### 20. calls for the expansion and modernisation of eu communication strategies so that eu action is sufficiently visible both within and beyond the eu; urges the european external action service (eeas) to further strengthen its capacities to counter disinformation , including the creation of a dedicated far-east stratcom task force focused on the disinformation emanating from china , and imposing costs on countries that deliberately spread disinformation to divide and harm the eu and its member states; ### 20. calls for the expansion and modernisation of eu communication strategies so that eu action is sufficiently visible both within and beyond the eu; urges the european external action service (eeas) to further strengthen its capacities to counter disinformation , hybrid warfare , propaganda and espionage including the creation of dedicated stratcom task forces focused on the disinformation emanating from a) china and b) the middle east , particularly iran , and imposing costs on countries that deliberately spread disinformation to divide and harm the eu and its member states , as well as partners and neighbours covered by enp; points out that not only russia and china , but also iran conducts extensive intelligence operations in europe;


### 20. calls for the expansion and modernisation of eu communication strategies so that eu action is sufficiently visible both within and beyond the eu; urges the european external action service (eeas) to further strengthen its capacities to counter disinformation , including the creation of a dedicated far-east stratcom task force focused on the disinformation emanating from china , and imposing costs on countries that deliberately spread disinformation to divide and harm the eu and its member states; ### 20. calls for a new institutional approach to strategic communication in order to tackle the challenges and risks facing western liberal democracies as well as for the expansion and modernisation of eu communication strategies so that eu action is sufficiently visible both within and beyond the eu; urges the european external action service (eeas) to further strengthen its capacities to counter disinformation , including the creation of a dedicated far-east stratcom task force focused on the disinformation emanating from china , and imposing costs on countries that deliberately spread disinformation to divide and harm the eu and its member states;


### 20. calls for the expansion and modernisation of eu communication strategies so that eu action is sufficiently visible both within and beyond the eu; urges the european external action service (eeas) to further strengthen its capacities to counter disinformation , including the creation of a dedicated far-east stratcom task force focused on the disinformation emanating from china , and imposing costs on countries that deliberately spread disinformation to divide and harm the eu and its member states; ### 20. calls for the expansion and modernisation of eu communication strategies so that eu action is sufficiently visible both within and beyond the eu especially in neighbouring areas; urges the european external action service (eeas) to further strengthen its capacities to counter disinformation , including the creation of a dedicated far-east stratcom task force focused on the disinformation emanating from china , and imposing costs on countries that deliberately spread disinformation to divide and harm the eu and its member states;


### 20. calls for the expansion and modernisation of eu communication strategies so that eu action is sufficiently visible both within and beyond the eu; urges the european external action service (eeas) to further strengthen its capacities to counter disinformation , including the creation of a dedicated far-east stratcom task force focused on the disinformation emanating from china , and imposing costs on countries that deliberately spread disinformation to divide and harm the eu and its member states; ### 20. calls for the expansion and modernisation of eu communication strategies so that eu action is sufficiently visible both within and beyond the eu; urges the european external action service (eeas) to further strengthen its capacities to counter disinformation , including the creation of a dedicated far-east stratcom task force focused on the disinformation emanating from china , and imposing costs on countries and non-states actors that deliberately spread disinformation to divide and harm the eu and its member states;


### 21. stresses that its biggest global consumer market of almost 500 million people gives the eu leverage on the world stage , and believes that a geopolitical commission should use this leverage when other countries are not prepared to comply with the rule of law or international treaties; ### 21. stresses that its biggest global consumer market of almost 500 million people gives the eu significant leverage on the world stage and therefore urges the eu to be more ambitious; , believes that a geopolitical commission should use this leverage when other countries are not prepared to comply with the rule of law or international treaties;


### 21. stresses that its biggest global consumer market of almost 500 million people gives the eu leverage on the world stage , and believes that a geopolitical commission should use this leverage when other countries are not prepared to comply with the rule of law or international treaties; ### 21. stresses that its biggest global consumer market of almost 500 million people gives the eu leverage on the world stage , and believes that a geopolitical commission should use this leverage to defend eu interests when other countries are not prepared to comply with well-established practices of international law and bilateral agreements;


### 22. notes that the covid-19 pandemic has shown the need to reduce dependency on third countries in certain strategic and existential sectors and might prompt diversification of its most critical supply chains; ### 22. notes that the covid-19 pandemic has shown the need to reduce dependency on third countries in certain strategic and existential sectors and might prompt diversification of its most critical supply chains; believes that the union must seize the opportunity and aim for ‘health strategic autonomy’ in areas such as the production of critical medicine and pharmaceutical products and equipment , notably active pharmaceutical ingredients (api) , personal protective equipment (ppe) , ventilators and masks;


### 22. notes that the covid-19 pandemic has shown the need to reduce dependency on third countries in certain strategic and existential sectors and might prompt diversification of its most critical supply chains; ### 22. notes that the covid-19 pandemic has shown the need to reduce dependency on third countries in certain strategic and existential sectors and might prompt diversification of its most critical supply chains; stresses the need to create adequate strategic stockpiles of essential medical and pharmaceutical products;


### 23. recalls its request for a strong global sanctions regime to address serious human rights violations , which would be the eu equivalent of the so-called magnitsky act; ### 23. recalls its request for a strong global sanctions regime to address serious human rights violations , which would be the eu equivalent of the so-called magnitsky act; welcomes the announcement by president von der leyen that the commission will soon come forward with a proposal;


### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu engagement and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south; stresses that the eu must give western balkan countries that are not yet part of the eu a fair chance to join the eu , and that the eu must continue its efforts to invest in the region; ### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu engagement and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south;


### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu engagement and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south; stresses that the eu must give western balkan countries that are not yet part of the eu a fair chance to join the eu , and that the eu must continue its efforts to invest in the region; ### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu engagement and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south; stresses that the eu must involve western balkan countries that are not yet part of the eu in its actions to fight the pandemic and to give them a fair chance to join the eu if they fulfil the necessary criteria , and that the eu must continue its efforts to invest in the region;


### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu engagement and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south; stresses that the eu must give western balkan countries that are not yet part of the eu a fair chance to join the eu , and that the eu must continue its efforts to invest in the region; ### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu engagement and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south; stresses that the eu has to support western balkan countries and encourage them to continue with the ongoing reforms towards a full alignment with the eu values and rules with a view to union membership and thereby contribute to stability , security and prosperity;


### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu engagement and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south; stresses that the eu must give western balkan countries that are not yet part of the eu a fair chance to join the eu , and that the eu must continue its efforts to invest in the region; ### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu engagement and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south; stresses that the eu must give western balkan countries that are not yet part of the eu a fair chance to join the eu , and that the eu must step up its efforts to invest in the region;


### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu engagement and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south; stresses that the eu must give western balkan countries that are not yet part of the eu a fair chance to join the eu , and that the eu must continue its efforts to invest in the region; ### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu leadership and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south; stresses that the eu must give western balkan countries that are not yet part of the eu a fair chance to join the eu , and that the eu must continue its efforts to invest in the region;


### 25. stresses that the covid-19 crisis could destabilise countries in africa which often have a fragile health infrastructure and high debts; calls for the eu presence in africa to be strengthened , for financial assistance and recovery plans to be fostered and for an alternative to chinese investments to be provided; ### 25. stresses that the covid-19 crisis could destabilise countries in africa which often have a fragile health infrastructure and high debts; calls for the eu presence in africa to be strengthened and more effectively coordinated , for financial assistance and recovery plans to be fostered , for becoming more visible by implementing a common infrastructure and investment plan and for an alternative to chinese investments to be provided;


### 25. stresses that the covid-19 crisis could destabilise countries in africa which often have a fragile health infrastructure and high debts; calls for the eu presence in africa to be strengthened , for financial assistance and recovery plans to be fostered and for an alternative to chinese investments to be provided; ### 25. stresses that the covid-19 crisis could destabilise countries in africa which often have a fragile health infrastructure and high debts acting as a "conflict multiplier"; calls for the eu presence in africa to be strengthened , for financial assistance and recovery plans to be fostered and for an alternative to chinese investments to be provided;


### 26. calls for the common security and defence policy (csdp) missions tasked with conflict prevention or mitigation to be strengthened , notably those in the eu’s immediate neighbourhood , to help stabilise already fragile settings and prevent a relapse in conflicts and violence due to additional tensions caused by covid-19; calls in this regard for a swift adoption of the european peace facility; ### 26. calls for the common security and defence policy (csdp) missions tasked with conflict prevention or mitigation to be strengthened , notably those in the eu’s immediate neighbourhood , to help stabilise already fragile settings and prevent a relapse in conflicts and violence due to additional tensions caused by covid-19; calls in this regard for an analysis of establishment of a standing eu multinational unit dedicated to fulfil article 43 teu military tasks and to enhance the eu’s ability to conduct crisis management operations as well as a swift adoption of the european peace facility;


### 27. is of the opinion that the covid-19 crisis has highlighted certain weaknesses of our union and has shown the urgent need for an effective and efficient union; believes that the conference on the future of europe will provide a good platform to move forward in constructing more efficient decision making in eu external policies; is therefore determined to start the conference as soon as possible; ### 27. is of the opinion that the covid-19 crisis has highlighted certain weaknesses of our union and has shown the urgent need for an effective and efficient union equipped with internal and external mechanisms for crisis prevention and rapid and efficient countermeasures , including financial instruments for support and recovery in the aftermath; believes that the conference on the future of europe will provide a good platform to move forward in constructing more efficient decision making in eu external policies; is therefore determined to start the conference as soon as possible;


### 27. is of the opinion that the covid-19 crisis has highlighted certain weaknesses of our union and has shown the urgent need for an effective and efficient union; believes that the conference on the future of europe will provide a good platform to move forward in constructing more efficient decision making in eu external policies; is therefore determined to start the conference as soon as possible; ### 27. is of the opinion that the covid-19 crisis has highlighted certain weaknesses of our union both internally and on the world stage and has again reconfirmed the urgent need for an effective and efficient union; believes that the conference on the future of europe will provide a good platform to move forward in constructing more efficient decision making in eu external policies; is therefore determined to start the conference as soon as possible;


### 24. welcomes the progress made in eu-nato cooperation since the joint declaration in warsaw in 2016; commends the progress made in implementing the common set of proposals of december 2017 , in particular the intensification of eu-nato political dialogue at all levels , as well as the structured dialogue on military mobility , the efforts to ensure greater coherence between the respective defence planning processes , and closer cooperation in countering hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns; calls on the eu and nato to further enhance the mutually reinforcing cooperation and to deepen their strategic partnership; ### 24. welcomes the progress made in eu-nato cooperation since the joint declaration in warsaw in 2016; commends the progress made in implementing the common set of proposals of december 2017 , in particular the intensification of eu-nato political dialogue at all levels , as well as the structured dialogue on military mobility , the efforts to ensure greater coherence between the respective defence planning processes , and closer cooperation in countering hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns; calls on the eu and nato to further enhance the mutually reinforcing cooperation , including between missions and operations , and to deepen their strategic partnership;


### a. whereas albania has continued making sustained efforts on its path towards the eu , meeting the conditions for holding the first intergovernmental conference; ### a. whereas albania has continued making far too few efforts on its path towards the eu , and has not yet met the conditions for holding the first intergovernmental conference;


### a. whereas albania has continued making sustained efforts on its path towards the eu , meeting the conditions for holding the first intergovernmental conference; ### a. whereas albania has continued making sustained efforts on its path towards the eu , partly meeting the conditions for holding the first intergovernmental conference;


### a. whereas albania has continued making sustained efforts on its path towards the eu , meeting the conditions for holding the first intergovernmental conference; ### a. whereas albania has continued making sustained efforts on its path towards the eu , meeting the most conditions for holding the first intergovernmental conference;


### b. whereas the country needs to keep making progress in the consolidation of democratic institutions and procedures , in ensuring the proper functioning of its judicial institutions , and by safeguarding media freedom and minority rights; ### b. whereas the country still needs to keep making lots of progress in the consolidation of democratic institutions and procedures , in ensuring the proper functioning of its judicial institutions , and by safeguarding media freedom and minority rights;


### b. whereas the country needs to keep making progress in the consolidation of democratic institutions and procedures , in ensuring the proper functioning of its judicial institutions , and by safeguarding media freedom and minority rights; ### b. whereas the country needs to keep making progress in the consolidation of democratic institutions and procedures , in ensuring the proper functioning of its judicial institutions , the fight against corruption and by safeguarding media freedom and minority rights;


### c. whereas consistent efforts on the key reforms require the joint engagement of all stakeholders; ### c. whereas the merit-based prospect of full eu membership is in the union's own political , security and economic interests , the quality and dedication to the necessary reforms determine the timetable for accession; whereas consistent efforts on the key reforms require the joint engagement of all stakeholders;


### 1. welcomes the clear strategic orientation and commitment of albania to european integration , manifesting itself in good neighbourly relations and the continued implementation of the accession-related reforms; ### 1. notes some progress in the orientation and commitment of albania to european integration , manifesting itself in good neighbourly relations and the continued implementation of the accession-related reforms;


### 1. welcomes the clear strategic orientation and commitment of albania to european integration , manifesting itself in good neighbourly relations and the continued implementation of the accession-related reforms; ### 1. welcomes the clear strategic orientation and commitment of albania to european integration , manifesting itself in good neighbourly relations and the continued implementation of the accession-related reforms; in that regard welcomes the council decision of 26 march 2020 on opening accession negotiations with north macedonia and albania;


### 2. supports the convening of the first intergovernmental conference without further delay , following the adoption of the negotiating framework by the council; ### 2. supports the convening of the first intergovernmental conference without further delay after the complete fulfilment of the conditions set by the european council , following the adoption of the negotiating framework by the council;


### 2. supports the convening of the first intergovernmental conference without further delay , following the adoption of the negotiating framework by the council; ### 2. supports the convening of the first intergovernmental conference without further delay once all conditions set by the council are fulfilled and , following the adoption of the negotiating framework by the council;


### 3. recalls that progress in accession under the revised enlargement methodology depends on lasting , in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas , in particular the rule of law and the fight against corruption; ### 3. stresses that progress in accession under the revised enlargement methodology depends on lasting , in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas , in particular the rule of law and the fight against corruption;


### 3. recalls that progress in accession under the revised enlargement methodology depends on lasting , in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas , in particular the rule of law and the fight against corruption; ### 3. recalls that progress in accession under the revised enlargement methodology depends on lasting , in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas , in particular the rule of law and the fight against corruption , judiciary and fundamental rights , good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation;


### 3. recalls that progress in accession under the revised enlargement methodology depends on lasting , in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas , in particular the rule of law and the fight against corruption; ### 3. recalls that progress in accession under the revised enlargement methodology depends on lasting , in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas , starting with the rule of law , the functioning of democratic institutions and public administration as well as the economy of the candidate country;


### 4. urges the authorities to step up their efforts to strengthen the political dialogue and the functioning of the country’s democratic institutions , while improving the climate for media pluralism and civil society; ### 4. urges the authorities to step up their efforts to strengthen the political dialogue and the functioning of the country’s democratic institutions , while improving the climate for media pluralism and civil society and increase the fight against corruption and organised crime;


### 5. encourages political leaders to create a climate of confidence by overcoming the lack of dialogue and expresses its serious concern about the polarised political climate and lack of sustainable cross-party cooperation that continue to hamper the democratic process; ### 5. urges political leaders to create a climate of confidence by overcoming the lack of dialogue and expresses its serious concern about the polarised political climate and lack of sustainable cross-party cooperation that continue to hamper the democratic process;


### 5. encourages political leaders to create a climate of confidence by overcoming the lack of dialogue and expresses its serious concern about the polarised political climate and lack of sustainable cross-party cooperation that continue to hamper the democratic process; ### 5. encourages political leaders to create a climate of confidence by overcoming the lack of dialogue and expresses its serious concern about the polarised political climate and lack of sustainable cross-party cooperation that continue to hamper the democratic process; recalls the importance of constructive political dialogue to advance with the reform process;


### 7. stresses that the general elections of 25 april 2021 will be key for the country’s democratic consolidation; ### 7. stresses that the general elections of 25 april 2021 will be key for the country’s democratic consolidation; reminds that free and fair elections are a fundamental prerequisite for eu integration;


### 7. stresses that the general elections of 25 april 2021 will be key for the country’s democratic consolidation; ### 7. stresses that the general elections of 25 april 2021 will be key for the country’s democratic consolidation and will play an important role in renewing and strengthening the democratic structures in albania;


### 7. stresses that the general elections of 25 april 2021 will be key for the country’s democratic consolidation; ### 7. stresses that the general elections of 25 april 2021 will be key for the country’s democratic consolidation; and the crackdown on corruption;


