### in the case of market data concerning shares , redistribute part of their revenues for the purposes of covering the cost related to mandatory contribution and of ensuring a fair level of participation for regulated markets , and in particular smaller regulated markets , in the revenue generated by the consolidated tape , in accordance with article 27da(4); ### in the case of market data concerning shares , redistribute part of their revenues for the purposes of covering the cost related to mandatory contribution and of ensuring a fair level of participation for regulated markets , and in particular smaller regulated markets and sme growth markets , in the revenue generated by the consolidated tape , in accordance with article 27da(4);


### make consolidated core market data , for the provision of which the ctp is selected in accordance with article 27da , available in accordance with the data quality requirements set out in article 22b to users into a continuous electronic data stream on non-discriminatory terms as close to real time as technically possible; ### make consolidated core market data , for the provision of which the ctp is selected in accordance with article 27da , available in accordance with the data quality requirements set out in article 22b to users into a continuous electronic data stream of post-trade data delayed by 15 minutes and made available to users on non-discriminatory terms;


### make consolidated core market data , for the provision of which the ctp is selected in accordance with article 27da , available in accordance with the data quality requirements set out in article 22b to users into a continuous electronic data stream on non-discriminatory terms as close to real time as technically possible; ### make consolidated core market data , for the provision of which the ctp is selected in accordance with article 27da , available in accordance with the data quality requirements set out in article 22b to users into a continuous electronic data stream of one minute delayed post-trade data provided to users on non-discriminatory terms;


### make consolidated core market data , for the provision of which the ctp is selected in accordance with article 27da , available in accordance with the data quality requirements set out in article 22b to users into a continuous electronic data stream on non-discriminatory terms as close to real time as technically possible; ### make consolidated core market data , for the provision of which the ctp is selected in accordance with article 27da , available in accordance with the data quality requirements set out in article 22b to users into a continuous electronic data stream on non-discriminatory terms with a delay of one minute;


### for the purpose of establishing the participation in point (c) , the revenue of the ctp shall be allocated among regulated markets according to a formula that reflects the proportion of pre-trade transparent liquidity in shares displayed by a regulated market relative to the average daily turnover in these shares in the union. ### esma shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the features of the revenue sharing scheme aimed at remunerating market data providers , such as the maximum amount per user of the ct that would contribute to the revenue sharing mechanism put in place by the ctp , and the modalities of the allocation of revenues. in particular , esma should consider the allocation revenues in the following order:


### 4. after 12 months of full operation of the ctp for shares , esma shall provide the commission with a motivated opinion on the effectiveness and fairness of the level of participation of regulated markets in the revenues generated by the ctp as set out in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 1. the commission may request esma to provide further opinions , where necessary or appropriate. the commission shall be empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with article 50 to revise the allocation key for the revenue redistribution , where appropriate.; ### 4. after 18 months of full operation of the ctp for shares , esma shall provide the commission with a motivated opinion on the effectiveness and fairness of the level of participation of regulated markets , and in particular of smaller regulated markets and sme growth markets , in the revenues generated by the ctp as set out in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 1. the commission may request esma to provide further opinions , where necessary or appropriate. the commission shall be empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with article 50 to revise the allocation key for the revenue redistribution , where appropriate.;


### (18) in article 28(1) , paragraph 1 , the introductory wording is replaced by the following: ### (18) article 28 is modified as follows:


### 1. at the request of the competent authority of a member state , the commission may suspend the derivatives trading obligation with respect to certain investment firms in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 51 and after having consulted esma. the competent authority shall indicate why it considers that the conditions for a suspension are met. in particular , the competent authority shall demonstrate that an investment firm within its jurisdiction: ### 1. at the request of the competent authority of a member state , the commission may suspend the derivatives trading obligation with respect to certain financial counterparties in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 51 and after having consulted esma. the competent authority shall indicate why it considers that the conditions for a suspension are met. in particular , the competent authority shall demonstrate that an investment firm within its jurisdiction:


### 2. when assessing whether to suspend the trading obligation in accordance with paragraph 1 , the commission shall take into account whether such suspension of the trading obligation would have a distortive effect on the clearing obligation laid down in article 4(1) of regulation (eu) no 648/2012. ### 2. when assessing whether to suspend the trading obligation in accordance with paragraph 1 and 1a , the commission shall consider whether to suspend it for specific markets only , and shall take into account whether such suspension of the trading obligation would have a distortive effect on the clearing obligation laid down in article 4(1) of regulation (eu) no 648/2012.


### 3. the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 shall be accompanied by the evidence presented by the competent authority requesting the suspension. ### 3. the implementing act referred to in paragraphs 1 and 1a shall be accompanied by the evidence presented by the competent authority requesting the suspension.


### article 39a ### article 39a


### investment firms acting on behalf of clients shall not receive any fee or commission or non-monetary benefits from any third party for forwarding client orders to such third party for their execution.; ### (1) investment firms acting on behalf of clients shall not receive any fee or commission or non-monetary benefits from any third party for forwarding client orders to such third party for their execution , unless the investment firm complies with all of the following conditions:


### investment firms acting on behalf of clients shall not receive any fee or commission or non-monetary benefits from any third party for forwarding client orders to such third party for their execution.; ### -1. investment firms executing orders on behalf of a retail client shall take all necessary steps to obtain the best possible price for their clients , accounting for all expenses directly related to the execution of the order , such as execution venue fees , clearing and settlement fees and any other fees paid to third parties involved in the execution of the order.


### investment firms acting on behalf of clients shall not receive any fee or commission or non-monetary benefits from any third party for forwarding client orders to such third party for their execution.; ### 1. investment firms executing orders on behalf of a retail client shall take all necessary steps to obtain the best possible price for their clients , net of costs relating to execution , which shall include all expenses directly related to the execution of the order , including execution venue fees , clearing and settlement fees and any other fees paid to third parties involved in the execution of the order.


### investment firms acting on behalf of clients shall not receive any fee or commission or non-monetary benefits from any third party for forwarding client orders to such third party for their execution.; ### 1. investment firms acting on behalf of clients shall not receive any fee or commission or non-monetary benefits from any third party for forwarding client orders to such third party for their execution unless all of the following conditions are met:


### 11. three years after the first authorisation of a consolidated tape , the commission shall , after having consulted esma , submit a report to the european parliament and to the council on the following: ### 11. eighteen months after the first authorisation of a consolidated tape , the commission shall , after having consulted esma , submit a report to the european parliament and to the council on the following:


### 12. if by [op insert date 1 year as of entry into force] , no consolidated tape has emerged through the selection procedure organised by esma as referred to in article 27da , the commission shall review the framework and may accompany that review , where appropriate and after having consulted esma , with a legislative proposal setting out how esma should provide a consolidated tape.; ### 12. if by [op insert date 1 year as of entry into force] , no consolidated tape has emerged through the selection procedure organised by esma as referred to in article 27da , the commission shall review the framework and may accompany that review , where appropriate and after having consulted esma , with a legislative proposal addressing the identified shortcomings.


### proposal for a ### proposal for a


### (4) to date , however , no supervised entity has applied for authorisation to act as a ctp. esma has identified three main obstacles that have prevented supervised entities to apply for registration as a ctp33 . first , a lack of clarity as to how the ctp is to procure market data from the various execution venues or from the data reporting service providers concerned. second , insufficient quality in terms of harmonisation of the data reported by those execution venues to allow for a cost-efficient consolidation. third , a lack of commercial incentives to apply for authorisation as a ctp. it is therefore necessary to remove those obstacles. such removal requires , first , that all trading venues and systematic internalisers (‘sis’) provide ctps with market data (provision rule). it secondly requires an improvement of the data quality by harmonising the data reports that trading venues and sis should submit to the ctp. ### (4) to date , however , no supervised entity has applied for authorisation to act as a ctp. esma has identified three main obstacles that have prevented supervised entities to apply for registration as a ctp33 . first , a lack of clarity as to how the ctp is to procure market data from the various execution venues or from the data reporting service providers concerned. second , insufficient quality in terms of harmonisation of the data reported by those execution venues to allow for a cost-efficient consolidation. third , a lack of commercial incentives to apply for authorisation as a ctp. it is therefore necessary to remove those obstacles. such removal requires , first , that all trading venues and systematic internalisers (‘sis’) provide ctps with market data (provision rule). it secondly requires an improvement of the data quality by harmonising the data reports that trading venues and sis should submit to the ctp. finally , it requires that the data collected by the ctp contain at minimum as close to real time as it is technically possible pre- and post trade information for shares , and as close to real time as it is technically possible post trade information for bonds.


### (6) article 4 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 allows competent authorities to waive the pre-trade transparency requirements for market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue who determine their prices by reference to the midpoint price of the primary market or the most relevant market in terms of liquidity. as there is no justification for excluding the smallest orders from a transparent order book and in order to increase pre-trade transparency and thereby reinforce the price formation process , that waiver should be applicable to orders with a size greater than or equal to twice the standard market size. where the consolidated tape for shares and exchange-traded funds (etfs) will provide bid and offer prices from which a midpoint can be derived , the reference price waiver should also be available for systems deriving the midpoint price from the consolidated tape. ### (6) article 4 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 allows competent authorities to waive the pre-trade transparency requirements for market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue who determine their prices by reference to the midpoint price of the primary market or the most relevant market in terms of liquidity. as there is no justification for excluding the smallest orders from a transparent order book and in order to increase pre-trade transparency and thereby reinforce the price formation process , that waiver should be applicable to orders with a size greater than or equal to twice the standard market size.


### (7) dark trading is trading without pre-trade transparency , using the reference price waiver laid down in article 4(1) , point (a) of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 and the negotiated trade waiver laid down in article 4(a) point (a) , point (i) of that regulation. the use of both waivers is capped by the double volume cap (‘dvc’). the dvc is a mechanism that limits the level of dark trading to a certain proportion of total trading in an equity instrument. the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument on an individual venue may not exceed 4% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached , dark trading in that instrument on that venue is suspended. secondly the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument in the union may not exceed 8% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached all dark trading in that instrument is suspended. the venue specific threshold leaves room for continued use of those waivers on other platforms on which trading in that equity instrument is not yet suspended , until the union wide threshold is breached. this causes complexity in terms of monitoring the levels of dark trading and of enforcing the suspension. to simplify the double volume cap while keeping its effectiveness , the new single volume cap should rely solely on the eu-wide threshold. that threshold should be lowered to 7 % to compensate for a potential increase of trading under those waivers as a consequence of abolishing the venue specific threshold. ### (7) dark trading is trading without pre-trade transparency and includes all trading venues operating under a pre-trade transparency waiver and should also encompass systematic internalisers when trading above the minimum size or frequent batch auctions (fbas). because trades above the large in scale threshold do not participate in the price formation process and shall be protected against market impact , dark trading shall be restricted to trading venues operating using the reference price waiver laid down in article 4(1) , point (a) of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 and the negotiated trade waiver laid down in article 4(a) point (a) , point (i) of that regulation. currently , the use of both waivers is capped by the double volume cap (‘dvc’). the dvc is a mechanism that limits the level of dark trading to a certain proportion of total trading in an equity instrument. the amount of dark trading under both waivers in an equity instrument on an individual venue may not exceed 4% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached , dark trading in that instrument on that venue is suspended. secondly the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument in the union may not exceed 8% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached all dark trading in that instrument is suspended. the dvc faces certain limitations as it only limits dark trading inside the two waivers it covers. the venue specific threshold leaves room for continued use of those waivers on other platforms on which trading in that equity instrument is not yet suspended , until the union wide threshold is breached. this causes complexity in terms of monitoring the levels of dark trading and of enforcing the suspension. to simplify the double volume cap while keeping its effectiveness , the new single volume cap should rely solely on an eu-wide threshold , not be limited to certain waivers , but capture all price-forming transactions below the large-in-scale threshold and subject to the share trading obligation. the volume cap threshold should be determined by esma taking into account the impact of the cap on price formation , liquidity , and end investors’ outcome.


### (7) dark trading is trading without pre-trade transparency , using the reference price waiver laid down in article 4(1) , point (a) of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 and the negotiated trade waiver laid down in article 4(a) point (a) , point (i) of that regulation. the use of both waivers is capped by the double volume cap (‘dvc’). the dvc is a mechanism that limits the level of dark trading to a certain proportion of total trading in an equity instrument. the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument on an individual venue may not exceed 4% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached , dark trading in that instrument on that venue is suspended. secondly the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument in the union may not exceed 8% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached all dark trading in that instrument is suspended. the venue specific threshold leaves room for continued use of those waivers on other platforms on which trading in that equity instrument is not yet suspended , until the union wide threshold is breached. this causes complexity in terms of monitoring the levels of dark trading and of enforcing the suspension. to simplify the double volume cap while keeping its effectiveness , the new single volume cap should rely solely on the eu-wide threshold. that threshold should be lowered to 7 % to compensate for a potential increase of trading under those waivers as a consequence of abolishing the venue specific threshold. ### (7) dark trading is trading without pre-trade transparency , using the reference price waiver laid down in article 4(1) , point (a) of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 and the negotiated trade waiver laid down in article 4(a) point (a) , point (i) of that regulation. the use of both waivers is capped by the double volume cap (‘dvc’). the dvc is a mechanism that limits the level of dark trading to a certain proportion of total trading in an equity instrument. the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument on an individual venue may not exceed 4% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached , dark trading in that instrument on that venue is suspended. secondly the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument in the union may not exceed 8% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached all dark trading in that instrument is suspended. the venue specific threshold leaves room for continued use of those waivers on other platforms on which trading in that equity instrument is not yet suspended , until the union wide threshold is breached. this causes complexity in terms of monitoring the levels of dark trading and of enforcing the suspension. in order to reduce complexity and align the union with international practices , the cap mechanism should be suspended for at least five years. esma , which would be empowered to monitor market conditions and , in particular , the price formation process and the liquidity available on lit venues , should review the suspension at the end of the five year period. at the end of the five-year suspension period , esma should in its final report detailing the impact of the suspension on union markets. on the basis of that report the commission should consider whether i) to renew the suspension , ii) revert to a cap at 10% of eu-wide trading threshold , or iii) delete the provisions related to the cap mechanism altogether.


### (7) dark trading is trading without pre-trade transparency , using the reference price waiver laid down in article 4(1) , point (a) of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 and the negotiated trade waiver laid down in article 4(a) point (a) , point (i) of that regulation. the use of both waivers is capped by the double volume cap (‘dvc’). the dvc is a mechanism that limits the level of dark trading to a certain proportion of total trading in an equity instrument. the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument on an individual venue may not exceed 4% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached , dark trading in that instrument on that venue is suspended. secondly the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument in the union may not exceed 8% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached all dark trading in that instrument is suspended. the venue specific threshold leaves room for continued use of those waivers on other platforms on which trading in that equity instrument is not yet suspended , until the union wide threshold is breached. this causes complexity in terms of monitoring the levels of dark trading and of enforcing the suspension. to simplify the double volume cap while keeping its effectiveness , the new single volume cap should rely solely on the eu-wide threshold. that threshold should be lowered to 7 % to compensate for a potential increase of trading under those waivers as a consequence of abolishing the venue specific threshold. ### (7) dark trading is trading without pre-trade transparency , using the reference price waiver laid down in article 4(1) , point (a) of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 and the negotiated trade waiver laid down in article 4(a) point (a) , point (i) of that regulation. the use of both waivers is capped by the double volume cap (‘dvc’). the dvc is a mechanism that limits the level of dark trading to a certain proportion of total trading in an equity instrument. the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument on an individual venue may not exceed 4% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached , dark trading in that instrument on that venue is suspended. secondly the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument in the union may not exceed 8% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached all dark trading in that instrument is suspended. the venue specific threshold leaves room for continued use of those waivers on other platforms on which trading in that equity instrument is not yet suspended , until the union wide threshold is breached. this causes complexity in terms of monitoring the levels of dark trading and of enforcing the suspension. to simplify the double volume cap while keeping its effectiveness , the new single volume cap should rely solely on the eu-wide threshold. that threshold should be lowered to 7 % to compensate for a potential increase of trading under those waivers as a consequence of abolishing the venue specific threshold. in addition , in order to further enhance transparency , the new single volume cap should be expanded to include other non-transparent trades that do not contribute to the price formation process to ensure all forms of dark trading fall within the cap.


### (9) to ensure an adequate level of transparency , the price of a non-equity transaction should be published as close to real time as possible and only be delayed until maximally the end of the trading day. however , in order not to expose liquidity providers in non-equity instruments to undue risk , it should be possible to mask volumes of transactions for a short period of time , which should not be longer than two weeks. the exact calibration of the various buckets corresponding to different time deferrals should be left to esma due to the technical expertise required to specify the calibration as well as due to the need to allow for the flexibility to amend the calibration. those deferrals should be based on the liquidity of the non-equity instrument , the size of the transaction and , for bonds , the credit rating and it should no longer include the size specific to the instrument concerned. ### (9) to ensure an adequate level of transparency , the price of a non-equity transaction should be published as close to real time as possible. however , in order not to expose liquidity providers in non-equity instruments to undue risk , it should be possible to mask the price and volume of very large or illiquid transactions for a longer period of time , which should not exceed four weeks. the exact calibration of the various buckets corresponding to different time deferrals should be left to esma due to the technical expertise required to specify the calibration as well as due to the need to allow for the flexibility to amend the calibration. those deferrals should be based on the liquidity of the non-equity instrument (using the issuance size as a proxy) , the size of the transaction (trade size) , the credit rating of the non-equity instrument , and should no longer include the size specific to the instrument concerned nor the large in scale size. in order to simplify the pre-trade transparency regime for bonds and derivatives , the size specific to the instrument should be removed , and the large in scale size should be lowered so that only one threshold remains at an adequate level.


### (10) article 13 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 requires market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue to make the pre-trade and post-trade information on transactions in financial instruments available to the public on a reasonable commercial basis (‘rcb’) , and to ensure non-discriminatory access to that information. that article has , however , not delivered on its objectives. the information provided by trading venues , apas and systematic internalisers on a reasonable commercial basis does not enable users to understand market data policies and how the price for market data is set. esma issued guidelines explaining how the concept of rcb should be applied. these guidelines should be converted to legal obligations. due to the high level of detail required to specify rcb and the required flexibility in amending the applicable rules based on the fast changing data landscape , esma should be empowered to develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying how rcb should be applied , thereby further strengthening the harmonised and consistent application of article 13 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014. ### deleted


### (10) article 13 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 requires market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue to make the pre-trade and post-trade information on transactions in financial instruments available to the public on a reasonable commercial basis (‘rcb’) , and to ensure non-discriminatory access to that information. that article has , however , not delivered on its objectives. the information provided by trading venues , apas and systematic internalisers on a reasonable commercial basis does not enable users to understand market data policies and how the price for market data is set. esma issued guidelines explaining how the concept of rcb should be applied. these guidelines should be converted to legal obligations. due to the high level of detail required to specify rcb and the required flexibility in amending the applicable rules based on the fast changing data landscape , esma should be empowered to develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying how rcb should be applied , thereby further strengthening the harmonised and consistent application of article 13 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014. ### (10) article 13 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 requires market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue to make the pre-trade and post-trade information on transactions in financial instruments available to the public on a reasonable commercial basis (‘rcb’) , and to ensure non-discriminatory access to that information. that article has , however , not delivered on its objectives. the information provided by trading venues , apas and systematic internalisers on a reasonable commercial basis does not enable users to understand market data policies and how the price for market data is set. esma issued guidelines explaining how the concept of rcb should be applied. these guidelines should be converted to legal obligations. due to the high level of detail required to specify rcb and the required flexibility in amending the applicable rules based on the fast changing data landscape , esma should be empowered to develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying how rcb should be applied , thereby further strengthening the harmonised and consistent application of article 13 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014. furthermore , the provision to provide market data on the basis of costs of producing and disseminating the market data is moved to the level 1 text. such a move would allow to further specify the general principle via level 2 measures bearing in mind that the market data is a by-product of the trading activity. additionally , there is added a requirement in the level 1 text for trading venues , apas , sis and ctps to share information on the actual costs for producing and disseminating market data as well as on the margins included with cas and esma combined with an empowerment of esma to develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the content , format and terminology of suchinformation.article13 shall be amended to remove references to pricing based on the value generated by the data user. art. 86 (2) of delegated regulation 2017/565 and art 8 (2) of delegated regulation 2017/567. these articles run counter to the objectives of article 13 , as they allow venues to charge for market data proportionate to the value the market data represents to users , thereby pushing up prices regularly and increasing the number of complicated licensing structures which add additional costs to the investor.


### (11) in order to reinforce the price formation process and to maintain a level playing field between trading venues and systematic internalisers , article 14 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers to make public all quotes in equity instruments placed by that systematic internaliser below the standard market size. systematic internalisers are free to decide which sizes they quote , as long as they quote at a minimum size of 10% of the standard market size. that possibility , however , has led to very low levels of pre-trade transparency provided by systematic internalisers in equity instruments , and has hampered the achievement of a level playing field. it is therefore necessary to require systematic internalisers to publish firm quotes relating to a minimum of twice the standard market size. ### (11) in order to reinforce the price formation process and to maintain a level playing field between trading venues and systematic internalisers , article 14 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers to make public all quotes in equity instruments placed by that systematic internaliser below the standard market size. systematic internalisers are free to decide which sizes they quote , as long as they quote at a minimum size of 10% of the standard market size. that possibility , however , leads to significant volumes of transactions being traded in the dark , not contributing to the price formation process on the multilateral venues , i.e. the multilateral trading facilities and the regulated markets. this includes also retail investor volumes , since systematic internalisers are allowed to transact any sizes of orders. retail investors are key to capital markets financing especially for smes. systematic internalisers and dark pools play a role in order to avoid market impact , and this is relevant only for larger transactions. it is therefore necessary to require systematic internalisers to only match orders which are larger in size.


### (11) in order to reinforce the price formation process and to maintain a level playing field between trading venues and systematic internalisers , article 14 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers to make public all quotes in equity instruments placed by that systematic internaliser below the standard market size. systematic internalisers are free to decide which sizes they quote , as long as they quote at a minimum size of 10% of the standard market size. that possibility , however , has led to very low levels of pre-trade transparency provided by systematic internalisers in equity instruments , and has hampered the achievement of a level playing field. it is therefore necessary to require systematic internalisers to publish firm quotes relating to a minimum of twice the standard market size. ### (11) in order to reinforce the price formation process and to maintain a level playing field between trading venues and systematic internalisers , article 14 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers to make public all quotes in equity instruments placed by that systematic internaliser below the standard market size. systematic internalisers are free to decide which sizes they quote , as long as they quote at a minimum size of 10% of the standard market size. that possibility , however , has led to very low levels of pre-trade transparency provided by systematic internalisers in equity instruments , and has hampered the achievement of a level playing field. it is therefore necessary to require systematic internalisers to only quote and trade orders that are large in scale compared to the standard market size.


### (12) in order to create a level playing field , in addition to the obligation to publish firm quotes relating to a minimum of twice the standard market size , systematic internalisers should also no longer be allowed to match at midpoint below twice the standard market size. it should furthermore be clarified that systematic internalisers should be allowed to match at midpoint in so far as they comply with the tick-size rules in accordance with article 49 of directive 2014/65/eu when they trade above twice the standard market size but below the large in-scale threshold. when systematic internalisers trade above a large in-scale threshold , they should continue to be allowed to match at midpoint without complying with the tick-size regime. ### deleted


### (13) market participants need core market data to be able to make informed investment decisions. pursuant to the current article 27h of regulation (eu) 600/2014 , sourcing core market data about certain financial instruments directly from trading venues and apas requires that consolidated tape providers enter into separate licensing agreements with all those data contributors. that process is burdensome , costly and time consuming. it has been one of the obstacles to consolidated tape providers emerging on a cross market basis. this obstacle should be removed in order to enable consolidated tape providers to obtain the market data and to overcome licencing issues. trading venues and apas , or investment firms and systematic internalisers without intervention of apas (‘market data contributors’) should be required to submit their market data to consolidated tape providers , and to use harmonised templates respecting high–quality data standards to do so. only ctps selected and authorised by esma should be able to collect harmonised market data from the individual data sources in accordance with the mandatory contribution rule. to make the market data useful for investors , market data contributors should be required to provide the ctp with market data as close as technically possible to real time. ### (13) market participants need core market data to be able to make informed investment decisions. pursuant to the current article 27h of regulation (eu) 600/2014 , sourcing core market data about certain financial instruments directly from trading venues and apas requires that consolidated tape providers enter into separate licensing agreements with all those data contributors. that process is burdensome , costly and time consuming. it has been one of the obstacles to consolidated tape providers emerging on a cross market basis. this obstacle should be removed in order to enable consolidated tape providers to obtain the market data and to overcome licencing issues. trading venues and apas , or investment firms and systematic internalisers without intervention of apas (‘market data contributors’) should be required to submit their post-trade market data to consolidated tape providers , and to use harmonised templates respecting high–quality data standards to do so. only ctps selected and authorised by esma should be able to collect harmonised market data from the individual data sources in accordance with the mandatory contribution rule. to make the market data useful for investors , market data contributors should be required to provide the ctp with market data maximum 15 minutes after the conclusion of transactions.


### (13) market participants need core market data to be able to make informed investment decisions. pursuant to the current article 27h of regulation (eu) 600/2014 , sourcing core market data about certain financial instruments directly from trading venues and apas requires that consolidated tape providers enter into separate licensing agreements with all those data contributors. that process is burdensome , costly and time consuming. it has been one of the obstacles to consolidated tape providers emerging on a cross market basis. this obstacle should be removed in order to enable consolidated tape providers to obtain the market data and to overcome licencing issues. trading venues and apas , or investment firms and systematic internalisers without intervention of apas (‘market data contributors’) should be required to submit their market data to consolidated tape providers , and to use harmonised templates respecting high–quality data standards to do so. only ctps selected and authorised by esma should be able to collect harmonised market data from the individual data sources in accordance with the mandatory contribution rule. to make the market data useful for investors , market data contributors should be required to provide the ctp with market data as close as technically possible to real time. ### (13) market participants need core market data to be able to make informed investment decisions. pursuant to the current article 27h of regulation (eu) 600/2014 , sourcing core market data about certain financial instruments directly from trading venues and apas requires that consolidated tape providers enter into separate licensing agreements with all those data contributors. that process is burdensome , costly and time consuming. it has been one of the obstacles to consolidated tape providers emerging on a cross market basis. this obstacle should be removed in order to enable consolidated tape providers to obtain the market data and to overcome licencing issues. trading venues and apas , or investment firms and systematic internalisers without intervention of apas (‘market data contributors’) should be required to submit their market data on executed transactions to consolidated tape providers , and to use harmonised templates respecting high–quality data standards to do so. only ctps selected and authorised by esma should be able to collect harmonised market data from the individual data sources in accordance with the mandatory contribution rule. to make the market data useful for investors , market data contributors should be required to provide the ctp with market data no later than one minute after the transaction is executed.


### (13) market participants need core market data to be able to make informed investment decisions. pursuant to the current article 27h of regulation (eu) 600/2014 , sourcing core market data about certain financial instruments directly from trading venues and apas requires that consolidated tape providers enter into separate licensing agreements with all those data contributors. that process is burdensome , costly and time consuming. it has been one of the obstacles to consolidated tape providers emerging on a cross market basis. this obstacle should be removed in order to enable consolidated tape providers to obtain the market data and to overcome licencing issues. trading venues and apas , or investment firms and systematic internalisers without intervention of apas (‘market data contributors’) should be required to submit their market data to consolidated tape providers , and to use harmonised templates respecting high–quality data standards to do so. only ctps selected and authorised by esma should be able to collect harmonised market data from the individual data sources in accordance with the mandatory contribution rule. to make the market data useful for investors , market data contributors should be required to provide the ctp with market data as close as technically possible to real time. ### (13) market participants benefit from core market data when making informed investment decisions. pursuant to the current article 27h of regulation (eu) 600/2014 , sourcing core market data about certain financial instruments directly from trading venues and apas requires that consolidated tape providers enter into separate licensing agreements with all those data contributors. that process is burdensome , costly and time consuming. it has been one of the obstacles to consolidated tape providers emerging on a cross market basis. this obstacle should be removed in order to enable consolidated tape providers to obtain the market data and to overcome licencing issues. trading venues and apas , or investment firms and systematic internalisers without intervention of apas (‘market data contributors’) should be required to submit their market data to consolidated tape providers , and to use harmonised templates respecting high–quality data standards to do so. only ctps selected and authorised by esma should be able to receive harmonised market data from the individual data sources in accordance with the mandatory contribution rule. to make the market data useful for investors , market data contributors should be required to provide the ctp with market data with a delay of one minute.


### (14) title ii and iii of regulation (eu) 600/2014 require trading venues , apas , investment firms and systematic internalisers (‘market data contributors’) to publish pre-trade data on financial instruments , including bid and offer prices and post-trade data on transactions , including the price and volume at which a transaction in a specific instrument has been concluded. market participants are not obliged to use the consolidated core market data provided by the ctp. the requirement to publish those pre-trade and post-trade data should therefore remain applicable to enable market participants to access market data. however , to avoid undue burden on market data contributors , it is appropriate to align the requirement for market data contributors to publish data as much as possible with the requirement to contribute data to the ctp. ### (14) market participants are not obliged to use the consolidated core market data provided by the ctp. the requirement to publish those post-trade data with a delay of one minute should therefore remain applicable to enable market participants to access market data. however , to avoid undue burden on market data contributors , it is appropriate to align the requirement for market data contributors to publish data as much as possible with the requirement to contribute data to the ctp.


### (15) due to the disparate quality of market data , it is difficult for market participants to compare those data , which devoids data consolidation of much added-value. it is of the utmost importance for the proper functioning of the transparency regime set out in title ii and iii of regulation (eu) 600/2014 and for the consolidation of data by consolidated tape providers that market data are of high quality. it is therefore appropriate to require that those market data comply with high quality standards in terms of both substance and format. it should be possible to change the substance and the format of the data within a short time to allow for changing market practices and insights. therefore the requirements for the quality of data should specified by the commission in a delegated act and should take into account the advice of a dedicated consultative group , composed of experts from the industry and from public authorities. ### (15) due to the disparate quality of market data , it is difficult for market participants to compare those data , which devoids data consolidation of much added-value. it is of the utmost importance for the proper functioning of the transparency regime set out in title ii and iii of regulation (eu) 600/2014 and for the consolidation of data by consolidated tape providers that market data are of high quality. it is therefore appropriate to require that those market data comply with high quality standards in terms of both substance and format. it should be possible to change the substance and the format of the data within a short time to allow for changing market practices and insights. therefore the requirements for the quality of data should specified by the commission in a delegated act.


### (15) due to the disparate quality of market data , it is difficult for market participants to compare those data , which devoids data consolidation of much added-value. it is of the utmost importance for the proper functioning of the transparency regime set out in title ii and iii of regulation (eu) 600/2014 and for the consolidation of data by consolidated tape providers that market data are of high quality. it is therefore appropriate to require that those market data comply with high quality standards in terms of both substance and format. it should be possible to change the substance and the format of the data within a short time to allow for changing market practices and insights. therefore the requirements for the quality of data should specified by the commission in a delegated act and should take into account the advice of a dedicated consultative group , composed of experts from the industry and from public authorities. ### (15) due to the disparate quality of market data , it is difficult for market participants to compare those data , which devoids data consolidation of much added-value. it is of the utmost importance for the proper functioning of the transparency regime set out in title ii and iii of regulation (eu) 600/2014 and for the consolidation of data by consolidated tape providers that market data are of high quality. it is therefore appropriate to require that those market data comply with high quality standards in terms of both substance and the consistency of the content of the market data. it should be possible to envisage adaptions to the substance and the consistency of the content of market data to allow for changing market practices and insights. a reasonable implementation period should nevertheless be provided for in consultation with the contributors to the consolidated tape. therefore the requirements for the quality of data should specified by the commission in a delegated act and should take into account the advice of a dedicated consultative group , composed of experts from the industry and from public authorities. experts from all the eu exchanges contributing the most market data will be permanent members of the dedicated consultative group. in the event that consensus between data users and data contributors cannot be reached , the insights this group formulates should be reviewed by independent experts that do not hold a position at a stakeholder firm , nor have a stake in the matter (e.g. without commercial) ties to a stakeholder firm , nor any other potential conflict of interest).


### (17) article 23 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 requires that the majority of trading in shares takes place on trading venues or systematic internalisers (‘share trading obligation’). this requirement does not apply to trades in shares which are non-systematic , ad hoc or irregular and infrequent. it is not clear when this exemption applies. esma therefore clarified this by making a distinction between shares on the basis of their international securities identification number (isin). pursuant to that distinction , only shares with an eea isin are subject to the share trading obligation. that approach provides clarity to market participants trading in shares. it is therefore appropriate to incorporate esma’s current practice in regulation (eu) no 600/2014 , while simultaneously removing the exemption for trades in shares which are non-systematic , ad-hoc or irregular and infrequent. in order to provide market participants with certainty on which instruments fall under the share-trading obligation , esma should be empowered to publish and maintain a list containing all the shares subject to that obligation. ### (17) article 23 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 requires that the majority of trading in shares takes place on trading venues or systematic internalisers (‘share trading obligation’). this requirement does not apply to trades in shares which are non-systematic , ad hoc or irregular and infrequent. it is not clear when this exemption applies. esma therefore clarified this by making a distinction between shares on the basis of their international securities identification number (isin). pursuant to that distinction , only shares with an eea isin are subject to the share trading obligation. that approach provides clarity to market participants trading in shares. it is therefore appropriate to incorporate esma’s current practice in regulation (eu) no 600/2014 , while simultaneously removing the exemption for trades in shares which are non-systematic , ad-hoc or irregular and infrequent.


### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. taking into account the novelty of the proposed scheme , esma should only mandate the provision of post-trade transparency data for the first selection procedure that it runs in relation to shares. at least 18 months before the launch of the second selection procedure , esma should submit a report to the commission assessing whether there is market demand for extending the data contributed to the tape to pre-trade data. on the basis of such a report , the commission should be empowered , by way of a delegated act , to further specify the depth of pre-trade data to the tape. ### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. taking into account the novelty of the proposed scheme , esma should pursue a careful and sequenced approach starting with those asset classes that would benefit most form an increase in market transparency. therefore , the sequence should be: fixed income , derivatives and equities.


### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. taking into account the novelty of the proposed scheme , esma should only mandate the provision of post-trade transparency data for the first selection procedure that it runs in relation to shares. at least 18 months before the launch of the second selection procedure , esma should submit a report to the commission assessing whether there is market demand for extending the data contributed to the tape to pre-trade data. on the basis of such a report , the commission should be empowered , by way of a delegated act , to further specify the depth of pre-trade data to the tape. ### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. taking into account the novelty of the proposed scheme , esma should only mandate the provision of post-trade transparency data with a 1 minute delay period for the first selection procedure that it runs in relation to shares. at least 18 months before the launch of the second selection procedure , esma should submit a report to the commission assessing whether there is market demand for the provision of the post-trade consolidated tape in real-time or in a close to real-time period , taking into account a reliable evaluation of the provisions of this regulation. the commission shall also conduct a detailed impact assessment of the consequences of the consolidated tape on exchange's revenues. the application of a potential real-time post-trade tape may be evaluated if esma is able to demonstrate , through an exhaustive impact assessment , that a consolidated tape containing real-time post-trade data will not have significant impact on the exchange's revenues. on the basis of such a report , the commission should be empowered , by way of a delegated act , to further specify the timeline for the provision of a real-time or close to real-time post-trade data to the consolidated tape where appropriate.


### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. taking into account the novelty of the proposed scheme , esma should only mandate the provision of post-trade transparency data for the first selection procedure that it runs in relation to shares. at least 18 months before the launch of the second selection procedure , esma should submit a report to the commission assessing whether there is market demand for extending the data contributed to the tape to pre-trade data. on the basis of such a report , the commission should be empowered , by way of a delegated act , to further specify the depth of pre-trade data to the tape. ### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. esma should mandate the inclusion of pre-trade data related to the best bid and offer as well as post-trade transparency data for the selection procedure that it runs in relation to shares. esma should require the ctp for shares to be capable of consolidating and displaying pre-trade data related to the first five layers of order books.


### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. taking into account the novelty of the proposed scheme , esma should only mandate the provision of post-trade transparency data for the first selection procedure that it runs in relation to shares. at least 18 months before the launch of the second selection procedure , esma should submit a report to the commission assessing whether there is market demand for extending the data contributed to the tape to pre-trade data. on the basis of such a report , the commission should be empowered , by way of a delegated act , to further specify the depth of pre-trade data to the tape. ### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. esma should prioritise the selection and authorisation of a consolidated tape provider for equities and etfs , followed by bonds and finally by derivatives. the selection processes for each ctp should be staggered at regular intervals , with each selection process starting no later than six months after the initiation of the preceding one. each successive selection process shall start within 6 months regardless of any delays experienced by the preceding process. for shares/etfs only , the ctp should comprise pre-trade data related to the best bid and offer. esma should also require the ctp for shares to be capable or at least to have the technical capabilities to consolidate and display pre trade data related to the first five layers of order books.


### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. taking into account the novelty of the proposed scheme , esma should only mandate the provision of post-trade transparency data for the first selection procedure that it runs in relation to shares. at least 18 months before the launch of the second selection procedure , esma should submit a report to the commission assessing whether there is market demand for extending the data contributed to the tape to pre-trade data. on the basis of such a report , the commission should be empowered , by way of a delegated act , to further specify the depth of pre-trade data to the tape. ### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise , for each of the asset class for which a tape will be established , a competitive selection procedure awarding to a single entity the operation of a consolidated tape for a given asset class. taking into account the novelty of the proposed scheme , esma should only mandate the provision of post-trade transparency data for the first selection procedure that it runs in relation to shares. at least 18 months before the launch of the second selection procedure , esma should submit a report to the commission on possible improvements to the one minute delayed tape. on the basis of such a report , the commission should be empowered , by way of a delegated act , to further specify measures for improving the post trade data tape , including on the delay of market data contributed to the consolidated tape provider.


### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. taking into account the novelty of the proposed scheme , esma should only mandate the provision of post-trade transparency data for the first selection procedure that it runs in relation to shares. at least 18 months before the launch of the second selection procedure , esma should submit a report to the commission assessing whether there is market demand for extending the data contributed to the tape to pre-trade data. on the basis of such a report , the commission should be empowered , by way of a delegated act , to further specify the depth of pre-trade data to the tape. ### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. taking into account the novelty of the proposed scheme , esma should only mandate the provision of post-trade transparency data for the first selection procedure that it runs in relation to shares. at least 18 months before the launch of the second selection procedure , esma should submit a report to the commission on possible modifications to the 15 minutes delayed tape. based on esma’s report , the commission should be empowered , by way of a delegated act , to further specify measures for improving the post trade data tape.


### (21) according to data presented in the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for this regulation , the expected revenue generation for the consolidated tape will vary depending on the precise features of the tape. the expected revenue of the ctp should significantly exceed the cost of its production and therefore help to build a solid revenue participation scheme whereby the ctp and the market data contributors share aligned commercial interests. this principle should not prevent ctps from making a necessary margin to maintain a viable business model and from using the core market data to offer further analytics or other services aimed to increase the revenue pool. ### (21) according to data presented in the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for this regulation , the expected revenue generation for the consolidated tape will vary depending on the precise features of the tape. the expected revenue of the ctp should exceed the cost of its production and therefore help to build a solid revenue participation scheme whereby the ctp and the market data contributors share aligned commercial interests. this principle should not prevent ctps from making a necessary margin to maintain a viable business model.


### (21) according to data presented in the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for this regulation , the expected revenue generation for the consolidated tape will vary depending on the precise features of the tape. the expected revenue of the ctp should significantly exceed the cost of its production and therefore help to build a solid revenue participation scheme whereby the ctp and the market data contributors share aligned commercial interests. this principle should not prevent ctps from making a necessary margin to maintain a viable business model and from using the core market data to offer further analytics or other services aimed to increase the revenue pool. ### (21) according to data presented in the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for this regulation , the expected revenue generation for the consolidated tape will vary depending on the precise features of the tape. the expected revenue of the ctp should significantly exceed the cost of its production and therefore help to build a solid revenue participation scheme whereby the ctp and the market data contributors share aligned commercial interests. this principle should not prevent ctps from making a necessary margin to maintain a viable business model. the market data contributors should at least receive a remuneration based on the costs it has incurred in generating and providing the data to the ct.


### (21) according to data presented in the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for this regulation , the expected revenue generation for the consolidated tape will vary depending on the precise features of the tape. the expected revenue of the ctp should significantly exceed the cost of its production and therefore help to build a solid revenue participation scheme whereby the ctp and the market data contributors share aligned commercial interests. this principle should not prevent ctps from making a necessary margin to maintain a viable business model and from using the core market data to offer further analytics or other services aimed to increase the revenue pool. ### (21) according to data presented in the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for this regulation , the expected revenue generation for the consolidated tape will vary depending on the precise features of the tape. the expected revenue of the ctp should significantly exceed the cost of its production and therefore help to build a solid revenue participation scheme whereby the ctp and the market data contributors share aligned commercial interests. this principle should not prevent ctps from making a necessary margin to maintain a viable business model and from using the core market data to offer further analytics or other services aimed to increase the revenue pool. the market data contributor should only receive a remuneration based on the costs it has incurred in generating the data and providing it to the ctp. smaller regulated markets , independent and not part of any bigger exchange group , should benefit from a more important remuneration in order to incentivize their contribution to the ctp. retail investors should have access to the consolidated tape , either free of charge or for a nominal annual fee , and the tape provider should ensure that the information provided to retail investors is easily accessible and displayed in a user-friendly and understandable format.


### (22) there is an objective difference between a venue of primary admission and other trading venues that serve as secondary trading markets. a venue of primary admission admits companies to the public markets , playing a crucial role in the life of a share and for the share’s liquidity. this is particularly true in the case of shares listed on smaller regulated markets which remain typically traded mostly on the venue of primary admission. when the pre-trade transparent trading of a certain share takes place exclusively or predominantly on the venue of primary admission , such smaller venue plays a more important role in the price formation for that share. the core market data a smaller regulated market contributes to the consolidated tape therefore plays a more determining role in the price formation for the shares this venue admits to trading. a preferential treatment in the revenue participation scheme is therefore considered appropriate to allow these smaller exchanges to maintain their local admissions and safeguard a rich and vibrant ecosystem in line with the objectives of the capital markets union. ### (22) there is an objective difference between a venue of primary admission and other trading venues that serve as secondary trading markets. a venue of primary admission brings companies to the public markets , playing a crucial role in getting shares listed , the longer-term life of a share , and for the share’s liquidity. this is particularly true in the case of shares listed on smaller regulated markets which capitalise companies grounded in local economies and local supply chains and which remain typically traded mostly on the venue of primary admission. in smaller regulated markets , and associated sme growth markets , the level of concentration of trading in shares , for which they are also the venue of primary admission , means that their relative contribution to the fragmentation of trading in the union is less significant compared to that of larger regulated markets. the average daily trading volume of shares in the smaller regulated markets is relatively low , often accounting for less than 1 % of the average daily trading volume of the union as a whole. finally , smaller regulated markets , and associated sme growth markets , that are not owned by larger groups of exchange operators are , on average , less diversified and more dependent on data revenues , and the inclusion of their pretrade data on the consolidated tape for shares could deprive them of their most important source of income. therefore , as an interim measure , given the lower levels of fragmentation of smaller markets , their relative share of the overall trading landscape and legitimate concerns about the viability of their business , an exclusion from the mandatory inclusion of their real time pre-trade data in the consolidated tape output should be considered appropriate to allow smaller regulated markets that are not owned by larger groups of exchange operators to maintain their local admissions and so as to safeguard a rich and vibrant ecosystem , integrated into the wider eu market , and in line with the objectives of the capital markets union. from a procedural perspective , the first exclusion criterion should be market share; if the market share at any future point exceeds the threshold set out in this regulation , fragmentation criteria should apply as alternative exemption criteria. notwithstanding the mandatory inclusion exemption as regards real time pretrade , smaller regulated markets that wish to be included in the consolidated view provided by the ct should be able to opt in into the mandatory inclusion scheme by notifying esma and the ctp of their intent. nevertheless , the development of a consolidated tape should aim to achieve fully inclusive and mandatory participation and eventually no requirement for any exemptions in order to achieve the full benefits of an integrated capital markets union.


### (22) there is an objective difference between a venue of primary admission and other trading venues that serve as secondary trading markets. a venue of primary admission admits companies to the public markets , playing a crucial role in the life of a share and for the share’s liquidity. this is particularly true in the case of shares listed on smaller regulated markets which remain typically traded mostly on the venue of primary admission. when the pre-trade transparent trading of a certain share takes place exclusively or predominantly on the venue of primary admission , such smaller venue plays a more important role in the price formation for that share. the core market data a smaller regulated market contributes to the consolidated tape therefore plays a more determining role in the price formation for the shares this venue admits to trading. a preferential treatment in the revenue participation scheme is therefore considered appropriate to allow these smaller exchanges to maintain their local admissions and safeguard a rich and vibrant ecosystem in line with the objectives of the capital markets union. ### (22) there is an objective difference between a venue of primary admission and other trading venues that serve as secondary trading markets. a venue of primary admission admits companies to the public markets , playing a crucial role in the life of a share and for the share’s liquidity. this is particularly true in the case of shares listed on smaller regulated markets which remain typically traded mostly on the venue of primary admission and in the case of sme growth markets , which are often the center of liquidity for the securities they offer for trading. when the pre-trade transparent trading of a certain share takes place exclusively or predominantly on the venue of primary admission , such smaller venue plays a more important role in the price formation for that share. the core market data a smaller regulated market or sme growth market contributes to the consolidated tape therefore plays a more determining role in the price formation for the shares this venue admits to trading. a preferential treatment in the revenue participation scheme is therefore considered appropriate to allow these smaller exchanges and sme growth markets to maintain their local admissions and safeguard a rich and vibrant ecosystem in line with the objectives of the capital markets union.


### (23) small regulated markets are regulated markets which admit shares of issuers for which trading in the secondary market tends to be less liquid than the trading of shares admitted to trading on larger regulated markets. in order to avoid that lower trading volumes (or nominal values) penalise smaller exchanges in the revenue participation scheme designed for the consolidated tape for shares , data from trades in these less liquid shares should attract a higher remuneration than their notional trading value would indicate. whether a share is less liquid should be determined on the basis of the proportion of pre-trade transparent liquidity displayed by the regulated market that admits the less liquid share , relative to the average daily trading turnover in that share. ### (23) small regulated markets and sme growth markets are regulated markets which admit shares of issuers for which trading in the secondary market tends to be less liquid than the trading of shares admitted to trading on larger regulated markets. in order to avoid that lower trading volumes (or nominal values) penalise smaller exchanges and sme growth markets in the revenue participation scheme designed for the consolidated tape for shares , data from trades in these less liquid shares should attract a higher remuneration than their notional trading value would indicate.


### (24) given the novelty of the consolidated tape in the context of the eu financial markets , esma should be entrusted with providing the european commission with an assessment of the revenue participation scheme designed for regulated markets in the context of the consolidated tape for shares. this report should be prepared on the basis of at least 12 months of operation of the ctp and subsequently at the request of the commission , where deemed necessary or appropriate. the assessment should focus in particular on whether the participation of small regulated markets in the revenue of the ctp is fair and effective in safeguarding the role that these markets play in their local financial ecosystem. the commission should be empowered to revise the mechanism of allocation by way of a delegated act , where necessary or appropriate. ### (24) given the novelty of the consolidated tape in the context of the eu financial markets , esma should be entrusted with providing the european commission with an assessment of the revenue participation scheme designed for regulated markets in the context of mandatory participation in the consolidated tape for shares. this report should be prepared on the basis of at least 12 months of operation of the ctp and subsequently at the request of the commission , where deemed necessary or appropriate. the assessment should focus in particular on whether the participation of small regulated markets in the revenue of the ctp is fair and effective in safeguarding the role that these markets play in their local financial ecosystem. the commission should be empowered to revise the mechanism of allocation by way of a delegated act , where necessary or appropriate.


### (24) given the novelty of the consolidated tape in the context of the eu financial markets , esma should be entrusted with providing the european commission with an assessment of the revenue participation scheme designed for regulated markets in the context of the consolidated tape for shares. this report should be prepared on the basis of at least 12 months of operation of the ctp and subsequently at the request of the commission , where deemed necessary or appropriate. the assessment should focus in particular on whether the participation of small regulated markets in the revenue of the ctp is fair and effective in safeguarding the role that these markets play in their local financial ecosystem. the commission should be empowered to revise the mechanism of allocation by way of a delegated act , where necessary or appropriate. ### (24) given the novelty of the consolidated tape in the context of the eu financial markets , esma should be entrusted with providing the european commission with an assessment of the revenue participation scheme designed for regulated markets in the context of the consolidated tape for shares. this report should be prepared on the basis of at least 12 months of operation of the ctp and subsequently at the request of the commission , where deemed necessary or appropriate. the assessment should focus in particular on whether the participation of small regulated markets and sme growth markets in the revenue of the ctp is fair and effective in safeguarding the role that these markets play in their local financial ecosystem. the commission should be empowered to revise the mechanism of allocation by way of a delegated act , where necessary or appropriate.


### (32) financial intermediaries should strive to achieve the best possible price and the highest possible likelihood of execution for trades that they execute on behalf of their clients. to that end , financial intermediaries should select the trading venue or counterparty for executing their client trades solely on the basis of achieving best execution for their clients. it should be incompatible with that principle of best execution that a financial intermediary receives a payment from a trading counterpart in exchange for ensuring the execution of client trades. investment firms should be therefore be prohibited from receiving such payment. ### (32) financial intermediaries should strive to achieve the best possible quality of execution for trades that they execute on behalf of their clients. to that end , financial intermediaries should select the trading venue or counterparty for executing their client trades solely on the basis of achieving best execution for their clients. financial intermediaries receiving a payment from a trading counterpart in exchange for ensuring the execution of client trades should therefore adhere to strict governance and transparency rules.


### (32) financial intermediaries should strive to achieve the best possible price and the highest possible likelihood of execution for trades that they execute on behalf of their clients. to that end , financial intermediaries should select the trading venue or counterparty for executing their client trades solely on the basis of achieving best execution for their clients. it should be incompatible with that principle of best execution that a financial intermediary receives a payment from a trading counterpart in exchange for ensuring the execution of client trades. investment firms should be therefore be prohibited from receiving such payment. ### (32) financial intermediaries should strive to achieve the best possible price and the highest possible likelihood of execution for trades that they execute on behalf of their clients. to that end , financial intermediaries should select the trading venue or counterparty for executing their client trades solely on the basis of achieving best execution for their clients. it should be incompatible with that principle of best execution that a financial intermediary receives a payment from a trading counterpart in exchange for ensuring the execution of client trades. investment firms should be therefore be prohibited from receiving such payment. that prohibition should apply to instruments where the price formation process is order driven and should concern any type of intermediary.


### (33) the commission should adopt the draft regulatory technical standards developed by esma regarding the precise characteristics of the deferral regime for non-equity transactions , regarding the provision of information on a reasonable commercial basis , regarding the application of the synchronised business clocks by trading venues , systematic internalisers , apas and ctps and regarding characteristics of the public reporting obligation of the ctp. the commission should adopt those draft regulatory technical standards by means of delegated acts pursuant to article 290 tfeu and in accordance with articles 10 to 14 of regulation (eu) no 1093/2010. ### (33) the commission should adopt the draft regulatory technical standards developed by esma regarding the precise characteristics of the deferral regime for non-equity transactions , regarding , regarding the application of the synchronised business clocks by trading venues , systematic internalisers , apas and ctps and regarding characteristics of the public reporting obligation of the ctp. the commission should adopt those draft regulatory technical standards by means of delegated acts pursuant to article 290 tfeu and in accordance with articles 10 to 14 of regulation (eu) no 1093/2010.


### the best bids and offers with corresponding volumes; ### deleted


### the best bids and offers with corresponding volumes; ### for lit continuous trading mechanisms , the five best bid and offers prices with corresponding volumes available at those prices;


### the best bids and offers with corresponding volumes; ### at a minimum the five best bids and offers with corresponding volumes and timestamps , limited to pre-trade transparency data for shares. for auction systems , that also means the price at which the auction trading system would best satisfy its trading algorithm and the volume that participants in that system would potentially execute at that price;


### the best bids and offers with corresponding volumes; ### the best bids and offers with corresponding volumes and timestamps , limited to pre-trade transparency data for shares. for auction systems , that also means the price at which the trading algorithm would be best satisfied and the volume potentially executed at that price by participants in that system;


### (ii) the transaction price and volume executed at the stated price; ### (ii) for all-price forming trades across all trading mechanisms , the transaction price and volume executed at the stated price , the transaction time , the trading protocol , applicable waivers and deferrals in accordance with the industry standard market model typology;


### (ii) the transaction price and volume executed at the stated price; ### (ii) the transaction price and volume executed at the stated price , including trades concluded during intraday and end of day auctions;


### (iii) the intra-day auction information; ### deleted


### (iii) the intra-day auction information; ### (iii) the intra-day auction information; for scheduled and unscheduled auctions (the open , close , and intraday) , the indicative price and indicative volume during the auction call period ;


### (iv) the end-of-day auction information; ### deleted


### (iv) the end-of-day auction information; ### (iv) the end-of-day auction information; for all venues and trading protocols operated , all changes to the trading status of the instrument - i.e. closed , suspended , regulatory halt , open in continuous , in auction;


### the market identifier code identifying the execution venue; ### on all messages , the market identifier code identifying the execution venue segment;


### (vi) the standardised instrument identifier that applies across venues; ### (vi) on all messages , the standardised instrument identifier that applies across venues;


### (vii) the timestamp information on all of the following: ### (vii) on all messages , the timestamp information , including pre-trade transparency data , on all of the following:


### — the time of execution of the trade; ### - the venue’s time of execution of the trade , or of amendment to the best bid or offer price or volume , amendment to the indicative price or volume , and amendment to the trading status of an instrument.


### — the time of publication of the trade; ### - the venue’s time of publication of the trade , updated bid or offer price or volume , updated indicative price or volume , amendment to the trading status of an instrument;


### — the receipt of market data from the market data contributors; ### - any change to the trading status of an instrument or segment


### — the receipt of market data by the consolidated tape provider; ### deleted


### — the dissemination of consolidated market data to subscribers; ### deleted


### (viii) the trading protocols and the applicable waivers or deferrals; ### (viii) the trading protocols and the applicable waivers or deferrals;


### all of the following data on non-equities: ### deleted


### all of the following data on non-equities: ### all of the following data on bonds and otc derivatives subject to the clearing obligation:


### (36c) ‘regulatory data’ means data related to the status of systems matching orders in financial instruments , including information about circuit breakers , trading halts , and opening and closing prices of those financial instruments; ### deleted


### 1. trading venues shall suspend their use of the waivers referred to in article 4(1) , point (a) , and 4(1) , point (b)(i) where the percentage of volume traded in the union in a financial instrument carried out under those waivers exceeds 7% of the total volume traded in that financial instrument in the union. trading venues shall base their decision to suspend the use of those waivers on the data published by esma in accordance with paragraph 4 , and shall take such decision within two working days after this publication of those data and for a period of six months.; ### 1. trading venues shall suspend their use of the waivers referred to in article 4(1) , point (a) , and 4(1) , point (b)(i) and any price pegged to , imported , or derived from the current bid and offer prices displayed on lit markets , where the percentage of volume traded in the union in a financial instrument carried out using these mechanisms exceeds 7% of the total volume traded in that financial instrument in the union. trading venues shall activate this suspension based on the data published by esma in accordance with paragraph 4 , and shall take such decision within two working days after this publication of those data and for a period of six months.;


### 1. trading venues shall suspend their use of the waivers referred to in article 4(1) , point (a) , and 4(1) , point (b)(i) where the percentage of volume traded in the union in a financial instrument carried out under those waivers exceeds 7% of the total volume traded in that financial instrument in the union. trading venues shall base their decision to suspend the use of those waivers on the data published by esma in accordance with paragraph 4 , and shall take such decision within two working days after this publication of those data and for a period of six months.; ### 1. trading venues and systematic internalisers shall suspend trading as referred to in paragraph 4(b) where the percentage of this volume traded in the union in a financial instrument exceeds the threshold determined by esma in accordance with paragraph 9. trading venues and systematic internalisers shall base their decision on the data published by esma in accordance with paragraph 4 , and shall take such decision within two working days after this publication of those data and for a period of six months.;


### the percentage of trading in a financial instrument carried out across the union under the waivers referred to in article 4(1) , point (a) , and article 4(1) , point (b)(i); ### the percentage of trading in a financial instrument as referred to in paragraph 1 carried out across the union;


### the percentage of trading in a financial instrument carried out across the union under the waivers referred to in article 4(1) , point (a) , and article 4(1) , point (b)(i); ### the percentage of trading in a financial instrument carried out across the union under the waivers referred to in article 4(1) , point (a) , and article 4(1) , point (b)(i) ) , and without pre-trade transparency for orders subject to the share trading obligation and outside the waivers referred to in article 4(1);


### 7. to ensure a reliable basis for monitoring the trading taking place under the waivers referred to in article 4(1) , point (a) , and article 4(1) , point (b)(i) and for determining whether the limits referred to in paragraph 1 have been exceeded , operators of trading venues shall have in place systems and procedures to enable the identification of all trades which have taken place on their venue under those waivers.; ### 7. to ensure a reliable basis for monitoring trading as referred to in paragraph 4(b) and for determining whether the limits referred to in paragraph 1 have been exceeded , operators of trading venues and systematic internalisers shall have in place systems and procedures to enable the identification of all trades referred to in paragraph 4(b) which have taken place on their execution venue.


### 7. to ensure a reliable basis for monitoring the trading taking place under the waivers referred to in article 4(1) , point (a) , and article 4(1) , point (b)(i) and for determining whether the limits referred to in paragraph 1 have been exceeded , operators of trading venues shall have in place systems and procedures to enable the identification of all trades which have taken place on their venue under those waivers.; ### 7. to ensure a reliable basis for monitoring the trading as referred to in paragraph 1 and for determining whether the limits referred to in paragraph 1 have been exceeded , operators of trading venues shall have in place systems and procedures to enable the identification of all trades which have taken place on their venue under those waivers and using such reference prices as referred to in paragraph 1.;


### (6) article 11 is amended as follows: ### deleted


### based on the deferral regime as set out in paragraph 4 , competent authorities shall authorise market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue to defer the publication of the price of transactions until the end of the trading day , or the volume of transactions for a maximum of two weeks.; ### based on the deferral regime as set out in paragraph 4 , competent authorities shall authorise market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue to defer the publication of the price of transactions until the end of the trading day , or the volume of transactions for a maximum of one week.;


### the liquidity determination; ### the liquidity determination in relation to trades that are above retail size;


### the size of the transaction , in particular transactions in illiquid markets or transactions that are large in scale; ### the size of the transaction;


### for bonds , the classification of the bond as investment grade or high yield.; ### deleted


### (7) in article 13 , the following paragraph 3 is added: ### deleted


### 3. esma shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the content , format and terminology of the reasonable commercial basis information that trading venues , apas , ctps and systematic internalisers have to make available to the public. ### 3. esma shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to


### 3. esma shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the content , format and terminology of the reasonable commercial basis information that trading venues , apas , ctps and systematic internalisers have to make available to the public. ### 3. esma shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to:


### paragraphs 2 and 3 are replaced by the following: ### deleted


### 2. this article and articles 15 , 16 and 17 shall apply to systematic internalisers when they deal in sizes up to twice the standard market size. systematic internalisers shall not be subject to this article and articles 15 , 16 and 17 when they deal in sizes above twice the standard market size. ### deleted


### 3. systematic internalisers are allowed to quote any size. the minimum quoting size shall be at least the equivalent of twice the standard market size of a share , depositary receipt , etf , certificate , or other financial instrument that is similar to those financial instruments and that is traded on a trading venue. for a particular share , depository receipt , etf , certificate or other financial instrument that is similar to those financial instruments and that is traded on a trading venue , each quote shall include a firm bid and offer price , or firm bid and offer prices for a size or sizes which could be up to twice the standard market size for the class of shares , depositary receipts , etfs , certificates or financial instruments that are similar to those financial instruments , to which the financial instrument belongs. the price or prices shall reflect the prevailing market conditions for that share , depositary receipt , etf , certificate or financial instrument that is similar to those financial instruments.; ### 3. systematic internalisers shall be prohibited from quoting and matching orders that are smaller than large in scale. for a particular share , depository receipt , etf , certificate or other financial instrument that is similar to those financial instruments and that is traded on a trading venue , each quote shall include a firm bid and offer prices for a size or sizes which could be minimum large in scale. the price or prices shall reflect the prevailing market conditions for that share , depositary receipt , etf , certificate or financial instrument that is similar to those financial instruments.;


### the following paragraph 6a is inserted: ### deleted


### 2. the application of the tick sizes set in accordance with article 49 of directive 2014/65/eu shall not prevent systematic internalisers from matching orders large in scale at mid-point within the current bid and offer prices. matching orders at mid-point within the current bid and offer prices below large in scale but above twice the standard market size shall be allowed in so far as those tick sizes are complied with.; ### 2. the application of the tick sizes set in accordance with article 49 of directive 2014/65/eu shall not prevent systematic internalisers from matching orders large in scale at mid-point within the current bid and offer prices.


### (2) article 12a of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 provides that global systemically important institution (g-sii) groups with a resolution strategy under which more than one group entity might be resolved (multiple point of entry (mpe) resolution strategy) are to calculate their risk-based requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities under the theoretical assumption that only one entity of the group would be resolved , with the losses and recapitalisation needs of any subsidiaries of that group being transferred to the resolution entity (single point of entry (spe) resolution strategy). in line with the tlac standard , that calculation should take into account all third-country entities belonging to a g-sii that would be resolution entities were they established in the union. ### (2) article 12a of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 provides that global systemically important institution (g-sii) groups with a resolution strategy under which more than one group entity might be resolved (multiple point of entry (mpe) resolution strategy) are to calculate their risk-based requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities under the theoretical assumption that only one entity of the group would be resolved , with the losses and recapitalisation needs of any subsidiaries of that group being transferred to the resolution entity (single point of entry (spe) resolution strategy). a similar requirement is provided for in article 45d(4) of directive 2014/59/eu , for the additional requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities that may be imposed by resolution authorities pursuant to paragraph 3 of that article. in line with the tlac standard , those calculations should take into account all third-country entities belonging to a g-sii that would be resolution entities were they established in the union.