system and of the internal market. to this end , member states should deploy independent , effective and impartial aml/cft supervision and set forth the conditions for effective , timely and sustained cooperation between supervisors.


### (60) supervisors should adopt a risk-based approach to their work , which should enable them to focus their resources where the risks are the highest , whilst ensuring that no sector or entity is left exposed to criminal attempts to launder money or finance terrorism. amla should play a leading role in fostering a common understanding of risks , and should therefore be entrusted with developing the benchmarks and a methodology for assessing and classifying the inherent and residual risk profile of obliged entities , as well as the frequency at which such risk profile should be reviewed. ### (60) supervisors should adopt a risk-based approach to their work , which should enable them to focus their resources where the risks are the highest , whilst ensuring that no sector or entity is left exposed to criminal attempts to launder money or finance terrorism. amla should play a leading role in fostering a common understanding of risks , and should therefore be entrusted with developing the benchmarks and a methodology for assessing and classifying the inherent and residual risk profile of obliged entities , as well as the frequency at which such risk profile should be reviewed. in that regard , supervisors and self-regulatory bodies should adopt an annual activity report and make a summary thereof available to amla.


### (69) directive (eu) 2015/849 allowed member states to entrust the supervision of some obliged entities to self-regulatory bodies. however , the quality and intensity of supervision performed by such self-regulatory bodies has been insufficient , and under no or close to no public scrutiny. where a member state decides to entrust supervision to a self-regulatory body , it should also designate a public authority to oversee the activities of the self-regulatory body to ensure that the performance of those activities is in line with the requirements of this directive. ### deleted


### (70) the importance of combating money laundering and terrorist financing should result in member states laying down effective , proportionate and dissuasive administrative sanctions and measures in national law for failure to respect the requirements of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation]. national supervisors should be empowered by member states to impose such measures to obliged entities to remedy the situation in the case of breaches and , where the breach so justifies , issue pecuniary sanctions. the range of sanctions and measures should be sufficiently broad to allow member states and competent authorities to take account of the differences between obliged entities , in particular between credit institutions and financial institutions and other obliged entities , as regards their size , characteristics and the nature of the business. ### (70) the importance of combating money laundering and terrorist financing should result in member states laying down effective , proportionate and dissuasive administrative sanctions and measures in national law for failure to respect the requirements of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation]. national supervisors should be empowered by member states to impose such measures to obliged entities to remedy the situation in the case of breaches and , where the breach so justifies , issue pecuniary sanctions. the range of sanctions and measures should be sufficiently broad to allow member states and competent authorities to take account of the differences between obliged entities , in particular between credit institutions and financial institutions and between traditional financial institutions and virtual asset issuers and service providers , and other obliged entities , as regards their size , characteristics and the nature of the business.


### (71) member states currently have a diverse range of administrative sanctions and measures for breaches of the key preventative provisions in place and an inconsistent approach to investigating and sanctioning violations of anti-money laundering requirements , nor is there a common understanding among supervisors as to what should constitute a "serious" violation and thus distinguish when an administrative sanction should be imposed. that diversity is detrimental to the efforts made in combating money laundering and terrorist financing and the union's response is fragmented. therefore , common criteria for determining the most appropriate supervisory response to breaches should be laid down and a range of administrative measures that the supervisors could impose when the breaches are not sufficiently serious to be punished with an administrative sanction should be provided. in order to incentivise obliged entities to comply with the provisions of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] , it is necessary to strengthen the dissuasive nature of administrative sanctions. accordingly , the minimum amount of the maximum penalty that can be imposed in case of serious breaches of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] should be raised. in transposing this directive , member states should ensure that the imposition of administrative sanctions and measures , and of criminal sanctions in accordance with national law , does not breach the principle of ne bis in idem. ### (71) member states currently have a diverse range of administrative sanctions and measures for breaches of the key preventative provisions in place and an inconsistent approach to investigating and sanctioning violations of anti-money laundering requirements , nor is there a common understanding among supervisors as to what should constitute a "serious" violation and thus distinguish when an administrative sanction should be imposed. that diversity is detrimental to the efforts made in combating money laundering and terrorist financing and the union's response is fragmented. therefore , common criteria for determining the most appropriate supervisory response to breaches should be laid down and a range of administrative measures that the supervisors could impose when the breaches are not sufficiently serious to be punished with an administrative sanction should be provided. in order to incentivise obliged entities to comply with the provisions of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] , it is necessary to strengthen the dissuasive nature of administrative sanctions. accordingly , the minimum amount of the maximum penalty that can be imposed in case of serious breaches of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] should be raised , in a proportionate and adequate way. in transposing this directive , member states should ensure that the imposition of administrative sanctions and measures , and of criminal sanctions in accordance with national law , does not breach the principle of ne bis in idem.


