### (12) while the objective of the cbam is to prevent the risk of carbon leakage , this regulation would also encourage the use of more ghg emissions-efficient technologies by producers from third countries , so that less emissions per unit of output are generated. ### (12) while the objective of the cbam is to prevent the risk of carbon leakage , this regulation would also encourage the use of more ghg emissions-efficient technologies by producers from third countries , so that less emissions per unit of output are generated. the union is also committed to providing third countries , particularly least developed countries , with support for the adoption of carbon pricing mechanisms similar to the eu ets , the deployment of decarbonisation technologies , and the implementation of other measures aimed at achieving climate neutrality.


### (13) as an instrument to prevent carbon leakage and reduce ghg emissions the cbam should ensure that imported products are subject to a regulatory system that applies carbon costs equivalent to the ones that otherwise would have been borne under the eu ets. the cbam is a climate measure which should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support the union’s increased ambition on climate mitigation , while ensuring wto compatibility. ### (13) as an instrument to prevent carbon leakage and reduce ghg emissions the cbam should ensure that imported products are subject to a regulatory system that applies carbon costs equivalent to the ones that otherwise would have been borne under the eu ets. the cbam is a climate measure which should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support the union’s increased ambition on climate mitigation. given that the european union benefits from an open and rule-based international trade system , it is absolutely crucial that the cbam is fully compatible with the rules of the world trade organisation.


### (13) as an instrument to prevent carbon leakage and reduce ghg emissions the cbam should ensure that imported products are subject to a regulatory system that applies carbon costs equivalent to the ones that otherwise would have been borne under the eu ets. the cbam is a climate measure which should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support the union’s increased ambition on climate mitigation , while ensuring wto compatibility. ### (13) as an instrument to prevent carbon leakage and reduce ghg emissions the cbam should ensure that imported products are subject to a regulatory system that applies carbon costs equivalent to the ones that otherwise would have been borne under the eu ets. the cbam may also cover products containing large amounts of these energy-intensive commodities that may be particularly at risk of carbon leakage. the cbam is a climate measure which should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support the union’s increased ambition on climate mitigation , while ensuring wto compatibility.


### (13) as an instrument to prevent carbon leakage and reduce ghg emissions the cbam should ensure that imported products are subject to a regulatory system that applies carbon costs equivalent to the ones that otherwise would have been borne under the eu ets. the cbam is a climate measure which should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support the union’s increased ambition on climate mitigation , while ensuring wto compatibility. ### (13) as an instrument to prevent carbon leakage and reduce ghg emissions the cbam should ensure that imported products are subject to a regulatory system that applies carbon costs equivalent to the ones that otherwise would have been borne under the eu ets. the cbam is a climate measure which should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support the union’s increased ambition on climate mitigation , while ensuring wto compatibility and safeguarding the competitiveness of companies in the union.


### (13) as an instrument to prevent carbon leakage and reduce ghg emissions the cbam should ensure that imported products are subject to a regulatory system that applies carbon costs equivalent to the ones that otherwise would have been borne under the eu ets. the cbam is a climate measure which should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support the union’s increased ambition on climate mitigation , while ensuring wto compatibility. ### (13) as an instrument to prevent carbon leakage and reduce ghg emissions the cbam should ensure that imported products are subject to a regulatory system that applies carbon costs equivalent to the ones that otherwise would have been borne under the eu ets. the cbam is a climate measure which should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support the union’s increased ambition on climate mitigation , while ensuring wto compatibility. however , the cbam should be combined with rules addressing the exports component , such as the implementation of full or partial export duty exemptions , in order to fully eliminate concerns of carbon leakage and protect the competitiveness of european exported goods. such a mechanism would be in line with the rules provided by the wto agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures(ascm).


### (13) as an instrument to prevent carbon leakage and reduce ghg emissions the cbam should ensure that imported products are subject to a regulatory system that applies carbon costs equivalent to the ones that otherwise would have been borne under the eu ets. the cbam is a climate measure which should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support the union’s increased ambition on climate mitigation , while ensuring wto compatibility. ### (13) as an instrument to prevent carbon leakage and reduce ghg emissions the cbam should ensure that imported products are subject to a regulatory system that applies carbon costs equivalent to the ones that otherwise would have been borne under the eu ets. the cbam is a climate measure which should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support the union’s increased ambition on climate mitigation , while ensuring wto compatibility and industrial competitiveness.


### (13) as an instrument to prevent carbon leakage and reduce ghg emissions the cbam should ensure that imported products are subject to a regulatory system that applies carbon costs equivalent to the ones that otherwise would have been borne under the eu ets. the cbam is a climate measure which should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support the union’s increased ambition on climate mitigation , while ensuring wto compatibility. ### (13) as an instrument to prevent carbon leakage and reduce ghg emissions the cbam should ensure that imported products are subject to a regulatory system that applies carbon costs equivalent to the ones that otherwise would have been borne under the eu ets. the cbam is a climate measure which should prevent the risk of carbon leakage and support the union’s increased ambition on climate mitigation. given that the union benefits from an open and rule-based international trade system , the cbam should be fully compatible with the union's international commitments , particularly in relation to the un sustainable development goals (sdgs) and the rules of the world trade organisation.


### (17) the ghg emissions to be regulated by the cbam should correspond to those ghg emissions covered by annex i to the eu ets in directive 2003/87/ec , namely carbon dioxide (‘co2’) as well as , where relevant , nitrous oxide (‘n2o’) and perfluorocarbons (‘pfcs’). the cbam should initially apply to direct emissions of those ghg from the production of goods up to the time of import into the customs territory of the union , and after the end of a transition period and upon further assessment , as well to indirect emissions , mirroring the scope of the eu ets. ### (17) the ghg emissions to be regulated by the cbam should correspond to those ghg emissions covered by annex i to the eu ets in directive 2003/87/ec , namely carbon dioxide (‘co2’) as well as , where relevant , nitrous oxide (‘n2o’) and perfluorocarbons (‘pfcs’). the cbam should initially apply to direct emissions of those ghg from the production of goods up to the time of import into the customs territory of the union , and after the end of the administrative transitional period and upon further assessment on the impact on carbon leakage for energy-intensive sectors with a withdrawal of eu ets compensation , as well to indirect emissions , mirroring the scope of the eu ets.


### (28) whilst the ultimate objective of the cbam is a broad product coverage , it would be prudent to start with a selected number of sectors with relatively homogeneous products where there is a risk of carbon leakage. union sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage are listed in commission delegated decision 2019/70842. ### (28) whilst the ultimate objective of the cbam is a broad product coverage , it would be prudent to start with a selected number of sectors with relatively homogeneous products where there is a risk of carbon leakage. union sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage are listed in commission delegated decision 2019/70842. in parallel to the entry into force of the cbam , the commission should launch an impact analysis to determine to which further sectors and/or products , in addition to those listed in annex i , the scope of this regulation should be extended , at the end of the transitional period.


### (28) whilst the ultimate objective of the cbam is a broad product coverage , it would be prudent to start with a selected number of sectors with relatively homogeneous products where there is a risk of carbon leakage. union sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage are listed in commission delegated decision 2019/70842 . ### (28) whilst the ultimate objective of the cbam is a broad product coverage , it would be prudent to start with a selected number of sectors with relatively homogeneous products where there is a risk of carbon leakage. further , the cbam may also cover products containing large amounts of these energy-intensive commodities that may be particularly at risk of carbon leakage. union sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage are listed in commission delegated decision 2019/70842 .


