### 171. the european parliament has set up the pega inquiry committee , which is working diligently and effectively within its powers and mandate. however , it has no powers to summon witnesses or hear them under oath , and it has no access to classified information. it lacks the full investigative powers that most national parliaments have. in addition , the influence of national governments is frequently present in the deliberations of pega , which on occasion is an obstacle to thorough , fully independent , and objective investigations. it is quite cynical that the european parliament does not have the full powers to investigate , when some of its own members are victims of illegal surveillance. ### 171. the european parliament has set up the pega inquiry committee acting within the scope of its mandate.


### 172. although the national governments claim that the spyware scandal is a purely national matter , it was actually discussed in the council of the european union and the national governments decided to respond collectively to the questionnaire of the european parliament333 . in doing so , they have fully acknowledged that it is in fact a matter for the council. however , responsibility is not a menu that you can pick and choose from: you cannot only selectively deal with procedural matters , but not the substance. ### deleted


### 173. to date , the european council has not responded publicly or substantively to the scandal. some of its members have a stake in the matter , as they themselves may be complicit in the illegitimate hacks , or they simply wish to keep the eu weak and powerless in this area. the omertà and lack of cooperation of the council does not bode well for any future regulatory initiatives. the council is a legislator , but it may well be reluctant to regulate its own members. ### 173. to date , the european council has not responded publicly or substantively to the scandal. the issue was discussed in the council of the eu and the decision to respond collectively to the questionnaire of the european parliament was made.


### 174. even if illegal or criminal behaviour was ultimately to be proven , members of national governments cannot be impeached or made to resign from their eu jobs. this means that persons who are guilty of such acts may well continue with impunity to sit on eu bodies and take decisions affecting all european citizens. ### 174. members of national governments cannot be impeached or made to resign from their eu jobs as it is the responsibility of individual member states.


### 175. europol was requested to assist the cypriot police and an academic expert in conducting a three-level forensic examination of the equipment found in the black van of tal dilian in 2019. during the pega hearing on 30 august 2022 , europol made no reference to this , despite questions by members on europol’s role in investigating spyware in the eu. it has not been mentioned since. ### 175. europol provided support to the cypriot police and an academic expert in conducting a three-level forensic examination of the equipment found in the black van of tal dilian in 2019. during the pega hearing on 30 august 2022 europol explained the support provided by the agency.


### 176. europol does not have any autonomous operational powers , and it cannot act without the consent and cooperation of the member state(s) concerned. that presents a problem when there is clear evidence of criminal acts - such as cybercrime , corruption and extortion - but national authorities fail to investigate. this problem is made worse when the member state authorities are themselves complicit in the crimes. ### 176. europol does not have any autonomous operational powers , and it cannot act without the consent and cooperation of the member state(s) concerned. while article 6 of the amended europol regulation determines that europol may propose to the competent authorities of the member state concerned the initiation , conduct or coordination of criminal investigations , europol’s competencies in the amended europol regulation are subject to the overall requirements of article 88(3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) , following which any operational action by europol must be carried out in liaison and in agreement with the authorities of the member state concerned , with the application of coercive measures being the exclusive responsibility of the competent national authorities.


### 177. however , europol has recently obtained new powers allowing it to pro-actively propose an investigation , even when it concerns a crime committed only in one member state334 , but so far it has been reluctant to make use of those powers. europol wants to cherish the good relations with the governments , as it fears such an initiative would lead to a breakdown of cooperation in other areas. ### 177. europol has recently obtained powers allowing the agency to propose to initiate , conduct or coordinate a criminal investigation to the competent authorities in the member states , even when it concerns a crime committed only in one member state and at the same time affecting a common interest covered by a union policy. however , europol cannot interfere or challenge the decision-making at national level and must act within the scope of article 88(3) of the tfeu and article 3 of teu fulfilling its supportive role.


### 178. on 28 september 2022 , pega wrote a letter to europol335 , urging it to make use of its new powers under article 6 of the europol regulation336 . in a letter of reply dated 13 october 2022337 , europol stated that it has ‘contacted five member states to ascertain whether there is relevant information available at the national level for europol and whether there is an ongoing or envisaged criminal investigation (or , instead , another inquiry under the applicable provisions of national law). one of the five member states has meanwhile confirmed to europol the initiation of criminal investigations under the oversight of the competent judicial authorities , and this has also been verified by eurojust’. it is not known which countries the letter refers to , nor whether the aforementioned criminal inquiry by one member state concerns the abuse of spyware by eu member state governments or by third countries. ### 178. on 28 september 2022 , pega wrote a letter to europol335 , urging it to make use of its new powers under article 6 of the europol regulation336 . in a letter of reply dated 13 october 2022337 , europol stated that it has ‘contacted five member states to ascertain whether there is relevant information available at the national level for europol and whether there is an ongoing or envisaged criminal investigation (or , instead , another inquiry under the applicable provisions of national law). one of the five member states has meanwhile confirmed to europol the initiation of criminal investigations under the oversight of the competent judicial authorities , and this has also been verified by eurojust’. it is not known which countries the letter refers to as europol cannot unilaterally disclose this information , nor whether the aforementioned criminal inquiry by one member state concerns the abuse of spyware by eu member state governments or by third countries.


### 179. the eu turns out to be quite powerless against potential criminal activity by national authorities , even if it affects the eu. ### deleted


### 180. paradoxically , contrary to europol , the us is actively investigating the use of spyware in the eu. on 5 november 2022 , it was reported that the fbi visited athens to investigate ‘how far the illegal surveillance has spread and who trafficked it.’338 . ### deleted


### 182. the european data protection board , the european data protection supervisor , the eu ombudsman , the european court of auditors and eurojust have few competences to scrutinise or intervene in case of illegitimate use of , or trade in spyware by member state governments. some of their members may indeed be involved in the scandals in their member state of origin , and in covering them up. additionally , this may have an impact on the functioning and the integrity of these eu bodies. the european public prosecutor’s office could potentially intervene when eu money is involved in any way. ### 182. the european data protection board , the european data protection supervisor , the eu ombudsman , the european court of auditors and eurojust have few competences to scrutinise or intervene in case of illegitimate use of , or trade in spyware by member state governments. the european public prosecutor’s office could potentially intervene when eu money is involved in any way.


### the explicit commitment to grant any request by europol pursuant to art 6(1a) of the europol regulation relating to investigations into allegations of illegitimate use of spyware; and ### the explicit commitment to involve europol pursuant to articles 4 and 5 of the europol regulation relating to investigations into allegations of illegitimate use of spyware; and


### repealing all export licences that are not fully in line with both the letter and the spirit of the dual-use regulation; ### all export licences that are not fully in line with both the letter and the spirit of the dual-use regulation are repealed;


### a. whereas it has been revealed that government bodies in several countries , both member states and third countries , have used pegasus and other brands of surveillance spyware against journalists , politicians , law enforcement officials , diplomats , lawyers , business people , civil society actors and other actors , for political and even criminal purposes; whereas such practices are extremely alarming and underscore the risk of abuse of surveillance technologies to undermine human rights and democracy; ### a. whereas it has been revealed that government bodies in several countries , both member states and third countries , have used pegasus and other brands of surveillance spyware against journalists , politicians , law enforcement officials , diplomats , lawyers , business people , civil society actors and other actors , for various purposes; whereas such practices demonstrate the risk of abuse of surveillance technologies to undermine human rights and democracy;


### c. whereas the arrival of encrypted mobile communication applications led to the emergence of the spyware industry exploring existing vulnerabilities in smartphones’ operative systems to install software used to import spyware into the phone , including through ‘zero-click’ , enabling the extraction of data before encryption; ### c. whereas the development of communication technology , and especially the arrival of encrypted mobile communication applications has provided criminal organizations with secure channels from which to coordinate , promote and execute all sorts of illicit activities; whereas these secure channels have contributed to the increased resilience , scope and diversification of serious and organized criminal activity in the last few years;


### d. whereas the use of spyware surveillance should remain the exception and always subject to an effective and meaningful ex ante judicial authorisation by an impartial and independent judicial authority , which must ensure that the measure is necessary and proportionate and strictly limited to cases affecting national security , terrorism and serious crime; ### d. whereas the use of spyware surveillance should remain the exception and always subject to an effective , binding and meaningful ex ante judicial authorisation by an impartial and independent judicial authority , which must ensure that the measure is necessary and proportionate and strictly limited to cases affecting national security , terrorism and serious crime;


