### 2. recalls the negative effects of rapid inflation on markets , investments and the beneficiaries of union funds; notes that rural communities and farmers , especially small-scale and young farmers , are suffering at a time when their capacity to invest is limited and the budgetary capacity of the union and the member states is being reduced; ### 2. recalls the negative effects of rapid inflation on markets , investments and the beneficiaries of union funds; notes that rural communities and farmers , especially small-scale and young farmers , are suffering because of the explosion in commodity and input prices at a time when their capacity to invest is limited and the budgetary capacity of the union and the member states is being reduced;


### 2. recalls the negative effects of rapid inflation on markets , investments and the beneficiaries of union funds; notes that rural communities and farmers , especially small-scale and young farmers , are suffering at a time when their capacity to invest is limited and the budgetary capacity of the union and the member states is being reduced; ### 2. recalls the negative effects of rapid inflation on markets , investments and the beneficiaries of union funds; notes that rural communities and farmers , especially small-scale , traditional and young farmers are particularly vulnerable suffering at a time when their capacity to invest is limited and the budgetary capacity of the union and the member states is being reduced;


### 3. stresses that the cef is a key enabler for achieving the objectives of the trans-european transport network (ten-t) policy; points out that investment needs in the ten-t are estimated at eur 500 billion to complete the core network by 2030 and eur 1500 billion for the entire network by 2050; highlights the strategic value of the ten-t and cef for meeting new objectives as regards the eu sustainable and smart mobility strategy , enhanced military mobility in the eu and stronger connectivity with our strategic partners in non-eu countries; ### 3. stresses that the cef is a key enabler for achieving the objectives of the trans-european transport network (ten-t) policy , in particular the completion of european rail traffic management system (ertms) and cross-border missing links; points out that investment needs in the ten-t are estimated at eur 500 billion to complete the core network by 2030 and eur 1500 billion for the entire network by 2050 including measures for accelerated ertms deployment and the implementation of technical specifications for interoperability ; highlights the strategic value of the ten-t and cef for meeting new objectives as regards the eu sustainable and smart mobility strategy and a fast and widespread deployment of alternative fuels infrastructures throughout the union;


### 3. highlights that , in the short term , large-scale humanitarian aid in ukraine and financial support to member states receiving and helping to settle people fleeing the conflict are needed to address the impact of the war against ukraine; ### 3. highlights that , in the short term , large-scale humanitarian aid in ukraine and financial support to member states receiving and helping to settle people fleeing the conflict are needed to address the impact of the war against ukraine; notes the amending letter for the 2023 budget in this context , which reinforces humanitarian aid and addresses the global food crisis as a first step; points out that further reinforcements will be needed in the future not only in the area of humanitarian aid but also in emergency assistance in order to sustain basic services and to fix the most essential infrastructure; highlights in this context the importance of reinforcing the solidarity lanes through connecting europe facility;


### 3. underlines the necessity of providing the regions with appropriate financial means in order to deal with the waves of migration caused by the russian aggression against ukraine and its multifaceted consequences; emphasises the need to address the grave difficulties that the current rise in energy costs is causing for the regions , and to identify suitable financial instruments to deal with them at a regional level; ### 3. underlines the necessity of providing the regions with appropriate financial means in order to deal with the waves of migration caused by the russian aggression against ukraine and its multifaceted consequences; stresses the need to earmark financial aid for european regions in preparation for a possible wave of migrants from third countries largely dependent on farm output in russia and ukraine; emphasises the need to address the grave difficulties that the current rise in energy costs is causing for the regions , and to identify suitable financial instruments to deal with them at a regional level;


### 3. deeply regrets the fact that the protection of the eu budget , including the comprehensive processing of information , the ease of accessibility , the feasibility of in-depth audits , substantive scrutiny and the possibility to monitor , follow up on and evaluate the financed actions , as envisaged by the rrf regulation , has not been adequately embedded within the current mff package as a whole; acknowledges that this shortcoming enormously weakens both the level of transparency of the implementing actions and the effectiveness of scrutiny and monitoring; calls for the revision of the 2021-2027 mff to address these shortcomings; calls , therefore , for a mandatory single interoperable database to be introduced during the current programming period , including relevant information on the direct and ultimate beneficiaries of eu funds , providing a clear overview of the recipients of eu funding; ### 3. deeply regrets the fact that the protection of the eu budget , including the comprehensive processing of information , the ease of accessibility , the feasibility of in-depth audits , substantive scrutiny and the possibility to monitor , follow up on and evaluate the financed actions , as envisaged by the rrf regulation , has not been adequately embedded within the current mff package as a whole; acknowledges that this shortcoming enormously weakens both the level of transparency of the implementing actions and the effectiveness of scrutiny and monitoring; calls for the revision of the 2021-2027 mff to address these shortcomings; calls , therefore , for a mandatory single interoperable it-system to be introduced during the current programming period , which combines relevant information on eu co-financed programmes and projects with information on the direct and ultimate beneficiaries of eu funds and their beneficial owners , providing a clear overview of the recipients of eu funding;


### 3. underlines its undivided solidarity with the people of ukraine and recalls the need to mobilise all available eu budget instruments to provide the strongest possible economic and financial support to ukraine and to people fleeing the war; calls for work to start on a marshall-plan-like facility within the eu budget (ukraine solidarity trust fund) to rebuild ukraine after the war , and for a massive investment programme to be launched; ### 3. underlines its undivided solidarity with the people of ukraine and recalls the need to mobilise all available eu budget instruments to provide the strongest possible economic and financial support to ukraine and to people fleeing the war; calls for work to start on a marshall-plan-like facility within the eu budget (ukraine solidarity trust fund) to rebuild ukraine after the war , and for a massive investment programme to be launched; considers that apart from eu and member states contributions , the fund should be filled by russia’s compensation for war damages , including russian assets which were previously frozen as a result of sanctions and should be legally confiscated in accordance with international law;


### 3. calls on the council to preserve an ambitious multiannual budget for heading 3 , bearing in mind the importance of food security; ### 3. calls on the council to preserve an ambitious multiannual budget for heading 3 , bearing in mind the importance of food security , especially in the wake of recent climate challenges such as drought , heat-waves and water scarcity;


### 3. calls on the council to preserve an ambitious multiannual budget for heading 3 , bearing in mind the importance of food security; ### 3. calls on the council to preserve an ambitious multiannual budget for heading 3 , bearing in mind the importance of food security; recalls , furthermore , to assess the safeguarding of food security in non-eu countries;


### 3. calls on the council to preserve an ambitious multiannual budget for heading 3 , bearing in mind the importance of food security; ### 3. calls on the council to preserve an ambitious multiannual budget for heading 3 , bearing in mind the need to support farmers with a view to achieving food security;


### 4. recommends further strengthening synergies between the cef and other programmes such as horizon europe and investeu , in order to support innovation , sustainability and safety in the transport sector and optimise the use of budgetary resources; ### 4. recommends further strengthening synergies between the cef and other programmes such as horizon europe , investeu and repowereu , in order to support competitiveness , innovation , sustainability and safety in the transport sector and optimise the use of budgetary resources;


### 4. welcomes the decision to grant ukraine and moldova candidate country status; emphasises that this decision entails a long-term financial and budgetary commitment to supporting the necessary reforms specific to each country , as has been the case with other candidate countries , as well as to reconstruction and recovery; ### 4. welcomes the decision to grant ukraine and moldova candidate country status; emphasises that this decision entails a long-term financial and budgetary commitment to support the reconstruction and recovery as well as the necessary reforms specific to each country , as has been the case with other candidate countries ,


### 4. welcomes the regulation on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the eu budget (the conditionality regulation); emphasises the clear link between respect for the rule of law and the efficient implementation of the eu budget; notes that any upscaling of the 2021-2027 mff should aim to reinforce the protection of the eu’s financial interests , ensuring alignment with rule of law conditionality and strengthening public procurement rules to avoid any potential conflict of interests and increase transparency; ### 4. welcomes the regulation on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the eu budget (the conditionality regulation); emphasises the clear link between respect for the rule of law and the efficient implementation of the eu budget; notes that any upscaling of the 2021-2027 mff should aim to reinforce the protection of the eu’s financial interests , ensuring alignment with rule of law conditionality and strengthening public procurement rules to avoid any potential conflict of interests and increase transparency; reducing the administrative burden for beneficiaries , strengthening the efficacy of spending with a view to achieving greater european added value and increasing access to eu funding for citizens , smes and local and regional authorities;


### 4. welcomes the commission’s upcoming proposal for a european defence investment programme (edip) , the aim of which would be to introduce joint procurement and life cycle management of military capabilities , in particular those necessary to harness eu defence over the decades to counter a military threat from russia; calls on all member states to complement eu funding with funding from their national defence budgets; invites the commission to open this programme to key strategic partners and allies; ### 4. welcomes the commission’s upcoming proposal for a european defence investment programme (edip) , the aim of which would be to introduce joint procurement and life cycle management of military capabilities , in particular those necessary to harness eu defence over the decades to counter a military threat from russia; calls on all member states to complement eu funding with funding from their national defence budgets; invites the commission to open this programme to key strategic partners and allies; calls on the nato secretary general as well as the commission and european council presidents to regularly monitor eu-nato cooperation in those regards and give the necessary impetus to its future evolution;