### (28) whilst the ultimate objective of the cbam is a broad product coverage , it would be prudent to start with a selected number of sectors with relatively homogeneous products where there is a risk of carbon leakage. union sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage are listed in commission delegated decision 2019/70842 . ### (28) whilst the ultimate objective of the cbam is a broader product coverage , it is prudent to start with a selected number of sectors with relatively homogeneous products where there is a risk of carbon leakage. the commission should consider to further extend the scope of included goods , when cbam is proven efficient to reduce carbon leakage for the sectors included in annex i of this regulation. a proposal of the inclusion of finished goods shall be presented by the commission before the comprehensive transitional period. union sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage are listed in commission delegated decision 2019/70842 .


### (29) the goods under this regulation should be selected after a careful analysis of their relevance in terms of cumulated ghg emissions and risk of carbon leakage in the corresponding eu ets sectors while limiting complexity and administrative burden. in particular , the actual selection should take into account basic materials and basic products covered by the eu ets with the objective of ensuring that imports of energy intensive products into the union are on equal footing with eu products in terms of eu ets carbon pricing , and to mitigate risks of carbon leakage. other relevant criteria to narrow the selection should be: firstly , relevance of sectors in terms of emissions , namely whether the sector is one of the largest aggregate emitters of ghg emissions; secondly , sector’s exposure to significant risk of carbon leakage , as defined pursuant to directive 2003/87/ec; thirdly , the need to balance broad coverage in terms of ghg emissions while limiting complexity and administrative effort. ### the goods under this regulation should be selected after a careful analysis of their relevance in terms of cumulated ghg emissions and risk of carbon leakage in the corresponding eu ets sectors while limiting complexity and administrative burden. in particular , the actual selection should take into account basic materials and basic products covered by the eu ets with the objective of ensuring that imports of energy intensive products into the union are on equal footing with eu products in terms of eu ets carbon pricing , and to mitigate risks of carbon leakage. other relevant criteria to narrow the selection should be: firstly , relevance of sectors in terms of emissions , namely whether the sector is one of the largest aggregate emitters of ghg emissions; secondly , sector’s exposure to significant risk of carbon leakage , as defined pursuant to directive 2003/87/ec; thirdly , the need to balance broad coverage in terms of ghg emissions while limiting complexity and administrative effort. special attention should also be paid to the risk of market distortion between the different sectors covered by the cbam and to the risk of an excessive administrative burden for european enterprises , particularly smes and micro-enterprises.


### (29) the goods under this regulation should be selected after a careful analysis of their relevance in terms of cumulated ghg emissions and risk of carbon leakage in the corresponding eu ets sectors while limiting complexity and administrative burden. in particular , the actual selection should take into account basic materials and basic products covered by the eu ets with the objective of ensuring that imports of energy intensive products into the union are on equal footing with eu products in terms of eu ets carbon pricing , and to mitigate risks of carbon leakage. other relevant criteria to narrow the selection should be: firstly , relevance of sectors in terms of emissions , namely whether the sector is one of the largest aggregate emitters of ghg emissions; secondly , sector’s exposure to significant risk of carbon leakage , as defined pursuant to directive 2003/87/ec; thirdly , the need to balance broad coverage in terms of ghg emissions while limiting complexity and administrative effort. ### (29) the goods under this regulation should be selected after a careful analysis of their relevance in terms of cumulated ghg emissions and risk of carbon leakage in the corresponding eu ets sectors while limiting complexity and administrative burden and taking into account the complex production processes and deeply integrated value chains of the different sectors. in particular , the actual selection should take into account basic materials and basic products covered by the eu ets with the objective of ensuring that imports of energy intensive products into the union are on equal footing with eu products in terms of eu ets carbon pricing , and to mitigate risks of carbon leakage. other relevant criteria to narrow the selection should be: firstly , relevance of sectors in terms of emissions , namely whether the sector is one of the largest aggregate emitters of ghg emissions; secondly , sector’s exposure to significant risk of carbon leakage , as defined pursuant to directive 2003/87/ec; thirdly , the need to balance broad coverage in terms of ghg emissions while limiting complexity and administrative effort and avoiding negative impacts because of complex production processes and deeply integrated value chains of specific sectors.


### (29) the goods under this regulation should be selected after a careful analysis of their relevance in terms of cumulated ghg emissions and risk of carbon leakage in the corresponding eu ets sectors while limiting complexity and administrative burden. in particular , the actual selection should take into account basic materials and basic products covered by the eu ets with the objective of ensuring that imports of energy intensive products into the union are on equal footing with eu products in terms of eu ets carbon pricing , and to mitigate risks of carbon leakage. other relevant criteria to narrow the selection should be: firstly , relevance of sectors in terms of emissions , namely whether the sector is one of the largest aggregate emitters of ghg emissions; secondly , sector’s exposure to significant risk of carbon leakage , as defined pursuant to directive 2003/87/ec; thirdly , the need to balance broad coverage in terms of ghg emissions while limiting complexity and administrative effort. ### (29) the goods under this regulation should be selected after a careful analysis of their relevance in terms of cumulated ghg emissions and risk of carbon leakage in the corresponding eu ets sectors while limiting complexity and administrative burden for european industry , affected authorities , companies and smes. in particular , the actual selection should take into account basic materials and basic products covered by the eu ets with the objective of ensuring that imports of energy intensive products into the union are on equal footing with eu products in terms of eu ets carbon pricing , and to mitigate risks of carbon leakage. other relevant criteria to narrow the selection should be: firstly , relevance of sectors in terms of emissions , namely whether the sector is one of the largest aggregate emitters of ghg emissions; secondly , sector’s exposure to significant risk of carbon leakage , as defined pursuant to directive 2003/87/ec; thirdly , the need to balance broad coverage in terms of ghg emissions while limiting complexity and administrative effort.


### (50) a transitional period should apply during the period 2023 until 2025. a cbam without financial adjustment should apply , with the objective to facilitate a smooth roll out of the mechanism hence reducing the risk of disruptive impacts on trade. declarants should have to report on a quarterly basis the actual embedded emissions in goods imported during the transitional period , detailing direct and indirect emissions as well as any carbon price paid abroad. ### (50) a transitional period should apply during the period 2023 until 2025. a cbam without financial adjustment should apply , with the objective to facilitate a smooth roll out of the mechanism hence reducing the risk of disruptive impacts on trade. declarants should have to submit a quarterly report that is easy to read , accessible and drawn up in accordance with a common template , on the actual embedded emissions in goods imported during the transitional period , detailing direct and indirect emissions as well as any carbon price paid abroad.


### (50) a transitional period should apply during the period 2023 until 2025. a cbam without financial adjustment should apply , with the objective to facilitate a smooth roll out of the mechanism hence reducing the risk of disruptive impacts on trade. declarants should have to report on a quarterly basis the actual embedded emissions in goods imported during the transitional period , detailing direct and indirect emissions as well as any carbon price paid abroad. ### (50) an administrative transitional period without financial adjustment should apply during the period 2023 to 2025 , with the objective to facilitate a smooth roll out of the mechanism hence reducing the risk of disruptive impacts on trade and european industry. declarants should have to report on a quarterly basis the actual embedded emissions in goods imported during the administrative transitional period , detailing direct and indirect emissions as well as any carbon price paid abroad.


### (50) a transitional period should apply during the period 2023 until 2025. a cbam without financial adjustment should apply , with the objective to facilitate a smooth roll out of the mechanism hence reducing the risk of disruptive impacts on trade. declarants should have to report on a quarterly basis the actual embedded emissions in goods imported during the transitional period , detailing direct and indirect emissions as well as any carbon price paid abroad. ### (50) a transitional period should apply during the period 2023 until 2025. a cbam without financial adjustment should apply , with the objective to facilitate a smooth roll out of the mechanism hence reducing the risk of disruptive impacts on trade and internal market competitiveness. declarants should have to report on a quarterly basis the actual embedded emissions in goods imported during the transitional period , detailing direct and indirect emissions as well as any carbon price paid abroad.


