### 3. the employer shall publish the information referred to in paragraph 1 , points (a) to (f) on an annual basis in a user-friendly way on its website or shall otherwise make it publicly available. the information from the previous four years , if available , shall also be accessible upon request. in addition , the employer shall share this information with the monitoring body referred to in paragraph 6. ### deleted


### 3. the employer shall publish the information referred to in paragraph 1 , points (a) to (f) on an annual basis in a user-friendly way on its website or shall otherwise make it publicly available. the information from the previous four years , if available , shall also be accessible upon request. in addition , the employer shall share this information with the monitoring body referred to in paragraph 6. ### 3. the employer shall publish the information referred to in paragraph 1 , points (a) to (f) on an annual basis in a user-friendly way on its website or shall otherwise make it publicly available. the information shall be published in accessible formats for persons with disabilities in accordance with the harmonised legal acts of the union on accessibility. the information from the previous four years , if available , shall also be accessible upon request. in addition , the employer shall share this information with the monitoring body referred to in paragraph 6.


### 3. the employer shall publish the information referred to in paragraph 1 , points (a) to (f) on an annual basis in a user-friendly way on its website or shall otherwise make it publicly available. the information from the previous four years , if available , shall also be accessible upon request. in addition , the employer shall share this information with the monitoring body referred to in paragraph 6. ### 3. the employer shall publish the information referred to in paragraph 1 , points (a) to (f) on an annual basis in a user-friendly way on its website or shall otherwise make it publicly available. the information shall be published in accessible formats for persons with disabilities in line with eu harmonised accessibility legislation. the information from the previous four years , if available , shall also be accessible upon request. in addition , the employer shall share this information with the monitoring body referred to in paragraph 6.


### 3. the employer shall publish the information referred to in paragraph 1 , points (a) to (f) on an annual basis in a user-friendly way on its website or shall otherwise make it publicly available. the information from the previous four years , if available , shall also be accessible upon request. in addition , the employer shall share this information with the monitoring body referred to in paragraph 6. ### 3. the employer shall publish the information referred to in paragraph 1 , points (a) to (f) on an annual basis in a user-friendly way on its website or shall otherwise make it publicly available. the information from the previous four years , if available , shall also be accessible upon request. in addition , the employer shall share this information with the monitoring body referred to in paragraph 6. in the case of employers who are bound by collective wage agreements , the obligations in this paragraph shall apply only every five years.


### 3. the employer shall publish the information referred to in paragraph 1 , points (a) to (f) on an annual basis in a user-friendly way on its website or shall otherwise make it publicly available. the information from the previous four years , if available , shall also be accessible upon request. in addition , the employer shall share this information with the monitoring body referred to in paragraph 6. ### 3. the employer shall publish the information referred to in paragraph 1 , points (a) to (f) every three years , collectively bargained companies every five years in a user-friendly way on its website or shall otherwise make it publicly available. the information from the previous four years , if available , shall also be accessible upon request.


### 4. member states may decide to compile the information set out in paragraph 1 , points (a) to (f) themselves , on the basis of administrative data such as data provided by employers to the tax or social security authorities. this information shall be made public in accordance with paragraph 6. ### deleted


### 4. member states may decide to compile the information set out in paragraph 1 , points (a) to (f) themselves , on the basis of administrative data such as data provided by employers to the tax or social security authorities. this information shall be made public in accordance with paragraph 6. ### 4. member states may decide to compile the information set out in paragraph 1 , points (a) to (f) themselves , on the basis of administrative data such as data provided by employers to the tax or social security authorities. this information shall be made public in accordance with paragraph 6. member states shall provide support , technical assistance and training , in particular for microenterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises , to comply with the obligations pursuant to this article.


### 5. the employer shall provide the information referred to in paragraph 1 , point (g) to all workers and their representatives , as well as to the monitoring body referred to in paragraph 6. it shall provide it to the labour inspectorate and the equality body upon their request. the information from the previous four years , if available , shall also be provided upon request. ### deleted


### 5. the employer shall provide the information referred to in paragraph 1 , point (g) to all workers and their representatives , as well as to the monitoring body referred to in paragraph 6. it shall provide it to the labour inspectorate and the equality body upon their request. the information from the previous four years , if available , shall also be provided upon request. ### 5. the employer shall provide the information referred to in paragraph 1 to all workers , their trade union representatives or the trade union with which the employer has struck a collective bargaining agreement. the employer shall , upon request , provide the information to the monitoring body appointed in accordance with article 26 of this directive.


### 6. member states shall entrust the monitoring body designated pursuant to article 26 to collect the data received from employers pursuant to paragraph 1 , points (a) to (f) and to ensure that this data is public and allows a comparison between employers , sectors and regions of the member state concerned in a user-friendly way. ### deleted


### 7. workers and their representatives , labour inspectorates and equality bodies shall have the right to ask the employer for additional clarifications and details regarding any of the data provided , including explanations concerning any gender pay differences. the employer shall respond to such request within a reasonable time by providing a substantiated reply. where gender pay differences are not justified by objective and gender-neutral factors , the employer shall remedy the situation in close cooperation with the workers’ representatives , the labour inspectorate and/or the equality body. ### 7. those entitled to information from the employer pursuant to article 2 shall have the right to ask the employer for additional clarifications and details regarding any of the data provided , including explanations concerning any gender pay differences. the employer shall respond to such request within a reasonable time by providing a substantiated reply. where gender pay differences are not justified by objective and gender-neutral factors , the employer shall take appropriate measures.


### 7. workers and their representatives , labour inspectorates and equality bodies shall have the right to ask the employer for additional clarifications and details regarding any of the data provided , including explanations concerning any gender pay differences. the employer shall respond to such request within a reasonable time by providing a substantiated reply. where gender pay differences are not justified by objective and gender-neutral factors , the employer shall remedy the situation in close cooperation with the workers’ representatives , the labour inspectorate and/or the equality body. ### 7. workers and their representatives , labour inspectorates and equality bodies shall have the right to ask the employer for additional clarifications and details regarding any of the data provided , including explanations concerning any gender pay differences. the employer shall respond to such request within a reasonable time by providing a substantiated reply. where gender pay differences are not justified by objective and gender-neutral factors , the employer shall remedy the situation. member states may foresee that workers’ representatives , the labour inspectorate and/or the equality body may be involved in this procedure.


### 7. workers and their representatives , labour inspectorates and equality bodies shall have the right to ask the employer for additional clarifications and details regarding any of the data provided , including explanations concerning any gender pay differences. the employer shall respond to such request within a reasonable time by providing a substantiated reply. where gender pay differences are not justified by objective and gender-neutral factors , the employer shall remedy the situation in close cooperation with the workers’ representatives , the labour inspectorate and/or the equality body. ### 7. workers and their representatives and labour inspectorates shall have the right to ask the employer for additional clarifications and details , including explanations concerning any gender pay differences. the employer shall respond to such request within a reasonable time by providing a substantiated reply. where gender pay differences are not justified by objective and gender-neutral factors , the employer shall remedy the situation in close cooperation with the workers’ representatives , the labour inspectorate and/or the equality body.


### 7. workers and their representatives , labour inspectorates and equality bodies shall have the right to ask the employer for additional clarifications and details regarding any of the data provided , including explanations concerning any gender pay differences. the employer shall respond to such request within a reasonable time by providing a substantiated reply. where gender pay differences are not justified by objective and gender-neutral factors , the employer shall remedy the situation in close cooperation with the workers’ representatives , the labour inspectorate and/or the equality body. ### 7. workers and their representatives , labour inspectorates and/or equality bodies shall have the right to ask the employer for additional clarifications and details regarding any of the data provided , including explanations concerning any gender pay differences. the employer shall respond to such request within a reasonable time by providing a substantiated reply. where gender pay differences are not justified by objective and gender-neutral factors , the employer shall remedy the situation in close cooperation with the workers’ representatives , the labour inspectorate and/or the equality body.