### e. whereas any spyware surveillance must be scrutinised by an independent ex post oversight authority , which must ensure that any authorised surveillance is carried out in compliance with fundamental rights and in accordance with the conditions set out by the court of justice of the european union (cjeu) , the european court of human rights (ecthr) and the venice commission and must be able to terminate the surveillance if it is not; ### e. whereas any spyware surveillance must be scrutinised by an independent ex post oversight authority , which must ensure that any authorised surveillance is carried out in compliance with democratic standards , applicable laws , fundamental rights and in accordance with the conditions set out by the court of justice of the european union (cjeu) , the european court of human rights (ecthr) and the venice commission and must be able to terminate the surveillance if it is not;


### g. whereas the rights of targeted persons are laid down in the charter of fundamental rights and international conventions , notably the right to privacy and the right to a fair trial , and in union rules on the rights of suspects and accused; ### g. whereas the rights of targeted persons are laid down in the charter of fundamental rights and international conventions , notably the right to privacy and the right to a fair trial , in union rules on the rights of suspects and accused and are confirmed by case law of cjeu and ecthr;


### h. whereas it results from the testimonies of victims that even if legal remedy and civil rights may exist on paper , they mostly become void in the face of obstruction by government bodies , the absence of implementation of the right to be informed for victims and the administrative burden to prove the status as victim; ### h. whereas it results from the testimonies of victims that even if legal remedy and civil rights may exist on paper , they mostly become void in the face of obstruction by government bodies , the absence of implementation of the right to be informed for victims and the administrative obstacles to prove the status as victim; whereas even in systems that offer quick and open procedures , the nature of spyware makes it very hard to prove the nature and extent of victimhood and authorship;


### i. whereas the polish government has weakened and eliminated institutional and legal safeguards including proper oversight and scrutiny procedures , effectively leaving victims without any meaningful remedy; whereas the pegasus surveillance spyware has been illegally deployed to spy on journalists , politicians , prosecutors and civil society actors for political purposes; ### i. whereas the polish government has weakened and eliminated institutional and legal safeguards including proper oversight and scrutiny procedures , effectively leaving victims without any meaningful remedy; whereas the pegasus surveillance spyware has been illegally deployed to spy on journalists , politicians , lawyers , prosecutors and civil society actors for political purposes;


### k. whereas greek members of parliament , opposition as well as nea demokratia (nd) mps , nd party loyalists and journalists have been targeted with predator spyware , the use of which is illegal under greek law; whereas many of the persons targeted were also under official surveillance by the eyp greek secret service; whereas the greek government denies having purchased or used predator , but it is highly probable that predator has been used by or on behalf of persons very close to the prime minister’s office; whereas the greek government admitted it has granted export licences to intellexa for the sale of the predator spyware to repressive governments; whereas the government has responded to the scandal with legislative amendments that further reduce the rights of the target to be informed after surveillance has taken place; ### k. whereas greek members of parliament , opposition as well as nea demokratia (nd) mps , nd party loyalists and journalists have been targeted with predator spyware , the use of which is illegal under greek law; whereas many of the persons targeted were also under official surveillance by the eyp greek secret service; whereas the greek government denies having purchased or used predator; whereas the greek government admitted it has granted export licences to intellexa for the sale of the predator spyware to repressive governments; whereas the government has responded to the scandal with legislative amendments that further reduce the rights of the target to be informed after surveillance has taken place;


### l. whereas revelations showed two categories of spyware targets in spain; whereas the first includes the prime minister and the minister of defence that are believed to be spied upon by morocco; whereas the second concerns some 65 victims referred to as ‘catalangate’ including catalan parliamentarians , members of parliament , lawyers and civil society actors; whereas the spanish authorities admitted in may 2020 to targeting 18 of those 65 victims with court authorisation , however , they have refrained from providing further information , invoking national security; ### l. whereas revelations showed two categories of spyware targets in spain; whereas the first includes the prime minister and the minister of defence , the minister of the interior and other high officials whereas the second concerns some 65 victims referred to as ‘catalangate’ by the organization citizen lab , concerning catalan parliamentarians , members of parliament , lawyers and civil society actors; whereas the spanish national intelligence centre (cni) provided explanations in may 5th 2022 in regards to the surveillance of 18 figures related to the catalan secessionist movement with court authorisation; whereas the legal requirements of secrecy contained in the official secrets act have prevented the disclosure of additional information which , nevertheless , has been reviewed and verified by independent bodies with the adequate mandate , such as the ombudsman , in addition to the official secrets committee of the congress of deputies;


### m. whereas there are allegations of the cyprus government party spying on critics , but so far no spyware infections have been detected; whereas cyprus is an important european export hub for the surveillance industry and an attractive location for companies selling surveillance technologies; ### m. whereas no infections of spyware have been detected in cyprus; whereas according to the government of cyprus claims that there are ten spyware industry companies;


### n. whereas there are strong indications of among others the governments of morocco and ruanda targeting union citizens with spyware , including the president of france , the prime minister and defence minister of spain , the then prime minister of belgium , the former president of the commission and former prime minister of italy , and the daughter of paul rusesabagina; ### n. whereas there are strong indications that high profile official have been targeted with spyware , including the president of france , the prime minister , minister of defence and minister of the interior of spain , the then prime minister of belgium , the former president of the commission and former prime minister of italy; whereas there are strong indicators that high profile individuals like the daughter of paul rusesabagina have also been targeted;


### o. whereas it can be safely assumed that all member states have purchased or used one or more spyware systems; whereas most governments will refrain from illegitimate use of spyware , but in the absence of a solid legal framework including safeguards and oversight , the risk of abuse is very high; ### o. whereas most governments will refrain from illegitimate use of spyware , but the absence of a solid legal framework including safeguards and oversight increases the risk of abuse;


### p. whereas the member state governments and member state parliaments have not provided parliament with meaningful information about the legal frameworks governing the use of spyware in their member states beyond what was already publicly known , despite an obligation to do so pursuant to article 3 , paragraph 4 of the decision of the european parliament , the council and the commission of 6 march 1995 on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the european parliament’s right of inquiry; whereas it is difficult to assess the enforcement of union legislation and the safeguards , oversight , and means of redress which prevents the adequate protection of citizen’s fundamental rights; ### p. whereas only a few member state governments and member state parliaments have provided parliament with meaningful information about the legal frameworks governing the use of spyware in their member states beyond what was already publicly known , despite an obligation to do so pursuant to article 3 , paragraph 4 of the decision of the european parliament , the council and the commission of 6 march 1995 on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the european parliament’s right of inquiry; whereas it is difficult to assess the enforcement of union legislation and the safeguards , oversight , and means of redress which prevents the adequate protection of citizen’s fundamental rights notwithstanding the cases in which provisions have been made for independent authorities to verify the legality of procedures , as it was the case in spain;


### q. whereas several key figures from the spyware industry have acquired maltese citizenship in order to be able to operate freely within and from the union; ### q. whereas several key figures from the spyware industry have acquired maltese citizenship , which facilitates their operations within the union;


### r. whereas different spyware vendors are or have been registered in one or more member states; whereas examples include nso group with corporate presence in luxembourg , cyprus , the netherlands and bulgaria , the parent company of intellexa , thalestris limited , in ireland , greece , switzerland and cyprus , dsirf in austria , amesys and nexa technologies in france , tykelab and rcs lab in italy , and finfisher (now defunct) in germany; ### r. whereas multiple spyware developers and vendors are or have been registered in one or more member states; whereas examples include nso group with corporate presence in luxembourg , cyprus , the netherlands and bulgaria , the parent company of intellexa , thalestris limited , in ireland , greece , switzerland and cyprus , dsirf in austria , amesys and nexa technologies in france , tykelab and rcs lab in italy , and finfisher (now defunct) in germany;


### s. whereas all member states but cyprus are participating in the wassenaar arrangement for controlling conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies; ### s. whereas the european union does not participate in the wassenaar arrangement for controlling conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies; whereas all member states but cyprus are participating in the wassenaar arrangement; whereas cyprus is bound by eu regime for the control of exports , brokering , technical assistance , transit and transfer of dual-use items (dual-use regulation);