### (51) to facilitate and ensure a proper functioning of the cbam , the commission should provide support to the competent authorities responsible for the application of this regulation in carrying out their obligations. ### deleted


### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods47 . ### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to prevent distortion of competition in the eu and in global markets and possibly extend the scope to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods47 . with regard to indirect emissions , the evaluation should take into account the exposure of eu producers to carbon costs passed on in electricity prices due to the functioning of the eu energy market.


### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods47. ### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to prevent distortion of competition in the eu and in global markets and possibly extend the scope to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods47 to ensure equal co2 costs for imported products and eu products.


### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods47 . ### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods47 . the commission should also monitor and comment on any challenges brought forward in relation to the cbam's wto compatibility.


### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods47 . ### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the administrative transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , assess the impact on sectors listed in annex i to ensure that the complex production processes and deeply integrated value chains of specific sectors listed in annex i have been appropriately taken into account. furthermore , the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope of annex i to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , such as finished goods , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods47. the commission should in particular focus on:


### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods47 . ### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the administrative transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope of annex i to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , such as finished goods , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods. the commission should in particular focus on:


### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods47 . ### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to prevent distortion of competition in the eu and in global markets and possibly extend the scope to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods47 . with regard to indirect emissions , the evaluation shall take into account the exposure of eu producers to carbon costs passed on in electricity prices due to the functioning of the eu energy market.


### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods47 . ### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. it should also evaluate the potential impact of this regulation on least developed countries and how it can assist in the accelerating the decarbonisation process in those countries. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods47 .


### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods47. ### (52) the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope to indirect emissions , as well as to certain agricultural and food products and other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods47.


### (55) as the cbam aims to encourage cleaner production processes , the eu stands ready to work with low and middle-income countries towards the de-carbonisation of their manufacturing industries. moreover , the union should support less developed countries with the necessary technical assistance in order to facilitate their adaptation to the new obligations established by this regulation. ### (55) as the cbam aims to encourage cleaner production processes , the eu stands ready to work with low and middle-income countries towards the de-carbonisation of their manufacturing industries. the commission should pay particular attention to developing countries and less developed countries and provide them , where applicable , with the necessary strategic documents and technical assistance in order to facilitate their adaptation to the new obligations established by this regulation , and help them to strengthen their environmental technologies and standards , in order to avoid the risk of circumventing the cbam.


### 3. the mechanism will progressively become an alternative to the mechanisms established under directive 2003/87/ec to prevent the risk of carbon leakage , notably the allocation of allowances free of charge in accordance with article 10a of that directive. ### 3. the mechanism should progressively become an alternative to the mechanisms established under directive 2003/87/ec to prevent the risk of carbon leakage , notably the allocation of allowances free of charge in accordance with article 10a of that directive , if it has demonstrated its effectiveness in preventing the risk of carbon leakage both for imports and exports from the union. this should happen without prejudice to maintaining eu ets allowances free of charge at benchmark level until a test period with actual surrendering obligation by declarants running until 2030 has proven such effectiveness.


### 3. the mechanism will progressively become an alternative to the mechanisms established under directive 2003/87/ec to prevent the risk of carbon leakage , notably the allocation of allowances free of charge in accordance with article 10a of that directive. ### 3. the mechanism should progressively become an alternative to the mechanisms established under directive 2003/87/ec to prevent the risk of carbon leakage , notably the allocation of allowances free of charge in accordance with article 10a of that directive , if it has proven to be effective to prevent the risk of carbon leakage both for imports into or exports from the customs territory of the union , maintaining eu ets free allowances until it has proven such effectiveness.


### 3. the mechanism will progressively become an alternative to the mechanisms established under directive 2003/87/ec to prevent the risk of carbon leakage , notably the allocation of allowances free of charge in accordance with article 10a of that directive. ### 3. the mechanism will intends to complement and gradually become an alternative to the mechanisms established under directive 2003/87/ec to prevent the risk of carbon leakage , notably the allocation of allowances free of charge in accordance with article 10a of that directive.


### 3. the mechanism will progressively become an alternative to the mechanisms established under directive 2003/87/ec to prevent the risk of carbon leakage , notably the allocation of allowances free of charge in accordance with article 10a of that directive. ### 3. the main purpose of the mechanism will be to complement the mechanisms established under directive 2003/87/ec to prevent the risk of carbon leakage , notably the allocation of allowances free of charge in accordance with article 10a of that directive.


### 11. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 28 to amend the lists in annex ii , sections a or b , depending on whether the conditions in paragraphs 5 , 7 or 9 are satisfied. ### deleted


### 11. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 28 to amend the lists in annex ii , sections a or b , depending on whether the conditions in paragraphs 5 , 7 or 9 are satisfied. ### 11. if a third country is committed to decarbonisation processes that should result in the adoption of emission trading system similar to the eu ets , the importation of goods originating in that country shall be exempt from the application of the cbam , provided all of the following conditions are satisfied:


### 11. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 28 to amend the lists in annex ii , sections a or b , depending on whether the conditions in paragraphs 5 , 7 or 9 are satisfied. ### 11. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 28 to amend the lists in annex ii , sections a or b , depending on whether the conditions in paragraphs 5 , 7 or 9 are satisfied.


### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts concerning detailed rules regarding the elements of the calculation methods set out in annex iii , including determining system boundaries of production processes , emission factors , installation-specific values of actual emissions and default values and their respective application to individual goods as well as laying down methods to ensure the reliability of data on the basis of which the default values shall be determined , including the level of detail and the verification of the data. where necessary , those acts shall provide that the default values can be adapted to particular areas , regions or countries to take into account specific objective factors such as geography , natural resources , market conditions , prevailing energy sources , or industrial processes. the implementing acts shall build upon existing legislation for the verification of emissions and activity data for installations covered by directive 2003/87/ec , in particular implementing regulation (eu) no 2018/2067. ### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts , in accordance with article 28 , concerning detailed rules regarding the elements of the calculation methods set out in annex iii , including determining system boundaries of production processes , emission factors , installation-specific values of actual emissions and default values and their respective application to individual goods as well as laying down methods to ensure the reliability of data on the basis of which the default values shall be determined , including the level of detail and the verification of the data. where necessary , those acts shall provide that the default values can be adapted to particular areas , regions or countries to take into account specific objective factors such as geography , natural resources , market conditions , prevailing energy sources , or industrial processes. the implementing acts shall build upon existing legislation for the verification of emissions and activity data for installations covered by directive 2003/87/ec , in particular implementing regulation (eu) no 2018/2067.


### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts concerning detailed rules regarding the elements of the calculation methods set out in annex iii , including determining system boundaries of production processes , emission factors , installation-specific values of actual emissions and default values and their respective application to individual goods as well as laying down methods to ensure the reliability of data on the basis of which the default values shall be determined , including the level of detail and the verification of the data. where necessary , those acts shall provide that the default values can be adapted to particular areas , regions or countries to take into account specific objective factors such as geography , natural resources , market conditions , prevailing energy sources , or industrial processes. the implementing acts shall build upon existing legislation for the verification of emissions and activity data for installations covered by directive 2003/87/ec , in particular implementing regulation (eu) no 2018/2067. ### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts concerning detailed rules regarding the elements of the calculation methods set out in annex iii , including determining system boundaries of production processes , emission factors , installation-specific values of actual emissions and default values and their respective application to individual goods as well as laying down methods to ensure the reliability of data on the basis of which the default values shall be determined , including the level of detail and the verification of the data. where necessary , those acts shall provide that the default values can be adapted to particular areas , regions or countries to take into account specific objective factors such as geography , natural resources , market conditions , prevailing energy sources , or industrial processes. the implementing acts shall build upon existing legislation for the verification of emissions and activity data for installations covered by directive 2003/87/ec , in particular implementing regulation (eu) no 2018/2067.


### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts concerning detailed rules regarding the elements of the calculation methods set out in annex iii , including determining system boundaries of production processes , emission factors , installation-specific values of actual emissions and default values and their respective application to individual goods as well as laying down methods to ensure the reliability of data on the basis of which the default values shall be determined , including the level of detail and the verification of the data. where necessary , those acts shall provide that the default values can be adapted to particular areas , regions or countries to take into account specific objective factors such as geography , natural resources , market conditions , prevailing energy sources , or industrial processes. the implementing acts shall build upon existing legislation for the verification of emissions and activity data for installations covered by directive 2003/87/ec , in particular implementing regulation (eu) no 2018/2067. ### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts concerning detailed rules regarding the elements of the calculation methods set out in annex iii , including determining system boundaries of production processes , emission factors , installation-specific values of actual emissions and default values and their respective application to individual goods as well as laying down methods to ensure the reliability of data on the basis of which the default values shall be determined , including the level of detail and the verification of the data. the implementing acts shall build upon existing legislation for the verification of emissions and activity data for installations covered by directive 2003/87/ec , in particular implementing regulation (eu) no 2018/2067.


### iii competent authorities ### iii cbam authority


### iii competent authorities ### cbam authority


### competent authorities ### appointment of the cbam authority


### competent authorities ### competent authority


### 1. each member state shall designate the competent authority to carry out the obligations under this regulation and inform the commission thereof. ### deleted


### 2. member states shall require that competent authorities exchange any information that is essential or relevant to the exercise of their functions and duties. ### deleted


### 2. member states shall require that competent authorities exchange any information that is essential or relevant to the exercise of their functions and duties. ### 2. member states shall require that national competent authorities exchange any information that is essential or relevant to the exercise of their functions and duties through a network established under the responsibility of the european central cbam authority.


### 2. member states shall require that competent authorities exchange any information that is essential or relevant to the exercise of their functions and duties. ### 2. member states shall require that national authorities exchange any information that is essential or relevant to the exercise of their functions and duties through a network established under the responsibility of the eu cbam authority.


### 1. the competent authority may review the cbam declaration within the period ending with the fourth year after the year in which the declaration should have been submitted. the review may consist in verifying the information provided in the cbam declaration on the basis of the information communicated by the customs authorities in accordance with article 25(2) and any other relevant evidence , and on the basis of any audit deemed necessary , including at the premises of the authorised declarant. ### 1. the competent authority may review the cbam declaration within the period ending with the third year after the year in which the declaration should have been submitted. the review may consist in verifying the information provided in the cbam declaration on the basis of the information communicated by the customs authorities in accordance with article 25(2) and any other relevant evidence , and on the basis of any audit deemed necessary , including at the premises of the authorised declarant.


### 1. the competent authority may review the cbam declaration within the period ending with the fourth year after the year in which the declaration should have been submitted. the review may consist in verifying the information provided in the cbam declaration on the basis of the information communicated by the customs authorities in accordance with article 25(2) and any other relevant evidence , and on the basis of any audit deemed necessary , including at the premises of the authorised declarant. ### 1. the european central cbam authority and the national competent authorities may review the cbam declaration within the period ending with the fourth year after the year in which the declaration should have been submitted. the review may consist in verifying the information provided in the cbam declaration on the basis of the information communicated by the customs authorities in accordance with article 25(2) and any other relevant evidence , and on the basis of any audit deemed necessary , including at the premises of the authorised declarant.


### 1. the competent authority may review the cbam declaration within the period ending with the fourth year after the year in which the declaration should have been submitted. the review may consist in verifying the information provided in the cbam declaration on the basis of the information communicated by the customs authorities in accordance with article 25(2) and any other relevant evidence , and on the basis of any audit deemed necessary , including at the premises of the authorised declarant. ### 1. the central and national authorities may review the cbam declaration within the period ending with the year after the year in which the declaration should have been submitted. the review may consist in verifying the information provided in the cbam declaration on the basis of the information communicated by the customs authorities in accordance with article 25(2) and any other relevant evidence , and on the basis of any audit deemed necessary , including at the premises of the authorised declarant.


### 1. the competent authority may review the cbam declaration within the period ending with the fourth year after the year in which the declaration should have been submitted. the review may consist in verifying the information provided in the cbam declaration on the basis of the information communicated by the customs authorities in accordance with article 25(2) and any other relevant evidence , and on the basis of any audit deemed necessary , including at the premises of the authorised declarant. ### 1. the competent authority may review the cbam declaration within the period ending with the year after the year in which the declaration should have been submitted. the review may consist in verifying the information provided in the cbam declaration on the basis of the information communicated by the customs authorities in accordance with article 25(2) and any other relevant evidence , and on the basis of any audit deemed necessary , including at the premises of the authorised declarant.


### 2. before the end of the transitional period , the commission shall present a report to the european parliament and the council on the application of this regulation. the report shall contain , in particular , the assessment of the possibilities to further extend the scope of embedded emissions to indirect emissions and to other goods at risk of carbon leakage than those already covered by this regulation , as well as an assessment of the governance system. it shall also contain the assessment of the possibility to further extend the scope to embedded emissions of transportation services as well as to goods further down the value chain and services that may be subject to the risk of carbon leakage in the future. ### 2. before the end of the transitional period , the commission shall present a report to the european parliament and the council on the application of this regulation. the report shall contain an impact analysis to determine to which sectors and/or products , in addition to those listed in annex i , the scope of this regulation should be extended , as well as an assessment of the governance system. this impact analysis must also determine the extent to which the scope of embedded emissions must be extended to indirect emissions. it shall also contain the assessment of the possibility to further extend the scope to embedded emissions of transportation services as well as to goods further down the value chain and services that may be subject to the risk of carbon leakage in the future. where appropriate , the report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal.


### 2. before the end of the transitional period , the commission shall present a report to the european parliament and the council on the application of this regulation. the report shall contain , in particular , the assessment of the possibilities to further extend the scope of embedded emissions to indirect emissions and to other goods at risk of carbon leakage than those already covered by this regulation , as well as an assessment of the governance system. it shall also contain the assessment of the possibility to further extend the scope to embedded emissions of transportation services as well as to goods further down the value chain and services that may be subject to the risk of carbon leakage in the future. ### 2. before the end of the transitional period , the commission shall present a report to the european parliament and the council on the application of this regulation. the report shall contain , in particular , the assessment of the possibilities to further extend the scope of embedded emissions to indirect emissions and to other goods at risk of carbon leakage than those already covered by this regulation. this assessment shall be based on an impact assessment of the effects of the different possibilities for this further extension of the scope , including indirect emissions. the report shall also contain an assessment of the governance system and it shall also include the assessment of the possibility to further extend the scope to embedded emissions of transportation services as well as to goods further down the value chain and services that may be subject to the risk of carbon leakage in the future.