### joint pay assessment ### joint pay assessment and gender action plan


### 1. member states shall take appropriate measures to ensure that employers with at least 250 workers conduct , in cooperation with their workers’ representatives , a joint pay assessment where both of the following conditions are met: ### deleted


### 1. member states shall take appropriate measures to ensure that employers with at least 250 workers conduct , in cooperation with their workers’ representatives , a joint pay assessment where both of the following conditions are met: ### 1. member states shall take appropriate measures to ensure that employers with at least 200 workers or lower if already defined at a national level , conduct in cooperation with their workers’ following a joint agreement between social partners and in cooperation with workers’ representatives , a joint pay assessment where both of the following conditions are met:


### (1) member states shall take appropriate measures to ensure that employers with at least 250 workers conduct , in cooperation with their workers’ representatives , a joint pay assessment where both of the following conditions are met: ### (1) member states shall take appropriate measures to ensure that employers with at least 1 000 workers conduct , in cooperation with their workers’ representatives , a joint pay assessment where both of the following conditions are met:


### 1. member states shall take appropriate measures to ensure that employers with at least 250 workers conduct , in cooperation with their workers’ representatives , a joint pay assessment where both of the following conditions are met: ### 1. member states shall take appropriate measures to ensure that employers with at least 500 workers conduct , in cooperation with their workers’ representatives , a joint pay assessment where both of the following conditions are met:


### 1. member states shall take appropriate measures to ensure that employers with at least 250 workers conduct , in cooperation with their workers’ representatives , a joint pay assessment where both of the following conditions are met: ### 1. member states shall take appropriate measures to ensure that employers with at least 200 workers conduct , in cooperation with their workers’ representatives , a joint pay assessment where both of the following conditions are met:


### 1. member states shall take appropriate measures to ensure that employers with at least 250 workers conduct , in cooperation with their workers’ representatives , a joint pay assessment where both of the following conditions are met: ### 1. member states shall take appropriate measures to ensure that employers with at least 30 workers conduct , in cooperation with their workers’ representatives , a joint pay assessment where both of the following conditions are met:


### 2. the joint pay assessment shall include the following: ### deleted


### measures to address such differences if they are not justified on the basis of objective and gender-neutral criteria; ### measures to address such differences if they are not justified on the basis of objective and gender-neutral criteria. a gender action plan shall be proportional , based on a balanced approach and shall not add an excessive administrative burden on the employer , in particular smes and micro-enterprises


### 3. employers shall make the joint pay assessments available to workers , workers’ representatives , the monitoring body designated pursuant to article 26 , the equality body and the labour inspectorate. ### deleted


### 3. employers shall make the joint pay assessments available to workers , workers’ representatives , the monitoring body designated pursuant to article 26 , the equality body and the labour inspectorate. ### 3. employers shall make the joint pay assessments available to workers , workers’ representatives , the monitoring body designated pursuant to article 26 and/or the equality body and/or the labour inspectorate.


### 4. if the joint pay assessment reveals differences in average pay for equal work or work of equal value between female and male workers which cannot be justified by objective and gender-neutral criteria , the employer shall remedy the situation , in close cooperation with the workers’ representatives , labour inspectorate , and/or equality body. such action shall include the establishment of gender-neutral job evaluation and classification to ensure that any direct or indirect pay discrimination on grounds of sex is excluded. ### deleted


### 4. if the joint pay assessment reveals differences in average pay for equal work or work of equal value between female and male workers which cannot be justified by objective and gender-neutral criteria , the employer shall remedy the situation , in close cooperation with the workers’ representatives , labour inspectorate , and/or equality body. such action shall include the establishment of gender-neutral job evaluation and classification to ensure that any direct or indirect pay discrimination on grounds of sex is excluded. ### 4. if the joint pay assessment reveals differences in average pay for equal work or work of equal value between female and male workers which cannot be justified by objective and gender-neutral criteria , the employer shall remedy the situation , in close cooperation with the workers’ representatives , labour inspectorate , and/or equality body. either party can choose to give the negotiation mandate over the issue to the workers' or employers' representatives. such action shall include the establishment of gender-neutral job evaluation and classification to ensure that any direct or indirect pay discrimination on grounds of sex is excluded.


### 4. if the joint pay assessment reveals differences in average pay for equal work or work of equal value between female and male workers which cannot be justified by objective and gender-neutral criteria , the employer shall remedy the situation , in close cooperation with the workers’ representatives , labour inspectorate , and/or equality body. such action shall include the establishment of gender-neutral job evaluation and classification to ensure that any direct or indirect pay discrimination on grounds of sex is excluded. ### 4. if the joint pay assessment reveals differences in average pay for equal work or work of equal value between female and male workers which cannot be justified by objective and gender-neutral criteria , the employer shall remedy the situation within a reasonable time frame. such action shall include the establishment of gender-neutral job evaluation and classification to ensure that any direct or indirect pay discrimination on grounds of sex is excluded.


### 4. if the joint pay assessment reveals differences in average pay for equal work or work of equal value between female and male workers which cannot be justified by objective and gender-neutral criteria , the employer shall remedy the situation , in close cooperation with the workers’ representatives , labour inspectorate , and/or equality body. such action shall include the establishment of gender-neutral job evaluation and classification to ensure that any direct or indirect pay discrimination on grounds of sex is excluded. ### 4. if the joint pay assessment reveals differences in average pay for equal work or work of equal value between female and male workers which cannot be justified by objective and gender-neutral criteria , the employer shall remedy the situation , in close cooperation with the workers’ representatives. such action shall include the establishment of gender-neutral job evaluation and classification to ensure that any direct or indirect pay discrimination on grounds of sex is excluded.


### article 13 ### deleted


### 1. member states shall ensure that associations , organisations , equality bodies and workers’ representatives or other legal entities which have , in accordance with the criteria laid down by national law , a legitimate interest in ensuring equality between men and women , may engage in any judicial or administrative procedure to enforce any of the rights or obligations related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value. they may act on behalf or in support of a worker who is victim of an infringement of any right or obligation related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value , with the latter’s approval. ### 1. member states shall , in accordance with national law and practice and industrial relations systems , ensure that associations , organisations , equality bodies and workers’ representatives or other legal entities which have , in accordance with the criteria laid down by national law , a legitimate interest in ensuring gender equality between men and women , may engage in any judicial or administrative procedure to enforce any of the rights or obligations related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value. they may act on behalf or in support of a worker who is victim of an infringement of any right or obligation related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value , with the latter’s approval.


### 2. equality bodies and workers’ representatives shall also have the right to act on behalf or in support of several workers , with the latter’s approval. ### 2. equality bodies , workers’ representatives and employers' representatives shall also have the right to act on behalf or in support of several workers , with the latter’s approval.


### 2. the compensation or reparation referred to in paragraph 1 shall ensure real and effective compensation for the loss and damage sustained , in a way which is dissuasive and proportionate to the damage suffered. ### 2. the compensation or reparation referred to in paragraph 1 shall ensure real and effective compensation for the loss and damage sustained , in a way which is proportionate to the damage suffered.


### 3. the compensation shall place the worker who has suffered harm in the position in which that person would have been if he or she had not been discriminated based on sex or if no infringement of any of the rights or obligations relating to equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value had occurred. it shall include full recovery of back pay and related bonuses or payments in kind , compensation for lost opportunities and moral prejudice. it shall also include the right to interest on arrears. ### 3. the compensation shall place the worker who has suffered harm in the position in which that person would have been if he or she had not been discriminated based on sex or if no infringement of any of the rights or obligations relating to equal pay between men and women for equal work had occurred.


### an injunction order establishing an infringement of any right or obligation related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value and stopping the infringement; ### deleted


### 1. member states shall take the appropriate measures , in accordance with their national judicial systems , to ensure that , when workers who consider themselves wronged because the principle of equal pay has not been applied to them , establish before a court or other competent authority , facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination , it shall be for the defendant to prove that there has been no direct or indirect discrimination in relation to pay. ### deleted


### 2. member states shall ensure that , in any legal or administrative proceedings concerning direct or indirect discrimination , where an employer failed to comply with any of the rights or obligations related to pay transparency set out in articles 5 through 9 of this directive , it shall be for the employer to prove that there has been no such discrimination. ### deleted


### 2. member states shall ensure that , in any legal or administrative proceedings concerning direct or indirect discrimination , where an employer failed to comply with any of the rights or obligations related to pay transparency set out in articles 5 through 9 of this directive , it shall be for the employer to prove that there has been no such discrimination. ### 2. member states shall ensure that , in any legal or administrative proceedings concerning direct or indirect discrimination , where an employer failed to comply with any of the rights or obligations related to pay transparency set out in articles 5 through 9 of this directive , it shall be for the employee to prove that there has been such discrimination.


### 3. the claimant shall benefit from any doubt that might remain. ### deleted


### 5. member states need not apply paragraph 1 to proceedings in which it is for the court or competent body to investigate the facts of the case. ### deleted


### 2. member states shall ensure that national courts have the power to order the disclosure of evidence containing confidential information where they consider it relevant to the claim. they shall ensure that , when ordering the disclosure of such information , national courts have at their disposal effective measures to protect such information. ### 2. member states shall ensure that national courts have the power to order the disclosure of evidence where they consider it relevant to the claim. they shall ensure that , when ordering the disclosure of such information , national courts have at their disposal effective measures to protect such information.


