### 19. welcomes the activities of the srb in 2021 , including the further completion of the single resolution fund; takes note of the srb’s work programme for the coming years , which includes making the effective resolution of all banks under the srb possible by 2023; ### 19. welcomes the activities of the srb in 2021 , including the further completion of the single resolution fund; welcomes that overall banks under the srb’s remit have delivered good progress towards resolvability and in building up loss-absorbing capacity; takes note of the srb’s work programme for the coming years , which includes making the effective resolution of all banks under the srb possible by 2023;


### 20. supports the specification of the public interest assessment criteria so that the srm is applied in a more consistent and predictable manner; proposes that an alternative liquidation regime for small and medium-sized banks be considered; asks for a more proportionate setting of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (mrel) level; ### 20. supports the specification of the public interest assessment criteria so that the srm is applied in a more consistent and predictable manner; proposes that options should be considered for an alternative common liquidation regime for small and medium-sized banks; notes the importance of the srb taking a proportionate approach for banks to build their minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (mrel)


### 20. supports the specification of the public interest assessment criteria so that the srm is applied in a more consistent and predictable manner; proposes that an alternative liquidation regime for small and medium-sized banks be considered; asks for a more proportionate setting of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (mrel) level; ### 20. supports the specification of the public interest assessment criteria so that the srm is applied in a more consistent and predictable manner; proposes that an alternative liquidation regime for small and medium-sized banks be considered; underlines the need for all resolution banks to meet adequate levels of minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (mrel);


### 21. supports the updating of state aid rules in order to ensure their greater adequacy and consistency with the srm framework; emphasises that one of the goals of such an update should be to enable quick and effective interventions under the srm or in the alternative liquidation regime; ### 21. supports the updating of state aid rules in order to ensure their greater adequacy and consistency with the srm framework; emphasises that one of the goals of such an update should be to enable quick and effective interventions under the srm or in the alternative liquidation regime , safeguarding fair competition in the banking sector , the integrity of the banking union and the requisite speed and efficiency , without drowning national and european authorities and market agents in red tape;


### 21. supports the updating of state aid rules in order to ensure their greater adequacy and consistency with the srm framework; emphasises that one of the goals of such an update should be to enable quick and effective interventions under the srm or in the alternative liquidation regime; ### 21. supports the revisiting of state aid rules in order to ensure their greater adequacy and consistency with the srm framework to reflect progress in the implementation and improvement of the crisis management framework; emphasises that one of the goals of such an update should be to enable quick and effective interventions under the srm or in the alternative liquidation regime;


### 21. supports the updating of state aid rules in order to ensure their greater adequacy and consistency with the srm framework; emphasises that one of the goals of such an update should be to enable quick and effective interventions under the srm or in the alternative liquidation regime; ### 21. supports the updating of state aid rules in order to ensure their greater adequacy and consistency with the srm framework; emphasises that one of the goals of such an update should be to reduce incentives to avoid resolution;


### 22. recalls that the ssm and the srm operate at eu level , while deposit guarantee schemes (dgss) are operated at national level; recognises that a european deposit insurance scheme (edis) would improve protection for depositors in the eu; ### 22. recalls that the ssm and the srm operate at eu level , while deposit guarantee schemes (dgss) are operated at national level; recognises that a european deposit insurance scheme (edis) would improve protection for depositors in the eu; calls , therefore , for the rapid approval and implementation of the edis as a means to complete the banking union and turn it into a more effective tool with a view to fully establishing the economic and monetary union;


### 22. recalls that the ssm and the srm operate at eu level , while deposit guarantee schemes (dgss) are operated at national level; recognises that a european deposit insurance scheme (edis) would improve protection for depositors in the eu; ### 22. recalls that the ssm and the srm operate at eu level , while deposit guarantee schemes (dgss) are operated at national level; recognises that a european deposit insurance scheme (edis) that improves the link between banks and their sovereign debt , establishing a real single market for deposits that provides equal conditions for all depositors , would improve protection for depositors in the eu;


### 22. recalls that the ssm and the srm operate at eu level , while deposit guarantee schemes (dgss) are operated at national level; recognises that a european deposit insurance scheme (edis) would improve protection for depositors in the eu; ### 22. recalls that the ssm and the srm operate at eu level , while deposit guarantee schemes (dgss) are operated at national level;


### 23. notes the ongoing discussion of various concepts for the edis; ### 23. notes the ongoing discussion of various concepts for the edis; understands that this discussion should take account of parliament's positions , of input from the european central bank and national central banks , which are highly qualified to give input , of the proposals from the european banks and other economic and financial agents involved , of experience from similar national tools and of good practices in this area put forward by third countries; insists , however , that this discussion process should , out of necessity , be fast and focused on the key aspects with a view to the reasonably rapid adoption of the edis;


### 23. notes the ongoing discussion of various concepts for the edis; ### 23. notes the ongoing discussion of various concepts for the edis; welcomes the renewed efforts of the eurogroup in progressing banking union in order to reach agreement on the different work streams and files , including edis; reiterates parliament's commitment to working towards an agreement on the edis , which should be combined with appropriate risk reduction measures;


### 23. notes the ongoing discussion of various concepts for the edis; ### 23. notes the ongoing discussion of various concepts for the edis; favours a deposit reinsurance scheme as the next step;


### 24. considers that the main obstacles for edis are concerns about risks in some banking systems; stresses that the implementation of credible and effective risk reduction measures could enable an agreement on edis; ### 24. considers that the main obstacles for edis are concerns about risks in some banking systems; stresses that the implementation of credible and effective risk reduction measures could enable an agreement on edis; notes that such risk-reduction measures should precede any further risk sharing;


### 26. supports streamlining the crisis management framework to make it more credible , coherent and effective; ### deleted


### (6) the overarching objective of the settlement discipline regime is to improve settlement efficiency within the union. however , the market volatility in 2020 amplified concerns about the potential negative effects of mandatory buy-in rules , both in normal and stressed market conditions. the application of those rules should therefore be subject to an assessment by the commission as to its appropriateness in the light of the evolution of settlement efficiency in the union. cash penalties and reporting requirements should however continue to apply in order to assess their impact on improving settlement efficiency in the union. considering the potential impacts of mandatory buy-in rules , such rules should apply only where certain conditions are met , namely where the application of cash penalties has not resulted in a long-term , continuous reduction of settlement fails in the union , where settlement efficiency in the union has not reached appropriate levels considering the situation in third-country capital markets that are comparable in terms of size , liquidity as well as instruments traded and types of transactions executed on such markets , or where the level of settlement fails in the union has or is likely to have a negative effect on the financial stability of the union. where the commission considers that any of those conditions is met and that the application of mandatory buy-ins is proportionate to address level of settlement fails in the union , the commission should be empowered to adopt an implementing act determining for which financial instruments or categories of transactions the mandatory buy-in rules should start to apply. the cash penalties referred to in the third subparagraph of article 7(2) of regulation (eu) no 909/2014 should be calculated on a daily basis for each business day that a transaction fails to be settled until the end of the buy-in process or the actual settlement day , whichever is the earlier. ### (6) the overarching objective of the settlement discipline regime is to improve settlement efficiency within the union. however , the market volatility in 2020 amplified concerns about the potential negative effects of mandatory buy-in rules , both in normal and stressed market conditions. the application of those rules should therefore be subject to an assessment by the commission as to its appropriateness in the light of the evolution of settlement efficiency in the union. cash penalties and reporting requirements should however continue to apply in order to assess their impact on improving settlement efficiency in the union. considering the potential impacts of mandatory buy-in rules , such rules should apply only where certain conditions are met , namely where the application of cash penalties has not resulted in a long-term , continuous reduction of settlement fails in the union , or where the level of settlement fails in the union has or is likely to have a negative effect on the financial stability of the union. where the commission considers that any of those conditions is met and that the application of mandatory buy-ins is proportionate to address level of settlement fails in the union , the commission should be empowered to adopt an implementing act determining for which financial instruments or categories of transactions the mandatory buy-in rules should start to apply. the cash penalties referred to in the third subparagraph of article 7(2) of regulation (eu) no 909/2014 should be calculated on a daily basis for each business day that a transaction fails to be settled until the settlement transaction is either settled or bilaterally cancelled.