### 4. calls on the council and the commission to recognise that the capacity of farmers to withstand inflation pressure and increased input prices and to ensure food security is impacted by variation in cap payments; calls , therefore , for additional support to the member states with the lowest payments; ### 4. calls on the council and the commission to recognise that the capacity of farmers to withstand inflation pressure and increased input prices and to ensure food security is impacted by variation in cap payments; calls , therefore , for additional support to the member states with the lowest payments; reminds that according to parliaments resolution((2020/2126(ini)) in some member states there is a clear inequality between fund allocations for big and small farmers , with systemic advantages for big farms , whose beneficiaries have close ties to the ruling political parties or are themselves members of these parties in their countries;


### 5. points out that essential new policy initiatives put forward since the adoption of the current mff have come with proposals to shift money away from key eu policies and objectives; ### 5. points out that the commission has changed the mff with new policy initiatives that have been put forward since the adoption of the current mff , by taking money away from the agreed programmes through redeployments;


### 5. points out that essential new policy initiatives put forward since the adoption of the current mff have come with proposals to shift money away from key eu policies and objectives; ### 5. regrets that essential new policy initiatives put forward since the adoption of the current mff have come with proposals to shift money away from key eu policies and objectives at their expense;


### 5. calls for stronger defence cooperation with ukraine and moldova to be established , including by enhancing the financial capabilities of the european defence agency (eda) to help identify where ukraine should participate in eu defence capability development over the years to come. ### 5. calls for stronger defence cooperation with ukraine and moldova to be established , including by enhancing the financial capabilities of the european defence agency (eda) to help identify where ukraine should participate in eu defence capability development over the years to come , reiterates its call to fund the eda and permanent structured cooperation (pesco) from the unionbudget as foreseen by article 41(2) teu;


### 5. calls for the mff revision to provide additional funds to the neighbourhood , development and international cooperation instrument (ndici) – global europe instrument , particularly to reinforce the budget lines most in demand recently and to meet the additional needs caused by the russian war against ukraine without diverting money from other geographic regions; ### 5. calls for the mff revision to provide additional funds to humanitarian aid to address emergencies particularly in the context of food insecurity as well as to the neighbourhood , development and international cooperation instrument (ndici) – global europe instrument , particularly to reinforce the budget lines most in demand recently and to meet the additional needs caused by the russian war against ukraine , particularly in the context peace , security and conflict prevention , financing of cross-sectoral efforts to increase capacity for diversified local and regional food production , ensure nutritional and food security , without diverting money from other geographic regions;


### 5. calls on the council to modify article 4 of the mff regulation to allow for the technical adjustment of ceilings to take into account inflation of above 2 %. ### 5. calls on the council to provide for sufficient margins so as to allow for the technical adjustment of ceilings to take into account inflation of above 2 %.


### 6. stresses that the transition to a smart and sustainable mobility system has to be fair and inclusive and requires mitigating the risk of energy and mobility poverty and protecting the most vulnerable; considers that to ensure a successful transition , it is essential to invest in the upskilling and reskilling of workers; therefore insists on targeted measures within the ‘fit for 55’ package in that respect , in coordination with member states’ plans; ### 6. stresses that the transition to a smart and sustainable mobility system has to be fair and inclusive and requires mitigating the risk of energy and transport poverty and protecting the most vulnerable; considers that to ensure a successful transition , investments in the upskilling and reskilling of workers should be accompanied by measures to support the most impacted eu industrial supply chains , such as the automotive one; therefore insists on targeted measures and financing opportunities within the ‘fit for 55’ package in that respect , in coordination with member states’ plans;


### 6. points to the extensive use made of the special instruments in the first two years of the mff; notes that the flexibility instrument was mobilised for heading 6 spending in 2022 and points to the proposal that it be mobilised for spending under both headings 6 and 7 in 2023; points out that , under the defence proposal of july 202218 , further appropriations are to be mobilised via special instruments in 2023 and 2024; ### 6. points to the extensive use made of the special instruments in the first two years of the mff; notes that the flexibility instrument was mobilised for heading 6 spending in 2022 and points to the proposal that it be mobilised under the same heading again in 2023; points out that , under the defence proposal of july 202218 , further appropriations are to be mobilised via special instruments in 2023 and 2024;


### 6. points to the extensive use made of the special instruments in the first two years of the mff; notes that the flexibility instrument was mobilised for heading 6 spending in 2022 and points to the proposal that it be mobilised for spending under both headings 6 and 7 in 2023; points out that , under the defence proposal of july 202218 , further appropriations are to be mobilised via special instruments in 2023 and 2024; ### 6. points to the extensive use made of the special instruments in the first two years of the mff; notes that the flexibility instrument was mobilised for heading 6 (neighbourhood and the world) spending in 2022 and points to the proposal that it be mobilised for spending under headings 6 in 2023; points out that , under the defence proposal of july 202218 , further appropriations are to be mobilised via special instruments in 2023 and 2024;


### 6. notes that the mff revision should be accompanied by the necessary legislative changes to the ndici – global europe regulation. ### 6. notes that the mff revision may have to be accompanied by the necessary legislative changes to the ndici – global europe regulation to enhance flexibility and efficiency of implementation and to reflect to the changed international environment.


### 7. regrets the fragmentation of the funding possibilities available for tourism in the current mff; highlights that this economically important sector , especially the small and medium-sized enterprises , is struggling to overcome the effects of the covid-19 pandemic and the crisis caused by the current war; reiterates the urgency of creating a specific eu programme on sustainable tourism and introducing a dedicated budget line to address the needs of the sector; insists on its request for the establishment of a european crisis mechanism for the eu tourism sector and of a european agency for tourism. ### 7. regrets the fragmentation of the funding possibilities available for tourism in the current mff; highlights that this economically important sector , made for 99% of small and medium-sized enterprises , is struggling to overcome the effects of the covid-19 pandemic and the crisis caused by the current war; reiterates the urgency of creating a specific eu programme on tourism and introducing a dedicated budget line to address the needs of the sector; reiterates that coordination is key for the recovery of the eu tourism industry as a short-term solution and insists on its request for the establishment of a european crisis mechanism for the eu tourism sector and of a european agency for tourism to maintain europe's standing as a leading destination;


### 7. calls on the commission to ensure that the european anti-fraud office , the court of auditors and the european public prosecutor’s office have the necessary means and staff to investigate potential cases of fraud against the eu budget. ### 7. calls on the commission to ensure that the european anti-fraud office , the court of auditors and the european public prosecutor’s office have the necessary means and staff to investigate potential cases of fraud against the eu budget; welcomes the ongoing recruitment of approximately 190 full time equivalents for ngeu-related tasks , including audit and control; as well as the planned new 118 additional posts for eppo in 2022;


### a. whereas russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against ukraine has undermined food security; whereas the heads of state or government of the member states have emphasised the importance of food security and sovereignty; ### a. whereas the covid-19 pandemic and russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against ukraine have undermined food security and stoked price volatility in the internal market; whereas there is a greater need than ever to reaffirm the objectives of the common agricultural policy , which are effective market stabilisation , guaranteed security of supply and reasonable prices for consumers; whereas the heads of state or government of the member states have emphasised the importance of food security and sovereignty;


### d. whereas citizens rightly expect the eu budget to respond effectively to evolving needs and to support them in crises; ### d. whereas citizens rightly expect the union to respond promptly and effectively to evolving needs and to support them in crises; whereas the eu budget should be the only instrument that enables the union to provide financing for its policies , programmes and needs;


### d. whereas all member states are facing rapidly rising prices for goods and services , which is impacting farmers , businesses , communities and all citizens; ### d. whereas all member states are facing rapidly rising prices for goods and services , especially in the energy and agricultural sectors , which are , in general , impacting on market forces such as the balance between supply and demand , on price fluctuations and , in particular , on farmers , businesses , communities and all citizens;


### d. whereas all member states are facing rapidly rising prices for goods and services , which is impacting farmers , businesses , communities and all citizens; ### d. whereas all member states are facing rapidly rising prices for goods and services , which is impacting farmers , businesses , consumers , communities and all citizens;


### e. whereas the combined effect of multiple crises and low mff ceilings has given rise to a ‘galaxy’ of ad hoc instruments beyond the eu budget , as well as greater use of external assigned revenue not subject to the budgetary procedure , most notably in the case of nextgenerationeu; whereas , as one arm of the budgetary authority , parliament should play a full role in this new budgetary environment in order to ensure democratic accountability and transparency; ### e. whereas the combined effect of multiple crises and low mff ceilings has given rise to a ‘galaxy’ of ad hoc instruments beyond the eu budget , as well as greater use of external assigned revenue not subject to the budgetary procedure , most notably in the case of nextgenerationeu; whereas , as one arm of the budgetary authority , parliament should play a full role in this new budgetary environment in order to ensure democratic accountability and transparency for the remaining of the current mff;


### new challenges and shocks revealing shortcomings in the current mff ### consecutive crises and the war in ukraine revealing inadequacy of the current mff


### 1. underlines the central role that the eu budget plays in delivering on the union’s political priorities , including making a success of the green and digital transitions , fostering an inclusive and social recovery , promoting growth , strategic autonomy and energy independence , providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises , fostering sustainable development that leaves no one behind and ensures cohesion and upward convergence , ensuring a more robust european health union in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis , promoting the rule of law , eu values and fundamental rights , contributing to greater opportunities for all , and ensuring a stronger union for its people and in the world; ### deleted


### 1. underlines the central role that the eu budget plays in delivering on the union’s political priorities , including making a success of the green and digital transitions , fostering an inclusive and social recovery , promoting growth , strategic autonomy and energy independence , providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises , fostering sustainable development that leaves no one behind and ensures cohesion and upward convergence , ensuring a more robust european health union in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis , promoting the rule of law , eu values and fundamental rights , contributing to greater opportunities for all , and ensuring a stronger union for its people and in the world; ### 1. underlines the central role that the eu budget plays in delivering on the union’s political priorities , including making a success of the green and digital transitions , fostering an inclusive and social recovery , promoting growth , strategic autonomy and energy independence , providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises , fostering sustainable development that leaves no one behind and ensures cohesion and upward convergence , ensuring a more robust european health union in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis , promoting the rule of law , eu values and fundamental rights , contributing to greater opportunities for all , and ensuring a stronger union for its people and in the world; in this context emphasises the clear link between the respect for the rule of law and the efficient implementation of the eu budget and reiterates the importance of the regulation on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the eu budget (the conditionality regulation);


### 1. underlines the central role that the eu budget plays in delivering on the union’s political priorities , including making a success of the green and digital transitions , fostering an inclusive and social recovery , promoting growth , strategic autonomy and energy independence , providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises , fostering sustainable development that leaves no one behind and ensures cohesion and upward convergence , ensuring a more robust european health union in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis , promoting the rule of law , eu values and fundamental rights , contributing to greater opportunities for all , and ensuring a stronger union for its people and in the world; ### 1. underlines the central role that the eu budget plays in delivering on the union’s political priorities , including making a success of the green and digital transitions , fostering an inclusive and social recovery , promoting growth and competitiveness , strategic autonomy and energy independence , providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises , fostering sustainable development that leaves no one behind and ensures cohesion and upward convergence , ensuring a more robust european health union in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis , promoting the rule of law , eu values and fundamental rights , contributing to greater opportunities for all , and ensuring a stronger union for its people and in the world;


### 1. reiterates that , from the very beginning of the new multiannual financial framework (mff) , the available margins under heading 6 have been limited and have been shrinking further , including through early depletion of the cushion; encourages the commission to propose an ambitious early revision of the mff in order to meet needs more effectively; ### 1. reiterates that , under the current mff , the funding for external action has been lagging behind the geopolitical necessities and the potential for global eu added value from the beginning; russia’s war of aggression against ukraine , and the resulting need for the eu to engage , has radically underlined the need for an early revision of the mff , including the need for more appropriate funding tools to effectively address the tectonic shifts in the geopolitical landscape of europe that are currently unfolding; the available margins under heading 6 have been limited and have been shrinking further , including through early depletion of the cushion; encourages the commission to propose an ambitious early revision of the mff in order to meet needs more effectively; including , yet not limited to , in terms of greater defence spending , divestment from russian hydrocarbons , and alleviation of the socio-economic consequences of the war for eu citizens;


### 1. considers that the commission’s proposed revision of the mff should be aligned with the ‘fit for 55’ package and should take into consideration the main points of the versailles declaration , notably food security; ### 1. considers that the commission’s proposed revision of the mff should be linked to the 'fit for 55' package , taking into consideration the political priorities and financial flexibility needed to achieve new policies and programmes , as well as the main points of the versailles declaration , notably ensuring food security and a stronger economic base , reducing the european union's dependence on external markets;


### 1. considers that the commission’s proposed revision of the mff should be aligned with the ‘fit for 55’ package and should take into consideration the main points of the versailles declaration , notably food security; ### 1. considers that the commission’s proposed revision of the mff should be aligned with the ‘fit for 55’ package and should take into consideration the main points of the versailles declaration , notably food security; points out in this connection that any new objective must lead to the allocation of additional financial resources;


### 8. emphasises , therefore , that the 2021-2027 mff is already being pushed to its limits less than two years after its adoption , a situation aggravated by the unforeseeable events of 2022; points out that it is simply not equipped , in terms of size , structure or rules , to respond to a multitude of crises of this scale , nor to adequately finance new shared eu policy ambitions and the swift implementation of the requisite eu-wide solutions; ### deleted


### 8. emphasises , therefore , that the 2021-2027 mff is already being pushed to its limits less than two years after its adoption , a situation aggravated by the unforeseeable events of 2022; points out that it is simply not equipped , in terms of size , structure or rules , to respond to a multitude of crises of this scale , nor to adequately finance new shared eu policy ambitions and the swift implementation of the requisite eu-wide solutions; ### 8. emphasises that the current mff is already being pushed to its limits less than two years after its adoption; points out that it is simply not equipped , in terms of size , structure or rules , to respond to the consequences of the war in ukraine and other crises , nor to adequately finance new shared eu policy ambitions and the swift implementation of the requisite eu-wide solutions; highlights further the strategic importance of an upscaled mff , which would allow the union to respond to the current and future needs in an adequate manner reflecting its position in the international arena;


### 8. welcomes the application by the commission of the rule of law conditionality regulation5laying down the rules necessary for the protection of the union budget in the case of breaches of the principles of the rule of law in the member states which affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the union in a sufficiently direct way; ### 8. draws attention to the judgments of the european court of justice4a with regard to the conditionality of the rule of law laying down the rules necessary for the protection of the union budget in the case of breaches of the principles of the rule of law in the member states which affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the union in a sufficiently direct way; welcomes the application by the commission of the rule of law conditionality regulation5;


### 9. recalls that the mff is increased annually on the basis of a 2 % deflator applied to 2018 prices; underlines that spiralling energy prices and extreme energy market volatility caused mainly by russia’s decision to cut gas supply have been feeding soaring inflation , with severe impacts on citizens , businesses and consumers; is deeply concerned that such unexpectedly high levels of inflation are placing the mff under severe strain and reducing its purchasing power further , in a context where its overall level is already lower than previous mffs; stresses that , in practice , this means that fewer union projects and actions can be funded , thereby negatively impacting beneficiaries; ### 9. recalls that the mff is increased annually on the basis of a 2 % deflator applied to 2018 prices; underlines that spiralling energy prices and extreme energy market volatility caused mainly by russia’s decision to cut gas supply have been feeding soaring inflation , with severe impacts on citizens , businesses , consumers and the efficiency and effectiveness of eu administration; is deeply concerned that such unexpectedly high levels of inflation are placing the mff under severe strain and reducing its purchasing power further , in a context where its overall level is already lower than previous mffs; stresses that , in practice , this means that fewer union projects and actions can be funded , thereby negatively impacting beneficiaries;


### 9. recalls that the mff is increased annually on the basis of a 2 % deflator applied to 2018 prices; underlines that spiralling energy prices and extreme energy market volatility caused mainly by russia’s decision to cut gas supply have been feeding soaring inflation , with severe impacts on citizens , businesses and consumers; is deeply concerned that such unexpectedly high levels of inflation are placing the mff under severe strain and reducing its purchasing power further , in a context where its overall level is already lower than previous mffs; stresses that , in practice , this means that fewer union projects and actions can be funded , thereby negatively impacting beneficiaries; ### 9. recalls that the mff is increased annually on the basis of a 2 % deflator applied to 2018 prices; underlines that spiralling energy prices and extreme energy market volatility caused mainly by russia’s decision to cut gas supply have been feeding soaring inflation , with severe impacts on all citizens and businesses; is deeply concerned that such unexpectedly high levels of inflation place the mff under severe strain and reduce its purchasing power further , in a context where its overall level is already lower than previous mffs; stresses that , in practice , this means that fewer union projects and actions can be funded , thereby negatively impacting beneficiaries;


### 10. recalls , further , that , despite parliament’s demands that the european union recovery instrument (euri) be placed over and above the ceilings , the refinancing costs are repaid from within the mff ceilings , exerting further pressure on the mff , especially in a context of rising interest rates; ### 10. recalls , further , that , despite parliament’s demands that the european union recovery instrument (euri) be placed over and above the ceilings , the refinancing costs are repaid from within the mff ceilings , exerting further pressure on the mff , especially in a context of rising interest rates; points , in that regard to the amending letter for the 2023 budget , which increases appropriations on the euri line by eur 450 million by using two-thirds of available resources under the single margin instrument , thereby curtailing the budget's ability to respond to emerging needs;