### 2. limitation periods shall not begin to run before the violation of the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or for work of equal value or infringement of the rights or obligations under this directive has ceased and the claimant knows , or can reasonably be expected to know , about the violation or infringement. ### deleted


### 3. member states shall ensure that the limitation periods for bringing claims are set at three years at least. ### deleted


### 3. member states shall ensure that the limitation periods for bringing claims are set at three years at least. ### 3. member states shall ensure that the limitation periods for bringing claims are set at three years or in line with national specificities.


### 3. member states shall ensure that the limitation periods for bringing claims are set at three years at least. ### 3. member states shall ensure that the limitation periods for bringing claims are set at one year at most.


### 4. member states shall ensure that a limitation period is suspended or , depending on national law , interrupted , as soon as a claimant undertakes action by lodging a claim or bringing the claim to the attention of the employer , workers’ representatives , labour inspectorate or equality body. ### deleted


### 4. member states shall ensure that a limitation period is suspended or , depending on national law , interrupted , as soon as a claimant undertakes action by lodging a claim or bringing the claim to the attention of the employer , workers’ representatives , labour inspectorate or equality body. ### 4. member states shall ensure that a limitation period is suspended or , depending on national law , interrupted , as soon as a claimant undertakes action by lodging a claim.


### article 19 ### deleted


### claimants who prevail on a pay discrimination claim shall have the right to recover from the defendant , in addition to any other damages , reasonable legal and experts’ fees and costs. defendants who prevail on a pay discrimination claim shall not have the right to recover any legal and experts’ fees from the claimant(s) and costs , unless the claim was brought in bad faith , was clearly frivolous or where such non-recovery is considered manifestly unreasonable under the specific circumstances of the case. ### deleted


### claimants who prevail on a pay discrimination claim shall have the right to recover from the defendant , in addition to any other damages , reasonable legal and experts’ fees and costs. defendants who prevail on a pay discrimination claim shall not have the right to recover any legal and experts’ fees from the claimant(s) and costs , unless the claim was brought in bad faith , was clearly frivolous or where such non-recovery is considered manifestly unreasonable under the specific circumstances of the case. ### claimants who prevail on a pay discrimination claim shall have the right to recover from the defendant , in addition to any other damages , reasonable legal and experts’ fees and costs.


### penalties ### sanctions


### 1. member states shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of national provisions adopted pursuant to this directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. the penalties provided for shall be effective , proportionate and dissuasive. member states shall , without delay , notify the commission of those rules and of those measures and of any subsequent amendment affecting them. ### 1. member states shall lay down the rules on sanctions applicable to infringements of national provisions adopted pursuant to this directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. the sanctions provided for shall be effective , proportionate and dissuasive and may include fines. member states shall , without delay , notify the commission of those rules and of those measures and of any subsequent amendment affecting them.


### 1. member states shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of national provisions adopted pursuant to this directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. the penalties provided for shall be effective , proportionate and dissuasive. member states shall , without delay , notify the commission of those rules and of those measures and of any subsequent amendment affecting them. ### 1. member states shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of national provisions adopted pursuant to this directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. the penalties provided for shall be effective and proportionate. member states shall , without delay , notify the commission of those rules and of those measures and of any subsequent amendment affecting them.


### 2. member states shall ensure that fines are applied to infringements of the rights and obligations relating to equal pay for the same work or work of equal value. they shall set a minimum level for such fines ensuring real deterrent effect. the level of the fines shall take into account: ### 2. if fines are applied , the level of the fines shall take into account:


### 2. member states shall ensure that fines are applied to infringements of the rights and obligations relating to equal pay for the same work or work of equal value. they shall set a minimum level for such fines ensuring real deterrent effect. the level of the fines shall take into account: ### 2. member states shall ensure that fines are applied to infringements of the rights and obligations relating to equal pay for the same work or work of equal value. they shall set a proportional minimum level for such fines ensuring real deterrent effect. the level of the fines shall take into account:


### 2. member states shall ensure that fines are applied to infringements of the rights and obligations relating to equal pay for the same work or work of equal value. they shall set a minimum level for such fines ensuring real deterrent effect. the level of the fines shall take into account: ### 2. member states shall ensure that fines are applied to infringements of the rights and obligations relating to equal pay for the same work or work of equal value. they shall set a minimum level for such fines. the level of the fines may take into account:


### 3. member states shall establish specific penalties to be imposed in case of repeated infringements of the rights and obligations relating to equal pay between men and women , such as the revocation of public benefits or the exclusion , for a certain period of time , from any award of financial inducements. ### 3. member states shall establish specific sanctions to be imposed in case of repeated infringements of the rights and obligations relating to equal pay between men and women , such as the revocation of public benefits or the exclusion , for a certain period of time , from any award of financial inducements.


### 4. member states shall take all measures necessary to ensure that the penalties provided for are effectively applied in practice. ### 4. member states shall take all measures necessary to ensure that the sanctions provided for are effectively applied in practice.


### 2. each member state shall designate a body (‘monitoring body’) for the monitoring and support of the implementation of national legal provisions implementing this directive and shall make the necessary arrangements for the proper functioning of such body. the monitoring body may be part of existing bodies or structures at national level. ### 2. each member state shall designate a body (‘monitoring body’) for the monitoring and support of the implementation of national legal provisions implementing this directive and shall make the necessary arrangements for the proper functioning of such body. the monitoring body may be part of existing bodies or structures at national level. this body may also be required to cooperate with labour inspectorates or other bodies that enforce the rights of workers , including the social partners.


### 2. each member state shall designate a body (‘monitoring body’) for the monitoring and support of the implementation of national legal provisions implementing this directive and shall make the necessary arrangements for the proper functioning of such body. the monitoring body may be part of existing bodies or structures at national level. ### 2. each member state shall designate a body (‘monitoring body’) for the monitoring and support of the implementation of national legal provisions implementing this directive and shall make the necessary arrangements for the proper functioning of such body. the monitoring body may be part of existing bodies or structures at national level. it shall work closely with the social partners involved in the application of the principle of equal pay.


### to raise awareness among public and private undertakings and organisations , social partners and the general public to promote the principle of equal pay and the right to pay transparency; ### to raise awareness among and provide support for public and private undertakings and organisations , social partners and the general public to promote the principle of equal pay and the right to pay transparency;


### to tackle the causes of the gender pay gap and devise tools to help analyse and assess pay inequalities; ### deleted


### to aggregate data received from employers pursuant to article 8(6) , and publish this data in a user-friendly manner; ### deleted


### to aggregate data received from employers pursuant to article 8(6) , and publish this data in a user-friendly manner; ### to aggregate data received from employers pursuant to article 8(6) , and publish those data in a user-friendly manner and in an accessible manner for persons with disabilities in accordance with the harmonised legal acts of the union on accessibility;


### to aggregate data received from employers pursuant to article 8(6) , and publish this data in a user-friendly manner; ### to aggregate data received from employers pursuant to article 8(6) , and publish this data in a user-friendly manner and in an accessible manner for disabled persons in accordance with eu harmonised accessibility legislation;


### to aggregate data received from employers pursuant to article 8(6) , and publish this data in a user-friendly manner; ### to aggregate data received from employers pursuant to article 8(6) , and publish this data in a user-friendly manner ensuring compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and with business secrecy provisions.


### this directive shall not affect in any way the right to negotiate , conclude and enforce collective agreements and to take collective action in accordance with national law or practice. ### this directive shall not affect in any way the right to negotiate , conclude and enforce collective agreements and to take collective action in accordance with national law or practice.


### member states shall provide the commission (eurostat) with up-to-date gender pay gap data annually and in a timely manner. these statistics shall be broken down by gender , economic sector , working time (full-time/part-time) , economic control (public/private ownership) and age and be calculated on an annual basis. ### member states shall provide the commission (eurostat) with up-to-date gender pay gap data annually and in a timely manner. these statistics shall be broken down by gender , economic sector , working time (full-time/part-time) , economic control (public/private ownership) , disability and age and be calculated on an annual basis.


### member states shall provide the commission (eurostat) with up-to-date gender pay gap data annually and in a timely manner. these statistics shall be broken down by gender , economic sector , working time (full-time/part-time) , economic control (public/private ownership) and age and be calculated on an annual basis. ### member states shall provide the commission (eurostat) with up-to-date gender pay gap data annually and in a timely manner. these statistics shall be broken down by gender , economic sector , working time (full-time/part-time) , economic control (public/private ownership) disability and age and be calculated on an annual basis.


