### 2. underlines that international carbon pricing and fully competitive low-emission solutions would render the mechanism obsolete; stresses , therefore , that the eu needs to step up efforts in this respect; ### 2. underlines that international carbon pricing and fully competitive low-emission solutions would render the mechanism obsolete; stresses , therefore , that the eu needs to step up efforts in this respect; stresses that the union’s increased climate ambition at the core of the green deal will increase the risk of carbon leakage in many industrial sectors; calls on the commission to ensure comprehensive and timely carbon leakage protection for all sectors;


### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; ### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; highlights , however , the importance of ensuring that this responsibility does not result in carbon leakage , which may occur “either because production is transferred from the eu to other countries with lower ambition for emission reduction , or because eu products are replaced by more carbon-intensive imports” , as mentioned in the european green deal communication;


### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; ### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; highlights the importance of ensuring that this responsibility does not result in carbon leakage , which may occur “either because production is transferred from the eu to other countries with lower ambition for emission reduction , or because eu products are replaced by more carbon-intensive imports” , as mentioned in the european green deal communication;


### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; ### 3. stresses that the union has always been a champion of global climate action , what is proven by the adoption of the climate neutrality 2050 goal and raising of its 2030 ghg reduction target; assumes that the union has the opportunity to become an exemplary model for green and climate friendly transition if the achievement of its ambitious climate goals is coupled with the economic growth and increasing of the standard of living of its citizens.


### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; ### 3. stresses that the union should play a leading role in global climate action , in cooperation with all of the world’s other major industrialised economies;


### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; ### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to significantly engage against carbon leakage;


### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market; ### 3. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which still represent 94% of union industrial emissions;


### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market; ### 3. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94% of union industrial emissions;


### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market; ### 3. considers that a cbam should eventually cover all imports; but that as a starting point it should cover for example energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers;


### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market; ### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all sectors covered by the eu ets in order to avoid distortion in the internal market; considers that the cbam may also cover products containing large amounts of these energy-intensive commodities that may be particularly at risk of carbon leakage;


### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market; ### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market and that it guarantee the competitiveness of the european economy;


### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market; ### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the global market;


### 3. emphasises that decentralised climate actions can lead to carbon leakage and a competitive disadvantage on international markets for the eu industry; urges the commission , therefore , to ensure full carbon-leakage protection and to consider the inclusion of export rebates in the mechanism; ### 3. emphasises that decentralised climate actions can lead to carbon leakage and a competitive disadvantage on international markets for the eu industry; urges the commission , therefore , to implement the mechanism as a complementary tool to existing carbon measures to ensure full carbon-leakage protection and to consider the inclusion of export rebates in the mechanism;


### 3. emphasises that decentralised climate actions can lead to carbon leakage and a competitive disadvantage on international markets for the eu industry; urges the commission , therefore , to ensure full carbon-leakage protection and to consider the inclusion of export rebates in the mechanism; ### 3. emphasises that asymmetrical climate actions can lead to carbon leakage and a competitive disadvantage on international markets for the eu industry; urges the commission , therefore , to ensure full carbon-leakage protection and to include export rebates in the mechanism;


### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; ### deleted


### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; ### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; underlines that it needs to be coupled with incentives for the business to transform their operations towards green economy , regulatory arrangements preventing carbon leakage and creating a level playing field for european companies and industries in transition , thus protecting jobs and investments in the eu by applying the adequate price for indirect carbon influx (carbon footprint of goods consumed in the eu and produced in third countries);


### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; ### 4. welcomes the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels;


### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; ### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities;


### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at country level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; ### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at country level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; furthermore , considers that importers should have the option to prove , in accordance with eu standards for mrv , that the carbon content of their products is lower than the benchmark , and avail of a cbam price adapted accordingly;


### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at country level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; ### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at producer level , which will reward firms by its carbon efficiency; whereas , should this not be feasible , the country level with possible adjustment for different levels of carbon efficiency should be used.


### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at country level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; ### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at producer level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products;


### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions; ### 4. highlights the role such a mechanism could play , if balanced and appropriately implemented , in energy intensive industries , such as steel , cement and aluminium , given the experienced trade exposure of those sectors and their participation in the ets; suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time if deemed appropriate; considers it necessary that the scope of the mechanism covers as a large part of the carbon footprint of a product as possible , i.e. through the inclusion of emissions from energy in production; stresses that this should be done considering their respective value chains and not lead to internal market distortions notably on downstream markets; recalls that determining the carbon footprint of a product includes several insecurities and that the mechanism should not contribute to an undue regulatory burden for importing companies especially smes;


### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions; ### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions; acknowledges however , that for many products it’s difficult to determine and verify a "product carbon footprint" , this applies in particularly to complex technical products whose production and supply processes consist of multiple stages;


### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions; ### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that such mechanism should be applied to all third countries without a carbon trading scheme ideally linked to the eu ets or equivalent carbon pricing mechanism and not lead to internal market distortions;


### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2 % below 1990 levels in 2018 , while at the same time its ghg emissions embedded in international trade have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global footprint; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu represent more than 20 % of the union’s domestic co2 emissions; ### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2 % below 1990 levels in 2018 , while at the same time its ghg emissions embedded in imports to eu have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global carbon footprint; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu are equivalent of more than 20 % of the union’s domestic co2 emissions;


### 5. requests that the implementation of the cbam should lead to the progressive phasing out of the free allocation of allowances , following an appropriate transition period , since the mechanism ensures that eu producers and importers would have to deal with the same carbon costs in the eu market; notes that this phasing out should be coupled in parallel with the introduction of export rebates in order to maintain strong decarbonisation incentives , while ensuring a level playing field for eu exports; ### 5. until at least 2030 , the cbam framework should be an additional measure to the existing carbon leakage measures under the eu ets; if after 2030 global markets for carbon lean products are put in place , the cbam could lead to the gradual phasing out of the free allocation of allowances; the mechanism intends to ensure that eu producers and importers would have to deal with similar carbon costs; notes that this phasing out should be coupled in parallel with the introduction of export rebates in order to maintain strong decarbonisation incentives;


### 5. requests that the implementation of the cbam should lead to the progressive phasing out of the free allocation of allowances , following an appropriate transition period , since the mechanism ensures that eu producers and importers would have to deal with the same carbon costs in the eu market; notes that this phasing out should be coupled in parallel with the introduction of export rebates in order to maintain strong decarbonisation incentives , while ensuring a level playing field for eu exports; ### 5. requests that the implementation of the cbam should lead to the progressive phasing out of the free allocation of allowances , following an appropriate transition period , since the mechanism ensures that eu producers and importers would have to deal with the same carbon costs in the eu market; notes that this phasing out should be coupled in parallel with the introduction of export rebates in order to maintain strong decarbonisation incentives , while ensuring a level playing field for eu exports , as well as preventing any potential undermining of global climate policies by carbon leakage;


### 5. requests that the implementation of the cbam should lead to the progressive phasing out of the free allocation of allowances , following an appropriate transition period , since the mechanism ensures that eu producers and importers would have to deal with the same carbon costs in the eu market; notes that this phasing out should be coupled in parallel with the introduction of export rebates in order to maintain strong decarbonisation incentives , while ensuring a level playing field for eu exports; ### 5. requests that the implementation of the cbam should lead to the progressive phasing out of the free allocation of allowances , following an appropriate transition period , since the mechanism ensures that eu producers and importers would have to deal with the same carbon costs in the eu market; notes that these measures do not ensure a level playing field for eu exporters; asks european commission to propose a set of measures , which will ensure strong incentives for decarbonisation outside and within the eu , to provide a level playing field for eu exports.


### 5. stresses the need to limit international retaliation measures against the eu caused by the mechanism; urges the commission to make the mechanism world trade organization-compatible and to take a multilateral approach to its design; ### 5. strongly emphasises that the success of european smes and hidden champions depends on access to global markets. therefore , calls on the commission to base any legislative proposal on a thorough impact assessment , which takes into consideration the impact of possible counter measures taken by affected third countries against european industries stresses the need to limit and possibly avoid international retaliation measures against the eu caused by the mechanism; urges the commission to make the mechanism compatible with the wto acquis and provisions in the union’s free trade agreements and to take a multilateral approach to its design; underlines the need to deduct costs incurred from carbon taxes , emissions rights under cap-and-trade schemes or equivalent climate mitigation measures , including those of a regulatory rather than a fiscal nature , in the country of production from payments at import under the mechanism and to avoid any discrimination based on origin;


### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; ### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce eu and global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in eu industry and in international trade , by preventing any potential undermining of eu climate policies by carbon leakage , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners (while fully respecting the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities) , and not as an instrument for protectionism;


### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; ### 6. supports the timely conclusion of a comprehensive impact assessment of the environmental , socioeconomic and political consequences of introducing a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to reduce ghg emissions embedded in international trade and better address the risk of carbon leakage , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism;


### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; ### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism or generating tax revenues; as such it cannot be perceived as the alternative to carbon leakage measures embedded in union law;


### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; ### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners; considers that such measure should take into account both the environmental footprint including ghg emissions over the full life cycle of products and a global level playing field with third countries’ producers.


