### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users or end users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or end users;


### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights or obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or


### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core and ancillary platform services , respectively pursuant to article 3 and article 2 (point 14) , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the gatekeeper itself or any third party belonging to the same undertaking , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature.


### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , including through by any form of behavioural techniques and interface design that would undermine the effectiveness of articles 5 and 6.


### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , including by any form of behavioural techniques and interface design that would undermine the effectiveness of articles 5 and 6.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain at the level of their own services or products the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. in case consent is directly expressed by the end-user at the level of the services offered by the business user through the relevant core platform service , it shall prevail over any consent provided at the gatekeeper level.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or , if the consent is not obtained , to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain at the level of their own services or products the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. when consent is directly expressed by the end-user at the level of the services offered by the business user through the relevant core platform service , it shall prevail over any consent provided at the gatekeeper level.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions , accessibility or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or prejudice the exercise of those rights or choices.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or obstruct or make discriminatory the exercise of those rights or choices.


### obligation to inform about concentrations ### prior notification of intended concentrations


### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission and competent national authorities of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules.


### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall notify to the commission any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules.


### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission and competent national authorities of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation(ec) no 139/2004 irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules.


### a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest. ### a gatekeeper shall notify the commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest.


### a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest. ### a gatekeeper shall notify to the commission such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest in accordance with the procedure set out in regulation (ec) no 139/2004.


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of business users and end users or consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually.


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers and any other digital technology technique used to entice users to engage in certain actions or predict their actions that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually.


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers and any other digital technology technique used to entice users to engage incertain actions or predict their actions that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually.


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### 1. within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually.


### 1. when the commission intends to carry out a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of decisions pursuant to articles 15 , 16 and 17 , it shall adopt a decision opening a market investigation. ### 1. when the commission intends to carry out a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of decisions pursuant to articles 15 , 16 , 16a and 17 , it shall adopt a decision opening a market investigation.


### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. the commission must conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6). ### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within three months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6).


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but , after giving the provider the possibility to express its views , it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4.


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper obligations laid down in article 5 and article 6(1) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4.


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper relevant obligations laid down in article 5 and article 6(1) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4.


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5 and article 6 , as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4.


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### deleted


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5 and article 6 , as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4.


### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within nine months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are effective and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.


### (17) a very significant turnover in the union and the provision of a core platform service in at least three member states constitute compelling indications that the provider of a core platform service has a significant impact on the internal market. this is equally true where a provider of a core platform service in at least three member states has a very significant market capitalisation or equivalent fair market value. therefore , a provider of a core platform service should be presumed to have a significant impact on the internal market where it provides a core platform service in at least three member states and where either its group turnover realised in the eea is equal to or exceeds a specific , high threshold or the market capitalisation of the group is equal to or exceeds a certain high absolute value. for providers of core platform services that belong to undertakings that are not publicly listed , the equivalent fair market value above a certain high absolute value should be referred to. the commission should use its power to adopt delegated acts to develop an objective methodology to calculate that value. a high eea group turnover in conjunction with the threshold of users in the union of core platform services reflects a relatively strong ability to monetise these users. a high market capitalisation relative to the same threshold number of users in the union reflects a relatively significant potential to monetise these users in the near future. this monetisation potential in turn reflects in principle the gateway position of the undertakings concerned. both indicators are in addition reflective of their financial capacity , including their ability to leverage their access to financial markets to reinforce their position. this may for example happen where this superior access is used to acquire other undertakings , which ability has in turn been shown to have potential negative effects on innovation. market capitalisation can also be reflective of the expected future position and effect on the internal market of the providers concerned , notwithstanding a potentially relatively low current turnover. the market capitalisation value can be based on a level that reflects the average market capitalisation of the largest publicly listed undertakings in the union over an appropriate period. ### (17) a very significant turnover in the union constitutes a compelling indication that the provider of a core platform service has a significant impact on the internal market or a significant sector thereof. therefore , a provider of a core platform service should be presumed to have a significant impact on the internal market or a significant sector thereof where either its group turnover realised in the eea is equal to or exceeds a specific , high threshold or the market capitalisation of the group is equal to or exceeds a certain high absolute value. for providers of core platform services that belong to undertakings that are not publicly listed , the equivalent fair market value above a certain high absolute value should be referred to. the commission should use its power to adopt delegated acts to develop an objective methodology to calculate that value. a high eea group turnover in conjunction with the threshold of users in the union of core platform services reflects a relatively strong ability to monetise these users. a high market capitalisation relative to the same threshold number of users in the union reflects a relatively significant potential to monetise these users in the near future. this monetisation potential in turn reflects in principle the gateway position of the undertakings concerned. both indicators are in addition reflective of their financial capacity , including their ability to leverage their access to financial markets to reinforce their position. this may for example happen where this superior access is used to acquire other undertakings , which ability has in turn been shown to have potential negative effects on innovation. market capitalisation can also be reflective of the expected future position and effect on the internal market of the providers concerned , notwithstanding a potentially relatively low current turnover. the market capitalisation value can be based on a level that reflects the average market capitalisation of the largest publicly listed undertakings in the union over an appropriate period.


### (17) a very significant turnover in the union and the provision of a core platform service in at least three member states constitute compelling indications that the provider of a core platform service has a significant impact on the internal market. this is equally true where a provider of a core platform service in at least three member states has a very significant market capitalisation or equivalent fair market value. therefore , a provider of a core platform service should be presumed to have a significant impact on the internal market where it provides a core platform service in at least three member states and where either its group turnover realised in the eea is equal to or exceeds a specific , high threshold or the market capitalisation of the group is equal to or exceeds a certain high absolute value. for providers of core platform services that belong to undertakings that are not publicly listed , the equivalent fair market value above a certain high absolute value should be referred to. the commission should use its power to adopt delegated acts to develop an objective methodology to calculate that value. a high eea group turnover in conjunction with the threshold of users in the union of core platform services reflects a relatively strong ability to monetise these users. a high market capitalisation relative to the same threshold number of users in the union reflects a relatively significant potential to monetise these users in the near future. this monetisation potential in turn reflects in principle the gateway position of the undertakings concerned. both indicators are in addition reflective of their financial capacity , including their ability to leverage their access to financial markets to reinforce their position. this may for example happen where this superior access is used to acquire other undertakings , which ability has in turn been shown to have potential negative effects on innovation. market capitalisation can also be reflective of the expected future position and effect on the internal market of the providers concerned , notwithstanding a potentially relatively low current turnover. the market capitalisation value can be based on a level that reflects the average market capitalisation of the largest publicly listed undertakings in the union over an appropriate period. ### (17) a very significant turnover in the union and the provision of a core platform service in at least three member states constitute compelling indications that the provider of a core platform service has a significant impact on the internal market. this is equally true where a provider of a core platform service in at least three member states has a very significant market capitalisation or equivalent fair market value. therefore , a provider of a core platform service should be presumed to have a significant impact on the internal market where it provides a core platform service in at least three member states and where either its group turnover realised in the eea is equal to or exceeds a specific , high threshold or the market capitalisation of the group is equal to or exceeds a certain high absolute value. for providers of core platform services that belong to undertakings that are not publicly listed , the equivalent fair market value above a certain high absolute value should be referred to. the commission should use its power to adopt delegated acts to develop an objective methodology to calculate that value. a high eea group turnover in conjunction with the threshold of users in the union of core platform services reflects a relatively strong ability to monetise these users. a high market capitalisation relative to the same threshold number of users in the union reflects a relatively significant potential to monetise these users.. this monetisation potential in turn reflects in principle the gateway position of the undertakings concerned. both indicators are in addition reflective of their financial capacity , including their ability to leverage their access to financial markets to reinforce their position. this may for example happen where this superior access is used to acquire other undertakings , which ability has in turn been shown to have potential negative effects on innovation. market capitalisation can also be reflective of the expected position and effect on the internal market of the providers concerned , notwithstanding a potentially relatively low current turnover. the market capitalisation value can be based on a level that reflects the average market capitalisation of the largest publicly listed undertakings in the union over an appropriate period.


### (21) an entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. this is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least three member states to a very high number of business users and end users during at least three years. ### (21) an entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. this is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service to a very high number of business users and end users during at least two years.


### (21) an entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. this is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least three member states to a very high number of business users and end users during at least three years. ### (21) an entrenched and durable position in its operations occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. this is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least three member states to a very high number of business users and end users during at least three years.


### (25) such an assessment can only be done in light of a market investigation , while taking into account the quantitative thresholds. in its assessment the commission should pursue the objectives of preserving and fostering the level of innovation , the quality of digital products and services , the degree to which prices are fair and competitive , and the degree to which quality or choice for business users and for end users is or remains high. elements that are specific to the providers of core platform services concerned , such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration , can be taken into account. in addition , a very high market capitalisation , a very high ratio of equity value over profit or a very high turnover derived from end users of a single core platform service can point to the tipping of the market or leveraging potential of such providers. together with market capitalisation , high growth rates , or decelerating growth rates read together with profitability growth , are examples of dynamic parameters that are particularly relevant to identifying such providers of core platform services that are foreseen to become entrenched. the commission should be able to take a decision by drawing adverse inferences from facts available where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission. ### (25) such an assessment can only be done in light of an efficient market investigation tailored to the conditions on the digital market , while taking into account the quantitative thresholds. in its assessment the commission should pursue the objectives of preserving , stimulating and fostering the level of innovation , the quality of digital products and services , the degree to which prices are fair and competitive , and the degree to which quality or choice for business users and for end users is or remains high. elements that are specific to the providers of core platform services concerned , such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration , can be taken into account. in addition , a very high market capitalisation , a very high ratio of equity value over profit or a very high turnover derived from end users of a single core platform service can point to the tipping of the market or leveraging potential of such providers. together with market capitalisation , high growth rates , or decelerating growth rates read together with profitability growth , are examples of dynamic parameters that are particularly relevant to identifying such providers of core platform services that are foreseen to become entrenched. the commission should be able to take a decision by drawing adverse inferences from facts available where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission.


### (25) such an assessment can only be done in light of a market investigation , while taking into account the quantitative thresholds. in its assessment the commission should pursue the objectives of preserving and fostering the level of innovation , the quality of digital products and services , the degree to which prices are fair and competitive , and the degree to which quality or choice for business users and for end users is or remains high. elements that are specific to the providers of core platform services concerned , such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration , can be taken into account. in addition , a very high market capitalisation , a very high ratio of equity value over profit or a very high turnover derived from end users of a single core platform service can point to the tipping of the market or leveraging potential of such providers. together with market capitalisation , high growth rates , or decelerating growth rates read together with profitability growth , are examples of dynamic parameters that are particularly relevant to identifying such providers of core platform services that are foreseen to become entrenched. the commission should be able to take a decision by drawing adverse inferences from facts available where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission. ### (25) such an assessment can only be done in light of a market investigation , while taking into account the quantitative thresholds. in its assessment the commission should pursue the objectives of preserving and fostering the level of innovation , the quality of digital products and services , the degree to which prices are fair and competitive , and the degree to which quality or choice for business users and for end users is or remains high. elements that are specific to the providers of core platform services concerned , such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration , can be taken into account. in addition , a very high market capitalisation , a very high ratio of equity value over profit or a very high turnover derived from end users of a single core platform service can point to the tipping of the market or leveraging potential of such providers. together with market capitalisation , high growth rates , or decelerating growth rates read together with profitability growth , are examples of dynamic parameters that are particularly relevant to identifying such providers of core platform services that are entrenched. the commission should be able to take a decision by drawing adverse inferences from facts available where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission.


### (26) a particular subset of rules should apply to those providers of core platform services that are foreseen to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in the near future. the same specific features of core platform services make them prone to tipping: once a service provider has obtained a certain advantage over rivals or potential challengers in terms of scale or intermediation power , its position may become unassailable and the situation may evolve to the point that it is likely to become durable and entrenched in the near future. undertakings can try to induce this tipping and emerge as gatekeeper by using some of the unfair conditions and practices regulated in this regulation. in such a situation , it appears appropriate to intervene before the market tips irreversibly. ### (26) a particular subset of rules should apply to those providers of core platform services that are foreseen to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in the near future. the same specific features of core platform services make them prone to tipping , both from the perspective of market conditions and from that of user behaviour: once a service provider has obtained a certain advantage over rivals or potential challengers in terms of scale or intermediation power , its position may become unassailable and the situation may evolve to the point that it is likely to become durable and entrenched in the near future. undertakings can try to induce this tipping and emerge as gatekeeper by using some of the unfair conditions and practices regulated in this regulation. in such a situation , it appears appropriate to intervene in an effective and harmonised manner before the market tips irreversibly.


### (26) a particular subset of rules should apply to those providers of core platform services that are foreseen to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in the near future. the same specific features of core platform services make them prone to tipping: once a service provider has obtained a certain advantage over rivals or potential challengers in terms of scale or intermediation power , its position may become unassailable and the situation may evolve to the point that it is likely to become durable and entrenched in the near future. undertakings can try to induce this tipping and emerge as gatekeeper by using some of the unfair conditions and practices regulated in this regulation. in such a situation , it appears appropriate to intervene before the market tips irreversibly. ### deleted


### (27) however , such an early intervention should be limited to imposing only those obligations that are necessary and appropriate to ensure that the services in question remain contestable and allow to avoid the qualified risk of unfair conditions and practices. obligations that prevent the provider of core platform services concerned from achieving an entrenched and durable position in its operations , such as those preventing unfair leveraging , and those that facilitate switching and multi-homing are more directly geared towards this purpose. to ensure proportionality , the commission should moreover apply from that subset of obligations only those that are necessary and proportionate to achieve the objectives of this regulation and should regularly review whether such obligations should be maintained , suppressed or adapted. ### (27) however , such an early intervention should be limited to imposing only those obligations that are necessary and appropriate to ensure that the services in question remain contestable and allow to avoid the qualified risk of unfair conditions and practices. obligations that prevent the provider of core platform services concerned from achieving an entrenched and durable position in its operations , such as those preventing unfair leveraging , and those that facilitate switching and multi-homing are more directly geared towards this purpose. to ensure proportionality , the commission should moreover apply from that subset of obligations only those that are necessary and proportionate to achieve the objectives of this regulation and should regularly review whether such obligations should be maintained , suppressed or adapted , bearing in mind the basic objective of guaranteeing a framework for developing and encouraging innovation.


### (27) however , such an early intervention should be limited to imposing only those obligations that are necessary and appropriate to ensure that the services in question remain contestable and allow to avoid the qualified risk of unfair conditions and practices. obligations that prevent the provider of core platform services concerned from achieving an entrenched and durable position in its operations , such as those preventing unfair leveraging , and those that facilitate switching and multi-homing are more directly geared towards this purpose. to ensure proportionality , the commission should moreover apply from that subset of obligations only those that are necessary and proportionate to achieve the objectives of this regulation and should regularly review whether such obligations should be maintained , suppressed or adapted. ### deleted


### (30) the very rapidly changing and complex technological nature of core platform services requires a regular review of the status of gatekeepers , including those that are foreseen to enjoy a durable and entrenched position in their operations in the near future. to provide all of the market participants , including the gatekeepers , with the required certainty as to the applicable legal obligations , a time limit for such regular reviews is necessary. it is also important to conduct such reviews on a regular basis and at least every two years. ### (30) the very rapidly changing and complex technological nature of core platform services requires a regular review of the status of gatekeepers , including those that are foreseen to enjoy a durable and entrenched position in their operations in the near future. to provide all of the market participants , including the gatekeepers , with the required certainty as to the applicable legal obligations , a time limit for such regular reviews is necessary. it is also important to conduct such reviews on a regular basis and at least every three years.


### (30) the very rapidly changing and complex technological nature of core platform services requires a regular review of the status of gatekeepers , including those that are foreseen to enjoy a durable and entrenched position in their operations in the near future. to provide all of the market participants , including the gatekeepers , with the required certainty as to the applicable legal obligations , a time limit for such regular reviews is necessary. it is also important to conduct such reviews on a regular basis and at least every two years. ### (30) the very rapidly changing and complex technological nature of core platform services requires a regular review of the status of gatekeepers. to provide all of the market participants , including the gatekeepers , with the required certainty as to the applicable legal obligations , a time limit for such regular reviews is necessary. it is also important to conduct such reviews on a regular basis and at least every two years.


### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. ### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission and other competent national authorities of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation.


### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. ### (31) considering the essential role that data has on competition , a specific procedure should be introduced for intended concentrations within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving another provider of a core platform service or any other service in the digital sector. to ensure that competition in the single market is not distorted , the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should therefore notify the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such intended concentrations should therefore not only be notified , but explicitly cleared by the commission. the notification of such concentrations should therefore be subject to the merger control procedure provided for in regulation (ec) no 139/2004. such information also serves the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , and provides information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation.


### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. ### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission and other competent national authorities of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions. such information , especially regarding acquisitions of emerging competitors , should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation.


### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any practices by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation. ### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any relevant behaviour by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of behaviour that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation.


### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any practices by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation. ### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the commission should identify which obligations should apply to each individual core platform service identified as an important gateway insofar as its practices correspond to the type of practice that is the subject to any one of these obligations.


### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any practices by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation. ### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any behaviour by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , including product or interface design subverting , impairing or making user decision-making more burdensome , insofar as such behaviour has an equivalent object or effect to the practices that are prohibited under this regulation.


### (33) the obligations laid down in this regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. therefore , the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained , for example in the enforcement of the eu competition rules , shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users. in addition , it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. the obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified , following an in-depth investigation , as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations. ### (33) the obligations laid down in this regulation are limited to what is necessary , proportionate and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. therefore , the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained , for example in the enforcement of the eu competition rules , shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users. in addition , it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. the obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified , following an in-depth investigation , as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might , in certain cases , through the imposition of contractual terms and conditions , restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services or the direct online sales channels they own. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services or their own websites or other distribution channels. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be permitted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing or less favourable ranking of the offers of business users.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under the same or more favourable conditions , including price , outside their online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative intermediation services , limiting contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative distribution channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative distribution channels and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates , de-listing or less favourable ranking of the offers of business users.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use , drafted in plain and intelligible language , including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and including clear information on the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law. this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. all the rights and possibilities provided to business users should also be applicable to end users.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities , including national courts. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit or impede such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use , drafted inaccessible , intelligible and clear language , including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and providing clear information on the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law. this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users and end users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities , including national courts. for example , business users or end users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.


### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching. ### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise unjustified technical barriers so as to make switching more difficult , impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching.


### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching. ### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict or prevent the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. this would allow more providers to offer their services , thereby ultimately providing greater choice to the end user. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching more difficult or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to consumers , including by means of pre-installation , as well as the improvement of the offering to end users , such as better prices or quality , should not be construed as constituting a prohibited barrier to switching.


### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. this possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation. ### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain from the very beginning of the compliance period that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. as business practices and aspects of the core platform , services offered by gatekeepers might differ from one another , it is likely that uncertainties and misinterpretations about appropriateness of the implemented measures arise. to eliminate them even before the compliance period commences , it is necessary that gatekeepers could request the commission to determine whether the measures that it intends to implement are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. in this process , the commission may need additional advice , insight knowledge and experience about the market of the core platform service subject to the dialogue. in such cases , the commission may consult third parties like business users and competitors , civil society organisations , national competent authorities and others , which the commission has determined as relevant for the respective core platform service. the commission should act with respect and protection to sensitive business data during these consultations. this possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation.


### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. this possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation. ### (58) the objectives of this regulation are to ensure contestability and fairness for the digital sector in general and for business users and end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers in particular , with a view to promoting innovation , high quality of digital products and services , fair and competitive prices , as well as a high quality and choice for end users in the digital sector. to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. this possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation.