### bf. whereas two countries are particularly active in the field of elite capture and co-optation , namely russia and china , with , for instance , former german chancellor gerhard schröder and former prime minister of finland paavo lipponen having both joined gazprom to speed up the application process for nord stream 1 and 2 , former austrian minister of foreign affairs karin kneissl appointed board member of rosneft , former prime minister of france françois fillon appointed board member of zaroubejneft , former prime minister of france jean-pierre raffarin actively engaged in promoting chinese interests in france , and former czech commissioner štefan füle having worked for cefc china energy; ### bf. whereas two countries are particularly active in the field of elite capture and co-optation , namely russia and china;


### bi. whereas different state actors , such as the russian government and the chinese communist party , have been attempting to increase their influence using cultural , educational (e.g. through grants and scholarships) and religious institutes; ### bi. whereas different state actors , such as the russian government and the chinese communist party , have been attempting to increase their influence using cultural , educational (e.g. through grants and scholarships) and religious institutes; whereas alleged difficult situation of its national minority have been use in the past by russia as an excuse for direct intervention in the third countries;


### bi. whereas different state actors , such as the russian government and the chinese communist party , have been attempting to increase their influence using cultural , educational (e.g. through grants and scholarships) and religious institutes; ### bi. whereas different state actors , such as the russian government and the chinese communist party , have been attempting to increase their influence by setting up and using cultural , educational (e.g. through grants and scholarships) and religious institutes across eu member states;


### bi. whereas different state actors , such as the russian government and the chinese communist party , have been attempting to increase their influence using cultural , educational (e.g. through grants and scholarships) and religious institutes; ### bi. whereas different state actors , such as the russian or turkish government and the chinese communist party , have been attempting to increase their influence using cultural , educational (e.g. through grants and scholarships) and religious institutes;


### 82. condemns all types of elite capture and the technique of co-opting top-level civil servants and former eu politicians used by foreign companies with links to governments actively engaged in interference actions against the eu , and regrets the lack of tools and enforcement needed to prevent these practices; considers that disclosing confidential information acquired during public mandates or when performing civil servant functions , at the expense of the eu and its member states’ strategic interests , should be strictly prohibited; ### 82. condemns all types of elite capture and the technique of co-opting top-level civil servants and former eu politicians used by foreign companies with links to governments actively engaged in interference actions against the eu , and regrets the lack of tools and enforcement needed to prevent these practices; considers that disclosing confidential information acquired during public mandates or when performing civil servant functions , at the expense of the eu and its member states’ strategic interests , should be strictly prohibited; considers that declaration of income and property of such individuals should be made publicly available;


### 82. condemns all types of elite capture and the technique of co-opting top-level civil servants and former eu politicians used by foreign companies with links to governments actively engaged in interference actions against the eu , and regrets the lack of tools and enforcement needed to prevent these practices; considers that disclosing confidential information acquired during public mandates or when performing civil servant functions , at the expense of the eu and its member states’ strategic interests , should be strictly prohibited; ### 82. condemns illegitimate types of elite capture and the technique of co-opting top-level civil servants and former eu politicians used by foreign companies with links to governments actively engaged in interference actions against the eu , and regrets the lack of tools and enforcement needed to prevent these practices; considers that disclosing confidential information acquired during public mandates or when performing civil servant functions , at the expense of the eu and its member states’ strategic interests , should be strictly regulated under clear transparency requirements;


### 83. calls on the commission to encourage and coordinate actions against elite capture , such as complementing the cooling-off periods for eu commissioners with a reporting duty after the period , and structured rules to tackle elite capture at eu level; ### 83. calls on the commission to encourage and coordinate actions against elite capture , such as complementing the cooling-off periods for eu commissioners with a reporting duty after the period , ending the practice of "revolving doors" , and structured rules to tackle elite capture at eu level;


### 84. is concerned about integrated lobbying strategies combining industrial interests and foreign political goals , in particular when they favour the interests of an authoritarian state; calls , therefore , for the eu institutions to reform the transparency register , including by introducing more stringent transparency rules , mapping foreign funding for eu-related lobbying , and ensuring an entry which allows for the identification of funding from foreign governments; considers australia’s foreign influence transparency scheme to be a good practice to follow; ### 84. is concerned about integrated lobbying strategies combining industrial interests and foreign political goals , in particular when they favour the interests of an authoritarian state; calls , therefore , for the eu institutions to reform the transparency register , including by introducing more stringent transparency rules , mapping foreign funding for eu-related lobbying , and ensuring an entry which allows for the identification of funding from foreign governments; calls for effective cooperation on this matter among all eu institutions; considers australia’s foreign influence transparency scheme to be a good practice to follow;


### a. whereas gender equality is a fundamental value and an objective of the eu; whereas gender-based violence is an extreme form of discrimination against women and one of the biggest obstacles to achieving gender equality; ### a. whereas gender equality is a core value and an objective of the eu; whereas gender quality is a fundamental right enshrined in the treaties1a and the eu charter of fundamental rights2a and a key principle of the european pillar of social rights; whereas gender-based violence is an extreme form of discrimination against women and one of the biggest obstacles to achieving gender equality;


### a. whereas gender equality is a fundamental value and an objective of the eu; whereas gender-based violence is an extreme form of discrimination against women and one of the biggest obstacles to achieving gender equality; ### a. whereas gender equality is a core principle of the european union and should be reflected in all eu policies; whereas gender-based violence is a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination against women and one of the most serious obstacles to achieving gender equality; 1a


### a. whereas gender equality is a fundamental value and an objective of the eu; whereas gender-based violence is an extreme form of discrimination against women and one of the biggest obstacles to achieving gender equality; ### a. whereas equality between men and women is a fundamental value and an objective of the eu; whereas violence based on a person's sex is an extreme form of discrimination against women and one of the biggest obstacles to achieving equality of the sexes;


### b. whereas , in spite of numerous instances of formal recognition and progress having been made on gender equality , women and men do not enjoy the same rights in practice and social , economic and cultural inequalities persist; ### b. whereas , in spite of numerous instances of formal recognition and progress having been made on equality of the sexes , women and men do not enjoy the same rights in practice and social , economic and cultural inequalities persist;


### c. whereas intimate partner violence refers to any act of physical , sexual , psychological or economic violence that occurs between former or current spouses or partners , whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared a residence with the victim; whereas intimate partner violence is one of the most prevalent forms of gender-based violence , with an estimated 22 % of women having experienced physical and/or sexual violence , and 43 % having experienced psychological violence by their partner6 ; whereas women and children are disproportionately affected by this type of violence; whereas domestic violence is a serious and often hidden social problem that can cause systematic physical and psychological trauma with serious consequences for the victims , as the perpetrator is a person the victim should be able to trust; ### c. whereas intimate partner violence refers to any act of physical , sexual , psychological or economic violence that occurs between former or current spouses or partners , whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared a residence with the victim; whereas intimate partner violence is one of the most prevalent forms of gender-based violence , with an estimated 22 % of women having experienced physical and/or sexual violence , and 43 % having experienced psychological violence by their partner6 ; whereas women and children are disproportionately affected by this type of violence; whereas domestic violence is a serious and often long-term and hidden social problem that causes systematic physical and/or psychological trauma with serious consequences for the victims , as the perpetrator is a person the victim should be able to trust;


### d. whereas the lockdown and social distancing measures during the covid-19 pandemic have been associated with an exponential increase in the prevalence and intensity of intimate partner violence cases in many member states , resulting from forced confinement within the home and making it difficult for women to access effective protection and support; whereas in spite of the prevalence of the phenomenon , intimate partner violence against women remains under-reported in the eu and there is a significant lack of comprehensive data; ### d. whereas the lockdown and social distancing measures during the covid-19 pandemic have been associated with an exponential increase in the prevalence and intensity of intimate partner violence cases in many member states , resulting from forced confinement within the home and making it difficult for women to access effective protection and support; whereas it revealed insufficient support resources and structures as well as limited access to support services for victims , whereas in spite of the prevalence of the phenomenon , intimate partner violence against women remains under-reported in the eu and there is a significant lack of comprehensive and comparable data; whereas the phenomenon has been aggravated due to the interruption of schooling;