### 6. stresses that importers from third countries should not pay twice for the carbon content embodied in its products; ### 6. stresses that importers from third countries should not pay twice for the carbon content embodied in its products; asks european commission to carry out risk assessment and propose ways to mitigate it.


### 6. stresses that importers from third countries should not pay twice for the carbon content embodied in its products; ### 6. stresses that importers from third countries should be treated on equal footing and without any discrimination and should not pay twice for the carbon content embodied in its products;


### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered eu own resources; is convinced that these resources must be used for climate measures; ### 6. underlines that resources incurred by the mechanism must not create distortions based on the member state of import but help level the global playing field between competing industries and for low carbon investment and industrial manufacturing transformation;


### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered eu own resources; is convinced that these resources must be used for climate measures; ### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered eu own resources; is convinced that a substantial share of these resources must be used for climate measures;


### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered eu own resources; is convinced that these resources must be used for climate measures; ### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered at least partially eu own resources; is convinced that these resources must be used for climate measures;


### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered eu own resources; is convinced that these resources must be used for climate measures; ### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered member state resources; is convinced that these resources must be used for climate measures;


### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local jobs and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition; ### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local jobs , and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy and a level playing field from an environmental perspective , while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition; recalls too the importance of ensuring the competitiveness of exports from european producers;


### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local jobs and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition; ### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union environmental policy that is both ambitious and socially fair , and compatible with european green deal objective of decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local jobs , will not be detrimental to competitiveness of the european economy and will ensure the environmental level playing field on the european internal market along with the 'polluter pays' principle while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition;


### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local jobs and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition; ### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe , by 2050 at the latest , that will create local jobs and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition; considers that the cbam should come with a 2050 decarbonisation target and required transition plans for industry;


### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local jobs and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition; ### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both technologically advanced and superior to any international competitior’s , environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local jobs and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition;


### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local jobs and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition; ### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy , which aims at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of the union that will create local jobs , protect social rights and ensure the competitiveness of the member states economy while contributing to a greater respect for the environment.


### 7. calls for the inclusion of cbam revenues into the eu budget; ### 7. considers that the cbam being an environmental measure , the revenues could be used to co-finance projects that foster technological and energetic transition as well as research on low-carbon projects and further projects in line with the union`s environmental ambitions;


### 7. calls for the inclusion of cbam revenues into the eu budget; ### 7. calls for the inclusion of cbam revenues into the eu budget; being an environmental measure , the cbam revenues could be used to co-finance projects that foster technological and energetic transition as well as research on low-carbon projects and further projects in line with the union`s environmental ambitions;


### 7. calls for the inclusion of cbam revenues into the eu budget; ### 7. calls for the inclusion of cbam revenues into the eu budget; considers that these should be allocated to research and innovation as a priority;


### 7. calls on the commission to conduct an impact assessment of different mechanisms and designs to incentivise international climate action and prevent carbon leakage before presenting a legislative proposal. ### 7. calls on the commission to conduct an in-depth impact assessment of different mechanisms and alternatives before presenting a legislative proposal; including regulatory climate standards for imported products and the compatibility with eu ets’s free allocation of allowances , to incentivise international climate action and prevent carbon leakage.


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should cover as many imports as possible , especially the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; due to its complexity , the functioning of the cbam should be tested during a transition period with the objective of detecting operational and administrative problems of the mechanism and making the necessary adjustments and modifications;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all sectors covered by the eu ets , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial greenhouse gas emissions; considers that the cbam may also cover products containing large amounts of these energy-intensive commodities that may be particularly at risk of carbon leakage;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94% of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the energy sector and , as a priority , energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement and steel , which represent almost 40% of the emissions from sectors at risk of carbon leakage in europe , before moving on to other sectors that are vulnerable to carbon leakage , such as refining , aluminium , chemicals and fertilisers , depending on the technical feasibility and the level of risk of carbon leakage;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. notes that before establishing a cbam and deciding which sectors it should cover , the commission should deliver an impact assessment that considers the consequences on sectors most exposed to carbon leakage; considers that such impact assessment should take into consideration the upcoming revision of the ets system that , as currently structured , presents a number of difficulties in fostering investments in low carbon technologies through the ets itself;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; stresses , however , the need to avoid internal market distortions , notably on downstream markets;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam as a starting point should cover the sectors that are sensitive to carbon leakage in the sense that they have carbon intense production and are trade intensive; considers that it could both include goods and energy;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , glass , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers; stresses the need to avoid internal market distortions , notably on downstream markets;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should ultimately cover the vast majority of imports , but that as a starting point it should gradually cover specific sectors of the economy determined according to an impact assessment including for example the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers;


