### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. ### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers in order to combine personal data gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should be prohibited combining personal data of end users.


### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. ### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including those created by the own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner.


### (38) to prevent further reinforcing their dependence on the core platform services of gatekeepers , the business users of these gatekeepers should be free in promoting and choosing the distribution channel they consider most appropriate to interact with any end users that these business users have already acquired through core platform services provided by the gatekeeper. conversely , end users should also be free to choose offers of such business users and to enter into contracts with them either through core platform services of the gatekeeper , if applicable , or from a direct distribution channel of the business user or another indirect distribution channel such business user may use. this should apply to the promotion of offers and conclusion of contracts between business users and end users. moreover , the ability of end users to freely acquire content , subscriptions , features or other items outside the core platform services of the gatekeeper should not be undermined or restricted. in particular , it should be avoided that gatekeepers restrict end users from access to and use of such services via a software application running on their core platform service. for example , subscribers to online content purchased outside a software application download or purchased from a software application store should not be prevented from accessing such online content on a software application on the gatekeeper’s core platform service simply because it was purchased outside such software application or software application store. ### (38) to prevent further reinforcing their dependence on the core platform services of gatekeepers , the business users of these gatekeepers should be free in promoting and choosing the distribution channel they consider most appropriate to interact with any end users that these business users have already acquired through core platform services provided by the gatekeeper. conversely , end users should also be free to choose offers of such business users and to enter into contracts with them either through core platform services of the gatekeeper , if applicable , or from a direct distribution channel of the business user or another indirect distribution channel such business user may use. this should apply to the promotion of offers and conclusion of contracts between business users and end users. moreover , the ability of end users to freely acquire digital content and services , subscriptions , features or other items outside the core platform services of the gatekeeper should not be undermined in any way or restricted , especially through the use of technical restrictions. in particular , it should be avoided that gatekeepers restrict end users from access to and use of such legally acquired digital content and services via hardware or software features that are used by that gatekeeper when providing a similar digital content or digital service , simply because it was purchased outside the gatekeeper’s core platform service.


### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. ### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested , to the extent possible and free of charge , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain.


### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. ### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent , complex and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , with free of charge , effective , high quality , continuous and real-time information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain and the availability and visibility of advertisement.


### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. ### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the unilateral decision-making by industry actors that are not representative of the entire advertising value chain. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , with free of charge , effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain and the availability and visibility of advertisement.


### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. ### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the unilateral decision making by industry actors that are not representative of the entire advertising value chain. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , with free of charge , effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain and the availability and visibility of advertisement.


### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service. ### (43) gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users , including as part of an ancillary service. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform or from transactions on its ancillary service , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services or goods to that of its business users or of its suppliers. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users or against its suppliers. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service or with the supplier of an ancillary service.


### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service. ### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users , including as part of an ancillary service. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform or from transactions on its ancillary service , for the purpose of its own services or goods that offer similar services to that of its business users or of its suppliers. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users or against its suppliers. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service


### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service. ### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users , including as part of an ancillary service. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform , including from transactions on its ancillary service , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services or goods to that of its business users or of its suppliers. this may be the case , for instance , where ag ate keeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users or against its suppliers. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service or with the supplier of an ancillary service.


### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service. ### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. several providers of core platform services or ancillary services within the same undertaking , with at least one gatekeeper status , often results in a similar dual role. thus obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service.


### (46) a gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications. ### (46) a gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing or removing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications. this obligation should not apply to applications which are necessary for functionality.


### (46) a gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications. ### (46) a gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not prevent end users and business users , including device manufacturers and device providers , from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on their core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications , unless they are proven as essential to the functioning or security of the operating system , device or other software applications installed by the business or end users.


### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. in order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system. ### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. in order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system. this prohibition on restricting the ability of end users to install and use , or access , third-party software applications or application stores should therefore also be without prejudice to the ability of gatekeepers to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal content online.


### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. in order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system. ### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. in order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system. this prohibition on restricting the ability of end users to install and use , or access third - party software applications or application stores should not prevent gatekeepers to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal content online.


### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. in order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system. ### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. in some instances , and in line with the goals of the digital services act , these rules may legitimately help user safety and data protection , as well as the integrity of the hardware or operating system , and contribute to providing user choice in devices markets. however , such restriction should be demonstrated , in order to not unduly limit the ability of business users and of end users to use alternative distribution channels.


### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. in order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system. ### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of business users and end users to install , set as defaults and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. to ensure contestability , the gatekeeper should allow all downloaded applications or application stores to prompt the end user enabling decision on setting them as default. in order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper and do not compromise data protection , user privacy , security or choice , the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system.


### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. in order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system. ### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. in order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system. this should also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.


### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. ### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also using that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked within or along the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which may be considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. such preferential or embedded display of a separate online intermediation service should be regarded as a favouring irrespective of whether the information or results within the favoured groups of specialised results may also be provided by competing services and are as such ranked in a non-discriminatory way. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper potentially leading to a conflict of interest. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.


### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. ### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , or engage in self-preferencing through other settings , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace , or products or services to which users are directed following a request to a digital voice assistant. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.


### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. ### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also using that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked within or along the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which may be considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. such preferential or embedded display of a separate online intermediation service shall be regarded as a favouring irrespective of whether the information or results within the favoured groups of specialised results may also be provided by competing services and are as such ranked in a non-discriminatory way. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper potentially leading to a conflict of interest. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.


### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. ### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , display or default settings , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.


### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. ### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also using that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked within or along the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which can be considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. such preferential or embedded display of a separate online intermediation service should be regarded as a favouring irrespective of whether the information or results within the favoured groups of specialised results can also be provided by competing services and are as such ranked in a non-discriminatory way. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper potentially leading to a conflict of interest. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.


### (49) in such situations , the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including display , rating , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34 ### (49) in such situations , the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it cooperates with. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair and the gatekeeper's own products or services do not have more access to information about the ranking or any other competition-relevant aspects than products or services of third parties. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including among others order , graphic display , rating , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. such an equivalent effect can for instance be achieved by ad formats that are used by users in a similar manner to the gatekeeper's or third parties' online intermediation services , or that benefit the gatekeeper in a similar manner to the preferential treatment in ranking itself (e.g. in terms of financial gains , user access/traffic or data access). the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.


### (49) in such situations , the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including display , rating , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34 ### (49) in such situations , the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking or through other settings on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking and other relevant settings are also generally fair and non-discriminatory. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including display , rating , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measures and settings that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34


### (50) gatekeepers should not restrict or prevent the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. this would allow more providers to offer their services , thereby ultimately providing greater choice to the end user. gatekeepers should ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and shall not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to consumers , including by means of pre-installation , as well as the improvement of the offering to end users , such as price reductions or increased quality , should not be construed as constituting a prohibited barrier to switching. ### (50) gatekeepers should not restrict or prevent the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. this would allow more providers to offer their services , thereby ultimately providing greater choice to the end user. gatekeepers should ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and shall not raise unjustified technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to consumers , including by means of pre-installation , as well as the improvement of the offering to end users , such as price reductions or increased quality , should not be construed as constituting a prohibited barrier to switching.


### (50) gatekeepers should not restrict or prevent the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. this would allow more providers to offer their services , thereby ultimately providing greater choice to the end user. gatekeepers should ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and shall not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to consumers , including by means of pre-installation , as well as the improvement of the offering to end users , such as price reductions or increased quality , should not be construed as constituting a prohibited barrier to switching. ### deleted


### (51) gatekeepers can hamper the ability of end users to access online content and services including software applications. therefore , rules should be established to ensure that the rights of end users to access an open internet are not compromised by the conduct of gatekeepers. gatekeepers can also technically limit the ability of end users to effectively switch between different internet access service providers , in particular through their control over operating systems or hardware. this distorts the level playing field for internet access services and ultimately harms end users. it should therefore be ensured that gatekeepers do not unduly restrict end users in choosing their internet access service provider. ### (51) gatekeepers can hamper the ability of end users to access electronic communications services including internet access service , online content and services including software applications. therefore , rules should be established to ensure that the rights of end users to access an open internet are not compromised by the conduct of gatekeepers. gatekeepers can also technically and commercially limit the ability of end users to effectively access and switch between different internet access service providers , in particular through their control over operating systems or hardware. this distorts the level playing field for electronic communications (including internet access services) and ultimately harms end users. it should therefore be ensured that gatekeepers do not restrict end users in choosing their electronic communications network or internet access service provider.