### 8. underlines the importance of implementing the electoral reform measures codified in july 2020 , which are in line with the osce office for democratic institutions and human rights (osce/odihr) recommendations; welcomes the commitment to implement the forthcoming venice commission opinion regarding the amendments to the electoral code adopted in october 2020; ### 8. underlines the importance of implementing the electoral reform measures codified in july 2020 , which are in line with the osce office for democratic institutions and human rights (osce/odihr) ) and council of europe recommendations; stresses the importance to implement the forthcoming venice commission opinion regarding the amendments to the electoral code adopted in october 2020; deplores the breach of the 5 june 2020 agreement , and that the albanian parliament passed the disputed legislation , despite repeated calls by the international community to await the opinion of the venice commission;


### 8. underlines the importance of implementing the electoral reform measures codified in july 2020 , which are in line with the osce office for democratic institutions and human rights (osce/odihr) recommendations; welcomes the commitment to implement the forthcoming venice commission opinion regarding the amendments to the electoral code adopted in october 2020; ### 8. underlines the importance of implementing the electoral reform measures codified in july 2020 , which are in line with the osce office for democratic institutions and human rights (osce/odihr) recommendations; looks forward to the implementation of the forthcoming venice commission opinion regarding the amendments to the electoral code adopted in october 2020 , in line with the relevant commitment expressed by the albanian government;


### 8. underlines the importance of implementing the electoral reform measures codified in july 2020 , which are in line with the osce office for democratic institutions and human rights (osce/odihr) recommendations; welcomes the commitment to implement the forthcoming venice commission opinion regarding the amendments to the electoral code adopted in october 2020; ### 8. underlines the importance of implementing the electoral reform measures codified in july 2020 , which are in line with the osce office for democratic institutions and human rights (osce/odihr) recommendations; welcomes the commitment to implement as soon as possible the forthcoming venice commission opinion regarding the amendments to the electoral code adopted in october 2020;


### 10. commends the steady progress made in implementing the comprehensive judicial reform , underpinned by the unprecedented vetting process and the establishment of the relevant institutions and specialised bodies , enabling a tangible shift towards an accountable and independent judiciary; ### 10. commends the progress made in implementing the comprehensive judicial reform , underpinned by the unprecedented vetting process and the establishment of the relevant institutions and specialised bodies , and calls for the acceleration of these procedures in order to achieve a tangible shift towards an accountable and independent judiciary;


### 11. encourages albania to complete the relevant steps towards re-establishing the constitutional court’s ability to function fully and efficiently , and urges all involved to swiftly conclude the appointment process; ### 11. urges albania to swiftly complete the relevant steps towards re-establishing the constitutional court’s ability to function fully and efficiently , and urges all involved to swiftly conclude the appointment process;


### 11. encourages albania to complete the relevant steps towards re-establishing the constitutional court’s ability to function fully and efficiently , and urges all involved to swiftly conclude the appointment process; ### 11. urges albania to complete the relevant steps towards re-establishing the constitutional court’s ability to function fully and efficiently , and urges all involved to swiftly conclude the appointment process;


### 12. welcomes the fact that the high court has regained its ability to function and that it has been reviewing more than a thousand cases , and encourages it to make further progress in the appointment of additional judges; ### 12. welcomes the fact that the high court has partly regained its ability to function and that it has been reviewing more than a thousand cases , and encourages it to make further progress in the appointment of additional judges; underlines the need to support the effective functioning of these institutions by means of adequate human resources and funding;


### 12. welcomes the fact that the high court has regained its ability to function and that it has been reviewing more than a thousand cases , and encourages it to make further progress in the appointment of additional judges; ### 12. welcomes the fact that , as a first step , the high court has regained its ability to function and that it has been reviewing the admissibility of more than a thousand cases , and encourages it to make further progress in the appointment of additional judges , in order to become fully functional;


### 14. welcomes the creation of anti-corruption bodies and the fact that sustained investigations are being carried out by the newly established special anti-corruption and organised crime structure (spak) , and indictments are being handed down by the anti-corruption and organised crime courts , and underlines the need to maintain their independence and effectiveness in fighting impunity; ### 14. welcomes the creation of anti-corruption bodies such as the established special anti-corruption and organised crime structure (spak); now calls for the courts to be operational and to effectively and proactively address high-level corruption; therefore stresses the need of adequate resources and cooperation between these new structures and with other prosecution and judicial entities; underlines the need to maintain their independence and effectiveness in fighting impunity;


### 14. welcomes the creation of anti-corruption bodies and the fact that sustained investigations are being carried out by the newly established special anti-corruption and organised crime structure (spak) , and indictments are being handed down by the anti-corruption and organised crime courts , and underlines the need to maintain their independence and effectiveness in fighting impunity; ### 14. welcomes the creation of anti-corruption bodies and the fact that sustained investigations are being carried out by the newly established special anti-corruption and organised crime structure (spak) , and indictments are being handed down by the anti-corruption and organised crime courts , and underlines the need to maintain their independence and effectiveness in fighting impunity; stresses the need for albania to crack down on corruption at all levels of society , especially within government;


### 15. notes the increase in proactive investigations , prosecutions and final convictions targeting illicit wealth and money laundering , leading to the systematic freezing and seizure of criminal assets , and calls for their further intensification; ### 15. notes the increase in proactive investigations , prosecutions and final convictions targeting illicit wealth and money laundering , leading to the systematic freezing and seizure of criminal assets , and calls for further prosecution and final court convictions of these cases; underlines the extensive money laundering problems notably in the construction and real estate sector;


### 17. calls for the efforts to dismantle local and international criminal networks , and to eliminate drug production and trafficking , to be intensified further , building on the significant efforts of recent years; welcomes the increased cooperation with europol and the law enforcement institutions of eu member states , and encourages the albanian authorities to swiftly finalise the posting of an albanian liaison prosecutor to the european union agency for criminal justice cooperation (eurojust); ### 17. calls for exhaustive and rigorous efforts to dismantle local and international criminal networks , in particular the albanian mafia , and to eliminate drug production and trafficking , building on the significant efforts of recent years; welcomes the increased cooperation with europol and the law enforcement institutions of eu member states , and encourages the albanian authorities to swiftly finalise the posting of an albanian liaison prosecutor to the european union agency for criminal justice cooperation (eurojust);


### 17. calls for the efforts to dismantle local and international criminal networks , and to eliminate drug production and trafficking , to be intensified further , building on the significant efforts of recent years; welcomes the increased cooperation with europol and the law enforcement institutions of eu member states , and encourages the albanian authorities to swiftly finalise the posting of an albanian liaison prosecutor to the european union agency for criminal justice cooperation (eurojust); ### 17. calls for the efforts to dismantle local and international criminal networks , and to eliminate drug production and trafficking , to be intensified further , building on the significant efforts of recent years; welcomes the increased cooperation with europol and the law enforcement institutions of eu member states , and encourages the albanian authorities to swiftly finalise the posting of an albanian liaison prosecutor to the european union agency for criminal justice cooperation (eurojust); recommends albania to adopt a new strategy and action plan on drugs , including to fill-in the legislative gap on drug precursors;


### 20. welcomes the update on the anti-discrimination legislation and urges the authorities to ensure the effective prevention and prosecution of hate speech and hate crimes; ### 20. welcomes the update on the anti-discrimination legislation and urges the authorities to ensure the effective prevention and prosecution of hate speech and hate crimes and antisemitism;


### ; ### 21a. stresses the need for sufficient human , technical and financial resources to relevant actors , such as the ombudsman and the commissioner for protection from discrimination (cpd) , and their work on human rights promotion and protection;


### 22. calls for the creation of an effective mechanism for the prevention of gender-based and domestic violence , and for protection and support to be given to its victims , combined with the effective and efficient prosecution of its perpetrators; ### 22. calls for the creation of an effective mechanism for the prevention of gender-based and domestic violence including violence against children , and for protection and support to be given to its victims , combined with the effective and efficient prosecution of its perpetrators;


### 23. reminds albania of its calls for further improvements to be made in the education and health , and the employment rates and living conditions of roma and other ethnic minorities; ### 23. reminds albania of its calls for further improvements to be made in the education and health , and the employment rates and living and health conditions of people with disabilities and other ethnic minorities , notably the roma minority - as one of the most marginalized minorities;


### 24. recalls the importance of measures ensuring the protection of national minorities , including self-identification , the use of languages and property rights; ### 24. urges to swiftly adopt the remaining five by-laws to ensure full implementation of the 2017 framework law on the protection of national minorities and the related rights to free self- identification , the use of minority languages and the right to education in minority languages;


### 24. recalls the importance of measures ensuring the protection of national minorities , including self-identification , the use of languages and property rights; ### 24. recalls the importance of measures ensuring the protection of national minorities , including self-identification , the use of languages and property rights; calls on albania to protect and promote cultural heritage , languages and traditions of its national minorities;