### (6) the overarching objective of the settlement discipline regime is to improve settlement efficiency within the union. however , the market volatility in 2020 amplified concerns about the potential negative effects of mandatory buy-in rules , both in normal and stressed market conditions. the application of those rules should therefore be subject to an assessment by the commission as to its appropriateness in the light of the evolution of settlement efficiency in the union. cash penalties and reporting requirements should however continue to apply in order to assess their impact on improving settlement efficiency in the union. considering the potential impacts of mandatory buy-in rules , such rules should apply only where certain conditions are met , namely where the application of cash penalties has not resulted in a long-term , continuous reduction of settlement fails in the union , where settlement efficiency in the union has not reached appropriate levels considering the situation in third-country capital markets that are comparable in terms of size , liquidity as well as instruments traded and types of transactions executed on such markets , or where the level of settlement fails in the union has or is likely to have a negative effect on the financial stability of the union. where the commission considers that any of those conditions is met and that the application of mandatory buy-ins is proportionate to address level of settlement fails in the union , the commission should be empowered to adopt an implementing act determining for which financial instruments or categories of transactions the mandatory buy-in rules should start to apply. the cash penalties referred to in the third subparagraph of article 7(2) of regulation (eu) no 909/2014 should be calculated on a daily basis for each business day that a transaction fails to be settled until the end of the buy-in process or the actual settlement day , whichever is the earlier. ### (6) the overarching objective of the settlement discipline regime is to improve settlement efficiency within the union. however , the market volatility in 2020 amplified concerns about the potential negative effects of mandatory buy-in rules , both in normal and stressed market conditions. the existence of such rules is a disproportionate interference in the execution of securities transactions and the functioning of securities markets , poses significant risks for market liquidity and financial stability in the union , and could jeopardise the global competitiveness of the union. because of the implications that the deployment of mandatory buy-ins might have , the possibility of their application should be discarded. cash penalties and reporting requirements should however continue to apply in order to assess their impact on improving settlement efficiency in the union. considering the potential impacts of mandatory buy-in rules , such rules should apply only where certain conditions are met , namely where the application of cash penalties has not resulted in a long-term , continuous reduction of settlement fails in the union , where settlement efficiency in the union has not reached appropriate levels considering the situation in third-country capital markets that are comparable in terms of size , liquidity as well as instruments traded and types of transactions executed on such markets , or where the level of settlement fails in the union has or is likely to have a negative effect on the financial stability of the union. where the commission considers that any of those conditions is met and that the application of mandatory buy-ins is proportionate to address level of settlement fails in the union , the commission should be empowered to adopt an implementing act determining for which financial instruments or categories of transactions the mandatory buy-in rules should start to apply. the cash penalties referred to in the third subparagraph of article 7(2) of regulation (eu) no 909/2014 should be calculated on a daily basis for each business day that a transaction fails to be settled until the end of the buy-in process or the actual settlement day , whichever is the earlier.


### (19) regulation (eu) no 909/2014 requires the cooperation of authorities that have an interest in the operations of csds that offer services in relation to financial instruments issued under the law of more than one member states. nonetheless , the supervisory arrangements remain fragmented and can lead to differences in the allocation and nature of supervisory powers depending on the csd concerned. this in turn creates barriers to the cross-border provision of csd services in the union , perpetuates the remaining inefficiencies in the union settlement market and has negative impacts on the stability of union financial markets. despite the possibility to set up colleges in accordance with article 24(4) of that regulation ( , that option has barely been used. in order to ensure an effective and efficient coordination of the supervision by competent authorities , the requirement to set up mandatory colleges should apply in two cases. firstly , for csds that offer notary and central maintenance services in relation to financial instruments issued under the law of more than one member states (the passporting colleges) and secondly for csds that belong to the same group (the “group-level colleges”). to reduce the administrative burden on the authorities participating to colleges , where a csd offering services cross-border is also part of a group of csds , the chair of the college should be able to decide that only one college is established for that csd. where the other csds in the group also offer services cross-border , the chair of the college should be able to make that decision only where the competent authorities of those other csds consent. in that case , there would be only one college for all csds within the group that would exercise the tasks assigned to passporting and group-level colleges. such colleges should ensure the sharing of information pertaining to the csds concerned. ### (19) regulation (eu) no 909/2014 requires the cooperation of authorities that have an interest in the operations of csds that offer services in relation to financial instruments issued under the law of more than one member states. nonetheless , the supervisory arrangements remain fragmented and can lead to differences in the allocation and nature of supervisory powers depending on the csd concerned. this in turn creates barriers to the cross-border provision of csd services in the union , perpetuates the remaining inefficiencies in the union settlement market and has negative impacts on the stability of union financial markets. despite the possibility to set up colleges in accordance with article 24(4) of that regulation ( , that option has barely been used. in order to ensure an effective and efficient coordination of the supervision by competent authorities , the requirement to set up mandatory colleges should apply for csds that belong to the same group (the “group-level colleges”).


### (19) regulation (eu) no 909/2014 requires the cooperation of authorities that have an interest in the operations of csds that offer services in relation to financial instruments issued under the law of more than one member states. nonetheless , the supervisory arrangements remain fragmented and can lead to differences in the allocation and nature of supervisory powers depending on the csd concerned. this in turn creates barriers to the cross-border provision of csd services in the union , perpetuates the remaining inefficiencies in the union settlement market and has negative impacts on the stability of union financial markets. despite the possibility to set up colleges in accordance with article 24(4) of that regulation ( , that option has barely been used. in order to ensure an effective and efficient coordination of the supervision by competent authorities , the requirement to set up mandatory colleges should apply in two cases. firstly , for csds that offer notary and central maintenance services in relation to financial instruments issued under the law of more than one member states (the passporting colleges) and secondly for csds that belong to the same group (the “group-level colleges”). to reduce the administrative burden on the authorities participating to colleges , where a csd offering services cross-border is also part of a group of csds , the chair of the college should be able to decide that only one college is established for that csd. where the other csds in the group also offer services cross-border , the chair of the college should be able to make that decision only where the competent authorities of those other csds consent. in that case , there would be only one college for all csds within the group that would exercise the tasks assigned to passporting and group-level colleges. such colleges should ensure the sharing of information pertaining to the csds concerned. ### (19) regulation (eu) no 909/2014 requires the cooperation of authorities that have an interest in the operations of csds that offer services in relation to financial instruments issued under the law of more than one member states. nonetheless , the supervisory arrangements remain fragmented and can lead to differences in the allocation and nature of supervisory powers depending on the csd concerned. this in turn creates barriers to the cross-border provision of csd services in the union , perpetuates the remaining inefficiencies in the union settlement market and has negative impacts on the stability of union financial markets. despite the possibility to set up colleges in accordance with article 24(4) of that regulation , that option has barely been used. in order to ensure an effective and efficient coordination of the supervision by competent authorities , the requirement to set up mandatory colleges should be based on a single existing and reliable criterion , namely , the substantial importance of a csd for a jurisdiction other than the one where it is established. the threshold for the mandatory establishment by competent authorities of a college of supervisory authorities should be met where a csd is of substantial importance in at least two host member states. such colleges should ensure the sharing of information pertaining to the csds concerned. members of a college should have the possibility of requesting the adoption by the college of a binding opinion concerning issues identified during the review and evaluation process of csds , or during the review and evaluation of providers of banking-type ancillary services , or that relate to the extension or outsourcing of activities and services provided by the csd , or concerning any potential breach of the requirements of regulation (eu)no 909/2014 arising from the provision of services in a host member state. the process for the adoption of such an opinion should rely on a simple majority vote.


### (27) within an appropriately set risk limit , csds that are not authorised to provide banking-type ancillary services should be able to offer a sufficient amount of foreign currency settlement through accounts opened with credit institutions or through its own account. the threshold below which a csd may designate a credit institution to provide any banking-type ancillary services from within a separate legal entity without being required to comply with the conditions set out in title iv of regulation (eu) no 909/2014 should be calibrated in a way that promotes efficiency of settlement and the use of banking ancillary services while ensuring financial stability. as a body with specialised expertise regarding banking and credit risk matters , eba should be entrusted with the development of draft regulatory technical standards to set the appropriate thresholds and , where necessary , any risk mitigating requirements. eba should also closely cooperate with the members of the escb and with esma. the commission should be empowered to adopt regulatory technical standards in accordance with article 290 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) with regard to the detailed elements of the determining for the provisioning of banking type ancillary services , the accompanying details of the risk management and capital requirements for csds and the prudential requirements on credit and liquidity risks for csds and designated credit institutions that are authorised to provide banking-type ancillary services. ### (27) within an appropriately set risk limit , csds that are not authorised to provide banking-type ancillary services should be able to offer a sufficient amount of foreign currency settlement through accounts opened with credit institutions or through its own account. the threshold below which a csd may designate a credit institution to provide any banking-type ancillary services from within a separate legal entity without being required to comply with the conditions set out in title iv of regulation (eu) no 909/2014 should be calibrated in a way that promotes efficiency of settlement and the use of banking ancillary services while ensuring financial stability. as a body with specialised expertise regarding banking and credit risk matters , eba should be entrusted with the development of draft regulatory technical standards to set the appropriate thresholds and , where necessary , any risk mitigating requirements. eba should also closely cooperate with the members of the escb and with esma. the commission should be empowered to adopt regulatory technical standards in accordance with article 290 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) with regard to the detailed elements of the determining for the provisioning of banking type ancillary services , the accompanying details of the risk management and capital requirements for csds and the prudential requirements on credit and liquidity risks for csds and designated credit institutions that are authorised to provide banking-type ancillary services while ensuring a level playing field following the principle of "same activity , same risks , same rules".


