### (6) gatekeepers have a significant impact on the internal market , providing gateways for a large number of business users , to reach end users , everywhere in the union and on different markets. the adverse impact of unfair practices on the internal market and particularly weak contestability of core platform services , including their negative societal and economic implications , have led national legislators and sectoral regulators to act. a number of national regulatory solutions have already been adopted or proposed to address unfair practices and the contestability of digital services or at least with regard to some of them. this has created a risk of divergent regulatory solutions and thereby fragmentation of the internal market , thus raising the risk of increased compliance costs due to different sets of national regulatory requirements. ### (6) gatekeepers have a significant impact on the internal market , providing gateways for a large number of business users , to reach end users , everywhere in the union and on different markets. the adverse impact of unfair practices on the internal market and particularly weak contestability of core platform services , including their negative societal and economic implications , have led national legislators and sectoral regulators to act. a number of national regulatory solutions have already been adopted or proposed , or are in the process of being adopted , to address unfair practices and the contestability of digital services or at least with regard to some of them. this has created a risk of divergent regulatory solutions and thereby fragmentation of the internal market , leading to reduced legal certainty on the internal market , and thus raising the risk of increased compliance costs due to different sets of national regulatory requirements.


### (6) gatekeepers have a significant impact on the internal market , providing gateways for a large number of business users , to reach end users , everywhere in the union and on different markets. the adverse impact of unfair practices on the internal market and particularly weak contestability of core platform services , including their negative societal and economic implications , have led national legislators and sectoral regulators to act. a number of national regulatory solutions have already been adopted or proposed to address unfair practices and the contestability of digital services or at least with regard to some of them. this has created a risk of divergent regulatory solutions and thereby fragmentation of the internal market , thus raising the risk of increased compliance costs due to different sets of national regulatory requirements. ### (6) gatekeepers have a significant impact on the internal market , providing gateways for a very large number of business users , to reach end users , everywhere in the union and on different markets. the adverse impact of unfair practices on the internal market and particularly weak contestability of core platform services , including their negative societal and economic implications , have led national legislators and sectoral regulators to act. a number of national regulatory solutions have already been adopted or proposed to address unfair practices and the contestability of digital services or at least with regard to some of them. this has created a risk of divergent regulatory solutions and thereby fragmentation and reduced certainty for users and businesses of the internal market , thus raising the risk of increased compliance costs due to different sets of national regulatory requirements.


### (6) gatekeepers have a significant impact on the internal market , providing gateways for a large number of business users , to reach end users , everywhere in the union and on different markets. the adverse impact of unfair practices on the internal market and particularly weak contestability of core platform services , including their negative societal and economic implications , have led national legislators and sectoral regulators to act. a number of national regulatory solutions have already been adopted or proposed to address unfair practices and the contestability of digital services or at least with regard to some of them. this has created a risk of divergent regulatory solutions and thereby fragmentation of the internal market , thus raising the risk of increased compliance costs due to different sets of national regulatory requirements. ### (6) gatekeepers have a significant impact on the internal market , providing gateways for a large number of business users , to reach end users , everywhere in the union and on different markets. the adverse impact of unfair practices on the internal market and particularly weak contestability of core platform services , including their negative societal and economic implications , have led national legislators and sectoral regulators to act. a number of national regulatory solutions have already been adopted or proposed to address unfair practices and the contestability of digital services or at least with regard to some of them. this has created divergent regulatory solutions and thereby fragmentation of the internal market , thus raising the risk of increased compliance costs due to different sets of national regulatory requirements.


### (7) therefore , business users and end-users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers should be afforded appropriate regulatory safeguards throughout the union against the unfair behaviour of gatekeepers in order to facilitate cross-border business within the union and thereby improve the proper functioning of the internal market and to address existing or likely emerging fragmentation in the specific areas covered by this regulation. moreover , while gatekeepers tend to adopt global or at least pan-european business models and algorithmic structures , they can adopt , and in some cases have adopted , different business conditions and practices in different member states , which is liable to create disparities between the competitive conditions for the users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of integration within the internal market. ### (7) therefore , business users and end-users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers should be afforded harmonised and appropriate regulatory safeguards throughout the union against the unfair behaviour of gatekeepers in order to facilitate cross-border business within the union and thereby improve the proper functioning of the internal market and legal certainty , and to address existing or likely emerging fragmentation in the specific areas covered by this regulation. moreover , while gatekeepers tend to adopt global or at least pan-european business models and algorithmic structures , they can adopt , and in some cases have adopted , different business conditions and practices in different member states , which is liable to create disparities between the competitive conditions for the users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of integration within the internal market.