### (73) publication of an administrative sanction or measure for breach of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] can have a strong dissuasive effect against repetition of such breach. it also informs other entities of the money laundering and financing of terrorism risks associated with the sanctioned obliged entity before entering into a business relationship and assists supervisors in other member states in relation to the risks associated with an obliged entity when it operates in their member state on a cross-border basis. for those reasons , the requirement to publish decisions on sanctions against which there is no appeal should be confirmed. however , any such publication should be proportionate and , in the taking of a decision whether to publish an administrative sanction or measure , supervisors should take into account the gravity of the breach and the dissuasive effect that the publication is likely to achieve. ### (73) publication of an administrative sanction or measure for breach of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] can have a strong dissuasive effect against repetition of such breach. it also informs other entities of the money laundering and financing of terrorism risks associated with the sanctioned obliged entity before entering into a business relationship and assists supervisors in other member states in relation to the risks associated with an obliged entity when it operates in their member state on a cross-border basis. for those reasons , the requirement to publish decisions on sanctions against which there is no appeal possible should be confirmed. however , any such publication should be proportionate and , in the taking of a decision whether to publish an administrative sanction or measure , supervisors should take into account the gravity of the breach and the dissuasive effect that the publication is likely to achieve.


### (73) publication of an administrative sanction or measure for breach of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] can have a strong dissuasive effect against repetition of such breach. it also informs other entities of the money laundering and financing of terrorism risks associated with the sanctioned obliged entity before entering into a business relationship and assists supervisors in other member states in relation to the risks associated with an obliged entity when it operates in their member state on a cross-border basis. for those reasons , the requirement to publish decisions on sanctions against which there is no appeal should be confirmed. however , any such publication should be proportionate and , in the taking of a decision whether to publish an administrative sanction or measure , supervisors should take into account the gravity of the breach and the dissuasive effect that the publication is likely to achieve. ### (73) publication of an administrative sanction or measure for breach of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] can have a strong dissuasive effect against repetition of such breach. it also informs other entities of the money laundering and financing of terrorism risks associated with the sanctioned obliged entity before entering into a business relationship and assists supervisors in other member states in relation to the risks associated with an obliged entity when it operates in their member state on a cross-border basis. for those reasons , the requirement to publish decisions on sanctions against which no appeal can be lodged should be confirmed. however , any such publication should be proportionate and , in the taking of a decision whether to publish an administrative sanction or measure , supervisors should take into account the gravity of the breach and the dissuasive effect that the publication is likely to achieve.


### (76) in order to facilitate and promote effective cooperation , and in particular the exchange of information , member states should be required to communicate to the commission and amla the list of their competent authorities and relevant contact details. ### (76) in order to facilitate and promote effective cooperation , and in particular the exchange of information , member states should be required to communicate to the commission and amla the list of their competent authorities and relevant contact details. this list should take into account existing expertise and available networks , such as the expertise gained by member states' competent authorities and third countries through europol , in their fight against money laundering/terrorist financing.


### (86) it is essential that the alignment of this directive with the revised fatf recommendations is carried out in full compliance with union law , in particular as regards union data protection law , including rules on data transfers , as well as the protection of fundamental rights as enshrined in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (the ‘charter’). certain aspects of the implementation of this directive involve the collection , analysis , storage and sharing of data within the union and with third countries. such processing of personal data should be permitted , while fully respecting fundamental rights , only for the purposes laid down in this directive , and for the activities required under this directive , such as the exchange of information among competent authorities. ### (86) it is essential that the alignment of this directive with the revised fatf recommendations is carried out in full compliance with union law , in particular as regards union data protection law , including rules on data transfers , as well as the protection of fundamental rights as enshrined in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (the ‘charter’). certain aspects of the implementation of this directive involve the collection , analysis , storage and sharing of data within the union and with third countries. such processing of personal data should be permitted , while fully respecting fundamental rights and data protection rules , that require an increased level of protection of when data is shared with third countries and entities , only for the purposes laid down in this directive , and for the activities required under this directive , such as the exchange of information among competent authorities.