### 2. when informing the commission , member states shall also accompany it with a summary of the results of their assessment regarding the impact of their transposition act on small and medium-sized enterprises and a reference to where such assessment is published. ### 2. when informing the commission , member states shall also accompany it with a summary of the results of their assessment regarding the impact of their transposition act on small and medium-sized enterprises including micro-enterprises and a reference to where such assessment is published.


### 2. when informing the commission , member states shall also accompany it with a summary of the results of their assessment regarding the impact of their transposition act on small and medium-sized enterprises and a reference to where such assessment is published. ### 2. when informing the commission , member states shall also accompany it with a summary of the results of their assessment regarding the impact of their transposition act on mid-cap enterprises and a reference to where such assessment is published.


### during repair and maintenance , including blowing down and depressurizing equipment to perform repair and maintenance; ### during repair and maintenance , including blowing down , purging and depressurizing equipment to perform repair and maintenance;


### where methane does not meet the gathering pipeline specifications , provided the operator analyses methane samples twice per week to determine whether the specifications have been achieved and routes the methane into a gathering pipeline as soon as the pipeline specifications are met; ### deleted


### during commissioning of pipelines , equipment or facilities , only for as long as necessary to purge introduced impurities from the pipeline or equipment; ### during (re)commissioning of pipelines , facility equipment or gas storage wells , only for as long as necessary to purge introduced impurities from the pipeline or equipment;


### 4. where venting is allowed pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 , operators shall vent only where flaring is not technically feasible or risks endangering safety of operations or personnel. in such a situation , as part of the reporting obligations set out in article 16 , operators shall demonstrate to the competent authorities the necessity to opt for venting instead of flaring. ### 4. where venting is allowed pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 , operators shall vent only where flaring is not technically feasible , where risks endangering safety of operations or personnel , where recovery of the gas into the process and flare systems leads to more ghg emissions , where flaring is not technically feasible , where risks endangering safety of operations or personnel , where the venting operations result in less than x kg methane emissions per year , when the competent authority requires venting as opposed to flaring in view of nature protection (e.g. bird migration) , when flaring is not allowed by other legal obligations. in such a situation , as part of the reporting obligations set out in article 16 , operators shall demonstrate to the competent authorities the necessity to opt for venting instead of flaring.


### 4. where venting is allowed pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 , operators shall vent only where flaring is not technically feasible or risks endangering safety of operations or personnel. in such a situation , as part of the reporting obligations set out in article 16 , operators shall demonstrate to the competent authorities the necessity to opt for venting instead of flaring. ### 4. where venting is allowed pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 , operators shall vent only in the following cases:


### 5. flaring shall only be allowed where either re-injection , utilisation on-site or dispatch of the methane to a market are not feasible for reasons other than economic considerations. in such a situation , as part of the reporting obligations set out in article 16 , operators shall demonstrate to the competent authorities the necessity to opt for flaring instead of either re-injection , utilisation on-site or dispatch of the methane to a market. ### 5. flaring shall only be allowed where either re-injection , or utilisation on-site or dispatch of the methane are not technically feasible or risks endangering safety of operations or personnel or security of supply.


### caused by an emergency or a malfunction; ### of more than [5 ,000 kg] of methane caused by an incident , emergency or a malfunction;


### caused by an emergency or a malfunction; ### of more than [5000 kg] of methane caused by an incident , emergency or a malfunction;


### lasting a total of 8 hours or more within a 24 hour period from a single event. ### deleted


### the notification referred to in the first subparagraph shall be made without delay after the event and at the latest within 48 hours from the start of the event or the moment the operator became aware of it. ### the notification referred to in the first subparagraph shall be made without any unnecessary delay after the event. the requirements applicable for this notification will be in accordance to national or local legislation regarding notification of incidents , emergencies or other unusual occurrences , when already existing


### the notification referred to in the first subparagraph shall be made without delay after the event and at the latest within 48 hours from the start of the event or the moment the operator became aware of it. ### the notification referred to in the first subparagraph shall be made without delay after the event. the requirements applicable for this notification will be in accordance to national or local legislation regarding notification of incidents , emergencies or other unusual occurrences , when already existing.


### 1. where a facility is built , replaced or refurbished , or where new flare stacks or other combustion devices are installed , operators shall install only combustion devices with an auto-igniter or continuous pilot and a complete destruction removal efficiency for hydrocarbons. ### 1. where a facility is built , replaced or refurbished , or where new flare stacks or other combustion devices meant to replace flares are installed , replaced or refurbished , operators shall install only combustion devices with at least 98% destruction removal efficiency for hydrocarbons or applicable national standard appropriate to the situation.


### by … [36 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 30 march every year thereafter , operators shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for operated assets referred to in paragraph 2 , complemented by measurements of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site. ### by … [42 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 31 may every year thereafter , operators shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing quantification of material source-level methane emissions for non de minimis sources operated assets referred to in paragraph 2 , complemented by assessments of site-level methane emissions if these are material , confirmed by a representative sample of an alternative quantification method described by cen standards for operated facilities with methane emissions exceeding [100 tonnes per year] according the reporting of the previous year. as long as no cen standards provide adequate methodologies allowing such emission assessment methods , they can be performed on a voluntary basis. the competent authority shall authorize the assessment's scope and frequency , which should be based on prior experience with a risk-based methodology or a comparable approach.


### by … [36 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 30 march every year thereafter , operators shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for operated assets referred to in paragraph 2 , complemented by measurements of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site. ### by … [42 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 31 may every year thereafter , operators shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing quantification of source-level methane emissions for non-deminimis sources operated assets referred to in paragraph 2 confirmed by a representative sample of an alternative/different quantification method described by cen standards for operated facilities with methane emissions exceeding [100 tonnes per year] according the reporting of the previous year. as long as no cen standards provide adequate methodologies allowing such emission assessment methods , they can be performed on a voluntary basis. the assessment scope and frequency shall be based on experience using a risk-based approach or similar and shall be approved by the competent authority.


### by … [36 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 30 march every year thereafter , operators shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for operated assets referred to in paragraph 2 , complemented by measurements of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site. ### (does not affect the english version.)


### 4. by … [36 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , undertakings established in the union shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for non-operated assets. reporting at such level may involve the use of source-level measurement and sampling as the basis for establishing specific emission factors used for emissions estimation. ### deleted


### by … [48 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 30 march every year thereafter , undertakings established in the union shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for non-operated assets as set out in paragraph 4 , complemented by measurements of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site. ### deleted


### by … [48 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 30 march every year thereafter , undertakings established in the union shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for non-operated assets as set out in paragraph 4 , complemented by measurements of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site. ### (does not affect the english version.)


### data per detailed , individual , emission source type; ### data per detailed , emission source type;


### detailed information on the quantification methodologies employed to measure methane emissions; ### detailed information on the quantification;


### detailed information on the quantification methodologies employed to measure methane emissions; ### detailed information on the quantification methodologies


### share of ownership and methane emissions from non-operated assets multiplied by the share of ownership; ### ownership share of non-operated assets (percentage of ownership) in non-operated assets;


### the commission shall , by means of implementing acts , lay down a reporting template for the reports under paragraphs 2 , 3 , 4 and 5. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 32(2). ### the commission shall , by means of implementing acts , lay down a reporting template for the reports under paragraphs 2 , 3 , 4 and 5 taking into account the national inventory reports already in place. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 32(2). [until the adoption of the relevant implementing acts , operators shall use the technical guidance documents and reporting templates of the oil and gas methane partnership 2.0 , for upstream and for mid and downstream operations , as applicable.]


### the commission shall , by means of implementing acts , lay down a reporting template for the reports under paragraphs 2 , 3 , 4 and 5. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 32(2). ### the commission shall , by means of implementing acts , lay down a reporting template for the reports under paragraphs 2 , 3 , 4 and 5 taking into account the national inventory reports already in place. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 32(2).


### 7. for site-level measurements referred to in paragraphs 3 and 5 , appropriate quantification technologies shall be used which can provide such measurements. ### deleted


### 8. in the case of significant discrepancies between the emissions quantified using source-level methods and those resulting from site-level measurement , additional measurements shall be carried out within the same reporting period. ### 8. in the case of significant discrepancies , which cannot be attributed to the technologies , procedures , or environmental factors , between the emissions quantified using source-level methods and those resulting from site-level assessment and those resulting from alternative quantification methods , operators shall provide justification for the discrepancy ,additional measurements shall be carried out within the same reporting period or as soon as possible in the following reporting period.