### v. whereas spyware producers exporting to third countries establish themselves within the union to gain respectability while trading in spyware to totalitarian regimes; whereas exports from the union to totalitarian regimes or non-state actors are taking place , in violation of the eu export rules on surveillance technologies; ### v. whereas exports from the union to totalitarian regimes or non-state actors are taking place , in violation of the eu export rules on intrusion software;


### w. whereas amesys and nexa technologies are currently being prosecuted in france for exporting surveillance technology to libya , egypt , and saudi arabia; whereas intellexa companies based in greece reportedly exported their products to bangladesh , sudan , madagascar and at least one arab country , finfisher’s software is being used by dozens of countries all over the world , including angola , bahrain , bangladesh , egypt , ethiopia , gabon , jordan , kazakhstan , myanmar , oman , qatar , saudi arabia , turkey and morocco’s intelligence services have been accused of using pegasus spyware against journalists and politicians by amnesty and forbidden stories; whereas it is unknown if export licences were granted for the export of spyware to all these countries; ### w. whereas amesys and nexa technologies are currently being prosecuted in france for exporting surveillance technology to libya , egypt , and saudi arabia; whereas intellexa companies based in greece reportedly exported their products to bangladesh , sudan , madagascar and at least one arab country , finfisher’s software is being used by dozens of countries all over the world , including angola , bahrain , bangladesh , egypt , ethiopia , gabon , jordan , kazakhstan , myanmar , oman , qatar , saudi arabia , turkey and morocco’s intelligence services have been accused of using pegasus spyware against journalists and politicians by amnesty and forbidden stories;


### x. whereas the number of attendees at arms fairs and issworld marketing spyware capabilities demonstrates the prevalence of third country providers of spyware and related products and services , a significant number of which are headquartered in israel (e.g. nso group , wintego , quadream and cellebrite) , and reveals prominent producers in india (cleartrail) , the united kingdom (bae systems and black cube) and the united arab emirates (darkmatter) , while the united states entity list blacklisting spyware producers located in israel (nso group and candiru) , russia (positive technologies) and singapore (computer security initiative consultancy pte ltd.) further highlights the diversity of origin among spyware producers; whereas the fair is also attended by a wide range of european public authorities , including local police forces; ### x. whereas multiple third country providers of spyware and related products and services operate on eu market , a significant number of which are headquartered in israel (e.g. nso group , wintego , quadream and cellebrite) , and reveals prominent producers in india (cleartrail) , the united kingdom (bae systems and black cube) and the united arab emirates (darkmatter) , while the united states entity list blacklisting spyware producers located in israel (nso group and candiru) , russia (positive technologies) and singapore (computer security initiative consultancy pte ltd.);


### y. whereas member states claim that matters relating to national security fall outside of the treaties as article 4 (2) teu provides that national security remains the sole responsibility of the member states; ### y. whereas article 4 (2) teu establishes that matters relating to national security are the sole responsibility of member states;


### z. whereas however , the cjeu has ruled (c-623/17) that ‘although it is for the member states to define their essential security interests and to adopt appropriate measures to ensure their internal and external security , the mere fact that a national measure has been taken for the purpose of protecting national security cannot render eu law inapplicable and exempt the member states from their obligation to comply with that law’; ### z. whereas the cjeu has ruled (c-623/17) that ‘although it is for the member states to define their essential security interests and to adopt appropriate measures to ensure their internal and external security , the mere fact that a national measure has been taken for the purpose of protecting national security cannot render eu law inapplicable and exempt the member states from their obligation to comply with that law’;


### ad. whereas use of surveillance spyware for the prevention , investigation , detection or prosecution of criminal offences and the execution of criminal penalties , including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security , falls within the scope of eu law; ### ad. whereas use of surveillance spyware for the prevention , investigation , detection or prosecution of criminal offences and the execution of criminal penalties , including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security , falls within the scope of eu law , expects the commission to continue to step up its work in this area; in this regard , welcomes that the commission has included in its proposal for the european media freedom act a provision which significantly limits the use of spy software against media service providers , their employees and their families


### ad. whereas use of surveillance spyware for the prevention , investigation , detection or prosecution of criminal offences and the execution of criminal penalties , including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security , falls within the scope of eu law; ### ad. whereas important aspects of the use of surveillance spyware for the prevention , investigation , detection or prosecution of criminal offences and the execution of criminal penalties , including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security , falls also within the scope of eu law as indicated in articles 4(2) and 5(3) of the tue;


### ae. whereas the charter lays down the conditions for the limitation of the exercise of fundamental rights: it must be provided for by law , respect the essence of the rights and freedoms concerned , be subject to the principle of proportionality , and only be imposed if it is necessary and genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others; whereas in the case of the use of spyware the level of interference with the right to privacy is so severe that the individual is in fact deprived of it and the use cannot be considered proportionate , irrespective of whether the measure can be deemed necessary to achieve the legitimate objectives of a democratic state; ### ae. whereas the charter lays down the conditions for the limitation of the exercise of fundamental rights: it must be provided for by law , respect the essence of the rights and freedoms concerned , be subject to the principle of proportionality , and only be imposed if it is necessary and genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others;


### af. whereas the e-privacy directive provides that member states must ensure the confidentiality of communications; whereas the deployment of surveillance tools constitutes a restriction of the right to protection of terminal equipment afforded by the e-privacy directive; whereas this would place national laws on spyware within the scope of the e-privacy directive similar to national data retention laws; whereas regular deployment of intrusive spyware technology would not be compatible with the union legal order; ### af. whereas the e-privacy directive provides that member states must ensure the confidentiality of communications; whereas the deployment of surveillance tools constitutes a restriction of the right to protection of terminal equipment afforded by the e-privacy directive;


### ag. whereas a state under international law only has the right to investigate potential crimes within its jurisdiction and has to resort to the assistance of other states where the investigation has to take place in other states unless there is a basis for conducting investigations in the other jurisdiction due to an international agreement , or in the case of member states , in union law; ### deleted


### ah. whereas the infection of a device with spyware and the subsequent collection of data takes place through the servers of the mobile service provider , and as the free roaming within the union has resulted in persons more often having mobile contracts from other member states than the one in which they live , a legal base for the collection of data in the other member state through the use of spyware is currently absent in union law; ### deleted


### aj. whereas it has been reported that large financial institutions have tried to incite spyware producers to refrain from applying appropriate human rights standards and due diligence and continue selling spyware to totalitarian regimes; ### deleted


### ak. whereas israel participates in union research programmes since 2000; whereas funds have been made available to israeli military and security companies through these european programmes; ### deleted


### 1. highlights the undeniable importance of protection of privacy and the right to dignity and private life in an increasingly digital world where more and more of our activities take place online; ### 1. highlights the undeniable importance of protection of privacy , the right to dignity and private life , right to family life , freedom of expression , freedom of information , right to a fair trial in an increasingly digital world where more and more of our activities take place online;


### 2. takes the firm position that breaches of the right to dignity , privacy and private life is not only a question of respect for the common legal principles set out in the treaties and in other sources but a fundamental question of whether future human life will be free and democratic or controlled by digital processes; ### 2. takes the firm position that fundamental rights and freedoms are key for the respect for the common legal principles set out in the treaties;


### 3. strongly condemns the use of spyware by member state governments or members of government for the purpose of monitoring , blackmailing , intimidating , manipulating and discrediting opposition and critics , eliminating democratic scrutiny and free press , and manipulating elections; ### 3. strongly condemns the use of spyware by member state governments , members of government authorities or state institutions for the purpose of monitoring , blackmailing , intimidating , manipulating and discrediting opposition and critics , eliminating democratic scrutiny and free press , and manipulating elections;


### 4. points out that this illegitimate use of spyware by national governments directly and indirectly affects the union institutions and the decision making process , thus undermining the integrity of european union democracy; ### 4. points out that this illegitimate use of spyware by some national governments directly and indirectly affects the union institutions and the decision making process , thus undermining the integrity of european union democracy;