### the penalty mechanism referred to in the first subparagraph shall include cash penalties for participants that cause settlement fails (‘failing participants’) except where those settlement fails are caused by factors not attributable to the participants to the transaction or for operations that do not involve two trading parties. cash penalties shall be calculated on a daily basis for each business day that a transaction fails to be settled after its intended settlement date until the end of the buy-in process referred to in paragraphs 3 to 8 that is to be applied pursuant to paragraph 2a , or the actual settlement day , whichever is the earlier. the cash penalties shall not be configured as a revenue source for the csd.; ### the penalty mechanism referred to in the first subparagraph shall include cash penalties for participants that cause settlement fails (‘failing participants’) except where those settlement fails are caused by factors not attributable to the participants to the transaction or for operations that do not involve two trading parties. cash penalties shall be calculated on a daily basis for each business day that a transaction fails to be settled after its intended settlement date until the transaction is either settled or bilaterally cancelled. the cash penalties shall not be configured as a revenue source for the csd.;


### 2a. without prejudice to the penalty mechanism referred to in paragraph 2 of this article and the right to bilaterally cancel the transaction , the commission may , by means of an implementing act , decide to which of the financial instruments referred to in article 5(1) or categories of transactions in those financial instruments the settlement discipline measures referred to in paragraphs 3 to 8 of this article are to be applied where the commission considers that those measures constitute a proportionate means to address the level of settlement fails in the union and that , based on the number and volume of settlement fails , any of the following conditions is met: ### deleted


### settlement efficiency in the union has not reached appropriate levels considering the situation in third-country capital markets that are comparable in terms of size , liquidity as well as instruments traded and types of transactions executed on such markets; ### deleted


### 2. an authorised csd or a csd that has applied for authorisation pursuant to article 17 that intends to provide the core services referred to in section a , points 1 and 2 , of the annex in relation to financial instruments constituted under the laws of another member state referred to in article 49(1) , second subparagraph , or to set up a branch in another member state shall be subject to the procedure referred to in paragraphs 3 to 7 of this article. the csd may provide such services only after it has been authorised pursuant to article 17 but not earlier than the relevant date applicable in accordance with paragraph 6. ### 2. an authorised csd or a csd that has applied for authorisation pursuant to article 17 that intends to provide the core services referred to in section a , points 1 and 2 , of the annex in relation to shares constituted under the laws of another member state referred to in article 49(1) , second subparagraph , or to set up a branch in another member state shall be subject to the procedure referred to in paragraphs 3 to 7 of this article. the csd may provide such services only after it has been authorised pursuant to article 17 but not earlier than the relevant date applicable in accordance with paragraph 6.


### within 1 month from the receipt of the information referred to in paragraph 3 , the competent authority of the home member state shall communicate that information to the competent authority of the host member state unless , by taking into account the provision of services envisaged , it has reasons to doubt the adequacy of the administrative structure or the financial situation of the csd wishing to provide its services in the host member state. where the csd already provides services to other host member states , the competent authority of the home member state shall also inform the passporting college referred to in article 24a. ### within 1 month from the receipt of the information referred to in paragraph 3 , the competent authority of the home member state shall communicate that information to the competent authority of the host member state unless , by taking into account the provision of services envisaged , it has reasons to doubt the adequacy of the administrative structure or the financial situation of the csd wishing to provide its services in the host member state.


### colleges of supervisors for csds providing services in another member state and for csds that are part of a group with two or more csds ### colleges of supervisors for csds that are part of a group with two or more csds


### where a csd is subject to the procedure referred to in article 23(3) to (7) (‘passporting college’); ### deleted


### in the case referred to in the first subparagraph , point (a) , the csd’s home competent authority shall establish , manage and chair the passporting college. that college shall be established within 1 month from the date referred to in article 23(6). where the csd submits subsequent notifications pursuant to article 23(3) , the competent authority of the home member state shall invite the competent authorities of the relevant host member states to the passporting college within 1 month from the date referred to in article 23(6). ### deleted


### in the case referred to in the first subparagraph , point (b) , where the parent undertaking is a csd authorised in the union , the competent authority of the home member state of that csd shall establish , manage and chair the group-level college. where the parent undertaking is not a csd authorised in the union , the competent authority of the home member state of the csd with the largest balance sheet total shall establish , manage and chair the group-level college. ### deleted


### by way of derogation from the third subparagraph , where the application of the criteria referred to in that subparagraph would be inappropriate , the competent authorities may waive by common agreement those criteria and appoint a different csd’s competent authority to manage and chair the college , taking into account the csds concerned and the relative importance of their activities in the relevant member states. in such cases , the parent csd or the csd with the largest balance sheet total , as applicable , shall have the right to be heard before the competent authorities take the decision. ### deleted


### in the case of a passporting college , the competent authority of the host member states; ### deleted


### 3. where a csd subject to the procedure referred to in article 23(3) to (7) is also part of a group that comprises two or more csds and its competent authority is the chair of the group-level college , that competent authority may decide that only one college shall be established for the purposes of paragraph 1 , points (a) and (b) , of this article for that csd. where any of the other csds within the group are also subject to the procedure referred to in article 23(3) to (7) , the chair of the college may make that decision only with the agreement of the competent authorities of those csds. ### deleted


### in the case of a passporting college , the cooperation of the home and host member state pursuant to article 24 and regarding the measures referred to in article 23(4) , point (e) and on any issues encountered in the provision of services in other member states; ### deleted


### in the case of a group-level college , the exchange of information on resources shared and outsourcing arrangements in place within a group of csds pursuant to article 19 , on significant changes to the structure and ownership of the group , and on changes in the organisation , senior management , processes or arrangements where those changes have a significant impact on governance or risk management for the csds belonging to the group. ### the exchange of information on resources shared and outsourcing arrangements in place within a group of csds pursuant to article 19 , on significant changes to the structure and ownership of the group , and on changes in the organisation , senior management , processes or arrangements where those changes have a significant impact on governance or risk management for the csds belonging to the group.


### that agreement shall determine the practical arrangements for the functioning of the college , including the modalities of communication amongst college members , and may determine tasks to be entrusted to the csd’s competent authority or another member of the college. ### that agreement shall determine the practical arrangements for the functioning of the college , including the modalities of communication amongst college members , and may determine tasks to be entrusted to the csd’s competent authority or another member of the college , as well as the modalities for inviting other relevant authorities on an ad hoc basis and for specific topics.


### the corporate or similar law of the member state where the issuer is established; and ### for shares , the law of the member state where the issuer is established; and


### the governing corporate or similar law under which the securities are issued. ### for securities other than shares , the law of the member state under which the securities are issued.


### member states shall compile a list of key relevant provisions of their law , as referred to in the second subparagraph. competent authorities shall communicate that list to esma by 18 december 2014. esma shall publish the list by 18 january 2015. member states shall update that list regularly and at least every 2 years. they shall communicate the updated list at those regular intervals to esma. esma shall publish the updated list.; ### member states shall compile a list of key relevant provisions of their law , as referred to in the second subparagraph. competent authorities shall communicate that list to esma by 18 december 2014. esma shall publish the list by 18 january 2015. member states shall update that list every 2 years. they shall communicate the updated list at those regular intervals to esma. esma shall publish the updated list.;


### paragraph 4 shall not apply to credit institutions referred to in paragraph 2 , point (b) , that offer to settle the cash payments for part of the csd’s securities settlement system , if the total value of such cash settlement through accounts opened with those credit institutions does not exceed a maximum amount calculated over a one-year period. that threshold shall be determined in accordance with paragraph 9. ### paragraph 4 shall not apply to credit institutions referred to in paragraph 2 , point (b) , that offer to settle the cash payments for part of the csd’s securities settlement system , if the total value of such cash settlement through accounts opened with those credit institutions does not exceed a maximum amount calculated over a one-year period. that threshold shall be determined in accordance with paragraph 9 and be reviewed on an annual basis.