### d. whereas the lockdown and social distancing measures during the covid-19 pandemic have been associated with an exponential increase in the prevalence and intensity of intimate partner violence cases in many member states , resulting from forced confinement within the home and making it difficult for women to access effective protection and support; whereas in spite of the prevalence of the phenomenon , intimate partner violence against women remains under-reported in the eu and there is a significant lack of comprehensive data; ### d. whereas the lockdown and social distancing measures during the covid-19 pandemic have been associated with an exponential increase in the prevalence and intensity of intimate partner violence cases in many member states , resulting from forced confinement within the home and making it difficult for women to access effective protection , support and justice; whereas in spite of the prevalence of the phenomenon , intimate partner violence against women remains under-reported in the eu for various reasons and there is a significant lack of comprehensive data;


### e. whereas children may suffer ‘witnessed violence’ in the family environment , through experiencing any form of ill-treatment , carried out through acts of physical , verbal , psychological , sexual and economic violence against reference figures or other affectively significant figures; whereas such violence has very serious consequences for the psychological and emotional development of the child , and whereas it is therefore essential to pay due attention to this type of violence in separations and parental custody arrangements , taking the best interests of the child into account , in particular in order to determine custody and visitation rights in separation cases; ### e. whereas children may suffer ‘witnessed violence’ when they witness acts of violence in the family environment , through experiencing any form of ill-treatment , carried out through acts of physical , verbal , psychological , sexual and economic violence against reference figures or other affectively significant figures; whereas such violence has very serious consequences for the psychological and emotional development of the child , and whereas it is therefore essential to pay due attention to this type of violence in separations and parental custody arrangements , taking the best interests of the child into account , in particular in order to determine custody and visitation rights in separation cases;


### e. whereas children may suffer ‘witnessed violence’ in the family environment , through experiencing any form of ill-treatment , carried out through acts of physical , verbal , psychological , sexual and economic violence against reference figures or other affectively significant figures; whereas such violence has very serious consequences for the psychological and emotional development of the child , and whereas it is therefore essential to pay due attention to this type of violence in separations and parental custody arrangements , taking the best interests of the child into account , in particular in order to determine custody and visitation rights in separation cases; ### e. whereas children may , directly or indirectly , suffer ‘witnessed violence’ in the family environment , through experiencing any form of ill-treatment , carried out through acts of physical , verbal , psychological , sexual and economic violence against reference figures or other affectively significant figures; whereas such violence has very serious consequences for the psychological and emotional development of the child , and whereas it is therefore essential to pay due attention to this type of violence in separations and parental custody arrangements , taking the best interests of the child into account , in particular in order to determine custody and visitation rights in separation cases;


### b. whereas openness builds trust; whereas the eu institutions must strive for the highest possible standards of transparency , accountability and integrity; whereas openness and the participation of civil society are indispensable for promoting good governance in the eu institutions; ### b. whereas openness can be one factor in building citizen's trust in the union; whereas the functioning of the eu is founded on representative democracy; whereas eu institutions , bodies , offices and agencies must strive for the highest possible standards of transparency , accountability and integrity; whereas openness and participation of citizens and civil society in the democratic life of the union are indispensable for promoting good governance in the eu institutions;


### c. whereas in the final report of the conference on the future of europe , citizens expressed their dissatisfaction with the lack of transparency in the eu’s decision-making process and voiced a desire for more citizen involvement and accountability; ### c. whereas in the final report of the conference on the future of europe , citizens called for more transparency in the eu’s decision-making process and voiced a desire for more citizen involvement and accountability;


### d. whereas citizens’ expectations as regards transparency , accountability and technical solutions have evolved in recent years; whereas this may require the adoption of new technical solutions and guidelines; ### d. whereas citizens’ expectations as regards transparency and accountability of public institutions , and possible technical solutions have evolved in recent years; whereas this may require the adoption of new guidelines to reflect these developments;


### g. whereas the union’s response to the covid-19 crisis showed its ability to act , but also demonstrated the need for increased transparency within the union; ### deleted


### h. whereas parliament adopted its first-reading position on the commission proposal for reform of regulation (ec) no 1049/2001 in december 2011; whereas negotiations on that regulation have been at a standstill since 2012; whereas the eu has taken on many new responsibilities since the regulation came into force; whereas increased responsibility requires increased transparency in order to uphold the eu’s credibility and legitimacy in citizens’ eyes; ### h. whereas parliament adopted its first-reading position on the commission proposal for reform of regulation (ec) no 1049/2001 in december 2011; whereas negotiations on that regulation have been at a standstill since 2012; whereas the eu has taken on many new responsibilities since the regulation came into force; whereas increased responsibility requires increased democratic scrutiny in order to uphold the eu’s credibility and legitimacy in citizens’ eyes;


### 2. notes with concern that in 2021 , following a request for public access to text messages between the commission president and the ceo of a pharmaceutical company regarding the purchase of covid-19 vaccines , the commission refused to even search properly for such text messages , let alone grant public access to them; recalls that registering a document is a consequence of the existence of a document and not a prerequisite for its existence; supports the ombudsman’s finding of maladministration by the commission in this case17 ; ### 2. notes with concern that in 2021 , following a request for public access to text messages between the commission's president and the ceo of a pharmaceutical company regarding the purchase of covid-19 vaccines , the commission did not disclose the messages and did not inform whether the text messages in question existed; regrets that currently the commission’s internal policy is , in effect , not to register text messages; takes note of the ombudsman’s finding of maladministration by the commission in this case17 ;


### 3. notes with concern that a common problem faced in requests for access to documents is the refusal of access by institutions on the basis of insubstantial arguments; reiterates that an institution invoking one of the exceptions to access has to make an objective and individual assessment and show that the risk to the interest protected is foreseeable and not purely hypothetical , and define how access to the document would specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected18 ; highlights that it might be possible to disclose some parts of a document when other parts need to be protected; notes with interest the case lodged against the council for its frequent recourse to the informal ‘working document’ predicate19 ; ### 3. reiterates that an institution invoking one of the exceptions to access to documents under article 4 of regulation (ec) no 1049/2001 has to make an objective and individual assessment and show that the risk to the interest protected is foreseeable and not purely hypothetical , as well as define how access to the document would specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected18 ; highlights that it might be possible to disclose some parts of a document when other parts need to be protected; notes with interest the case lodged against the council for its frequent recourse to the informal ‘working document’ predicate19 ; notes with concern that a common problem faced in requests for access to documents is the refusal of access by institutions on the basis of insubstantial arguments;


### 5. regrets the fact that access to the advice of the institutions’ respective legal services is too limited; notes with interest that the court has highlighted that the question of whether a legal opinion is particularly sensitive depends on whether the content of the opinion itself is particularly sensitive , not on whether the legislative process related to the opinion is sensitive20 ; ### 5. regrets the fact that access to the advice of the institutions’ respective legal services is too limited; takes note of the cjeu judgement which stated that regulation (ec) no 1049/2001 imposes , in principle , an obligation to disclose the opinions of the council’s legal service relating to a legislative process; notes that according to the court the only possible grounds for refusal on account of the protection of legal advice given in the context of the legislative process is a particularly sensitive nature of the content of the opinion or its particularly wide scope that goes beyond the context of the legislative process; echoes court’s opinion that in such case institution concerned is obliged to give a detailed statement of the reasons for such a refusal20 ;


### 9. welcomes the commission’s intention to increase transparency within the eu based on ‘transparency by default’; implores the commission not to consider any proposal to revise regulation (ec) no 1049/2001 that would lower the standards of transparency and access to documents; deplores the fact that negotiations have long been at a standstill and strongly urges the council and the commission to resume negotiations with the other institutions on the basis of commission’s proposals from 2008 and 2011; notes that any reform will need to address key issues such as the scope of the grounds for refusal , the public-interest test , transparency in the legislative process , and opposition to block exemptions; calls for the council , the commission and parliament to work constructively with the ultimate aim of giving eu citizens wider and improved access to documents; ### 9. welcomes the commission’s intention to increase transparency within the eu based on ‘transparency by default’; calls on all eu institutions , bodies , offices and agencies to publish documents proactively on their websites and make the search of these documents easy for citizens in order to allow for public scrutiny; implores the commission not to consider any proposal to revise regulation (ec) no 1049/2001 that would lower the standards of transparency and access to documents; deplores the fact that negotiations have long been at a standstill and strongly urges the council to resume negotiations with the parliament on the basis of the commission’s proposals from 2008 and 2011; notes that any reform will need to address key issues such as the scope of the grounds for refusal to grant access to documents , a public-interest test , transparency in the legislative process as well as the issue of vexatious and repeated requests; calls for the council , the commission and the parliament to work constructively with the ultimate aim of giving eu citizens wider and improved access to documents;


### 10. stresses the importance of parliament’s transparency register and calls for the introduction of a mandatory requirement for all members to make public all scheduled meetings with people external to parliament where these meetings relate to a report or resolution of the european parliament; ### 10. stresses the importance of parliament’s transparency register and declaration of scheduled meetings with diplomatic representatives of third countries in case of an active role on a report or a resolution to allow for scrutiny of interest representation and decision making process , in line with the reform plan proposed by president roberta metsola; calls for a swift implementation of the reform that is aimed at strengthening the parliament's integrity , independence and accountability; calls for the reform to reflect the need for more transparency , also through better access to documents , in order to ensure public scrutiny;


### 11. calls for a revision of the staff regulations , especially article 22(c) thereof , in order to align them with the standards of the whistleblower directive; reiterates its call for a special committee tasked with identifying potential flaws in the european parliament’s rules on transparency , integrity and corruption and with making proposals for reforms; recalls its commitment to setting up a committee of inquiry to investigate cases of corruption and improper actions by non-eu countries seeking to buy influence in the european parliament; recalls its position that the commission should put forward a proposal to set up a new ethics body for the eu institutions as soon as possible; ### 11. calls for a revision of the staff regulations , especially article 22(c) thereof , in order to align them with the standards of the whistleblower directive; welcomes the endorsement by the political groups' leaders of the reform plan and reminds that the reform should be aimed at enhancing public trust in the parliament while protecting the right of meps in the free exercise of their mandate;


### 12. welcomes the ombudsman’s practical recommendations on how to record text and instant messages sent or received by staff members in their professional capacity23 ; recognises that work-related text and instant messages are ‘documents’ within the meaning of regulation (ec) no 1049/2001 on public access to documents and invites the other eu institutions , bodies , offices and agencies to also recognise this; calls on the other eu institutions , bodies , offices and agencies to use a broad interpretation of the concept of ‘document’ , which is particularly important in an information society and in the context of new forms of communication; ### 12. welcomes the ombudsman’s practical recommendations on how to record text and instant messages sent or received by staff members in their professional capacity; recognises that certain work-related text and instant messages may be considered as ‘documents’ within the meaning of regulation (ec) no 1049/2001 on public access to documents and invites the other eu institutions , bodies , offices and agencies to also recognise this; calls on the other eu institutions , bodies , offices and agencies to use a broad interpretation of the concept of ‘document’ , which is particularly important in an information society and in the context of new forms of communication;


### 13. calls for the eu institutions to have a policy of ‘transparency by design’ and publish documents linked to legislative files proactively , within a reasonable time frame and in a user-friendly way; calls for the eu institutions to comply fully with the judgment of the cjeu in case t-540/1524 on access to trilogue documents; insists that the council should improve its rules and procedures on legislative transparency , including the accessibility and classification of legislative documents; ### 13. calls for the eu institutions to have a policy of ‘transparency by design’ and publish documents linked to legislative files proactively , within a reasonable time frame and in a user-friendly way; calls for the eu institutions to comply fully with the judgment of the cjeu in case t-540/1524 on access to trilogue documents; insists that the eu institutions and in particular the council should improve its rules and procedures on legislative transparency , including the accessibility and classification of legislative documents;


### c. whereas its resolution of 3 may 2022 on the reform of the electoral law of the european union proposes the establishment of a union-wide constituency; ### deleted


### d. whereas a modification of the act concerning the election of the members of the european parliament by direct universal suffrage is required to provide the legal basis for the establishment of such a union-wide constituency; ### deleted


### e. whereas the determination of the number of seats of a potential union-wide constituency falls within the remit of the european council decision on the composition of the european parliament based on article 14(2) teu , while the provisions necessary for its establishment are based on article 223(1) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union; ### deleted


### e. whereas the determination of the number of seats of a potential union-wide constituency falls within the remit of the european council decision on the composition of the european parliament based on article 14(2) teu , while the provisions necessary for its establishment are based on article 223(1) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union; ### e. whereas the determination of the number of seats of a potential union-wide constituency falls within the remit of the european council decision on the composition of the european parliament based on article 14(2) teu , while the provisions necessary for its establishment are based on article 223(1) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union and require changing the act concerning the election of the members of the european parliament by direct universal suffrage ;


### 1. notes that the current allocation of seats in the european parliament as established in european council decision 2018/937/eu only applies to the 2019-2024 parliamentary term; stresses , therefore , that a new decision on the composition of the european parliament for the 2024-2029 parliamentary term is required; ### 1. notes that the current allocation of seats in the european parliament as established in european council decision 2018/937/eu applies to the 2019-2024 parliamentary term; stresses , therefore , that a new decision on the composition of the european parliament for the 2024-2029 parliamentary term is required without delay;


### 2. acknowledges that the current allocation of seats in the european parliament breaches the principle of degressive proportionality in six instances , and therefore must be corrected in a new allocation to be applied as of the next european elections in 2024; ### 2. acknowledges that the current allocation of seats in the european parliament breaches the principle of degressive proportionality in six instances , and therefore should be corrected in a new allocation to be applied as of the next european elections in 2024;


### 4. stresses that the proposed allocation of seats should include a reserve of 28 additional seats for members elected in an union-wide constituency in line with parliament’s proposal on the electoral law as adopted on 3 may 2022; points out that , in line with that proposal , those seats can only be taken up after the elections following the entry into force of a revised electoral law including the necessary provisions for the union-wide constituency; ### deleted


### 4. stresses that the proposed allocation of seats should include a reserve of 28 additional seats for members elected in an union-wide constituency in line with parliament’s proposal on the electoral law as adopted on 3 may 2022; points out that , in line with that proposal , those seats can only be taken up after the elections following the entry into force of a revised electoral law including the necessary provisions for the union-wide constituency; ### 4. stresses that the proposed allocation of seats should include a reserve of 28 additional seats for members elected in an union-wide constituency in line with parliament’s proposal on the electoral law as adopted on 3 may 2022; however , points out that , in line with that proposal , those seats shall only be effectively established after the elections following the entry into force of a revised electoral law including the necessary provisions for the union-wide constituency;


### 2. instructs its president to sign the agreement with the president of the european central bank and to arrange for its publication in the official journal of the european union; ### 2. instructs its president to sign the letter to the president of the european central bank , to which those arrangements are annexed;


### 1. points out that the eci is the only tool for participatory democracy at eu level that can potentially lead to a proposal for a legal act of the union; considers it essential to involve citizens , in particular young people , in the democratic life of the union; recalls , therefore , that the use of the eci instrument must be enhanced by all available means; ### 1. points out that the eci is the only tool for participatory democracy at eu level that can potentially lead to a proposal for a legal act of the union; considers it essential to involve citizens , in particular young people , in the democratic life of the union; believes that the eci can strengthen the democratic dimension of the eu by promoting active citizenship; recalls , therefore , that the use of the eci instrument must be enhanced by all available means;


### 2. stresses that the online collection of statements of support is fundamental for the success of ecis; welcomes the improvements made by the commission to its central online collection system , including the possibility of customising its features and providing statistics to citizens; is concerned , however , that phasing out individual online collection systems might have a negative effect on the possibility for organisers to use online collection systems tailored to their needs; ### 2. stresses that the online collection of statements of support is fundamental for the success of ecis; acknowledges the advantages offered by the central online collection system in terms of budget and timing and welcomes the improvements made by the commission to its central online collection system , including the possibility of customising its features and providing statistics to citizens; also recognises , however , the benefits of individual online collection systems that give more freedom to organisers in the way they manage their campaign; is concerned therefore that phasing out individual online collection systems might have a negative effect on the possibility for organisers to use online collection systems tailored to their needs;


### 9. underlines the need to continue to raise awareness of this participatory instrument , in particular by promoting it on social media and including it in civic education curriculums , in order to reach as many citizens as possible , especially young people; ### 9. underlines the need to continue to raise awareness of this participatory instrument , in particular by promoting it on social media and including it in civic education curriculums , in order to reach as many citizens as possible , especially young people; welcomes in this sense the educational module for high schools promoted by the commission;


### 1. recognises that implementing the framework decision on the european arrest warrant (fdeaw) has put legal systems in many member states under strain; notes that the fdeaw revealed stark national differences in substantive and procedural criminal law; ### 1. recognises that implementing the framework decision on the european arrest warrant (fdeaw) has put legal systems in many member states under strain , notably with regard to the extradition of their own nationals; notes that the fdeaw revealed stark national differences in substantive and procedural criminal law;


