### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts; ### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country;


### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts; ### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; stresses the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts;


### 3. takes the view that the eu should identify the un bodies and other multilateral organisations that are key to promoting policy dialogue , convergence and policy solutions to global challenges and standard setting and should define clear objectives and clear priorities for dialogue with and support , including budgetary support , to such bodies and organisations; recalls , in this regard , that the eu and its member states are already the leading donors to the un and many of its agencies and programmes , but that this commitment to and support for the un does not always translate into a stronger presence by the eu and its member states in key un agency positions; calls on the eu and its member states to further improve their coordination when it comes to establishing joint support for candidacies for leadership positions in multilateral fora; points to the positive potential of also enhancing this coordination with like-minded partners in other world regions and looking at the importance of the principle of the equitable geographical distribution of leadership positions; ### 3. takes the view that the eu should identify the un bodies and other multilateral organisations that are key to promoting policy dialogue , convergence and policy solutions to global challenges and standard setting and should define clear objectives and clear priorities for dialogue with and support , including budgetary support , to such bodies and organisations; recalls , in this regard , that the eu and its member states are already the leading donors to the un and many of its agencies and programmes , but that this commitment to and support for the un does not always translate into a stronger presence by the eu and its member states in key un agency positions; calls on the eu and its member states to further improve their coordination when it comes to establishing joint support for candidacies for leadership positions in multilateral fora; points to the positive potential of also enhancing this coordination with like-minded partners in other world regions and looking at the importance of the principle of the equitable geographical distribution of leadership positions; emphasizes in this regard the key role that the osce is playing as pillar of european security and calls for further strengthening the comprehensive security approach of the organisation;


### 3. takes the view that the eu should identify the un bodies and other multilateral organisations that are key to promoting policy dialogue , convergence and policy solutions to global challenges and standard setting and should define clear objectives and clear priorities for dialogue with and support , including budgetary support , to such bodies and organisations; recalls , in this regard , that the eu and its member states are already the leading donors to the un and many of its agencies and programmes , but that this commitment to and support for the un does not always translate into a stronger presence by the eu and its member states in key un agency positions; calls on the eu and its member states to further improve their coordination when it comes to establishing joint support for candidacies for leadership positions in multilateral fora; points to the positive potential of also enhancing this coordination with like-minded partners in other world regions and looking at the importance of the principle of the equitable geographical distribution of leadership positions; ### 3. takes the view that the eu should identify the un bodies and other multilateral organisations that are key to promoting policy dialogue , convergence and policy solutions to global challenges , standard setting , including through budgetary support; recalls , in this regard , that the eu and its member states are already the leading donors to the un , many of its agencies and programmes , and other organisations , but that this commitment and support does not always translate into a stronger impact by the eu , its member states and like-minded partners in multilateral fora , which is particularly worrying at a time of growing assertiveness of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in such fora; calls on the eu , its member states and like-minded partners to further improve their coordination when it comes to establishing joint support for candidacies for leadership positions in multilateral fora;


### 3. takes the view that the eu should identify the un bodies and other multilateral organisations that are key to promoting policy dialogue , convergence and policy solutions to global challenges and standard setting and should define clear objectives and clear priorities for dialogue with and support , including budgetary support , to such bodies and organisations; recalls , in this regard , that the eu and its member states are already the leading donors to the un and many of its agencies and programmes , but that this commitment to and support for the un does not always translate into a stronger presence by the eu and its member states in key un agency positions; calls on the eu and its member states to further improve their coordination when it comes to establishing joint support for candidacies for leadership positions in multilateral fora; points to the positive potential of also enhancing this coordination with like-minded partners in other world regions and looking at the importance of the principle of the equitable geographical distribution of leadership positions; ### 3. takes the view that the eu should identify the un bodies and other multilateral organisations that are key to promoting policy dialogue , convergence and policy solutions to global challenges and standard setting and should define clear objectives and clear priorities for dialogue with and support , including budgetary support , to such bodies and organisations; recalls , in this regard , that the eu and its member states are already the leading donors to the un and many of its agencies and programmes , but that this commitment to and support for the un does not always translate into a stronger presence by the eu and its member states in key un agency positions; calls on the eu and its member states to further improve their coordination when it comes to establishing joint support for candidacies for leadership positions in multilateral fora; points to the positive potential of also enhancing this coordination with like-minded partners in other world regions;


### 3. takes the view that the eu should identify the un bodies and other multilateral organisations that are key to promoting policy dialogue , convergence and policy solutions to global challenges and standard setting and should define clear objectives and clear priorities for dialogue with and support , including budgetary support , to such bodies and organisations; recalls , in this regard , that the eu and its member states are already the leading donors to the un and many of its agencies and programmes , but that this commitment to and support for the un does not always translate into a stronger presence by the eu and its member states in key un agency positions; calls on the eu and its member states to further improve their coordination when it comes to establishing joint support for candidacies for leadership positions in multilateral fora; points to the positive potential of also enhancing this coordination with like-minded partners in other world regions and looking at the importance of the principle of the equitable geographical distribution of leadership positions; ### 3. takes the view that the eu should identify the un bodies and other multilateral organisations that are key to promoting policy dialogue , convergence and policy solutions to global challenges and standard setting and should define clear objectives and clear priorities for dialogue with and support , including budgetary support , to such bodies and organisations; recalls , in this regard , that the eu and its member states are already the leading financial contributors to the un and many of its agencies and programmes , but that this commitment to and support for the un does not always translate into a stronger presence by the eu and its member states in key un agency positions; calls on the eu and its member states to further improve their coordination when it comes to establishing joint support for candidacies for leadership positions in multilateral fora; points to the positive potential of also enhancing this coordination with like-minded partners in other world regions and looking at the importance of the principle of the equitable geographical distribution of leadership positions;


### 4. praises the ability of the eu and its member states to work in a coherent and synergic fashion and to present unified positions in the un system , with particular regard to the un general assembly , un security council and un human rights council; praises , in this regard , the valuable coordination efforts by the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva; believes that this unified , synergic approach should be replicated for every un body , agency or other international organisation , so that the eu can act and deliver as one across the board in multilateral fora; laments that the security council is not as reactive to crises like the ones in syria , ethiopia and sudan as it has been to other crises in the past and that this has had a negative impact on preventing , managing and resolving these crises; points to the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu should promote reflecting on the terms of a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner , thoroughly limit the right to veto and change the composition of the security council to reflect today’s world better; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should find a broad consensus on reforming the security council , inter alia , through the provision of a permanent seat for the eu , in addition to the already existing seats held by eu member states; ### 4. laments that the security council is not as reactive to crises like the ones in syria , ethiopia and sudan as it has been to other crises in the past and that this has had a negative impact on preventing , managing and resolving these crises; points to the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu should promote reflecting on the terms of a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner , thoroughly limit the right to veto and change the composition of the security council to reflect today’s world better; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should find a broad consensus on reforming the security council , inter alia , through the provision of a permanent seat for the eu , in addition to the already existing seats held by eu member states;


### 4. praises the ability of the eu and its member states to work in a coherent and synergic fashion and to present unified positions in the un system , with particular regard to the un general assembly , un security council and un human rights council; praises , in this regard , the valuable coordination efforts by the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva; believes that this unified , synergic approach should be replicated for every un body , agency or other international organisation , so that the eu can act and deliver as one across the board in multilateral fora; laments that the security council is not as reactive to crises like the ones in syria , ethiopia and sudan as it has been to other crises in the past and that this has had a negative impact on preventing , managing and resolving these crises; points to the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu should promote reflecting on the terms of a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner , thoroughly limit the right to veto and change the composition of the security council to reflect today’s world better; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should find a broad consensus on reforming the security council , inter alia , through the provision of a permanent seat for the eu , in addition to the already existing seats held by eu member states; ### 4. praises the ability of the eu and its member states to work in a coherent and synergic fashion and to present unified positions in the un system , with particular regard to the un general assembly , un security council and un human rights council; praises , in this regard , the valuable coordination efforts by the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva; believes that this unified , synergic approach should be replicated for every un body , agency or other international organisation , so that the eu can act and deliver as one across the board in multilateral fora; laments that the security council is not as reactive to crises like the ones in syria , ethiopia and sudan as it has been to other crises in the past and that this has had a negative impact on preventing , managing and resolving these crises due to the extensive veto right; emphasises that it is indefensible that one state can stop efforts when genocide , crimes against humanity or war crimes are committed; points to the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu should promote reflecting on the terms of a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner , thoroughly limit the right to veto and change the composition of the security council to reflect today’s world better; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should find a broad consensus on reforming the security council , inter alia , through the provision of a permanent seat for the eu , in addition to the already existing seats held by eu member states;


### 4. praises the ability of the eu and its member states to work in a coherent and synergic fashion and to present unified positions in the un system , with particular regard to the un general assembly , un security council and un human rights council; praises , in this regard , the valuable coordination efforts by the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva; believes that this unified , synergic approach should be replicated for every un body , agency or other international organisation , so that the eu can act and deliver as one across the board in multilateral fora; laments that the security council is not as reactive to crises like the ones in syria , ethiopia and sudan as it has been to other crises in the past and that this has had a negative impact on preventing , managing and resolving these crises; points to the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu should promote reflecting on the terms of a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner , thoroughly limit the right to veto and change the composition of the security council to reflect today’s world better; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should find a broad consensus on reforming the security council , inter alia , through the provision of a permanent seat for the eu , in addition to the already existing seats held by eu member states; ### 4. praises the ability of the eu and its member states to work in a coherent and synergic fashion and to present unified positions in the un system , with particular regard to the un general assembly , un security council and un human rights council; praises , in this regard , the valuable coordination efforts by the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva; believes that this unified , synergic approach should be replicated for every un body , agency or other international organisation , so that the eu can act and deliver as one across the board in multilateral fora; laments that the security council is not as reactive to crises like the ones in syria , ethiopia and sudan as it has been to other crises in the past and that this has had a negative impact on preventing , managing and resolving these crises; points to the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu should promote reflecting on the terms of a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner , thoroughly limit the right to veto and change the composition of the security council to reflect today’s world better; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should find a broad consensus on reforming the security council , inter alia , through the provision of a permanent seat for the eu , in addition to the already existing seats held by eu member states; encourages eu member states not to compete against each other when it comes to securing a seat on the security council;


### 4. praises the ability of the eu and its member states to work in a coherent and synergic fashion and to present unified positions in the un system , with particular regard to the un general assembly , un security council and un human rights council; praises , in this regard , the valuable coordination efforts by the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva; believes that this unified , synergic approach should be replicated for every un body , agency or other international organisation , so that the eu can act and deliver as one across the board in multilateral fora; laments that the security council is not as reactive to crises like the ones in syria , ethiopia and sudan as it has been to other crises in the past and that this has had a negative impact on preventing , managing and resolving these crises; points to the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu should promote reflecting on the terms of a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner , thoroughly limit the right to veto and change the composition of the security council to reflect today’s world better; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should find a broad consensus on reforming the security council , inter alia , through the provision of a permanent seat for the eu , in addition to the already existing seats held by eu member states; ### 4. praises the ability of the eu and its member states to work in a coherent and synergic fashion and to present unified positions in the un system , with particular regard to the un general assembly , un security council and un human rights council; praises , in this regard , the valuable coordination efforts by the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva; believes that this unified , synergic approach should be replicated across multilateral fora; calls on the eu and its member states to review and update the eu strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to take account of the recent geopolitical , technological and legal developments and provide an up-to-date and ambitious basis for eu’s multilateral engagement for non-proliferation and disarmament; laments that the security council is divided and not reactive to regional and global crises; points to the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu should promote reflecting on the terms of a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should work towards finding a broad consensus on reforming the security council , inter alia , through the provision of a permanent seat for the eu , in addition to the already existing seats held by eu member states;


### 4. praises the ability of the eu and its member states to work in a coherent and synergic fashion and to present unified positions in the un system , with particular regard to the un general assembly , un security council and un human rights council; praises , in this regard , the valuable coordination efforts by the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva; believes that this unified , synergic approach should be replicated for every un body , agency or other international organisation , so that the eu can act and deliver as one across the board in multilateral fora; laments that the security council is not as reactive to crises like the ones in syria , ethiopia and sudan as it has been to other crises in the past and that this has had a negative impact on preventing , managing and resolving these crises; points to the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu should promote reflecting on the terms of a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner , thoroughly limit the right to veto and change the composition of the security council to reflect today’s world better; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should find a broad consensus on reforming the security council , inter alia , through the provision of a permanent seat for the eu , in addition to the already existing seats held by eu member states; ### 4. praises the ability of the eu and its member states to work in a coherent and synergic fashion and to present unified positions in the un system , with particular regard to the un general assembly , un security council and un human rights council; praises , in this regard , the valuable coordination efforts by the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva; believes that this unified , synergic approach should be replicated for every un body , agency or other international organisation , so that the eu can act and deliver as one across the board in multilateral fora; laments that the security council is not as reactive to crises like the ones in syria , ethiopia , sudan and ukraine as it has been to other crises in the past and that this has had a negative impact on preventing , managing and resolving these crises; points to the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu should promote reflecting on the terms of a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner , thoroughly limit the right to veto and change the composition of the security council to reflect today’s world better; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should find a broad consensus on reforming the security council , inter alia , through the provision of a permanent seat for the eu , in addition to the already existing seats held by eu member states;


### 4. praises the ability of the eu and its member states to work in a coherent and synergic fashion and to present unified positions in the un system , with particular regard to the un general assembly , un security council and un human rights council; praises , in this regard , the valuable coordination efforts by the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva; believes that this unified , synergic approach should be replicated for every un body , agency or other international organisation , so that the eu can act and deliver as one across the board in multilateral fora; laments that the security council is not as reactive to crises like the ones in syria , ethiopia and sudan as it has been to other crises in the past and that this has had a negative impact on preventing , managing and resolving these crises; points to the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu should promote reflecting on the terms of a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner , thoroughly limit the right to veto and change the composition of the security council to reflect today’s world better; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should find a broad consensus on reforming the security council , inter alia , through the provision of a permanent seat for the eu , in addition to the already existing seats held by eu member states; ### 4. praises the ability of the eu and its member states to work in a coherent and synergic fashion and to present unified positions in the un system , with particular regard to the un general assembly , un security council and un human rights council; praises , in this regard , the valuable coordination efforts by the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva; believes that this unified , synergic approach should be replicated for every un body , agency or other international organisation , so that the eu can act and deliver as one across the board in multilateral fora; laments that the security council is not as reactive to crises like the ones in syria , ethiopia and sudan as it has been to other crises in the past and that this has had a negative impact on preventing , managing and resolving these crises; deplores the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu should promote reflecting on the terms of a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner , thoroughly limit the right to veto and change the composition of the security council to reflect today’s world better; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should find a broad consensus on reforming the security council , inter alia , through the provision of a permanent seat for the eu , in addition to the already existing seats held by eu member states;


### 5. calls on the eu and its member states to further their ability to share information , consult and coordinate , including in the governing bodies and boards of multilateral bodies where the eu is not represented; shares the view of the vp/hr and the commission that the eu should establish coordination mechanisms in all international financial institutions; believes that the same coordination ability should be expanded to the boards of all un bodies , such as , for example , the food and agriculture organization; ### 5. calls on the eu and its member states to further their ability to share information , consult and coordinate , including in the governing bodies and boards of multilateral bodies where the eu is not represented; shares the view of the vp/hr and the commission that the eu should establish coordination mechanisms in all international financial institutions; believes that the same coordination ability should be expanded to the boards of all un bodies;


### — having regard to council decision (cfsp) 2021/509 of 22 march 2021 establishing a european peace facility (epf)1 , ### — having regard to the council decision (cfsp) 2021/509 of 22 march 2021 establishing a european peace facility (epf)1 ,


### — having regard to the response force of the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) , ### — having regard to the response force and other forces held at high readiness by the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) ,


### — having regard to the madrid summit declaration adopted by the nato heads of state and government participating in the north atlantic council meeting in madrid on 29 june 2022 , ### — having regard to the madrid summit declaration adopted by the nato heads of state and government participating in the north atlantic council meeting in madrid on 29 june 2022 , and in particular to the new nato strategic concept adopted at this summit ,


### — having regard to the madrid summit declaration adopted by the nato heads of state and government participating in the north atlantic council meeting in madrid on 29 june 2022 , ### — having regard to the new nato strategic concept and the madrid summit declaration adopted by the nato heads of state and government participating in the north atlantic council meeting in madrid on 29 june 2022 ,


### — having regard to the two joint declarations on eu-nato cooperation signed on 8 july 2016 and 10 july 2018 , ### — having regard to the two joint declarations on eu-nato cooperation signed on 8 july 2016 and 10 july 2018 , and the 74 proposals for common action endorsed by eu member states and nato allies ,


### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions abroad in order to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , international organisations and third countries; ### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions abroad in order to promote peace , security and stability in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , international organisations , including nato and third countries;


### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions abroad in order to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , international organisations and third countries; ### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions abroad in order to promote peace , security and stability in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , international organisations and third countries;


### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions abroad in order to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , international organisations and third countries; ### a. whereas the european union has experience in deploying multinational missions abroad in order to promote peace , security in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , international organisations and third countries;


### b. whereas csdp missions regularly depend on the effective performance of third-party missions , reliable cooperation , timely information sharing and sincere host nation support; whereas the lack of any of these can jeopardise the implementation of a csdp mission’s mandate and could ultimately lead to the withdrawal of eu forces; ### b. whereas csdp missions regularly depend on the effective performance of third-party missions , reliable cooperation , timely information sharing and sincere host nation institutional and societal support; whereas the lack of any of these can jeopardise the implementation of a csdp mission’s mandate and could ultimately lead to the withdrawal of eu-led forces;


### b. whereas csdp missions regularly depend on the effective performance of third-party missions , reliable cooperation , timely information sharing and sincere host nation support; whereas the lack of any of these can jeopardise the implementation of a csdp mission’s mandate and could ultimately lead to the withdrawal of eu forces; ### b. whereas csdp missions regularly depend on the effective performance of third-party missions , reliable cooperation , timely information sharing and sincere host nation support; whereas the lack of any of these can jeopardise the successful implementation of a csdp mission’s mandate and could ultimately lead to the withdrawal of eu forces;


### c. whereas the premature termination of csdp missions leaves populations unprotected and makes weak host nation authorities vulnerable , thereby opening up opportunities for state and non-state actors , including terrorists and extremists , and including those sponsored by our global competitors; ### deleted


### c. whereas the premature termination of csdp missions leaves populations unprotected and makes weak host nation authorities vulnerable , thereby opening up opportunities for state and non-state actors , including terrorists and extremists , and including those sponsored by our global competitors; ### c. whereas the premature termination of csdp missions can leave host nations and their authorities in a weak position to protect their populations , thereby creating power vacuums to be exploited by other state and non-state actors , including terrorists and extremists , and including those sponsored by our global competitors;


### c. whereas the premature termination of csdp missions leaves populations unprotected and makes weak host nation authorities vulnerable , thereby opening up opportunities for state and non-state actors , including terrorists and extremists , and including those sponsored by our global competitors; ### c. whereas the premature termination of csdp missions leaves populations unprotected and makes weak host nation authorities vulnerable , thereby opening up opportunities for malicious state and non-state actors , including terrorists and extremists;


### d. whereas the european union and its member states should strive for autonomy when preparing , conducting and sustaining their csdp missions; whereas the union should be capable of rapidly deploying multidimensional forces , swiftly reinforcing them where needed and sustaining them as long as required and without depending on third-party support; ### d. whereas the european union and its member states should strive for coordination with like-minded partners when preparing , conducting and sustaining their csdp missions; whereas the union should be capable of rapidly deploying multidimensional forces , swiftly reinforcing them where needed and sustaining them as long as required in coordination with like-minded partners but without depending on third-party support;


### d. whereas the european union and its member states should strive for autonomy when preparing , conducting and sustaining their csdp missions; whereas the union should be capable of rapidly deploying multidimensional forces , swiftly reinforcing them where needed and sustaining them as long as required and without depending on third-party support; ### d. whereas the european union and its member states should strive for more autonomy when preparing , conducting and sustaining their csdp missions; whereas the union should be capable of rapidly deploying multidimensional forces , swiftly reinforcing them where needed and sustaining them as long as required and without depending on third-party support;


### e. whereas csdp missions are undertaken using capabilities provided by the member states and depend greatly on the sufficient provision of forces and equipment; whereas member states frequently fail to provide sufficient forces and equipment to csdp missions; whereas the member states’ capabilities are used for national purposes and for their contributions to collective defence and to missions abroad; ### e. whereas csdp missions are undertaken using human resources and capabilities provided by the member states and depend on the sufficient provision of forces and equipment; whereas member states frequently fail to provide sufficient forces and equipment to csdp missions; whereas the member states’ capabilities are used for national purposes and for their contributions to collective defence and to missions abroad; whereas the union could step up links between csdp missions and operations and ad hoc coalitions when the latter are operating in the same or neighbouring theatres;


### f. whereas for collective defence many member states coordinate their efforts and employ their forces within the nato framework; whereas many member states also contribute to missions abroad within the csdp framework; ### f. whereas nato remains the foundation of collective defence for its members , who coordinate their efforts and employ their forces within the nato framework; whereas many member states also contribute to missions abroad within the csdp framework;


### f. whereas for collective defence many member states coordinate their efforts and employ their forces within the nato framework; whereas many member states also contribute to missions abroad within the csdp framework; ### f. whereas for collective defence many member states coordinate their efforts and employ their forces within the nato framework as a matter of priority; whereas many member states also contribute to missions abroad within the csdp framework;


### h. whereas the strategic compass sets out eu-level action in many of these areas; whereas the european defence fund and the european peace facility are eu instruments which have already been deployed and that are designed to improve military capabilities and foster operational cooperation and burden-sharing abroad; ### h. whereas the strategic compass sets out eu-level action in many of these areas; whereas the european defence fund and the european peace facility are eu instruments which have already been deployed and that are designed to improve military capabilities and foster operational cooperation and burden-sharing abroad; whereas the strategic compass proposes to "[s]ignificantly enhancing and harnessing the full potential of eu funding instruments , in particular the european defence fund , [a]s key to strengthen our defence capabilities and also equip member states’ forces to face the future battlefields'"1a;


### h. whereas the strategic compass sets out eu-level action in many of these areas; whereas the european defence fund and the european peace facility are eu instruments which have already been deployed and that are designed to improve military capabilities and foster operational cooperation and burden-sharing abroad; ### h. whereas the strategic compass contributes towards setting out eu-level action in many of these areas; whereas the european defence fund and the european peace facility are eu instruments which are currently being deployed and that are designed to improve military capabilities and foster operational cooperation and burden-sharing abroad;


### i. whereas the battlegroup concept has helped develop multinational defence cooperation and interoperability , as well as transformation for rapid deployment and force modernisation; ### i. whereas the battlegroup concept has helped develop multinational defence cooperation and interoperability , as well as transformation for rapid deployment and force modernisation; whereas battlegroups have never been used;


### k. whereas the integrated approach is also meant to prioritise prevention and promote the human security of local populations over narrow self-interests; ### deleted


### k. whereas the integrated approach is also meant to prioritise prevention and promote the human security of local populations over narrow self-interests; ### k. whereas the integrated approach is also meant to prioritise prevention and promote the human security of local populations;


### l. whereas joint declarations on eu-nato cooperation should define areas of cooperation and coordination , establish the tasks to be fulfilled within each framework and be accompanied by roadmaps for their implementation; ### l. whereas joint declarations on eu-nato cooperation should define areas of cooperation and coordination , establish the tasks to be fulfilled within each framework and be accompanied by roadmaps for their implementation; whereas eu defence missions should complement nato missions;


### l. whereas joint declarations on eu-nato cooperation should define areas of cooperation and coordination , establish the tasks to be fulfilled within each framework and be accompanied by roadmaps for their implementation; ### l. whereas the much anticipated third joint declaration on eu-nato cooperation should define the interaction and link between the rdc and nato’s rapid response forces;


### l. whereas joint declarations on eu-nato cooperation should define areas of cooperation and coordination , establish the tasks to be fulfilled within each framework and be accompanied by roadmaps for their implementation; ### l. whereas the 2016 and 2018 joint declarations on eu-nato cooperation have identified areas of cooperation and coordination , which are being implemented through the 74 proposals for common action endorsed by eu member states and nato allies;


### m. whereas the strategic compass sets out a clear roadmap for implementing eu-level actions , in particular for transforming the eu battlegroup system , establishing a rapid deployment capacity (rdc) and paving the way towards entrusting the implementation of specific tasks to a group of member states within the union framework in accordance with articles 42(5) and 44 of the teu; ### m. whereas the strategic compass sets out a clear roadmap for implementing eu-level actions , in particular for transforming the eu battlegroup system , establishing a rapid deployment capacity (rdc) and paving the way towards entrusting the implementation of specific tasks to a group of member states within the union framework in accordance with articles 42(5) and 44 of the teu; whereas the rdc is a key deliverable of the strategic compass , and should therefore be implemented as a matter of urgency and given the necessary level of urgency by eu member states;


### m. whereas the strategic compass sets out a clear roadmap for implementing eu-level actions , in particular for transforming the eu battlegroup system , establishing a rapid deployment capacity (rdc) and paving the way towards entrusting the implementation of specific tasks to a group of member states within the union framework in accordance with articles 42(5) and 44 of the teu; ### m. whereas the strategic compass sets out a clear roadmap for implementing eu-level actions , in particular for transforming the eu battlegroup system , establishing a more agile and flexible rapid deployment capacity (rdc) and paving the way towards entrusting the implementation of specific tasks to a group of member states within the union framework in accordance with articles 42(5) and 44 of the teu;


### m. whereas the strategic compass sets out a clear roadmap for implementing eu-level actions , in particular for transforming the eu battlegroup system , establishing a rapid deployment capacity (rdc) and paving the way towards entrusting the implementation of specific tasks to a group of member states within the union framework in accordance with articles 42(5) and 44 of the teu; ### m. whereas the strategic compass sets out a clear roadmap for implementing eu-level actions , in particular for transforming the eu battlegroup system , establishing a european union rapid deployment capacity (eu rdc) and paving the way towards entrusting the implementation of specific tasks to a group of member states within the union framework in accordance with articles 42(5) and 44 of the teu;


### n. whereas article 44 has never been used , and is ambiguous in terms of how it would work in practice in specific cases; ### n. whereas article 44 has never been used , and is ambiguous in terms of how it would work in practice in specific cases; whereas decision-making for the deployment of the rdc could be made via so-called ‘constructive abstention’ , whereby a member state would not block a council decision to launch a mission of the rdc; highlights , that lack of unanimity in the council to launch a mission of the rdc could be circumvented through the creation of an informal ‘coalition of the willing’ , which would allow an rdc mission to operate with the eu’s blessing;


### n. whereas article 44 has never been used , and is ambiguous in terms of how it would work in practice in specific cases; ### n. whereas article 44 has never been used , and is imprecise in terms of how it would work in practice in specific cases;


### o. whereas the practical implementation of article 44 of the teu , as well as the establishment and operation of the rdc , should be considered the main aspects of the csdp on which the vice-president of the european commission / high representative of the european union for foreign affairs and security policy (vp/hr) needs to regularly consult parliament; ### o. whereas the practical implementation of article 44 of the teu , as well as the establishment and operation of the rdc , should be considered key aspects of the csdp on which the vice-president of the european commission / high representative of the european union for foreign affairs and security policy (vp/hr) needs to regularly consult parliament;


### p. whereas , in line with article 41 of the teu , the administrative and operating expenditure for the rdc should be charged to the union budget except for expenditure that is covered by the european peace facility , notwithstanding the possibility for participating member states to make free-of-charge contributions to the rdc; ### p. whereas , in line with article 41 of the teu , the administrative and operating expenditure for the rdc should be charged to the union budget except for expenditure that is covered by the european peace facility;


### p. whereas , in line with article 41 of the teu , the administrative and operating expenditure for the rdc should be charged to the union budget except for expenditure that is covered by the european peace facility , notwithstanding the possibility for participating member states to make free-of-charge contributions to the rdc; ### p. whereas , in line with article 41 of the teu , the administrative and operating expenditure for the eu rdc should be charged to the union budget except for expenditure that is covered by the european peace facility , notwithstanding the possibility for participating member states to make free-of-charge contributions to the eu rdc;


### p. whereas , in line with article 41 of the teu , the administrative and operating expenditure for the rdc should be charged to the union budget except for expenditure that is covered by the european peace facility , notwithstanding the possibility for participating member states to make free-of-charge contributions to the rdc; ### p. whereas , in line with article 41 of the teu , the administrative expenditure for the rdc should be charged to the union budget except for expenditure that is covered by the european peace facility , notwithstanding the possibility for participating member states to make voluntary contributions to the rdc;


### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish an rdc; stresses the importance of the eu having the necessary capabilities and structures to take action rapidly and decisively during crises in order to serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests and values across the world; ### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish an rdc; stresses the importance of the eu having the necessary capabilities and structures to take action rapidly and decisively during crises in order to serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests and values across the world; considers the rdc as a crucial element for closing the gap between the eu’s level of ambition and its actual capabilities; calls on eu member states , especially those participating in pesco with its 20 binding commitments , and the eeas to facilitate participation in the rdc by providing adequate financial incentives in order to ensure provision of forces for the rdc by the member states;


### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish an rdc; stresses the importance of the eu having the necessary capabilities and structures to take action rapidly and decisively during crises in order to serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests and values across the world; ### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish an eu rdc; recalls that the eu rdc should reach full operational capability by 2025; stresses the importance of the eu having the necessary capabilities and command and control structure to act rapidly and decisively during crises in order to assert itself as a more credible security and defence actor and serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests and values across the world;


### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish an rdc; stresses the importance of the eu having the necessary capabilities and structures to take action rapidly and decisively during crises in order to serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests and values across the world; ### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish an rdc; stresses the importance of the eu having the necessary flexible , robust and credible instruments , capabilities and structures to take action , effectively rapidly and decisively during crises in order to serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests and values across the world;


### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish an rdc; stresses the importance of the eu having the necessary capabilities and structures to take action rapidly and decisively during crises in order to serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests and values across the world; ### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish an rdc; calls for the operationalisation of the rdc as soon as possible and by 2025 at the latest , based on the ability to respond rapidly and decisively during crises in order to serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests and values across the world;


### 2. strongly encourages the vp/hr to propose a council decision on establishing an eu rdc to protect the union’s values and serve its interests along the following lines: ### 2. strongly encourages the vp/hr to propose a council decision on establishing an eu rdc to protect the union’s values and serve its interests along the following lines taking account of the changes in the geopolitical landscape highlighted by the aggression against ukraine:


### 2. strongly encourages the vp/hr to propose a council decision on establishing an eu rdc to protect the union’s values and serve its interests along the following lines: ### 2. strongly encourages the vp/hr to propose a council decision on establishing an eu rdc to respond to imminent threats or to react rapidly to a crisis situation outside the union at any stage of the conflict cycle along the following lines:


### 2. strongly encourages the vp/hr to propose a council decision on establishing an eu rdc to protect the union’s values and serve its interests along the following lines: ### 2. strongly encourages the vp/hr to propose a council decision on establishing an eu rdc to protect the union’s values and serve the interests of the union as a whole along the following lines:


### 2. strongly encourages the vp/hr to propose a council decision on establishing an eu rdc to protect the union’s values and serve its interests along the following lines: ### 2. strongly encourages the vp/hr to propose a council decision on establishing an eu rdc along the following lines:


### the rdc should be established as a european union structure with its own legal and institutional identity; ### deleted


### the rdc should be established as a european union structure with its own legal and institutional identity; ### the rdc should be established as a european union structure with its own legal and institutional identity following the example of the eeas in order to allow for setting up the rdc as a standing force that is permanently stationed and trains together;


### the rdc should be established as a european union structure with its own legal and institutional identity; ### the eu rdc should be established as the european union military high-readiness capability for crisis response with its own legal and institutional identity and build upon the unique capabilities and expertise already acquired;


### the rdc’s tasks should include , but not be limited to , rescue and evacuation operations , initial entry and initial phase of stabilisation operations , temporary reinforcement of other missions , and acting as a reserve force to secure exit; the council could assign further tasks as referred to under article 44 of the teu , and the duration and scope of the assignments should be consistent with resources allocated to the rdc; ### the eu rdc should be used in non-permissive environments and during all stages of a conflict cycle , including for tasks such as , but not limited to , rescue and evacuation operations , initial entry and initial phase of stabilisation operations , temporary reinforcement of other missions , and acting as a reserve force to secure exit; the council could assign further tasks as referred to under article 44 of the teu , and the duration and scope of the assignments should be consistent with resources allocated to the eu rdc;


### the rdc’s tasks should include , but not be limited to , rescue and evacuation operations , initial entry and initial phase of stabilisation operations , temporary reinforcement of other missions , and acting as a reserve force to secure exit; the council could assign further tasks as referred to under article 44 of the teu , and the duration and scope of the assignments should be consistent with resources allocated to the rdc; ### the rdc’s tasks should encompass all of the petersberg tasks identified in 1992 , including , but not be limited to , rescue and evacuation operations , initial entry and initial phase of stabilisation operations , temporary reinforcement of other missions , and acting as a reserve force to secure exit; the council could assign further tasks as referred to under article 44 of the teu , and the duration and scope of the assignments should be consistent with resources allocated to the rdc;


### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total; ### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence and strategic reconnaissance assets , special operations forces , and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total; underlines , that strategic enablers should also encompass strategic airlift capabilities , including capabilities to transport combat materiel such as tanks , and air-to-air refuelling capabilities; calls on member states to address capability shortfalls of strategic enablers by 2025 , in particular those linked to the rdc; stresses , that lack or shortfall of such capabilities should be addressed by common public procurement initiatives on the eu level , such as through edirpa; underlines , that common procurement initiatives are critical in ensuring the eu’s strategic autonomy in the context of a volatile regional and international environment; stresses that future eu acquisitions of weapons systems and strategic enablers should focus on ‘buying european’; stresses in this regard , that the eu should focus on building an eu single market for defence products that could facilitate joint development and procurement and therefore would achieve economies of scale and improved interoperability; welcomes in this regard the strategic compass’ aim of boosting cooperation and capabilities to make eu defence industrial cooperation the norm and the need for an innovative , competitive and resilient european defence technological and industrial base;


### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total; ### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total; for the eu to be able to deploy up to 10.000 troops it is important for the member states to ensure in parallel adequate capabilities of national reserve forces;


### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total; ### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total;


### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total; ### the rdc should number up to 5 000 troops , including land , air and maritime forces but excluding strategic enablers for military multi domain operations , such as intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units;


### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total; ### the rdc should number 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total;


### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato; ### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato; such exercises should be adapted to the current threat landscape and possible deployment scenarios of the rdc; highlights , that uniform training and certification standards improve the interoperability of available eu member state forces;


### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato; ### the eu rdc should frequently conduct joint exercises based on operational scenarios , yet to be developed , and following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato to improve readiness and interoperability; stresses that the operational scenarios should be flexible and adapted to geopolitical realities if need be;


### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato; ### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises on the ground following uniform training and certification standards;


### all force elements of the rdc should be assigned exclusively to it and not to any other international high-readiness forces , notwithstanding the possibility for member states to call them up for national duty in the event of an emergency; ### deleted


### all force elements of the rdc should be assigned exclusively to it and not to any other international high-readiness forces , notwithstanding the possibility for member states to call them up for national duty in the event of an emergency; ### all force elements of the rdc should be assigned exclusively to it and not to any other international high-readiness forces , notwithstanding the possibility for member states to call them up for national duty in the event of an emergency; highlights , that only the so-called ‘single-hatting’ would ensure the operationalisation of the rdc and the rdc’s availability in case of a crisis situation; calls on the member states to therefore fulfil their respective commitments to ensure the rdc’s operational readiness;


### all force elements of the rdc should be assigned exclusively to it and not to any other international high-readiness forces , notwithstanding the possibility for member states to call them up for national duty in the event of an emergency; ### all force elements of the eu rdc should be assigned exclusively to it , notwithstanding the possibility for member states to call them up for national duty in the event of an emergency , and taking into account national commitments to other multinational high readiness forces;


### in line with article 41 of the teu , the rdc’s administrative expenditure should be funded from the union budget; ### in line with article 41 of the teu , the eu rdc’s administrative expenditure should be funded from the union budget;


### similarly , its operating expenditure should be funded from the union budget with the exception of expenditure that is charged to the european peace facility; ### similarly , its operating expenditure should be funded from the union budget with the exception of expenditure that is charged to the european peace facility; underlines the need to increase the budget cap and financial resources of the epf; stresses , that such funding increases should take into account the need to fund the ukrainian war , and therefore be increased in such a manner , that the epf’s budget can cover the costs for its scheduled activities and parts of the operating expenditure of the rdc; notes , that all eu defence initiatives , even those paid for by the eu budget , should be included in a given member states’ calculated commitment to nato’s 2% defence investment guideline;


### similarly , its operating expenditure should be funded from the union budget with the exception of expenditure that is charged to the european peace facility; ### similarly , its operating expenditure should be funded from the union budget with the exception of that deriving from operations with military or defence implications and expenditure that is charged to the european peace facility; calls for consideration to be given to what types of operating expenditure related to the rapid deployment capacity can be financed from the eu budget in light of article 44 teu;


### similarly , its operating expenditure should be funded from the union budget with the exception of expenditure that is charged to the european peace facility; ### similarly , its operating expenditure including joint exercises for fully operational capability (foc) certification should be funded from the union budget with the exception of expenditure that is charged to the european peace facility;


### 3. calls on the member states to transform the eu battlegroup system to match the needs of the rdc; considers that the eu battlegroups should be funded from the union budget during their stand-up , stand-by and stand-down phases; ### 3. calls on the member states to transform the eu battlegroup system to match the needs of the rdc; considers that the eu battlegroups should be funded from the union budget during their stand-up , stand-by and stand-down phases; stresses that the development of the rdc should build on the lessons learnt of the eu battlegroups and that the rdc should not be viewed as a revised eu battlegroups concept;


### 3. calls on the member states to transform the eu battlegroup system to match the needs of the rdc; considers that the eu battlegroups should be funded from the union budget during their stand-up , stand-by and stand-down phases; ### 3. calls on the member states to transform the eu battlegroup system to match the needs of the rdc; considers that the eu battlegroups should be funded from the union budget during their stand-up , stand-by and stand-down phases; calls on member states to adapt national procedures and if necessary the legislative framework in order to allow for rapid deployment;


### 3. calls on the member states to transform the eu battlegroup system to match the needs of the rdc; considers that the eu battlegroups should be funded from the union budget during their stand-up , stand-by and stand-down phases; ### 3. calls on the member states to transform the eu battlegroup system into a more robust and flexible instrument to match the needs of the eu rdc; considers that the eu battlegroups should be funded from the union budget during their stand-up , stand-by and stand-down phases;


### 4. highlights that rapid deployment requires flexibility in political decision-making and the high readiness of military modules , which implies not only having land troops on high readiness , but also the necessary air , sea and special operation components and strategic enablers; ### 4. highlights that rapid deployment requires flexibility in political decision-making and the adequate readiness of military modules , which includes in addition to ground forces the necessary air , sea and special operation components and strategic enablers; stresses the insufficient progress of the eu with regard to strategic enablers over the past 20 years and calls on the council to substantially increase its efforts to close these crucial capability gaps; underlines in that regard the role of the european defence fund for addressing capability shortfalls and calls for increased funding of the instrument; welcomes , furthermore , the commission’s initiatives to facilitate joint procurement as an complementary instrument to improve eu’s capabilities and interoperability;


### 4. highlights that rapid deployment requires flexibility in political decision-making and the high readiness of military modules , which implies not only having land troops on high readiness , but also the necessary air , sea and special operation components and strategic enablers; ### 4. highlights that rapid deployment requires flexibility in political decision-making and the high readiness of military modules , which implies not only having land troops on high readiness , but also the necessary air , sea and special operation components and strategic enablers; stresses that such a rapid deployment necessitates increasing the eu’s readiness and cooperation by enhancing military mobility; welcomes the action plan on military mobility 2.0 , especially its stated goal of supporting large-scale movements of military forces across the eu , which are crucial in allowing the eu to deploy the rdc on short notice1a;


### 4. highlights that rapid deployment requires flexibility in political decision-making and the high readiness of military modules , which implies not only having land troops on high readiness , but also the necessary air , sea and special operation components and strategic enablers; ### 4. highlights that rapid deployment requires flexibility in political decision-making and the high readiness of military modules , which implies not only having land troops on high readiness , but also the necessary air , sea and special operation components and strategic enablers; calls on the vp/hr and the member states to give serious consideration to implementation arrangements for article 44 teu on entrusting the implementation of a csdp task to a group of member states in order to make the csdp including the operationalisation of the rdc more flexible and efficient in the field while maintaining a strong european dimension;


### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; ### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent , fully-fledged operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; highlights that the mpcc currently lacks adequate human and infrastructure resources to be able to perform its mandate , including the lack of necessary office space and the availability of a secure communications system; underlines the need for funding of the mpcc to be increased to be able to carry out its mandated tasks; highlights that the mpcc will play the coordinating role of coordinating and testing the procedures for the deployment of the rdc; underlines , that the full operability of the mpcc is the fundamental requirement for the successful deployment of the rdc; requests the mpcc to address the lack of interoperable communications systems between eu defence forces;


### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; ### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; expresses its concern that despite the ambition for the mpcc laid out in the strategic compass , the mpcc is still lacking sufficient staffing that should amount to at least 180 personnel and also lacks the necessary command and communication capabilities as well as an adequate infrastructure; calls therefore upon the eu member states , the council and the commission to swiftly provide the necessary personnel , allocate sufficient funds as well to establish the necessary infrastructure , including access to eu capabilities in order to enable the mpcc to fulfil its tasks;


### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; ### 5. reiterates its call on the eeas to rapidly set up a fully functional eu military headquarters by merging the military planning and conduct capability (mpcc) structure and the civil planning and conduct capability (cpcc) directorate in order to create a fully-fledged civil-military operational headquarters that manages rdc operations as well;


### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; ### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; calls for the military planning and conduct capability (mpcc) to be provided with the necessary financial and human resources to enable it to carry out its functions;


### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; ### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness , avoid unnecessary duplication with nato initiatives and in order to uphold the integrated approach;


### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; ### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness once it is up and running at full operational capacity;


### 6. calls for the eu rdc to have the possibility of being deployed and acting in emergencies , natural disasters such as floods or wildfires , or other significant civil-protection crises inside eu territory , at the proposal of the vp/hr and following the pertinent authorisation procedures; ### 6. calls for the eu rdc to have the possibility of being deployed and acting in emergencies , natural disasters such as floods or wildfires , or other significant civil-protection crises inside eu territory , at the proposal of the vp/hr and following the pertinent authorisation procedures; points out that to enable the armed forces to be able to effectively deal with natural disasters , proper training and equipment should be provided;


### 6. calls for the eu rdc to have the possibility of being deployed and acting in emergencies , natural disasters such as floods or wildfires , or other significant civil-protection crises inside eu territory , at the proposal of the vp/hr and following the pertinent authorisation procedures; ### 6. calls for the eu rdc to have the possibility of being deployed and acting in emergencies , at the proposal of the vp/hr and following the pertinent authorisation procedures;


### 6. calls for the eu rdc to have the possibility of being deployed and acting in emergencies , natural disasters such as floods or wildfires , or other significant civil-protection crises inside eu territory , at the proposal of the vp/hr and following the pertinent authorisation procedures; ### 6. calls for the eu rdc to have the possibility of being deployed and acting in emergencies , natural disasters such as floods or wildfires , or other significant civil-protection crises inside eu territory , at the proposal of the vp/hr , including by prior suggestion of a member state , and following the pertinent authorisation procedures;


### 6. calls for the eu rdc to have the possibility of being deployed and acting in emergencies , natural disasters such as floods or wildfires , or other significant civil-protection crises inside eu territory , at the proposal of the vp/hr and following the pertinent authorisation procedures; ### 6. calls for the eu rdc to improve the overall effectiveness of the eu's crisis management response system also in emergencies , natural disasters such as floods or wildfires , or other significant civil-protection crises inside eu territory , at the proposal of the vp/hr and following the pertinent authorisation procedures;


### 7. calls on the member states participating in the rdc to agree to act in the name of the european union as mandated by the council under article 44 of the teu: ### 7. calls on the member states participating in the rdc to agree to act in the name of the european union as mandated by the council under article 44 of the teu and to the extent permitted by the treaties:


### solely upon a proposal by the vp/hr , who should ensure that the views of parliament are duly taken into consideration in their proposal , and ### solely upon a proposal by the vp/hr , including by prior suggestion of a member state , who should ensure that the views of parliament are duly taken into consideration in their proposal , and


### acting by qualified majority after deliberation in the council; ### maintaining unanimity in decision-making on the use of this capability and on military missions or operations , and following the principle of ‘constructive abstention’ which allows a state that is reluctant to abstain in decision-making and , in exchange , not to participate in missions or operations , as also enshrined in the decision on the european peace facility for the financing of lethal weapons;


### 9. highlights that the use of article 44 offers significant benefits compared to member states acting outside the eu framework; ### 9. highlights that the use of article 44 offers significant benefits compared to member states acting outside the eu framework; highlights , that decision-making on the deployment of the rdc based on article 44 teu also allows for the involvement of third countries in rdc missions where necessary and desired;


### — having regard to the negotiating framework for turkey of 3 october 2005 , ### — having regard to the negotiating framework for turkey of 3 october 2005 , and to the fact that , as it is the case for all candidate countries , turkey’s accession to the eu depends on full compliance with the copenhagen criteria , and to the need to normalize its relations with all eu member states , including the republic of cyprus


### — having regard to the negotiating framework for turkey of 3 october 2005 , ### — having regard to the negotiating framework for turkey of 3 october 2005 , and to the fact that , as is the case for all accession countries , turkey’s accession to the eu depends on full compliance with the copenhagen criteria , and to the need to normalize its relations with all eu member states , including the republic of cyprus;


### — having regard to the statement of the members of the european council of 25 march 2021 on the eastern mediterranean , to the european council’s conclusions of 24 june 2021 and 1 october 2020 , and to all previous relevant council and european council conclusions , ### — having regard to the council conclusions of 26 june 2018 and18 june 2019 on enlargement and stabilisation and association process , to the council conclusions of 15 july and 14 october 2019 on turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the eastern mediterranean to the european council conclusions of 12 december 2019 , 1-2 and 15-16 october 2020 , to the statement of the eu foreign ministers of 15 may 2020 and the main results of their videoconference of 14 august 2020 on the situation in the eastern mediterranean , to the outcome of the informal meeting of eu foreign ministers in gymnich of 27-28 august 2020 to the statement of the members of the european council of 25 march 2021 on the eastern mediterranean , to the european council’s conclusions of 24 june 2021 and 1 october 2020 , and to all previous relevant council and european council conclusions ,


### — having regard to the statement of the members of the european council of 25 march 2021 on the eastern mediterranean , to the european council’s conclusions of 24 june 2021 and 1 october 2020 , and to all previous relevant council and european council conclusions , ### — having regard to the council’s conclusions on enlargement and association and stabilisation process of 14 december 2021 , the statement of the members of the european council of 25 march 2021 on the eastern mediterranean , to the european council’s conclusions of 24 june 2021 and 1 october 2020 , and to all previous relevant council and european council conclusions ,


### — having regard to the relevant resolutions by the committee of ministers of the council of europe , including the interim resolution of 2 december 2021 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in kavala against turkey , the interim resolution of 2 december 2021 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in selahattin demirtaş v turkey (no. 2) , and the interim resolution of 2 february 2022 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in kavala against turkey , ### — having regard to the relevant resolutions by the committee of ministers of the council of europe , including the interim resolution of 2 december 2021 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in kavala against turkey , the interim resolution of 2 december 2021 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in selahattin demirtaş v turkey (no. 2) , the interim resolution of 2 february 2022 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in kavala against turkey , and the interim resolution of 16september 2021 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in cyprus v. turkey ,


### — having regard to the relevant resolutions of the un security council on cyprus , including resolution 550(1984) of 11 may 1984 on secessionist actions in cyprus and resolution 789(1992) of 25 november 1992 urging all concerned in the cyprus question to commit themselves to the confidence-building measures set out in the resolution , ### — having regard to the relevant resolutions of the un security council on cyprus , including resolution 550(1984) of 11 may 1984 on secessionist actions in cyprus and resolution 789(1992) of 25 november 1992 which consider attempts to settle any part of varosha by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible , and call for the transfer of that area to the administration of the united nations urging all concerned in the cyprus question to commit themselves to the confidence-building measures set out in the resolution ,


### a. whereas turkey , besides being a candidate for eu accession , is a key partner in relation to the economy , trade and migration , as well as a strategic partner; ### a. whereas turkey , besides being a candidate for eu accession , is a key partner , whereas economic integration with the eu remained high and turkey positioned as the eu’s sixth largest trading partner in 2020 , while the eu remains by far turkey’s largest trading partner and its largest source of foreign direct investment (fdi); whereas turkey is currently undergoing an economic and financial crisis which exacerbates the economic impact of the pandemic; whereas turkey hosts the largest refugee population in the world , with almost 4 million registered refugees from syria , iraq and afghanistan , and whereas the eu-funding to these communities has proven its value for assisting turkey in swiftly responding to the humanitarian and development needs of refugees and their host communities;


### a. whereas turkey , besides being a candidate for eu accession , is a key partner in relation to the economy , trade and migration , as well as a strategic partner; ### a. whereas turkey , besides being a candidate for eu accession , is a key partner in relation to the economy , trade and migration , as well as a strategic partner and as such , turkey is expected to respect democratic values , rule of law and human rights; whereas recently , work on the security dimension of the eu is progressing , receiving structure and substance , turkey would represent an extremely valuable partner as a nato member and , in this aspect , a military ally to most eu states;


### a. whereas turkey , besides being a candidate for eu accession , is a key partner in relation to the economy , trade and migration , as well as a strategic partner; ### a. whereas turkey , besides being a candidate for eu accession , is a key partner in relation to the economy , trade and migration , as well as a strategic partner and a nato ally that also occupies a key location for europe;


### a. whereas turkey , besides being a candidate for eu accession , is a key partner in relation to the economy , trade and migration , as well as a strategic partner; ### a. whereas turkey , besides being a candidate for eu accession , is a key partner in essential areas of joint interest , such as migration , public health , climate , counter – terrorism and regional issues;


### a. whereas turkey , besides being a candidate for eu accession , is a key partner in relation to the economy , trade and migration , as well as a strategic partner; ### a. whereas turkey is a key partner in relation to the economy , trade and migration , as well as a strategic partner;


### b. whereas , in the aftermath of recent tensions between the eu and turkey , particularly in relation to the situation in the eastern mediterranean , the european council offered to nurture a more positive dynamic in eu-turkey relations by expressing readiness to engage with turkey in a phased , proportionate and reversible manner in a number of areas of common interest; ### b. whereas , in the aftermath of recent tensions between the eu and turkey , particularly in relation to the situation in the eastern mediterranean , the european council offered to nurture a more positive dynamic in eu-turkey relations by expressing readiness to engage with turkey in a phased , proportionate and reversible manner in a number of areas of common interest , subject to the established conditionalities set out in previous european council conclusions , notably good neighbourly relations and respect for human rights and international law;


### b. whereas , in the aftermath of recent tensions between the eu and turkey , particularly in relation to the situation in the eastern mediterranean , the european council offered to nurture a more positive dynamic in eu-turkey relations by expressing readiness to engage with turkey in a phased , proportionate and reversible manner in a number of areas of common interest; ### b. whereas , the european council offered to nurture a more positive dynamic in eu-turkey relations by expressing readiness to engage with turkey in a phased , proportionate and reversible manner in a number of areas of common interest , provided that the de-escalation of recent tensions between the eu and turkey , particularly in relation to the situation in the eastern mediterranean , is sustained and that turkey engages constructively and subject to the established conditionalities set out in previous european council conclusions;


### b. whereas , in the aftermath of recent tensions between the eu and turkey , particularly in relation to the situation in the eastern mediterranean , the european council offered to nurture a more positive dynamic in eu-turkey relations by expressing readiness to engage with turkey in a phased , proportionate and reversible manner in a number of areas of common interest; ### b. whereas , in the aftermath of recent tensions between the eu and turkey , particularly in relation to the situation in the eastern mediterranean , the european council expressed readiness to engage with turkey in a phased , proportionate and reversible manner in a number of areas of common interest; provided that the de-escalation is sustained and that turkey engages constructively , and subject to the established conditionalities set out in previous european council conclusions;


### c. whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach in all aspects the values , interests , standards and policies of the eu; whereas an analysis of the eu’s reports in recent years reveal that turkey’s distance from the eu’s values and its normative framework is still considerable and is even growing in fundamental areas such as the rule of law and human rights; ### c. whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach in all aspects the values , interests , standards and policies of the eu; whereas an analysis of the eu’s reports in recent years reveal that turkey’s distance from the eu’s values and its normative framework is still considerable and is even growing in fundamental areas such as the rule of law and human rights as well as good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation;


### c. whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach in all aspects the values , interests , standards and policies of the eu; whereas an analysis of the eu’s reports in recent years reveal that turkey’s distance from the eu’s values and its normative framework is still considerable and is even growing in fundamental areas such as the rule of law and human rights; ### c. whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively align with the eu acquis in all aspects - values , interests , standards and policies of the eu; whereas an analysis of the eu’s reports in recent years reveal that turkey’s distance from the eu’s values and its normative framework is still considerable and is even growing in fundamental areas such as the rule of law and human rights;


### d. whereas over the past year , eu-turkey relations have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; whereas this report reflects this situation by welcoming positive developments and pointing to further potential in the relationship , while signalling remaining problems , in particular as regards the rule of law and fundamental rights; ### d. whereas over the past year , eu-turkey relations have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; whereas this report reflects this situation by welcoming positive developments and pointing to further potential in the relationship , while signalling remaining problems , in particular as regards the rule of law and fundamental rights; whereas if this report is to assess turkey’s progress or lack of progress in terms of human rights and rule of law , as the core of the accession process , it is important to describe the concrete mechanisms of erosion of freedoms that , taken together , lead to this general backsliding with regard to european standards; whereas this approach means going beyond a long list of citizens and groups who are suffering as a result of these decisions to identifying the operators and bodies of the public authorities responsible of this worrying situation in their particular area of action; whereas generic criticism must be replaced by targeted criticism;


### d. whereas over the past year , eu-turkey relations have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; whereas this report reflects this situation by welcoming positive developments and pointing to further potential in the relationship , while signalling remaining problems , in particular as regards the rule of law and fundamental rights; ### d. whereas over the past year , the council reiterated that turkey continues to move further away from the european union , and that turkey’s accession negotiations have effectively come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing , while according to the commission , the underlying facts leading to this assessment still hold; nonetheless , dialogue and cooperation with turkey increased in 2021; whereas this report reflects this situation by pointing to further potential in the relationship , while signalling remaining problems , in particular as regards the rule of law and fundamental rights and good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation;


### d. whereas over the past year , eu-turkey relations have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; whereas this report reflects this situation by welcoming positive developments and pointing to further potential in the relationship , while signalling remaining problems , in particular as regards the rule of law and fundamental rights; ### d. whereas over the past year , eu-turkey relations have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts , such as the threat to expel western ambassadors over their calls in relation to extremely serious matters concerning violations of human rights; whereas this report reflects this situation by welcoming positive developments and pointing to further potential in the relationship , while signalling remaining problems , in particular as regards the rule of law and fundamental rights;


### d. whereas over the past year , eu-turkey relations have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; whereas this report reflects this situation by welcoming positive developments and pointing to further potential in the relationship , while signalling remaining problems , in particular as regards the rule of law and fundamental rights; ### d. whereas over the past year , eu-turkey relations have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular tensions; whereas this report reflects this situation by welcoming positive developments and pointing to further potential in the relationship , while signalling remaining problems , in particular as regards the rule of law and fundamental rights;