### 8. in the case of significant discrepancies between the emissions quantified using source-level methods and those resulting from site-level measurement , additional measurements shall be carried out within the same reporting period. ### 8. in the case of significant discrepancies between the emissions quantified using source-level methods and those resulting from alternative/different quantification methods , operators shall provide justification for the discrepancy. where the discrepancy is not due to the uncertainty of the quantification technology used or to environmental conditions , competent authorities may request an additional measurement.


### 9. methane emissions measurements for gas infrastructure shall be conducted according to appropriate european (cen) or international (iso) standards for methane emissions quantification. ### 9. methane emissions measurements for gas infrastructure shall be conducted according to appropriate european (cen) or international (iso) standards.


### operators shall take all measures available to them to prevent and minimise methane emissions in their operations. ### operators shall take all appropriate and reasonable mitigation measures to prevent and minimize methane emissions in their operations.


### by … [3 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall submit a leak detection and repair programme to the competent authorities which shall detail the contents of the surveys to be carried out in accordance with the requirements in this article. ### by … [6 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall submit a leak detection and repair programme to the competent authorities which shall detail the activity to be carried out in accordance with the requirements in this article and the cen standard referred in [new] paragraph 1 or the corresponding technical specification document.


### by … [3 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall submit a leak detection and repair programme to the competent authorities which shall detail the contents of the surveys to be carried out in accordance with the requirements in this article. ### by … [6 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall submit a leak detection and repair programme to the competent authorities which shall detail the activity to be carried out in accordance with the requirements in this article and the cen standard referred in [new] paragraph 1 or the corresponding technical specification document


### the competent authorities may require the operator to amend the programme taking into account the requirements of this regulation. ### the competent authorities may require the operator to amend the programme taking into account the requirements of this regulation without undue delay , but no later than 1 month after the operator receives the request for amendment.


### the competent authorities may require the operator to amend the programme taking into account the requirements of this regulation. ### the competent authorities may require the operator to amend the programme taking into account the requirements of this regulation and the cen standard or the corresponding cen technical specification document.


### by … [6 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall carry out a survey of all relevant components under their responsibility in accordance with the leak detection and repair programme referred in paragraph 1. ### by … [12 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall carry out a survey of all high priority components under their responsibility in accordance with the leak detection and repair programme referred in paragraph 1.


### by … [6 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall carry out a survey of all relevant components under their responsibility in accordance with the leak detection and repair programme referred in paragraph 1. ### by … [12 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall carry out a survey of all relevant components under their responsibility in accordance with the leak detection and repair programme referred in paragraph 1.


### by … [6 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall carry out a survey of all relevant components under their responsibility in accordance with the leak detection and repair programme referred in paragraph 1. ### by … [12 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall initiate a survey of all relevant components under their responsibility in accordance with the leak detection and repair programme referred in paragraph 1.


### thereafter , leak detection and repair surveys shall be repeated every three months. ### thereafter , leak detection and repair surveys in mid-stream sector will be for compressor station , underground storage lng-terminal every 6 months for a minimum leak size searched for of 400g/h and every 12 months of 20g/h. this latter case also applies to the regulating and metering station. for valve stations , leak detection and repair surveys in mid-stream sector will be every 24 months for a minimum leak size searched for of 20g/h.


### thereafter , leak detection and repair surveys shall be repeated every three months. ### thereafter , leak detection and repair surveys shall be continued according to the schedule in the leak detection and repair programme.


### thereafter , leak detection and repair surveys shall be repeated every three months. ### thereafter , leak detection and repair surveys shall be repeated according to the type of asset and size of leak to search for.


### thereafter , leak detection and repair surveys shall be repeated every three months. ### thereafter , leak detection and repair surveys shall be repeated at least every three months.


### 1. highlights that taxation is one of the few areas that remain subject to unanimity voting in council; stresses that it has become increasingly evident over recent years that stronger coordination in the field of taxation is needed at eu and global levels in the light of economic developments and the new challenges created by digitalisation and globalisation; regrets , in this regard , hungary’s misuse of its veto right to block the council negotiations on the commission proposal of 22 december 2021 for a council directive on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational groups in the union (com(2021)0823); ### 1. remarks the continuous trend to reduce the fields of policy area falling under unanimity voting in council; takes note that , in this regard , taxation has not been part of this trend so far; stresses it has become increasingly evident over recent years that stronger coordination in the field of taxation is needed at eu and global levels in the light of economic developments and the new challenges created by digitalisation and globalisation; remarks , in this regard , that the misuse of veto right for decisions requiring the unanimity , blocks negotiations and delays the adoption of important legislations needed in tax matters;


### 1. highlights that taxation is one of the few areas that remain subject to unanimity voting in council; stresses that it has become increasingly evident over recent years that stronger coordination in the field of taxation is needed at eu and global levels in the light of economic developments and the new challenges created by digitalisation and globalisation; regrets , in this regard , hungary’s misuse of its veto right to block the council negotiations on the commission proposal of 22 december 2021 for a council directive on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational groups in the union (com(2021)0823); ### 1. highlights that taxation is subject to unanimity voting in council; stresses that it has become increasingly evident over recent years that stronger coordination and cooperation in the field of taxation is needed at eu and global levels in the light of economic developments and the new challenges created by digitalisation and globalisation; regrets , in this regard , hungary’s misuse of its veto right to block the council negotiations on the commission proposal of 22 december 2021 for a council directive on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational groups in the union (com(2021)0823);


### 1. highlights that taxation is one of the few areas that remain subject to unanimity voting in council; stresses that it has become increasingly evident over recent years that stronger coordination in the field of taxation is needed at eu and global levels in the light of economic developments and the new challenges created by digitalisation and globalisation; regrets , in this regard , hungary’s misuse of its veto right to block the council negotiations on the commission proposal of 22 december 2021 for a council directive on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational groups in the union (com(2021)0823); ### 1. highlights that taxation is one of the few areas that remain subject to unanimity voting in council; stresses that it has become increasingly evident over recent years that stronger coordination in the field of taxation is needed at eu and global levels in the light of economic developments and the new challenges created by digitalisation and globalisation; regrets , in this regard , hungary’s misuse of its veto right for unrelated purposes to block the council negotiations on the commission proposal of 22 december 2021 for a council directive on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational groups in the union (com(2021)0823); welcomes , however , the agreement of in the council on the oecd pillar ii reforms in december 2022;


### 1. regrets that passerelle clauses have never been used in the field of the cfsp , even though the russian war against ukraine has clearly called for more efficient and swift decision-making; ### 1. notes that passerelle clauses have never been used in the field of the cfsp , even though the russian war against ukraine has clearly called for more efficient and swift decision-making;


### 2. regrets the fact that the current situation often leads to delays and a lack of progress in the harmonisation and coordination of tax rules across the union , even though such harmonisation and coordination would benefit everyone; notes that some legislative proposals , such as the debt-equity bias reduction allowance (debra) or the business in europe: framework for income taxation (befit) , will be key to supporting the competitiveness of european companies; ### 2. notes that some legislative proposals , such as the debt-equity bias reduction allowance (debra) or the business in europe: framework for income taxation (befit) , will be key to supporting the competitiveness of european companies;


### 2. regrets the fact that the current situation often leads to delays and a lack of progress in the harmonisation and coordination of tax rules across the union , even though such harmonisation and coordination would benefit everyone; notes that some legislative proposals , such as the debt-equity bias reduction allowance (debra) or the business in europe: framework for income taxation (befit) , will be key to supporting the competitiveness of european companies; ### 2. stresses that unanimity voting in the council over tax policy does not facilitate the changes needed to tackle the current challenges; regrets the fact that the current situation often leads to delays and a lack of progress in the harmonisation and coordination of tax rules across the union , even though such harmonisation and coordination would benefit everyone; notes that some legislative proposals , such as the debt-equity bias reduction allowance (debra) or the business in europe: framework for income taxation (befit) , will be key to supporting the competitiveness of european companies;


### 2. urges the council presidency to follow up on the czech initiative in an effective way by putting the use of the passerelle clauses in the field of the cfsp on the agenda; ### 2. urges the council presidency to follow up on the czech initiative in an effective way by putting the feasibility of the use of the passerelle clauses in specific areas of the cfsp on the agenda;


### 3. recalls that article 48(7) of the treaty on european union provides for two general passerelle clauses that allow the decision-making procedures to be changed in order to adopt measures in council through qualified majority voting (qmv) in areas that are currently subject to unanimity; regrets the fact that these passerelle clauses have never been used; recalls that activating the passerelle clauses would in any case require unanimity in the european council and parliament’s consent; ### 3. takes note that article 48(7) of the treaty on european union provides for two general passerelle clauses that allow the decision-making procedures to be changed in order either to adopt measures in council through qualified majority voting (qmv) in areas that are currently subject to unanimity or to change the legislative procedure in areas that are currently subject to special legislative procedures in favour of the ordinary one; regrets the fact that these passerelle clauses have never been used;