### (7) therefore , business users and end-users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers should be afforded appropriate regulatory safeguards throughout the union against the unfair behaviour of gatekeepers in order to facilitate cross-border business within the union and thereby improve the proper functioning of the internal market and to address existing or likely emerging fragmentation in the specific areas covered by this regulation. moreover , while gatekeepers tend to adopt global or at least pan-european business models and algorithmic structures , they can adopt , and in some cases have adopted , different business conditions and practices in different member states , which is liable to create disparities between the competitive conditions for the users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of integration within the internal market. ### (7) therefore , the objective of this regulation is to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market , by increasing the level of consumer protection , by establishing rules that ensure contestability and fairness for the digital section in general , as well as for business users and end-users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers in particular. business users and end-users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers should be afforded appropriate regulatory safeguards throughout the union against the unfair behaviour of gatekeepers in order to facilitate cross-border business within the union and thereby improve the proper functioning of the internal market and to address existing or likely emerging fragmentation in the specific areas covered by this regulation. moreover , while gatekeepers tend to adopt global or at least pan-european business models and algorithmic structures , they can adopt , and in some cases have adopted , different business conditions and practices in different member states , which is liable to create disparities between the competitive conditions for the users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of integration within the internal market.


### (8) by approximating diverging national laws , obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services , including retail services , within the internal market should be eliminated. a targeted set of harmonised mandatory rules should therefore be established at union level to ensure contestable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market. ### (8) by approximating diverging national laws , obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services , including retail services , within the internal market should be eliminated. a targeted set of harmonised , effective , mandatory rules befitting the digital age should therefore be established at union level to ensure contestable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market.


### (8) by approximating diverging national laws , obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services , including retail services , within the internal market should be eliminated. a targeted set of harmonised mandatory rules should therefore be established at union level to ensure contestable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market. ### (8) by approximating diverging national laws , obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services , including retail services , within the internal market should be eliminated. a targeted set of harmonised rules should therefore be established at union level to ensure contestable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market.


### (9) a fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if member states are prevented from applying national rules which are specific to the types of undertakings and services covered by this regulation. at the same time , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. however , the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market. ### (9) nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing the same , stricter or different obligations on undertakings in order to pursue legitimate public interests , in compliance with union law. those legitimate public interests can be , among others , the protection of consumers , the fight against acts of unfair competition and the protection of media freedom and pluralism. in particular , nothing in this regulation precludes member states from pursuing those legitimate interests by imposing obligations on undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this regulation as well as other undertakings. since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question.


### (9) a fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if member states are prevented from applying national rules which are specific to the types of undertakings and services covered by this regulation. at the same time , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. however , the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market. ### (9) a fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if member states are prevented from applying national rules which are specific to the types of undertakings and services covered by this regulation. at the same time , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. a coherent application of these rules can only be effectively achieved if the commission and member states are able to exchange confidential information and work in close cooperation and coordinate their enforcement actions to ensure coherent , effective and complementary outcomes.


### (9) a fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if member states are prevented from applying national rules which are specific to the types of undertakings and services covered by this regulation. at the same time , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. however , the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market. ### (9) nothing in this regulation precludes the member states from imposing the same or stricter obligations on undertakings in pursuit of legitimate public interests , in accordance with union law. legitimate public interests include , among others , consumer protection , the fight against unfair competition , and the protection of freedom and pluralism. in particular , there is nothing in this regulation to preclude the member states from pursuing these legitimate public interests by imposing obligations on undertakings with gatekeeper status in accordance with this regulation. since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question.


### (9) a fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if member states are prevented from applying national rules which are specific to the types of undertakings and services covered by this regulation. at the same time , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. however , the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market. ### (9) a fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if member states are prevented from applying national rules which are within the scope of this regulation. at the same time , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour in an exclusively national context and that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. however , the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market.


### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should be without prejudice to their application. ### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and from rules under consumer protection law and thus it should be without prejudice to their application.


### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation. ### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu)2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council , regulation (eu)xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council , regulation (eu)2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council , as well as national rules taken in accordance with that union legislation.


### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation. ### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , directive 2005/29/ec , council directive 93/13/eec and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation.


### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation. ### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules taken in accordance that union legislation.


### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. accordingly , it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where , based on current market conditions , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective. ### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. accordingly , it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where , based on current and prospective market conditions , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , (including , among others , marketplaces , app stores , digital voice assistants) , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. for marketplaces , an active end user is a user who has completed at least one commercial transaction each month.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems (which include digital voice assistants and connected tvs) , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services , web browsers and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems (including those for smart tvs , digital voice assistants and alike) , web browsers , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services , online advertising services and web browsers all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. therefore any digital service which focuses on software application as the intermediated product or service should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32. in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems (which include digital voice assistants , connected tvs and in-car infotainment systems) , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services , web browsers and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services , virtual assistants and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems (which include digital voice assistants and connected tvs) , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services , web browsers and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. virtual or voice activated assistants and other connected devices , represent the fastest developing interface for users to access the web , to use and control smart devices and access consumer iot services , and therefore fall within the scope of this regulation not only as operating systems , an online intermediation service or a search engine , but as a distinctive core platform service category. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32. in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services (including , inter alia , marketplaces , application stores , digital voice assistants) , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32. in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (14) a number of other ancillary services , such as identification or payment services and technical services which support the provision of payment services , may be provided by gatekeepers together with their core platform services. as gatekeepers frequently provide the portfolio of their services as part of an integrated ecosystem to which third-party providers of such ancillary services do not have access , at least not subject to equal conditions , and can link the access to the core platform service to take-up of one or more ancillary services , the gatekeepers are likely to have an increased ability and incentive to leverage their gatekeeper power from their core platform services to these ancillary services , to the detriment of choice and contestability of these services. ### (14) a number of other ancillary services , such as identification or payment services and technical services which support the provision of payment services , may be provided by gatekeepers together with their core platform services. as gatekeepers frequently provide the portfolio of their services as part of an integrated ecosystem to which third-party providers of such ancillary services do not have access , at least not subject to equal conditions , and can link the access to the core platform service to take-up of one or more ancillary services , the gatekeepers are likely to have an increased ability and incentive to leverage their gatekeeper power from their core platform services to these ancillary services , to the detriment of choice and contestability of these services. gatekeepers that provide ancillary services such as retailing or distribution activities that are targeted at end users alongside their core platform services and in a manner that is indistinguishable for the average user should also be subject to the obligations applicable to core platform services.


### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply only to undertakings designated on the basis of these three objective criteria , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users. ### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply only to undertakings designated on the basis of these three objective criteria , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users.


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) core platform services offered by gatekeepers serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , in particular pricing conditions , data usage conditions or conditions related to the licensing of rights held by the business user , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. “imposing” encompasses both explicit and implicit demands , by means of contract or fact , including , for example , an online search engine making the ranking results dependent on the transfer of certain rights or data. pricing or other general access or treatment conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access or treatment conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of the relevant core platform service; prices charged or conditions imposed by the gatekeeper for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the gatekeeper for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the gatekeeper for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. furthermore , conditions shall be deemed unfair if the gatekeeper charges prices or imposes conditions without entering into genuine negotiations with business users or collective management organisations representing these business users or without accepting a binding procedure of price fixing like established mechanism under laws of collective rights management or without accepting a reasonable offer of a binding arbitration by the business users. it shall also be deemed unfair if a gatekeeper demands a royalty-free license as a condition to access or treatment , or enforces royalties that are significantly below prices fixed in accordance with laws of collective rights management. it shall also be deemed unfair if access to the service or the quality or other conditions of the service are made dependent on the transfer of data or the granting of rights by the business user which are unrelated to or not strictly necessary for providing the core platform service. while this obligation should not establish an unconditional access right , it shall ensure that the conditions of access to and treatment by the core platforms are fair and non-discriminatory. this obligation should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of core platform services to take the required responsibility as set out in regulation [digital services act].


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. the following practice shall be considered as an unfair access condition or unfair treatment: the gatekeeper demands a royalty-free license as a condition to access or treatment , or enforces royalties that are significantly below prices fixed in accordance with laws and collective rights. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act].


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide core platform services , in particular software application stores , online search engines and online social networking services , serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act].


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) gatekeepers which provide access to core platform services serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their core platform services , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions and conditions obliging transfer of data or certain rights , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of relevant services; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the core platform service for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the core platform service for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of core platform services to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act].


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) core platform services provided by gatekeepers serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by another provider of core platform services; prices charged or conditions imposed for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of core platform services for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to their ability to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act].


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) gatekeepers which provide access to core platform services serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their core platform services , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , data usage conditions or conditions related to the licensing of rights held by the business user that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access or treatment conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access or treatment conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of core platform services; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of core platform services for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of core platform services for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of core platform services for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of core platform services to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act].