### 6. takes the firm position that the export of spyware from the union to dictatorships and oppressive regimes with poor human-right records where such tools are used against human rights activists , journalist and government critics is a severe violation of fundamental rights enshrined in the charter and a gross violation on union export rules; ### 6. takes the firm position that the export of spyware from the union to dictatorships and oppressive regimes with poor human-right records where such tools can be used against human rights activists , journalist and government critics can lead to a severe violation of fundamental rights enshrined in the charter and a gross violation on union export rules;


### 7. is of the opinion that contraventions , or maladministration in the implementation of union law with regard to the use of , and trade in spyware , have taken place in poland , hungary , greece , spain and cyprus; ### 7. is of the opinion that contraventions , or maladministration in the implementation of union law with regard to the use of spyware , have taken place in poland and hungary;


### 7. is of the opinion that contraventions , or maladministration in the implementation of union law with regard to the use of , and trade in spyware , have taken place in poland , hungary , greece , spain and cyprus; ### 7. is of the opinion that contraventions , or maladministration in the implementation of union law with regard to the use of , and trade in spyware , have taken place in poland , hungary , greece and cyprus;


### (31) for the sake of legal certainty , it should be clarified that articles 41 and 42 of regulation (eu) no 1307/2013 allow member states to review , on an annual basis , their decisions on the redistributive payment. ### (31) for the sake of legal certainty , it should be clarified that articles 41 and 42 of regulation (eu) no 1307/2013 allow member states to review and overhaul , on an annual basis , their decisions on the redistributive payment , notifying the commission accordingly regarding any such decisions.


### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 member states shall determine a shorter period of one to three in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension of commitments after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments directly following a commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes.; ### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 member states shall determine period of five to seven years in their rural development programmes. this shall be done , provided that once the rules included in regulation (eu) .../... [cap plan regulation] take effect and that this expenditure is provided in the respective cap strategic plan for [2022 - 2027] , the persons undertaking to carry out operations under this article shall adapt their practices in accordance with the new rules. should the support to beneficiaries fall below the level granted in the previous planning period , beneficiaries shall have the option to opt out of the legal commitment before its original termination.


### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 , member states shall determine a shorter period of one to three years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension of commitments after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments directly following a commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes. ### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 member states may determine a shorter period in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension of commitments after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments directly following a commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes.


### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 , member states shall determine a shorter period of one to three years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension for the maintenance of organic farming after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments concerning maintenance that directly follow the commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes. ### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 , member states shall determine a period of five to seven years in their rural development programmes. this shall be done , provided that once the rules laid down in regulation (eu) .../... [cap plan regulation] take effect and that this expenditure is provided for in the respective cap strategic plan for [2022 - 2027] , the persons undertaking to carry out operations under this article shall adapt their practices in accordance with the new rules. should the support to beneficiaries fall below the level granted in the previous planning period , beneficiaries shall have the option to opt out of the legal commitment before its original termination.


### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 , member states shall determine a shorter period of one to three years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension for the maintenance of organic farming after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments concerning maintenance that directly follow the commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes. ### for new commitments to be undertaken as from 2021 member states may determine a shorter period in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension for the maintenance of organic farming after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments concerning maintenance that directly follow the commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes.


### for new commitments to be undertaken as from 2021 member states shall determine a shorter period of one to three years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual renewal of commitments after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , as from 2021 the renewal shall not go beyond one year. ### for new commitments to be undertaken as from 2021 member states may determine a shorter period in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual renewal of commitments after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , as from 2021 the renewal shall not go beyond one year.


### (1) in article 25 , the following third subparagraph is added: ### deleted


### 12. for calendar year 2021 , member states may decide to apply further internal convergence by applying paragraph 11 to the respective year.; ### 12. for calendar years during the transitional period , member states may decide to apply further internal convergence by applying paragraph 11 to the respective year.;


### 12. for calendar year 2021 , member states may decide to apply further internal convergence by applying paragraph 11 to the respective year. ### 12. for the whole of the period of application of this regulation , member states shall apply further internal convergence by applying paragraph 11 to the respective year.


### 2. the union shall finance the measures provided for in chapters iii and iv up to an amount of eur 23 000 000. ### 2. the union shall finance the measures provided for in chapters iii and iv up to an amount of eur 23 930 000.


### 3. the amount allocated to finance the specific supply arrangements referred to in chapter iii shall not exceed eur 6 830 000.' . ### 3. the amount allocated to finance the specific supply arrangements referred to in chapter iii shall not exceed eur 7 110 000


### by 1 august 2020 , member states may decide to make available , as additional support financed under the eafrd in financial year 2022 , up to 15 % of their annual national ceilings for calendar year 2021 set out in annex ii to this regulation. as a result , the corresponding amount shall no longer be available for granting direct payments. that decision shall be notified to the commission by 1 august 2020 and shall set out the percentage chosen. ### by 31 december 2020 , member states may decide to make available , as additional support financed under the eafrd in financial year 2022 , up to 15 % of their annual national ceilings for calendar year 2021 set out in annex ii to this regulation. as a result , the corresponding amount shall no longer be available for granting direct payments. that decision shall be notified to the commission by 31 december 2020 and shall set out the percentage chosen.


### by 1 august 2020 , member states which do not take the decision referred to in paragraph 1 for financial year 2022 , may decide to make available as direct payments up to 15 % , or in the case of bulgaria , estonia , spain , latvia , lithuania , poland , portugal , romania , slovakia , finland and sweden up to 25 % , of the amount allocated to support financed under the eafrd in financial year 2022 by union legislation adopted after the adoption of council regulation (eu) [xxxx/xxxx]*[mff]. as a result , the corresponding amount shall no longer be available for support financed under the eafrd. that decision shall be notified to the commission by 1 august 2020 and shall set out the percentage chosen. ### by 31 december 2020 , member states which do not take the decision referred to in paragraph 1 for financial year 2022 , may decide to make available as direct payments up to 15 % , or in the case of bulgaria , estonia , spain , latvia , lithuania , poland , portugal , romania , slovakia , finland and sweden up to 25 % , of the amount allocated to support financed under the eafrd in financial year 2022 by union legislation adopted after the adoption of council regulation (eu) [xxxx/xxxx]*[mff]. as a result , the corresponding amount shall no longer be available for support financed under the eafrd. that decision shall be notified to the commission by 31 december 2020 and shall set out the percentage chosen.


### a. whereas the principle of equality between women and men is a core value of the eu , enshrined in the treaties and the charter of fundamental rights of the european union; whereas gender mainstreaming should therefore be implemented and integrated as a horizontal principle in all eu activities and policies; ### a. whereas the principle of equality between women and men is a core value of the eu , enshrined in the treaties and the charter of fundamental rights of the european union;


### a. whereas the principle of equality between women and men is a core value of the eu , enshrined in the treaties and the charter of fundamental rights of the european union; whereas gender mainstreaming should therefore be implemented and integrated as a horizontal principle in all eu activities and policies; ### a. whereas the principle of equality between women and men is a core value of the eu , enshrined in the treaties and the charter of fundamental rights of the european union; whereas gender mainstreaming should therefore be implemented and integrated as a horizontal principle in all eu activities and policies and eu-funded projects;


### b. whereas cohesion policy is as an important policy tool to support gender equality; ### b. whereas cohesion policy is as an important policy tool that has proven its relevance by achieving significant progress towards equality between citizens and territorial balance;


### c. whereas promoting gender equality is important to reduce regional economic and social disparities and for ensuring the long-term sustainable development of regions; ### c. whereas equality , be it between men and women , regions or generations , among others , is important to reduce regional economic and social disparities and for ensuring the long-term sustainable development of regions;


### c. whereas promoting gender equality is important to reduce regional economic and social disparities and for ensuring the long-term sustainable development of regions; ### c. whereas promoting gender equality is important to reduce local and regional economic and social disparities as well as for ensuring the long-term sustainable development of regions;


### d. whereas the involvement of local and regional authorities , gender equality institutions and non-governmental organisations in partnership agreements and monitoring committees is still insufficient; ### d. whereas the involvement of local and regional authorities , gender equality institutions , university establishments and non-governmental organisations in partnership agreements and monitoring committees is still insufficient;