### 3. recalls that article 48(7) of the treaty on european union provides for two general passerelle clauses that allow the decision-making procedures to be changed in order to adopt measures in council through qualified majority voting (qmv) in areas that are currently subject to unanimity; regrets the fact that these passerelle clauses have never been used; recalls that activating the passerelle clauses would in any case require unanimity in the european council and parliament’s consent; ### 3. recalls that article 48(7) of the treaty on european union provides for two general passerelle clauses that allow the decision-making procedures to be changed in order to adopt measures in council through qualified majority voting (qmv) in areas that are currently subject to unanimity and , in cases of special legislative procedure , to adopt a decision in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure; underlines that any decision on the use of a passerelle clause must be limited to a specific area or case , according to the same article 48(7); notes that these passerelle clauses have never been used; recalls that activating the passerelle clauses would in any case require unanimity in the european council and parliament’s consent; stresses that national parliaments are entitled to oppose the activation of such clauses;


### 3. urges the member states to switch to qmv for decisions in all areas of the cfsp , starting within a year with priority areas such as the eu global human rights sanctions regime , restrictive measures and other instruments linked to the russian war against ukraine and interim steps in the enlargement process; stresses that unanimity decisions should remain required for the creation and deployment of military missions or operations under the common security and defence policy (csdp); ### 3. urges the member states to continue working on building common threat perception and strategic culture which , alongside political will , are the key to more efficient and swift decision-making; stresses that unanimity decisions should remain required for the creation and deployment of military missions or operations under the common security and defence policy (csdp);


### 3. urges the member states to switch to qmv for decisions in all areas of the cfsp , starting within a year with priority areas such as the eu global human rights sanctions regime , restrictive measures and other instruments linked to the russian war against ukraine and interim steps in the enlargement process; stresses that unanimity decisions should remain required for the creation and deployment of military missions or operations under the common security and defence policy (csdp); ### 3. urges the member states to switch to qmv for decisions in all areas of the cfsp , starting within a year with priority areas such as the eu global human rights sanctions regime , restrictive measures and other instruments linked to the russian war against ukraine and interim steps in the enlargement process with the exception of the interim benchmarks related to chapters 23 and 24; stresses that unanimity decisions should remain required for the creation and deployment of military missions or operations under the common security and defence policy (csdp);


### 3. urges the member states to switch to qmv for decisions in all areas of the cfsp , starting within a year with priority areas such as the eu global human rights sanctions regime , restrictive measures and other instruments linked to the russian war against ukraine and interim steps in the enlargement process; stresses that unanimity decisions should remain required for the creation and deployment of military missions or operations under the common security and defence policy (csdp); ### 3. urges the member states to switch to qmv for , as a matter of priority , decisions in areas of cfsp concerning the eu global human rights sanctions regime , restrictive measures and other instruments linked to the russian war against ukraine; stresses that unanimity decisions should remain required for the creation and deployment of military missions or operations under the common security and defence policy (csdp);


### 3. urges the member states to switch to qmv for decisions in all areas of the cfsp , starting within a year with priority areas such as the eu global human rights sanctions regime , restrictive measures and other instruments linked to the russian war against ukraine and interim steps in the enlargement process; stresses that unanimity decisions should remain required for the creation and deployment of military missions or operations under the common security and defence policy (csdp); ### 3. urges the member states to switch to qmv , starting within a year with priority areas , for decisions in certain areas of the cfsp such as the eu global human rights sanctions regime , restrictive measures and other instruments linked to the russian war against ukraine and interim steps in the enlargement process; stresses that unanimity decisions should remain required for the creation and deployment of military missions or operations under the common security and defence policy (csdp);


### 4. recommends using the two general passerelle clauses for selected treaty articles concerning the eu’s competences in the area of taxation; recalls that the commission communication of 15 january 2019 entitled ‘towards a more efficient and democratic decision making in eu tax policy’ (com(2019)0008) and the conclusions of the conference on the future of europe both recommended moving from unanimity voting to qmv on tax matters. ### deleted


### 4. recommends using the two general passerelle clauses for selected treaty articles concerning the eu’s competences in the area of taxation; recalls that the commission communication of 15 january 2019 entitled ‘towards a more efficient and democratic decision making in eu tax policy’ (com(2019)0008) and the conclusions of the conference on the future of europe both recommended moving from unanimity voting to qmv on tax matters. ### 4. calls on the commission to relaunch the discussion on the use of qualified majority voting in some tax matters through a phased approach , as a follow-up to its communication of 15 january 2019 entitled ‘towards a more efficient and democratic decision making in eu tax policy’ (com(2019)0008) and as a response to the outcome of the conference on the future of europe; nevertheless reminds that taxation constitutes one of the core elements of the member states's sovereignity and the introduction of qmv in the tax policy area might raise issues in relation to some constitutional requirements in the eu member states; therefore takes into consideration the idea of the adoption of qmv for technical adjustments and tax fraud/evasion while maintaining the unanimous voting for tax rates and tax base.


### 4. recommends using the two general passerelle clauses for selected treaty articles concerning the eu’s competences in the area of taxation; recalls that the commission communication of 15 january 2019 entitled ‘towards a more efficient and democratic decision making in eu tax policy’ (com(2019)0008) and the conclusions of the conference on the future of europe both recommended moving from unanimity voting to qmv on tax matters. ### 4. recommends using the two general passerelle clauses for selected treaty articles concerning the eu’s competences in the area of taxation on issues that are of a technical nature or that implement international agreements that member states have previously agreed to on international level; recalls that the commission communication of 15 january 2019 entitled ‘towards a more efficient and democratic decision making in eu tax policy’ (com(2019)0008) and the conclusions of the conference on the future of europe both recommended moving from unanimity voting to qmv on tax matters.


### a. whereas the potential for fast , efficient and effective foreign policy , security and defence action , as set out in the lisbon treaty , has only been used in a very limited way over the past decade due to a lack of political will from the member states; ### a. whereas the potential for fast , efficient and effective foreign policy , security and defence action , as set out in the lisbon treaty , has only been used in a very limited way over the past decade due to lack of common threat perception , strategic culture and political will from the member states;


### b. whereas the use of passerelle clauses would immediately boost the efficiency of decision-making in the field of the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) and would be highly appropriate given the dramatic change to the european security environment as a result of the russian war against ukraine; ### b. whereas the use of passerelle clauses may boost the efficiency of decision-making in the field of the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) and may be appropriate given the dramatic change to the european security environment as a result of the russian war against ukraine;


### (1) promoting a fair and sustainable business environment , including through targeted tax measures that incentivise investment and growth , is a high political priority of the union. to support sustainable and long-term corporate financing , the tax system should minimise unintended distortions of business decisions , for example towards debt rather than equity financing. while the commission’s capital markets union 2020 action plan14 includes important actions to support such financing , for example action 4 - encouraging more long-term and equity financing from institutional investors , targeted tax measures should be adopted in order to enhance such actions. such measures should take into account fiscal sustainability considerations. ### (1) promoting a fair and sustainable business environment , including through targeted tax measures that incentivise investment and growth , is a high political priority of the union. to support sustainable and long-term corporate financing , the tax system should reduce the tax burden to a maximum and to minimise unintended distortions of business decisions , for example towards debt rather than equity financing. while the commission’s capital markets union 2020 action plan14 includes important actions to support such financing , for example action 4 - encouraging more long-term and equity financing from institutional investors , targeted tax measures should be adopted in order to enhance such actions. such measures should take into account fiscal sustainability considerations.


### (2) member states’ tax systems allow the taxpayers to deduct interest payments on debt financing , and thereby reduce the corporate income tax liability , while costs related to equity financing are non-tax deductible in most member states. the asymmetric tax treatment of debt and equity financing across the union induces a bias towards debt in investment decisions. moreover , where member states provide for a tax allowance on equity financing in their domestic law , such national measures differ significantly in terms of policy design. ### (2) member states’ tax systems allow the taxpayers to deduct interest payments on debt financing , and thereby reduce the corporate income tax liability , while costs related to equity financing are non-tax deductible in most member states. the asymmetric tax treatment of debt and equity financing across the union induces a bias towards debt in investment decisions. moreover , where member states provide for a tax allowance on equity financing in their domestic law , such national measures differ significantly in terms of policy design. it is therefore essential to safeguard a level playing field for equity solutions and debt instruments , having in regard the need to guarantee minimum levels of systematic coherence between national tax frameworks , namely at the tax benefits level.