### eba shall , in close cooperation with esma and the members of the escb , develop draft regulatory technical standards to determine the maximum amount referred to in paragraph 5 , taking into account the need to balance the credit and liquidity risks for csds that result from the settlement of cash payments through accounts opened with credit institutions and the need to allow csds to settle in foreign currencies through accounts opened with such credit institutions. when developing these draft regulatory technical standards the eba shall also determine , where necessary , any accompanying appropriate risk management and prudential mitigating requirements. ### eba shall , in close cooperation with esma and the members of the escb , develop draft regulatory technical standards to determine the maximum amount referred to in paragraph 5 , taking into account at least the following criteria:


### (ii) are members of or participants in a regulated market or an mtf;; ### (ii) are members of or participants in a regulated market or an mtf , except for non-financial entities who execute transactions on a trading venue which are objectively measurable as reducing risks directly relating to the commercial activity or treasury financing activity of those non-financial entities or their groups;


### d. whereas new technological solutions , such as blockchain , can be used by tax administrations to better serve the needs of tax payers while such technologies can also be abused and serve as a vehicle for illicit activities , with the criminal intent to avoid paying taxes; ### d. whereas new technological solutions , such as blockchain , can be used by tax administrations to better serve the needs of tax payers while such technologies can also be abused and serve as a vehicle for illicit activities , with the criminal intent to avoid paying taxes; whereas in particular the increased visibility of blockchain transactions might facilitate tax administrations efforts to combat tax fraud;


### h. whereas the union has already taken important steps towards a clear definition of crypto-assets and this definition must facilitate the fair and simple taxation of these assets; and whereas definitions of such crypto-assets must be highly aligned with international standards , namely with the financial action task force; ### h. whereas the union has already taken important steps towards a clear definition of crypto-assets and crypto asset service providers and , more broadly , towards establishing a suitable regulatory framework for crypto assets , the markets in crypto assets regulation; whereas this framework and this definition will facilitate the fair and simple taxation of these assets; and whereas definitions of such crypto-assets must be highly aligned with international standards , namely with the financial action task force;


### i. whereas tax policy is a national competence , but strong cooperation between member states is essential to respond to the challenges posed to the integrity of the single market , namely by the increasing the use of crypto-assets; whereas a framework of 27 significantly different approaches to crypto-assets taxation could lead to significant obstacles for the fulfilment of the objectives of the european digital single market; ### i. whereas tax policy is a national competence , but strong cooperation between member states is essential to respond to the challenges posed to the integrity of the single market , inter alia the increasing use of crypto-assets; whereas a framework of 27 significantly different approaches to crypto-assets taxation could lead to significant obstacles for the fulfilment of the objectives of the european digital single market; whereas there is therefore a clear case for european coordination and cooperation;


### 11. points out that the taxation of crypto-assets in cross-border situations is linked to several dimensions of tax policy and that such dimensions are distributed between national and european competences , but the benefit of a european approach is concentrated in instruments linked to administrative cooperation and corporate taxation; ### 11. points out that the taxation of crypto-assets in cross-border situations is linked to several dimensions of tax policy such as income taxes or vat and that such dimensions are distributed between national and european competences , but the benefit of a european approach is concentrated in instruments linked to administrative cooperation and corporate taxation;


### 14. points out that the crypto-asset landscape is global and requires an international approach; understands , in this regard , the need to further negotiate international instruments on the matter; ### 14. points out that the crypto-asset landscape is global and requires an international approach; understands , in this regard , the need to further negotiate international instruments on the matter; considers that the organisation for economic cooperation and development (oecd) , that has already done substantial work on both taxation and the treatment of crypto assets , could be a suitable forum in this regard;


### a. whereas article 140 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) provides for the achievement of a high degree of sustainable convergence by reference to the fulfilment by each member state of the following criteria: the achievement of a high degree of price stability; the sustainability of the government's financial position; the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism; and the durability of convergence achieved by the member state and of its participation in the exchange-rate mechanism of the european monetary system being reflected in the long-term interest-rate levels (the ‘maastricht criteria’); ### a. whereas article 140 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) provides for the achievement of a high degree of sustainable convergence by reference to the fulfilment by each member state of the following criteria: the achievement of a high degree of price stability; the sustainability of the government's financial position; the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism; and the durability of convergence achieved by the member state and of its participation in the exchange-rate mechanism of the european monetary system being reflected in the long-term interest-rate levels (the ‘maastricht criteria’); whereas adherence to those criteria is paramount so ensure a smooth integration into the economic and monetary union and to ensure the economic and monetary union’s long-term stability;


### — having regard to the ecb climate action plan of 4 july 2022 to further incorporate climate change into its monetary policy operations , ### deleted


### — having regard to eurostat’s flash estimate for august 2022 , ### — having regard to eurostat’s announcement on the inflation in the euro area for august 2022 ,


### — having regard to eurostat’s flash estimate for august 2022 , ### — having regard to eurostat’s flash estimate from 30 september 2022 ,


### — having regard to eurostat’s flash estimate for august 2022 , ### — having regard to eurostat’s flash estimate for september2022 ,


### — having regard to the results of the ecb climate risk stress test of 8 july 2022 , ### deleted


### — having regard to the paris agreement adopted under the un framework convention on climate change , ### deleted


### — having regard to articles 127(1) and (2) , 130 and 284(3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union , ### — having regard to articles 123 , 127(1) and (2) , 130 and 284(3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union ,


### a. whereas according to the ecb projections of september 2022 , economic growth will decline from 3.1 % in 2022 to 0.9 % in 2023 , before recovering to 2.3 % in 2024; whereas the outlook for euro area activity is surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty , related to the development of the war in ukraine and the energy crisis , with a number of independent forecasts predicting a recession; ### a. whereas according to the ecb baseline projections of september 2022 , economic growth will decline from 3.1 % in 2022 to 0.9 % in 2023 , before recovering to 2.3 % in 2024; whereas certain core assumptions of that forecast are already outdated; whereas the outlook for euro area activity is surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty , related to the development of the war in ukraine and the energy crisis , with a number of independent forecasts predicting a recession;


### a. whereas according to the ecb projections of september 2022 , economic growth will decline from 3.1 % in 2022 to 0.9 % in 2023 , before recovering to 2.3 % in 2024; whereas the outlook for euro area activity is surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty , related to the development of the war in ukraine and the energy crisis , with a number of independent forecasts predicting a recession; ### a. whereas according to the ecb projections of september 2022 , economic growth will decline from 3.1 % in 2022 to 0.9 % in 2023 , before recovering to 1.9 % in 2024 in the baseline scenario; whereas the outlook for euro area activity is surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty , related to the development of the war in ukraine and the energy crisis , with a number of independent forecasts predicting a recession;


### a. whereas according to the ecb projections of september 2022 , economic growth will decline from 3.1 % in 2022 to 0.9 % in 2023 , before recovering to 2.3 % in 2024; whereas the outlook for euro area activity is surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty , related to the development of the war in ukraine and the energy crisis , with a number of independent forecasts predicting a recession; ### a. whereas according to the ecb base line projections of september 2022 , economic growth will decline from 3.1 % in 2022 to 0.9 % in 2023 , before recovering to 2.3 % in 2024; whereas the outlook for euro area activity is surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty , related to the development of the war in ukraine and the energy crisis , with a number of independent forecasts predicting a recession;


### b. whereas russia’s unprovoked aggression against ukraine has severely hit confidence , caused energy and food prices to soar and , in conjunction with other supply-side disruptions in china , compounded existing supply chain pressures; ### b. whereas russia’s unprovoked , immoral and unjustified aggression against ukraine , which is illegal from the point of view of international law , has severely hit confidence , caused energy and food prices to soar and , in conjunction with other supply-side disruptions in china , compounded existing supply chain pressures that had been felt since mid-2021;


### b. whereas russia’s unprovoked aggression against ukraine has severely hit confidence , caused energy and food prices to soar and , in conjunction with other supply-side disruptions in china , compounded existing supply chain pressures; ### b. whereas russia’s war of aggression against ukraine has severely hit confidence , caused energy and food prices to soar and , in conjunction with other supply-side disruptions in china , compounded existing supply chain pressures;


### c. whereas according to the ecb projections of september 2022 , headline inflation is expected to fall from 8.1 % in 2022 to 2.3 % in 2024; ### c. whereas according to the ecb projections of september 2022 , headline inflation is expected to fall from 8.1 % in 2022 to 2.3 % in 2024; whereas this means that headline inflation is expected to remain above the 2% target in the medium-term , even though the ecb's projections lately have structurally underestimated the inflation rates;


### c. whereas according to the ecb projections of september 2022 , headline inflation is expected to fall from 8.1 % in 2022 to 2.3 % in 2024; ### c. whereas according to the ecb projections of september 2022 , headline inflation is expected to fall from 8.1 % in 2022 to 2.3 % in 2024; whereas 2 ,3% is still above the ecb target rate;


### c. whereas according to the ecb projections of september 2022 , headline inflation is expected to fall from 8.1 % in 2022 to 2.3 % in 2024; ### c. whereas according to the ecb projections of september 2022 , average inflation is expected to fall from 8.1 % in 2022 to 2.3 % in 2024;


### d. whereas acting within its mandate , the ecb has committed to contributing to the objectives of the paris agreement; ### deleted


### d. whereas acting within its mandate , the ecb has committed to contributing to the objectives of the paris agreement; ### d. whereas president lagarde has pledged to keep the european parliament and the general public informed about ecb’s progress on ongoing work to incorporate climate change considerations into monetary policy operations;