### d. whereas the provision of care is of the utmost importance in enabling women to remain active in the labour market; ### d. whereas the provision of care is of the utmost importance in enabling women to remain active in the labour market as they are mostly involved in care responsibilities; whereas in light of emerging demographic trends , such as ageing societies , lower birth rates and consequently the decline of the working age population , the need for formal and informal long-term care services becomes more important than ever; whereas covid-19 has exposed a long-standing problem in care provision in the eu; whereas care needs to be viewed holistically along a continuum , from childcare to afterschool care , to care for those with disabilities to care for older persons;


### e. whereas gender-disaggregated data and the adoption of appropriate selection procedures are considered useful for promoting gender equality; ### e. whereas the study and comparison of disaggregated data , based on reliable and verified sources , and the adoption of appropriate selection procedures are considered useful for promoting the identification of possible inequalities or injustices on which to act and also to develop effective policies to uphold equal rights and freedoms among citizens;


### f. whereas policy coherence is lacking in the area of gender equality , and whereas a unified system facilitating an identical understanding and implementation of gender mainstreaming in the eu institutions does not yet exist; ### deleted


### h. whereas the eu recovery fund focuses on economic stimuli for sectors with a high share of male employment , which risks increasing gender inequalities in employment; ### h. whereas the eu recovery fund focuses on economic stimuli for sectors that have been hit particularly hard by the health crisis and the subsequent economic crisis and whereas the impact on european society as a whole will therefore have long-term effects on the education , employability and future of these citizens; commends the rapid response of the european institutions and the willingness to support european society;


### 1. stresses the importance of cohesion policy in promoting gender equality and the eu gender equality strategy; recalls that all policy goals need appropriate resources dedicated to their implementation; ### 1. stresses the importance of cohesion policy in promoting equal opportunities between people and between regions and the eu gender equality strategy; recalls that all policy goals need appropriate resources dedicated to their implementation;


### 1. stresses the importance of cohesion policy in promoting gender equality and the eu gender equality strategy; recalls that all policy goals need appropriate resources dedicated to their implementation; ### 1. stresses the importance of cohesion policy in promoting gender equality and the eu gender equality strategy; recalls that all policy goals need appropriate and sustainable resources dedicated to their implementation;


### 2. strongly believes that gender equality is still mainly addressed in a general manner and limited to the policy domains of the european social fund (esf) , as well as in the context analysis and programming phase , while more attention is needed in the implementation , monitoring and evaluation phases; ### 2. strongly believes that gender equality is still mainly addressed in a general manner and limited to the policy domains of the european social fund (esf) , as well as in the context analysis and programming phase , while more attention is needed in the implementation , monitoring and evaluation phases; recommends that the member states take gender equality measures into consideration when developing and approving operational programmes;


### 3. believes that eu rules should be written in a clear and explicit way , and be binding in relation to gender equality; ### 3. considers that eu rules should be written in a clear way that facilitates their application always for the benefit of citizens;


### 3. calls on the member states and their respective authorities to share good practices in the application of gender mainstreaming through knowledge sharing , technical assistance , training and awareness raising; ### 3. calls on the member states and their respective authorities to share good practices in the application of gender mainstreaming through knowledge sharing , technical assistance , training and awareness raising; encourages the decision-making committees to adopt gender-balance within their boards to improve diverse decisions and invites the member states and their respective authorities to support such a gender-balanced appointment within decision-making committees;


### 4. stresses the role of cohesion policy funding , in the light of the unprecedented impact of the covid-19 crisis , in supporting , facilitating and promoting programmes that , through consideration of the special needs of women , including rural women , encourage women’s employment and entrepreneurship , improve their access to land , credit and financial instruments , boost their skills and performance through education , training and advisory services , increase their participation in local action groups and the development of local partnerships , and address infrastructural deficiencies , including in relation to the provision of different types of care; stresses that cooperation at european level , together with the efficient use of eu funds , can contribute to the development of high-quality , accessible and affordable care services that are vitally important to maintaining women’s labour market activity. ### 4. stresses the role of cohesion policy funding , in the light of the unprecedented impact of the covid-19 crisis , in supporting , facilitating and promoting programmes that , through consideration of the special needs of women , including rural women and those living in poorer , mountainous and outermost regions , encourage women’s employment and entrepreneurship , facilitate their childcare duties , enhance work-life balance and wellbeing , improve their access to land , credit and financial instruments , boost their skills and performance through education , training and advisory services , increase their participation in decision making on national and regional level , in local action groups and the development of local partnerships , and address infrastructural deficiencies , including in relation to the provision of different types of care; stresses that cooperation at european level , together with the efficient use of eu funds , can contribute to the development of high-quality , accessible and affordable care services that are vitally important to maintaining women’s labour market activity;


### 5. considers regrettable the downgrading of gender equality in the public debate and policy agenda at eu and national level in post-2020 cohesion policy; ### 5. considers that the representativeness of all social groups is adequately reflected in the public sphere , although it might be appropriate to highlight the disappearance from the debate of the elderly , who are not consulted or represented to an extent commensurate with the impact that public policies have on their daily lives , and calls for this to be taken into account in the policy agenda at eu and national level in post-2020 cohesion policy;


### 6. emphasises the importance of a coordinated governance framework on gender equality , national guidelines and technical support , and stronger scrutiny at eu level after the adoption of operational programmes; ### 6. emphasises the importance of a coordinated governance framework between all administrations involved as well as managers , national guidelines and technical support , and stronger scrutiny at eu level after the adoption of operational programmes; calls , furthermore , for account to be taken of the connection with the national plans resulting from the recovery plan for the development of the economic and social development objectives of these programmes;


### 7. points out the insufficient training and capacity-building of managing authorities and implementing partners as regards the gender dimension of the european structural and investment funds (esi funds) , as well as insufficient gender-oriented monitoring and evaluation systems; ### 7. considers it necessary to boost skills and capacity-building in managing authorities and implementing partners as regards the evaluation of comparative equality data from the european structural and investment funds (esi funds) , as well as the insufficient monitoring and evaluation systems as regards managing and disaggregating useful data aimed at identifying possible inequalities between citizens;


### 7. points out the insufficient training and capacity-building of managing authorities and implementing partners as regards the gender dimension of the european structural and investment funds (esi funds) , as well as insufficient gender-oriented monitoring and evaluation systems; ### 7. points out the insufficient involvement of managing authorities and implementing partners in training and capacity-building as regards the gender dimension of the european structural and investment funds (esi funds) , as well as insufficient gender-oriented monitoring and evaluation systems;


### 8. stresses the lack of a binding gender equality strategy at national and regional level and a lack of awareness as regards the benefits of pursuing gender equality for socio-economic growth and sustainable development; ### 8. stresses the lack of awareness as regards the benefits of pursuing equal opportunities for women and men for socio-economic growth and sustainable development;


### 8. stresses the lack of a binding gender equality strategy at national and regional level and a lack of awareness as regards the benefits of pursuing gender equality for socio-economic growth and sustainable development; ### 8. stresses the need for a gender equality strategy at national and regional level and awareness-raising programmes on the benefits of pursuing gender equality for socio-economic growth and sustainable development;


### 9. encourages the member states to coordinate closely with local and regional authorities and civil society partners , in particular in the framework of the partnership agreement and when drafting the partnership principle , to take into account challenges related to effective equality policies at local and regional level; ### 9. encourages the member states to coordinate closely with local and regional authorities and civil society partners from university and employers and trade union circles , in particular in the framework of the partnership agreement and when drafting the partnership principle , to take into account challenges related to effective equality policies at local and regional level;


### 9. encourages the member states to coordinate closely with local and regional authorities and civil society partners , in particular in the framework of the partnership agreement and when drafting the partnership principle , to take into account challenges related to effective equality policies at local and regional level; ### 9. encourages the member states to coordinate closely with local and regional authorities and economic and civil society partners , in particular in the framework of the partnership agreement and when drafting the partnership principle in a cross-cutting manner , to take into account challenges related to effective equality policies at local and regional level;


### 10. considers that programme stakeholders and monitoring committees still lack expertise on the implementation of a gender perspective in concrete projects , especially in european regional development fund (erdf) interventions; considers there to be a lack of guidelines , training programmes and concrete examples of good practice to address this; ### 10. considers that programme stakeholders and monitoring committees should be equipped with clearer indicators of programme efficiency and effectiveness , in line with the objectives set , especially in european regional development fund (erdf) interventions;