### (2) member states’ tax systems allow the taxpayers to deduct interest payments on debt financing , and thereby reduce the corporate income tax liability , while costs related to equity financing are non-tax deductible in most member states. the asymmetric tax treatment of debt and equity financing across the union induces a bias towards debt in investment decisions. moreover , where member states provide for a tax allowance on equity financing in their domestic law , such national measures differ significantly in terms of policy design. ### (2) member states’ tax systems allow the taxpayers to deduct interest payments on debt financing , and thereby reduce the corporate income tax liability , while costs related to equity financing are non-tax deductible in most member states. the asymmetric tax treatment of debt and equity financing across the union induces a bias towards debt in investment decisions. moreover , where member states provide for a tax allowance on equity financing in their domestic law , such national measures differ significantly in terms of policy design. due to the recent crises and debt problems in the single market there is an urgent need for this reform that puts equity and debt on equal footing and does not give an advantage to debt financing.


### (3) in order to remove possible tax related distortions among member states , it is necessary to lay down a common framework of rules to address the tax related debt-equity bias across the union in a coordinated manner. such rules should ensure that equity and debt financing are treated in a similar way for tax purposes across the single market. at the same time , a common union legislative framework should be sustainable also in the short term for member states’ budgets. such framework should therefore include rules , on the one hand , for the tax deductibility of equity financing costs and , on the other , for limiting the tax deductibility of debt financing costs. ### (3) in order to remove possible tax related distortions among member states , it is necessary to lay down a common framework of rules to address the tax related debt-equity bias across the union in a coordinated manner , in full respect of the eu institutional framewok on tax matters established by the treaties. such rules should ensure that equity and debt financing are treated in a similar way for tax purposes across the single market. at the same time , a common union legislative framework should be sustainable also in the short term for member states’ budgets. such framework should therefore include rules , on the one hand , for the tax deductibility of equity financing costs and , on the other , for limiting the tax deductibility of debt financing costs.


### (4) to ensure a simple and comprehensive legislative framework , the common framework of rules should apply to all undertakings in the union that are subject to corporate income tax in a member state. financial undertakings have special features and require a specific treatment. if the rules to address the tax related debt-equity bias were to apply to them , the economic burden of the measures would be unequally distributed at the expense of non-financial undertakings. financial undertakings should therefore be excluded from the scope of this directive. ### (4) to ensure a simple and comprehensive legislative framework , the common framework of rules should apply to all undertakings in the union that are subject to corporate income tax in a member state. financial undertakings have special features and require a specific treatment. if the rules to address the tax related debt-equity bias were to apply to them , the economic burden of the measures would be unequally distributed at the expense of non-financial undertakings. financial undertakings should therefore be excluded from the scope of this directive to put them on equal footing with non-financial corporations.


### (5) to neutralise the bias against equity financing , an allowance should be envisaged so that increases in a taxpayer's equity from one tax period to the next are deductible from its taxable base , subject to certain conditions. the allowance should be calculated by multiplying the increase in equity with a notional interest rate based on risk-free interest rate as laid down in the implementing acts adopted pursuant to article 77e(2) of directive 2009/138/ec. such risk-free interest rates are already part of eu law and have been practically and effectively applied as such. any part of the allowance that cannot be deducted in a tax period due to insufficient taxable profits may be carried forward. taking into account the specific challenges that small- and medium-sized enterprises (smes) face in accessing capital markets , an increased allowance on equity should be envisaged for taxpayers that are smes. in order for the deduction of an allowance on equity to be sustainable for public finances in the short term , it should be limited in time. to safeguard the system from abuses , it is necessary to exclude the tax value of a taxpayer's own shares as well as that of its participation in associated enterprises from the calculation of changes in equity. in the same vein , it is necessary to provide for the taxation of a decrease in a taxpayer’s equity from one tax period to the following one , to prevent an equity increase from being effected in an abusive manner. such a rule would also encourage the retention of a level of equity. it would apply so that where there is a decrease in equity of a taxpayer that has benefitted from an allowance on equity increase , an amount calculated in the same way as the allowance would become taxable for 10 tax periods; unless the taxpayer provides evidence that this decrease is exclusively due to losses incurred during the tax period or due to a legal obligation. ### (5) to neutralise the bias against equity financing , an allowance should be envisaged so that increases in a taxpayer's equity from one tax period to the next are deductible from its taxable base , subject to certain conditions. once this right has been granted , it should become irrevocable. the allowance should be calculated by multiplying the increase in equity with a notional interest rate based on risk-free interest rate as laid down in the implementing acts adopted pursuant to article 77e(2) of directive 2009/138/ec. such risk-free interest rates are already part of eu law and have been practically and effectively applied as such. any part of the allowance that cannot be deducted in a tax period due to insufficient taxable profits may be carried forward. taking into account the specific challenges that small- and medium-sized enterprises (smes) face in accessing capital markets , an increased allowance on equity should be envisaged for taxpayers that are smes. in order for the deduction of an allowance on equity to be sustainable for public finances in the short term , it should be limited in time. their disadvantaged situation with smaller and more complicated financing possibilities and their exposure to longer loss periods leads to the need for longer tax deductibility periods than for larger companies. to safeguard the system from abuses , it is necessary to exclude the tax value of a taxpayer's own shares as well as that of its participation in associated enterprises from the calculation of changes in equity. in the same vein , it is necessary to provide for the taxation of a decrease in a taxpayer’s equity from one tax period to the following one , to prevent an equity increase from being effected in an abusive manner. such a rule would also encourage the retention of a level of equity. it would apply so that where there is a decrease in equity of a taxpayer that has benefitted from an allowance on equity increase , an amount calculated in the same way as the allowance would become taxable for 10 tax periods; unless the taxpayer provides evidence that this decrease is exclusively due to losses incurred during the tax period or due to a legal obligation.


### (5) to neutralise the bias against equity financing , an allowance should be envisaged so that increases in a taxpayer's equity from one tax period to the next are deductible from its taxable base , subject to certain conditions. the allowance should be calculated by multiplying the increase in equity with a notional interest rate based on risk-free interest rate as laid down in the implementing acts adopted pursuant to article 77e(2) of directive 2009/138/ec. such risk-free interest rates are already part of eu law and have been practically and effectively applied as such. any part of the allowance that cannot be deducted in a tax period due to insufficient taxable profits may be carried forward. taking into account the specific challenges that small- and medium-sized enterprises (smes) face in accessing capital markets , an increased allowance on equity should be envisaged for taxpayers that are smes. in order for the deduction of an allowance on equity to be sustainable for public finances in the short term , it should be limited in time. to safeguard the system from abuses , it is necessary to exclude the tax value of a taxpayer's own shares as well as that of its participation in associated enterprises from the calculation of changes in equity. in the same vein , it is necessary to provide for the taxation of a decrease in a taxpayer’s equity from one tax period to the following one , to prevent an equity increase from being effected in an abusive manner. such a rule would also encourage the retention of a level of equity. it would apply so that where there is a decrease in equity of a taxpayer that has benefitted from an allowance on equity increase , an amount calculated in the same way as the allowance would become taxable for 10 tax periods; unless the taxpayer provides evidence that this decrease is exclusively due to losses incurred during the tax period or due to a legal obligation. ### (5) to neutralise the bias against equity financing , an allowance should be envisaged so that increases in a taxpayer's equity from one tax period to the next are deductible from its taxable base , subject to certain conditions. the allowance should be calculated by multiplying the increase in equity with a notional interest rate based on risk-free interest rate as laid down in the implementing acts adopted pursuant to article 77e(2) of directive 2009/138/ec. such risk-free interest rates are already part of eu law and have been practically and effectively applied as such. any part of the allowance that cannot be deducted in a tax period due to insufficient taxable profits may be carried forward. taking into account the specific challenges that small- and medium-sized enterprises (smes) face in accessing capital markets , an increased allowance on equity should be envisaged for taxpayers that are smes. in order for the deduction of an allowance on equity to be sustainable for public finances in the short term , it should be properly and proportionately limited in time. to safeguard the system from abuses , it is necessary to exclude the tax value of a taxpayer's own shares as well as that of its participation in associated enterprises from the calculation of changes in equity. in the same vein , it is necessary to provide for the taxation of a decrease in a taxpayer’s equity from one tax period to the following one , to prevent an equity increase from being effected in an abusive manner. such a rule would also encourage the retention of a level of equity. it would apply so that where there is a decrease in equity of a taxpayer that has benefitted from an allowance on equity increase , an amount calculated in the same way as the allowance would become taxable; unless the taxpayer provides evidence that this decrease is exclusively due to losses incurred during the tax period or due to a legal obligation.