### (91) in order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this directive , implementing powers should be conferred on the commission in order to lay down a methodology for the collection of statistics , establish the format for the submission of beneficial ownership information , define the technical conditions for the interconnection of beneficial ownership registers and of bank account registers and data retrieval mechanisms as well as to adopt implementing technical standards specifying the format to be used for the exchange of the information among fius of the member states. those powers should be exercised in accordance with regulation (eu) no 182/2011 of the european parliament and of the council39. ### (91) in order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this directive , implementing powers should be conferred on the commission in order to lay down a methodology for the collection of statistics , establish the format for the submission of beneficial ownership information , define the technical conditions for the interconnection of beneficial ownership registers and of bank account registers and data retrieval mechanisms , define the technical conditions for the connection of the member states’ mechanisms to the single access point on land and real estate , to specify the criteria and format to be used by fius for sharing information on suspended or prohibited transactions and on suspended accounts , to adopt implementing technical standards specifying the format to be used for the exchange of the information among fius of the member states as well as to adopt implementing technical standards specifying a common template for the cooperation agreements between financial supervisors and their counterparts in third countries. those powers should be exercised in accordance with regulation (eu) no 182/2011 of the european parliament and of the council39.


### 1. where the national risk assessment carried out by member states pursuant to article 8 identifies that , in addition to obliged entities , entities in other sectors are exposed to money laundering and terrorist financing risks , member states may decide to apply the requirements of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] to those additional entities. ### 1. where the national risk assessment carried out by member states pursuant to article 8 identifies that , in addition to obliged entities , entities in other sectors are exposed to money laundering and terrorist financing risks , member states may decide to apply the requirements of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final] to those additional entities. member states may decide to implement a grandfathering clause for those sectors that are not under the current aml/cft obligations before the implementation of the new regulation.


### 1. member states shall ensure that currency exchange and cheque cashing offices , and trust or company service providers are either licensed or registered. ### 1. member states shall ensure that currency exchange and cheque cashing offices , as well as trust or company service providers are either licensed or registered.


### 6. for the purposes of this article , member states shall ensure that , in accordance with their national law , supervisors or any other authority competent at national level for assessing the appropriateness of persons referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 , check the existence of a relevant conviction in the criminal record of the person concerned. any exchange of information for those purposes shall be carried out in accordance with framework decision 2009/315/jha and decision 2009/316/jha as implemented in national law. ### 6. for the purposes of this article , member states shall ensure that , in accordance with their national law , supervisors or any other authority competent at national level for assessing the appropriateness of persons referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 , check the existence of a conviction in the criminal record of the person concerned when such conviction is directly related to the type of function carried by a member of the senior management. any exchange of information for those purposes shall be carried out in accordance with framework decision 2009/315/jha and decision 2009/316/jha as implemented in national law.


### the most widespread means used to launder illicit proceeds , including , where available , those particularly used in transactions between member states and third countries , independently of the identification of a third country pursuant to section 2 of chapter iii of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final]; ### the most widespread means used to launder illicit proceeds , including , where available , those particularly used in transactions between member states and third countries , independently of the identification of a third country or territory pursuant to section 2 of chapter iii of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation - com/2021/420 final];


### 6. within 2 years of the adoption of the report referred to in paragraph 1 , and every four years thereafter , the commission shall submit a report to the european parliament and to the council on the actions taken based on the findings of that report. ### 6. within 2 years of the adoption of the report referred to in paragraph 1 , and every three years thereafter , the commission shall submit a report to the european parliament and to the council on the actions taken based on the findings of that report.


### 2. each member state shall designate an authority or establish a mechanism to coordinate the national response to the risks referred to in paragraph 1. the identity of that authority or the description of the mechanism shall be notified to the commission , amla , and other member states. ### 2. each member state shall designate an authority or establish a mechanism to coordinate the national response to the risks referred to in paragraph 1. the identity of that authority or the description of the mechanism shall be notified to the commission , amla , europol , and other member states.


### 3. in carrying out the national risk assessments referred to in paragraph 1 of this article , member states shall take into account the report referred to in article 7(1). ### 3. in carrying out the national risk assessments referred to in paragraph 1 of this article , member states shall take into account the methodology and the report referred to in article 7(1).