### 2. before the end of the transitional period , the commission shall present a report to the european parliament and the council on the application of this regulation. the report shall contain , in particular , the assessment of the possibilities to further extend the scope of embedded emissions to indirect emissions and to other goods at risk of carbon leakage than those already covered by this regulation , as well as an assessment of the governance system. it shall also contain the assessment of the possibility to further extend the scope to embedded emissions of transportation services as well as to goods further down the value chain and services that may be subject to the risk of carbon leakage in the future. ### 2. before the end of the transitional period , the commission shall present a report to the european parliament and the council on the application of this regulation. the report shall contain , in particular , an in-depth assessment developed in cooperation with the sectors at risk of carbon leakage covered by this regulation of the rules to be applied in the testing period established pursuant art. 30b is and the possibilities to further extend the scope of embedded emissions to indirect emissions and to other goods at risk of carbon leakage than those already covered by this regulation , as well as an assessment of the governance system as well as an assessment of the impact on competitiveness of the eu downstream industry. it shall also contain the assessment of the possibility to further extend the scope to embedded emissions of transportation services as well as to goods further down the value chain and services that may be subject to the risk of carbon leakage in the future. such an extension should be considered only if a clear calculation methodology has been established by the commission and once the mechanism has proven fully effective in terms of achieving its objective of carbon leakage protection.


### 2. before the end of the transitional period , the commission shall present a report to the european parliament and the council on the application of this regulation. the report shall contain , in particular , the assessment of the possibilities to further extend the scope of embedded emissions to indirect emissions and to other goods at risk of carbon leakage than those already covered by this regulation , as well as an assessment of the governance system. it shall also contain the assessment of the possibility to further extend the scope to embedded emissions of transportation services as well as to goods further down the value chain and services that may be subject to the risk of carbon leakage in the future. ### 2. the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the administrative transitional period , and report to the european parliament and the council. the first report of the commission should focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , in particular evaluate the impact on sectors listed in annex i to ensure that the complex production processes and deeply integrated value chains of specific sectors have been appropriately taken into account. furthermore , the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope of annex i to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , such as finished goods , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods:


### 2. before the end of the transitional period , the commission shall present a report to the european parliament and the council on the application of this regulation. the report shall contain , in particular , the assessment of the possibilities to further extend the scope of embedded emissions to indirect emissions and to other goods at risk of carbon leakage than those already covered by this regulation , as well as an assessment of the governance system. it shall also contain the assessment of the possibility to further extend the scope to embedded emissions of transportation services as well as to goods further down the value chain and services that may be subject to the risk of carbon leakage in the future. ### 2. the commission should evaluate the application of this regulation before the end of the administrative transitional period and report to the european parliament and the council. the first report of the commission should in particular focus on possibilities to enhance climate actions towards the objective of a climate neutral union by 2050. the commission should , as part of that evaluation , initiate collection of information necessary to possibly extend the scope of annex i to indirect emissions , as well as to other goods and services at risk of carbon leakage , such as finished goods , and to develop methods of calculating embedded emissions based on the environmental footprint methods:


### 2. before the end of the transitional period , the commission shall present a report to the european parliament and the council on the application of this regulation. the report shall contain , in particular , the assessment of the possibilities to further extend the scope of embedded emissions to indirect emissions and to other goods at risk of carbon leakage than those already covered by this regulation , as well as an assessment of the governance system. it shall also contain the assessment of the possibility to further extend the scope to embedded emissions of transportation services as well as to goods further down the value chain and services that may be subject to the risk of carbon leakage in the future. ### 2. before the end of the transitional period , the commission shall present a report to the european parliament and the council on the application of this regulation. the report shall contain , in particular , an in-depth assessment developed in cooperation with the sectors at risk of carbon leakage covered by this regulation of the rules to be applied in the testing period established pursuant art. 30bis and the possibilities to further extend the scope of embedded emissions to indirect emissions and to other goods at risk of carbon leakage than those already covered by this regulation , as well as an assessment of the governance system as well as an assessment of the impact on competitiveness of the eu downstream industry. it shall also contain the assessment of the possibility to further extend the scope to embedded emissions of transportation services as well as to goods further down the value chain and services that may be subject to the risk of carbon leakage in the future. such an extension should be considered only if a clear calculation methodology has been established by the commission and once the mechanism has proven fully effective in terms of achieving its objective of carbon leakage protection.


### articles 32 to 34 shall apply until 31 december 2025. ### articles 32 to 34 shall apply until the end of the year the commission has evaluated the application of this regulation , reported to the european parliament and the council and the european parliament has given its consent to the full application of the cbam including the financial adjustment.


### articles 4 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 and 31 shall apply from 1 january 2026. ### articles 4 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 and 31 shall apply from 1 january of the year after the commission has evaluated the application of this regulation , reported to the european parliament and the council and the european parliament has given its consent to the full application of the cbam including the financial adjustment.


### fertilisers ### fertilisers


### accounts in the national registries ### accounts in the cbam registry


### 1. the competent authority shall assign to each authorised declarant a unique cbam account number. ### 1. the national competent authority shall assign to each authorised declarant a unique cbam account number registered by the european central cbam authority.


### 1. the competent authority shall assign to each authorised declarant a unique cbam account number. ### deleted


### 1. the competent authority shall assign to each authorised declarant a unique cbam account number. ### 1. the national competent authority shall assign to each authorised declarant a unique cbam account number , which will be registered with the eu cbam authority.


### 3. the competent authority shall set up the account as soon as the authorisation referred to in article 17(1) is granted and notify the authorised declarant thereof. ### deleted


### 4. if the authorised declarant has ceased its economic activity or its authorisation was revoked , the competent authority shall close the account of that declarant. ### deleted


### 1. the competent authority shall authorise a declarant who submits an application for authorisation in accordance with article 5(1) , if the following conditions are fulfilled: ### 1. the national competent authority shall authorise a declarant who submits an application for authorisation in accordance with article 5(1) , if the following conditions are fulfilled:


### the declarant has not been involved in a serious infringement or repeated infringements of customs legislation , taxation rules and market abuse rules and has no record of serious criminal offences relating to its economic activity during the five years preceding the application; ### the declarant and the operators of installations located in third countries from whom the declarants sources goods have respectively not been involved in a serious infringement or repeated infringements of customs legislation , circumvention of antidumping or antisubsidy duties , taxation rules and market abuse rules and has no record of serious criminal offences relating to its economic activity during the five years preceding the application;


### the declarant has not been involved in a serious infringement or repeated infringements of customs legislation , taxation rules and market abuse rules and has no record of serious criminal offences relating to its economic activity during the five years preceding the application; ### the declarant and the operators of installations located in third countries from whom the declarants sources goods have respectively not been involved in a serious infringement or repeated infringements of customs legislation , circumvention of antidumping or antisubsidy duties taxation rules and market abuse rules and has no record of serious criminal offences relating to its economic activity during the five years preceding the application;


### 2. where the competent authority finds that the conditions listed in paragraph 1 are not fulfilled , or where the applicant has failed to provide the information listed in article 5(3) , the authorisation of the declarant shall be refused. ### 2. where the national competent authority finds that the conditions listed in paragraph 1 are not fulfilled , or where the applicant has failed to provide the information listed in article 5(3) , the authorisation of the declarant shall be refused.


### 2. where the competent authority finds that the conditions listed in paragraph 1 are not fulfilled , or where the applicant has failed to provide the information listed in article 5(3) , the authorisation of the declarant shall be refused. ### 2. where the competent authority finds that the conditions listed in paragraph 1 are not fulfilled , or where the applicant has failed to provide the information listed in article 5(3) , the authorisation of the declarant shall be refused. the competent authority shall notify the declarant of that refusal as soon as possible.