### 8. believes that the above proposal is compatible with world trade organization rules , since it does not discriminate between producers , is based on objective criteria and has a clear environmental objective. ### 8. is of the opinion that cbam mechanism is fully compatible with world trade organization rules , it does not discriminate between producers or the country of the origin , and it is based on sound and urgent environmental objective that is based on transparent and science-based objective criteria; in addition , calls on the commission to pursue multilateral wto reforms that bring international trade law in line with the goals of the paris agreement;


### 8. believes that the above proposal is compatible with world trade organization rules , since it does not discriminate between producers , is based on objective criteria and has a clear environmental objective. ### 8. believes that the above proposal is compatible with world trade organization rules and the eu's international obligations , since it treats imports and national production in the same way , is based on objective criteria and has a clear environmental objective.


### 8. believes that the above proposal is compatible with world trade organization rules , since it does not discriminate between producers , is based on objective criteria and has a clear environmental objective. ### 8. believes that the above proposal should be compatible with the world trade organization rules , should not discriminate between producers , and be based on objective criteria and have a clear environmental objective.


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid , disaggregated by different production methods with varying emission intensities; considers that importers should have the option to prove , in accordance with eu standards for measurement , reporting and verification (mrv) , that the carbon content of their products is lower than the benchmark , and avail of a cbam price adapted accordingly;


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing , initially and by default , the european average ghg emissions content of individual products , while working towards standardised reporting on an international level in order to allow the global average to be used in the long term; considers that the climate policies of third countries and their level of development should also be taken into account;


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; stresses in this respect the need for the cbam to cover both direct and indirect carbon emissions;


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; stresses in this respect the need for the cbam to cover both direct and indirect carbon emissions.


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid for the estimation of indirect emissions in the country of origin;


### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that the introduction of a rising carbon floor price under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu; ### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets);


### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that the introduction of a rising carbon floor price under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu; ### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); such evolution shall grant that ets free allowances remain at 100% of the benchmark without any reduction; points out that the introduction of a rising carbon floor price under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu;


### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that the introduction of a rising carbon floor price under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu; ### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that the introduction of a rising carbon auction floor price under the eu ets could be a way to ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu for the power sector while incentivizing the industry sectors;


### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that the introduction of a rising carbon floor price under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu; ### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that an increased ambition will result in a higher carbon price;


### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; ### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; calls on the commission to pursue multilateral wto reforms that bring international trade law in line with the goals of the paris agreement;


### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; ### 11. points out that in order to be applied rapidly a cbam must be compatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind;


### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; ### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental , social and economic integrity in mind;


### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , all existing measures on carbon leakage under union law should immediately cease to apply as soon as the cbam enters into force , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets; ### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , therefore the cbam should apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets including rebates similar to carbon leakage measures under eu ets; stresses that the possibility of acquiring rebate under cbam should also be an incentive for importers to search for goods with low carbon footprint , thus incentivising low carbon production in third countries and at the same time reducing carbon footprint of eu's consumption; therefore asks the commission to consider any design options that allow the existing carbon leakage measures to co-exist with the mechanism while not leading to double protection; therefore takes the view that the mechanism should co-exist together with the free allocation of allowances and the compensation of indirect emission costs for certain sectors; the potential phasing out of existing carbon leakage measures should be the effect of longstanding climate policy and not the result of the introduction of a cbam;


### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , all existing measures on carbon leakage under union law should immediately cease to apply as soon as the cbam enters into force , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets; ### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure; considers that a phase-out of free allocation may be possible while ensuring full protection of carbon leakage for european industry;


### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , all existing measures on carbon leakage under union law should immediately cease to apply as soon as the cbam enters into force , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets; ### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , all existing measures on carbon leakage under union law should gradually cease to apply after the cbam enters into force , so as to ensure that it is fully operational , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets;


### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , all existing measures on carbon leakage under union law should immediately cease to apply as soon as the cbam enters into force , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets; ### 12. underlines the national treatment requirement under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , all existing measures on carbon leakage under union law should immediately cease to apply in sectors covered by the cbam as soon as the cbam enters into force , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets;


### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , all existing measures on carbon leakage under union law should immediately cease to apply as soon as the cbam enters into force , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets; ### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , the cbam should take into account the existing carbon leakage measures applicable to the european industry to avoid double protection; stresses that a core objective of the cbam should be that eu producers and importers would have to deal with the same carbon costs;


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle;


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through a rebasing of the cap and adjustment of the linear reduction factor resulting in ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal;