### improve its aml/cft regime , in particular by identifying any areas where obliged entities are to apply enhanced measures and , where appropriate , specifying the measures to be taken; ### improve its aml/cft regime , in particular by identifying high and low-risk areas where obliged entities are to apply measures in line with the risk-profile and , where appropriate , specifying the measures to be taken;


### in the national risk assessment , member states shall describe the institutional structure and broad procedures of their aml/cft regime , including , inter alia , the fiu , tax authorities and prosecutors , as well as the allocated human and financial resources to the extent that this information is available. ### in the national risk assessment , member states shall describe the institutional structure and broad procedures of their aml/cft regime , including , inter alia , the fiu , tax authorities and prosecutors , level of european and international cooperation with regard to money laundering and terrorist financing , as well as the allocated human and financial resources to the extent that this information is available.


### 5. member states shall make the results of their national risk assessments , including their updates , available to the commission , to amla and to the other member states. any member state may provide relevant additional information , where appropriate , to the member state carrying out the national risk assessment. a summary of the assessment shall be made publicly available. that summary shall not contain classified information. the information contained therein shall not permit the identification of any natural or legal person. ### 5. member states shall make the results of their national risk assessments , including their updates , available to the commission , to amla and to the other member states. any member state may provide relevant additional information , where appropriate , to the member state carrying out the national risk assessment. a summary of the assessment shall be made publicly available , while respecting high standards of data protection. that summary shall not contain classified information. the information contained therein shall not permit the identification of any natural or legal person.


### a statement accompanied by a justification , that there is no beneficial owner or that the beneficial owner(s) could not be identified and verified; ### a statement by the legal entity accompanied by a justification and supporting documents , that there is no beneficial owner or that the beneficial owner(s) could not be identified and verified; identified pursuant to articles 42 and 43 of the [aml regulation]; these documents shall be available to obliged entities;


### 4. the commission is empowered to adopt , by means of implementing acts , the format for the submission of beneficial ownership information to the central register. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 54(2). ### 4. by [1 year after the entry into force of this directive] the commission shall adopt , by means of implementing acts , the format for the submission of beneficial ownership information to the central register , including a checklist of minimum requirements for information to be examined by the registrant. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 54(2).


### 5. member states shall require that the beneficial ownership information held in the central registers is adequate , accurate and up-to-date. for that purpose , member state shall apply at least the following requirements: ### 5. member states shall require that the beneficial ownership information held in the central registers is adequate , accurate , up-to-date , and is at least made available in english. for that purpose , member state shall apply at least the following requirements:


### (5) member states shall require that the beneficial ownership information held in the central registers is adequate , accurate and up-to-date. for that purpose , member state shall apply at least the following requirements: ### (5) member states shall be responsible for ensuring that the beneficial ownership information held in the central registers is adequate , accurate and up-to-date. for that purpose , member state shall apply at least the following requirements:


### competent authorities , if appropriate and to the extent that this requirement does not interfere unnecessarily with their functions , shall report to the entity in charge of the central registers any discrepancies they find between beneficial ownership information available in the central registers and the beneficial ownership information available to them. ### competent authorities shall report to the entity in charge of the central registers any discrepancies they find between beneficial ownership information available in the central registers and the beneficial ownership information available to them.


### 6. member states shall require that the reporting of discrepancies referred to in paragraph 5 takes place within 14 calendar days after detecting the discrepancy. in cases of lower risk to which measures under section 3 of chapter iii of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] apply , member states may allow obliged entities to request the customer to rectify discrepancies of a technical nature that do not hinder the identification of the beneficial owner(s) directly with the entity in charge of the central registers. ### 6. member states shall require that the reporting of discrepancies referred to in paragraph 5 takes place within 28 calendar days after detecting the discrepancy. in cases of lower risk to which measures under section 3 of chapter iii of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] apply , member states may allow obliged entities to request the customer to rectify discrepancies of a technical nature that do not hinder the identification of the beneficial owner(s) directly with the entity in charge of the central registers.