### 11. observes the continuing demand for the eu budget to serve as a guarantee for additional macro-financial assistance (mfa); notes , however , that the higher risks of default and the large amount at stake entail significant contingent liabilities; ### 11. observes the continuing demand for the eu budget to serve as a guarantee for additional macro-financial assistance (mfa); underlines that , in the event of default or the withdrawal of national guarantees , the eu budget ultimately underwrites all mfa loans and therefore significant contingent liabilities;


### 12. concludes that , in this context , the need for an urgent review and revision of the mff is beyond any doubt and that a ‘business as usual’ approach will not remotely suffice to tackle the array of challenges posed and could thereby undermine confidence in the union in the long term; ### 12. concludes that , in the context of the war in ukraine and several consecutive crises , the need for an urgent revision of the mff is beyond any doubt and that a ‘business as usual’ approach will not remotely suffice to tackle the array of challenges posed and could thereby undermine confidence in the union in the long term;


### addressing the funding gaps – more financial capacity with greater transparency and democratic accountability ### addressing the funding gaps throughout the mff headings – a call for strong european action with greater transparency and democratic accountability


### 13. calls on the commission , therefore , to conduct an in-depth review of the functioning of the current mff and proceed with a legislative proposal for a comprehensive mff revision as soon as possible and no later than the first quarter of 2023; ### deleted


### 13. calls on the commission , therefore , to conduct an in-depth review of the functioning of the current mff and proceed with a legislative proposal for a comprehensive mff revision as soon as possible and no later than the first quarter of 2023; ### 13. calls on the commission , therefore , to conduct an in-depth review of the functioning of the current mff and proceed with a legislative proposal for a comprehensive and ambitious mff revision as soon as possible and no later than the first quarter of 2023;


### 14. underlines that the unanimity requirement for adoption of the mff regulation impedes the necessary decisions in the revision process; calls , in that regard , on the european council to activate the passerelle clause set out in article 312(2) tfeu to allow for adoption of the mff regulation by qualified majority; ### deleted


### 15. insists on the need for fully-fledged negotiations between the council , parliament and the commission on the mff revision , building on past practice and the iia , whereby the institutions have committed to seeking to determine specific arrangements for cooperation and dialogue throughout the procedure leading to the adoption of a substantial revision of the mff; ### 15. stands ready to engage in fully-fledged negotiations with the council and the commission on the mff revision , building on past practice and the iia , whereby the institutions have committed to seeking to determine specific arrangements for cooperation and dialogue throughout the procedure leading to the adoption of a substantial revision of the mff;


### 16. insists that the principle of unity , whereby all items of the union’s revenue and expenditure are shown in the budget , is both a treaty requirement and a basic precondition for accountability , democratic legitimacy and the transparency of the eu’s public finances; stresses the need for an upscaled mff to ensure a stronger and more agile eu budget which meets the highest standards of transparency and democratic accountability; requests , therefore , an increase in the mff ceilings , as well as an increase in and redesign of budgetary flexibility and significantly greater parliamentary control over all eu spending , including off-budget instruments , funds and common borrowing and lending programmes; ### 16. insists that the principle of unity , whereby all items of the union’s revenue and expenditure are shown in the budget , is both a treaty requirement and a basic precondition for accountability , democratic legitimacy and the transparency of the eu’s public finances;


### 16. insists that the principle of unity , whereby all items of the union’s revenue and expenditure are shown in the budget , is both a treaty requirement and a basic precondition for accountability , democratic legitimacy and the transparency of the eu’s public finances; stresses the need for an upscaled mff to ensure a stronger and more agile eu budget which meets the highest standards of transparency and democratic accountability; requests , therefore , an increase in the mff ceilings , as well as an increase in and redesign of budgetary flexibility and significantly greater parliamentary control over all eu spending , including off-budget instruments , funds and common borrowing and lending programmes; ### 16. insists that the principle of unity , whereby all items of the union’s revenue and expenditure are shown in the budget , is both a treaty requirement and a basic precondition for accountability , democratic legitimacy and the transparency of the eu’s public finances; stresses the need for an upscaled mff to ensure a stronger and more agile eu budget which meets the highest standards of transparency and democratic accountability , striving to restore economic balance in the long term; requests , therefore , an increase in the mff ceilings , as well as an increase in and redesign of budgetary flexibility and significantly greater parliamentary control over all eu spending , including off-budget instruments , funds and common borrowing and lending programmes; reiterates that all new instruments should be monitored like any other financial tool from the eu budget;


### 17. reaffirms its long-standing position that new political initiatives must be financed with additional fresh money and not to the detriment of well-established , pre-existing union programmes or policies; ### deleted


### 17. reaffirms its long-standing position that new political initiatives must be financed with additional fresh money and not to the detriment of well-established , pre-existing union programmes or policies; ### 17. reaffirms its long-standing position that new political initiatives must be financed with additional fresh money and not to the detriment of well-established , pre-existing union programmes or policies; insists in this context that the financial envelopes of chips act and secure connectivity as well as any other new initiatives should be financed with fresh money and not through redeployments;


### 17. reaffirms its long-standing position that new political initiatives must be financed with additional fresh money and not to the detriment of well-established , pre-existing union programmes or policies; ### 17. reaffirms its long-standing position that new political initiatives , new and additional tasks delegated to the eu administration must be financed with additional fresh money and not to the detriment of well-established , pre-existing union programmes or policies;


### 18. highlights that many of the policy ambitions recently stated – notably in the fields of energy and strategic and industrial autonomy – and the new policy initiatives since january 2021 (chips act , secure connectivity , health emergency preparedness and response authority) imply spending under heading 1; opposes the use of agreed programme envelopes to finance new initiatives and believes that the margins are insufficient to accommodate the greater long-term needs; calls , therefore , for an increase in the ceiling of heading 1; ### 18. increase ceilings for heading 1: single market , innovation and digital; highlights that many of the policy ambitions recently stated – notably in the fields of energy and strategic and industrial autonomy – and the new policy initiatives since january 2021 (chips act , secure connectivity , health emergency preparedness and response authority) imply spending under heading 1; recalls the importance of research , innovation and the smes and opposes the use of agreed programme envelopes to finance new initiatives at the expense of existing flagship programmes; believes that the margins are insufficient to accommodate for greater short- , medium and long-term needs; highlights especially the investment needs into fully functioning solidarity lanes to ukraine through the connecting europe facility;


### 18. highlights that many of the policy ambitions recently stated – notably in the fields of energy and strategic and industrial autonomy – and the new policy initiatives since january 2021 (chips act , secure connectivity , health emergency preparedness and response authority) imply spending under heading 1; opposes the use of agreed programme envelopes to finance new initiatives and believes that the margins are insufficient to accommodate the greater long-term needs; calls , therefore , for an increase in the ceiling of heading 1; ### 18. highlights that many of the policy ambitions recently stated – notably in the fields of energy and strategic and industrial autonomy – and the new policy initiatives since january 2021 (chips act , secure connectivity , health emergency preparedness and response authority) should entail additional spending under heading 1; opposes the use of agreed programme envelopes to finance new initiatives and believes that the margins are insufficient to accommodate the greater long-term needs; calls , therefore , for an increase in the ceiling of heading 1;


### 19. regrets that , contrary to parliament’s position , it was decided that the costs of euri borrowing and the repayment of debt be included as a budget line under heading 2b , alongside flagship programmes such as erasmus+ , eu4health , and citizens , equality , rights and values; stresses that interest costs and debt repayment depend on market developments , are not discretionary spending , do not follow the logic of caps on spending and should never compete with programmes under the same ceiling; recalls that any activation of the emergency support instrument also depends on the availability of an unallocated margin under the ceiling of this heading; insists , therefore , that the status quo presents significant risks to programme spending and that the repayment line be removed from heading 2b and counted over and above the mff ceilings; ### 19. reinforce heading 2:cohesion , resilience and values according to developing dynamics in europe; calls to remove the euri repayment line from heading 2b and for it to be counted over and above the mff ceilings; regrets that , contrary to parliament’s position , it was decided that the costs of euri borrowing and the repayment of debt be included as a budget line under heading 2b , alongside flagship programmes such as erasmus+ , eu4health , and citizens , equality , rights and values; stresses that interest costs and debt repayment depend on market developments , are not discretionary spending , do not follow the logic of caps on spending and should never compete with programmes under the same ceiling; recalls that any activation of the emergency support instrument also depends on the availability of an unallocated margin under the ceiling of this heading; insists , therefore , that the status quo presents significant risks to programme spending; underlines that tackling demographic challenges should be one of the criteria within a number of programmes with a social dimension;