### (7) to effectively address the tax-related debt-equity bias in a manner sustainable for the union’s public finances , an allowance for equity financing should be accompanied by a limitation on the deductibility of debt financing costs. an interest limitation rule should therefore limit the deductibility of exceeding borrowing costs and apply independently from the allowance. given the different objectives between such a rule and the existing anti-tax avoidance rule on interest limitation of article 4 of directive (eu) 2016/1164 , both rules should be maintained. taxpayers should first calculate the deductibility of exceeding borrowing costs under this directive and then under atad. in the event that the latter results in a lower amount of deductible exceeding borrowing costs , the taxpayer should deduct this lower amount and carry forward or back any difference between the two amounts in accordance with article 4 of atad. ### deleted


### (7) to effectively address the tax-related debt-equity bias in a manner sustainable for the union’s public finances , an allowance for equity financing should be accompanied by a limitation on the deductibility of debt financing costs. an interest limitation rule should therefore limit the deductibility of exceeding borrowing costs and apply independently from the allowance. given the different objectives between such a rule and the existing anti-tax avoidance rule on interest limitation of article 4 of directive (eu) 2016/1164 , both rules should be maintained. taxpayers should first calculate the deductibility of exceeding borrowing costs under this directive and then under atad. in the event that the latter results in a lower amount of deductible exceeding borrowing costs , the taxpayer should deduct this lower amount and carry forward or back any difference between the two amounts in accordance with article 4 of atad. ### (7) to effectively address the tax-related debt-equity bias in a manner sustainable for the union’s public finances , an allowance for equity financing should be accompanied by a limitation on the deductibility of debt financing costs. an interest limitation rule should therefore limit the deductibility of exceeding borrowing costs and apply independently from the allowance , excluding from this to the smes and their loans , as they are more vulnerable. given the different objectives between such a rule and the existing anti-tax avoidance rule on interest limitation of article 4 of directive (eu) 2016/1164 , both rules should be maintained. taxpayers should first calculate the deductibility of exceeding borrowing costs under this directive and then under atad. in the event that the latter results in a lower amount of deductible exceeding borrowing costs , the taxpayer should deduct this lower amount and carry forward or back any difference between the two amounts in accordance with article 4 of atad.


### (9) in order to evaluate the effectiveness of this directive , the commission should prepare and publish an evaluation report on the basis of the information provided by member states and of other available data. ### (9) in order to evaluate the effectiveness of this directive , the commission should prepare and publish an evaluation report on the basis of the information provided by member states and of other available data. in its report , the commission should assess in particular the suitability and effectiveness of the provisions in this directive for smes and whether to extend the regime to a company's entire equity rather than its incremental equity increase. the report should be accompanied by a legislative proposal where appropriate.


### (9) in order to evaluate the effectiveness of this directive , the commission should prepare and publish an evaluation report on the basis of the information provided by member states and of other available data. ### (9) in order to evaluate the effectiveness of this directive , the commission should prepare and publish an evaluation report on the basis of the information provided by member states and of other available data. the evaluation should include a section dedicated exclusively to smes and the impact on them. in the case of poor results , the commission should present a proposal to remedy the problems identified.


### an allowance on equity shall be deductible , for 10 consecutive tax periods , from the taxable base of a taxpayer for corporate income tax purposes up to 30% of the taxpayer's earnings before interest , tax , depreciation and amortisation (“ebitda ”). ### an allowance on equity shall be deductible , for 15 consecutive tax periods for large companies and 20 consecutive periods for smes , from the taxable base of a taxpayer for corporate income tax purposes up to 30% of the taxpayer's earnings before interest , tax , depreciation and amortisation (“ebitda ”).


### an allowance on equity shall be deductible , for 10 consecutive tax periods , from the taxable base of a taxpayer for corporate income tax purposes up to 30% of the taxpayer's earnings before interest , tax , depreciation and amortisation (“ebitda ”). ### an allowance on equity shall be deductible , for 15 consecutive tax periods , from the taxable base of a taxpayer for corporate income tax purposes up to 30% of the taxpayer's earnings before interest , tax , depreciation and amortisation (“ebitda ”).


### an allowance on equity shall be deductible , for 10 consecutive tax periods , from the taxable base of a taxpayer for corporate income tax purposes up to 30% of the taxpayer's earnings before interest , tax , depreciation and amortisation (“ebitda ”). ### an allowance on equity shall be deductible , for 15 consecutive tax periods , from the taxable base of a taxpayer for corporate income tax purposes up to 50% of the taxpayer's earnings before interest , tax , depreciation and amortisation (“ebitda ”).


### member states shall ensure that the taxpayers may carry forward , for a maximum of 5 tax periods , the part of the allowance on equity which exceeds 30% of ebitda in a tax period. ### member states shall ensure that the taxpayers may carry forward , for a maximum of 10 tax periods for larger companies and a maximum of 15 tax periods for smes , the part of the allowance on equity which exceeds 30% of ebitda in a tax period.


### member states shall ensure that the taxpayers may carry forward , for a maximum of 5 tax periods , the part of the allowance on equity which exceeds 30% of ebitda in a tax period. ### member states shall ensure that the taxpayers may carry forward , for a maximum of 10 tax periods , the part of the allowance on equity which exceeds 30% of ebitda in a tax period.


### member states shall ensure that the taxpayers may carry forward , for a maximum of 5 tax periods , the part of the allowance on equity which exceeds 30% of ebitda in a tax period. ### member states shall ensure that the taxpayers may carry forward , for a maximum of 5 tax periods , the part of the allowance on equity which exceeds 50% of ebitda in a tax period.


### subject to article 5 , the base of the allowance on equity shall be calculated as the difference between the level of net equity at the end of the tax period and the level of net equity at the end of the previous tax period. ### subject to article 5 , the base of the allowance on equity shall be calculated as the difference between the level of net equity at the end of the tax period and the level of net equity at the end of the previous tax period , in other words , the year-on-year increase in own funds.


### the allowance on equity shall be equal to the base of the allowance multiplied by the 10-year risk-free interest rate for the relevant currency and increased by a risk premium of 1% or , where the taxpayer is an sme , a risk premium of 1.5%. ### the allowance on equity shall be equal to the base of the allowance multiplied by the 10-year risk-free interest rate for the relevant currency and increased by a risk premium of 1.5% or , where the taxpayer is an sme , a risk premium of 2.5%.


### the allowance on equity shall be equal to the base of the allowance multiplied by the 10-year risk-free interest rate for the relevant currency and increased by a risk premium of 1% or , where the taxpayer is an sme , a risk premium of 1.5%. ### the allowance on equity shall be equal to the base of the allowance multiplied by the 10-year risk-free interest rate for the relevant currency and increased by a risk premium of 1 ,5% or , where the taxpayer is an sme , a risk premium of 2%.


### 3. if , after having obtained an allowance on equity , the base of the allowance on equity is negative in a tax period , an amount equal to the negative allowance on equity shall become taxable for 10 consecutive tax periods , up to the overall increase of net equity for which such allowance has been obtained under this directive , unless the taxpayer provides sufficient evidence that this is due to accounting losses incurred during the tax period or due to a legal obligation to reduce capital. ### 3. if , after having obtained an allowance on equity , the base of the allowance on equity is negative in a tax period , an amount equal to the negative allowance on equity shall become taxable for 15 consecutive tax periods for large companies and 20 consecutive periods for smes , up to the overall increase of net equity for which such allowance has been obtained under this directive , unless the taxpayer provides sufficient evidence that this is due to accounting losses incurred during the tax period or due to a legal obligation to reduce capital.


### 3. if , after having obtained an allowance on equity , the base of the allowance on equity is negative in a tax period , an amount equal to the negative allowance on equity shall become taxable for 10 consecutive tax periods , up to the overall increase of net equity for which such allowance has been obtained under this directive , unless the taxpayer provides sufficient evidence that this is due to accounting losses incurred during the tax period or due to a legal obligation to reduce capital. ### 3. if , after having obtained an allowance on equity , the base of the allowance on equity is negative in a tax period , an amount equal to the negative allowance on equity shall become taxable for 15 consecutive tax periods , up to the overall increase of net equity for which such allowance has been obtained under this directive , unless the taxpayer provides sufficient evidence that this is due to accounting losses incurred during the tax period or due to a legal obligation to reduce capital.


### article 6 ### deleted


### reports ### reports and review


### 2. when drawing up the report , the commission shall take into account the information communicated by member states pursuant to article 7. ### 2. in its report , the european commission shall in particular assess: