### 3. the commission shall publish the report on its website. ### 3. the commission shall publish the report on its website. the report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal where appropriate.


### (4) the uk financial conduct authority (fca) has announced it will stop supporting the production of one of the most important interest rate benchmarks , the london interbank offered rate (libor) by the end of 2021. as of the end of the transition period for the united kingdom’s withdrawal from the union on 31 december 2021 , libor will no longer qualify as a critical benchmark. the cessation of libor may nevertheless result in negative consequences that produce significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the union. in the union there is a stock of contracts in the areas of debt , loans , term deposits and derivatives that reference libor , that mature beyond 31 december 2021 and that do not have robust contractual fall-back provisions to cover for the cessation of libor. many of those contracts cannot be renegotiated to incorporate a contractual fall-back prior to 31 december 2021. the cessation of libor may therefore result in significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the union. ### (4) as of the end of the transition period , the london interbank offered rate (libor) will not qualify as a critical benchmark. the uk financial conduct authority (fca) has announced it will stop encouraging or compelling banks to contribute to libor thereby creating a substantial risk of cessation of one of the most important interest rate benchmarks , by the end of 2021. as of the end of the transition period for the united kingdom’s withdrawal from the union on 31 december 2021 , libor will no longer qualify as a critical benchmark. the cessation of libor may nevertheless result in negative consequences that produce significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the union. in the union there is a stock of contracts in the areas of debt , loans , term deposits and derivatives that reference libor , that mature beyond 31 december 2021 and that do not have robust contractual fall-back provisions to cover for the cessation of libor. many of those contracts cannot be renegotiated to incorporate a contractual fall-back prior to 31 december 2021. the cessation of libor may therefore result in significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the union.


### (5) to be able to provide for an orderly wind down of contracts that reference a widely used benchmark the cessation of which may result in negative consequences that produce significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the union and where such contracts cannot be renegotiated to include a contractual fall-back rate by the time of that benchmark’s cessation , a framework accompanying the cessation of such benchmarks should be laid down. that framework should comprise a mechanism aimed at transitioning such contracts to suitable replacement benchmarks. replacement benchmarks should ensure avoiding contract frustration which may result in negative consequences that produce significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the union. ### (5) to be able to provide for an orderly wind down of contracts that reference a widely used critical benchmark the cessation of which may result in negative consequences that produce significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the union and where such contracts cannot be renegotiated to include a contractual fall-back rate by the time of that benchmark’s cessation , a framework accompanying the cessation of such benchmarks should be laid down. that framework should comprise a mechanism aimed at transitioning such contracts to suitable replacement benchmarks. replacement benchmarks should ensure avoiding contract frustration which may result in negative consequences that produce significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the union.


### (10) in exercising its implementing powers to designate a replacement benchmark , the commission should take into account recommendations by private sector working groups operating under the auspices of the central bank responsible for the currency in which the interest rates of the replacement benchmark are denominated with regard to replacement rates to be used in existing financial instruments and contracts referencing the benchmark in cessation. those recommendations should be based on extensive public consultations and expert knowledge , and reflect benchmark users’ agreement about the most appropriate replacement rate for the interest rate benchmark in cessation. ### (10) in exercising its implementing powers to designate a replacement benchmark , the commission should take into account recommendations by private sector working groups operating under the auspices of the central bank responsible for the currency in which the interest rates of the replacement benchmark are denominated with regard to replacement rates to be used in existing financial instruments and contracts referencing the benchmark in cessation. the commission should also take into account the recommendations of the relevant supervisory authority of the benchmark administrator as well as of esma. those recommendations should be based on extensive public consultations and expert knowledge , and reflect benchmark users’ agreement about the most appropriate replacement rate for the interest rate benchmark in cessation.


### 4. the commission shall adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 49 to create and update as appropriate a list of foreign exchange benchmarks that fulfil the criteria laid down in paragraph 3. competent authorities of supervised entities that use third country foreign exchange benchmarks that are designated by the commission in accordance with paragraph 3 shall report to the commission and to esma on the number of derivative contracts that use that foreign exchange benchmark for hedging against third country currency volatility at least every two years.; ### 4. by 31 december 2022 , the commission shall conduct a public consultation to identify spot foreign exchange benchmarks that fulfil the criteria laid down in paragraph 3 of this article. by 31 december 2023 , the commission shall adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 49 of this regulation to create a list of spot foreign exchange benchmarks that fulfil the criteria laid down in paragraph 3 of this article. the commission shall update that list as appropriate.


### (1) the commission may designate a replacement benchmark for a benchmark that will cease to be published where the cessation of that publication may result in significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the union and provided that any of the following events has occurred: ### (1) the commission may designate one or more replacement benchmarks for a critical benchmark that will cease to be published where the cessation of that publication may result in significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in one or more member states and provided that any of the following events has occurred:


### the competent authority for the administrator of that benchmark has issued a public statement , or has published information , in which it is announced that the capability of that benchmark to measure the underlying market or economic reality cannot be restored through the exercise of any of the remedial powers referred to in article 23; ### the competent authority for the administrator of that benchmark has issued a public statement , or has published information , in which it is announced that the capability of that benchmark to measure the underlying market or economic reality cannot be restored through the exercise of any of the remedial powers referred to in article 23;


### (3) the commission shall adopt implementing acts to designate a replacement benchmark in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 50(2) where one of the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 is fulfilled. when adopting the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 , the commission shall take into account , where available , the recommendation by an alternative reference rate working group operating under the auspices of the central bank responsible for the currency in which the interest rates of the replacement benchmark are denominated. ### (3) the commission shall adopt implementing acts to designate one or more replacement benchmarks in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 50(2) where one of the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 is fulfilled. when adopting the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 , the commission shall take into account , where available , the recommendation by an alternative reference rate working group operating under the auspices of the central bank responsible for the currency in which the interest rates of the replacement benchmark are denominated. before establishing a new replacement benchmark , the commission shall conduct a public consultation and consult esma as well as the national competent authority of the benchmark administrator.


### — having regard to the monetary dialogues with the president of the european central bank , christine lagarde , of 6 february and 8 june 2020 , ### — having regard to the monetary dialogues with the president of the european central bank , christine lagarde , of 6 february , 8 june and 28 september 2020 ,


### b. whereas , according to the eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections of june 2020 , annual inflation for the euro area in the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp) will be 0.3 % in 2020 , 0.8 % in 2021 and 1.3 % in 2022; ### b. whereas , according to the ecb staff macroeconomic projections of september 2020 , annual inflation for the euro area in the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp) is expected to increase from 0.3% in 2020 to 1.0% and 1.3% in 2021 and 2022 , respectively;


### 1. welcomes the role of the ecb in safeguarding euro stability; highlights that the statutory independence of the ecb , as laid down in the treaties , is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability; ### 1. welcomes the role of the ecb in safeguarding euro stability; highlights that the statutory independence of the ecb , as laid down in the treaties , is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate; stresses that according to tfeu the ecb's primary mandate is to maintain price stability , while supporting the general economic policies with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the union; acknowledges the challenges to the transmission of monetary policy and calls on the ecb to further consider unconventional monetary policies that have the potential to stimulate the economy and address the severe economic impact of the pandemic crisis.


### 1. welcomes the role of the ecb in safeguarding euro stability; highlights that the statutory independence of the ecb , as laid down in the treaties , is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability; ### 1. welcomes the role of the ecb in safeguarding euro stability; highlights that the statutory independence of the ecb , as laid down in the treaties , is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability; stresses that this independence must not be infringed on;


### 1. welcomes the role of the ecb in safeguarding euro stability; highlights that the statutory independence of the ecb , as laid down in the treaties , is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability; ### 1. welcomes the role of the ecb in safeguarding euro stability; highlights that the statutory independence of the ecb , as laid down in the treaties , is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability; highlights that central bank independence should always be complemented with a corresponding level of accountability;


### 2. is concerned about the unprecedented healthcare and economic crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic , with a sharp contraction of the euro area economy and rapidly deteriorating labour market conditions; notes that euro area activity is expected to rebound , although the speed and scale of the rebound remains highly uncertain; ### 2. is concerned about the unprecedented healthcare and economic crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic , with a sharp contraction of the euro area economy and rapidly deteriorating labour market conditions; notes that euro area activity is expected to rebound , although the speed and scale of the rebound remains highly uncertain , and uneven across member states;


### 3. is concerned , moreover , that the balance of risks to the growth outlook remains to the downside in a context of exceptional uncertainty where the extent of the contraction and the recovery will depend on the duration and effectiveness of the containment measures , the success of policies to mitigate the adverse impact on incomes and employment , and the extent to which supply capacity and domestic demand are permanently affected; ### 3. is concerned , moreover , that the balance of risks to the growth outlook remains to the downside in a context of exceptional uncertainty where the extent of the contraction and the recovery will depend on the duration and effectiveness of the containment measures , the success of policies to mitigate the adverse impact on incomes and employment , and the extent to which supply capacity , domestic demand and international supply chains are permanently affected;


### 6. acknowledges president lagarde’s strong call for ‘full alignment of fiscal and monetary policies’; ### 6. acknowledges president lagarde’s strong call for ‘full alignment of fiscal and monetary policies’; welcomes the ecb's pandemic emergency purchase programme to support the economic recovery of the eurozone; supports the commission’s plan to issue bonds of up to 750 billion to finance the recovery.


### 7. notes the quick and substantial ecb monetary policy response to the covid-19 crisis in a context of emergency; ### 7. notes the quick and substantial ecb monetary policy response to the covid-19 crisis in a context of emergency; expects that the ecb will withstand its support as long as it is needed , and points to the negative consequences of a premature withdrawal of the measures;


### 7. notes the quick and substantial ecb monetary policy response to the covid-19 crisis in a context of emergency; ### 7. notes the quick and substantial ecb monetary policy response to the covid-19 crisis in a context of emergency; urges the ecb to limit flexibility of its self imposed issuer limit and capital key only to the pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp) , and to not broaden this flexibility to the general ecb’s asset-purchase programmes (app);


### 7. notes the quick and substantial ecb monetary policy response to the covid-19 crisis in a context of emergency; ### 7. welcomes the quick and substantial ecb monetary policy response to the covid-19 crisis in a context of emergency;


### 8. stresses that monetary policy alone will not suffice to achieve a sustainable economic recovery; emphasises that far-reaching structural reforms and initiatives are necessary to restore and enhance competitiveness across the union; believes that the impact of monetary policy on the recovery is limited and , while respecting the independence and mandate of the ecb , expresses caution regarding the further expansion of monetary measures; ### 8. stresses that monetary policy alone will not suffice to achieve a sustainable economic recovery; emphasises that far-reaching structural reforms and initiatives are necessary to restore and enhance competitiveness across the union; believes that the impact of monetary policy on the recovery is limited and , while respecting the independence and mandate of the ecb , expresses caution regarding the further expansion of monetary measures , particularly in light of potential undesired side-effects of an ultra-accommodative monetary policy , such as the impact on savers or the risk of asset price inflation;


### 13. understands that the severity of the crisis has forced the ecb to shift attention away from its monetary policy framework strategy review , which has been postponed to mid-2021; calls on the ecb to involve parliament in the review process; ### 13. understands that the severity of the crisis has forced the ecb to shift attention away from its monetary policy framework strategy review , which has been postponed to mid-2021; calls on the ecb to involve parliament in the review process; welcomes in that regard president lagarde’s commitment during the monetary dialogue held on 28 september 2020 to interact closely in that context and to ensure regular dialogues;


### 15. notes that the purchases of green bonds and their share of the ecb’s portfolio continue to increase; ### 15. notes that the purchases of green bonds and their share of the ecb’s portfolio continue to increase; highlights that the purchase of large amounts of green bonds could lead to market distortions;


### 17. calls on the ecb to continue its efforts to ensure the stability of financial markets for all possible contingencies related to brexit; ### 17. calls on the ecb to continue its efforts to ensure the stability of financial markets for all possible contingencies related to the withdrawal of the united kingdom to the european union;


### 19. calls on the ecb to increase its monitoring of the development of crypto-currencies and the increased cyber-security risks , and to assess the possible need for central bank digital currencies; calls on the ecb to ensure an adequate balance between allowing regulatory financial innovation in the fintech area and ensuring financial stability; ### 19. calls on the ecb to increase its monitoring of the development of crypto-currencies and the increased cyber-security risks , also taking into account the associated risks of money laundering , terrorism financing and other criminal activities related with the anonymity provided by crypto-assets as outlined in the reports of the ecb's crypto-assets task force; welcomes the ecb's analysis and preparatory work towards the introduction of a digital euro; supports in that regard the ecb's recommendation that the issuance of a digital euro should be accessible outside the euro area , in a way that is consistent with the objectives of the eurosystem , in order to stimulate the demand for the euro among foreign investors , fostering thus a stronger role for the euro internationally; calls on the ecb to ensure an adequate balance between allowing regulatory financial innovation in the fintech area and ensuring financial stability;


### 19. calls on the ecb to increase its monitoring of the development of crypto-currencies and the increased cyber-security risks , and to assess the possible need for central bank digital currencies; calls on the ecb to ensure an adequate balance between allowing regulatory financial innovation in the fintech area and ensuring financial stability; ### 19. calls on the ecb to increase its monitoring of the development of crypto-currencies and the increased cyber-security risks , and to assess the possible need for central bank digital currencies; calls on the ecb to ensure an adequate balance between allowing regulatory financial innovation in the fintech area , ensuring financial stability and providing a sufficient level of consumer protection;


### 19. calls on the ecb to increase its monitoring of the development of crypto-currencies and the increased cyber-security risks , and to assess the possible need for central bank digital currencies; calls on the ecb to ensure an adequate balance between allowing regulatory financial innovation in the fintech area and ensuring financial stability; ### 19. calls on the ecb to increase its monitoring of the development of crypto-assets , including stablecoins , and the increased risks in cyber-security and money-laundering , and to assess the possible need for central bank digital currencies; calls on the ecb to ensure an adequate balance between allowing regulatory financial innovation in the fintech area and ensuring financial stability;


### 21. recognises the ecb’s success in anti-counterfeiting , as evidenced by the continuously low share of counterfeit banknotes in total circulation; welcomes the introduction of modernised 100 euro and 200 euro notes with enhanced security features in 2019; ### 21. recognises the ecb’s success in anti-counterfeiting , as evidenced by the continuously low share of counterfeit banknotes in total circulation; welcomes the introduction of modernised 100 euro and 200 euro notes with enhanced security features in 2019; points out the importance of cash as a means of payment for eu citizens;


### 22. calls on the ecb to explore ways of strengthening the international role of the euro , as this would increase the eu’s ability to frame its policy stance independently vis-à-vis other global powers and is a key element in safeguarding european economic sovereignty; ### 22. calls on the ecb to explore ways of strengthening the international role of the euro , as this would increase the eu’s ability to frame its policy stance independently vis-à-vis other global powers and is a key element in safeguarding european economic sovereignty; notes that making the euro more attractive as a reserve currency will further enhance its international use and regrets in that regard the scarcity of euro-denominated safe assets; underlines the need for the creation of a european safe asset; calls on the ecb to assess the possibility of issuing certificates of deposit under the existing legal basis;


### 25. emphasises that executive board member nominations should be prepared carefully , with full transparency and together with parliament in line with the treaties; calls on the council to draw up a shortlist for any upcoming vacancies and to share this with parliament , thus allowing parliament to play a more meaningful advisory role in the appointment process; regrets that no satisfactory progress has been made to date; recalls that the equal treatment of men and women is a constitutional principle that must be strictly adhered to; ### 25. emphasises that executive board member nominations should be prepared carefully , with full transparency and together with parliament in line with the treaties; calls on the council to draw up a shortlist for any upcoming vacancies and to share this with parliament , thus allowing parliament to play a more meaningful advisory role in the appointment process; regrets that no satisfactory progress has been made to date; recalls the parliament’s resolution of 14 march 2019 on gender balance in eu economic and monetary affairs nominations and its commitment not to take into account lists of candidates where the gender balance principle has not been respected alongside the requirements concerning qualifications and experience in the selection process;


### 28. acknowledges , and congratulates the ecb and president lagarde on , the ongoing efforts to improve communication and transparency with the european parliament; ### 28. acknowledges , and congratulates the ecb and president lagarde on , the ongoing efforts to improve communication and transparency with the european parliament and agrees further with president lagarde that the ecb has to enhance its communication to citizens on the impact of its policies;


### b. whereas the term ‘crypto-assets’ is used to refer to a wide variety of digital assets , including but not limited to virtual currencies and tokens; ### b. whereas the term ‘crypto-assets’ is used to refer to a wide variety of digital assets , including but not limited to virtual currencies and tokens , which have a range of uses and purposes and can be issued and traded in a number of ways;


### b. whereas the term ‘crypto-assets’ is used to refer to a wide variety of digital assets , including but not limited to virtual currencies and tokens; ### b. whereas the term ‘crypto-assets’ is used to refer to a wide variety of digital assets , including but not limited to virtual currencies and tokens but sometimes excluding certain forms of stablecoins or certain tokens such as security tokens;


### c. whereas the two most common components of crypto-assets adopted are (i) the private nature of the asset , and (ii) the use of cryptography and distributed ledger technology (dlt) or similar technology to underpin exchanges of the asset; ### c. whereas the two most common components of crypto-assets adopted are (i) the private nature of the entitlement regarding the underlying asset , claim or right , and (ii) the use of cryptography and distributed ledger technology (dlt) or similar technology to underpin exchanges of the asset;


### d. whereas stablecoins exhibit similar features to crypto-assets and do not take the form of any specific currency , but rely on a set of tools which aim to minimise fluctuations of their price as denominated in a currency; ### d. whereas stablecoins exhibit similar features to crypto-assets and do not take the form of any specific currency , but rely on a set of tools which aim to minimise fluctuations of their price as denominated in a currency; whereas the set of tools aiming to minimise price fluctuations has not been tested in situations when significant numbers of transactions are being carried out with stablecoins;


### g. whereas digital finance has a strong cross-border element , which goes beyond the union level and therefore international cooperation in this field is essential; ### g. whereas digital finance has a strong cross-border element , which goes beyond the union level and therefore international cooperation and standard-setting in this field is essential;


### i. whereas experts of the european central bank (ecb) noted in their publication of 20193 , that even though crypto-assets are highly speculative , they do not represent an immediate threat to financial stability; ### i. whereas experts of the european central bank (ecb) noted in their publication of 20193 , that even though crypto-assets are highly speculative , they do not represent an immediate threat to financial stability; whereas the international monetary fund (imf) , in its 2018 global financial stability report , and the financial stability board (fsb) , in its july 2018 report , reached the same conclusions , although in the fsb’s opinion the situation should still be monitored , given how quickly changes occur on these markets;


### l. whereas the increased use of artificial intelligence in financial services will lead to a need for stronger operational resilience and the appropriate corresponding supervision; ### l. whereas the increased use of artificial intelligence in financial services will lead to a need for stronger operational resilience , the appropriate corresponding supervision and consumers’ data protection;


### m. whereas operational problems , particularly ict and security risks , can generate systemic risks for the financial sector; ### m. whereas operational problems , particularly ict and security risks , can generate systemic risks for the financial sector as pointed out by the european systemic risk board1a;


### m. whereas operational problems , particularly ict and security risks , can generate systemic risks for the financial sector; ### m. whereas new operational problems , particularly ict and security risks , can generate systemic risks for the financial sector; such new risks to be addressed by appropriate regulation;


### 2. considers that fintech will be integral to the success of the capital markets union (cmu) and encourages the commission to consider how to harness the benefits of fintech in driving forward capital market integration in the union; ### 2. considers that fintech which consists of the use of new technologies to enable and enhance activities of the financial sector and thus plays a key role in developing financial activities , will be integral to the success of the capital markets union (cmu) and encourages the commission to consider how to empower the innovators of fintech in driving forward capital market integration in the union; cryptography , dlt and similar technologies could facilitate and efficiency boost for the value chain in financial markets , triggering a rethinking of the role of intermediaries;


### 2. considers that fintech will be integral to the success of the capital markets union (cmu) and encourages the commission to consider how to harness the benefits of fintech in driving forward capital market integration in the union; ### 2. considers that fintech will be integral to the success of the capital markets union (cmu) for its capacity to improve the offer of financing options for companies and citizens as well as bringing a more attractive investment offer; and encourages the commission to integrate the benefits of fintech in the 2020 cmu action plan;


### 2. considers that fintech will be integral to the success of the capital markets union (cmu) and encourages the commission to consider how to harness the benefits of fintech in driving forward capital market integration in the union; ### 2. considers that fintech will be integral to the success of the capital markets union (cmu) and encourages the commission to consider how to harness the benefits of fintech in driving forward capital market integration and retail investor participation in the union;


### 3. highlights the importance for the commission to closely align its work with international fora and regulatory bodies in developing international standards given the cross-jurisdictional nature of digital finance; ### 3. stresses that , given the cross-jurisdictional nature of digital finance , close international cooperation is essential; calls , therefore , on the commission to closely align its work with international fora and regulatory bodies in developing international standards;


### 4. calls on the commission to deploy a proportionate , cross-sectorial and holistic approach to its work on fintech; ### 4. calls on the commission to deploy a concerted , proportionate , cross-sectorial and holistic approach to its work on fintech;


### 5. calls on the commission to act as first mover in order to create a favourable environment for european fintech hubs and firms to scale up; ### 5. calls on the commission to act as first mover in order to create a favourable environment for european fintech hubs , european digital champions and firms to scale up for attracting foreign capital and investments and also , promoting the eu competes in global markets;


### 5. calls on the commission to act as first mover in order to create a favourable environment for european fintech hubs and firms to scale up; ### 5. calls on the commission to act as first mover in order to create a favourable environment for european fintech hubs and firms to scale up and boost the eu's position vis-à-vis its international competitors;


### 5. calls on the commission to act as first mover in order to create a favourable environment for european fintech hubs and firms to scale up; ### 5. calls on the commission to act as first mover in order to create a favourable environment for european fintech hubs and firms as well as the established financial industry using fintech to scale up;


### 6. stresses that law and supervision in the area of fintech should be based on the following principles: ### 6. stresses that law and supervision of financial and non-financial actors offering financial services should be based on the following principles:


### b. technology neutrality; ### b. proportionality and technology neutrality;


### 7. points out that union level measures should not stifle opportunities for businesses to grow and develop within the union; ### 7. points out that union level measures should not stifle opportunities for businesses to grow and develop within the union while ensuring at the same time the general objectives of the eu like financial stability , investor and consumer protection or market integrity;


### 7. points out that union level measures should not stifle opportunities for businesses to grow and develop within the union; ### 7. points out that union level measures should not stifle opportunities for businesses to grow and develop within the union , but should nonetheless strive to achieve comparable standards and outcomes across the union;


### 7. points out that union level measures should not stifle opportunities for businesses to grow and develop within the union; ### 7. points out that union level measures should not stifle opportunities for businesses to grow and develop within the union; specially smes , as they are the main drivers of the eu economy and labour market;


### 7. points out that union level measures should not stifle opportunities for businesses to grow and develop within the union; ### 7. points out that union level measures should not stifle opportunities for businesses , and particularly smes , to grow and develop within the union;


### 9. considers that developing a pan-european taxonomy for crypto-assets is desirable as a step towards fostering a common understanding , facilitating collaboration across jurisdictions and providing greater regulatory certainty for market participants engaged in cross border activity; recommends taking into account the importance of international cooperation and global initiatives as regards frameworks for crypto-assets , bearing in mind in particular their borderless nature; cautions , however , that developing an open-ended taxonomy template may be more appropriate for this evolving market segment; ### 9. considers that developing a pan-european taxonomy for new products such as crypto-assets is desirable as a step towards fostering a common understanding , facilitating collaboration across jurisdictions and providing greater regulatory certainty for market participants engaged in cross border activity; recommends taking into account the importance of international cooperation and global initiatives as regards frameworks for crypto-assets , bearing in mind in particular their borderless nature; cautions , however , that developing an open-ended taxonomy template may be more appropriate for this evolving market segment; emphasises that consumer-focused startups are often building innovative financial services to the benefit of eu citizens and companies , and that any legislation should be designed with a view to empower more innovation and consumer-choice in financial services;


### 9. considers that developing a pan-european taxonomy for crypto-assets is desirable as a step towards fostering a common understanding , facilitating collaboration across jurisdictions and providing greater regulatory certainty for market participants engaged in cross border activity; recommends taking into account the importance of international cooperation and global initiatives as regards frameworks for crypto-assets , bearing in mind in particular their borderless nature; cautions , however , that developing an open-ended taxonomy template may be more appropriate for this evolving market segment; ### 9. considers that not all crypto-assets can be regulated in the same way , solely on the basis of the fact that they are digital; considers , therefore , that developing a pan-european taxonomy for crypto-assets is desirable as a step towards fostering a common understanding , facilitating collaboration across jurisdictions and providing greater regulatory certainty for market participants engaged in cross border activity; recommends taking into account the importance of international cooperation and global initiatives as regards frameworks for crypto-assets , bearing in mind in particular their borderless nature; cautions , however , that developing an open-ended taxonomy template may be more appropriate for this evolving market segment;


### 10. believes , therefore , that any further categorisation should be balanced and flexible in order to give space for innovation in the sector while ensuring that risks can be identified at an early stage; ### 10. believes that , given that crypto-assets take many forms and are constantly evolving , any further categorisation should be balanced , adaptable and flexible in order to give space for innovation in the sector while ensuring that risks can be identified at an early stage;


### 10. believes , therefore , that any further categorisation should be balanced and flexible in order to give space for innovation in the sector while ensuring that risks can be identified at an early stage; ### 10. believes , therefore , that any further categorisation should be balanced and flexible in order to give space for innovation and competitiveness in the sector while ensuring that risks can be identified at an early stage;


### 12. points out that applying existing regulations to previously unregulated crypto-assets will be necessary , as will creating bespoke regulatory regimes for evolving crypto-asset activities , such as initial coin offerings; ### 12. points out that applying existing regulations to previously unregulated crypto-assets will be necessary , as will creating bespoke regulatory regimes for evolving crypto-asset activities , such as initial coin offerings; points out that certain types of crypto-assets could indeed fit well into the existing regulatory framework , e.g. as ‘transferable securities' as defined in mifid ii;


### 12. points out that applying existing regulations to previously unregulated crypto-assets will be necessary , as will creating bespoke regulatory regimes for evolving crypto-asset activities , such as initial coin offerings; ### 12. points out that applying the objectives in existing regulations to all types of crypto-assets will be necessary , as will creating bespoke regulatory regimes for evolving new types of crypto-asset activities , while existing rules will need to be adapted accordingly for fintech regarding existing assets;


### 13. highlights that a common union framework on crypto-assets should help increase consumer and investor protection , enhance know your customer (kyc) obligations and oversight of the underlying technology; ### 13. highlights that a common union framework on crypto-assets should help increase consumer and investor protection , enhance the application of anti-money laundering provisions , such as know your customer (kyc) obligations , and improve oversight of the underlying technology;


### 14. points out that with the increasing digitalisation of financial services , as well as outsourcing to external it solution or maintenance providers , such as cloud providers , the exposure of financial institutions and markets to disruption caused by internal failures or external attacks is becoming more pronounced; ### 14. points out that with the increasing digitalisation of financial services , as well as outsourcing to external it solution or maintenance providers , such as cloud providers , the exposure of financial institutions and markets to disruption caused by internal failures or external attacks is becoming more pronounced; underlines that those risks are particularly relevant in cases of outsourcing to third country services providers;


### d. oversight of critical ict third-party providers; ### d. oversight of and minimum standards for critical ict third-party providers;


### 17. stresses the need for further information sharing , in particular on incidents , and enhanced coordination between relevant regulatory and supervisory authorities; ### 17. stresses the need for further information sharing , in particular on incidents , and enhanced coordination between relevant regulatory and supervisory authorities; asks the commission to explore ways to facilitate and encourage information sharing;


### 20. requests , in this regard , that the commission examines how to ensure that digital finance entities can access on an equitable basis relevant and useful data to help ensure that innovative fintech businesses can grow within the union and beyond; ### 20. requests , in this regard , that the commission examines how to ensure that digital finance entities can access on an equitable basis relevant and useful data to help ensure that innovative fintech businesses can grow within the union and beyond; points out though that the commission should refrain from price regulation for access to private data streams;


### 20. requests , in this regard , that the commission examines how to ensure that digital finance entities can access on an equitable basis relevant and useful data to help ensure that innovative fintech businesses can grow within the union and beyond; ### 20. requests , in this regard , that the commission examines how to ensure that digital finance entities can access on an equitable basis relevant and useful data to help ensure that innovative fintech businesses can grow within the union and beyond , guaranteeing the protection of its consumers’ data on eu territory;


### 20. requests , in this regard , that the commission examines how to ensure that digital finance entities can access on an equitable basis relevant and useful data to help ensure that innovative fintech businesses can grow within the union and beyond; ### 20. requests , in this regard , that the commission examines how to ensure that digital finance entities can access on an equitable basis relevant and useful data to help creating more customer value and ensure that innovative fintech businesses can grow within the union and beyond;


### 21. requests that the commission consider a framework for digital onboarding and the use of digital financial identities , which would aim to harmonise these measures across the union insofar as necessary; ### 21. requests that the commission consider a framework for digital onboarding and the use of digital financial identities , which would aim to harmonise these measures across the union insofar as necessary; highlights the importance of and potential benefit from enabling the use of digital financial identities across all sectors and member states , while taking appropriate and proportionate measures to avoid data or identity incidents;


### 21. requests that the commission consider a framework for digital onboarding and the use of digital financial identities , which would aim to harmonise these measures across the union insofar as necessary; ### 21. requests that the commission consider a framework for digital onboarding and the use of digital financial identities , which would aim to harmonise these measures across the union insofar as necessary and facilitates compliance with the relevant anti-money laundering provisions;


### 21. requests that the commission consider a framework for digital onboarding and the use of digital financial identities , which would aim to harmonise these measures across the union insofar as necessary; ### 21. requests that the commission considers a framework for digital onboarding and the use of digital financial identities , which would aim to harmonise the existing regulatory requirements across the union and to facilitate the use of such measures;


### 22. points out that customer data or “big data” is being increasingly used by financial institutions; recalls the provisions of article 71 of the gdpr and calls on all stakeholders to increase efforts to guarantee the enforcement of the rights therein; ### 22. points out that customer data or “big data” is being increasingly considered as key for creating additional customer value and maintain competitiveness by financial institutions; recalls the provisions of article 71 of the gdpr and calls on all stakeholders to increase efforts to guarantee the enforcement of the rights therein;


### 4. to increase data sharing in accordance with union principles in order to stimulate innovation. the aim should be to facilitate access to public data across the union. this would not only benefit digital finance companies , but would also be to the benefit of a number of other union policy areas and increase market transparency; ### 4. to increase data sharing in accordance with union principles in order to stimulate innovation. the aim should be to facilitate access to data across the union guaranteeing a secure and consumers’ data protection framework. this would not only benefit digital finance companies and smes , but would also be to the benefit of a number of other union policy areas and increase market transparency;


### 1. to put forward a legislative proposal for crypto-assets , which provides legal certainty for the treatment of crypto-assets while ensuring consumer and investor protection. such a framework should consider an open taxonomy and aim to legislate according to the principle of the same rules applying according to the same activity and risks; ### 1. to put forward a legislative proposal for crypto-assets , including stablecoins , which provides legal certainty for the treatment of crypto-assets while ensuring consumer and investor protection. such a framework should consider an open taxonomy and aim to legislate according to the principle of the same rules applying according to the same activity and risks while taking due account of ensuring a high level of investor protection , ensuring financial stability and the possible implications for the transmission of monetary policy operations;


### 1. to put forward a legislative proposal for crypto-assets , which provides legal certainty for the treatment of crypto-assets while ensuring consumer and investor protection. such a framework should consider an open taxonomy and aim to legislate according to the principle of the same rules applying according to the same activity and risks; ### 1. to put forward a legislative proposal for crypto-assets , which provides legal certainty for the treatment of crypto-assets while ensuring a level playing field and tackling the most serious risks in order to protect consumers and investors; such a framework should consider an open taxonomy and aim to legislate according to the principle of the same rules applying according to the same activity and risks;


### 3. to propose a framework for digital onboarding. such a framework should comply with relevant union legislation such as anti-money laundering provisions and aim to ensure a common understanding of digital financial identities across the single market. ### 3. to propose a framework for digital onboarding. such a framework should comply with relevant union legislation such as anti-money laundering provisions and anti-terrorist financing , and aim to ensure a common understanding of digital financial identities across the single market.


### (10) the application of ifrs 9 during the economic downturn caused by the covid-19 pandemic may lead to a sudden significant increase in expected credit loss provisions , as for many exposures expected losses over their lifetime may need to be calculated. the bcbs agreed on 3 april 2020 to allow more flexibility in the implementation of the transitional arrangements that phase in the impact of ifrs 9. in order to limit the possible volatility of regulatory capital that may occur if the covid-19 crisis results in a significant increase in expected credit loss provisions , it is necessary to extend the transitional arrangements also in union law. ### (10) the application of ifrs 9 during the economic downturn caused by the covid-19 pandemic may lead to a sudden significant increase in (i) expected credit loss provisions , as for many exposures expected losses over their lifetime may need to be calculated , for assets at amortized cost; and (ii) net unrealised looses on assets measured at fair value through other comprehensive income (oci). the bcbs agreed on 3 april 2020 to allow more flexibility in the implementation of the transitional arrangements that phase in the impact of ifrs 9. in order to limit the possible volatility of regulatory capital that may occur if the covid-19 crisis results in a significant increase in expected credit loss provisions , it is necessary to extend the transitional arrangements also in union law.


### (11) to mitigate the potential impact that a sudden increase in expected credit loss provisions may have on institutions’ capacity to lend to clients at times when it is most needed , the transitional arrangements should be extended by two years and institutions should be allowed to fully add-back to their common equity tier 1 capital any increase in new expected credit loss provisions that they recognise in 2020 and 2021 for their financial assets , which are not credit-impaired. this would bring additional relief to the impact of the covid-19 crisis on institutions’ possible rise in provisioning needs under ifrs 9 while maintaining the transitional arrangements for the expected credit loss amounts established before the pandemic of covid-19. ### (11) to mitigate the potential impact that a sudden increase in expected credit loss provisions and net unrealised losses on assets measured at fair value through oci may have on institutions’ capacity to lend to clients at times when it is most needed , the transitional arrangements should be extended by two years and institutions should be allowed to fully add-back to their common equity tier 1 capital any increase in new expected credit loss provisions and net unrealised losses on assets measured at fair value through oci that they recognise in 2020 and 2021 for their financial assets , which are not credit-impaired. this would bring additional relief to the impact of the covid-19 crisis on institutions’ possible rise in provisioning needs and unrealised losses under ifrs 9 while maintaining the transitional arrangements for the expected credit loss amounts established before the pandemic of covid-19.


### emlr = the institution's total exposure measure as defined in article 429(4) , including the exposures excluded in accordance with point (n) of paragraph 1 of this article , on the day of the public declaration referred to in point (a) of paragraph 5 of this article; and ### emlr = the institution's total exposure measure as defined in article 429(4) , including the exposures excluded in accordance with point (n) of paragraph 1 of this article , on the date referred to in point (c) of paragraph 5 of this article; and


### cb = the total value of the institution’s exposures to its central bank that are eligible to be excluded in accordance with point (n) of paragraph 1 , on the day of the public declaration referred to in point (a) of paragraph 5.; ### cb = the average value of the institution’s exposures to its central bank , calculated over the full reserve maintenance period of the central bank just preceding the date referred to in point (c) of paragraph 5 , that are eligible to be excluded in accordance with point (n) of paragraph 1.;


### the sum of the 12-month expected credit losses determined in accordance with paragraph 5.5.5 of the annex relating to ifrs 9 and the amount of the loss allowance for lifetime expected credit losses determined in accordance with paragraph 5.5.3 of the annex relating to ifrs 9 excluding the loss allowance for lifetime expected credit losses for financial assets that are credit-impaired as defined in appendix a to the annex relating to ifrs 9 as of 1 january 2020 or on the date of initial application of ifrs 9 , whichever is later.; ### the sum of the 12-month expected credit losses determined in accordance with paragraph 5.5.5 of the annex relating to ifrs 9 and the amount of the loss allowance for lifetime expected credit losses determined in accordance with paragraph 5.5.3 of the annex relating to ifrs 9 excluding the loss allowance for lifetime expected credit losses for financial assets that are credit-impaired as defined in appendix a to the annex relating to ifrs 9 as of 1 january 2020 or on the date of initial application of ifrs 9 , whichever is later. institutions may replace the reference date mentioned above by 1 january 2018 when the sum of expected credit losses is lower at that date;


### institutions shall replace the amount calculated in accordance with point (b) of paragraph 3 of this article by the sum of the 12-month expected credit losses determined in accordance with paragraph 5.5.5 of the annex relating to ifrs 9 and the amount of the loss allowance for lifetime expected credit losses determined in accordance with paragraph 5.5.3 of the annex relating to ifrs 9 excluding the loss allowance for lifetime expected credit losses for financial assets that are credit-impaired , as defined in appendix a to the annex relating to ifrs 9 , as of 1 january 2020 or on the date of initial application of ifrs 9 , whichever is later , reduced by the sum of related expected loss amounts for the same exposures calculated in accordance with article 158(5) , (6) and (10). where the calculation results in a negative number , the institution shall set the value of the amount referred to in point (b) of paragraph 3 of this article as equal to zero.; ### institutions shall replace the amount calculated in accordance with point (b) of paragraph 3 of this article by the sum of the 12-month expected credit losses determined in accordance with paragraph 5.5.5 of the annex relating to ifrs 9 and the amount of the loss allowance for lifetime expected credit losses determined in accordance with paragraph 5.5.3 of the annex relating to ifrs 9 excluding the loss allowance for lifetime expected credit losses for financial assets that are credit-impaired , as defined in appendix a to the annex relating to ifrs 9 ,as of 1 january 2020 or on the date of initial application of ifrs 9 , whichever is later , reduced by the sum of related expected loss amounts for the same exposures calculated in accordance with article 158(5) , (6) and (10). institutions may replace the reference date mentioned above by 1 january 2018 when the sum of expected credit losses is lower at this date. where the calculation results in a negative number , the institution shall set the value of the amount referred to in point (b) of paragraph 3 of this article as equal to zero.;


### 0 ,7 during the period from 1 january 2020 to 31 december 2020; ### 1 during the period from 1 january 2018 to 31 december 2018;


### 0 ,5 during the period from 1 january 2021 to 31 december 2021; ### 0 ,85 during the period from 1 january 2019 to 31 december 2019;


### 0 ,25 during the period from 1 january 2022 to 31 december 2022; ### 0 ,85 during the period from 1 january 2020 to 31 december 2020;


### 0 during the period from 1 january 2023 to 31 december 2024. ### 0 ,85 during the period from 1 january 2021 to 31 december 2021;


### (3) the following article is inserted: ### deleted


### by way of derogation from article 47c(3) , until [date of entry into force of this amending regulation + 7 years] the factors set out in article 47c(4) shall also apply to the part of the non-performing exposure guaranteed by an eligible provider referred to in points (a) to (e) of article 201(1) , where , subject to compliance with union state aid rules , where applicable , the guarantee or counter-guarantee is provided as part of support measures to assist borrowers amid the covid-19 pandemic. ### by way of derogation from article 47c(3) , the factors set out in article 47c(4) shall also apply to the part of the non-performing exposure guaranteed by an eligible provider referred to in points (a) to (e) of article 201(1) , where , subject to compliance with union state aid rules , where applicable , the guarantee or counter-guarantee is provided as part of support measures to assist borrowers amid the covid-19 pandemic.


### 1. the risk weight for a position in an npe securitisation shall be calculated in accordance with article 254 , subject to a floor of 100%. ### 1. the risk weight for a position in an npe securitisation shall be calculated in accordance with article 254.


### 2. by way of derogation from paragraph 1 , institutions shall assign a risk weight of 100% to the senior securitisation position in a traditional npe securitisation , provided the exposures in the pool backing the securitisation have been transferred to the sspe with a non-refundable price discount of at least 50% on the nominal amount of the exposures. ### 2. institutions shall assign to the senior tranche of a qualifying traditional npe securitisation the following risk weights:


### 2. by way of derogation from paragraph 1 , institutions shall assign a risk weight of 100% to the senior securitisation position in a traditional npe securitisation , provided the exposures in the pool backing the securitisation have been transferred to the sspe with a non-refundable price discount of at least 50% on the nominal amount of the exposures. ### 2. by way of derogation from paragraph 1 , institutions shall assign the following risk weights to the senior tranche of a qualifying traditional npe securitisation subject to a 100% risk-weight ceiling:


### (1) the covid-19 pandemic is severely affecting people , companies , health systems and the economies of member states. the commission , in its communication to the european parliament , the european council , the council , the european economic and social committee and the committee of the regions of 27 may 2020 entitled ‘europe's moment: repair and prepare for the next generation’8 stressed that liquidity and access to finance will be a continued challenge in the months to come. it is therefore crucial to support the recovery from the severe economic shock caused by the covid-19 pandemic by introducing targeted amendments to existing pieces of financial legislation. this package of measures is adopted under the label “capital markets recovery package”. ### (1) the covid-19 pandemic is severely affecting people , companies , health systems and the economies of member states. the commission , in its communication to the european parliament , the european council , the council , the european economic and social committee and the committee of the regions of 27 may 2020 entitled ‘europe's moment: repair and prepare for the next generation’8 stressed that liquidity and access to finance will be a continued challenge in the months to come. it is therefore crucial to support the recovery from the severe economic shock caused by the covid-19 pandemic by introducing targeted amendments to existing pieces of financial legislation to ensure that european companies have access to a diverse range of funding mechanisms at this vital time. in order to eliminate frictions that can impact companies' ability to raise equity and retain access to deep pools of liquidity , the share trading obligation as established in regulation (eu) no 600/2014 should be amended accordingly , particularly given the issues that will arise for impacted companies at the end of the transition period on 31 december 2020 as specified in the withdrawal agreement between the eu and the uk. this package of measures is adopted under the label “capital markets recovery package”.


### (4) product governance requirements can restrict the sale of corporate bonds. corporate bonds with a “make whole clause” are generally considered safe and simple products that are eligible for retail clients. such a “make whole clause” protects investors against losses in case an issuer opts for early repayment by ensuring that those investors are provided with a payment equal to the net present value of the coupons they would have received if the bond would not have been called. the product governance requirements should therefore no longer apply to corporate bonds with such “make-whole clauses”. ### (4) product governance requirements can restrict the sale of simple products such as so called "plain vanilla bonds" , shares traded on regulated markets and non-complex ucits; in order to simplify the investment process for retail investors and intermediaries alike , the product governance requirements should therefore no longer apply to these product categories;


### (4) product governance requirements can restrict the sale of corporate bonds. corporate bonds with a “make whole clause” are generally considered safe and simple products that are eligible for retail clients. such a “make whole clause” protects investors against losses in case an issuer opts for early repayment by ensuring that those investors are provided with a payment equal to the net present value of the coupons they would have received if the bond would not have been called. the product governance requirements should therefore no longer apply to corporate bonds with such “make-whole clauses”. ### (4) product governance requirements are an important tool regarding investor protection. exemptions reduce the effectiveness of product governance requirements and diverge the level-playing field. moreover , product governance requirements are already lower with regard to less complex and less risky instruments. therefore , a thorough impact assessment and risk analysis should be part of the upcoming mifid review , before certain instruments get exempted from the product governance requirements.


### (5) the call for evidence , launched by the european securities and markets authority (esma) , on the impact of inducements and cost and charges disclosure requirements under directive 2014/65/eu and the public consultation of the commission both confirmed that professional clients and eligible counterparties do not need standardised and mandatory cost information as they already receive the necessary information when they negotiate with their service provider. that information is tailored to their needs and often more detailed. eligible counterparties and professional clients should therefore be exempted from those cost and charges disclosure requirements , except with regard to the services of investment advice and portfolio management because professional clients entering into portfolio management or investment advice relationships are do not necessarily have sufficient expertise or knowledge to be exempted from the costs and charges disclosures. ### (5) the call for evidence , launched by the european securities and markets authority (esma) , on the impact of inducements and cost and charges disclosure requirements under directive 2014/65/eu and the public consultation of the commission both confirmed that professional clients and eligible counterparties do not need standardised and mandatory cost information as they already receive the necessary information when they negotiate with their service provider. that information is tailored to their needs and often more detailed. eligible counterparties and professional clients should therefore be exempted from those cost and charges disclosure requirements;


### (10) directive 2014/65/eu allows persons that trade in commodity derivatives , emission allowances and derivatives on emission allowances on a professional basis to make use of an exemption from authorisation as an investment firm when their trading activity is ancillary to their main business. those persons applying for the ancillary activity test are required to notify the relevant competent authority annually that they make use of that possibility and provide the necessary elements to satisfy the two quantitative tests that determine whether its trading activity is ancillary to its main business. the first test compares the size of an entity's speculative trading activity to the total trading activity in the union on an asset class basis. the second test compares the size of the speculative trading activity , with all asset classes included , to the total trading activity in financial instruments by the entity at group level. there is an alternative form of the second test , which consists of comparing the estimated capital used for the speculative trading activity to the actual amount of capital used at group level for the main business. those quantitative tests are particularly complex and have not altered the status quo in terms of persons that are eligible for the exemption. therefore , the exemption should rely solely on qualitative elements. persons that are eligible for the exemption , including market makers , are dealing on own account or providing investment services other than dealing on own account , to customers or suppliers of their main business. the exemption is available for both cases individually and on an aggregate basis where this is an ancillary activity , when considered on a group basis. that exemption should not be available for persons who apply a high-frequency algorithmic trading technique or are part of a group the main business of which is the provision of investment services , or banking activities , or acting as a market maker in relation to commodity derivatives. all provisions regarding the quantitative elements should be deleted. ### (10) directive 2014/65/eu allows persons that trade in commodity derivatives , emission allowances and derivatives on emission allowances on a professional basis to make use of an exemption from authorisation as an investment firm when their trading activity is ancillary to their main business. those persons applying for the ancillary activity test are required to notify the relevant competent authority annually that they make use of that possibility and provide the necessary elements to satisfy the two quantitative tests that determine whether its trading activity is ancillary to its main business. the first test compares the size of an entity's speculative trading activity to the total trading activity in the union on an asset class basis. the second test compares the size of the speculative trading activity , with all asset classes included , to the total trading activity in financial instruments by the entity at group level. there is an alternative form of the second test , which consists of comparing the estimated capital used for the speculative trading activity to the actual amount of capital used at group level for the main business. those quantitative tests are particularly complex and have not altered the status quo in terms of persons that are eligible for the exemption. therefore , the exemption should rely solely on qualitative elements. in order to have a common european approach across member states , esma shall provide qualitative guidance. persons that are eligible for the exemption , including market makers , are dealing on own account or providing investment services other than dealing on own account , to customers or suppliers of their main business. the exemption is available for both cases individually and on an aggregate basis where this is an ancillary activity , when considered on a group basis. that exemption should not be available for persons who apply a high-frequency algorithmic trading technique or are part of a group the main business of which is the provision of investment services , or banking activities , or acting as a market maker in relation to commodity derivatives. all provisions regarding the quantitative elements should be deleted.


### (14) the current position limit regime does not recognise the unique characteristics of securitised derivatives. securitised derivatives should therefore be excluded from the position limit regime. ### (14) the current position limit regime does not recognise the unique characteristics of securitised derivatives. securitied derivatives fall within the transferable securities definition in article 4(1)(44)(c).


### the following point (50a) is inserted: ### deleted


### (3) in article 16(3) the following subparagraph is added: ### deleted


### the requirements laid down in the second to fifth subparagraphs of this paragraph shall not apply to corporate bonds with make-whole clauses.; ### for the purposes of this article , "instruments that embed a derivative" shall not encompass bonds with a make-whole clause.


### in paragraph 2 , the following subparagraph is added: ### deleted


### (ii) the client has agreed to receive the information shortly after the conclusion of the transaction.; ### (ii) the client has agreed to receive the information without undue delay after the conclusion of the transaction.;


### when providing investment advice or portfolio management services that involve switching of financial instruments , investment firms shall analyse the costs and benefits of the switching financial instruments , and inform the client whether or not the benefits of such switching of financial instruments are greater than the costs involved in such switching.; ### when providing investment advice or portfolio management services that involve switching of financial instruments , investment firms shall analyse the costs and benefits of the switching financial instruments. when providing the service of investment advice , investment firms shall inform the client whether or not the benefits of such switching of financial instruments are greater than the costs involved in such switching.;


### the reporting requirement laid down in this paragraph shall however not apply until [date of entry into force of this amending directive + 2 years].; ### the reporting requirement laid down in this paragraph shall however not apply until [date of entry into force of this amending directive + 2 years]; the european commission shall comprehensively review the adequacy of the reporting requirements in article 27 (3) and provide a report to the european parliament and the council by [date of entry into force of this amending directive + 1 year];


### (1) the requirements laid down in point (c) of article 24(4) , shall not apply to services provided to professional clients except for investment advice and portfolio management. ### (1) the requirements laid down in point (c) of article 24(4) , shall not apply to services provided to professional clients and eligible counterparties;


### (7) before the financial crisis , some securitisation activities followed an “originate to distribute” model. in that model , assets of inferior quality were selected for securitisation to the detriment of investors , who ended up with more risk then they might have intended to undertake. the requirement to verify the credit granting standards used in the creation of the securitised assets was introduced to prevent such practices for the future. for npe securitisations however , that verification of credit granting standards should take into account the specific circumstances including the purchase of those non-performing assets and the type of securitisation. it is therefore necessary to amend the verification of credit granting standards to enable the investor to carry out a due diligence on the quality and performance of the non-performing assets in order to make a sensible and well-informed investment decision. ### (7) before the financial crisis of 2008 , some securitisation activities followed an “originate to distribute” model. in that model , assets of inferior quality were selected for securitisation to the detriment of investors , who ended up with more risk then they might have intended to undertake. the requirement to verify the credit granting standards used in the creation of the securitised assets was introduced to prevent such practices for the future. for npe securitisations however , that verification of credit granting standards should take into account the specific circumstances including the purchase of those non-performing assets and the type of securitisation. it is therefore necessary to amend the verification of credit granting standards to enable the investor to carry out a due diligence on the quality and performance of the non-performing assets in order to make a sensible and well-informed investment decision.


### (24) ‘non-performing exposure (npe) securitisation’ means a securitisation backed by a pool of non-performing exposures that meet the conditions set out in article 47a(3) of regulation 575/2013 and the value of which makes up at least 90% of the pool’s value at the time of origination; ### (24) ‘non-performing exposure (npe) securitisation’ means a securitisation backed by a pool of non-performing exposures that meet the conditions set out in article 47a(3) of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 and the value of which makes up not less than 90% of the pool’s nominal value at the time of origination and at any subsequent date on which assets are added to or removed from the underlying pool due to replenishment of the pool or restructuring of the securitisation.;


### in case of npe securitisations , the requirement of this paragraph may also be fulfilled by the servicer.; ### in case of npe securitisations , the requirement of this paragraph may also be fulfilled by the servicer that manages the pool of purchased receivables or the underlying credit exposures on a day-to-day basis;


### transactions that feature non-sequential amortisation shall have triggers for the performance of the underlying exposures changing the amortisation to sequential in order of seniority. such performance-related triggers shall include the deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying exposures below a pre-determined threshold. ### transactions that feature non-sequential amortisation shall have triggers to switch to sequential amortisation in order of seniority following the deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying exposures below a pre-determined threshold.


### the provisions that ensure the replacement of the servicer , trustee , other ancillary service providers or the third-party verification agent referred to in article 26e(4) in the event of default or insolvency of either of those service providers , in a manner that does not result in the termination of the provision of those services; ### the provisions that ensure the replacement of the servicer , trustee , other ancillary service providers or the third-party verification agent referred to in article 26e(4) in the event of default or insolvency of either of those service providers , where those service providers differ from the originator , in a manner that does not result in the termination of the provision of those services;


### the amount of the credit protection payment shall be calculated at the level of the individual underlying exposure for which a credit event has occurred. ### the amount of the credit protection payment shall be calculated at each level of the individual underlying exposure for which a credit event has occurred.


### exercise of an option to call the transaction at a given point in time (time call) , when the time period measured from the closing date is equal to or greater than the weighted average life of the initial reference portfolio at closing; ### the exercise of an option to call the transaction at a given point in time ("time call") , when the time period measured from the closing date is equal to or greater than the weighted average life of the initial reference portfolio at the closing date;


### those debts securities have a remaining maximum maturity of three months which matches the payment dates; ### those debt securities have a remaining maximum maturity of three months which is no later than the next payment date;


### collateral in the form of cash held with a third-party credit institution or in the form of cash on deposit with the originator , subject to a minimum credit quality step 2 as referred to in article 136 of regulation (eu) no 575/2013. ### collateral in the form of cash held with a third-party credit institution or in the form of cash on deposit with the originator , subject to a minimum credit quality step 3 as referred to in article 136 of regulation (eu) no 575/2013.


### for the purposes of point (b) , where the third-party credit institution or the originator no longer satisfy the minimum credit quality step 2 , the collateral shall be promptly transferred to a third-party credit institution with a credit quality step of 2 or higher or the collateral shall be invested in securities meeting the criteria laid down in point (a) of this paragraph. the requirements set out in this point (b) shall be deemed satisfied in the case of investments in credit linked notes issued by the originator , in accordance with article 218 of regulation (eu) no 575/2013. ### for the purposes of point (b) , where the third-party credit institution or the originator no longer satisfy the minimum credit quality step 3 , the collateral shall be transferred within a period of six months to a third-party credit institution with a credit quality step of 3 or higher or the collateral shall be invested in securities meeting the criteria laid down in point (a) of this paragraph. the requirements set out in this point (b) shall be deemed satisfied in the case of investments in credit linked notes issued by the originator , in accordance with article 218 of regulation (eu) no 575/2013.


### (1) the covid-19 pandemic is severely affecting people , companies , health systems and the economies of member states. the commission , in its communication to the european parliament , the european council , the council , the european economic and social committee and the committee of the regions of 27 may 2020 entitled ‘europe's moment: repair and prepare for the next generation’13 stressed that liquidity and access to finance will be a continued challenge in the months to come. it is therefore crucial to support the recovery from the severe economic shock caused by the covid-19 pandemic by introducing targeted amendments to existing pieces of financial legislation. this package of measures is adopted under the label “capital markets recovery package”. ### (1) the covid-19 pandemic is severely affecting people , companies , health systems and the economies of member states. the commission , in its communication to the european parliament , the european council , the council , the european economic and social committee and the committee of the regions of 27 may 2020 entitled ‘europe's moment: repair and prepare for the next generation’13 stressed that liquidity and access to finance will be a continued challenge in the months to come. it is therefore crucial to support the recovery from the severe economic shock caused by the covid-19 pandemic by introducing targeted amendments to existing pieces of financial legislation to ensure that european companies have access to a diverse range of funding mechanisms at this vital time. in order to avoid any extraterritorial conflicts , article 23 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 should be amended to clarify the scope of the share trading obligation. in particular it should be clarified that the scope of article 23 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 only applies to trades in shares with an isin code from an eea country or to trades in shares denominated in a non-eu currency or if the share was admitted to trading on a third country trading venue before 31 december 2020 and traded in an eu currency. this package of measures is adopted under the label “capital markets recovery package”.


### (3) credit institutions have been active in the recovery to support companies that needed financing and are expected to be a fundamental pillar of the recovery. regulation (eu) 2017/1129 entitles credit institutions to an exemption from the obligation to publish a prospectus in case of an offer of certain non-equity securities issued in a continuous or repeated manner up to an aggregated amount of eur 75 million in a 12 month-period. that exemption threshold should be increased for a limited period of time in order to foster fundraising for credit institutions and bring them a breathing space to support their clients in the real economy. as that measure is limited to the recovery phase , it should therefore be available for a limited time period of 18 months. ### (3) credit institutions have been active in the recovery to support companies that needed financing and are expected to be a fundamental pillar of the recovery. regulation (eu) 2017/1129 entitles credit institutions to an exemption from the obligation to publish a prospectus in case of an offer of certain non-equity securities issued in a continuous or repeated manner up to an aggregated amount of eur 75 million in a 12 month-period. that exemption threshold should be increased for a limited period of time in order to foster fundraising for credit institutions and bring them a breathing space to support their clients in the real economy. as that measure is limited to the recovery phase , it should therefore be available for fixed time period , ending by latest on 31 december 2022.


### (4) in order to swiftly address the severe economic impact of the covid-19 pandemic , it is important to introduce measures to facilitate investments in the real economy , allow for a rapid recapitalisation of companies in the union and enable issuers to tap into public markets at an early stage in the recovery process. in order to achieve those objectives , it is appropriate to create a new short-form prospectus (‘eu recovery prospectus’) that is easy to produce for issuers , easy to understand for investors who want to finance them and easy to scrutinise and approve for competent authorities. ### (4) in order to swiftly address the severe economic impact of the covid-19 pandemic , it is important to introduce measures to facilitate investments in the real economy , allow for a rapid recapitalisation of companies in the union and enable issuers to tap into public markets at an early stage in the recovery process. in order to achieve those objectives , it is appropriate to create a new short-form prospectus (‘eu recovery prospectus’) that is easy to produce for issuers , easy to understand for investors who want to finance them and easy to scrutinise and approve for competent authorities. however , the eu recovery prospectus should not be seen as the stimulant of re-equitizing , rather it is a facilitator albeit one that needs careful monitoring to ensure the investor's information needs are met. moreover , the regulation on the eu recovery prospectus should not be a shortcut of changes of prospectus regulation as the revision will need to be done with proper , careful impact assessment.


### (7) the eu recovery prospectus should include a short-form summary as a useful source of information for investors , in particular retail investors. that summary should be a self-contained part of the eu recovery prospectus and should focus on key information that would enable investors to decide which offers and admissions to trading of securities to study further by reviewing the eu recovery prospectus as a whole to take their decision. ### (7) the eu recovery prospectus should include a short-form summary as a useful source of information for investors , in particular retail investors. the eu recovery prospectus should safeguard the functionality of current prospectus regulation vis-à-vis retail investor protection needs while avoiding excessive administrative burden. that summary should be a self-contained part of the eu recovery prospectus and should focus on key information that would enable investors to decide which offers and admissions to trading of securities to study further by reviewing the eu recovery prospectus as a whole to take their decision. it should be supervised that the planned summary will not worsen the investor protection nor give misleading impression of the role of the investor. this means higher diligence requirements for prospectus providers.


### (10) regulation (eu) 2017/1129 requires financial intermediaries to inform investors of the possibility of a supplement and , under certain circumstances , to contact investors on the same day that a supplement is published. the scope of investors to contact as well as the deadline to contact them can raise difficulties. in order to provide relief and free up resources for financial intermediaries while maintaining a high level of investor protection , a more proportionate regime should be laid down. such regime should specify which investors should be contacted by financial intermediaries when a supplement is published and extend the deadline to contact those investors. ### (10) regulation (eu) 2017/1129 requires financial intermediaries to inform investors of the possibility of a supplement and , under certain circumstances , to contact investors on the same day that a supplement is published. the scope of investors to contact as well as the deadline to contact them can raise difficulties. in order to provide relief and free up resources for financial intermediaries while maintaining a high level of investor protection , a more proportionate regime should be laid down. such regime should specify which investors should be contacted by financial intermediaries when a supplement is published and extend the deadline to contact those investors. financial intermediaries should inform their clients at least once of the possibility of a supplement being published , and where and when it would be published. upon subscription of the securities within the initial subscription period financial intermediaries should inform their clients about their right to withdraw acceptances and facilitate proceeding when investors exert their right of withdrawal. in case a supplement is published financial intermediaries should contact their clients by electronic means. if an investor does not provide a channel of electronic communication to the intermediary , this investor waives the right to be contacted by the intermediary. in this case , the information about the supplement should be made available on the issuer’s website.


### (10) regulation (eu) 2017/1129 requires financial intermediaries to inform investors of the possibility of a supplement and , under certain circumstances , to contact investors on the same day that a supplement is published. the scope of investors to contact as well as the deadline to contact them can raise difficulties. in order to provide relief and free up resources for financial intermediaries while maintaining a high level of investor protection , a more proportionate regime should be laid down. such regime should specify which investors should be contacted by financial intermediaries when a supplement is published and extend the deadline to contact those investors. ### (10) regulation (eu) 2017/1129 requires financial intermediaries to inform investors of the possibility of a supplement and , under certain circumstances , to contact investors on the same day that a supplement is published. the scope of investors to contact as well as the deadline to contact them can raise difficulties. in order to provide relief and free up resources for financial intermediaries while maintaining a high level of investor protection , a more proportionate regime should be laid down. such regime should specify which investors should be contacted by financial intermediaries when a supplement is published and extend the deadline to contact those investors. it needs to be taken into account that this might create a bias in fairness of providing the same information to all investors.


### (11) as the eu recovery prospectus is limited to the recovery phase , the regime of this prospectus should expire 18 months after the date of application of this regulation. in order to ensure the continuity of eu recovery prospectuses , the ones approved before the expiration of the regime should benefit from a grandfathering provision. ### (11) as the eu recovery prospectus is limited to the recovery phase , the regime of this prospectus should expire by 31 december 2022. in order to ensure the continuity of eu recovery prospectuses , the ones approved before the expiration of the regime should benefit from a grandfathering provision.


### (12) the commission should , before 21 july 2022 , present a report to the european parliament and the council on the application of this regulation , accompanied where appropriate by a legislative proposal. this review should incorporate in its assessment whether the disclosure regime for eu recovery prospectuses is appropriate to meet the objectives pursued by this regulation. ### (12) the commission should , before 21 july 2022 , present a report to the european parliament and the council on the application of this regulation , accompanied where appropriate by a legislative proposal. this review should incorporate in its assessment whether the disclosure regime for eu recovery prospectuses is appropriate to meet the objectives pursued by this regulation , in particular if it achieves the right balance between a reduction of administrative burdens and the protection of investors.


### from [date of application of this regulation] to [18 months from the date of application of this regulation] non-equity securities issued in a continuous or repeated manner by a credit institution , where the total aggregated consideration in the union for the securities offered is less than eur 150 000 000 per credit institution calculated over a period of 12 months , provided that those securities: ### from [date of application of this regulation] to 31 december 2022 non-equity securities issued in a continuous or repeated manner by a credit institution , where the total aggregated consideration in the union for the securities offered is less than eur 150 000 000 per credit institution calculated over a period of 12 months , provided that those securities:


### 2. where the prospectus relates to an offer of securities to the public , investors who have already agreed to purchase or subscribe for the securities before the supplement is published shall have the right , exercisable within three working days after the publication of the supplement , to withdraw their acceptances , provided that the significant new factor , material mistake or material inaccuracy referred to in paragraph 1 arose or was noted before the closing of the offer period or the delivery of the securities , whichever occurs first. that period may be extended by the issuer or the offeror. the final date of the right of withdrawal shall be stated in the supplement.; ### 2. where the prospectus relates to an offer of securities to the public , investors who have already agreed to purchase or subscribe for the securities before the supplement is published shall have the right to withdraw their acceptances , provided that the significant new factor , material mistake or material inaccuracy referred to in paragraph 1 arose or was noted before the closing of the offer period or the delivery of the securities , whichever occurs first. the right to withdraw is exercisable within three working days after the publication of the supplement. that period may be extended by the issuer or the offeror. the final date of the right of withdrawal shall be stated in the supplement.;


### 3. where investors purchase or subscribe securities through a financial intermediary , between the time when the prospectus for those securities is approved and the closing of the offer period or the time when trading on a regulated market begins , whichever occurs later , that financial intermediary shall inform those investors of the possibility of a supplement being published , where and when it would be published and that the financial intermediary would assist them in exercising their right to withdraw acceptances in such case. ### 3. where investors purchase or subscribe securities through a financial intermediary , between the time when the prospectus for those securities is approved and the closing of the initial offer period whichever occurs later , that financial intermediary shall inform those investors of the possibility of a supplement being published , where and when it would be published and that the financial intermediary would assist them in exercising their right to withdraw acceptances in such case.


### where the investors referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph have the right of withdrawal referred to in paragraph 2 , the financial intermediary shall contact those investors within one working day after the publication of the supplement.; ### where the investors referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph have the right of withdrawal referred to in paragraph 2 , the financial intermediary shall contact those investors within the business day following the one on which the supplement has been published.;


### where the investors referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph have the right of withdrawal referred to in paragraph 2 , the financial intermediary shall contact those investors within one working day after the publication of the supplement.; ### where the investors referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph have the right of withdrawal referred to in paragraph 2 , the financial intermediary shall contact those investors within the business day after the one on which the supplement has been published.;


### the regime set out in article 14a expires on [18 months from the date of application of this regulation]. ### the regime set out in article 14a expires on 31 december 2022.


### eu recovery prospectuses drawn up in accordance with article 14a and approved between [date of application of this regulation] and [18 months after the date of application of this regulation] shall continue to be governed in accordance with that article until the end of their validity or until twelve months have elapsed after [18 months after date of application of this regulation] , whichever occurs first. ### eu recovery prospectuses drawn up in accordance with article 14a and approved between [date of application of this regulation] and 31 december 2022 shall continue to be governed in accordance with that article until the end of their validity or until twelve months have elapsed after 31 december 2022 , whichever occurs first.


### an analysis of whether the eu growth prospectus strikes a proper balance between investor protection and the reduction of administrative burdens for the persons entitled to use it; ### an analysis of whether the eu growth prospectus strikes a proper balance between investor protection and the reduction of administrative burdens for the persons entitled to use it; to gather experience about the eu recovery prospectus for post-evaluation and the basis of analysing the possible needs to develop the prospectus regulation.


### i. name of the issuer , member state of incorporation , link to the issuer’s website ### i. name of the issuer , country of incorporation , link to the issuer’s website


### the purpose is to identify the company issuing shares , including its legal entity identifier (‘lei’) , its member state of incorporation and the website where investors can find information on the company’s business operations , the products it makes or the services it provides , the principal markets where it competes , its organisational structure and , where applicable , information incorporated by reference. ### the purpose is to identify the company issuing shares by its legal and commercial name , including its legal entity identifier (‘lei’) , its country of incorporation and the website where investors can find information on the company’s business operations , the products it makes or the services it provides , the principal markets where it competes , its organisational structure and , where applicable , information incorporated by reference.


### the statement shall indicate the competent authority that has approved the eu recovery prospectus , specify that such approval is not an endorsement of the issuer and specify that the eu recovery prospectus has been drawn up in accordance with article 14a. ### the statement shall indicate the competent authority that has approved the eu recovery prospectus in relation to completeness , comprehensibility and consistency as provided by this regulation , specify that such approval is not an endorsement of the issuer and specify that the eu recovery prospectus has been drawn up in accordance with article 14a.


### c. whereas the social and economic crisis resulting from covid-19 will have a particularly negative impact on smes and retail savers; whereas the eu’s response to covid-19 through the european recovery plan should provide a large injection of capital in order to increase european enterprises’ access to finance; ### c. whereas the social and economic crisis resulting from covid-19 will have a particularly negative impact on smes and retail savers; whereas the eu’s response to covid-19 through the european recovery plan should provide a large injection of capital and provide incentives to promote market based financing in order to increase european enterprises’ access to finance;


### 1. calls for the removal of barriers , including the simplification of legislation , to diversify funding sources for smes , in order to promote smes’ ability to access equity markets , and to reduce the existing debt bias; points out that the current situation makes smes more fragile and vulnerable; ### 1. calls for the removal of barriers , including the simplification of legislation , to diversify funding sources for smes , in order to promote smes’ ability to access equity markets and to more diverse , long-term and competitive investment opportunities for retail and large investors; highlights the need to reduce the existing debt bias; points out that the current situation makes smes more fragile and vulnerable;


### 1. calls for the removal of barriers , including the simplification of legislation , to diversify funding sources for smes , in order to promote smes’ ability to access equity markets , and to reduce the existing debt bias; points out that the current situation makes smes more fragile and vulnerable; ### 1. calls for the removal of barriers , including the simplification of legislation , to diversify funding sources european companies , with a particular focus on smes , in order to ensure access to equity markets , and to reduce the existing debt bias; points out that the current situation makes european companies and especially smes more fragile and vulnerable;


### 2. takes the view that the efficiency of financial markets should be improved and that the listing of companies should be facilitated; encourages the creation and prioritisation of a large private pan-european fund , an initial public offering (ipo) fund , to support smes; ### 2. takes the view that the efficiency of financial markets should be improved and that the listing of companies should be facilitated; encourages the creation and prioritisation of a large private pan-european fund , an initial public offering (ipo)/secondary offerings (spo) fund , to support smes;