### 20. reiterates its position that the social climate fund must be fully incorporated into the eu budget and within the mff , without negatively impacting other programmes and funds under this heading , bearing in mind the importance of ensuring food security and delivering on the green deal; calls for the ceiling of heading 3 to be adjusted accordingly; ### 20. adjust the ceiling of heading 3: natural resources and environment accordingly reiterating its position that the social climate fund must be fully incorporated into the eu budget and within the mff , without negatively impacting other programmes and funds under this heading , bearing in mind the importance of ensuring food security and delivering on the green deal;


### 21. emphasises that the war against ukraine has placed unexpected demands on the asylum , migration and integration fund , the border management and visa instrument (bmvi) and the decentralised agencies in heading 4; expresses further concern , furthermore , that successive commission proposals for agency mandate extensions are eroding the bmvi’s financial envelope; calls for the ceiling of heading 4 to be increased to reflect the real financing needs of the union’s migration and border management; ### 21. to increase the ceiling of heading 4: migration and border management to reflect the real financing needs of the union’s migration and border management; emphasises that the war against ukraine has placed unexpected demands on the asylum , migration and integration fund , the border management and visa instrument (bmvi) and the decentralised agencies in heading4; expresses further concern , furthermore , that successive commission proposals for agency mandate extensions are eroding the bmvi’s financial envelope;


### 22. highlights that the necessary spending to enhance defence cooperation and investment cannot solely be covered within the ceiling of heading 5; calls for the ceiling to be increased in line with needs; ### 22. highlights that the necessary spending to enhance defence cooperation and investment cannot solely be covered within the ceiling of heading 5; calls for the ceiling to be increased in line with needs; emphasises the need to strengthen security policies with a view to face increasing challenges in an constantly evolving security landscape , as necessary technological innovation require enhanced long term investments by the eu; calls on strengthening jha agencies , such as europol , to adequately ensure the fulfilment of essential tasks with a view to securing the proper functioning of the eu security architecture , such as the implementation of the interoperability agenda , including etias;


### 22. highlights that the necessary spending to enhance defence cooperation and investment cannot solely be covered within the ceiling of heading 5; calls for the ceiling to be increased in line with needs; ### 22. to increase the ceiling of heading 5: security and defence in line with the needs to enhance defence cooperation and investment especially in the light of changed geopolitical context; highlights that the necessary spending needs cannot solely be covered within the ceiling of heading 5;


### 23. deplores the fact that , even prior to the war against ukraine , funds available under heading 6 were woefully inadequate and that pressure has since increased substantially; underlines that the continued funding for the needs of refugees from syria , iraq and other countries was not factored into the mff or ndici-global europe negotiations and should therefore have been financed by fresh appropriations with a corresponding increase in the ceiling of heading 6; highlights that , owing to the risk of default on mfa loans provided to ukraine , a far higher rate of provisioning than the standard 9 % is likely to be required as further loans are rolled out; underlines that additional needs in ukraine must not lead to money being diverted away from other geographic regions in need; insists , therefore , on an increase in the ceiling for heading 6 to fully cover the current and projected future needs of the union’s external action , which have dramatically increased both in neighbouring countries and worldwide as a result of the food , energy and economic crises; ### 23. to increase the ceiling of heading 6: neighbourhood and the world to fully cover the current and projected future needs of the union’s external action , which have dramatically increased both in neighbouring countries and world wide as a result of the food , energy and economic crises; deplores the fact that , even prior to the war against ukraine , funds available under heading 6 were woefully inadequate and that pressure has since increased substantially; underlines that the continued funding for the needs of refugees from syria , iraq and other countries was not factored into the mff or ndici-global europe negotiations and should therefore have been financed by fresh appropriations with a corresponding increase in the ceiling of heading 6; highlights that , owing to the risk of default on mfa loans provided to ukraine , a far higher rate of provisioning than the standard 9 % is likely to be required as further loans are rolled out; underlines that additional needs in ukraine must not lead to money being diverted away from other geographic regions in need; highlights the need to continue europe’s financial support to the western balkan and the accession process of the countries in the region;


### 24. underlines that heading 7 spending must be set at a level that guarantees that the eu has an effective and efficient administration; calls for the swift adoption of the targeted revision of the financial regulation proposed by the commission in relation to the handling of default interest for the late repayment of cancelled or reduced competition fines , so as to avoid pressure on spending under heading 7; ### 24. underlines that heading 7 spending must be set at a level that guarantees that the eu has an effective and efficient administration; calls for the swift adoption of the targeted revision of the financial regulation proposed by the commission in relation to the handling of default interest for the late repayment of cancelled or reduced competition fines , so as to avoid pressure on spending under heading 7; points out that the parliament has decided on its position and stands ready to negotiate; encourages the council to treat this proposal with priority and enter into negotiations with the parliament;


### 24. underlines that heading 7 spending must be set at a level that guarantees that the eu has an effective and efficient administration; calls for the swift adoption of the targeted revision of the financial regulation proposed by the commission in relation to the handling of default interest for the late repayment of cancelled or reduced competition fines , so as to avoid pressure on spending under heading 7; ### 24. underlines that heading 7: european public administration spending must be set at a level that guarantees that the eu has an effective and efficient administration; calls for the swift adoption of the targeted revision of the financial regulation proposed by the commission in relation to the handling of default interest for the late repayment of cancelled or reduced competition fines , so as to avoid pressure on spending under heading 7;


### 26. recalls that payment appropriations flow directly from commitments and recalls , therefore , that any increase in the ceilings for commitments per heading will have to be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the ceiling for payments for the same or subsequent years; ### 26. recalls that payment appropriations flow directly from commitments and recalls , therefore , that any increase in the ceilings for commitments per heading will have to be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the ceiling for payments for the same or subsequent years; draws attention to the risk of an increasingly high payments backlog due to the worrying delays in programme implementation , particularly under shared management; calls on the commission to conduct a risk analysis of payments in the context of the review and to make the necessary proposals in the revision while protecting the policies , their objectives and the preallocated national envelopes , with a view to avoiding a payment crisis that would severely affect beneficiaries of the eu budget; warns , further , about the increasing use of external assigned revenue as a substitute for appropriations under the mff and the very acute risk that this may pose in honouring payments when the revenue is not guaranteed;


### 28. underlines that the temporary and short-term flexibility introduced into cohesion policy funds through the series of cohesion’s action for refugees in europe (care) proposals helped member states to deal quickly with the impact of the war against ukraine , following on from the model of the coronavirus response investment initiatives , crii and crii+ , which enabled eu action at the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic; ### deleted


### 29. stresses that , while crisis response measures are necessary and useful , cohesion policy is not a crisis response tool; is concerned that cohesion policy is increasingly being used to reinforce other policies and to make up for shortcomings in budgetary flexibility or crisis response mechanisms in the mff; emphasises that cohesion policy is one of the priorities of the union , has long-term investment objectives linked to the eu’s strategic agenda , in particular the european green deal and the digital agenda , and should not be used to replenish funding for other policies; calls , therefore , for cohesion funding levels to be preserved in the budget; ### deleted


### 35. insists that , beyond a reinforcement of the existing special instruments , it is necessary to establish a permanent fiscal capacity and common crisis instrument as an additional special instrument over and above the mff ceilings so that the eu budget can better adapt and quickly react to crises and their social and economic effects; ### deleted


### 35. insists that , beyond a reinforcement of the existing special instruments , it is necessary to establish a permanent fiscal capacity and common crisis instrument as an additional special instrument over and above the mff ceilings so that the eu budget can better adapt and quickly react to crises and their social and economic effects; ### 35. insists that , beyond a reinforcement of the existing special instruments , it is necessary that the eu budget is equipped with all necessary tools so that it can better adapt and quickly react to crises and their social and economic effects;


### 35. insists that , beyond a reinforcement of the existing special instruments , it is necessary to establish a permanent fiscal capacity and common crisis instrument as an additional special instrument over and above the mff ceilings so that the eu budget can better adapt and quickly react to crises and their social and economic effects; ### 35. insists that , beyond a reinforcement of the existing special instruments , it is necessary to establish a common crisis instrument as an additional special instrument over and above the mff ceilings so that the eu budget can better adapt and quickly react to crises and their social and economic effects;


### 36. insists that decommitted appropriations should remain in the budget so as to provide additional budgetary flexibility; underlines the need for corresponding changes to the financial regulation; ### deleted


### 36. insists that decommitted appropriations should remain in the budget so as to provide additional budgetary flexibility; underlines the need for corresponding changes to the financial regulation; ### 36. insists that decommitted appropriations should remain in the budget so as to provide additional budgetary flexibility; underlines the need for corresponding changes to the financial regulation; recalls that , as of 30 september 2022 , eur 836 ,09 million are available as research de-commitments to support the budget; stresses that the budgets constraints are clearly visible as the commission resorts to the use of de-commitments to mitigate the impact of new initiatives on existing programmes;


### 36. insists that decommitted appropriations should remain in the budget so as to provide additional budgetary flexibility; underlines the need for corresponding changes to the financial regulation; ### 36. insists that decommitted appropriations should remain in the budget so as to provide additional budgetary flexibility , which is needed more than ever in the current context of war in ukraine and its economic and social consequences; underlines the need for corresponding changes to the financial regulation;