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) core platform services provided by gatekeepers , which provide access to software application stores , serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by another provider of core platform services; prices charged or conditions imposed for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of core platform services for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to their ability to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act].


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) gatekeepers which provide access to core platform services serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their core platform services , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of core platform services; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of core platform services for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of core platform services for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of core platform services for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of core platform services to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act].


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### deleted


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. in its request , the gatekeeper shall provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. to ensure effective compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation , within one month after its effective designation , a gatekeeper may request the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement are effective in achieving the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. in the preparation of its position following this request of the gatekeeper , the commission may consult third parties such as business users and competitors , civil society organisations , national competent authorities and others deemed relevant by the commission for the respective core platform services subject of the request of the gatekeeper. the commission may specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement and shall submit its final position within three months after it has accepted the request of the gatekeeper. as stipulated in article 3(8) the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within four months after the conclusion of the procedure described in this article.


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. to ensure effective compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation , within one month after its effective designation , а gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. in the preparation of its position following this request of the gatekeeper , the commission may consult third parties such as business users and competitors , civil society organisations , national competent authorities and others deemed relevant by the commission for the respective core platform services subject of the request of the gatekeeper. the commission may specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement and shall submit its final position within three months after it has accepted the request of the gatekeeper. as stipulated in article 3(8) the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within four months after the conclusion of the procedure set out in this article.


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 5 and 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. in its request , the gatekeeper shall provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.


### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger , due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper , the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union , and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. the commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request. ### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that:


### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger , due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper , the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union , and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. the commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request. ### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 or measures related to article 7(2) for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that:


### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger , due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper , the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union , and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. the commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request. ### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger , due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper , the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union , and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. the commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request. the suspension decision shall be accompanied by a reasoned statement detailing the grounds for the suspension.


### 2. where the suspension is granted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall review its suspension decision every year. following such a review the commission shall either lift the suspension or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met. ### 2. where the suspension is granted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall review its suspension decision every year. following such a review the commission shall either lift the suspension or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met.


### 2. where the suspension is granted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall review its suspension decision every year. following such a review the commission shall either lift the suspension or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met. ### 2. where the suspension is granted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall review its suspension decision every year. following such a review the commission shall either wholly or partly lift the suspension or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met.


### 2. where the suspension is granted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall review its suspension decision every year. following such a review the commission shall either lift the suspension or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met. ### 2. where the suspension is granted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall review its suspension decision every year. following such a review which should include consultation with the gatekeeper and third parties with a justified interest the commission shall either wholly or partly lift the suspension or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met.


### in assessing the request , the commission shall take into account , in particular , the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union as well as on third parties. the suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the commission in order to ensure a fair balance between these interests and the objectives of this regulation. such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the commission pursuant to paragraph 1. ### in assessing the request , the commission shall take into account , in particular , the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union as well as on third parties , in particular the gatekeeper’s business users. the suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the commission in order to ensure a fair balance between these interests and the objectives of this regulation. such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the commission pursuant to paragraph 1.


### in assessing the request , the commission shall take into account , in particular , the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union as well as on third parties. the suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the commission in order to ensure a fair balance between these interests and the objectives of this regulation. such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the commission pursuant to paragraph 1. ### in assessing the request , the commission shall take into account , in particular , the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the economic viability of the operation of the conditions of paragraph 1 and the impact on third parties including smaller business users and end-users. the suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the commission in order to ensure a fair balance between these interests and the objectives of this regulation. such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the commission pursuant to paragraph 1.


### 1. the commission may , acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative , by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , exempt it , in whole or in part , from a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to article 3(7) , where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this article. the commission shall adopt the exemption decision at the latest 3 months after receiving a complete reasoned request. ### 1. the commission may , acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative , by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , exempt it , in whole or in part , from a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to article 3(7) , where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this article. the commission shall adopt the exemption decision at the latest 3 months after receiving a complete reasoned request. the exemption decision shall be accompanied by a reasoned statement detailing the grounds for the exemption.


### 2. an exemption pursuant to paragraph 1 may only be granted on grounds of: ### 2. an exemption pursuant to paragraph 1 may be granted on public interest grounds including:


### public morality; ### deleted


### article 10 ### deleted


### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to update the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6. ### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to supplement or amend the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need to update those obligations to address practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6.


### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to update the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6. ### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt legislative proposals in accordance with article 34 to update the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6.