### 10. considers that programme stakeholders and monitoring committees still lack expertise on the implementation of a gender perspective in concrete projects , especially in european regional development fund (erdf) interventions; considers there to be a lack of guidelines , training programmes and concrete examples of good practice to address this; ### 10. considers that programme stakeholders and monitoring committees have limited expertise when it comes to the implementation of a gender perspective in concrete projects , especially in european regional development fund (erdf) interventions; considers that the guidelines , training programmes and concrete examples of good practice to address this remain limited in volume;


### 13. stresses that cohesion policy needs to support equal access to training for women in order to bridge the digital gender gap and to support the green and digital transitions; ### 13. stresses that cohesion policy needs to support equal access to training and employment for women in order to bridge the digital gender gap and to support the green and digital transitions;


### 14. underlines the crucial role of cohesion policy in investing in high-quality public services , both for combating gender inequalities and for building social resilience and coping with economic , social and health crises; ### 14. underlines the crucial role of cohesion policy in investing in high-quality public services , both for combating the various inequalities that may exist and for building social resilience and coping with economic , social and health crises;


### 16. calls for compulsory requirements on gender equality objectives to be introduced in all post-2020 operational programmes , with specific and interdisciplinary measures to be translated into all operations; ### 16. calls for careful account to continue to be taken of the objectives of equality and of greater opportunities in all post-2020 operational programmes , with specific and interdisciplinary measures to be translated into all operations;


### 17. strongly supports the ex ante requirement of developing a national gender equality strategy to underpin cohesion policy interventions; ### 17. supports the possibility for each member state , in the free exercise of its powers , to develop a national equality strategy that can be taken into account in connection with cohesion policy interventions;


### 17. strongly supports the ex ante requirement of developing a national gender equality strategy to underpin cohesion policy interventions; ### 17. strongly supports the requirement for each member state to have a national gender equality strategy to support cohesion policy interventions;


### 18. stresses the importance of partnerships with gender equality bodies and their involvement in all programme phases; believes that all bodies created in the area of cohesion policy should be gender balanced; ### 18. stresses the importance of the cooperation of civil society and its involvement in all programme phases;


### 19. underlines that a gender impact assessment should be a mandatory part of member states’ evaluations on how the funds are spent and whether compliance with gender equality targets is respected; ### 19. underlines that an assessment of possible inequalities should form part of member states’ evaluations on how the funds are spent and whether compliance with established targets is respected;


### 20. recalls that gender mainstreaming must be applied in all stages of the budgetary process; stresses the need to track spending on gender equality in all budget lines , not just in targeted measures , and to assess the final impact of the budgetary lines on gender equality; requests that the commission , in cooperation with the european court of auditors , propose a methodology to that end; recommends the use of criteria such as the national median wage and the median annual gross income in purchasing power parity; ### deleted


### 21. calls on all institutions to provide guidance documents and training sessions , so as to disseminate concrete examples of good practices on gender mainstreaming; stresses , moreover , that at the project selection stage the criteria for gender mainstreaming should be strengthened through higher scoring and requirements for more practical actions; recommends making use of the existing tools developed by the european institute for gender equality (eige) such as its toolkit for gender budgeting in the esi funds; ### 21. calls on all institutions to provide guidance documents and training sessions , so as to disseminate concrete examples of good practices on integration , sound management and equality;


### 21. calls on all institutions to provide guidance documents and training sessions , so as to disseminate concrete examples of good practices on gender mainstreaming; stresses , moreover , that at the project selection stage the criteria for gender mainstreaming should be strengthened through higher scoring and requirements for more practical actions; recommends making use of the existing tools developed by the european institute for gender equality (eige) such as its toolkit for gender budgeting in the esi funds; ### 21. calls on all institutions to provide guidance documents and training sessions , so as to disseminate concrete examples of good practices on gender mainstreaming; stresses , moreover , that at the project selection stage the criteria for gender mainstreaming should be strengthened through higher scoring and requirements for more practical actions , broadly geared to creating new jobs and ensuring the same pay for the same work; recommends making use of the existing tools developed by the european institute for gender equality (eige) such as its toolkit for gender budgeting in the esi funds;


### (1) the commission adopted a communication on the european green deal on 11 december 20199 , drawing its roadmap towards a new growth policy for europe and setting ambitious objectives to counter climate change and for environmental protection. in line with the objective to achieve climate neutrality in the union by 2050 in an effective and fair manner , the european green deal announced a just transition mechanism to provide means for facing the climate challenge while leaving no one behind. the most vulnerable regions and people are the most exposed to the harmful effects of climate change and environmental degradation. at the same time , managing the transition requires significant structural changes. ### (1) the commission adopted a communication on the european green deal on 11 december 20199 , drawing its roadmap towards a new growth policy for europe and setting ambitious objectives to counter climate change and for environmental protection. in line with the objective to achieve climate neutrality in the union by 2050 in an effective and fair manner , the european green deal announced a just transition mechanism to provide means for facing the climate challenge while leaving no one behind. the most vulnerable regions and people are the most exposed to the harmful effects of climate change and environmental degradation. at the same time , managing the transition requires significant structural changes and while member states have different starting position , the least developed regions , outermost regions , mountainous , islands , sparsely populated , rural , remote and geographically disadvantaged areas with small population are those where the transition in energy towards climate neutrality is more difficult to implement.


### (1) the commission adopted a communication on the european green deal on 11 december 20199 , drawing its roadmap towards a new growth policy for europe and setting ambitious objectives to counter climate change and for environmental protection. in line with the objective to achieve climate neutrality in the union by 2050 in an effective and fair manner , the european green deal announced a just transition mechanism to provide means for facing the climate challenge while leaving no one behind. the most vulnerable regions and people are the most exposed to the harmful effects of climate change and environmental degradation. at the same time , managing the transition requires significant structural changes. ### (1) the commission adopted a communication on the european green deal on 11 december 20199 , drawing its roadmap towards a new growth policy for europe and setting ambitious objectives to counter climate change and for environmental protection. in line with the objective to achieve climate neutrality in the union by 2050 in an effective and fair manner , the european green deal announced a just transition mechanism to provide support and means for facing the climate challenge while leaving no one behind. the most vulnerable regions and people are the most exposed to the harmful effects of climate change and environmental degradation leading to depopulation of the regions affected. at the same time , managing the transition requires significant structural changes.


### (1) the commission adopted a communication on the european green deal on 11 december 20199 , drawing its roadmap towards a new growth policy for europe and setting ambitious objectives to counter climate change and for environmental protection. in line with the objective to achieve climate neutrality in the union by 2050 in an effective and fair manner , the european green deal announced a just transition mechanism to provide means for facing the climate challenge while leaving no one behind. the most vulnerable regions and people are the most exposed to the harmful effects of climate change and environmental degradation. at the same time , managing the transition requires significant structural changes. ### (1) the commission adopted a communication on the european green deal on 11 december 20199 , drawing its roadmap towards an allegedly new growth policy for europe and setting ambitious objectives to counter climate change and for environmental protection. in line with the objective to achieve climate neutrality in the union in an effective and fair manner , the european green deal announced a just transition mechanism to provide means for facing the transition towards a climate-neutral economy while leaving no one behind. the most vulnerable regions and people are the most exposed to the harmful effects of climate change and environmental degradation. at the same time , managing the transition requires significant structural changes.


### (3) the proposal for establishing the just transition fund was adopted by the commission on 14 january 202011 . for the better programming and implementation of the fund , territorial just transition plans are to be adopted , setting out the key steps and timeline of the transition process and identifying the territories most negatively affected by the transition towards a climate neutral economy and with less capacity to deal with the transition challenges. ### (3) the proposal for establishing the just transition fund was adopted by the commission on 14 january 202011 . for the better programming and implementation of the fund , territorial just transition plans are to be adopted , setting out the key steps and timeline of the transition process and identifying the territories most negatively affected by the transition towards a climate neutral economy and with less capacity to deal with the transition damages.


### (4) a public sector loan facility (the ‘facility’) should be provided. it constitutes the third pillar of the just transition mechanism , supporting public sector entities in their investments. such investments should meet the development needs resulting from the transition challenges described in the territorial just transition plans as adopted by the commission. the activities envisaged for support should be consistent with and complement those supported under the other two pillars of the just transition mechanism. ### (4) a public sector loan facility (the ‘facility’) should be provided. it constitutes the third pillar of the just transition mechanism , supporting public sector entities in their investments. such investments should meet the development needs resulting from the transition challenges described in the territorial just transition plans as adopted by the commission , bearing in mind the characteristics and potential of the area to be developed. the activities envisaged for support should be consistent with and complement those supported under the other two pillars of the just transition mechanism.


### (4) a public sector loan facility (the ‘facility’) should be provided. it constitutes the third pillar of the just transition mechanism , supporting public sector entities in their investments. such investments should meet the development needs resulting from the transition challenges described in the territorial just transition plans as adopted by the commission. the activities envisaged for support should be consistent with and complement those supported under the other two pillars of the just transition mechanism. ### (4) a public sector loan facility (the ‘facility’) should be provided. it constitutes the third pillar of the just transition mechanism , supporting public sector entities in their investments. such investments should meet the development needs resulting from the transition challenges described in the territorial just transition plans as adopted by the commission and should support the overarching objectives of the european green deal , in particular the “do not significant harm" principle referred to in regulation (eu) 2020/852 of the european parliament and of the council1a , and be in line with the framework for sustainable activities set out in eu taxonomy established by that regulation. the activities envisaged for support should be consistent with and complement those supported under the other two pillars of the just transition mechanism , in order to ensure that all three pillars are working towards the same objectives and should not crowd out private sector investment that will be facilitated through the just transition mechanism.


### (4) a public sector loan facility (the ‘facility’) should be provided. it constitutes the third pillar of the just transition mechanism , supporting public sector entities in their investments. such investments should meet the development needs resulting from the transition challenges described in the territorial just transition plans as adopted by the commission. the activities envisaged for support should be consistent with and complement those supported under the other two pillars of the just transition mechanism. ### (4) a public sector loan facility (the ‘facility’) should be provided. it constitutes the third pillar of the just transition mechanism , supporting public sector entities in their investments. such investments should meet the development needs resulting from the transition challenges described in the territorial just transition plans as adopted by the commission , and be in line with the objective of a climate-neutral union by 2050. the activities envisaged for support should be consistent with and complement those supported under the other two pillars of the just transition mechanism.


### (4) a public sector loan facility (the ‘facility’) should be provided. it constitutes the third pillar of the just transition mechanism , supporting public sector entities in their investments. such investments should meet the development needs resulting from the transition challenges described in the territorial just transition plans as adopted by the commission. the activities envisaged for support should be consistent with and complement those supported under the other two pillars of the just transition mechanism. ### (4) a public sector loan facility (the ‘facility’) should be provided. it constitutes the third pillar of the just transition mechanism , supporting public sector entities in their investments. such investments should meet the development needs resulting from the transition damages described in the territorial just transition plans as adopted by the commission. the activities envisaged for support should be consistent with and complement those supported under the other two pillars of the just transition mechanism.


### (4) a public sector loan facility (the ‘facility’) should be provided. it constitutes the third pillar of the just transition mechanism , supporting public sector entities in their investments. such investments should meet the development needs resulting from the transition challenges described in the territorial just transition plans as adopted by the commission. the activities envisaged for support should be consistent with and complement those supported under the other two pillars of the just transition mechanism. ### (4) a public sector loan facility (the ‘facility’) should be provided. it constitutes the third pillar of the just transition mechanism , supporting public sector entities in their investments. such investments should meet the development needs resulting from the transition challenges described in the territorial just transition plans as adopted by the commission. the activities envisaged for support should be consistent with and complement those supported under the other two pillars of the just transition mechanism in order to ensure that all three pillars are working towards the same objectives. the commission should monitor the complementarity between the three pillars on an ongoing basis and aim to develop synergies where possible.


### (5) in order to enhance the economic diversification of territories impacted by the transition , the facility should cover a wide range of investments , on condition that they contribute to meet the development needs in the transition towards a climate neutral economy , as described in the territorial just transition plans. the investments supported may cover energy and transport infrastructure , district heating networks , green mobility , smart waste management , clean energy and energy efficiency measures including renovations and conversions of buildings , support to transition to a circular economy , land restoration and decontamination , as well as up- and re-skilling , training and social infrastructure , including social housing. infrastructure developments may also include solutions leading to their enhanced resilience to withstand disasters. comprehensive investment approach should be favoured in particular for territories with important transition needs. investments in other sectors could also be supported if they are consistent with the adopted territorial just transition plans. by supporting investments that do not generate sufficient revenues , the facility aims at providing public sector entities with additional resources necessary to address the social , economic and environmental challenges resulting from the adjustment to climate transition. in order to help identify investments with a high positive environmental impact eligible under the facility , the eu taxonomy on environmentally sustainable economic activities may be used. ### (5) in order to enhance the economic diversification of territories impacted by the transition , the facility should cover a wide range of investments , on condition that they contribute to meet the development needs in the transition towards a climate neutral economy , as described in the territorial just transition plans. the investments supported may cover energy and transport infrastructure , including infrastructure for the bridging technology replacing coal , lignite , peat or oil shale , district heating networks , green mobility , smart waste management , clean energy and energy efficiency measures including renovations and conversions of buildings , support to transition to a circular economy , land restoration and decontamination , as well as up- and re-skilling , training and social infrastructure , including social housing. infrastructure developments may also include solutions leading to their enhanced resilience to withstand disasters. comprehensive investment approach should be favoured in particular for territories with important transition needs. investments in other sectors could also be supported if they are consistent with the adopted territorial just transition plans. by supporting investments that do not generate sufficient revenues , the facility aims at providing public sector entities with additional resources necessary to address the social , economic and environmental challenges resulting from the adjustment to climate transition. in order to help identify investments with a high positive environmental impact eligible under the facility , the eu taxonomy on environmentally sustainable economic activities may be used.


### (5) in order to enhance the economic diversification of territories impacted by the transition , the facility should cover a wide range of investments , on condition that they contribute to meet the development needs in the transition towards a climate neutral economy , as described in the territorial just transition plans. the investments supported may cover energy and transport infrastructure , district heating networks , green mobility , smart waste management , clean energy and energy efficiency measures including renovations and conversions of buildings , support to transition to a circular economy , land restoration and decontamination , as well as up- and re-skilling , training and social infrastructure , including social housing. infrastructure developments may also include solutions leading to their enhanced resilience to withstand disasters. comprehensive investment approach should be favoured in particular for territories with important transition needs. investments in other sectors could also be supported if they are consistent with the adopted territorial just transition plans. by supporting investments that do not generate sufficient revenues , the facility aims at providing public sector entities with additional resources necessary to address the social , economic and environmental challenges resulting from the adjustment to climate transition. in order to help identify investments with a high positive environmental impact eligible under the facility , the eu taxonomy on environmentally sustainable economic activities may be used. ### (5) in order to enhance the economic diversification of territories impacted by the transition , the facility should cover a wide range of investments , on condition that they contribute to meet the development needs in the transition towards a climate neutral economy , as described in the territorial just transition plans. the investments supported may cover energy and transport infrastructure , district heating networks , green mobility , smart waste management , clean energy and energy efficiency measures including renovations and conversions of buildings , support to transition to a circular economy , land restoration and decontamination , as well as up- and re-skilling , training and social infrastructure , including social housing. infrastructure developments may also include solutions leading to their enhanced resilience to withstand disasters and the coordination of crisis response capacities. comprehensive investment approach should be favoured in particular for territories with important transition needs. investments in other sectors could also be supported if they are consistent with the adopted territorial just transition plans. by supporting investments that do not generate sufficient revenues , the facility aims at providing public sector entities with additional resources necessary to address the social , economic and environmental challenges resulting from the adjustment to climate transition. in order to help identify investments with a high positive environmental impact eligible under the facility , the eu taxonomy on environmentally sustainable economic activities may be used.