### 25. encourages albania to make further progress on measures consolidating property rights , implementing the law on transitional ownership , and completing the comprehensive land sector reform; ### 25. encourages albania to make further progress on measures consolidating property rights , implementing the law on transitional procedures ownership , mainly by advancing in a transparent manner the process of registration of properties , and completing the comprehensive land sector reform;


### 26. welcomes albania’s efforts in promoting tolerance , inter-religious harmony and addressing prejudice and discrimination , including antisemitism; ### 26. welcomes albania’s efforts in promoting tolerance , inter-religious harmony and addressing prejudice and discrimination , including antisemitism; especially commends the adoption of the international holocaust remembrance alliance’s definition of anti-semitism , being the first muslim-majority country to accept the formulation;


### 26. welcomes albania’s efforts in promoting tolerance , inter-religious harmony and addressing prejudice and discrimination , including antisemitism; ### 26. welcomes albania’s efforts in promoting tolerance , inter-religious harmony and addressing prejudice and discrimination , including antisemitism; calls for respect for freedom of expression and freedom of belief or religion;


### 28. stresses that border protection and the prevention of cross-border crime , including in cooperation with the european border and coast guard agency (frontex) , must be conducted in full respect for fundamental rights; ### 28. stresses that border protection and the prevention of cross-border crime , including in cooperation with the european border and coast guard agency (frontex) , must be a priority and conducted in full respect for fundamental rights; welcomes the launch of first fully fledged frontex joint operation outside the european union , deploying 50 officers and equipment from 12 eu member states to support albania in border control and tackling cross-border crime;


### 28. stresses that border protection and the prevention of cross-border crime , including in cooperation with the european border and coast guard agency (frontex) , must be conducted in full respect for fundamental rights; ### 28. stresses that border protection and the prevention of cross-border crime , including in cooperation with the european border and coast guard agency (frontex) , must be a priority and conducted in full respect for fundamental rights;


### 30. welcomes the ongoing measures and calls for further progress to be made in considerably reducing the number of unfounded asylum claims by albanian nationals , including the arrivals of unaccompanied minors , in the eu member states; ### 30. welcomes the ongoing measures and calls for further progress to be made in considerably reducing irregular migration and the number of unfounded asylum claims by albanian nationals , including the arrivals of unaccompanied minors , in the eu member states;


### 33. recalls the importance of ensuring quality journalism and media literacy for the functioning of democracy and in tackling disinformation; ### 33. recalls the importance of ensuring quality journalism and media literacy for the functioning of democracy and in tackling disinformation; is very concerned about the nefarious allegations that disinformation is a common bludgeon deployed against investigative journalists , civil society activists and others seeking to hold powerful interests to account;


### 34. condemns the violence , intimidation , smear campaigns and indirect political and financial pressure directed against journalists , which seriously stifle media freedom , induce self-censorship and gravely undermine efforts to uncover crime and corruption; ### 34. condemns the violence , intimidation , smear campaigns and indirect political and financial pressure directed against journalists , which seriously stifle media freedom , induce self-censorship and gravely undermine efforts to uncover crime and corruption; calls for initiatives to foster a media environment free from external influences and conducive to a professional media conduct , including investigative journalism;


### 35. expresses grave concern about the proposed measures under the draft media law and welcomes the commitment to adopt amendments only if they are assessed as being fully in line with the venice commission’s recommendations; ### 35. expresses grave concern about the proposed measures under the draft media law and welcomes the commitment to adopt amendments only if they are assessed as being fully in line with the venice commission’s recommendations; regrets , however , that the venice commission recommendations are not yet adopted; notes that the media law was one of the preconditions for holding first intergovernmental conference as recognized in 2020 european commission's report;


### 35. expresses grave concern about the proposed measures under the draft media law and welcomes the commitment to adopt amendments only if they are assessed as being fully in line with the venice commission’s recommendations; ### 35. expresses grave concern about the proposed measures under the draft media law and welcomes the commitment to adopt amendments only if they are assessed as being fully in line with the venice commission’s recommendations; regrets , however , that the venice commission recommendations are not yet adopted;


### 37. stresses the need to substantially strengthen social care coverage and improve access to social and healthcare services; ### 37. encourages the albanian authorities to strengthen social care coverage and improve access to social and healthcare services especially for vulnerable communities;


### 38. calls for the measures addressing the demographic decline and the brain drain to be stepped up through active labour market policies that address skills mismatches and reduce long-term unemployment; ### 38. calls for the measures addressing the demographic decline and the brain drain to be stepped up through active labour market policies that address skills mismatches and reduce long-term unemployment; encourages measures to boost employment for young people in particular;


### 42. encourages the diversification of energy production , moving from hydropower towards wind and solar sources; urges the authorities to minimise the impact on biodiversity by restricting hydropower development in protected areas; underlines the need to improve both environmental and impact assessments across eco-sensitive sectors and boost the prosecution of environmental crimes; ### 42. encourages the diversification of energy production , ensuring environmentally sound investments in hydropower , wind and solar sources; urges the authorities to minimise the impact on biodiversity by restricting hydropower development in protected areas; underlines the need to improve both environmental and impact assessments across eco-sensitive sectors and boost the prosecution of environmental crimes;


### 45. welcomes albania’s unremitting efforts in promoting good neighbourly relations and regional integration; ### 45. welcomes albania’s efforts in promoting good neighbourly relations and regional integration;


### 45. welcomes albania’s unremitting efforts in promoting good neighbourly relations and regional integration; ### 45. welcomes albania’s ongoing efforts in promoting good neighbourly relations and regional integration;


### 46. commends the constructive steps towards the resolution of outstanding bilateral issues , including a joint undertaking by greece and albania to resolve a dispute over their ionian maritime border through international justice; ### 46. commends the constructive steps towards the resolution of outstanding bilateral issues , including a joint undertaking by greece and albania to refer the delimitation of the maritime zones to the international court of justice;


### 49. welcomes albania’s ongoing full alignment with the common foreign and security policy decisions and declarations since 2012 and its active contribution to the eu crisis management missions and operations; ### 49. welcomes albania’s ongoing full alignment with the common foreign and security policy decisions and declarations since 2012 and its active contribution to the eu crisis management missions and operations; commends albania’s active participation in military crisis management missions under the common security and defence policy , as well as its active contribution to nato missions of strategic importance to the eu;


### — having regard to the principles enshrined in article 21 of the treaty on european union (teu) , notably the promotion of democracy and the rule of law , the preservation of peace , the prevention of conflicts and the strengthening of international security , ### — having regard to the principles enshrined in article 346.1 (b) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) on the production of or trade in arms , in article 42.3 of the treaty on european union (teu) on “defining a european capabilities and armaments policy” , and in article 21 of the treaty on european union (teu) , notably the promotion of democracy and the rule of law , the preservation of peace , the prevention of conflicts and the strengthening of international security ,


### — having regard to the updated common military list of the european union , adopted by the council on 18 february 20197 , ### — having regard to the updated common military list of the european union , adopted by the council on 17 february 20207 ,


### — having regard to the commission proposal for a regulation of the european parliament and of the council of 13 june 2018 establishing the european defence fund (edf) (com(2018)0476) and to the common understanding reached between the co-legislators during negotiations , ### — having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the european parliament and of the council of 13 june 2018 establishing the european defence fund (edf) (com(2018)0476) ,


### a. whereas the latest sipri figures24 show that arms exports from the eu-28 amounted to some 26 % of the global total in 2015-2019 , making the eu-28 collectively the second largest arms supplier in the world after the usa (36 %) and followed by russia (21 %); ### a. whereas the latest sipri figures24 show that arms exports from the eu-28 amounted to some 26 % of the global total in 2015-2019 , making the eu-28 collectively the second largest arms supplier in the world after the usa (36 %) and followed by russia (21 %); questions the validity of this comparison because under article 346 teu the production of or trade in arms remain with member states and therefore the aggregated figures cannot be compared to unitary states like the usa or russia;


### 1. welcomes the publication of the 20th and 21st annual reports; deplores the late publication of information about exports during 2017 and 2018; ### 1. notes that the common position provides for a transparency procedure involving the publication of annual european union reports on arms exports; welcomes the publication of the 20th and 21st annual reports; deplores the late publication of information about exports during 2017 and 2018;


### 1. welcomes the publication of the 20th and 21st annual reports; deplores the late publication of information about exports during 2017 and 2018; ### 1. welcomes the publication of the 20th and 21st annual reports; deplores the late publication of information about exports during 2017 and 2018; welcomes member states efforts to comply with article 346.1 (b) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) on the production of or trade in arms;