### 1. is deeply concerned by the unprovoked russian invasion of ukraine and by its repercussions for the european economy; ### 1. is deeply concerned by the unprovoked , immoral and unjustified russian invasion of ukraine , which is illegal from the point of view of international law , and by its repercussions for the european economy , for instance disruption to supply chains and the inflationary spiral;


### 1. is deeply concerned by the unprovoked russian invasion of ukraine and by its repercussions for the european economy; ### 1. is deeply concerned by the unprovoked russian war of aggression against ukraine and by its repercussions for the european economy and constitutes a direct attack on european values;


### 1. is deeply concerned by the unprovoked russian invasion of ukraine and by its repercussions for the european economy; ### 1. is deeply concerned by russia's unprovoked war of aggression towards ukraine and by its repercussions for the european economy;


### 2. highlights that the statutory independence of the ecb , as laid down in the treaties , is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate; ### 2. highlights that the statutory independence of the ecb , as laid down in the treaties , is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability;


### 3. welcomes the republic of croatia as the 20th member country of the euro area; ### 3. welcomes the republic of croatia's accession to the euro area as its 20th member country as of 1 january 2023;


### 3. welcomes the republic of croatia as the 20th member country of the euro area; ### 3. welcomes the republic of croatia as the 20th member country of the euro area as of 1 january 2023;


### 4. notes that fiscal and monetary policies have reinforced each other during the pandemic; stresses that maintaining price stability today requires even closer coordination between fiscal , monetary and structural policies , as addressing supply-side shocks requires greater supply-chain resilience and a shift away from fossil fuels; ### 4. stresses that maintaining price stability today requires ever closer coordination between monetary , fiscal policies and structural reforms , as maintaining price stability and addressing supply-side shocks requires greater supply-chain resilience , diversification and a shift towards renewables;


### 4. notes that fiscal and monetary policies have reinforced each other during the pandemic; stresses that maintaining price stability today requires even closer coordination between fiscal , monetary and structural policies , as addressing supply-side shocks requires greater supply-chain resilience and a shift away from fossil fuels; ### 4. notes that fiscal and monetary policies have reinforced each other during the pandemic; stresses that maintaining price stability today requires even closer coordination between fiscal , monetary and structural policies; notes , however , that the eurozone's architecture has been designed on the premise of monetary dominance;


### 5. welcomes president lagarde’s statement that the current geopolitical crisis requires us to progress on eu fiscal integration; recalls that the economic and monetary union cannot function smoothly without a fiscal capacity at european level to respond to external shocks; ### deleted


### 5. welcomes president lagarde’s statement that the current geopolitical crisis requires us to progress on eu fiscal integration; recalls that the economic and monetary union cannot function smoothly without a fiscal capacity at european level to respond to external shocks; ### 5. recalls that the economic and monetary union cannot function smoothly without the coordination of national economic and fiscal policies;


### 5. welcomes president lagarde’s statement that the current geopolitical crisis requires us to progress on eu fiscal integration; recalls that the economic and monetary union cannot function smoothly without a fiscal capacity at european level to respond to external shocks; ### 5. recalls that the economic and monetary union cannot function smoothly without sustainable sovereign debt trajectories , creating fiscal buffers to respond to external shocks;


### 6. echoes president lagarde’s call for a swift revision and simplification of the stability and growth pact; ### deleted


### 6. echoes president lagarde’s call for a swift revision and simplification of the stability and growth pact; ### 6. echoes president lagarde’s call for a swift revision and simplification of the stability and growth pact , making the most of the justified extension of the general escape clause as a window of opportunity for a lively , structured , in-depth debate about economic governance in the euro area;


### 7. is alarmed that euro area inflation has continued to rise and has reached undesirably high levels; stresses that headline inflation rose to a record 9.1 % in august 2022; stresses that energy is by far the most significant driver of inflation (38.3 %) , followed by food prices (10.6 %); ### 7. is alarmed that euro area inflation has continued to rise and has reached record levels; stresses that headline inflation rose to a record 10 % in september 2022; stresses that energy is by far the most significant driver of inflation 40.8 %) , followed by food prices (11.8 %)1a; notes with concern that core inflation is also significantly above target;


### 7. is alarmed that euro area inflation has continued to rise and has reached undesirably high levels; stresses that headline inflation rose to a record 9.1 % in august 2022; stresses that energy is by far the most significant driver of inflation (38.3 %) , followed by food prices (10.6 %); ### 7. is alarmed that euro area inflation has continued to rise and has reached undesirably high levels; stresses that headline inflation rose to a record 10% in september 2022; stresses that energy is by far the most significant driver of inflation , followed by food prices;


### 8. takes note of recent ecb monetary policy decisions to raise rates by 50 and 75 basis points in july and september 2022; is concerned about the implications of such policy decisions for growth and employment; ### 8. welcomes the ecb's recent monetary policy decisions to raise rates by 50 and 75 basis points in july and september 2022 respectively; notes however that the ecb's monetary policy stance overall is still accommodative and highlights that further rate rises are necessary in order to slow down inflation;


### 8. takes note of recent ecb monetary policy decisions to raise rates by 50 and 75 basis points in july and september 2022; is concerned about the implications of such policy decisions for growth and employment; ### 8. takes note of recent ecb monetary policy decisions to raise rates by 50 and 75 basis points in july and september 2022; is concerned however that ecb’s monetary policy is still in an accommodative mode;


### 8. takes note of recent ecb monetary policy decisions to raise rates by 50 and 75 basis points in july and september 2022; is concerned about the implications of such policy decisions for growth and employment; ### 8. takes note of recent ecb monetary policy decisions to raise rates by 50 and 75 basis points in july and september 2022 and of the ecb's communicated expectation to raise interest rates further over the next several meetings;


### 9. observes that there is little evidence that rising inflation is spurring a wage-price spiral , not least given the extent of wage restraint in recent years; ### 9. notes that resilient labour markets and some catch-up to compensate for high inflation are likely to push up wage growth , risking spurring a wage-price spiral;


### 9. observes that there is little evidence that rising inflation is spurring a wage-price spiral , not least given the extent of wage restraint in recent years; ### 9. observes that there is little evidence that rising inflation is spurring a wage-price spiral , not least given the extent of wage restraint in recent years; notes that resilient labour markets and some catch-up to compensate for loss of purchasing power are likely to contribute to strong wage growth , risking spurring a wage-price spiral; calls on the ecb to monitor this risk very closely;


### 10. recalls that the ecb strategy review reconfirmed the medium-term orientation of inflation targeting; calls on the ecb to faithfully target this medium-term horizon; ### 10. recalls that the ecb monetary policy strategy review has set symmetric 2% inflation target over medium term; calls on the ecb to faithfully target this medium-term horizon;


### 10. recalls that the ecb strategy review reconfirmed the medium-term orientation of inflation targeting; calls on the ecb to faithfully target this medium-term horizon; ### 10. recalls that the ecb strategy review reconfirmed the medium-term orientation of inflation targeting with a symmetric medium-term target of 2%;


### 11. welcomes the ecb’s decision not to engage in quantitative tightening; ### deleted


### 11. welcomes the ecb’s decision not to engage in quantitative tightening; ### 11. is concerned about the size of the ecb's balance sheet , which has increased exponentially in recent years; notes that all maturing assets under the asset purchase programme (app) and the pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp) are still being reinvested , thereby not reducing the ecb's balance sheet; recalls that quantitative tightening is needed to normalise monetary policy;


### 11. welcomes the ecb’s decision not to engage in quantitative tightening; ### 11. welcomes the ecb’s decision not to discontinue pandemic emergency purchase programme;


### 12. stresses that an even transmission of monetary policy is vital to the achievement of the ecb’s price stability mandate; notes the ecb’s decision on 15 june 2022 to apply flexibility in reinvesting redemptions that are due under the pandemic emergency purchase programme; welcomes the launch of the transmission protection instrument to support the effective transmission of monetary policy across the euro area; ### 12. stresses that a proper transmission of monetary policy is vital to the achievement of the ecb’s price stability mandate; notes the ecb’s decision on 15 june 2022 to apply flexibility in reinvesting redemptions that are due under the pandemic emergency purchase programme; questions the legality and necessity of the transmission protection instrument as an instrument to support the effective transmission of monetary policy across the euro area; reminds the ecb that it already has the outright monetary transactions instrument in its toolbox , which has a similar objective and which to date has never been used;