### 3. if the competent authority refuses to authorise a declarant , the declarant requesting the authorisation may , prior to an appeal , object to the relevant authority under national law , who shall either instruct the national administrator to open the account or uphold the refusal in a reasoned decision , subject to requirements of national law that pursue a legitimate objective compatible with this regulation and are proportionate. ### 3. if the national competent authority refuses to authorise a declarant , the declarant requesting the authorisation may , prior to an appeal , object to the relevant authority under national law , who shall either instruct the national administrator to open the account or uphold the refusal in a reasoned decision , subject to requirements of national law that pursue a legitimate objective compatible with this regulation and are proportionate.


### 3. if the competent authority refuses to authorise a declarant , the declarant requesting the authorisation may , prior to an appeal , object to the relevant authority under national law , who shall either instruct the national administrator to open the account or uphold the refusal in a reasoned decision , subject to requirements of national law that pursue a legitimate objective compatible with this regulation and are proportionate. ### deleted


### 4. a decision of the competent authority authorising a declarant shall contain the following information ### 4. a decision of the national competent authority authorising a declarant shall contain the following information


### 4. a decision of the competent authority authorising a declarant shall contain the following information ### 4. a decision of the competent national authority authorising a declarant shall contain the following information


### 6. the competent authority shall require the provision of a guarantee in order to authorise a declarant in accordance with paragraph 1 , if the declarant was not established throughout the two financial years that precede the year when the application in accordance with article 5(1) was submitted. ### 6. the national competent authority shall require the provision of a guarantee in order to authorise a declarant in accordance with paragraph 1 , if the declarant was not established throughout the two financial years that precede the year when the application in accordance with article 5(1) was submitted.


### 6. the competent authority shall require the provision of a guarantee in order to authorise a declarant in accordance with paragraph 1 , if the declarant was not established throughout the two financial years that precede the year when the application in accordance with article 5(1) was submitted. ### 6. the competent national authority shall require the provision of a guarantee in order to authorise a declarant in accordance with paragraph 1 , if the declarant was not established throughout the two financial years that precede the year when the application in accordance with article 5(1) was submitted.


### the competent authority shall fix the amount of such guarantee at the maximum amount , as estimated by the competent authority , of the value of the cbam certificates that the authorised declarant have to surrender , in accordance with article 22. ### the national competent authority shall fix the amount of such guarantee at the maximum amount , as estimated by the competent authority , of the value of the cbam certificates that the authorised declarant have to surrender , in accordance with article 22.


### the competent authority shall fix the amount of such guarantee at the maximum amount , as estimated by the competent authority , of the value of the cbam certificates that the authorised declarant have to surrender , in accordance with article 22. ### the competent national authority shall fix the amount of such guarantee at the maximum amount , as estimated by the competent authority , of the value of the cbam certificates that the authorised declarant have to surrender , in accordance with article 22.


### 7. the guarantee shall be provided as a bank guarantee , payable at first demand , by a financial institution operating in the union or by another form of guarantee which provides equivalent assurance. where the competent authority establishes that the guarantee provided does not ensure , or is no longer certain or sufficient to ensure the amount of cbam obligations , it shall require the authorised declarant either to provide an additional guarantee or to replace the initial guarantee with a new guarantee , according to its choice. ### 7. the guarantee shall be provided as a bank guarantee , payable at first demand , by a financial institution operating in the union or by another form of guarantee which provides equivalent assurance. where the national competent authority establishes that the guarantee provided does not ensure , or is no longer certain or sufficient to ensure the amount of cbam obligations , it shall require the authorised declarant either to provide an additional guarantee or to replace the initial guarantee with a new guarantee , according to its choice.


### 7. the guarantee shall be provided as a bank guarantee , payable at first demand , by a financial institution operating in the union or by another form of guarantee which provides equivalent assurance. where the competent authority establishes that the guarantee provided does not ensure , or is no longer certain or sufficient to ensure the amount of cbam obligations , it shall require the authorised declarant either to provide an additional guarantee or to replace the initial guarantee with a new guarantee , according to its choice. ### 7. the guarantee shall be provided as a bank guarantee , payable at first demand , by a financial institution operating in the union or by another form of guarantee which provides equivalent assurance. where the competent national authority establishes that the guarantee provided does not ensure , or is no longer certain or sufficient to ensure the amount of cbam obligations , it shall require the authorised declarant either to provide an additional guarantee or to replace the initial guarantee with a new guarantee , according to its choice.


### 8. the competent authority shall release the guarantee immediately after 31 may of the second year in which the authorised declarant has surrendered cbam certificates in accordance with article 22. ### 8. the national competent authority shall release the guarantee immediately after 31 may of the second year in which the authorised declarant has surrendered cbam certificates in accordance with article 22.


### 8. the competent authority shall release the guarantee immediately after 31 may of the second year in which the authorised declarant has surrendered cbam certificates in accordance with article 22. ### 8. the competent national authority shall release the guarantee immediately after 31 may of the second year in which the authorised declarant has surrendered cbam certificates in accordance with article 22.


### 9. the competent authority shall revoke the authorisation for a declarant who no longer meets the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 , or who fails to cooperate with that authority. ### 9. the national competent authority shall revoke the authorisation for a declarant who no longer meets the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 , or who fails to cooperate with that authority. the national competent authority shall immediately inform the european central cbam authority of this fact.


### 9. the competent authority shall revoke the authorisation for a declarant who no longer meets the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 , or who fails to cooperate with that authority. ### 9. the competent national authority shall revoke the authorisation for a declarant who no longer meets the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 , or who fails to cooperate with that authority.


### 9. the competent authority shall revoke the authorisation for a declarant who no longer meets the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 , or who fails to cooperate with that authority. ### 9. the competent authority shall revoke the authorisation for a declarant who no longer meets the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 , or who fails to cooperate with that authority. the competent authority shall notify the declarant of that revocation as soon as possible.


### 3. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 28 for the accreditation referred to in paragraph 2 , specifying conditions for the control and oversight of accredited verifiers , for the withdrawal of accreditation and for mutual recognition and peer evaluation of the accreditation bodies. ### deleted


### 2. where a cbam declaration in accordance with article 6 has not been submitted , the competent authority of the member state of establishment of the authorised declarant shall assess the cbam obligations of that declarant on the basis of the information at its disposal and calculate the total number of cbam certificates due at the latest by the 31 december of the fourth year following that when the cbam declaration should have been submitted. ### 2. where a cbam declaration in accordance with article 6 has not been submitted , the competent authority of the member state of establishment of the authorised declarant shall assess the cbam obligations of that declarant on the basis of the information at its disposal and calculate the total number of cbam certificates due at the latest by the 31 december of the year following that when the cbam declaration should have been submitted.


### 3. where the competent authority has established that the declared number of cbam certificates to be surrendered is incorrect , or that no cbam declaration has been submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 , it shall adjust the number of cbam certificates due by the authorised declarant. the competent authority shall notify the authorised declarant of the adjustment and request that the authorised declarant shall surrender the additional cbam certificates within one month. ### 3. where the competent authority has established that the declared number of cbam certificates to be surrendered is incorrect , or that no cbam declaration has been submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 , it shall adjust the number of cbam certificates due by the authorised declarant. the competent authority shall notify the authorised declarant of the adjustment and request that the authorised declarant shall surrender the additional cbam certificates within 30 working days.


### 4. if the competent authority determines that an authorised declarant has failed to comply with the obligation to surrender cbam certificates as specified in paragraph 1 , or that a person has introduced goods into the customs territory of the union as specified in paragraph 2 , the competent authority shall impose the penalty and notify the authorised declarant or , in the situation under paragraph 2 , the person: ### 4. if the national competent authority determines that an authorised declarant has failed to comply with the obligation to surrender cbam certificates as specified in paragraph 1 , or that a person has introduced goods into the customs territory of the union as specified in paragraph 2 , the competent authority shall impose the penalty and notify the authorised declarant or , in the situation under paragraph 2 , the person:


### of the right of the authorised declarant or of the person to appeal under national rules. ### deleted


### 5. member states may apply administrative or criminal sanctions for failure to comply with the cbam legislation in accordance with their national rules in addition to penalties referred to in paragraph 2. such sanctions shall be effective , proportionate and dissuasive. ### 5. the national competent authorities may apply sanctions for failure to comply with the cbam legislation in addition to penalties referred to in paragraph 2. such sanctions shall be effective , proportionate and dissuasive.


### 5. member states may apply administrative or criminal sanctions for failure to comply with the cbam legislation in accordance with their national rules in addition to penalties referred to in paragraph 2. such sanctions shall be effective , proportionate and dissuasive. ### 5. the central cbam authority may apply administrative or criminal sanctions for failure to comply with the cbam legislation in addition to penalties referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4a. such sanctions shall be effective , proportionate and dissuasive.


### 2. practices of circumvention include situations where a change in the pattern of trade in relation to goods included in the scope of this regulation has insufficient due cause or economic justification other than avoiding obligations as laid down in this regulation and consist in replacing those goods with slightly modified products , which are not included in the list of goods in annex i but belong to a sector included in the scope of this regulation. ### 2. practices of circumvention include situations where a change in the pattern of trade in relation to goods included in the scope of this regulation has insufficient due cause or economic justification other than avoiding obligations as laid down in this regulation and include , but are not limited to:


### 2. practices of circumvention include situations where a change in the pattern of trade in relation to goods included in the scope of this regulation has insufficient due cause or economic justification other than avoiding obligations as laid down in this regulation and consist in replacing those goods with slightly modified products , which are not included in the list of goods in annex i but belong to a sector included in the scope of this regulation. ### 2. practices of circumvention include situations where a change in the pattern of trade in relation to goods included in the scope of this regulation , whether slightly modified or not , stems from a practice , process or work that have has insufficient due cause or economic justification other than avoiding obligations as laid down in this regulation , or undermining their effects , including on overall ghg emissions and on prices of the like products.


### 3. a member state or any party affected or benefitted by the situations described in paragraph 2 may notify the commission if it is confronted , over a two-month period compared with the same period in the preceding year with a significant decrease in the volume of imported goods included in the scope of this regulation and an increase of volume of imports of slightly modified products , which are not included in the list of goods in annex i. the commission shall continually monitor any significant change of pattern of trade of goods and slightly modified products at union level. ### 3. a member state or any party affected or benefitted by the situations described in paragraph 2 shall notify the commission if it is confronted , over a two-month period compared with the same period in the preceding year , with one of the situations described in paragraph 2. the commission shall continually monitor any significant change of pattern of trade of goods and slightly modified products at union level.


### 5. where the commission , taking into account the relevant data , reports and statistics , including when provided by the customs authorities of member states , has sufficient reasons to believe that the circumstances referred to in paragraph 3 are occurring in one or more member states , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 28 to supplement the scope of this regulation in order to include slightly modified products for anti-circumvention purposes. ### 5. where the commission , taking into account the relevant data , reports and statistics , including when provided by the customs authorities of member states , has sufficient reasons to believe that the circumstances referred to in paragraph 3 are occurring in one or more member states , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 28 to supplement the scope of this regulation in order to include slightly modified products for anti-circumvention purposes. when doing so , the commission shall duly take into account the union's international commitments , in particular those under the relevant wto agreements.


### 5. where the commission , taking into account the relevant data , reports and statistics , including when provided by the customs authorities of member states , has sufficient reasons to believe that the circumstances referred to in paragraph 3 are occurring in one or more member states , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 28 to supplement the scope of this regulation in order to include slightly modified products for anti-circumvention purposes. ### deleted


### 5. where the commission , taking into account the relevant data , reports and statistics , including when provided by the customs authorities of member states , has sufficient reasons to believe that the circumstances referred to in paragraph 3 are occurring in one or more member states , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 28 to supplement the scope of this regulation in order to include slightly modified products for anti-circumvention purposes. ### 5. where the commission , taking into account the relevant data , reports and statistics , including when provided by the customs authorities of member states , has sufficient reasons to believe that the circumstances referred to in paragraph 3 are occurring in one or more member states , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 28 to supplement the scope of this regulation in order to include slightly modified products for anti-circumvention purposes. when doing so , the commission shall duly take into account the union's international commitments , in particular those in relation to the un sustainable development goals and the relevant wto agreements.


### 2. the power to adopt delegated acts referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) shall be conferred on the commission for an indeterminate period of time. ### 2. the power to adopt delegated acts referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 7(6) , 9(4) , 18(3) and 27(5) shall be conferred on the commission for an indeterminate period of time.


### 2. the power to adopt delegated acts referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) shall be conferred on the commission for an indeterminate period of time. ### 2. the power to adopt delegated acts referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(14) , 18(3) and 27(5) shall be conferred on the commission for an indeterminate period of time.


### 3. the delegation of power referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council. ### 3. the delegation of power referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 7(6) , 9(4) , 18(3) and 27(5) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council.


### 3. the delegation of power referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council. ### 3. the delegation of power referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(14) , 18(3) and 27(5) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council.


### 7. a delegated act adopted pursuant to articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the european parliament or by the council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the european parliament and to the council or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the commission that they will not object. that period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the european parliament or of the council. ### 7. a delegated act adopted pursuant to article 2(10) , 2(11) , 7(6) , 9(4) , article 18(3) and article 27(5) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the european parliament or to the council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the european parliament and to the council or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the commission that they will not object. that period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the european parliament or of the council.


### 7. a delegated act adopted pursuant to articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the european parliament or by the council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the european parliament and to the council or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the commission that they will not object. that period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the european parliament or of the council. ### 7. a delegated act adopted pursuant to articles 2(10) , 2(14) , 18(3) and 27(5) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the european parliament or by the council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the european parliament and to the council or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the commission that they will not object. that period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the european parliament or of the council.


### 3. the report by the commission shall , if appropriate , be accompanied by a legislative proposal. ### 3. the commission , in cooperation with the competent authorities , shall regularly submit to the european parliament and the council a report on the implementation of this regulation. the report by the commission shall , if appropriate , be accompanied by a legislative proposal.


### 2. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts laying down a calculation methodology for the reduction referred to in paragraph 1. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(2). ### 2. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 28 supplementing this regulation by implementing acts laying down a calculation methodology for the reduction referred to in paragraph 1 ,providing for the standard format and the procedure for submitting the cbam declaration and the arrangements for surrendering cbam certificates as well as other measures necessary to integrate domestic producers into cbam as provided under paragraph 1b , specifying if and to what extend article 9 and corresponding delegated acts are applicable to paragraph 1b , and specifying when a cbam good is processed into another product. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(2).


### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts concerning the information to be reported , the procedures for communicating the information referred to in paragraph 3 and the conversion of the carbon price paid in foreign currency into euro at yearly average exchange rate. the commission is also empowered to adopt implementing acts to further define the necessary elements of the calculation method set out in annex iii , including determining system boundaries of production processes , emission factors , installation-specific values of actual emissions and their respective application to individual goods as well as laying down methods to ensure the reliability of data , including the level of detail and the verification of this data. the commission is further empowered to adopt implementing acts to develop a calculation method for indirect emissions embedded in imported goods. ### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts concerning the information to be reported , the procedures for communicating the information referred to in paragraph 3 and the conversion of the carbon price paid in foreign currency into euro at yearly average exchange rate. the commission is also empowered to adopt delegated acts to further define the necessary elements of the calculation method set out in annex iii , including determining system boundaries of production processes , emission factors , installation-specific values of actual emissions and their respective application to individual goods as well as laying down methods to ensure the reliability of data , including the level of detail and the verification of this data. the commission is further empowered to adopt delegated acts to develop a calculation method for indirect emissions embedded in imported goods.


### (3) tackling climate and other environmental-related challenges and reaching the objectives of the paris agreement are at the core of the european green deal. the value of the european green deal has only grown in light of the very severe effects of the covid-19 pandemic on the health and economic well-being of the union’s citizens. ### (3) tackling climate and other environmental-related challenges and reaching the objectives of the paris agreement are at the core of the european green deal. the value of the european green deal has only grown in light of the very severe effects of the covid-19 pandemic on public health , national health systems and citizens’ health security , as well as on the resilience of economies , the competitiveness of companies in the union and the economic well-being of the union’s citizens , particularly with regard to employment and working conditions.


### (6) the special report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) on the impacts of global temperature increases of 1.5°c above pre-industrial levels and related global ghg emission pathways36 provides a strong scientific basis for tackling climate change and illustrates the need to step up climate action. that report confirms that in order to reduce the likelihood of extreme weather events , ghg emissions need to be urgently reduced , and that climate change needs to be limited to a global temperature increase of 1.5°c. ### (6) the special report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) on the impacts of global temperature increases of 1.5°c above pre-industrial levels and related global ghg emission pathways36 provides a strong scientific basis for tackling climate change and illustrates the need to step up climate action. that report confirms that in order to reduce the likelihood of extreme weather events , ghg emissions need to be urgently reduced , and that climate change needs to be limited to a global temperature increase of 1.5°c. only through multilateral efforts will it be possible to achieve the objectives set in the paris agreement.


### (15) in order to exclude from the cbam third countries or territories fully integrated into , or linked , to the eu ets in the event of future agreements , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of tfeu should be delegated to the commission in respect of amending the list of countries in annex ii. conversely , those third countries or territories should be excluded from the list in annex ii and be subject to cbam whereby they do not effectively charge the ets price on goods exported to the union. ### (15) in order to exclude from the cbam third countries or territories fully integrated into , or linked , to the eu ets in the event of future agreements , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of tfeu should be delegated to the commission in respect of amending the list of countries in annex ii. conversely , those third countries or territories should be excluded from the list in annex ii and be subject to cbam whereby they do not effectively charge the ets price on goods exported to the union. the commission shall consistently monitor the status of third countries in order to allow for an appropriate classification.


### (15) in order to exclude from the cbam third countries or territories fully integrated into , or linked , to the eu ets in the event of future agreements , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of tfeu should be delegated to the commission in respect of amending the list of countries in annex ii. conversely , those third countries or territories should be excluded from the list in annex ii and be subject to cbam whereby they do not effectively charge the ets price on goods exported to the union. ### (15) in order to exclude from the cbam third countries or territories fully integrated into , or linked , to the eu ets and where the carbon cost burden is equivalent to that under the eu ets , in the event of future agreements , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of tfeu should be delegated to the commission in respect of amending the list of countries in annex ii. conversely , those third countries or territories should be excluded from the list in annex ii and be subject to cbam whereby they do not effectively charge the ets price on goods exported to the union.


### (15) in order to exclude from the cbam third countries or territories fully integrated into , or linked , to the eu ets in the event of future agreements , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of tfeu should be delegated to the commission in respect of amending the list of countries in annex ii. conversely , those third countries or territories should be excluded from the list in annex ii and be subject to cbam whereby they do not effectively charge the ets price on goods exported to the union. ### (15) in order to exclude from the cbam third countries or territories fully integrated into , or linked , to the eu ets in the event of future agreements , and where the carbon cost burden is equivalent to that under the eu ets , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of tfeu should be delegated to the commission in respect of amending the list of countries in annex ii. conversely , those third countries or territories should be excluded from the list in annex ii and be subject to cbam whereby they do not effectively charge the ets price on goods exported to the union.


### (19) however , while the eu ets sets an absolute cap on the ghg emissions from the activities under its scope and allows tradability of allowances (so called ‘cap and trade system’) , the cbam should not establish quantitative limits to import , so as to ensure that trade flows are not restricted. moreover , while the eu ets applies to installations based in the union , the cbam should be applied to certain goods imported into the customs territory of the union. ### (19) however , while the eu ets sets an absolute cap on the ghg emissions from the activities under its scope and allows tradability of allowances (so called ‘cap and trade system’) , the cbam must not establish quantitative limits to import , so as to ensure that trade flows are not restricted or disrupted. moreover , while the eu ets applies to installations based in the union , the cbam should be applied to certain goods imported into the customs territory of the union to ensure a level playing field and prevent the risk of carbon leakage while ensuring compatibility with wto.


### (19) however , while the eu ets sets an absolute cap on the ghg emissions from the activities under its scope and allows tradability of allowances (so called ‘cap and trade system’) , the cbam should not establish quantitative limits to import , so as to ensure that trade flows are not restricted. moreover , while the eu ets applies to installations based in the union , the cbam should be applied to certain goods imported into the customs territory of the union. ### (19) however , while the eu ets sets an absolute cap on the ghg emissions from the activities under its scope and allows tradability of allowances (so called ‘cap and trade system’) , the cbam should not establish quantitative limits to import , so as to ensure that trade flows are not restricted and that any unfair competition is prevented. moreover , while the eu ets applies to installations based in the union , the cbam should be applied to certain goods imported into the customs territory of the union.


### (20) the cbam system has some specific features compared with the eu ets , including on the calculation of the price of cbam certificates , on the possibilities to trade certificates and on their validity over time. these are due to the need to preserve the effectiveness of the cbam as a measure preventing carbon leakage over time and to ensure that the management of the system is not excessively burdensome in terms of obligations imposed on the operators and of resources for the administration , while at the same time preserving an equivalent level of flexibility available to operators under the eu ets. ### (20) the cbam system has some specific features compared with the eu ets , including on the calculation of the price of cbam certificates , on the possibilities to trade certificates and on their validity over time. these are due to the need to preserve the effectiveness of the cbam as a measure preventing carbon leakage over time and to ensure that the management of the system does not impose additional excessive administrative burdens on eu companies , particularly smes and micro-enterprises , in terms of obligations imposed on the operators and of resources , while at the same time preserving an equivalent level of flexibility available to operators under the eu ets.


### (20) the cbam system has some specific features compared with the eu ets , including on the calculation of the price of cbam certificates , on the possibilities to trade certificates and on their validity over time. these are due to the need to preserve the effectiveness of the cbam as a measure preventing carbon leakage over time and to ensure that the management of the system is not excessively burdensome in terms of obligations imposed on the operators and of resources for the administration , while at the same time preserving an equivalent level of flexibility available to operators under the eu ets. ### (20) the cbam system has some specific features compared with the eu ets , including on the calculation of the price of cbam certificates , on the possibilities to trade certificates and on their validity over time. these are due to the need to preserve the effectiveness of the cbam as a measure preventing carbon leakage over time and to ensure that the management of the system does not add excessive administrative burden to eu companies in terms of obligations imposed on the operators and of resources , while at the same time preserving an equivalent level of flexibility available to operators under the eu ets.