### 41. highlights that the ongoing revision of the financial regulation is an important opportunity to adapt the rules governing budgetary instruments to current circumstances , whereby external assigned revenue , borrowing and lending operations , trust funds and instruments under article 122 tfeu are being used with greater frequency despite often bypassing the scrutiny of the budgetary authority and thus diminishing the traceability of funds and accountability; points , in particular , to the declaration on reassessing the external assigned revenue and borrowing and lending provisions in the financial regulation that was agreed in the context of the mff negotiations; considers that external assigned revenue , as well as assets and liabilities linked to borrowing and lending operations , should form an integral part of the eu budget and be adopted by the budgetary authority as part of that budget; ### 41. highlights that the ongoing revision of the financial regulation should adapt the rules governing budgetary instruments to current circumstances , whereby external assigned revenue , borrowing and lending operations , trust funds and instruments under article 122 tfeu are being used with greater frequency despite often bypassing the scrutiny of the budgetary authority and thus diminishing the traceability of funds and accountability; points , in particular , to the declaration on reassessing the external assigned revenue and borrowing and lending provisions in the financial regulation that was agreed in the context of the mff negotiations; considers that external assigned revenue , as well as assets and liabilities linked to borrowing and lending operations , should form an integral part of the eu budget and be adopted by the budgetary authority as part of that budget;


### (3) the european green deal31 combines a comprehensive set of mutually reinforcing measures and initiatives aimed at achieving climate neutrality in the union by 2050 , and sets out a new growth strategy that aims to transform the union into a fair and prosperous society , with a modern , resource-efficient and competitive economy , where economic growth is decoupled from resource use. it also aims to protect , conserve and enhance the union's natural capital , and protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts. at the same time , this transition affects women and men differently and has a particular impact on some disadvantaged groups , such as older people , persons with disabilities and persons with a minority racial or ethnic background. it must therefore be ensured that the transition is just and inclusive , leaving no one behind. ### (3) the european green deal31 combines a comprehensive set of mutually reinforcing measures and initiatives aimed at achieving climate neutrality in the union by 2050 , and sets out a new growth strategy that aims to transform the union into a fair and prosperous society , with a modern , resource-efficient and competitive economy. it also aims to protect , conserve and enhance the union's natural capital , and protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts. at the same time , this transition affects women and men differently and has a particular impact on some disadvantaged groups , such as older people , persons with disabilities , persons suffering from energy or transport poverty , vulnerable micro , small and medium entrepreneurs and persons with a minority racial or ethnic background. the transition affects differently also member states. it must therefore be ensured that the transition is just and inclusive , leaving no one behind.


### (3) the european green deal31 combines a comprehensive set of mutually reinforcing measures and initiatives aimed at achieving climate neutrality in the eu by 2050 , and sets out a new growth strategy that aims to transform the union into a fair and prosperous society , with a modern , resource-efficient and competitive economy , where economic growth is decoupled from resource use. it also aims to protect , conserve and enhance the union's natural capital , and protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts. at the same time , this transition affects women and men differently and has a particular impact on some disadvantaged groups , such as older people , persons with disabilities and persons with a minority racial or ethnic background. it must therefore be ensured that the transition is just and inclusive , leaving no one behind. ### (3) the european green deal31 combines a comprehensive set of mutually reinforcing measures and initiatives aimed at achieving climate neutrality in the eu by 2050 , and sets out a new growth strategy that aims to transform the union into a fair and prosperous society , with a modern , resource-efficient , technology-neutral and competitive economy based on research and innovation as well as green jobs , where economic growth is decoupled from resource use , leaving no economic sector behind. it also aims to protect , conserve and enhance the union's natural capital , and protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts. at the same time , this transition affects different regions and member states , with different starting points and natural conditions , different economic sectors and residents of the european union and has a particular impact especially on some disadvantaged groups , such as older people , persons with disabilities , people and families on lower incomes and persons with a minority racial or ethnic background. it must therefore be ensured that the transition is just and inclusive , taking into account the unequal starting points of regions , countries , economies and domestic sectors , as well as populations and households , all of whom will face the greatest challenges of a transition which , for some , may otherwise even lead to energy poverty.


### (3) the european green deal31 combines a comprehensive set of mutually reinforcing measures and initiatives aimed at achieving climate neutrality in the union by 2050 , and sets out a new growth strategy that aims to transform the union into a fair and prosperous society , with a modern , resource-efficient and competitive economy , where economic growth is decoupled from resource use. it also aims to protect , conserve and enhance the union's natural capital , and protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts. at the same time , this transition affects women and men differently and has a particular impact on some disadvantaged groups , such as older people , persons with disabilities and persons with a minority racial or ethnic background. it must therefore be ensured that the transition is just and inclusive , leaving no one behind. ### (3) the european green deal31 combines a comprehensive set of mutually reinforcing measures and initiatives aimed at achieving climate neutrality in the union by 2050 , and sets out a new growth strategy that aims to transform the union into a fair and prosperous society , with a modern , resource-efficient and competitive economy , where economic growth is decoupled from resource use. it also aims to protect , conserve and enhance the union's natural capital , and protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts. at the same time , this transition affects women and men differently and has a particular impact on some disadvantaged groups , such as older people , persons with disabilities and persons with a minority racial or ethnic background. it must therefore be ensured that the transition is just and inclusive , leaving no one behind. furthermore , consideration should be given to the particularities of each member state , to the fact that not all member states , regions and cities are starting out from the same point on the path to transition , and that they do not all have the same capacity to respond;


### (3) the european green deal31 combines a comprehensive set of mutually reinforcing measures and initiatives aimed at achieving climate neutrality in the union by 2050 , and sets out a new growth strategy that aims to transform the union into a fair and prosperous society , with a modern , resource-efficient and competitive economy , where economic growth is decoupled from resource use. it also aims to protect , conserve and enhance the union's natural capital , and protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts. at the same time , this transition affects women and men differently and has a particular impact on some disadvantaged groups , such as older people , persons with disabilities and persons with a minority racial or ethnic background. it must therefore be ensured that the transition is just and inclusive , leaving no one behind. ### (3) the european green deal31 combines a comprehensive set of mutually reinforcing measures and initiatives aimed at achieving climate neutrality in the union by 2050 , and sets out a new growth strategy that aims to transform the union into a fair and prosperous society , with a modern , resource-efficient , competitive and technology-neutral economy based on research and innovation as well as green jobs , where economic growth is decoupled from resource use , leaving no economic sector behind. it also aims to protect , conserve and enhance the union's natural capital , and protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts. at the same time , this transition affects different regions and member states , with very different starting points and natural conditions , different economic sectors and residents of the european union and has a particular impact especially on some disadvantaged groups , such as older people , persons with disabilities , people and families on lower incomes and persons with a minority racial or ethnic background. it must therefore be ensured that the transition is just and inclusive , taking into account the unequal starting points of regions , countries , economies and domestic sectors , as well as populations and households , all of whom will face the greatest challenges of a transition which , for some , may otherwise even lead to energy poverty.


### (3) the european green deal31 combines a comprehensive set of mutually reinforcing measures and initiatives aimed at achieving climate neutrality in the union by 2050 , and sets out a new growth strategy that aims to transform the union into a fair and prosperous society , with a modern , resource-efficient and competitive economy , where economic growth is decoupled from resource use. it also aims to protect , conserve and enhance the union's natural capital , and protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts. at the same time , this transition affects women and men differently and has a particular impact on some disadvantaged groups , such as older people , persons with disabilities and persons with a minority racial or ethnic background. it must therefore be ensured that the transition is just and inclusive , leaving no one behind. ### (3) the european green deal31 combines a comprehensive set of effective , equitable and mutually reinforcing measures and initiatives aimed at achieving climate neutrality in the union by 2050 , and sets out a new growth strategy that aims to transform the union progressively and responsibly into a fair and prosperous society , with a modern , resource-efficient and competitive economy , where economic growth is decoupled from resource use. it also aims to protect , conserve and enhance the union's natural capital , and protect the health and well-being of citizens from environment-related risks and impacts. at the same time , the european green deal reflects the need to make the transition effective and fair , so as to provide investors with predictability and ensure that it remains irreversible. this transition , which is based on regional cooperation , affects women and men differently and has a particular impact on some disadvantaged groups , such as older people , persons with disabilities and persons with a minority racial or ethnic background. it must therefore be ensured that the transition is just and inclusive , leaving no one behind.


### (4) in regulation (eu) 2021/1119 of the european parliament and of the council 32 (‘european climate law’) , the union has enshrined into legislation the target of economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050. that regulation also establishes a binding union domestic reduction commitment of net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) of at least 55% below 1990 levels by 2030. ### (4) in regulation (eu) 2021/1119 of the european parliament and of the council 32 (‘european climate law’) , the union has enshrined into legislation the target of economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050 , while ensuring that the competitiveness and technological neutrality of the eu economy is maintained. that regulation also establishes a binding union domestic reduction commitment of net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) of at least 55% below 1990 levels by 2030 , taking into account the different starting positions in member states and regions as well as the principle that no one should be left behind in transition.