### 1. considers that the situation with regard of the rule of law , democracy and fundamental rights has substantially deteriorated in a number of member states; recalls in particular the importance of upholding the rule of law and the obligation of member states to ensure effective judicial protection , which is a core value of the union as a community based on law; ### 1. considers that the situation with regard of the rule of law , democracy and fundamental rights has substantially deteriorated in a number of member states , which is deeply regrettable; underlines that the union is founded on a set of common principles of democracy , the rule of law , and fundamental rights , as enshrined in article 2 teu; recalls in particular the importance of upholding the rule of law and the obligation of member states to ensure effective judicial protection , which is a core value of the union as a community based on law;


### 1. emphasises the urgent need for the union to develop a robust and positive agenda for protecting and reinforcing democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights for all its citizens; insists that the union must remain a champion of freedom and justice in europe and the world; ### 1. emphasises the urgent need for the union to develop a robust and positive agenda for protecting and reinforcing democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights for all its citizens; insists that the union must remain a champion of democracy and respect for the rule of law in europe and the world;


### 1. emphasises the urgent need for the union to develop a robust and positive agenda for protecting and reinforcing democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights for all its citizens; insists that the union must remain a champion of freedom and justice in europe and the world; ### 1. emphasises the urgent need for the union to develop a robust and positive agenda for protecting and reinforcing democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights for all its citizens and persons on its territory; insists that the union must remain a champion of freedom and justice in europe and the world;


### 1. emphasises the urgent need for the union to develop a robust and positive agenda for protecting and reinforcing democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights for all its citizens; insists that the union must remain a champion of freedom and justice in europe and the world; ### 1. emphasises the urgent need for the union to develop evidence-based and objective agenda for protecting and reinforcing democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights for all its citizens; insists that the union must remain a champion of freedom and justice in europe and the world;


### 1. considers that the union mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights should primarily aim at preventing and addressing any threat to the union values enshrined in article 2 of the treaty on european union (teu) before any clear risk arises in a member state and article 7 teu should be triggered; ### 1. considers that the union mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights should primarily aim at preventing and addressing any threat to the union values enshrined in article 2 of the treaty on european union (teu) before any clear risk of infringement of these values arises in a member state and article 7 teu should be triggered; recalls that failure to adhere to eu values may have a negative impact on the european project itself , particularly when it comes to the fundamental rights of european union citizens , thereby diminishing mutual trust between member states;


### 1. considers that the union mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights should primarily aim at preventing and addressing any threat to the union values enshrined in article 2 of the treaty on european union (teu) before any clear risk arises in a member state and article 7 teu should be triggered; ### 1. considers that the union mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights should primarily aim at preventing any threat to the union values enshrined in article 2 of the treaty on european union (teu) in all member states equally and also in the eu institutions without prejudice to article 5 of the treaty on european union (teu) and in a respect of article 4 teu and the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;


### 1. considers that the union mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights should primarily aim at preventing and addressing any threat to the union values enshrined in article 2 of the treaty on european union (teu) before any clear risk arises in a member state and article 7 teu should be triggered; ### 1. considers that the union mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights should primarily aim at preventing any threat to the union values enshrined in article 2 of the treaty on european union (teu) without prejudice to article 5 of the treaty on european union (teu) and in a respect of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.


### 2. warns that the union is facing an unprecedented and escalating crisis of its founding values , which threatens its long-term survival as a democratic peace project; is gravely concerned by the rise and entrenchment of autocratic and illiberal tendencies , further compounded by the covid-19 pandemic and economic recession , as well as corruption and state capture , in several member states; underlines the dangers of this trend for the cohesion of the union’s legal order , the functioning of its single market , the effectiveness of its common policies and its international credibility; ### deleted


### 2. warns that the union is facing an unprecedented and escalating crisis of its founding values , which threatens its long-term survival as a democratic peace project; is gravely concerned by the rise and entrenchment of autocratic and illiberal tendencies , further compounded by the covid-19 pandemic and economic recession , as well as corruption and state capture , in several member states; underlines the dangers of this trend for the cohesion of the union’s legal order , the functioning of its single market , the effectiveness of its common policies and its international credibility; ### 2. is concerned by the rise of illiberal tendencies as well as corruption; underlines the dangers of this trend for the cohesion of the union’s legal order , the functioning of its single market , the effectiveness of its common policies and its international credibility;


### 2. warns that the union is facing an unprecedented and escalating crisis of its founding values , which threatens its long-term survival as a democratic peace project; is gravely concerned by the rise and entrenchment of autocratic and illiberal tendencies , further compounded by the covid-19 pandemic and economic recession , as well as corruption and state capture , in several member states; underlines the dangers of this trend for the cohesion of the union’s legal order , the functioning of its single market , the effectiveness of its common policies and its international credibility; ### 2. warns that the union is facing an unprecedented and escalating crisis of its founding values , which threatens its long-term survival as a democratic peace project; is gravely concerned by the rise and entrenchment of autocratic and illiberal tendencies , further compounded by the covid-19 pandemic and economic recession , as well as corruption and state capture , in several member states; underlines the dangers of this trend for the cohesion of the union’s legal order , the protection of fundamental rights of all its citizens , the functioning of its single market , the effectiveness of its common policies and its international credibility;


### 2. warns that the union is facing an unprecedented and escalating crisis of its founding values , which threatens its long-term survival as a democratic peace project; is gravely concerned by the rise and entrenchment of autocratic and illiberal tendencies , further compounded by the covid-19 pandemic and economic recession , as well as corruption and state capture , in several member states; underlines the dangers of this trend for the cohesion of the union’s legal order , the functioning of its single market , the effectiveness of its common policies and its international credibility; ### 2. warns that the union is facing an unprecedented and escalating crisis of its founding values , which threatens its long-term survival as a democratic peace project; is gravely concerned by the rise and entrenchment of autocratic and illiberal tendencies , further compounded by the covid-19 pandemic and economic recession , as well as corruption and state capture , in several member states; underlines the dangers of this trend for the cohesion of the union’s legal order , the functioning of its single market , the effectiveness of its common policies , the protection of its citizen’s fundamental rights and its international credibility;


### 2. emphasises that an independent and impartial judiciary is an indispensable cornerstone of the rule of law; highlights that the requirement that courts be independent is of the essence to the fundamental right to effective judicial protection and a fair trial and to ensure that all rights deriving from union law are protected; stresses that every national court is also a european court when applying union law; is worried that recent attacks on the rule of law have mainly consisted of attempts to jeopardise judicial independence; ### 2. emphasises that all public authorities in the member states must always act within the limits of the law while observing the values arising from fundamental rights in a democracy , under the control of an independent and impartial judiciary system , which is an indispensable cornerstone of the rule of law; highlights that the requirement that courts be independent is of the essence to the fundamental right to effective judicial protection and a fair trial and to ensure that all rights , both material and procedural , deriving from union law are protected; stresses that every national court is also a european court , and is responsible for both applying union law and initiating the preliminary reference procedure under article 267 of the tfeu , with a view to ensuring consistency and uniformity when applying union law; is worried that recent attacks on the rule of law have mainly consisted of attempts to jeopardise judicial independence and call into question the very legal , political and economic bases of how the european union works;


### 2. emphasises that an independent and impartial judiciary is an indispensable cornerstone of the rule of law; highlights that the requirement that courts be independent is of the essence to the fundamental right to effective judicial protection and a fair trial and to ensure that all rights deriving from union law are protected; stresses that every national court is also a european court when applying union law; is worried that recent attacks on the rule of law have mainly consisted of attempts to jeopardise judicial independence; ### 2. emphasises that an independent and impartial judiciary is an indispensable cornerstone of the rule of law; highlights that the requirement that courts and lawyers be independent is of the essence to the fundamental right to effective judicial protection and a fair trial and to ensure that all rights deriving from union law are protected; stresses that every national court is also a european court when applying union law; is worried that recent attacks on the rule of law have mainly consisted of attempts to jeopardise judicial independence; emphasises that all citizens have the right to be advised , defended and represented by an independent lawyer according to article 47 of the charter of fundamental rights;


### 2. emphasises that an independent and impartial judiciary is an indispensable cornerstone of the rule of law; highlights that the requirement that courts be independent is of the essence to the fundamental right to effective judicial protection and a fair trial and to ensure that all rights deriving from union law are protected; stresses that every national court is also a european court when applying union law; is worried that recent attacks on the rule of law have mainly consisted of attempts to jeopardise judicial independence; ### 2. emphasises that an independent and impartial judiciary , legal certainty , access to justice together with non-discrimination and equality before the law are an indispensable cornerstone of the rule of law; highlights that the requirement that courts be independent is of the essence to the fundamental right to effective judicial protection and a fair trial and to ensure that all rights deriving from union law are protected; stresses that every national court is also a european court when applying union law; aims to avoid possible attacks on the rule of law , for instance those consisted of attempts to jeopardise judicial independence;