### 2. notes that ten member states made full submissions to the 20th annual report , and eleven to the 21st; deplores the fact that two of the main exporting countries – germany and the uk – did not make full submissions; ### 2. notes that ten member states made full submissions to the 20th annual report , and eleven to the 21st; notes the fact that , amongst others , germany and the uk did not make full submissions as regards actual exports , a non-mandatory requirement; welcomes however the additional information provided by the governments of germany and the uk in the “reports by the government of the federal republic of germany on its policy on exports of conventional military equipment” 2017 and 2018 , and the “uk strategic export controls annual reports” 2017 and 2018;


### 2. notes that ten member states made full submissions to the 20th annual report , and eleven to the 21st; deplores the fact that two of the main exporting countries – germany and the uk – did not make full submissions; ### 2. notes that ten member states made full submissions to the 20th annual report , and eleven to the 21st;


### 3. deplores the fact that member states use very different information in order to generate data on the value of licences , which renders the annual report considerably less usable as a comparative data set and serves to diminish its transparency and accountability before citizens and parliaments; urges france , in particular , to refrain from submitting data on the value of licences at pre-contract stage and broad values for global licences , which undermines the comparability of the report; ### 3. notes the fact that the member states have different national legislation , which renders the annual report difficult to use as a comparative data set;


### 3. deplores the fact that member states use very different information in order to generate data on the value of licences , which renders the annual report considerably less usable as a comparative data set and serves to diminish its transparency and accountability before citizens and parliaments; urges france , in particular , to refrain from submitting data on the value of licences at pre-contract stage and broad values for global licences , which undermines the comparability of the report; ### 3. acknowledges that member states may be forced to use different information in order to generate data on the value of licences; points out that article 8 of the common position requires the national authorities to fully comply with their transparency obligations and provide detailed information to the eeas and to other member states each year regarding licences issued and consignments delivered;


### 4. notes that the countries of the middle east and north africa , a region of several armed conflicts , remain the foremost regional destination for exports according to the last two annual reports; is concerned that this regional focus undermines the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) and specific eu action aimed at regional peace and stability; ### 4. notes that the countries of the middle east and north africa , a region of several armed conflicts , remain the foremost regional destination for exports according to the last two annual reports;


### 4. notes that the countries of the middle east and north africa , a region of several armed conflicts , remain the foremost regional destination for exports according to the last two annual reports; is concerned that this regional focus undermines the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) and specific eu action aimed at regional peace and stability; ### 4. notes that the countries of the middle east and north africa , a region of several armed conflicts , remain the foremost regional destination for exports according to the last two annual reports; welcomes these efforts because they are in line with the overall objectives of the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) set out in article 21 and of the regional priorities set in the eu global strategy (2016);


### 5. recalls that the eu has been implementing a number of arms embargoes25 ; ### 5. recalls that the eu has been implementing a number of arms embargoes25 ; through the promotion of the common position and its principles , not only in its immediate neighbourhood , but also on a global level through the arms trade treaty (att)framework , the eu could contribute to its overarching foreign policy goals of preventing conflict and promoting respect for human rights and international humanitarian law;


### 5. recalls that the eu has been implementing a number of arms embargoes25 ; ### 5. recalls that the eu has been implementing a number of arms embargoes25 ; welcomes the decisions of the governments of belgium , denmark , finland , germany , greece , italy , and the netherlands adopting restrictions on their arms exports to countries involved in the yemen war;


### 5. recalls that the eu has been implementing a number of arms embargoes25 ; ### 5. recalls that the eu has been implementing a number of arms embargoes25 , including all un embargos;


### 6. welcomes the council’s intention to increase convergence and transparency – the main objectives of its last review of the common position; ### 6. welcomes the council’s intention to increase convergence and transparency – the main objectives of its last review of the common position; and the council conclusions on the review of the common position that “the strengthening of a european defence technological and industrial base should be accompanied by closer cooperation and convergence in the field of export control of military technology and equipment”1a


### 7. points out that council decision (cfsp) 2019/1560 and the relevant conclusions of 16 september 2019 have the potential to ensure that eu citizens are furnished with better information about the strategic choices made by their governments in an area which directly affects their security and their countries’ adherence to values and norms; ### 7. points out that council decision (cfsp) 2019/1560 and the relevant conclusions of 16 september 2019 have the potential to provide eu citizens with better information about the strategic choices made by their governments;


### 7. points out that council decision (cfsp) 2019/1560 and the relevant conclusions of 16 september 2019 have the potential to ensure that eu citizens are furnished with better information about the strategic choices made by their governments in an area which directly affects their security and their countries’ adherence to values and norms; ### 7. points out that council decision (cfsp) 2019/1560 and the relevant conclusions of 16 september 2019 have the potential to ensure that national oversight bodies , parliaments , and eu citizens are furnished with better information about the strategic choices made by their governments in an area which directly affects their security and their countries’ adherence to values and norms;


### 8. notes with concern the growing divergences between the arms export policies and practices of the member states and the failure to introduce new instruments to promote convergence towards the strict application of eu rules in this area; ### 8. notes with concern the growing divergences between the arms export policies and practices of the member states and the failure to introduce new instruments to promote convergence towards the strict application of eu rules in this area; while the european defence fund (edf) as part of the eu’s industrial policy and a funding tool for joint defence r&d projects does not deal with arms transfers , yet future edf-funded programmes will inevitably produce new and innovative military technologies and equipment that , given the strong export orientation of european defence companies , will also be exported to third countries;


### 8. notes with concern the growing divergences between the arms export policies and practices of the member states and the failure to introduce new instruments to promote convergence towards the strict application of eu rules in this area; ### 8. notes the failure to introduce new instruments to promote convergence towards the strict application of eu rules in this area;


### 8. notes with concern the growing divergences between the arms export policies and practices of the member states and the failure to introduce new instruments to promote convergence towards the strict application of eu rules in this area; ### 8. notes with concern that there is no clear information of alleged growing divergences between the arms export policies and practices of the member states and on possible attempts to introduce new instruments to promote convergence towards the strict application of eu rules in this area;


### 10. notes that since the adoption of the legally binding common position in 2008 , an increasing number of weapon systems produced in europe are made up of components from multiple countries and involve bi- or multilateral cooperation for technological , industrial and political reasons; ### 10. notes that since the adoption of the legally binding common position in 2008 , the member states have stepped up their arms exports monitoring; an increasing number of weapon systems produced in europe are made up of components from multiple european countries and involve bi- or multilateral cooperation for technological , industrial and political reasons;


### 10. notes that since the adoption of the legally binding common position in 2008 , an increasing number of weapon systems produced in europe are made up of components from multiple countries and involve bi- or multilateral cooperation for technological , industrial and political reasons; ### 10. welcomes that since the adoption of the legally binding common position in 2008 , an increasing number of weapon systems produced in europe are made up of components from multiple eu member states and involve bi- or multilateral cooperation for technological , industrial and political reasons;


### 11. notes an increase in the transfer of knowledge and technology , which allows third countries to undertake licensed production of european military technology; ### 11. notes an increase in the transfer of knowledge and technology , which allows third countries to undertake licensed production of european military technology; highlights that this must not limit the eu’s capacity to control weapons , arms and military equipment production;


### 11. notes an increase in the transfer of knowledge and technology , which allows third countries to undertake licensed production of european military technology; ### 11. notes the lack of information of an alleged increase in the transfer of knowledge and technology , which allows third countries to undertake licensed production of european military technology;


### 12. notes that most member states have not outlined a policy regulating the transfer of weapons components to another member state which would ensure that any export to third countries from the member state of assembly is consistent with the export policy of the member state providing the components; regards this as particularly problematic in the context of the increasing divergences between licensing practices across the eu; observes that directive 2009/43/ec on intra-community transfers has proven ill-equipped to achieve the stated goal of setting high common standards for exports to third countries; ### 12. notes that most member states have not outlined a policy regulating the transfer of weapons components to another member state which would ensure that any export to third countries from the member state of assembly is consistent with the export policy of the member state providing the components;


### 12. notes that most member states have not outlined a policy regulating the transfer of weapons components to another member state which would ensure that any export to third countries from the member state of assembly is consistent with the export policy of the member state providing the components; regards this as particularly problematic in the context of the increasing divergences between licensing practices across the eu; observes that directive 2009/43/ec on intra-community transfers has proven ill-equipped to achieve the stated goal of setting high common standards for exports to third countries; ### 12. notes that most member states have not outlined a policy regulating the transfer of weapons components to another member state which would ensure that any export to third countries from the member state of assembly is consistent with the export policy of the member state providing the components; reminds that only a member state can consider that the transfer of a component is sensitive and impose export limitations;