### (4) in regulation (eu) 2021/1119 of the european parliament and of the council32 ( ‘european climate law’) , the union has enshrined into legislation the target of economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050. that regulation also establishes a binding union domestic reduction commitment of net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) of at least 55% below 1990 levels by 2030. ### (4) in regulation (eu) 2021/1119 of the european parliament and of the council32 ( ‘european climate law’) , the union has enshrined into legislation the target of economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050. that regulation also establishes a binding union domestic reduction commitment of net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) of at least 55% below 1990 levels by 2030. it ensures that sectors not covered by the ets play their part in achieving the targets of the european climate law. there is therefore no need for further intermediate targets and legislative proposals. the proposals and other legislative initiatives of the ‘fit for 55’ package are in line with the paris agreement.


### (4) in regulation (eu) 2021/1119 of the european parliament and of the council32 (‘european climate law’) , the union has enshrined into legislation the target of economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050. that regulation also establishes a binding union domestic reduction commitment of net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) of at least 55% below 1990 levels by 2030. ### (4) in regulation (eu) 2021/1119 of the european parliament and of the council32 (‘european climate law’) , the union has enshrined into legislation the target of economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050 , while ensuring that the competitiveness and technological neutrality of the eu economy is maintained. that regulation also establishes a binding union domestic reduction commitment of net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) of at least 55% below 1990 levels by 2030 , taking into account the different starting positions in member states and regions as well as the principle that no one should be left behind in transition.


### (5) in order to implement those commitments as well as the union’s contributions under the paris agreement33 adopted under the unfccc , the union regulatory framework to achieve the greenhouse gas emission reduction target should be adapted. ### (5) in order to implement those commitments as well as the union’s contributions under the paris agreement33 adopted under the unfccc , the union regulatory framework to achieve the greenhouse gas emission reduction target for both 2030 and beyond 2030 should be adapted as well as the development strategies at national , regional and local level taking into account the importance of domestic energy efficiency , self-sufficiency and independence , as well as the social consequences of the transition.


### (5) in order to implement those commitments as well as the union’s contributions under the paris agreement33 adopted under the unfccc , the union regulatory framework to achieve the greenhouse gas emission reduction target should be adapted. ### (5) in order to implement those commitments as well as the union’s contributions under the paris agreement33 adopted under the unfccc , the union regulatory framework to achieve the greenhouse gas emission reduction target should be adapted. this includes assessing the current accounting rules , especially in regard to methane , where differences between sources and cycles of biogenic and fossil methane emissions must be examined. in line with article 2 , paragraph 1(b) of the paris agreement , the achievement of the greenhouse gas emission reduction targets must be ensured in a manner that does not threaten food production.


### (5) in order to implement those commitments as well as the union’s contributions under the paris agreement33 adopted under the unfccc , the union regulatory framework to achieve the greenhouse gas emission reduction target should be adapted. ### (5) in order to implement those commitments as well as the union’s contributions under the paris agreement33 adopted under the unfccc , the union regulatory framework to achieve the greenhouse gas emission reduction target should be adapted , ensuring in particular that a balance is struck between the need to achieve ambitious climate targets on the one hand and ensure optimum burden sharing between member states in efforts to achieve the various sectoral targets on the other , so as to bring about convergence between the eu regions.


### (7) while emissions trading will also apply to greenhouse gas emissions from road and maritime transport as well as buildings , the scope of regulation (eu) 2018/842 will be maintained. regulation (eu) 2018/842 will therefore continue applying to the greenhouse gas emissions from domestic navigation , but not to those from international navigation. greenhouse gas emissions of a member state within the scope of regulation (eu) 2018/842 to be taken into account for compliance checks will continue to be determined upon completion of inventory reviews in accordance with regulation (eu) 2018/1999 of the european parliament and the council34. ### (7) while emissions trading will also apply to greenhouse gas emissions from road and maritime transport as well as buildings , the scope of regulation (eu) 2018/842 will be maintained. regulation (eu) 2018/842 will therefore continue applying to the greenhouse gas emissions from domestic navigation , but not to those from international navigation. greenhouse gas emissions of a member state within the scope of regulation (eu) 2018/842 to be taken into account for compliance checks will continue to be determined upon completion of inventory reviews in accordance with regulation (eu) 2018/1999 of the european parliament and the council34 corroborated with the most recent available data at union and international level , whereby it is imperative that the latest available data at national , union and international level are taken into account for the compliance check , providing a realistic picture of the actual situation.


### (8) in its communication of 17 september 2020 the commission35 indicated that the increased 2030 overall target can only be achieved with the contribution of all sectors. ### (8) in its communication of 17 september 2020 the commission35 indicated that the increased 2030 overall target can only be achieved with the contribution of all sectors. however , the social aspect of the transition needs to be taken into account , ensuring that green jobs are maintained or created , including through research and innovation , and that the achievement of overall targets does not lead to energy poverty , in which the economically weakest are the most affected.


### (9) in its conclusions of 11 december 2020 the european council mentioned that the 2030 target will be delivered collectively by the union in the most cost-effective manner possible , that all member states will participate in this effort , taking into account considerations of fairness and solidarity , while leaving no one behind , and that the new 2030 target needs to be achieved in a way that preserves the union’s competitiveness and takes account of member states’ different starting points and specific national circumstances and emission reduction potential , including those of island member states and islands , as well as efforts made. ### (9) in its conclusions of 11 december 2020 the european council mentioned that the 2030 target will be delivered collectively by the union in the most cost-effective manner possible , that all member states will participate in this effort , taking into account considerations of fairness and solidarity , while leaving no one behind , and that the new 2030 target needs to be achieved in a way that preserves the union’s competitiveness in terms of industries and economies as well as agriculture and takes account of member states’ different starting points and specific national circumstances , physical geographical characteristics and natural conditions as well as emission reduction potential , including those of island member states and islands and remote regions , as well as efforts made.


### (10) in order to achieve the target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55% , the sectors covered by regulation (eu) 2018/842 will need to reduce their emissions progressively until they reach-40% in 2030 , compared to 2005 levels. ### (10) in order to achieve the target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55% , member states for the sectors covered by regulation (eu) 2018/842 will need to reduce their emissions progressively until they reach collectively the eu-wide reduction target -40% in 2030 , compared to 2005 levels.


### (10) in order to achieve the target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55% , the sectors covered by regulation (eu) 2018/842 will need to reduce their emissions progressively until they reach-40% in 2030 , compared to 2005 levels. ### (10) in order to achieve the target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55% , the sectors covered by regulation (eu) 2018/842 will need to reduce their emissions progressively until they reach -40% in 2030 , compared to 2005 levels; at the same time , it is important to maintain industrial competitivity through the implementation of innovative , climate-neutral technologies , so that we do not see economic activities being relocated to non-eu countries;


### (11) for that purpose , the greenhouse gas emission reduction target for 2030 needs to be revised for each member state. the revision of the greenhouse gas emission reduction target should use the same methodology that was followed when regulation (eu) 2018/842 was first adopted , where the national contributions were determined in consideration of the different capacities and cost-efficiency opportunities in member states so to ensure a fair and balanced distribution of the effort. the reduction of the maximum greenhouse gas emissions for each member state in 2030 should thus be determined in relation to the level of its 2005 reviewed greenhouse gas emissions covered by this regulation , excluding verified greenhouse gas emissions from installations that operated in 2005 and which were only included in the emission trading system of the union after 2005. ### (11) for that purpose , the greenhouse gas emission reduction target for 2030 needs to be revised for each member state , taking due account of the social aspect and the social consequences that could result from emission reductions. the revision of the greenhouse gas emission reduction target should use the same methodology that was followed when regulation (eu) 2018/842 was first adopted , where the national contributions were determined in consideration of the different capacities and cost-efficiency opportunities in member states so to ensure a fair and balanced distribution of the effort and to ensure social and development cohesiveness within each country as well as at eu level. the reduction of the maximum greenhouse gas emissions for each member state in 2030 should thus be determined in relation to the level of its 2005 reviewed greenhouse gas emissions covered by this regulation , excluding verified greenhouse gas emissions from installations that operated in 2005 and which were only included in the emission trading system of the union after 2005.


### (13) the covid-19 pandemic has impacted the union’s economy and its level of emissions to a degree that cannot yet be fully quantified. on the other hand , the union is deploying its largest stimulus package ever , also having a potential impact on the level of emissions. due to those uncertainties , it is appropriate to review the emissions data in 2025 and , if necessary , readjust the annual emission allocations. ### deleted


### (13) the covid-19 pandemic has impacted the union’s economy and its level of emissions to a degree that cannot yet be fully quantified. on the other hand , the union is deploying its largest stimulus package ever , also having a potential impact on the level of emissions. due to those uncertainties , it is appropriate to review the emissions data in 2025 and , if necessary , readjust the annual emission allocations. ### (13) the covid-19 pandemic has impacted the union’s economy and its level of emissions to a degree that cannot yet be fully quantified. on the other hand , the union is deploying its largest stimulus package ever , also having a potential impact on the level of emissions. due to those uncertainties , it is appropriate to review the emissions data in 2025 and , if necessary , readjust the annual emission allocations in a way that is realistic and socially responsible;


### (13) the covid-19 pandemic has impacted the union’s economy and its level of emissions to a degree that cannot yet be fully quantified. on the other hand , the union is deploying its largest stimulus package ever , also having a potential impact on the level of emissions. due to those uncertainties , it is appropriate to review the emissions data in 2025 and , if necessary , readjust the annual emission allocations. ### (13) the covid-19 pandemic has impacted the union’s economy and its level of emissions to a degree that cannot yet be fully quantified. on the other hand , the union is deploying its largest stimulus package ever , also having a potential impact on the level of emissions. due to those uncertainties , the emissions data should be reviewed again in 2025 and , if necessary , the annual emission allocations readjusted by member states , taking into account the most recent data.


### (14) it is therefore appropriate to update in 2025 the annual emission allocations for the years 2026 to 2030. this should be based on a comprehensive review of the national inventory data carried out by the commission in order to determine the average of the greenhouse gas emissions of each member state during the years 2021 , 2022 and 2023. ### deleted


### (14) it is therefore appropriate to update in 2025 the annual emission allocations for the years 2026 to 2030. this should be based on a comprehensive review of the national inventory data carried out by the commission in order to determine the average of the greenhouse gas emissions of each member state during the years 2021 , 2022 and 2023. ### (14) in so far as the data of member states in 2025 deviate significantly from the baseline data , it is appropriate to update the annual emission allocations for the years 2026 to 2030. this should be based on a comprehensive review of the national inventory data carried out by the commission in order to determine the average of the greenhouse gas emissions of each member state during the years 2021 , 2022 and 2023.


### (18) the setting of more ambitious targets under regulation (eu) 2018/841 will decrease the capacity of member states to generate net removals that can be used for compliance under regulation (eu) 2018/842. in addition , the split of the use of the lulucf flexibility into two separate time periods , will further limit the availability of net removals for the purpose of compliance with regulation (eu) 2018/842. as a result , some member states may face challenges in meeting their targets under regulation (eu) 2018/842 , while some member states , the same or other , may generate net removals that cannot be used for compliance with regulation (eu) 2018/842. as long as the union objectives as set out in article 3 of regulation (eu) 2021/1119 are met , in particular with regard to the maximum limit of the contribution of net removals , it is appropriate to create a new voluntary mechanism , in the form of an additional reserve , that will help adhering member states to comply with their obligations. ### (18) the setting of more ambitious , but realistic , targets under regulation (eu) 2018/841 will decrease the capacity of member states to generate net removals that can be used for compliance under regulation (eu) 2018/842. in addition , the split of the use of the lulucf flexibility into two separate time periods , will further limit the availability of net removals for the purpose of compliance with regulation (eu) 2018/842. as a result , some member states may face challenges in meeting their targets under regulation (eu) 2018/842 , while some member states , the same or other , may generate net removals that cannot be used for compliance with regulation (eu) 2018/842. as long as the union objectives as set out in article 3 of regulation (eu) 2021/1119 are met , in particular with regard to the maximum limit of the contribution of net removals , it is appropriate to create a new voluntary mechanism , in the form of an additional reserve , that will help adhering member states to comply with their obligations.


### (18) the setting of more ambitious targets under regulation (eu) 2018/841 will decrease the capacity of member states to generate net removals that can be used for compliance under regulation (eu) 2018/842. in addition , the split of the use of the lulucf flexibility into two separate time periods , will further limit the availability of net removals for the purpose of compliance with regulation (eu) 2018/842. as a result , some member states may face challenges in meeting their targets under regulation (eu) 2018/842 , while some member states , the same or other , may generate net removals that cannot be used for compliance with regulation (eu) 2018/842. as long as the union objectives as set out in article 3 of regulation (eu) 2021/1119 are met , in particular with regard to the maximum limit of the contribution of net removals , it is appropriate to create a new voluntary mechanism , in the form of an additional reserve , that will help adhering member states to comply with their obligations. ### (18) the setting of more ambitious targets under regulation (eu) 2018/841 will decrease the capacity of member states to generate net removals that can be used for compliance under regulation (eu) 2018/842. in addition , the split of the use of the lulucf flexibility into two separate time periods , will further limit the availability of net removals for the purpose of compliance with regulation (eu) 2018/842. as a result , some member states may face challenges in meeting their targets under regulation (eu) 2018/842 , while some member states may generate net removals that cannot be used for compliance with regulation (eu) 2018/842. as long as the union objectives as set out in article 3 of regulation (eu) 2021/1119 are met , in particular with regard to the maximum limit of the contribution of net removals , it is appropriate to create a new voluntary mechanism , in the form of an additional reserve , that will help adhering member states to comply with their obligations.


### do not exceed , in the years 2023 , 2024 and 2025 , the limit defined by a linear trajectory starting in 2022 at the annual emission allocation for that member state , as set out pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article for that year , and ending in 2030 at the limit set for that member state in column 2 of annex i to this regulation; ### do not exceed , in the years 2023 to 2030 , the limit defined by a linear trajectory starting in 2022 at the annual emission allocation for that member state , as set out pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article for that year , and ending in 2030 at the limit set for that member state in column 2 of annex i to this regulation;


### do not exceed , in the years 2026 to 2030 , the limit defined by a linear trajectory starting in 2024 , at the average of its greenhouse gas emissions during the years 2021 , 2022 and 2023 , as submitted by the member state pursuant to article 26 of regulation (eu) 2018/1999 , and ending in 2030 at the limit set for that member state in column 2 of annex i to this regulation. ### deleted


### for the years 2023 , 2024 and 2025 , it shall determine the annual emission allocations based on the value for the 2005 greenhouse gas emissions of each member state indicated pursuant to the second subparagraph and the reviewed values of the national inventory data for the years 2016 , 2017 and 2018 referred to in the second subparagraph. ### for the years 2023 to 2030 , it shall determine the annual emission allocations based on the linear trajectory starting in2022 at the annual emission allocation of that member state forthat year , as determined pursuant to the second subparagraph , and ending in 2030 at the limit for that member state set out in column 2 of annex i to this regulation .


### for the years 2026 to 2030 , it shall determine the annual emission allocations based on the value for the 2005 greenhouse gas emissions of each member state indicated pursuant to the second subparagraph and on a comprehensive review of the most recent national inventory data for the years 2021 , 2022 and 2023 submitted by the member states pursuant to article 26 of regulation (eu) 2018/1999. ### deleted


### for the years 2021 and 2022 , it shall determine the annual emission allocations based on a comprehensive review of the most recent national inventory data for the years 2005 and 2016 to 2018 submitted by the member states pursuant to article 7 of regulation (eu) no 525/2013 and indicate the value for the 2005 greenhouse gas emissions of each member state used to determine those annual emission allocations. ### for the years 2021 and 2022 , it shall determine the annual emission allocations based on 2005 data and a further comprehensive review of the most recent national inventory data for the years 2005 and 2016 to 2018 submitted by the member states pursuant to article 7 of regulation (eu) no 525/2013 and indicate the corresponding value for the 2005 greenhouse gas emissions of each member state used to determine those annual emission allocations.


### (6) regulation (eu) 2018/842 lays down obligations on member states with respect to their minimum contributions for the period from 2021 to 2030 to fulfilling the union’s current target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 30 % below 2005 levels in 2030 in the sectors covered by article 2 of that regulation. it also lays down rules on determining annual emission allocations and for the evaluation of member states’ progress towards meeting their minimum contributions. ### (6) regulation (eu) 2018/842 lays down obligations on member states with respect to their minimum contributions for the period from 2021 to 2030 to fulfilling the union’s current target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 30 % below 2005 levels in 2030 in the sectors covered by article 2 of that regulation. it also lays down rules on determining annual emission allocations and for the evaluation of member states’ progress towards meeting their minimum contributions. in doing so , an appropriate flexibility shall be provided to member states in the choice of means and methods of achieving that objective.


### (12) as a consequence , it will be necessary to set , as from the year of adoption of this regulation , new binding national limits , expressed in annual emission allocations , progressively leading to the 2030 target of each member state , while keeping in force the annual limits established for the years preceding it as set in commission implementing decision (eu) 2020/212636. ### (12) as a consequence , it will be necessary to set , as from the year of adoption of this regulation , new binding national limits , expressed in annual emission allocations , progressively and with ensured flexibility for member states leading to the 2030 target of each member state , while keeping in force the annual limits established for the years preceding it as set in commission implementing decision (eu) 2020/212636.