### (6) member states shall require that the reporting of discrepancies referred to in paragraph 5 takes place within 14 calendar days after detecting the discrepancy. in cases of lower risk to which measures under section 3 of chapter iii of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] apply , member states may allow obliged entities to request the customer to rectify discrepancies of a technical nature that do not hinder the identification of the beneficial owner(s) directly with the entity in charge of the central registers. ### (6) member states shall require that the reporting of discrepancies referred to in paragraph 5 takes place within 28 calendar days after detecting the discrepancy. in cases of lower risk to which measures under section 3 of chapter iii of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] apply , member states may allow obliged entities to request the customer to rectify discrepancies of a technical nature that do not hinder the identification of the beneficial owner(s) directly with the entity in charge of the central registers.


### (7) member states shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central registers takes appropriate actions to cease the discrepancies , including amending the information included in the central registers where the entity is able to identify and verify the beneficial ownership information. a specific mention of the fact that there are discrepancies reported shall be included in the central registers and visible at least to competent authorities and obliged entities. ### (7) member states shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central registers is monitored. obliged entities must be able to rely on the information in the central registers.


### 8. in the case of corporate and other legal entities , member states shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central beneficial ownership register is empowered to carry out checks , including on-site investigations at the premises or registered office of the legal entity , in order to establish the current beneficial ownership of the entity and to verify that the information submitted to the central register is accurate , adequate and up-to-date. the right of the central register to verify such information shall not be restricted , obstructed or precluded in any manner. ### 8. in the case of corporate and other legal entities , member states shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central beneficial ownership register is empowered to carry out checks , including on-site investigations at the premises or registered office of the legal entity , in order to establish the current beneficial ownership of the entity and to verify that the information submitted to the central register is accurate , adequate and up-to-date. member states shall ensure that the entity in charge of the central registers takes appropriate actions to check disclosed beneficial ownership information against financial crime screening lists and verify the identities of directors and beneficial owners against independent sources of evidence. the right of the central register to verify such information shall not be restricted , obstructed or precluded in any manner.


### 1. member states shall ensure that competent authorities have timely , unrestricted and free access to the information held in the interconnected central registers referred to in article 10 , without alerting the entity or arrangement concerned. ### 1. member states shall ensure that competent authorities have immediate , unrestricted and free access to the information held in the interconnected central registers referred to in article 10 , without alerting the entity or arrangement concerned.


### 2. access to the central registers referred to in article 10 shall be granted to fius , supervisory authorities , public authorities with designated responsibilities for combating money laundering or terrorist financing , as well as tax authorities and authorities that have the function of investigating or prosecuting money laundering , its predicate offences and terrorist financing , tracing and seizing or freezing and confiscating criminal assets. self-regulatory bodies shall be granted access to the registers when performing supervisory functions. ### 2. access to the central registers referred to in article 10 shall be granted to fius , supervisory authorities , public authorities with designated responsibilities for combating money laundering or terrorist financing , obliged entities , as well as tax authorities and authorities that have the function of investigating or prosecuting money laundering , its predicate offences and terrorist financing , tracing and seizing or freezing and confiscating criminal assets. self-regulatory bodies shall be granted access to the registers when performing supervisory functions.


### (3) member states shall ensure that , when taking customer due diligence measures in accordance with chapter iii of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] , obliged entities have timely access to the information held in the interconnected central registers referred to in article 10. ### (3) member states shall ensure that , when taking customer due diligence measures in accordance with chapter iii of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] , obliged entities , representatives and outsourcing service providers to which obliged entities have contractually outsourced their due diligence obligations in accordance with [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] , have immediate and free of charge access to the information held in the interconnected central registers referred to in article 10.


### 3. member states shall ensure that , when taking customer due diligence measures in accordance with chapter iii of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] , obliged entities have timely access to the information held in the interconnected central registers referred to in article 10. ### 3. member states shall ensure that , when taking customer due diligence measures in accordance with chapter iii of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] , obliged entities have timely access to the information held in the interconnected central registers referred to in article 10. to this end , in the event that consultation of those registers by the obliged parties is deemed to be due , no financial charge shall be imposed on the obliged parties for access to the registers.


### 3. member states shall ensure that , when taking customer due diligence measures in accordance with chapter iii of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] , obliged entities have timely access to the information held in the interconnected central registers referred to in article 10. ### 3. member states shall ensure that , when taking customer due diligence measures in accordance with chapter iii of regulation [please insert reference – proposal for anti-money laundering regulation] , obliged entities have timely access to the information held in the interconnected central registers referred to in article 10.