### 12. notes that most member states have not outlined a policy regulating the transfer of weapons components to another member state which would ensure that any export to third countries from the member state of assembly is consistent with the export policy of the member state providing the components; regards this as particularly problematic in the context of the increasing divergences between licensing practices across the eu; observes that directive 2009/43/ec on intra-community transfers has proven ill-equipped to achieve the stated goal of setting high common standards for exports to third countries; ### 12. notes that most member states have not outlined a policy regulating the transfer of weapons components to another member state which would ensure that any export to third countries from the member state of assembly is consistent with the export policy of the member state providing the components; regards this as particularly problematic because of a lack of information in the context of the alleged divergences between licensing practices across the eu; observes that directive 2009/43/ec on intra-community transfers has proven ill-equipped to facilitate the transfer in the european armaments market;


### 13. observes a trend whereby the diverging export policies of the member states are increasingly considered as obstacles to cooperation projects , which is giving rise to a multitude of bilateral and specific agreements on weapon systems that allow for exports to third countries based on the least restrictive standards , rather than a joint , eu-wide approach; ### 13. observes that the arms policies of each member state may hamper cooperation projects;


### 13. observes a trend whereby the diverging export policies of the member states are increasingly considered as obstacles to cooperation projects , which is giving rise to a multitude of bilateral and specific agreements on weapon systems that allow for exports to third countries based on the least restrictive standards , rather than a joint , eu-wide approach; ### 13. observes the lack of clear information on alleged diverging export policies of the member states;


### 14. stresses that bilateral and multilateral agreements may further reduce convergence at eu level and that the failure to regulate exports uniformly between the member states and the lack of convergence in export decisions to third countries have a negative impact on human rights and international law , generate market distortions , and hinder industrial strategic planning , economies of scale and a level playing field; ### 14. stresses that bilateral and multilateral agreements may further facilitate the move towards a further convergence of member states’ arms export policies through information sharing among member states , a shared interpretation of the common criteria , increased availability of qualitative information that could strengthen national export control practices; and the inclusion of additional grounds for the refusal of licences that would decrease the space for national interpretation; and that the failure to regulate exports uniformly between the member states and the lack of convergence in export decisions to third countries have a negative impact on human rights and international law , generate market distortions , and hinder industrial strategic planning , economies of scale and a level playing field;


### 14. stresses that bilateral and multilateral agreements may further reduce convergence at eu level and that the failure to regulate exports uniformly between the member states and the lack of convergence in export decisions to third countries have a negative impact on human rights and international law , generate market distortions , and hinder industrial strategic planning , economies of scale and a level playing field; ### 14. stresses that bilateral and multilateral agreements may further reduce convergence at eu level and that the failure to regulate exports uniformly between the member states and the lack of convergence in export decisions to third countries may have a negative impact on human rights and international law;


### 14. stresses that bilateral and multilateral agreements may further reduce convergence at eu level and that the failure to regulate exports uniformly between the member states and the lack of convergence in export decisions to third countries have a negative impact on human rights and international law , generate market distortions , and hinder industrial strategic planning , economies of scale and a level playing field; ### 14. stresses that bilateral and multilateral agreements may further reduce convergence at eu level and that the failure to regulate exports uniformly between the member states and the lack of convergence in export decisions to third countries , generate market distortions , and hinder industrial strategic planning , economies of scale and a level playing field;


### 14. stresses that bilateral and multilateral agreements may further reduce convergence at eu level and that the failure to regulate exports uniformly between the member states and the lack of convergence in export decisions to third countries have a negative impact on human rights and international law , generate market distortions , and hinder industrial strategic planning , economies of scale and a level playing field; ### 14. stresses that bilateral and multilateral agreements may further improve convergence among member states and that the achievement to regulate exports in harmony between the member states and the improvement of convergence in export decisions to third countries have an impact on the european defence market; welcomes in this regard the franco-german treaty of aachen and the provision on a common approach on arms exports with regard to joint projects;


### the europeanisation of cooperation on arms production ### the strengthening of cooperation at eu level on defence capability development , including through wide convergence


### the europeanisation of cooperation on arms production ### stepping up european cooperation on arms production


### 15. notes that eu funds such as the preparatory action on defence research (padr) , the european defence industrial development programme (edidp) and the european defence fund (edf) , initiatives such as the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) , the coordinated annual review on defence (card) and the european peace facility (epf) , legislation such as the intra-community transfers and defence procurement directives of 2009 , and the creation of administrative capacities such as the commission directorate-general for defence industry and space (dg defis) are heralding an increasing europeanisation of arms production and capability development; ### 15. notes that more restrictive export policies that continue to push for further european convergence , shall not result in the lowering of national standards; and that eu funds such as the preparatory action on defence research (padr) , the european defence industrial development programme (edidp) and the european defence fund (edf) , initiatives such as the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) , the coordinated annual review on defence (card) and the european peace facility (epf) , legislation such as the intra-community transfers and defence procurement directives of 2009 , and the creation of administrative capacities such as the commission directorate-general for defence industry and space (dg defis) are heralding an increasing eu collaborative approach for an increasing europeanisation of arms production and capability development; the existence of different national approaches should be taken into consideration when efforts are made to construct a consolidated european defence industrial base that should be spread around the eu to ensure additional cohesion within the union;


### 15. notes that eu funds such as the preparatory action on defence research (padr) , the european defence industrial development programme (edidp) and the european defence fund (edf) , initiatives such as the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) , the coordinated annual review on defence (card) and the european peace facility (epf) , legislation such as the intra-community transfers and defence procurement directives of 2009 , and the creation of administrative capacities such as the commission directorate-general for defence industry and space (dg defis) are heralding an increasing europeanisation of arms production and capability development; ### 15. notes that eu funds such as the preparatory action on defence research (padr) , the european defence industrial development programme (edidp) and the european defence fund (edf) , initiatives such as the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) , the coordinated annual review on defence (card) and the european peace facility (epf) , legislation such as the intra-community transfers and defence procurement directives of 2009 , and the creation of administrative capacities such as the commission directorate-general for defence industry and space (dg defis) are leading towards the definition of a “european capabilities and armaments policy” as foreseen in article 42.3 of the treaty on european union (teu);


### 15. notes that eu funds such as the preparatory action on defence research (padr) , the european defence industrial development programme (edidp) and the european defence fund (edf) , initiatives such as the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) , the coordinated annual review on defence (card) and the european peace facility (epf) , legislation such as the intra-community transfers and defence procurement directives of 2009 , and the creation of administrative capacities such as the commission directorate-general for defence industry and space (dg defis) are heralding an increasing europeanisation of arms production and capability development; ### 15. notes that eu initiatives such as the preparatory action on defence research (padr) , the european defence industrial development programme (edidp) and the european defence fund (edf) , initiatives such as the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) , the coordinated annual review on defence (card) and the european peace facility (epf) , legislation such as the intra-community transfers and defence procurement directives of 2009 , and the creation of administrative capacities such as the commission directorate-general for defence industry and space (dg defis) are helping to enhance cooperation for the purposes of arms production and capability development at european level;


### 16. underlines the fact that the interinstitutional agreement on the establishment of the edf authorises the commission to assess whether the transfer of ownership or the granting of an exclusive licence of edf-co-funded military technology contravenes the security and defence interests of the eu and its member states or the objectives of the fund as set out in article 3 of the proposed regulation; notes that this new legislation establishes a specific type of control function for the commission with regard to a specific category of exports of military technology to third countries; ### 16. underlines the fact that the eu legislation of the edf has not yet been finalized;


### 16. underlines the fact that the interinstitutional agreement on the establishment of the edf authorises the commission to assess whether the transfer of ownership or the granting of an exclusive licence of edf-co-funded military technology contravenes the security and defence interests of the eu and its member states or the objectives of the fund as set out in article 3 of the proposed regulation; notes that this new legislation establishes a specific type of control function for the commission with regard to a specific category of exports of military technology to third countries; ### 16. underlines the fact that the interinstitutional agreement on the establishment of the edf authorises the commission to assess whether the transfer of ownership or the granting of an exclusive licence of edf-co-funded military technology contravenes the security and defence interests of the eu and its member states or the objectives of the fund as set out in article 3 of the proposed regulation; notes that this new legislation establishes a specific type of evaluation function for the commission with regard to a specific category of exports of military technology to third countries , without prejudice to the competence of the eu member state export control authorities to grant the necessary authorisation;