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. underlines that the cbam is only one of the measures leading to the implementation of european green deal objectives and calls on the commission to present the coherent package of legislation based on a thorough impact assessment including the reform of the eu ets , and necessary measures in non-ets sectors , ensuring the union delivers the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries;


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates are necessary to guarantee the competitiveness of the eu’s low-carbon products on export markets and to incentivise more efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to include export rebates in its proposal;


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; notes the importance of european exports on global market; stresses , therefore , the need for the mechanism to include an export rebate for eu producers;


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; notes the importance of european exports on the global market; stresses , therefore , the need for the mechanism to include an export rebate for eu producers;


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; notes the importance of european exports on the global market; stresses , therefore , the need for the mechanism to include an ascm-compliant export rebate which must ensure the competitiveness of eu producers and incentivize third countries to set up carbon pricing schemes;


### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and for stepping up the union’s contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states , which are most vulnerable to climate change; ### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be allocated as a priority to the research and innovation budget in order to support the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and step up the union’s contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states , which are most vulnerable to climate change;


### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and for stepping up the union’s contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states , which are most vulnerable to climate change; ### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , provided that the cbam is used as a commercial policy tool to defend european production; asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes that this revenue should be used to support sectors of the european economy severely affected by covid-19;


### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and for stepping up the union’s contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states , which are most vulnerable to climate change; ### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , however the budgetary role of cbam should be the by-product and not the primary goal of the instrument; asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy;


### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and for stepping up the union’s contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states , which are most vulnerable to climate change; ### 14. underlines that the introduction of the cbam should not lead to a distortion of revenue collected by the member states based on the country of import and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and for stepping up the union’s contribution to international climate actions;


### 2. underlines that the parliament has not yet set out its position on the proposal for the edirpa; signals , therefore , that it is premature to create a dedicated budget line for operational expenditure and to allocate in reserve eur 83 million of the remaining unallocated margin in commitment appropriations under the expenditure ceiling of heading 5 in 2022; ### 2. recalls that , due to the late adoption of the legal base for the edirpa , the conciliation committee on the general budget for the financial year 2023 agreed not to place any amount in commitment appropriations in the reserve for that purpose and not to create a corresponding budget line for the financial year 2022;


### (8) the authority for european political parties and foundations ( authority') is a body of the union within the meaning of article 263 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) whose purpose is to register , control and impose sanctions on european political parties and european political foundations. registration should be necessary in order to obtain european legal status , which entails a series of rights and obligations. to avoid any possible conflict of interests , the authority should be independent. ### (8) the authority for european political parties and foundations ( authority') is a body of the union within the meaning of article 263 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) whose purpose is to register , control and impose sanctions on european political parties and european political foundations. registration should be necessary in order to obtain european legal status , which entails a series of rights and obligations. to avoid any possible conflict of interests , the authority should be independent. the authority should be equipped with adequate resources to implement its additional tasks , in particular for procedures pertaining to the european elections in 2024.


### (34) the co-financing rate should be lowered to 0% in the year of the elections to the european parliament. eliminating the co-financing obligation in the year of the elections to the european parliament should help european political parties increase the number and intensity of their campaign activities and , therefore , also increase their visibility at national level. ### deleted


### (37) in order to enhance cooperation with long-standing members sharing eu values , contributions from member parties having their seat in a country outside the union but in the council of europe , should be allowed. however , such contributions should be subject to a cap in relation to total contribution , to limit the risk of foreign interference. ### deleted


### (37) in order to enhance cooperation with long-standing members sharing eu values , contributions from member parties having their seat in a country outside the union but in the council of europe , should be allowed. however , such contributions should be subject to a cap in relation to total contribution , to limit the risk of foreign interference. ### (37) in order to enhance cooperation with long-standing partners sharing eu values , association fees should be allowed from member parties having their seat in a former member state , in a country member of the european economic area (efta) , in eu candidate countries and in eastern partnership countries with which the eu has concluded comprehensive and enhanced partnership agreements. however , such association fees should be subject to a cap as well as to publication in a separate category by the authority , to limit the risk of foreign interference.


### (37) in order to enhance cooperation with long-standing members sharing eu values , contributions from member parties having their seat in a country outside the union but in the council of europe , should be allowed. however , such contributions should be subject to a cap in relation to total contribution , to limit the risk of foreign interference. ### (37) in order to enhance cooperation with long-standing members sharing eu values , contributions from member parties or organisations having their seat in a country outside the union but in the council of europe or a candidate country , should be allowed. however , such contributions should be subject to a cap in relation to total contribution , to limit the risk of foreign interference.


### (38) regulation (eu , euratom) no 1141/2014 acknowledges only two categories of revenues for european political parties and foundations apart from contributions from the budget of the european union , namely contributions from members and donations. a number of revenue sources generated from own economic activities (such as sales of publications or conference fees) fall outside the scope of these two categories , creating accounting and transparency problems. a third category of revenues (‘own resources’) should therefore be created. the proportion of own resources in the total budget of a european political party or foundations should be capped at 5% to avoid that it becomes overdimensioned in relation to the overall budget of these entities. ### (38) regulation (eu , euratom) no 1141/2014 acknowledges only two categories of revenues for european political parties and foundations apart from contributions from the budget of the european union , namely contributions from members and donations. revenue sources generated from own economic activities (sales of publications , conference fees) fall outside the scope of these two categories , creating accounting and transparency problems. a third category of revenues (‘other own resources’) should therefore be created. without prejudice to the condition that european political parties and european political foundations remain non-profit organisations at all times , the proportion of other own resources in the total budget of a european political party or foundations should be capped at 5% to avoid that it becomes overdimensioned in relation to the overall budget of these entities. european political parties and european political foundations should not have own resources beyond contributions from members , donations , association fees , and other own resources thus defined.


### (38) regulation (eu , euratom) no 1141/2014 acknowledges only two categories of revenues for european political parties and foundations apart from contributions from the budget of the european union , namely contributions from members and donations. a number of revenue sources generated from own economic activities (such as sales of publications or conference fees) fall outside the scope of these two categories , creating accounting and transparency problems. a third category of revenues (‘own resources’) should therefore be created. the proportion of own resources in the total budget of a european political party or foundations should be capped at 5% to avoid that it becomes overdimensioned in relation to the overall budget of these entities. ### (38) regulation (eu , euratom) no 1141/2014 acknowledges only two categories of revenues for european political parties and foundations apart from contributions from the budget of the european union , namely contributions from members and donations. a number of revenue sources generated from own economic activities (such as sales of publications or conference fees) fall outside the scope of these two categories , creating accounting and transparency problems. a third category of revenues (‘ancillary own resources’) should therefore be created. the proportion of own resources in the total budget of a european political party or foundations should be capped at 10% to avoid that it becomes overdimensioned in relation to the overall budget of these entities.


### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to support political activities in the common interest , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern the implementation of the teu and the tfeu . these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice. ### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to co-finance joint events to the extent that they concern issues of relevance for the union’s field of activity , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern the implementation of the teu and the tfeu. these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice. no funding should be made available for activities promoting the scope of article 50 teu.


### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to support political activities in the common interest , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern the implementation of the teu and the tfeu . these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice. ### (41) european political parties and foundations should not use the funding received from the general budget of the european union for the direct or indirect funding of other political parties and , in particular , national , parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties or political foundations from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties or member organisations in the union on issues of relevance for the union , from supporting political activities in the common interest , or from engaging in educational activities , in order to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu and act to reinforce the existence of the european demos. the prohibition of indirect funding should not prevent the participation of either representatives and staffers of political parties , nor of potentially politically active persons in events of european political foundations. however , european political foundations may not engage in training of political candidates in the 6 months before national or european elections. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern issues directly related to the european union. these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice.


### (50) it is necessary to establish a common repository for the disclosures of european political parties. given its specific role in the implementation of this regulation , the authority should establish and manage such repository as a part of the registry for european political parties. the information contained in the repository should be transmitted by european political parties to the authority using a standard format and may be automated. european political parties should make available in the authority’s repository information to enable the wider context of the political advertisement and its aims to be understood. the information on the amount allocated to political advertising in the context of a specific campaign to be included in the repository may be based on an estimated allocation of funding. the amounts to be mentioned in the repository include donations for specific purposes or benefits in kind. ### (50) it is necessary to establish a common repository for the disclosures of european political parties. given its specific role in the implementation of this regulation , the authority should establish and manage such repository as a part of the registry for european political parties. the information contained in the repository should be transmitted by european political parties to the authority using a standard format and may be automated. european political parties should make available in the authority’s repository information to enable the wider context of the political advertisement and its aims to be understood. the information on the amount allocated to political advertising in the context of a specific campaign to be included in the repository may be based on an estimated allocation of funding. the amounts to be mentioned in the repository include donations for specific purposes or benefits in kind , contributions , and other own resources.


### (55) for reasons of transparency , and in order to strengthen the scrutiny and the democratic accountability of european political parties and european political foundations , information considered to be of substantial public interest , relating in particular to their statutes , membership , financial statements , donors and donations , contributions and grants received from the general budget of the european union , as well as information relating to decisions taken by the authority and the authorising officer of the european parliament on registration , funding and sanctions , should be published in a user-friendly , open and machine readable format . laying down a regulatory framework to ensure that this information is publicly available is the most effective means of promoting a level playing field and fair competition between political forces , and of upholding open , transparent and democratic legislative and electoral processes , thereby strengthening the trust of citizens and voters in european representative democracy and , more broadly , preventing corruption and abuses of power. ### (55) for reasons of transparency , and in order to strengthen the scrutiny and the democratic accountability of european political parties and european political foundations , information considered to be of substantial public interest , relating in particular to their statutes , membership , financial statements , donors and donations , contributions and grants received from the general budget of the european union , as well as information relating to decisions taken by the authority and the authorising officer of the european parliament on registration , funding and sanctions , should be published in a user-friendly , open and machine readable format. european political parties and european political foundations should supply to the authority and the authorising officer of the european parliament any documentation required for publication purposes in a user-friendly , open and machine readable format. laying down a regulatory framework to ensure that this information is publicly available is the most effective means of promoting a level playing field and fair competition between political forces , and of upholding open , transparent and democratic legislative and electoral processes , thereby strengthening the trust of citizens and voters in european representative democracy and , more broadly , preventing corruption and abuses of power.


### (61) in order to facilitating the monitoring of the implementation of this regulation , single points of contact in charge of coordination with the european level should be designated by each member sate. such contact points should be adequately resourced to be able to ensure effective coordination , including on issues related to the monitoring of political advertising , ### (61) in order to facilitating the monitoring of the implementation of this regulation , single points of contact in charge of coordination with the european level should be designated by each member sate. such contact points should be adequately resourced to be able to ensure effective coordination , including on issues related to the monitoring of political advertising. the authority should regularly convene the points of contact designated by the member states for exchange of best practices on matters of common concern.


### (7) 'donation' means any cash offering , any offering in kind , the provision below market value of any goods , services (including loans) or works , and any other transaction which constitutes an economic advantage for the european political party or the european political foundation concerned , with the exception of contributions from members and usual political activities carried out on a voluntary basis by individuals; ### (7) 'donation' means any cash offering or bank transfer , any offering in kind , the provision below market value of any goods , services (including loans) or works , and any other transaction which constitutes an economic advantage for the european political party or the european political foundation concerned , with the exception of contributions from members , association fees , other own resources , and usual political activities carried out on a voluntary basis by individuals;


### (7) 'donation' means any cash offering , any offering in kind , the provision below market value of any goods , services (including loans) or works , and any other transaction which constitutes an economic advantage for the european political party or the european political foundation concerned , with the exception of contributions from members and usual political activities carried out on a voluntary basis by individuals; ### (7) 'donation' means any cash offering or by bank transfer , any offering in kind , the provision below market value of any goods , services (including loans) or works , and any other transaction which constitutes an economic advantage for the european political party or the european political foundation concerned , with the exception of contributions from members , association fees , ancillary own resources and usual political activities carried out on a voluntary basis by individuals;


### (8) 'contribution from members' means any payment in cash , including membership fees , or any contribution in kind , or the provision below market value of any goods , services (including loans) or works , and any other transaction which constitutes an economic advantage for the european political party or the european political foundation concerned , when provided to that european political party or to that european political foundation by one of its members , with the exception of usual political activities carried out on a voluntary basis by individual members; ### (8) 'contribution from members' means any payment in cash or bank transfer , including membership fees , or any contribution in kind , or the provision below market value of any goods , services (including loans) or works , and any other transaction which constitutes an economic advantage for the european political party or the european political foundation concerned , when provided to that european political party or to that european political foundation by one of its members , with the exception of usual political activities carried out on a voluntary basis by individual members;


### (9) ‘own resources’ means income generated by own economic activities , such as conference fees and sales of publications; ### (9) ‘other own resources’ means income generated by own economic activities , such as conference fees and sales of publications;


### (9) ‘own resources’ means income generated by own economic activities , such as conference fees and sales of publications; ### (9) ‘ancillary own resources’ means income generated by own economic activities , such as contributions from joint activities , sales of publications , participation fees for conferences or workshops or other activities directly linked to political action;


### (10) ‘indirect funding’ means funding from which the member party derives a financial advantage , even where no funds are directly transferred; this should include cases which allow the member party to avoid expenditure which it would otherwise have had to incur for activities , other than political activities in the common interest , organised for its own and sole benefit; ### (10) ‘indirect funding’ means funding from which the member party derives a financial advantage , even where no funds are directly transferred; this should include cases which allow the member party to avoid expenditure which it would otherwise have had to incur for activities , other than joint events co-financed to the extent they concern issues of relevance for the union´s field of activities; the european political party must be visible in any such joint event;


### (10) ‘indirect funding’ means funding from which the member party derives a financial advantage , even where no funds are directly transferred; this should include cases which allow the member party to avoid expenditure which it would otherwise have had to incur for activities , other than political activities in the common interest , organised for its own and sole benefit; ### (10) ‘indirect funding’ means funding from which the member party derives a financial advantage , even where no funds are directly transferred; this should include cases which allow the member party to avoid expenditure which it would otherwise have had to incur for activities , other than joint events co-financed to the extent they concern issues of relevance for the union´s fields of activities , organised for its own and sole benefit;


### it also ensures that its member parties having their seat in the union observe the values expressed in article 2 teu and that its member parties having their seat outside the union observe equivalent values. it provides a written declaration using the template in annex i; ### it also ensures that its member parties observe the values expressed in article 2 teu as well as that parties having their seat outside the union and that pay association fees observe equivalent values. it provides a written declaration using the template in annex i;


### it also ensures that its member organisations having their seat in the union observe the values expressed in article 2 teu and that its member organisations having their seat outside the union observe equivalent values. it provides a written declaration using the template in annex i; ### it also ensures that its member organisations having their seat in the union observe the values expressed in article 2 teu as well as that organisations having their seat outside the union and that pay association fees observe equivalent values. it provides a written declaration using the template in annex i;


### 2. each european political party shall transmit within five working days of the first dissemination to the authority information concerning each political advertisement that it sponsors or publishes directly to enable the wider context of the political advertisement and its aims to be understood by citizens. that information shall include at least the information listed in point 1 of annex ii. ### 2. each european political party shall transmit within five working days of the first dissemination to the authority information concerning each political advertisement that it sponsors or publishes directly to enable the wider context of the political advertisement and its aims to be understood by citizens. that information shall include at least the information listed in point 1 of annex ii. the information shall be provided to the authority in a form which is easily accessible and using plain language.


### the authority shall annually prepare and publish a report on the political advertising activity of european political parties. this report shall include a factual summary of the reports for the relevant reporting year published by european political parties according to article 5(4) , as well as any decisions of the national regulatory authorities designated under article 5(6) or of the supervisory authorities referred to in article 5(7) finding that a european political party has violated article 5 of this regulation. ### the authority shall annually prepare and publish a report on the political advertising activity of european political parties. this report shall include the reports for the relevant reporting year published by european political parties according to article 5(4) , as well as any decisions of the national regulatory authorities designated under article 5(6) or of the supervisory authorities referred to in article 5(7) finding that a european political party has violated article 5 of this regulation.


### the authority shall annually prepare and publish a report on the political advertising activity of european political parties. this report shall include a factual summary of the reports for the relevant reporting year published by european political parties according to article 5(4) , as well as any decisions of the national regulatory authorities designated under article 5(6) or of the supervisory authorities referred to in article 5(7) finding that a european political party has violated article 5 of this regulation. ### the authority shall annually prepare and publish a report on the political advertising activity of european political parties. this report shall include the reports for the relevant reporting year published by european political parties according to article 5(4) ,


### 23 donations , contributions and own resources ### 23 donations , contributions and other own resources


### 2. european political parties and european political foundations shall , at the time of the submission of their annual financial statements in accordance with article 26 , also transmit a list of all donors with their corresponding donations , indicating both the nature and the value of the individual donations. this paragraph shall also apply to contributions made by member parties of european political parties and member organisations of european political foundations. ### 2. european political parties and european political foundations shall , at the time of the submission of their annual financial statements in accordance with article 26 , also transmit a list of all donors with their corresponding donations , indicating both the nature and the value of the individual donations. this paragraph shall also apply to contributions made by member parties of european political parties and member organisations of european political foundations as well as to association fees and to other own resources.


### 5. for all donations the value of which exceeds eur 3000 , european political parties and european political foundations shall request donors to provide the necessary information for their proper identification. european political parties and european political foundations shall transmit the information received to the authority upon its request. ### 5. for all cumulated donations , i.e. the total of several individually transferred donations from the same donor , the value of which exceeds eur 3000 , european political parties and european political foundations shall request donors to provide the necessary information for their proper identification. european political parties and european political foundations shall transmit the information received to the authority upon its request.


### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member parties that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party. the value of contributions from member parties that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members. ### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state of the european union shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party.


### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member parties that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party. the value of contributions from member parties that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members. ### 9. contributions from members of a european political party shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party. the value of contributions from member parties that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members.


### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member parties that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party. the value of contributions from member parties that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members. ### 9. contributions from members of a european political party shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party.


### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member parties that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party. the value of contributions from member parties that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members. ### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party. the value of contributions from member parties that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members.