### (5) in order to enhance the economic diversification of territories impacted by the transition , the facility should cover a wide range of investments , on condition that they contribute to meet the development needs in the transition towards a climate neutral economy , as described in the territorial just transition plans. the investments supported may cover energy and transport infrastructure , district heating networks , green mobility , smart waste management , clean energy and energy efficiency measures including renovations and conversions of buildings , support to transition to a circular economy , land restoration and decontamination , as well as up- and re-skilling , training and social infrastructure , including social housing. infrastructure developments may also include solutions leading to their enhanced resilience to withstand disasters. comprehensive investment approach should be favoured in particular for territories with important transition needs. investments in other sectors could also be supported if they are consistent with the adopted territorial just transition plans. by supporting investments that do not generate sufficient revenues , the facility aims at providing public sector entities with additional resources necessary to address the social , economic and environmental challenges resulting from the adjustment to climate transition. in order to help identify investments with a high positive environmental impact eligible under the facility , the eu taxonomy on environmentally sustainable economic activities may be used. ### (5) in order to enhance the economic diversification of territories impacted by the transition , the facility should cover a wide range of investments , on condition that they contribute to meet the development needs in the transition towards a climate neutral and circular economy , as described in the territorial just transition plans. the investments supported may cover low carbon energy and transport infrastructure , district heating networks , green mobility , smart waste and water management and infrastructure , clean energy and energy efficiency measures including renovations and conversions of buildings , support to transition to a circular economy , land restoration and decontamination , as well as up- and re-skilling , training and social infrastructure , including social housing. infrastructure developments may also include solutions leading to their enhanced resilience to withstand disasters. comprehensive investment approach should be favoured in particular for territories with important transition needs. investments in other sectors could also be supported if they are consistent with the adopted territorial just transition plans and directly benefit the communities in the affected regions and reduce the socio-economic costs of the transition towards a climate-neutral europe by 2050. by supporting investments that do not generate sufficient revenues , the facility aims at providing public sector entities with additional resources necessary to address the social , economic and environmental challenges resulting from the adjustment to climate transition. in order to help identify investments with a high positive environmental impact eligible under the facility , the eu taxonomy on environmentally sustainable economic activities shall be used and the "do not significant harm" principle referred to in regulation (eu) 2020/852 adhered to.


### (5) in order to enhance the economic diversification of territories impacted by the transition , the facility should cover a wide range of investments , on condition that they contribute to meet the development needs in the transition towards a climate neutral economy , as described in the territorial just transition plans. the investments supported may cover energy and transport infrastructure , district heating networks , green mobility , smart waste management , clean energy and energy efficiency measures including renovations and conversions of buildings , support to transition to a circular economy , land restoration and decontamination , as well as up- and re-skilling , training and social infrastructure , including social housing. infrastructure developments may also include solutions leading to their enhanced resilience to withstand disasters. comprehensive investment approach should be favoured in particular for territories with important transition needs. investments in other sectors could also be supported if they are consistent with the adopted territorial just transition plans. by supporting investments that do not generate sufficient revenues , the facility aims at providing public sector entities with additional resources necessary to address the social , economic and environmental challenges resulting from the adjustment to climate transition. in order to help identify investments with a high positive environmental impact eligible under the facility , the eu taxonomy on environmentally sustainable economic activities may be used. ### (5) in order to enhance the economic diversification of territories impacted by the transition , the facility should cover a wide range of investments , on condition that they contribute to meet the development needs in the transition towards a climate neutral economy , as described in the territorial just transition plans. the investments supported may cover energy and transport infrastructure , district heating networks , local public transport , waste management , clean energy and energy efficiency measures including renovations and conversions of buildings , support to transition to a circular economy , land restoration and decontamination , as well as up- and re-skilling , training and social infrastructure , including social housing. infrastructure developments may also include solutions leading to their enhanced resilience to withstand disasters. comprehensive investment approach should be favoured in particular for territories with important transition needs. investments in other sectors could also be supported if they are consistent with the adopted territorial just transition plans. by supporting investments that do not generate sufficient revenues , the facility aims at providing public sector entities with additional resources necessary to address the social , economic and environmental damages resulting from the adjustment to the transition towards a climate-neutral economy.


### (5) in order to enhance the economic diversification of territories impacted by the transition , the facility should cover a wide range of investments , on condition that they contribute to meet the development needs in the transition towards a climate neutral economy , as described in the territorial just transition plans. the investments supported may cover energy and transport infrastructure , district heating networks , green mobility , smart waste management , clean energy and energy efficiency measures including renovations and conversions of buildings , support to transition to a circular economy , land restoration and decontamination , as well as up- and re-skilling , training and social infrastructure , including social housing. infrastructure developments may also include solutions leading to their enhanced resilience to withstand disasters. comprehensive investment approach should be favoured in particular for territories with important transition needs. investments in other sectors could also be supported if they are consistent with the adopted territorial just transition plans. by supporting investments that do not generate sufficient revenues , the facility aims at providing public sector entities with additional resources necessary to address the social , economic and environmental challenges resulting from the adjustment to climate transition. in order to help identify investments with a high positive environmental impact eligible under the facility , the eu taxonomy on environmentally sustainable economic activities may be used. ### (5) in order to enhance the economic diversification of territories impacted by the transition , the facility should cover a wide range of investments , on condition that they contribute to meet the development needs in the transition towards a climate neutral and circular economy , as described in the territorial just transition plans. the investments supported may cover energy and transport infrastructure , district heating networks , green mobility , smart waste management , clean energy and energy efficiency measures including renovations and conversions of buildings , support to transition to a circular economy , land restoration and decontamination , as well as up- and re-skilling , training and social infrastructure , including social housing. infrastructure developments may also include solutions leading to their enhanced resilience to withstand disasters. comprehensive investment approach should be favoured in particular for territories with important transition needs. investments in other sectors could also be supported if they are consistent with the adopted territorial just transition plans. by supporting investments that do not generate sufficient revenues , the facility aims at providing public sector entities with additional resources necessary to address the social , economic and environmental challenges resulting from the adjustment to climate transition. in order to help identify investments with a high positive environmental impact eligible under the facility , the eu taxonomy on environmentally sustainable economic activities should be used , and the "do not significant harm" principle referred to in regulation (eu) 2020/852 adhered to.


### (5) in order to enhance the economic diversification of territories impacted by the transition , the facility should cover a wide range of investments , on condition that they contribute to meet the development needs in the transition towards a climate neutral economy , as described in the territorial just transition plans. the investments supported may cover energy and transport infrastructure , district heating networks , green mobility , smart waste management , clean energy and energy efficiency measures including renovations and conversions of buildings , support to transition to a circular economy , land restoration and decontamination , as well as up- and re-skilling , training and social infrastructure , including social housing. infrastructure developments may also include solutions leading to their enhanced resilience to withstand disasters. comprehensive investment approach should be favoured in particular for territories with important transition needs. investments in other sectors could also be supported if they are consistent with the adopted territorial just transition plans. by supporting investments that do not generate sufficient revenues , the facility aims at providing public sector entities with additional resources necessary to address the social , economic and environmental challenges resulting from the adjustment to climate transition. in order to help identify investments with a high positive environmental impact eligible under the facility , the eu taxonomy on environmentally sustainable economic activities may be used. ### (5) in order to enhance the economic diversification of territories impacted by the transition , the facility should cover a wide range of investments , on condition that they contribute to meet the development needs in the transition towards a climate neutral economy , as described in the territorial just transition plans. the investments supported may cover the deployment of technology and infrastructure for affordable and sustainable energy and the decarbonisation of the transport sector , district heating networks , green mobility , smart waste management , clean energy and energy efficiency measures including renovations and conversions of buildings , urban renewal and regeneration , investments in care facilities , support to transition to a circular economy , land and ecosystem restoration and decontamination , protecting and restoring biodiversity and natural habitats , as well as up-skilling , re-skilling , new skills development and training , with a focus on gender equality , and social infrastructure , including social housing. infrastructure developments may also include solutions leading to their enhanced resilience to withstand disasters. comprehensive investment approach should be favoured in particular for territories with important transition needs. investments in other sectors could also be supported if they are consistent with the adopted territorial just transition plans. by supporting investments that do not generate sufficient revenues , the facility aims at providing public sector entities with additional resources necessary to address the social , economic and environmental challenges resulting from the adjustment to climate transition. in order to help identify investments with a high positive environmental impact eligible under the facility , the eu taxonomy on environmentally sustainable economic activities may be used. technical and administrative assistance will be available in conjunction with such investments.