### 16. underlines the fact that the interinstitutional agreement on the establishment of the edf authorises the commission to assess whether the transfer of ownership or the granting of an exclusive licence of edf-co-funded military technology contravenes the security and defence interests of the eu and its member states or the objectives of the fund as set out in article 3 of the proposed regulation; notes that this new legislation establishes a specific type of control function for the commission with regard to a specific category of exports of military technology to third countries; ### 16. underlines the fact that the interinstitutional agreement on the establishment of the edf authorises the commission to assess whether the transfer of ownership or the granting of an exclusive licence for research actions of edf-co-funded military technology contravenes the security and defence interests of the eu and its member states or the objectives of the fund as set out in article 3 of the proposed regulation; notes that this new legislation establishes a specific type of control function for the commission with regard to a specific category of exports of military technology to third countries;


### 17. notes that under the epf , member states and the european external action service (eeas) will work on creating an eu-level system for arms transfers to third countries; ### 17. notes that the international commitments given by european partners extend to the supply of information regarding their national control schemes and arms transfers; notes that under the epf , member states and the european external action service (eeas) will work towards a number of objectives , including the creation of an eu-level system for arms transfers to third countries;


### implementing the common position in the light of europeanised arms production ### implementing the common position in the light of enhanced european cooperation in the field of arms production


### implementing the common position in the light of europeanised arms production ### implementing the common position in the light of consolidating the eu cooperation on arms production


### 18. notes that the lack of convergence of national arms export policies and decision-making is becoming increasingly untenable in the context of the prevailing europeanisation of arms production and the stated ambitions and plans to increase this further; ### 18. notes that the lack of convergence of national arms export policies and decision-making is becoming increasingly untenable in the context of the prevailing coherence and convergence of european arms production and the stated ambitions and plans to develop this further;


### 18. notes that the lack of convergence of national arms export policies and decision-making is becoming increasingly untenable in the context of the prevailing europeanisation of arms production and the stated ambitions and plans to increase this further; ### 18. notes that the lack of convergence of national arms export policies and decision-making is becoming increasingly untenable in the context of strengthening the eu cooperation of arms production and the stated ambitions and plans to increase this further;


### 18. notes that the lack of convergence of national arms export policies and decision-making is becoming increasingly untenable in the context of the prevailing europeanisation of arms production and the stated ambitions and plans to increase this further; ### 18. notes that the harmonization of national arms export policies and decision-making is becoming necessary in view of the definition of a “european capabilities and armaments policy” as foreseen in article 42.3 of the treaty on european union (teu);


### 18. notes that the lack of convergence of national arms export policies and decision-making is becoming increasingly untenable in the context of the prevailing europeanisation of arms production and the stated ambitions and plans to increase this further; ### 18. notes the lack of convergence of national arms export policies and decision-making in the context of enhanced european cooperation in the field of arms production and the stated ambitions and plans to increase this further;


### 19. believes that the europeanisation of arms production needs to go hand in hand with increased transparency; believes that there is still room for improvement in this area , particularly as regards the quality and uniformity of the data submitted by member states; calls on the working party on conventional arms exports (coarm): ### 19. notes that enhanced european cooperation regarding arms production is being accompanied by increased transparency; believes that there is still room for improvement in this area , particularly as regards the quality and uniformity of the data submitted by member states; welcomes the efforts of the coarm group , in particular the guide to implementation of the common position by the member states in terms of cooperation , coordination and convergence; underlines the efforts of member states to support the work of coarm in promoting exchanges of best practice; recommends to the working party on conventional arms exports (coarm):


### 19. believes that the europeanisation of arms production needs to go hand in hand with increased transparency; believes that there is still room for improvement in this area , particularly as regards the quality and uniformity of the data submitted by member states; calls on the working party on conventional arms exports (coarm): ### 19. believes that the definition of a “european capabilities and armaments policy” as foreseen in article 42.3 of the treaty on european union (teu) needs to be in line with the common position 2008/944/cfsp;


### 19. believes that the europeanisation of arms production needs to go hand in hand with increased transparency; believes that there is still room for improvement in this area , particularly as regards the quality and uniformity of the data submitted by member states; calls on the working party on conventional arms exports (coarm): ### 19. believes that enhancing of cooperation at eu level on arms production needs to go hand in hand with increased transparency and coherence within the euro-atlantic area; believes that there is still room for improvement in this area , particularly as regards the quality and uniformity of the data submitted by member states; calls on the working party on conventional arms exports (coarm);


### a) to add the following additional categories in a revised reporting template in order to implement the recent september 2019 council conclusions: the exact type of weapon and the quantity exported , denomination of the munitions , the lot size and the specific end-user , revoked licences , and the value and duration of contracts regarding post-delivery services such as training and maintenance; ### deleted


### b) to disaggregate data with regard to denial information so as to facilitate the scrutiny of specific shipments or member states; ### deleted


### c) to clarify definitions such as licensed value and actual exports so as to facilitate the comparability of data between member states; ### deleted


### 20. welcomes the decision to transform the annual report into an interactive and searchable online database and expects it to be up and running before publication of the export data for 2019; calls on the eeas to inform parliament about the precise date on which this database will go online; urges coarm to chose a solution that enables data to be exported in a structured format; ### 20. welcomes the decision to transform the annual report into an interactive and searchable online database and expects it to be up and running before publication of the export data for 2019;


### 20. welcomes the decision to transform the annual report into an interactive and searchable online database and expects it to be up and running before publication of the export data for 2019; calls on the eeas to inform parliament about the precise date on which this database will go online; urges coarm to chose a solution that enables data to be exported in a structured format; ### 20. notes the decision to transform the annual report into an interactive and searchable online database and expects it to be up and running before publication of the export data for 2019; calls on the eeas to inform parliament about the precise date on which this database will go online; urges coarm to choose a solution that enables data to be exported in a safe and structured format;


### 21. calls on coarm to work towards amending article 7 of the common position , by calling for an improved exchange of ‘relevant information , including information on denial notifications and arms export policies’ and other ‘measures to further increase convergence’; stresses the need , to this end: ### 21. calls on coarm to persevere with its efforts to introduce a notification and exchange hub for member states to share policy information regarding exports to third countries and their decisions to reject applications for the necessary licences; recalls that the decision on whether or not to issue export authorisation remains the sole responsibility of each member state in accordance with the criteria set out in the common position; recommends that coarm improve exchanges of ‘relevant information , including information on denial notifications and arms export policies’ and other ‘measures to further increase convergence’; points out that information exchange must be compatible with the national laws and administrative procedures in each country; proposes to this end:


### 21. calls on coarm to work towards amending article 7 of the common position , by calling for an improved exchange of ‘relevant information , including information on denial notifications and arms export policies’ and other ‘measures to further increase convergence’; stresses the need , to this end: ### 21. calls on member states to use coarm to implement better article 346.1 (b) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) on the production of or trade in arms:


### 21. calls on coarm to work towards amending article 7 of the common position , by calling for an improved exchange of ‘relevant information , including information on denial notifications and arms export policies’ and other ‘measures to further increase convergence’; stresses the need , to this end: ### 21. calls on coarm , as stated under article 7 of the common position , to work towards improved exchange of ‘relevant information , including information on denial notifications and arms export policies’:


### a) to systematically discuss individual licence requests within coarm , where the receiving destination or recipient has been identified as a risk by one or several member states or the eeas; calls on member states to provide a justification if they decide to grant exports to such destinations; ### deleted


### b) to follow the example of the uk in this regard by publishing risk assessments in the annual reports; ### deleted


### c) to undertake a joint assessment of country situations or potential export recipients in the light of the principles and criteria of the common position within the framework of the cfsp and in consultation with external stakeholders , including parliament; ### deleted


### c) to undertake a joint assessment of country situations or potential export recipients in the light of the principles and criteria of the common position within the framework of the cfsp and in consultation with external stakeholders , including parliament; ### to share assessments of country situations or potential export recipients in the light of the principles and criteria of the common position within the framework of the cfsp and in consultation with external stakeholders , including parliament;


### 22. believes that the eu institutions should organise peer reviews with a view to encouraging authorities to share best practices on the collection and processing of data , fostering a better understanding of different national approaches , identifying differences as regards the interpretation of the eight criteria , and discussing ways to improve harmonisation; ### 22. believes that the eu institutions should continue to share experiences and best practices on the collection and processing of data , fostering a better understanding of different national approaches , identifying differences as regards the interpretation of the eight criteria;