### (53) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. to further enhance fairness , transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider , the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers , when requested , with free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers , advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising , as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services. ### (53) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. to further enhance fairness , transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider , the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers , when requested , with free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and granular information that is necessary for advertisers , advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising , as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services.


### (54) gatekeepers benefit from access to vast amounts of data that they collect while providing the core platform services as well as other digital services. to ensure that gatekeepers do not undermine the contestability of core platform services as well as the innovation potential of the dynamic digital sector by restricting the ability of business users to effectively port their data , business users and end users should be granted effective and immediate access to the data they provided or generated in the context of their use of the relevant core platform services of the gatekeeper , in a structured , commonly used and machine-readable format. this should apply also to any other data at different levels of aggregation that may be necessary to effectively enable such portability. it should also be ensured that business users and end users can port that data in real time effectively , such as for example through high quality application programming interfaces. facilitating switching or multi-homing should lead , in turn , to an increased choice for business users and end users and an incentive for gatekeepers and business users to innovate. ### (54) gatekeepers benefit from access to vast amounts of data that they collect while providing the core platform services as well as other digital services. to ensure that gatekeepers do not undermine the contestability of core platform services as well as the innovation potential of the dynamic digital sector by restricting the ability of business users to effectively port their data , business users and end users should be granted effective , free of charge and immediate access to the data they provided or generated in the context of their use of the relevant core platform services of the gatekeeper , in a structured , commonly used and machine-readable format. this should apply also to any other data at different levels of aggregation that may be necessary to effectively enable such portability. it should also be ensured that business users and end users can port that data in real time effectively , such as for example through high quality application programming interfaces. facilitating switching or multi-homing should lead , in turn , to an increased choice for business users and end users and an incentive for gatekeepers and business users to innovate.


### (54) gatekeepers benefit from access to vast amounts of data that they collect while providing the core platform services as well as other digital services. to ensure that gatekeepers do not undermine the contestability of core platform services as well as the innovation potential of the dynamic digital sector by restricting the ability of business users to effectively port their data , business users and end users should be granted effective and immediate access to the data they provided or generated in the context of their use of the relevant core platform services of the gatekeeper , in a structured , commonly used and machine-readable format. this should apply also to any other data at different levels of aggregation that may be necessary to effectively enable such portability. it should also be ensured that business users and end users can port that data in real time effectively , such as for example through high quality application programming interfaces. facilitating switching or multi-homing should lead , in turn , to an increased choice for business users and end users and an incentive for gatekeepers and business users to innovate. ### (54) gatekeepers benefit from access to vast amounts of data that they collect while providing the core platform services as well as other digital services. to ensure that gatekeepers do not undermine the contestability of core platform services as well as the innovation potential of the dynamic digital sector by restricting the ability of business users to effectively port their data , business users and end users or third parties authorised by an end user should be granted effective , free of charge and immediate access to the data they provided or generated in the context of their use of the relevant core platform services of the gatekeeper , in a structured , commonly used and machine-readable format. this should apply also to any other data at different levels of aggregation that may be necessary to effectively enable such portability. it should also be ensured that business users and end users can port that data in real time effectively , such as for example through high quality application programming interfaces. facilitating switching or multi-homing should lead , in turn , to an increased choice for business users and end users and an incentive for gatekeepers and business users to innovate.


### (55) business users that use large core platform services provided by gatekeepers and end users of such business users provide and generate a vast amount of data , including data inferred from such use. in order to ensure that business users have access to the relevant data thus generated , the gatekeeper should , upon their request , allow unhindered access , free of charge , to such data. such access should also be given to third parties contracted by the business user , who are acting as processors of this data for the business user. data provided or generated by the same business users and the same end users of these business users in the context of other services provided by the same gatekeeper may be concerned where this is inextricably linked to the relevant request. to this end , a gatekeeper should not use any contractual or other restrictions to prevent business users from accessing relevant data and should enable business users to obtain consent of their end users for such data access and retrieval , where such consent is required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec. gatekeepers should also facilitate access to these data in real time by means of appropriate technical measures , such as for example putting in place high quality application programming interfaces. ### (55) business users that use large core platform services provided by gatekeepers and end users of such business users provide and generate a vast amount of data , including data inferred from such use. in order to ensure that business users have access to the relevant data thus generated , the gatekeeper should , upon their request , allow unhindered access , free of charge , to such data. such access should also be given to third parties contracted by the business user , who are acting as processors of this data for the business user. data provided or generated by the same business users and the same end users of these business users in the context of other services provided by the same gatekeeper may be concerned where this is inextricably linked to the relevant request. to this end , a gatekeeper should not use any contractual or other restrictions to prevent business users from accessing relevant data and should enable business users to obtain consent of their end users for such data access and retrieval , where such consent is required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec. the obtaining of this consent should be as user-friendly as possible and under the same conditions , such as the duration and renewal of consent , as those applied to the consent provided by the end user to the gatekeeper for the use of such data for its own services. gatekeepers should also facilitate access to these data in real time by means of appropriate technical measures , such as for example putting in place high quality application programming interfaces.


### (55) business users that use large core platform services provided by gatekeepers and end users of such business users provide and generate a vast amount of data , including data inferred from such use. in order to ensure that business users have access to the relevant data thus generated , the gatekeeper should , upon their request , allow unhindered access , free of charge , to such data. such access should also be given to third parties contracted by the business user , who are acting as processors of this data for the business user. data provided or generated by the same business users and the same end users of these business users in the context of other services provided by the same gatekeeper may be concerned where this is inextricably linked to the relevant request. to this end , a gatekeeper should not use any contractual or other restrictions to prevent business users from accessing relevant data and should enable business users to obtain consent of their end users for such data access and retrieval , where such consent is required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec. gatekeepers should also facilitate access to these data in real time by means of appropriate technical measures , such as for example putting in place high quality application programming interfaces. ### (55) business users that use large core platform services provided by gatekeepers and end users of such business users provide and generate a vast amount of data , including data inferred from such use. in order to ensure that business users have access to the relevant data thus generated , the gatekeeper should , upon their request , allow unhindered access , free of charge , to such data. such access should also be given to third parties contracted by the business user , who are acting as processors of this data for the business user. data provided or generated by the same business users and the same end users of these business users in the context of other services provided by the same gatekeeper may be concerned where this is inextricably linked to the relevant request. to this end , a gatekeeper should not use any contractual or other restrictions to prevent business users from accessing relevant data and should enable business users to obtain consent of their end users for such data access and retrieval , where such consent is required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec. gatekeepers should also facilitate access to these data in real time by means of appropriate technical measures , such as for example putting in place high quality application programming interfaces or enabling access of data by the business user “in situ” , without a transfer by the gatekeeper.


### (60) in exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public morality , public health or public security , the commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. the regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability. ### (60) in exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public health and security , public health or public security , the commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. the regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability. where such an exemption is granted , the commission should review its decision every two years.


### (60) in exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public morality , public health or public security , the commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. the regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability. ### (60) in exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public morality , public health or public security , the commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. the regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability. where such an exemption is granted , the commission should review its decision every two years.


### (61) the data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. ensuring an adequate level of transparency of profiling practices employed by gatekeepers facilitates contestability of core platform services , by putting external pressure on gatekeepers to prevent making deep consumer profiling the industry standard , given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth , and at a similar scale. enhanced transparency should allow other providers of core platform services to differentiate themselves better through the use of superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. to ensure a minimum level of effectiveness of this transparency obligation , gatekeepers should at least provide a description of the basis upon which profiling is performed , including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on , the processing applied , the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used , the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services , and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the relevant use of such profiling , as well as to seek their consent. ### (61) the data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. ensuring an adequate level of transparency of profiling practices employed by gatekeepers facilitates contestability of core platform services , by putting external pressure on gatekeepers to prevent making deep consumer profiling the industry standard , given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth , and at a similar scale. enhanced transparency should allow other providers of core platform services to differentiate themselves better through the use of superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. to ensure a minimum level of effectiveness of this transparency obligation , gatekeepers should at least provide a description of the basis upon which profiling is performed , including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on , the processing applied , the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used , the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services , and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the relevant use of such profiling , as well as to seek their consent. artificial intelligence could be used to nudge users to engage in certain actions or predict their actions without necessarily profiling them. the power of big data artificial intelligence that is exclusively developed or brought up by undertakings which engage with gatekeepers position and practices should not be neglected.


### (61) the data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. ensuring an adequate level of transparency of profiling practices employed by gatekeepers facilitates contestability of core platform services , by putting external pressure on gatekeepers to prevent making deep consumer profiling the industry standard , given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth , and at a similar scale. enhanced transparency should allow other providers of core platform services to differentiate themselves better through the use of superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. to ensure a minimum level of effectiveness of this transparency obligation , gatekeepers should at least provide a description of the basis upon which profiling is performed , including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on , the processing applied , the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used , the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services , and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the relevant use of such profiling , as well as to seek their consent. ### (61) the data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. ensuring an adequate level of transparency of profiling practices employed by gatekeepers facilitates contestability of core platform services , by putting external pressure on gatekeepers to prevent making deep consumer profiling the industry standard , given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth , and at a similar scale. enhanced transparency should allow other providers of core platform services to differentiate themselves better through the use of superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. to ensure a minimum level of effectiveness of this transparency obligation , gatekeepers should at least provide a description of the basis upon which profiling is performed , including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on , the processing applied , the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used , the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services , and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the relevant use of such profiling , as well as to seek their consent. ai could be used to nudge users to engage in certain actions or predict their actions without necessarily profiling them. the power of big data ai that is exclusively developed or brought up by undertakings which engage with a gatekeeper's position and practices should not be neglected.


### (79) the objective of this regulation is to ensure a contestable and fair digital sector in general and core platform services in particular , with a view to promoting innovation , high quality of digital products and services , fair and competitive prices , as well as a high quality and choice for end users in the digital sector. this cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states , but can only , by reason of the business model and operations of the gatekeepers and the scale and effects of their operations , be fully achieved at union level. the union may adopt measures , in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union. in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. ### (79) the objective of this regulation is to ensure a contestable and fair digital sector in general and core platform services in particular , with a view to promoting and ensuring innovation , high quality of digital products and services , fair and competitive prices , as well as a high quality and choice for end users in the digital sector. this cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states , but can only , by reason of the business model and operations of the gatekeepers and the scale and effects of their operations , be fully achieved at union level. the union may adopt measures , in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union. in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.


### (79) the objective of this regulation is to ensure a contestable and fair digital sector in general and core platform services in particular , with a view to promoting innovation , high quality of digital products and services , fair and competitive prices , as well as a high quality and choice for end users in the digital sector. this cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states , but can only , by reason of the business model and operations of the gatekeepers and the scale and effects of their operations , be fully achieved at union level. the union may adopt measures , in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union. in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. ### (79) the objective of this regulation is to ensure a contestable and fair digital sector in general and accessible core platform services in particular , with a view to promoting and stimulating innovation , high quality of digital products and services , fair and competitive prices , as well as a high quality and choice for end users in the digital sector , within a harmonised digital market. this cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states , but can only , by reason of the business model and operations of the gatekeepers and the scale and effects of their operations , as well as the need to maintain the right balance on the digital market while pursuing the objective of stimulating innovation , be fully achieved at union level. the union may adopt measures , in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union. in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.


### this regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , in particular articles 16 , 47 and 50 thereof. accordingly , this regulation should be interpreted and applied with respect to those rights and principles ### this regulation fully respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , in particular articles 16 , 47 and 50 thereof. accordingly , this regulation should be interpreted and applied with respect to those rights and principles.


### 1. this regulation lays down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present. ### 1. this regulation lays down harmonised rules ensuring competitive and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present so as to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market.


### 1. this regulation lays down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present. ### 1. this regulation lays down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers for large platforms are present.


### 1. this regulation lays down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present. ### 1. the purpose of this regulation is to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market by laying down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present.