### 2. emphasises that an independent and impartial judiciary is an indispensable cornerstone of the rule of law; highlights that the requirement that courts be independent is of the essence to the fundamental right to effective judicial protection and a fair trial and to ensure that all rights deriving from union law are protected; stresses that every national court is also a european court when applying union law; is worried that recent attacks on the rule of law have mainly consisted of attempts to jeopardise judicial independence; ### 2. emphasises that an independent and impartial judiciary , legal certainty , access to justice together with non-discrimination and equality before the law are an indispensable cornerstone of the rule of law; highlights that the requirement that courts be independent is of the essence to the fundamental right to effective judicial protection and a fair trial and to ensure that all rights deriving from union law are protected;; aims to avoid possible attacks on the rule of law , especially those consisted of attempts to jeopardise judicial independence;


### 3. recognises that the union remains structurally ill-equipped to tackle democratic and rule of law backsliding in the member states; regrets the inability of the council to make meaningful progress in enforcing union values in ongoing article 7 teu procedures; notes with concern the disjointed nature of the union’s toolkit in that field; ### 3. recognises that the union remains structurally ill-equipped to tackle democratic and rule of law backsliding in the member states; regrets the inability of the council to make meaningful progress in enforcing union values in ongoing article 7 teu procedures; underscores that the existing instruments to prevent democratic and rule of law backsliding should be streamlined and properly enforced;


### 3. recognises that the union remains structurally ill-equipped to tackle democratic and rule of law backsliding in the member states; regrets the inability of the council to make meaningful progress in enforcing union values in ongoing article 7 teu procedures; notes with concern the disjointed nature of the union’s toolkit in that field; ### 3. recognises that the union remains structurally ill-equipped to tackle democratic , rule of law and fundamental rights violations and backsliding in the member states; regrets the inability of the council to make meaningful progress in enforcing union values in ongoing article 7 teu procedures; notes with concern the disjointed nature of the union’s toolkit in that field;


### 3. recognises that the union remains structurally ill-equipped to tackle democratic and rule of law backsliding in the member states; regrets the inability of the council to make meaningful progress in enforcing union values in ongoing article 7 teu procedures; notes with concern the disjointed nature of the union’s toolkit in that field; ### 3. recognises that the union remains structurally ill-equipped to tackle threats to democracy and the rule of law in the member states; regrets the inability of the council to make meaningful progress in enforcing union values in ongoing article 7 teu procedures; notes with concern the ineffective nature of the union’s toolkit in that field;


### 3. highlights that training of justice professionals is essential to the proper implementation and application of union law and thus to the strengthening of a european common legal culture based on the principles of mutual trust and the rule of law; considers that the upcoming european judicial training strategy must put additional focus on promoting the rule of law and judicial independence and include training on skills and non-legal issues so that judges are better prepared to resist undue pressure; ### 3. highlights that training of justice professionals is essential to the proper implementation and application of union law and thus to the strengthening of a european common legal culture based on the principles of mutual trust and the rule of law; considers that the upcoming european judicial training strategy must put additional focus on promoting the rule of law , judicial independence and include ict trainings aimed at adopting to digitalisation and facilitating access to justice though new technologies as well as permitting to judges to develop skills;


### 4. welcomes the commission’s work on the annual rule of law report; notes , however , that it fails to encompass the areas of democracy and fundamental rights; reiterates the need for a comprehensive monitoring mechanism enshrined in a legal act binding parliament , the council and the commission to a transparent and regularised process , with clearly defined responsibilities , so that the protection and promotion of union values becomes a permanent and visible part of the union agenda; ### 4. welcomes the commission’s work on the annual rule of law report; notes , however , that it fails to encompass the areas of democracy and fundamental rights; reiterates the need for evidence-based and objective monitoring mechanism enshrined in a legal act binding parliament , the council and the commission to a transparent and regularised process , with clearly defined responsibilities , so that the protection and promotion of union values becomes a permanent and visible part of the union agenda;


### 4. welcomes the commission’s work on the annual rule of law report; notes , however , that it fails to encompass the areas of democracy and fundamental rights; reiterates the need for a comprehensive monitoring mechanism enshrined in a legal act binding parliament , the council and the commission to a transparent and regularised process , with clearly defined responsibilities , so that the protection and promotion of union values becomes a permanent and visible part of the union agenda; ### 4. welcomes the commission’s work on the annual rule of law report; notes , however , that it fails to encompass the areas of democracy and fundamental rights; reiterates the need for a comprehensive monitoring mechanism enshrined in a legal act binding parliament , the council and the commission to a transparent and regularised process , with clearly defined responsibilities , so that the protection and promotion of all union values becomes a permanent and visible part of the union agenda;


### 4. observes that considerable differences remain in the level of participation in training across member states and types of legal professions; calls on the commission to identify the reasons for those differences and address them in the upcoming european judicial training strategy and to assess the impact of those differences on the independence , quality and efficiency of member states’ judiciaries; ### 4. observes that considerable differences remain in the level of participation in training across member states and types of legal professions; calls on the commission to identify the reasons for those differences and address them in the upcoming european judicial training strategy and to assess the impact of those differences on the independence , quality and efficiency of member states’ judiciaries; emphasises the need for closer cooperation among the bodies responsible for constitutional supervision; calls on the commission to identify support measures to promote and strengthen the projects of the conference of european constitutional courts;


### — having regard to the united nations instruments on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the case-law of the united nations treaty bodies , ### — having regard to the united nations instruments on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms , including the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities and the convention on the rights of the child , and the case-law of the united nations treaty bodies ,


### a. whereas the union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity , freedom , democracy , equality , the rule of law and respect for human rights , including the rights of persons belonging to minorities , as set out in article 2 of the treaty on european union (teu); whereas those values are values which are common to the member states and to which all member states have freely subscribed; ### a. whereas the union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity , freedom , democracy , equality , the rule of law and respect for human rights , including the rights of persons belonging to minorities , as set out in article 2 of the treaty on european union (teu); whereas those values are values which are common to the member states and to which all member states have freely subscribed; whereas democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing principles;


### а. whereas the union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity , freedom , democracy , equality , the rule of law and respect for human rights , including the rights of persons belonging to minorities , as set out in article 2 of the treaty on european union (teu); whereas those values are values which are common to the member states and to which all member states have freely subscribed; ### а. whereas the union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity , freedom , democracy , equality , the rule of law and respect for human rights , including the rights of persons belonging to minorities , as set out in article 2 of the treaty on european union (teu); whereas those values are values which are common to the member states and to which all member states are committed;


### b. whereas the preceding decade has seen brazen attacks against union values in several member states; whereas international comparisons and parliament resolutions have evidenced considerable democratic backsliding in hungary and poland in particular; whereas parliament has been calling since 2016 for a comprehensive , preventive and evidence-based monitoring in this field via an eu mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights; ### b. whereas the past years have seen threats to union values in several member states; whereas parliament has been calling since 2016 for a comprehensive , preventive and objective evidence-based monitoring in this field via an eu mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights;


### b. whereas the preceding decade has seen brazen attacks against union values in several member states; whereas international comparisons and parliament resolutions have evidenced considerable democratic backsliding in hungary and poland in particular; whereas parliament has been calling since 2016 for a comprehensive , preventive and evidence-based monitoring in this field via an eu mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights; ### b. whereas upholding of union values in all member states is essential in order for the union to function properly; whereas parliament has been calling since 2016 for a comprehensive and evidence-based monitoring in this field via an eu mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights;


### c. whereas breaches of the values referred to in article 2 teu weaken the cohesion of the european project , the rights of all union citizens and mutual trust among the member states; ### c. whereas breaches of the values referred to in article 2 teu do not concern solely the individual member state where the breaches materialise , but also have an impact on other member states , weaken the cohesion of the european project , the fundamental rights of all union citizens and mutual trust among the member states;


### c. whereas breaches of the values referred to in article 2 teu weaken the cohesion of the european project , the rights of all union citizens and mutual trust among the member states; ### c. whereas breaches of the values referred to in article 2 teu weaken the cohesion of the european project , the rights of all union citizens and of persons on union territory and mutual trust among the member states;


### e. whereas a regulation on the protection of the union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the member states , once adopted , would become an indispensable tool in safeguarding the rule of law within the union; ### e. whereas a regulation on the protection of the union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the member states , once adopted , would become an indispensable tool in safeguarding the rule of law within the union , if the voting procedure is designed in such a way that this instrument can be used effectively and cannot be blocked by a minority in the council;


### e. whereas a regulation on the protection of the union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the member states , once adopted , would become an indispensable tool in safeguarding the rule of law within the union; ### e. whereas a regulation on the protection of the union’s budget in case of serious and generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the member states , once adopted , would become an indispensable tool in safeguarding the rule of law within the union;


### f. whereas any monitoring mechanism must closely involve stakeholders active in the protection and promotion of democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights , including civil society , council of europe and united nations bodies , the european union agency for fundamental rights , national human rights institutions , national parliaments and local authorities; ### f. whereas any monitoring mechanism must closely involve stakeholders active in the protection and promotion of democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights , including civil society , council of europe and united nations bodies , the european union agency for fundamental rights , national human rights institutions , national parliaments and local authorities as well as national associations which are responsible for the support of the judiciaries in the independent delivery of justice;


### f. whereas any monitoring mechanism must closely involve stakeholders active in the protection and promotion of democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights , including civil society , council of europe and united nations bodies , the european union agency for fundamental rights , national human rights institutions , national parliaments and local authorities; ### f. whereas any monitoring mechanism must closely involve stakeholders active in the protection and promotion of democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights , including civil society , council of europe and united nations bodies , the european union agency for fundamental rights and relevant national authorities;


### f. whereas any monitoring mechanism must closely involve stakeholders active in the protection and promotion of democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights , including civil society , council of europe and united nations bodies , the european union agency for fundamental rights , national human rights institutions , national parliaments and local authorities; ### f. whereas any monitoring mechanism must closely involve all stakeholders active in the implementation , protection and promotion of democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights , including civil society , council of europe and united nations bodies , the european union agency for fundamental rights , national human rights institutions , national parliaments and local authorities , etc.;


### 5. proposes the establishment of an eu mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights (the ‘mechanism’) , building on parliament’s 2016 proposal and the commission’s 2020 rule of law report , to be governed by an interinstitutional agreement between parliament , the council and the commission , consisting of an annual monitoring cycle on union values , covering all aspects of article 2 teu , and applying equally , objectively and fairly to all member states; ### 5. proposes the establishment of an eu mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights (the ‘mechanism’) , building on parliament’s 2016 proposal and the commission’s 2020 rule of law report , to be governed by an interinstitutional agreement between parliament , the council and the commission , consisting of an annual monitoring cycle on union values , covering all aspects of article 2 teu , and applying equally , objectively and fairly to all member states while respecting the principles of subsidiarity , proportionality and necessity;


### 6. underlines that the annual monitoring cycle must contain country-specific recommendations , with timelines and targets for implementation , to be followed up in subsequent annual or urgent reports; stresses that failures to implement the recommendations must be linked to concrete union enforcement measures; ### 6. underlines that the annual monitoring cycle must contain country-specific recommendations , with timelines and targets for implementation , to be followed up in subsequent annual or urgent reports and calls on the commission to present again the anti-corruption reports that have been discontinued since 2016 , as a further useful evaluation tool; stresses that failures to implement the recommendations must be linked to concrete union enforcement measures;


### 6. underlines that the annual monitoring cycle must contain country-specific recommendations , with timelines and targets for implementation , to be followed up in subsequent annual or urgent reports; stresses that failures to implement the recommendations must be linked to concrete union enforcement measures; ### 6. underlines that the annual monitoring cycle must contain concrete country-specific recommendations , with timelines and targets for implementation; these measures should include , where necessary , enhanced cooperation between the relevant member state and the european commission; stresses that failures to implement the recommendations must be linked to concrete union enforcement measures;


### 6. underlines that the annual monitoring cycle must contain country-specific recommendations , with timelines and targets for implementation , to be followed up in subsequent annual or urgent reports; stresses that failures to implement the recommendations must be linked to concrete union enforcement measures; ### 6. underlines that the annual monitoring cycle must contain country-specific recommendations , with timelines and targets for implementation , to be followed up in subsequent annual or urgent reports; stresses that failures to implement the recommendations must be linked to concrete union enforcement measures , including financial measures;


### 6. underlines that the annual monitoring cycle must contain country-specific recommendations , with timelines and targets for implementation , to be followed up in subsequent annual or urgent reports; stresses that failures to implement the recommendations must be linked to concrete union enforcement measures; ### 6. underlines that the annual monitoring cycle must contain country-specific recommendations , with timelines and targets for implementation , to be followed up in subsequent annual or urgent reports; stresses that failures to implement the recommendations must be linked to concrete and legally available measures;


### 6. points to the complementarity that should exist between the eu justice scoreboard , which allows for an overview comparison between member states , and the annual monitoring report on union values as an in-depth qualitative mapping of the concrete situation in each member state; ### 6. points to the complementarity that should exist between the eu justice scoreboard , which allows for an overview comparison between member states , and the annual monitoring report on union values as an in-depth qualitative mapping of the concrete situation in each member state , and calls on the commission to present again the anti-corruption reports that have been discontinued since 2016 , as a further useful evaluation tool;


### 7. points out that the mechanism should consolidate and supersede existing instruments , in particular the annual rule of law report , the commission’s rule of law framework , the council’s rule of law dialogue and the cooperation and verification mechanism (cvm) , while increasing complementarity and coherence with other available tools , including infringement procedures under article 7 teu , budgetary conditionality once in force , and the european semester; is of the opinion that the annual monitoring cycle can fulfil the objectives of the cvm for bulgaria and romania , thus contributing to equal treatment of all member states; considers that the three institutions should use the findings from the annual monitoring cycle in their assessment for the purposes of triggering article 7 teu and regulation (eu) 2020/xxxx of the european parliament and of the council on the protection of the union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the member states11 ; ### 7. points out that the mechanism should consolidate and supersede existing instruments for monitoring , in particular the annual rule of law report , the commission’s rule of law framework , the council’s rule of law dialogue and the cooperation and verification mechanism (cvm) , but also other reports such as justice scoreboard or report on the application of the charter of fundamental rights; highlights also that the mechanism should increase complementarity and coherence with other available tools , mainly infringement procedures , article 7 teu procedure and budgetary conditionality once in force , and the european semester; is of the opinion that the annual monitoring cycle should replace the cvm for bulgaria and romania , thus contributing to equal treatment of all member states; considers that the three institutions should use the findings from the annual monitoring cycle in their internal discussions and for the adoption of their positions; notes that the institutions should be able to take the outcome into account for the purposes of triggering article 7 teu and the commission should be able to take the outcome into account for launching the procedure under regulation (eu) 2020/xxxx of the european parliament and of the council on the protection of the union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the member states11 , as well as for launching the procedure in accordance with article 17 teu;


### 7. points out that the mechanism should consolidate and supersede existing instruments , in particular the annual rule of law report , the commission’s rule of law framework , the council’s rule of law dialogue and the cooperation and verification mechanism (cvm) , while increasing complementarity and coherence with other available tools , including infringement procedures under article 7 teu , budgetary conditionality once in force , and the european semester; is of the opinion that the annual monitoring cycle can fulfil the objectives of the cvm for bulgaria and romania , thus contributing to equal treatment of all member states; considers that the three institutions should use the findings from the annual monitoring cycle in their assessment for the purposes of triggering article 7 teu and regulation (eu) 2020/xxxx of the european parliament and of the council on the protection of the union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the member states11 ; ### 7. points out that the mechanism should consolidate and supersede existing instruments , in particular the annual rule of law report , the commission’s rule of law framework , the council’s rule of law dialogue and the cooperation and verification mechanism (cvm) , while increasing complementarity and coherence with other available tools , including infringement procedures under article 7 teu , budgetary conditionality once in force , and the european semester; is of the opinion that the annual monitoring cycle can fulfil the objectives of the cvm for bulgaria and romania , thus contributing to equal treatment of all member states; considers that the benchmarks set up by the commission for assessing progress within the cvm could be used within the framework of the annual monitoring cycle; considers that the three institutions should use the findings from the annual monitoring cycle in their assessment for the purposes of triggering article 7 teu and regulation (eu) 2020/xxxx of the european parliament and of the council on the protection of the union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the member states;


### 7. points out that the mechanism should consolidate and supersede existing instruments , in particular the annual rule of law report , the commission’s rule of law framework , the council’s rule of law dialogue and the cooperation and verification mechanism (cvm) , while increasing complementarity and coherence with other available tools , including infringement procedures under article 7 teu , budgetary conditionality once in force , and the european semester; is of the opinion that the annual monitoring cycle can fulfil the objectives of the cvm for bulgaria and romania , thus contributing to equal treatment of all member states; considers that the three institutions should use the findings from the annual monitoring cycle in their assessment for the purposes of triggering article 7 teu and regulation (eu) 2020/xxxx of the european parliament and of the council on the protection of the union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the member states11 ; ### 7. points out that the mechanism should consolidate and supersede existing instruments , in particular the annual rule of law report , the commission’s rule of law framework , the council’s rule of law dialogue and the cooperation and verification mechanism (cvm) , while increasing complementarity and coherence with other available tools , including infringement procedures under article 258 tfeu , the procedure under article 7 teu , budgetary conditionality once in force , and the european semester; is of the opinion that the annual monitoring cycle can fulfil the objectives of the cvm for bulgaria and romania , thus contributing to equal treatment of all member states; considers that the three institutions should use the findings from the annual monitoring cycle in their assessment for the purposes of triggering article 7 teu and regulation (eu) 2020/xxxx of the european parliament and of the council on the protection of the union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the member states11 ;


### 7. calls on the commission to assess ict tools and other means put in place by member states at the disposal of citizens to facilitate their access to justice , in particular citizens with disabilities or belonging to vulnerable groups , such as national minorities and migrants; ### 7. calls on the commission to assess ict tools and other means put in place by member states at the disposal of citizens to facilitate their access to justice , in particular citizens with disabilities or belonging to vulnerable groups , such as national minorities and migrants , with particular attention to unaccompanied minors; calls on the commission to monitor the correct application of directive (eu) 2016/800 on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings;


### 7. calls on the commission to assess ict tools and other means put in place by member states at the disposal of citizens to facilitate their access to justice , in particular citizens with disabilities or belonging to vulnerable groups , such as national minorities and migrants; ### 7. calls on the commission to promote faster digitalisation at all levels of the member states’ judicial systems , to use artificial intelligence as a means of ensuring access to the justice system , and to assess ict tools and other means put in place by member states at the disposal of citizens to facilitate their access to justice , in particular citizens with disabilities or belonging to vulnerable groups , such as national minorities and migrants;


### 7. calls on the commission to assess ict tools and other means put in place by member states at the disposal of citizens to facilitate their access to justice , in particular citizens with disabilities or belonging to vulnerable groups , such as national minorities and migrants; ### 7. calls on the commission to assess ict tools and other means put in place by member states at the disposal of judges and citizens for faster procedures and to facilitate access to justice , in particular citizens with disabilities or belonging to vulnerable groups , such as national minorities and migrants;


### 8. recalls the indispensable role played by civil society , national human rights institutions and other relevant actors in all stages of the annual monitoring cycle , from providing input to facilitating implementation; points out that the accreditation status of national human rights institutions and the space for civil society may themselves serve as indicators for assessment purposes; considers that national parliaments must hold public debates and adopt positions on the outcome of the monitoring cycle; ### 8. recalls the indispensable role played by civil society , national human rights institutions , human rights defenders , associations which are responsible for the support of the judiciary in the independent delivery of justice and other relevant actors in all stages of the annual monitoring cycle , from providing input to facilitating and contributing to monitor implementation; points out that the existence , and , where they do exist , the formal and functional independence of national human rights institutions , as also reflected in their accreditation status , and the enabling space for civil society may themselves serve as indicators for assessment purposes; considers that national parliaments must hold public debates and adopt positions on the outcome of the monitoring cycle;


### 8. recalls the indispensable role played by civil society , national human rights institutions and other relevant actors in all stages of the annual monitoring cycle , from providing input to facilitating implementation; points out that the accreditation status of national human rights institutions and the space for civil society may themselves serve as indicators for assessment purposes; considers that national parliaments must hold public debates and adopt positions on the outcome of the monitoring cycle; ### 8. recalls the indispensable role played by civil society , national human rights institutions and other relevant actors in all stages of the annual monitoring cycle , from providing input to facilitating implementation; considers that national parliaments must hold public debates and adopt positions on the outcome of the monitoring cycle;


### 8. recalls the indispensable role played by civil society , national human rights institutions and other relevant actors in all stages of the annual monitoring cycle , from providing input to facilitating implementation; points out that the accreditation status of national human rights institutions and the space for civil society may themselves serve as indicators for assessment purposes; considers that national parliaments must hold public debates and adopt positions on the outcome of the monitoring cycle; ### 8. recalls the indispensable role played by civil society , national human rights institutions and other relevant actors in all stages of the annual monitoring cycle , from providing input to facilitating implementation; points out that the accreditation status of national human rights institutions and the space for civil society may themselves serve as indicators for assessment purposes; encourages national parliaments to hold debates or adopt positions on the outcome of the monitoring cycle;


### 9. reaffirms the role of parliament , in accordance with article 7 teu , in monitoring compliance with union values; reiterates the call for parliament to be present in article 7 hearings when it is parliament that initiated the procedure; believes that the mechanism , underpinned by an interinstitutional agreement , will provide the necessary framework for better coordination; ### 9. reaffirms the role of parliament , in accordance with article 7 teu , in monitoring compliance with union values; encourages the parliament to be present in article 7 hearings when it is parliament that initiated the procedure; believes that the mechanism , underpinned by an interinstitutional agreement , respecting prerogatives of each of the institutions and sincere cooperation , will provide the necessary framework for better coordination;


### 9. reaffirms the role of parliament , in accordance with article 7 teu , in monitoring compliance with union values; reiterates the call for parliament to be present in article 7 hearings when it is parliament that initiated the procedure; believes that the mechanism , underpinned by an interinstitutional agreement , will provide the necessary framework for better coordination; ### 9. reaffirms the role of parliament , in accordance with article 7 teu , in monitoring compliance with union values; reiterates the call for parliament to be present in article 7 hearings in accordance with the principle of mutual sincere cooperation as enshrined in article 13(2) teu; believes that the mechanism , underpinned by an interinstitutional agreement , will provide the necessary framework for better coordination;


### 10. is of the view that , in the long-term , strengthening the union’s ability to promote and defend its constitutional core will require treaty change; looks forward to the reflection and conclusions of the conference on the future of europe in that regard; ### 10. is of the view that , in the long-term , strengthening the union’s ability to promote and defend its constitutional core could require treaty change; looks forward to the reflection and conclusions of the conference on the future of europe in that regard;


### 11. strongly believes that addressing the crisis of union values , including through the proposed mechanism , is a precondition for re-establishing mutual trust among member states , thus enabling the union as a whole to sustain and further all common policies; ### 11. strongly believes that comprehensive monitoring of the upholding of union values , including through the proposed mechanism , is a precondition for re-establishing mutual trust among member states , thus enabling the union as a whole to sustain and further all common policies;


### 11. strongly believes that addressing the crisis of union values , including through the proposed mechanism , is a precondition for re-establishing mutual trust among member states , thus enabling the union as a whole to sustain and further all common policies; ### 11. strongly believes that addressing the breaches of union values , including through the proposed mechanism , is a precondition for re-establishing mutual trust among member states , thus enabling the union as a whole to sustain and further all common policies;


### 11. believes that addressing persisting gender and cultural gaps in in the composition and structure of member states’ judicial systems is necessary to enhance their quality , effectiveness and independence. ### 11. believes that addressing persisting gender gaps and promoting diversity in the composition and structure of member states’ judicial systems is necessary to enhance their quality , effectiveness and independence.


### (3) the european parliament , the council and the commission (‘the three institutions’) recognise the paramount importance of respect for union values. respect for union values is necessary for the good functioning of the union and the achievement of its objectives as set out in article 3 teu. the three institutions are committed to mutual sincere cooperation with the aim of promoting and ensuring respect for union values. ### (3) the european parliament , the council and the commission (‘the three institutions’) recognise the importance of respect for union values. respect for union values is necessary for the good functioning of the union and the achievement of its objectives as set out in article 3 teu. the three institutions are committed to mutual sincere cooperation with the aim of promoting and ensuring respect for union values.


### (4) the three institutions recognise the need for streamlining and strengthening the effectiveness of existing tools designed to foster compliance with union values. a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism should therefore be established in order to improve coordination between the three institutions and consolidate initiatives taken previously. in accordance with the conclusions of the justice and home affairs council of 6 and 7 june 2013 , such a mechanism should operate in 'a transparent manner , on the basis of evidence objectively compiled , compared and analysed and on the basis of equality of treatment as between all member states'. ### (4) the three institutions recognise the need for streamlining and strengthening the effectiveness of existing tools designed to foster compliance with union values. a comprehensive , evidence-based interinstitutional mechanism respecting the principles of subsidiarity , proportionality and necessity should therefore be established in order to improve coordination between the three institutions and consolidate initiatives taken previously. in accordance with the conclusions of the justice and home affairs council of 6 and 7 june 2013 , such a mechanism should operate in 'a transparent manner , on the basis of evidence objectively compiled , compared and analysed and on the basis of equality of treatment as between all member states'.


### (5) the three institutions agree that an annual monitoring cycle on union values is necessary to reinforce the promotion and respect for union values. the annual monitoring cycle should be comprehensive , objective , impartial , evidence-based and applied equally and fairly to all member states. the primary objective of the annual monitoring cycle should be to prevent violations of and non-compliance with union values , while providing a shared basis for other actions by the three institutions. the three institutions also agree to use this interinstitutional agreement to integrate existing instruments and initiatives relating to the promotion of and respect for union values , in particular the annual rule of law report , the council’s annual rule of law dialogue and the commission’s rule of law framework , in order to avoid duplication and strengthen overall effectiveness. ### (5) the three institutions agree that an annual monitoring cycle on union values is necessary to reinforce the promotion and respect for union values. the annual monitoring cycle should be comprehensive , objective , impartial , evidence-based and applied equally and fairly to all member states and should respect the principles of subsidiarity , proportionality and necessity. the primary objective of the annual monitoring cycle should be to prevent violations of and non-compliance with union values , while providing a shared basis for other actions by the three institutions. the three institutions also agree to use this interinstitutional agreement to integrate existing instruments and initiatives relating to the promotion of and respect for union values , in particular the annual rule of law report , the council’s annual rule of law dialogue , the commission’s rule of law framework , the eu justice scoreboard and the annual report on the application of the fundamental rights and freedoms , in order to avoid duplication and strengthen overall effectiveness.


### (5) the three institutions agree that an annual monitoring cycle on union values is necessary to reinforce the promotion and respect for union values. the annual monitoring cycle should be comprehensive , objective , impartial , evidence-based and applied equally and fairly to all member states. the primary objective of the annual monitoring cycle should be to prevent violations of and non-compliance with union values , while providing a shared basis for other actions by the three institutions. the three institutions also agree to use this interinstitutional agreement to integrate existing instruments and initiatives relating to the promotion of and respect for union values , in particular the annual rule of law report , the council’s annual rule of law dialogue and the commission’s rule of law framework , in order to avoid duplication and strengthen overall effectiveness. ### (5) the three institutions agree that an annual monitoring cycle on union values is necessary to reinforce the promotion and respect for union values. the annual monitoring cycle should be comprehensive , objective , impartial , evidence-based and applied equally and fairly to all member states. the primary objective of the annual monitoring cycle should be to prevent violations of and non-compliance with union values and to identify positive actions by member states and national actors including civil society and national human rights institutions to be promoted and supported by the union , while providing a shared basis for other actions by the three institutions. the three institutions also agree to use this interinstitutional agreement to integrate existing instruments and initiatives relating to the promotion of and respect for union values , in particular the annual rule of law report , the council’s annual rule of law dialogue and the commission’s rule of law framework , in order to avoid duplication and strengthen overall effectiveness.


### (5) the three institutions agree that an annual monitoring cycle on union values is necessary to reinforce the promotion and respect for union values. the annual monitoring cycle should be comprehensive , objective , impartial , evidence-based and applied equally and fairly to all member states. the primary objective of the annual monitoring cycle should be to prevent violations of and non-compliance with union values , while providing a shared basis for other actions by the three institutions. the three institutions also agree to use this interinstitutional agreement to integrate existing instruments and initiatives relating to the promotion of and respect for union values , in particular the annual rule of law report , the council’s annual rule of law dialogue and the commission’s rule of law framework , in order to avoid duplication and strengthen overall effectiveness. ### (5) the three institutions agree that an annual monitoring cycle on union values is necessary to reinforce the promotion and respect for union values. the annual monitoring cycle should be comprehensive , objective and impartial , should be based on clear and objective evidence , rather than on external influences , especially political influence , and should be applied equally and fairly to all member states. the primary objective of the annual monitoring cycle should be to prevent violations of and non-compliance with union values , while providing a shared basis for other actions by the three institutions. the three institutions also agree to use this interinstitutional agreement to integrate existing instruments and initiatives relating to the promotion of and respect for union values , in particular the annual rule of law report , the council’s annual rule of law dialogue and the commission’s rule of law framework , in order to avoid duplication and strengthen overall effectiveness.


### 1. considers that the union mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights should primarily aim at preventing and addressing any threat to the union values enshrined in article 2 of the treaty on european union (teu) before any clear risk arises in a member state and article 7 teu should be triggered; ### 1. considers that the union mechanism on democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights should primarily aim at envisaging measures to prevent and address any threat to the union values enshrined in article 2 of the treaty on european union (teu) before any clear risk arises in a member state and article 7 teu should be triggered;


### 3. highlights that training of justice professionals is essential to the proper implementation and application of union law and thus to the strengthening of a european common legal culture based on the principles of mutual trust and the rule of law; considers that the upcoming european judicial training strategy must put additional focus on promoting the rule of law and judicial independence and include training on skills and non-legal issues so that judges are better prepared to resist undue pressure; ### 3. highlights that training of justice professionals is essential to the proper implementation and application of union law and thus to the strengthening of a european common legal culture based on the principles of mutual trust and the rule of law; considers that the upcoming european judicial training strategy must put additional focus on promoting the rule of law and judicial independence and include training on skills and non-legal issues so that judges are better prepared to resist undue pressure; in this regard , calls on the commission to develop common judicial training standards and promote institutional cooperation on judicial training in the eu;


### 5. highlights the potential of judicial training for improving the dialogue between national courts and the court of justice of the european union , particularly through the use of references for a preliminary ruling and the interaction between the principles of subsidiarity and primacy of union law; ### 5. highlights the potential of judicial training for improving the dialogue between national courts and the court of justice of the european union , particularly through the use of references for a preliminary ruling and the interaction between the principles of subsidiarity and primacy of union law; emphasises that improving the skills and knowledge of european judges and prosecutors when it comes to identifying and responding to the challenges they face when applying the principle of the rule of law will help to ensure the uniform application of appropriate mechanisms to prevent its infringement;


### 6. points to the complementarity that should exist between the eu justice scoreboard , which allows for an overview comparison between member states , and the annual monitoring report on union values as an in-depth qualitative mapping of the concrete situation in each member state; ### 6. points to the complementarity that should exist between the eu justice scoreboard , which allows for an overview comparison between member states , and the annual monitoring report on union values as an in-depth qualitative mapping of the concrete situation in each member state; calls for the objective use and consideration of eu justice scoreboard data , without any discrimination against certain countries in the conclusions of the annual monitoring report.


### 2. calls on the council to resume those negotiations without undue delay; reiterates its previous position that , if those negotiations with the council do not succeed , the negotiations should be extended to the commission , so as to ensure that parliament is provided with the necessary information on how the council is implementing its budget , either directly or via the commission; ### 2. remains convinced that an agreement on this matter is possible and therefore , calls on the council to resume those negotiations without undue delay; reiterates its previous position that , if those negotiations with the council do not succeed , the negotiations should be extended to the commission , so as to ensure that parliament is provided with the necessary information on how the council is implementing its budget , either directly or via the commission;


### 3. observes that the council’s budget is mostly administrative with a large amount being used for expenditure concerning persons , buildings , furniture , equipment and miscellaneous running costs; calls on the council , as it has done in previous discharge resolutions , to separate the budget of the european council and the council into one budget for each institution for reasons of transparency and to improve accountability and expenditure efficiency for both institutions; ### 3. observes that the council’s budget is mostly administrative with a large amount being used for expenditure concerning persons , buildings , furniture , equipment and miscellaneous running costs; regrets that the request to separate the budget of the european council and the council into one budget for each institution that has been made by parliament in previous discharge resolutions has not been considered and urges the council , as it has done in previous discharge resolutions , to separate the budget of the european council and the council into one budget for each institution for reasons of transparency and to improve accountability and expenditure efficiency for both institutions;