### 22. believes that the eu institutions should organise peer reviews with a view to encouraging authorities to share best practices on the collection and processing of data , fostering a better understanding of different national approaches , identifying differences as regards the interpretation of the eight criteria , and discussing ways to improve harmonisation; ### 22. believes that the eu institutions should propose peer reviews with a view to encouraging authorities to share best practices on the collection and processing of data , fostering a better understanding of different national approaches , identifying differences as regards the interpretation of the eight criteria , and discussing ways to improve harmonisation;


### 23. strongly believes that a much higher level of convergence as regards the strict application of the criteria will strengthen human rights , international law and the cfsp , and bolster the eu’s strategic security interests and strategic autonomy; ### 23. strongly believes that a higher level of convergence as regards assessment of the criteria will strengthen human rights , international law and the cfsp , and bolster the eu’s strategic security interests and strategic autonomy;


### 24. stresses that effective end-use controls are crucial for a responsible export policy and for lowering the risk of diversion in particular; calls on the council , the member states , the eeas and the commission to set up a large-scale training and capacity-building programme for national and eu officials on arms export controls; stresses the need to use eu funding to ensure that sufficient staff resources are available at national and eu levels and at delegations and embassies in importing countries for the purposes of implementing viable end-use controls; calls on the eeas and coarm to report on itrace any identified diversion of eu-origin goods as part of the annual report; ### 24. stresses that effective end-use controls are crucial for a responsible export policy and for lowering the risk of diversion in particular; calls on the council , the member states , the eeas and the commission to set up a large-scale training and capacity-building programme for national and eu officials on arms export controls; stresses the need to provide sufficient funding to ensure that sufficient staff resources are available at national and eu levels and at delegations and embassies in importing countries for the purposes of implementing viable end-use controls; calls on the eeas and coarm to report on itrace any identified diversion of eu-origin goods as part of the annual report;


### 24. stresses that effective end-use controls are crucial for a responsible export policy and for lowering the risk of diversion in particular; calls on the council , the member states , the eeas and the commission to set up a large-scale training and capacity-building programme for national and eu officials on arms export controls; stresses the need to use eu funding to ensure that sufficient staff resources are available at national and eu levels and at delegations and embassies in importing countries for the purposes of implementing viable end-use controls; calls on the eeas and coarm to report on itrace any identified diversion of eu-origin goods as part of the annual report; ### 24. stresses that effective end-use controls are part of a responsible export policy and for lowering the risk of diversion in particular; calls on the council , the member states and the eeas to set up a large-scale training and capacity-building programme for national and eu officials on arms export controls; stresses the need to use eu funding to ensure that sufficient staff resources are available at national and eu levels and at delegations and embassies in importing countries for the purposes of implementing viable end-use controls; calls on the eeas and coarm to report on itrace any identified diversion of eu-origin goods as part of the annual report;


### 25. believes that the increasing europeanisation of arms production , the recent council conclusions on convergence in arms exports and the establishment of the epf should be complemented by a mechanism for eu-level monitoring and control based on strict compliance with the eight criteria; ### 25. believes that the increasing eu cooperation for arms production , the recent council conclusions on convergence in arms exports and the establishment of the epf should be complemented by promoting the quality of policy monitoring and evaluation , through developing guidelines , investing in capacity building , and ex post review and control mechanisms based on strict compliance with the eight criteria;


### 25. believes that the increasing europeanisation of arms production , the recent council conclusions on convergence in arms exports and the establishment of the epf should be complemented by a mechanism for eu-level monitoring and control based on strict compliance with the eight criteria; ### 25. believes that the definition of a “european capabilities and armaments policy” as foreseen in article 42.3 of the treaty on european union (teu) should be complemented by national oversight mechanisms in line with article 346.1 b of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) on the production of or trade in arms;


### 25. believes that the increasing europeanisation of arms production , the recent council conclusions on convergence in arms exports and the establishment of the epf should be complemented by a mechanism for eu-level monitoring and control based on strict compliance with the eight criteria; ### 25. believes that enhanced european cooperation in the field of arms production , together with the recent council conclusions on convergence in arms exports are conducive to the thorough and coordinated evaluation of arms exports;


### 25. believes that the increasing europeanisation of arms production , the recent council conclusions on convergence in arms exports and the establishment of the epf should be complemented by a mechanism for eu-level monitoring and control based on strict compliance with the eight criteria; ### 25. believes that the increasing coherence and convergence of european arms production , the recent council conclusions on convergence in arms exports and the establishment of the epf should be complemented by a mechanism for eu-level monitoring and control based on strict compliance with the eight criteria;


### 26. considers that regular consultations with national parliaments , arms export control authorities , industry associations and civil society are central to meaningful transparency; calls on coarm to enhance dialogue with civil society and consultations with parliament and arms export control authorities; encourages civil society and academia to exercise independent scrutiny of the arms trade and calls on the member states and the eeas to support such activities , including by financial means; ### 26. considers that regular consultations with national parliaments , arms export control authorities , industry associations and civil society are conducive to meaningful transparency; calls on coarm to continue dialogue with civil society and consultations with parliament and arms export control authorities;


### 26. considers that regular consultations with national parliaments , arms export control authorities , industry associations and civil society are central to meaningful transparency; calls on coarm to enhance dialogue with civil society and consultations with parliament and arms export control authorities; encourages civil society and academia to exercise independent scrutiny of the arms trade and calls on the member states and the eeas to support such activities , including by financial means; ### 26. considers that regular consultations with national parliaments , arms export control authorities , industry associations and civil society are central to meaningful transparency; calls on coarm to enhance dialogue with civil society and consultations with parliament and arms export control authorities; encourages civil society and academia to exercise independent scrutiny of the exports of defence technology and equipment and calls on the member states and the eeas to support such activities , including by financial means;


### 26. considers that regular consultations with national parliaments , arms export control authorities , industry associations and civil society are central to meaningful transparency; calls on coarm to enhance dialogue with civil society and consultations with parliament and arms export control authorities; encourages civil society and academia to exercise independent scrutiny of the arms trade and calls on the member states and the eeas to support such activities , including by financial means; ### 26. considers that regular consultations with national parliaments , arms export control authorities , industry associations and civil society are one of the ways to reach transparency; calls on coarm to enhance dialogue with civil society and consultations with parliament and arms export control authorities; encourages civil society and academia to exercise independent scrutiny of the arms trade and calls on the member states and the eeas to support such activities with advice , and possibly by financial means;


### b. whereas in the context of the covid-19 pandemic , democracy , human rights and fundamental freedoms have deteriorated in many parts of the world , disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks have increased , and isolationist trends and rivalry – rather than multilateral cooperation; ### b. whereas in the context of the covid-19 pandemic , democracy , human rights and fundamental freedoms have deteriorated in many parts of the world , disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks from third countries have increased , as well as isolationist trends and systemic rivalry – rather than multilateral cooperation according to the rules-based international order;


### b. whereas in the context of the covid-19 pandemic , democracy , human rights and fundamental freedoms have deteriorated in many parts of the world , disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks have increased , and isolationist trends and rivalry – rather than multilateral cooperation; ### b. whereas in the context of the covid-19 pandemic , democracy , human rights and fundamental freedoms have deteriorated in many parts of the world , disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks have increased , as well as isolationist , unilateral trends and rivalries – rather than multilateral cooperation;


### a. whereas the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (npt) has undoubtedly been the most important international instrument to regulate the nuclear regime for the last 50 years and has contributed substantially to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons , reducing the nuclear arsenal and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy; whereas in 1995 , npt state parties agreed to extend the npt indefinitely; ### a. whereas the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (npt) has undoubtedly been the most important international instrument to regulate the nuclear regime for the last 50 years; whereas it is the cornerstone of global strategic stability and an irreplaceable bulwark against the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons; whereas it has contributed significantly to reducing the nuclear arsenal and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy; whereas it is a mature and pragmatic treaty , almost universal and very widely complied with; whereas in 1995 , npt state parties agreed to extend the npt indefinitely;


### d. whereas the ultimate goal of strengthening the global non-proliferation regime in the 2010 review conference was achieved further to npt states recommitting to the basic provisions of the npt and adopting a 64-point action plan that includes , among other features , specific action plans on non-proliferation , disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy , underpinned by concrete and measurable actions that the state parties will take to support the three pillars; ### d. whereas the aim of strengthening the global non-proliferation regime in the 2010 review conference was partially achieved further to npt states recommitting to the basic provisions of the npt and adopting a 64-point action plan that includes , among other features , specific action plans on non-proliferation , disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy , underpinned by concrete and measurable actions that the state parties will take to support the three pillars;