### 12. stresses that an even transmission of monetary policy is vital to the achievement of the ecb’s price stability mandate; notes the ecb’s decision on 15 june 2022 to apply flexibility in reinvesting redemptions that are due under the pandemic emergency purchase programme; welcomes the launch of the transmission protection instrument to support the effective transmission of monetary policy across the euro area; ### 12. stresses that an even transmission of monetary policy is vital to the achievement of the ecb’s price stability mandate; notes the ecb’s decision on 15 june 2022 to apply flexibility in reinvesting redemptions that are due under the pandemic emergency purchase programme; notes that , with the launch of the transmission protection instrument , the ecb has gained more flexibility for raising interest rates; calls on the ecb to make good use of this flexibility;


### 12. stresses that an even transmission of monetary policy is vital to the achievement of the ecb’s price stability mandate; notes the ecb’s decision on 15 june 2022 to apply flexibility in reinvesting redemptions that are due under the pandemic emergency purchase programme; welcomes the launch of the transmission protection instrument to support the effective transmission of monetary policy across the euro area; ### 12. stresses that an even transmission of monetary policy is vital to the achievement of the ecb’s price stability mandate; notes the ecb’s decision on 15 june 2022 to apply flexibility in reinvesting redemptions that are due under the pandemic emergency purchase programme; takes note that , with the launch of the transmission protection instrument , the ecb created more flexible conditions for raising interest rates;


### 13. notes with concern that the combination of cheap targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltros) and higher interest rates allow european banks to earn billions in extra profit; regrets the fact that the ecb has not yet addressed this issue; ### 13. notes with concern that the combination of current targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltros) and higher interest rates allow european banks to enter into arbitrage; calls on ecb to closely monitor situation of the reserve remuneration and ensure that the balance between costs and benefits remain positive and banks continue financing real economy;


### 13. notes with concern that the combination of cheap targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltros) and higher interest rates allow european banks to earn billions in extra profit; regrets the fact that the ecb has not yet addressed this issue; ### 13. notes with concern that the combination of cheap targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltros) and higher interest rates allows for arbitrage transactions; invites the ecb to look into this issue;


### secondary objectives ### deleted


### 14. recalls that the treaty on the functioning of the european union requires the ecb to support the general economic policies of the union; ### 14. recalls that , without prejudice to the objective of price stability , the ecb shall support the general economic policies in the union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the union as laid down in article 3 of the treaty on european union; points out that there is a clear hierarchy between the ecb's objectives and that during times of inflation above target level , a particular focus should be put on achieving the ecb's primary monetary policy objectives;


### 14. recalls that the treaty on the functioning of the european union requires the ecb to support the general economic policies of the union; ### 14. recalls that , without prejudice to the objective of price stability , the ecb shall support the general economic policies in the union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the union as laid down in article 3 of the treaty on european union;


### 15. calls on the ecb to coordinate with the european parliament to specify the secondary objectives; suggests taking advantage of this resolution to specify and prioritise the policy areas where the ecb is expected to deliver on its secondary objectives; ### deleted


### 16. considers high levels of sustainable growth and investment to be key economic goals; calls on the ecb to consider how its monetary policy stance will impact those objectives; ### deleted


### 16. considers high levels of sustainable growth and investment to be key economic goals; calls on the ecb to consider how its monetary policy stance will impact those objectives; ### 16. considers high levels of sustainable growth and investment to be key economic goals;


### 16. considers high levels of sustainable growth and investment to be key economic goals; calls on the ecb to consider how its monetary policy stance will impact those objectives; ### 16. calls on the ecb to consider how its monetary policy stance will impact those objectives;


### 17. underlines the pivotal role of small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) in the eu’s economy and economic and social convergence and employment; ### 17. underlines the pivotal role of small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) for the eu’s economy and for employment;


### 17. underlines the pivotal role of small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) in the eu’s economy and economic and social convergence and employment; ### 17. underlines the pivotal role of small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) in the eu’s economy and economic and social convergence and employment; points out the need to encourage public and private investments in the eu , and therefore calls on the ecb to continue its efforts to facilitate access to finance for smes;


### 17. underlines the pivotal role of small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) in the eu’s economy and economic and social convergence and employment; ### 17. underlines the pivotal role of small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) in the eu’s economy and economic and social convergence and employment , which has to be given particular attention in its proportionality assessment;


### 18. reaffirms that achieving the union’s climate goals and ensuring a just transition are the top priorities of the eu’s general economic policies , which the ecb is expected to support; ### deleted


### 19. considers that the ecb should contribute to reducing inequality; calls on the ecb to ensure that the costs of its monetary policy operations are not disproportionately borne by lower income strata; invites the ecb to assess the effects of its monetary policy decisions on employment; ### deleted


### 20. stresses that addressing the climate emergency and the euro area’s dependence on fossil fuels touches not only upon the ecb’s secondary mandate , but also its primary mandate , given the serious threat these issues pose to price stability; ### 20. considers that maintaining price stability could help to create the right conditions for the implementation of the paris agreement;


### 20. stresses that addressing the climate emergency and the euro area’s dependence on fossil fuels touches not only upon the ecb’s secondary mandate , but also its primary mandate , given the serious threat these issues pose to price stability; ### 20. considers that maintaining price stability could help to create the right conditions for the implementation of the eu's other policy objectives , such as the implementation of the paris agreement;


### 21. welcomes the governing council’s decision to take further steps to include climate change considerations in the eurosystem’s monetary policy framework; ### 21. notes the governing council’s decision to take further steps to include climate change considerations in the eurosystem’s monetary policy framework; highlights that such decisions must not come at the expense of market neutrality or achieving the ecb's primary objective;


### 21. welcomes the governing council’s decision to take further steps to include climate change considerations in the eurosystem’s monetary policy framework; ### 21. notes the governing council’s decision to take further steps to include climate change considerations in the eurosystem’s monetary policy framework;


### 22. welcomes the ecb’s announcement to decarbonise its corporate bond holdings; calls for the ‘tilting’ of the ecb’s portfolio to be swift rather than gradual; ### 22. notes the ecb’s announcement to decarbonise its corporate bond holdings by ‘tilting’ the ecb's bond portfolio towards issuers with better climate performance through the reinvestment of the sizeable redemptions expected over the coming years; notes with concern that this decision constitutes a notable deviation from the principle of market neutrality;


### 22. welcomes the ecb’s announcement to decarbonise its corporate bond holdings; calls for the ‘tilting’ of the ecb’s portfolio to be swift rather than gradual; ### 22. notes the ecb’s announcement to “tilting”corporate portfolio in ecb’s reinvestment decision in order to better account for the climate change related risks , the level of disclosures by corporates in order to satisfy the secondary objective , which is what all european institutions are pursuing without prejudice to primary objective , which is price stability;


### 23. welcomes , furthermore , the announcement on the greening of the ecb’s collateral framework; regrets , however , that this will be limited to instruments issued by non-financial corporations , which represent only a small fraction of the instruments that banks pledge as collateral; ### deleted


### 23. welcomes , furthermore , the announcement on the greening of the ecb’s collateral framework; regrets , however , that this will be limited to instruments issued by non-financial corporations , which represent only a small fraction of the instruments that banks pledge as collateral; ### 23. notes that the eurosystem will take into account a climate score of issuers in all purchases of corporate bonds , in the context of the eurosystem's ongoing reinvestment purchases;


### 24. regrets that the climate roadmap does not include greening of the ecb’s targeted long-term refinancing operations; stresses that providing cheap liquidity to financial institutions investing in brown activities works against the fight against inflation and is not consistent with the objectives of the paris agreement; ### deleted


### 24. regrets that the climate roadmap does not include greening of the ecb’s targeted long-term refinancing operations; stresses that providing cheap liquidity to financial institutions investing in brown activities works against the fight against inflation and is not consistent with the objectives of the paris agreement; ### 24. welcomes the ecb’s action plan and its detailed roadmap of climate change-related actions to further incorporate climate change considerations into its policy framework and models;


### 25. is concerned about the implications of higher interest rates for green investments; calls on the ecb to assess the possibility of applying differentiated rates to support green investments and disincentivise brown investments; ### deleted


### 25. is concerned about the implications of higher interest rates for green investments; calls on the ecb to assess the possibility of applying differentiated rates to support green investments and disincentivise brown investments; ### 25. considers that measures in pipeline will reduce the eurosystem’s exposure to climate-related financial risk , as well as support the green transition of the economy in line with the eu’s climate neutrality objectives;


### 25. is concerned about the implications of higher interest rates for green investments; calls on the ecb to assess the possibility of applying differentiated rates to support green investments and disincentivise brown investments; ### 25. is concerned about the implications of higher interest rates for green investments; calls on the ecb to assess the possibility of applying the most efficient rates possible to support green investments and disincentivise brown investments;


### 26. welcomes the ecb climate risk stress test aimed at assessing the climate risk preparedness of the european banking sector; is concerned that the results published on 8 july 2022 show that banks do not have robust climate risk stress-testing frameworks and lack the relevant data; calls on the ecb to use all its available tools to ensure that banks take climate risk seriously; ### 26. notes that the ecb climate risk stress test aimed at assessing the climate risk preparedness of the european banking sector; notes that bank supervision should be risk-based and not guided by secondary considerations;


### 26. welcomes the ecb climate risk stress test aimed at assessing the climate risk preparedness of the european banking sector; is concerned that the results published on 8 july 2022 show that banks do not have robust climate risk stress-testing frameworks and lack the relevant data; calls on the ecb to use all its available tools to ensure that banks take climate risk seriously; ### 26. welcomes the ecb's supervisory climate risk stress test to assess how prepared banks are for dealing with financial and economic shocks stemming from climate risk; considers that the exercise showed that banks have made considerable progress with respect to their climate stress-testing capabilities , while the exercise also revealed many deficiencies , data gaps and inconsistencies across institutions;


### 27. stresses the need to further enhance the ecb’s accountability and transparency arrangements; ### 27. stresses the need to further enhance the ecb’s accountability and transparency arrangements; is concerned about the ecb’s lack of responsiveness to the proposal adopted by the conference of presidents of the european parliament for an interinstitutional agreement between parliament and the ecb; insists on its call for the ecb to take swift action by launching negotiations on a formal interinstitutional agreement as soon as possible , thus ensuring that its independence goes hand in hand with its accountability;


### 29. regrets that the gender imbalance also persists across the organisational structure of the ecb , notably in the share of women in senior management positions; ### 29. regrets that the gender imbalance also persists across the organisational structure of the ecb , notably in the share of women in senior management positions; notes that the latest available statistics indicate that the share of women in all ecb management positions rose to 30.3 % and in its senior management positions to 30.8 %;


### 31. welcomes the ecb’s progress on the digital euro project , as well as the dialogue with parliament in this regard; looks forward to the governing council reaching a decision on launching the digital euro; ### deleted


### 31. welcomes the ecb’s progress on the digital euro project , as well as the dialogue with parliament in this regard; looks forward to the governing council reaching a decision on launching the digital euro; ### 31. welcomes the ecb’s progress on the digital euro project , as well as the dialogue with parliament in this regard; looks forward to the governing council reaching a decision on launching the digital euro; recalls that cash payments are a very important means of payment for eu citizens and should not be endangered by a digital euro;


### 31. welcomes the ecb’s progress on the digital euro project , as well as the dialogue with parliament in this regard; looks forward to the governing council reaching a decision on launching the digital euro; ### 31. welcomes the ecb’s progress on the digital euro project , as well as the dialogue with parliament in this regard; looks forward to the end of the 24-month investigation phase of the digital euro project and to the governing council reaching a decision on the start of the process of launching the digital euro;


### (5) the rules for eltifs are almost identical for both professional and retail investors , including rules on the use of leverage , on the diversification of assets and composition of the portfolios , on concentration limits and on limits on the eligible assets and investments. both types of investors , however , have different time horizons , risk tolerances and investment needs. because of those almost identical rules and the consequential high administrative burden and associated costs for eltifs destined for professional investors , asset managers have been reluctant to offer tailored products to such investors. professional investors have a higher risk tolerance than retail investors and may have , due to their nature and activities , different time horizon and return objectives. it is therefore appropriate to provide for specific rules for eltifs that are destined to be marketed to professional investors , in particular with regard to the diversification and composition of the portfolio concerned , the minimum threshold for eligible assets , the concentration limits , and the borrowing of cash. ### (5) the rules for eltifs are almost identical for both professional and retail investors , including rules on the use of leverage , on the diversification of assets and composition of the portfolios , on concentration limits and on limits on the eligible assets and investments. both types of investors , however , have different time horizons , risk tolerances , investment needs and capabilities to analyse investment opportunities. because of those almost identical rules and the consequential high administrative burden and associated costs for eltifs destined for professional investors , asset managers have been reluctant to offer tailored products to such investors. professional investors have a higher risk tolerance than retail investors and may have , due to their nature and activities , different time horizon and return objectives. it is therefore appropriate to provide for specific rules for eltifs that are destined to be marketed to professional investors , in particular with regard to the diversification and composition of the portfolio concerned , the minimum threshold for eligible assets , the concentration limits , and the borrowing of cash.


### (10) it is necessary to extend the scope of eligible assets and promote the investments of eltifs in securitised assets. it should therefore be clarified that , where the underlying assets consist of long-term exposures , eligible investment assets should also include simple , transparent and standardised (sts) securitisations as referred to in article 18 of regulation (eu) 2017/2402 of the european parliament and of the council14 . those long-term exposures comprise securitisations of residential loans that are secured by one or more mortgages on residential immovable property (residential mortgage backed securities (rmbs)) , commercial loans that are secured by one or more mortgages on commercial immovable property , corporate loans , including loans which are granted to small and medium enterprises (smes) , and trade receivables or other underlying exposures that the originator considers to form a distinct asset type , provided that the proceeds from securitising those trade receivables or other underlying exposures are used for financing or refinancing long-term investments. ### (10) it is necessary to extend the scope of eligible assets and promote the investments of eltifs in securitised assets. it should therefore be clarified that , where the underlying assets consist of long-term exposures , eligible investment assets should also include securitisations. those long-term exposures comprise securitisations of residential loans that are secured by one or more mortgages on residential immovable property (residential mortgage backed securities (rmbs)) , commercial loans that are secured by one or more mortgages on commercial immovable property , corporate loans , including loans which are granted to small and medium enterprises (smes) , and trade receivables or other underlying exposures that the originator considers to form a distinct asset type , provided that the proceeds from securitising those trade receivables or other underlying exposures are used for financing or refinancing long-term investments.


### (11) in order to improve access of investors to more up-to-date and complete information on the eltif market , it is necessary to increase the granularity and the timeliness of the central public register referred to in article 3(3) , second subparagraph , of regulation (eu) 2015/760 (‘eltif register’). the eltif register should therefore contain additional information to the information that that register contains already , including , where available , the legal entity identifier (‘lei’) and the national code identifier of the eltif , the name , address and the lei of the eltif manager , the international securities identification numbers (‘isin’) codes of the eltif and of each separate share or unit class , the competent authority of the eltif and the home member state of that eltif , the member states where the eltif is marketed , whether the eltif can be marketed to retail investors or can solely be marketed to professional investors , the date of the authorisation of the eltif , and the date on which the marketing of the eltif has commenced. in addition , to enable eltif investors to analyse and compare existing eltifs , the eltif register should contain up-to-date links to the eltif documentation , including to the rules or instruments of incorporation of the eltif concerned , the annual reports , the prospectus and , where available , the key information document drawn up in accordance with regulation (eu) no 1286/2014 of the european parliament and of the council15 . to ensure an up-to-date status of the eltif register , it is appropriate to require competent authorities to communicate to esma any changes to the information on an eltif , including authorisations and withdrawals of such authorisations , on a monthly basis. ### (11) in order to improve access of investors to more up-to-date and complete information on the eltif market , it is necessary to increase the granularity and the timeliness of the central public register referred to in article 3(3) , second subparagraph , of regulation (eu) 2015/760 (‘eltif register’). the eltif register should therefore contain additional information to the information that that register contains already , including , where available , the legal entity identifier (‘lei’) and the national code identifier of the eltif , the name , address and the lei of the eltif manager , the international securities identification numbers (‘isin’) codes of the eltif and of each separate share or unit class , the competent authority of the eltif and the home member state of that eltif , the member states where the eltif is marketed , whether the eltif can be marketed to retail investors or can solely be marketed to professional investors , the date of the authorisation of the eltif , and the date on which the marketing of the eltif has commenced. to ensure an up-to-date status of the eltif register , it is appropriate to require competent authorities to communicate to esma any changes to the information on an eltif , including authorisations and withdrawals of such authorisations , on a quarterly basis.


### (13) due to concerns that fund-of-funds strategies can give rise to investments that would not fall within the scope of eligible investment assets , regulation (eu) 2015/760 currently contains restrictions on investments in other funds throughout the eltif’s life. fund-of-fund strategies are , however , a common and very effective way of obtaining rapid exposure to illiquid assets , in particular in respect of real estate and in the context of fully paid-in capital structures. it is therefore necessary to give eltifs the possibility to invest in other funds , because that would enable eltifs to ensure a faster deployment of capital. facilitating fund-of-fund investments by eltifs would also allow reinvestment of excess cash into funds as different investments with distinct maturities may lower the cash drag of the eltif. it is therefore necessary to expand the eligibility of funds-of-funds strategies for eltif managers beyond investments in european venture capital funds (euvecas) or european social entrepreneurship funds (eusefs). the scope of collective investment undertakings in which eltifs can invest should thus be broadened to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (ucits) and to eu alternative investment funds (eu aifs) managed by eu aif managers. however , in order to ensure effective investor protection , it is also necessary to set out that where an eltif invests in other eltifs , in european venture capital funds (euvecas) , in european social entrepreneurship funds (eusefs) , in ucits and eu aifs managed by eu aifms , those collective investment undertakings should also invest in eligible investments and have not themselves invested more than 10 % of their capital in any other collective investment undertaking. ### (13) due to concerns that fund-of-funds strategies can give rise to investments that would not fall within the scope of eligible investment assets , regulation (eu) 2015/760 currently contains restrictions on investments in other funds throughout the eltif’s life. fund-of-fund strategies are , however , a common and very effective way of obtaining rapid exposure to illiquid assets , in particular in respect of real estate and in the context of fully paid-in capital structures. it is therefore necessary to give eltifs the possibility to invest in other funds , because that would enable eltifs to ensure a faster deployment of capital. facilitating fund-of-fund investments by eltifs would also allow reinvestment of excess cash into funds as different investments with distinct maturities may lower the cash drag of the eltif. it is therefore necessary to expand the eligibility of funds-of-funds strategies for eltif managers beyond investments in european venture capital funds (euvecas) or european social entrepreneurship funds (eusefs). the scope of collective investment undertakings in which eltifs can invest should thus be broadened to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (ucits) and to eu alternative investment funds (eu aifs) managed by eu aif managers. however , in order to ensure effective investor protection , it is also necessary to set out that where an eltif invests in other eltifs , in european venture capital funds (euvecas) , in european social entrepreneurship funds (eusefs) , in ucits and eu aifs managed by eu aifms , those collective investment undertakings should also invest in eligible investments and have not themselves invested more than 25 % of their capital in any other collective investment undertaking.


### (13) due to concerns that fund-of-funds strategies can give rise to investments that would not fall within the scope of eligible investment assets , regulation (eu) 2015/760 currently contains restrictions on investments in other funds throughout the eltif’s life. fund-of-fund strategies are , however , a common and very effective way of obtaining rapid exposure to illiquid assets , in particular in respect of real estate and in the context of fully paid-in capital structures. it is therefore necessary to give eltifs the possibility to invest in other funds , because that would enable eltifs to ensure a faster deployment of capital. facilitating fund-of-fund investments by eltifs would also allow reinvestment of excess cash into funds as different investments with distinct maturities may lower the cash drag of the eltif. it is therefore necessary to expand the eligibility of funds-of-funds strategies for eltif managers beyond investments in european venture capital funds (euvecas) or european social entrepreneurship funds (eusefs). the scope of collective investment undertakings in which eltifs can invest should thus be broadened to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (ucits) and to eu alternative investment funds (eu aifs) managed by eu aif managers. however , in order to ensure effective investor protection , it is also necessary to set out that where an eltif invests in other eltifs , in european venture capital funds (euvecas) , in european social entrepreneurship funds (eusefs) , in ucits and eu aifs managed by eu aifms , those collective investment undertakings should also invest in eligible investments and have not themselves invested more than 10 % of their capital in any other collective investment undertaking. ### (13) due to concerns that fund-of-funds strategies can give rise to investments that would not fall within the scope of eligible investment assets , regulation (eu) 2015/760 currently contains restrictions on investments in other funds throughout the eltif’s life. fund-of-fund strategies are , however , a common and very effective way of obtaining rapid exposure to illiquid assets , in particular in respect of real estate and in the context of fully paid-in capital structures. it is therefore necessary to give eltifs the possibility to invest in other funds , because that would enable eltifs to ensure a faster deployment of capital. facilitating fund-of-fund investments by eltifs would also allow reinvestment of excess cash into funds as different investments with distinct maturities may lower the cash drag of the eltif. it is therefore necessary to expand the eligibility of funds-of-funds strategies for eltif managers beyond investments in european venture capital funds (euvecas) or european social entrepreneurship funds (eusefs). the scope of collective investment undertakings in which eltifs can invest should thus be broadened to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (ucits) and to eu alternative investment funds (eu aifs) managed by eu aif managers. however , in order to ensure effective investor protection , it is also necessary to set out that where an eltif invests in other eltifs , in european venture capital funds (euvecas) , in european social entrepreneurship funds (eusefs) , in ucits and eu aifs managed by eu aifms , those collective investment undertakings should also invest in eligible investments and have not themselves invested more than 20 % of their net asset value in any other collective investment undertaking.


### (15) the diversification requirements laid down in the current version of regulation (eu) 2015/760 were introduced to ensure that eltifs can withstand adverse market circumstances. those diversification thresholds imply , however , that eltifs are , on average , required to make ten distinct investments. in relation to investment in projects or infrastructures of large scale , the requirement to make ten investments per eltif may be difficult to achieve , and costly in terms of transactional costs and capital allocation. to reduce transaction and administrative costs for eltifs and ultimately their investors , eltifs should therefore be able to pursue more concentrated investment strategies and thus to be exposed to fewer eligible assets. it is therefore necessary to adjust the diversification requirements for eltifs’ exposures to single qualifying portfolio undertakings , single real assets , collective investment undertakings and certain other eligible investment assets , contracts and financial instruments. that additional flexibility in the portfolio composition of eltifs and the reduction in the diversification requirements should not materially affect the capacity of eltifs to withstand market volatility , since eltifs typically invest in assets that often do not have a readily available market quotation , may be highly illiquid , and frequently have long-term maturity or time horizon. ### (15) the diversification requirements laid down in the current version of regulation (eu) 2015/760 were introduced to ensure that eltifs can withstand adverse market circumstances. those diversification thresholds imply , however , that eltifs are , on average , required to make ten distinct investments. those provisions have proven to be too restrictive. in relation to investment in projects or infrastructures of large scale , the requirement to make ten investments per eltif may be difficult to achieve , and costly in terms of transactional costs and capital allocation. to reduce transaction and administrative costs for eltifs and ultimately their investors , eltifs should therefore be able to pursue more concentrated investment strategies and thus to be exposed to fewer eligible assets. it is therefore necessary to adjust the diversification requirements for eltifs’ exposures to single qualifying portfolio undertakings , single real assets , collective investment undertakings and certain other eligible investment assets , contracts and financial instruments. that additional flexibility in the portfolio composition of eltifs and the reduction in the diversification requirements should not materially affect the capacity of eltifs to withstand market volatility , since eltifs typically invest in assets that often do not have a readily available market quotation , may be highly illiquid , and frequently have long-term maturity or time horizon.


### (16) unlike retail investors , professional investors may , in certain circumstances , have a longer time horizon , distinct financial returns objectives , more expertise , possess higher risk tolerance to adverse market conditions and higher capacity to absorb losses. such professional thus require less investor protection measure than retail investors. it is therefore appropriate to remove the diversification requirements for eltifs that are solely marketed to professional investors. ### (16) unlike retail investors , professional investors may , in certain circumstances , have a longer time horizon , distinct financial returns objectives , more expertise , possess higher risk tolerance to adverse market conditions and higher capacity to absorb losses. such professional investors thus require more tailor-made investor protection measures that allow for more flexibility than retail investors. it is therefore appropriate to remove the diversification requirements for eltifs that are solely marketed to professional investors.


### (20) article 10 , point (e) , of regulation (eu) 2015/760 currently requires that eligible investment assets , where those assets are individual real assets , have a value of at least eur 10 000 000. real assets portfolios , however , are often composed of a number of individual real assets which have a value of less than eur 10 000 000. the value of individual real asset should therefore be reduced to eur 1 000 000. that amount is based on the estimated value of individual real assets which may typically form large real assets portfolios , and may thus contribute to the diversification of an investment portfolio. ### (20) article 10 , point (e) , of regulation (eu) 2015/760 currently requires that eligible investment assets , where those assets are individual real assets , have a value of at least eur 10 000 000. real assets portfolios , however , are often composed of a number of individual real assets which have a value of less than eur 10 000 000. the threshold should therefore be removed in order to facilitate the diversification of an investment portfolio and to take into consideration the different conditions in member states.


### (20) article 10 , point (e) , of regulation (eu) 2015/760 currently requires that eligible investment assets , where those assets are individual real assets , have a value of at least eur 10 000 000. real assets portfolios , however , are often composed of a number of individual real assets which have a value of less than eur 10 000 000. the value of individual real asset should therefore be reduced to eur 1 000 000. that amount is based on the estimated value of individual real assets which may typically form large real assets portfolios , and may thus contribute to the diversification of an investment portfolio. ### (20) article 10 , point (e) , of regulation (eu) 2015/760 currently requires that eligible investment assets , where those assets are individual real assets , have a value of at least eur 10 000 000. real assets portfolios , however , are often composed of a number of individual real assets which have a value of significantly less than eur 10 000 000. the value of individual real asset should therefore be reduced to eur 1 000 000. that amount is based on the estimated value of individual real assets which may typically form large real assets portfolios , and may thus contribute to the diversification of an investment portfolio.