### 2. proposes that the cbam be implemented as an extension of the eu emissions trading system (eu ets) , which would require importers to purchase allowances for the volume of carbon emissions incorporated in their products; notes that the mechanism should ensure a single carbon price , both for domestic producers and importers; ### 2. proposes that - to achieve the wto requirements of non-discrimination of foreign exporters - the cbam be implemented as complementary mechanism to the eu emissions trading system (eu ets) , for example by requiring importers to purchase allowances similar to the ets for the volume of carbon emissions related to their products; notes that the mechanism should ensure a single carbon price , both for domestic producers and importers;


### 2. underlines that international carbon pricing and fully competitive low-emission solutions would render the mechanism obsolete; stresses , therefore , that the eu needs to step up efforts in this respect; ### 2. underlines that international carbon pricing and fully competitive low-emission solutions would render the mechanism obsolete;


### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; ### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action but that it must not be to the detriment of the competitiveness of our own industry; stresses that the eu emits circa 8.5 % of the global emissions;


### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; ### 3. notes that the union is endeavouring to assume a leading role in global climate action;


### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market; ### deleted


### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market; ### 3. urges that the proposed cbam eventually apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market , starting with a few pilot sectors , such as steel , cement , fertilizers and electricity;


### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; ### 4. takes note of the commission’s ambitious proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels;


### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; ### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition;


### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; ### 4. takes note of the commission’s unduly proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities;


### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at country level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; ### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that imposes cbam on any carbon footprint of imports above an eu benchmark; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products;


### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at country level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; ### 4. recommends that a design be evaluated that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at country level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; the suggested design would serve as a basis for negotiations with the wto;


### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions; ### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors based on sector’s risk of carbon leakage , with the potential for emissions abatement in third countries , and limited impact on downstream sectors before being enlarged over time , after a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the mechanism’s impact on the sectors in question and downstream sectors; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions;


### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions; ### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage in accordance with the realities of each sector and the maturity of the technology , before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions;


### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2 % below 1990 levels in 2018 , while at the same time its ghg emissions embedded in international trade have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global footprint; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu represent more than 20 % of the union’s domestic co2 emissions; ### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2 % below 1990 levels in 2018 , while at the same time its ghg emissions embedded in international trade have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global footprint; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu represent more than 20 %of the union’s domestic co2 emissions; notes that incorrectly implemented co2 tariffs increase the competitiveness of third countries vis-à-vis intra-eu players.;


### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2 % below 1990 levels in 2018 , while at the same time its ghg emissions embedded in international trade have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global footprint; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu represent more than 20 % of the union’s domestic co2 emissions; ### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2 % below 1990 levels in 2018 , while at the same time its imported ghg emissions have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global footprint; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu represent more than 20 % of the union’s domestic co2 emissions;


### 5. requests that the implementation of the cbam should lead to the progressive phasing out of the free allocation of allowances , following an appropriate transition period , since the mechanism ensures that eu producers and importers would have to deal with the same carbon costs in the eu market; notes that this phasing out should be coupled in parallel with the introduction of export rebates in order to maintain strong decarbonisation incentives , while ensuring a level playing field for eu exports; ### 5. notes that the implementation of the cbam would fundamentally change the concept of the eu-ets and broaden its scope , which would motivate a thorough evaluation of the system as such; notes that a drastic and premature change of eu-ets risks to undermine its efficiency and long-term credibility;


### 5. requests that the implementation of the cbam should lead to the progressive phasing out of the free allocation of allowances , following an appropriate transition period , since the mechanism ensures that eu producers and importers would have to deal with the same carbon costs in the eu market; notes that this phasing out should be coupled in parallel with the introduction of export rebates in order to maintain strong decarbonisation incentives , while ensuring a level playing field for eu exports; ### 5. requests that the calculation of the cbam should be reconciled with free allocation of allowances , since this approach would ensure that eu producers and importers would deal with the same carbon costs in the eu market; notes that this approach would avoid the problems with the wto-consistency of export rebates;


### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; ### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; notes that , as the most important climate action , each nation state must take care of population growth and its own population;


### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; ### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism;


### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; ### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to reduce the eu's imported ghg emissions , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism;


### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered eu own resources; is convinced that these resources must be used for climate measures; ### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered eu own resources; is convinced that these resources must be used for climate measures; in particular it should be channelled to the regions covered by the just transition plans;


### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered eu own resources; is convinced that these resources must be used for climate measures; ### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be made available to the member states of the union; they can be used in sustainable industrial economic growth and job creation.


### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local jobs and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition; ### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe;


### 7. calls for the inclusion of cbam revenues into the eu budget; ### 7. calls for cbam revenues to be distributed among member states; emphasises that it should always be member states who decide about the size of the eu budget;


### 7. calls on the commission to conduct an impact assessment of different mechanisms and designs to incentivise international climate action and prevent carbon leakage before presenting a legislative proposal. ### 7. calls on the commission to conduct an impact assessment of different mechanisms and designs to incentivise international climate action and prevent carbon leakage before presenting a legislative proposal , taking into consideration the risk of relocation of companies , of strategic sectors , of unfair competition from member states and third countries. carry out an in-depth analysis of the compatibility with the multilateral system included in the provisions of the world trade organization.


### 7. calls on the commission to conduct an impact assessment of different mechanisms and designs to incentivise international climate action and prevent carbon leakage before presenting a legislative proposal. ### 7. calls on the commission to conduct an impact assessment , which covers the impact of the mechanism on each member state , of different mechanisms and designs to incentivise international climate action and prevent carbon leakage before presenting a legislative proposal; stresses the need to take the competitiveness of the eu industry in consideration whilst carrying out the impact assessment.


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam could theoretically cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; considers , however , that before introducing cbam on all imports , there should be a test phase of 3-5 years during which it should only cover the most energy-intensive products , such as steel and concrete , or aluminium; considers that the processing industry must receive a refund equivalent to that of its exports in order not to reduce its competitiveness on the international market;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should undergo a pilot stage and a phased introduction , and begin by covering energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers;


### 8. believes that the above proposal is compatible with world trade organization rules , since it does not discriminate between producers , is based on objective criteria and has a clear environmental objective. ### 8. believes that the above proposal must be negotiated with the wto in order to evaluate its compatibility with world trade organization rules , in order to ensure that it does not discriminate between producers , is based on objective criteria and has a clear environmental objective.


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products;


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid;


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions intensity of imports should be calculated on the basis of product-specific union benchmarks; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid , if the inclusion of indirect emissions can be achieved in a wto-compatible and non-discriminatory way;


### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that the introduction of a rising carbon floor price under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu; ### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets);


### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that the introduction of a rising carbon floor price under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu; ### 10. stresses that the pricing of fossil coal used in the co2 tariff mechanism should reflect the dynamic evolution of the prices of union allowances under the eu ets; points out that the introduction of a rising base price for fossil coal in the eu ets could ensure the predictability of the carbon tariff mechanism as well as a stronger price signal within the eu; stresses that the cbam should be based on a non-discriminatory principle in order to be wto compatible;


### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; ### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , but stresses that it is a major task to develop a correction mechanism that is fully compliant with wto rules; stresses , moreover , that it is of the utmost importance to develop a correction mechanism that provides the most legal certainty for entrepreneurs; points out that the correction mechanism should be developed in such a way that it creates a minimum administrative burden for entrepreneurs;


### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; ### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; calls for an independent and scientific research before deciding how and when a possible cbam is introduced


### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; ### 11. points out that a cbam can be designed in a wto-compatible and non-discriminatory way; highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the objective of reducing global ghg emissions;


### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , all existing measures on carbon leakage under union law should immediately cease to apply as soon as the cbam enters into force , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets; ### 12. underlines the principles of non-discrimination under most-favoured nation (mfn) and the national treatment provisions in gatt articles i and iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way , and not discriminating between imports from different third countries are key criteria for ensuring wto-compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , to ensure wto-compatibility , the calculation basis for a cbam must take into consideration existing measures on carbon leakage under union law , so that this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets;


### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , all existing measures on carbon leakage under union law should immediately cease to apply as soon as the cbam enters into force , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets; ### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets; considers that for the importer there should be an obligation to purchase allowances from a specific pool outside the ets dedicated to imports , which would mirror the eu ets system (border ets); considers further that the price should mirror the ets price in order for this measure to be wto compatible and fair;


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal;


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful fossil carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal;


### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and for stepping up the union’s contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states , which are most vulnerable to climate change; ### 14. the revenues generated by the cbam should be treated as any duty collected by the customs authorities of a member state. the member states should be authorised to retain 20 % as collection costs;


### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and for stepping up the union’s contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states , which are most vulnerable to climate change; ### 14. rejects the commission's intention to use revenues from the correction mechanism as new own resources for the eu budget; believes that the returns from the correction mechanism should flow back to the member states; further believes that the distribution key should be based on the members states net contribution to the union budget;


### (12) european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations wishing to obtain recognition as such at union level by virtue of european legal status and to receive public funding from the general budget of the european union should respect certain principles and fulfil certain conditions. in particular , it is necessary for european political parties , their affiliated european political foundations and their respective members in the union to observe the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu. european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should also ensure that their member parties and member organisations observe such values. ### (12) european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations wishing to obtain recognition and to receive public funding from the general budget of the european union should respect certain principles and fulfil certain conditions. in particular , it is necessary for european political parties , their affiliated european political foundations and their respective members in the union to observe the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu.


### (13) for the purpose of its decisions to register , in order to ascertain that a european political party or a european political foundation complies with its obligations to observe the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu , and that it ensures that its members observe such values , the authority should rely on a written declaration to be issued by the european political party or european political foundation by using a template attached to this regulation. the power of the authority , upon request from the european parliament , the council or the commission , to verify the compliance with such values should however not extend to possible breaches of those values by member parties or member organisations. ### (13) for the purpose of its decisions to register , in order to ascertain that a european political party or a european political foundation complies with its obligations to observe the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu , and that it confirms that its members observe such values , the authority should rely on a written declaration to be issued by the european political party or european political foundation by using a template attached to this regulation. the power of the authority , upon request from the european parliament , the council or the commission , to verify the compliance with such values should however not extend to possible breaches of those values by member parties or member organisations. the authority should carry out its competences in a fully transparent manner and should refrain from applying the values enshrined in article 2 teu in an instrumental or politically expedient way.


### (37) in order to enhance cooperation with long-standing members sharing eu values , contributions from member parties having their seat in a country outside the union but in the council of europe , should be allowed. however , such contributions should be subject to a cap in relation to total contribution , to limit the risk of foreign interference. ### deleted


### (38) regulation (eu , euratom) no 1141/2014 acknowledges only two categories of revenues for european political parties and foundations apart from contributions from the budget of the european union , namely contributions from members and donations. a number of revenue sources generated from own economic activities (such as sales of publications or conference fees) fall outside the scope of these two categories , creating accounting and transparency problems. a third category of revenues (‘own resources’) should therefore be created. the proportion of own resources in the total budget of a european political party or foundations should be capped at 5% to avoid that it becomes overdimensioned in relation to the overall budget of these entities. ### (38) regulation (eu , euratom) no 1141/2014 acknowledges only two categories of revenues for european political parties and foundations apart from contributions from the budget of the european union , namely contributions from members and donations. a number of revenue sources generated from own economic activities exercised within the framework of their political activities (such as sales of publications or conference fees) fall outside the scope of these two categories , creating accounting and transparency problems. a third category of revenues (‘self-generated resources’) should therefore be created. the proportion of self-generated resources in the total budget of a european political party or foundations should be capped at 5% to avoid that it becomes overdimensioned in relation to the overall budget of these entities.


### (39) in order to reach out to their members and constituencies across the union , european political parties should have the right to use their funding for cross-border political campaigns. the funding and limitation of election expenses for parties and candidates in those campaigns should be governed by the rules applicable in each member state. ### (39) in order to reach out to their members and constituencies across the union , european political parties should have the right to use their funding for cross-border political campaigns conducted in the context of elections to the european parliament , while the funding and limitation of election expenses for parties and candidates in those campaigns should be governed by the rules applicable in each member state.


### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to support political activities in the common interest , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern the implementation of the teu and the tfeu . these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice. ### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates.


### (9) ‘own resources’ means income generated by own economic activities , such as conference fees and sales of publications; ### (9) ‘self-generated resources’ means income generated by own economic activities exercised within the framework of their political activities , such as conference fees and sales of publications;


### it also ensures that its member parties having their seat in the union observe the values expressed in article 2 teu and that its member parties having their seat outside the union observe equivalent values. it provides a written declaration using the template in annex i; ### it also declares that its member parties having their seat in the union observe the values expressed in article 2 teu. it provides a written declaration using the template in annex i;


### it also ensures that its member organisations having their seat in the union observe the values expressed in article 2 teu and that its member organisations having their seat outside the union observe equivalent values. it provides a written declaration using the template in annex i; ### it also declares that its member organisations observe the values expressed in article 2 teu. it provides a written declaration using the template in annex i;


### 5. for all donations the value of which exceeds eur 3000 , european political parties and european political foundations shall request donors to provide the necessary information for their proper identification. european political parties and european political foundations shall transmit the information received to the authority upon its request. ### 5. for all donations european political parties and european political foundations shall request donors to provide the necessary information for their proper identification. european political parties and european political foundations shall transmit the information received to the authority upon its request.


### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member parties that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party. the value of contributions from member parties that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members. ### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party.


### 10. contributions from members of a european political foundation that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member organisations that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe , and from the european political party with which it is affiliated , shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political foundation and shall not derive from funds received by a european political party pursuant to this regulation from the general budget of the european union. the value of contributions from member organisations that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members. ### 10. contributions from members of a european political foundation that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state , and from the european political party with which it is affiliated , shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political foundation and shall not derive from funds received by a european political party pursuant to this regulation from the general budget of the european union.


### 2. the funding of european political parties and european political foundations from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance referendum campaigns when those campaigns concern the implementation of the treaties of the union. ### deleted


### (5) truly transnational european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations have a key role to play in articulating the voices of citizens at european level by bridging the gap between politics at national level and at union level. ### (5) the european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations can play a role in articulating the voices of citizens at european level by bridging the gap between politics at national level and at union level.


### 1. an authority for european political parties and european political foundations ( 'authority') is established for the purpose of registering , controlling and imposing sanctions on european political parties and european political foundations in accordance with this regulation. ### 1. an authority for european political parties and european political foundations ( 'authority') is established for the purpose of registering and controlling european political parties and european political foundations in accordance with this regulation.


### the authority shall decide on the registration and de-registration of european political parties and european political foundations in accordance with the procedures and conditions laid down in this regulation. in addition , the authority shall regularly verify that the registration conditions laid down in article 3 and the governance provisions set out in accordance with article 4(1) , points (a) , (b) , (d) , (e) and (f) , and in article 6(1) , points (a) to (e) , and (g) , continue to be complied with by the registered european political parties and european political foundations. ### the authority shall act in full transparency and decide on the registration and de-registration of european political parties and european political foundations in accordance with the procedures and conditions laid down in this regulation. in addition , the authority shall regularly verify that the registration conditions laid down in article 3 and the governance provisions set out in accordance with article 4(1) , points (a) , (b) , (d) , (e) and (f) , and in article 6(1) , points (a) to (e) , and (g) , continue to be complied with by the registered european political parties and european political foundations.


### 1. an application for registration shall be filed with the authority. an application for registration as a european political foundation shall be filed only through the european political party with which the applicant is formally affiliated. ### 1. the process of registration of a european political party or a european political foundation should be fully transparent and based on using templates and following clear instructions. an application for registration shall be filed with the authority. an application for registration as a european political foundation shall be filed only through the european political party with which the applicant is formally affiliated.


### 1. a european political party or a european political foundation shall lose its european legal personality upon the notification of a decision pursuant to article 11(5) . ### 1. the process of de-registration of a european political party or a european political foundations shall be fully transparent and based on using templates and following clear instructions. a european political party or a european political foundation shall lose its european legal personality upon the notification of a decision pursuant to article 11(5) .


### 1. on the basis of a decision of the authority removing a european political party or a european political foundation from the register , the authorising officer of the european parliament shall withdraw or terminate any ongoing decision or agreement on union funding , except in the cases provided for in article 19(2) , point (c) , and in article 3(1) , points (b) and (f). they shall also recover any union funding , including any unspent union funds from previous years. ### 1. on the basis of a decision removing a european political party or a european political foundation from the register , the authorising officer of the european parliament shall withdraw or terminate any ongoing decision or agreement on union funding , except in the cases provided for in article 19(2) , point (c) , and in article 3(1) , points (b) and (f). they shall also recover such union funding which has been proven that was spent in breach of this regulation.


### 1. welcomes the annual sustainable growth strategy 2022 pledge to continue placing a sustainable , fair and green transition at the heart of the european semester (semester) process , enshrining environmental sustainability , climate neutrality , public health and the wellbeing of citizens as guiding principles for the eu’s recovery. ### 1. notes the annual sustainable growth strategy 2022 pledge to continue placing a sustainable , fair and green transition at the heart of the european semester (semester) process , enshrining environmental sustainability , climate neutrality , public health and the wellbeing of citizens as guiding principles for the eu’s recovery; calls for honouring principles of market economy.


### 1. notes that the european economy is recovering faster than expected from the devastating impact of the global pandemic; underlines the crucial importance that timely policy interventions have played and will continue to play in mitigating the impact of the pandemic on the european economy; ### 1. notes that the european economy is recovering faster than expected from the devastating impact of the global covid-19 pandemic and the subsequent lockdowns; underlines the crucial importance that timely policy interventions have played and will continue to play in mitigating the impact of the pandemic on the european economy;


### 2. stresses the importance of accelerating the alignment of the semester process with the eu’s long-term climate and environmental objectives as set up under the european green deal and reinforced in the fit for 55 package; welcomes the insertion , at each european semester country report , of dedicated sections on the member state’s progress in the different sdg areas , as well as the set-up of additional indicators to monitor and guide member states’ performance in view of eu green deal policy goals; ### 2. stresses the importance of accelerating the alignment of the semester process with the eu’s long-term climate and environmental objectives as set up under the european green deal and reinforced in the fit for 55 package; notes the insertion , at each european semester country report , of dedicated sections on the member state’s progress in the different sdg areas , as well as the set-up of additional indicators to monitor and guide member states’ performance in view of eu green deal policy goals;


### 2. is concerned about emerging new variants , localised pandemic lockdowns , increased energy prices , inflationary pressure , supply-side disruptions and emerging labour shortages; notes that these risks could hamper economic growth prospects in the coming months and delay the transition to a more sustainable and future-proof economy; ### 2. remains vigilant about emerging new variants and localised pandemic lockdowns; is deeply concerned about increased energy prices , inflationary pressure , supply-side disruptions and emerging labour shortages; notes that these risks could hamper economic growth prospects in the coming months and delay the transition to a more sustainable and future-proof economy;


### 3. notes that , meeting the eu’s ambitious green deal agenda will require significant investment and that , according to the commission , the private and public investment gap to cater for the green transition are estimated at nearly eur 520 billion per year , for the next decade; further notes that whereas a substantial share of the investment will be borne by the private sector , public investment will have to increase as well; ### 3. notes that , meeting the eu’s ambitious green deal agenda will require significant investment and that , according to the commission , the private and public investment gap to cater for the green transition are estimated at nearly eur 520 billion per year , for the next decade; further warns against a substantial share of the investment to be borne by the private sector , and especially against public investment increase; highlights that the public investments that are directed to the green deal can’t primarily be directed to other important public services , such as health care , security or education , but at best have positive side-effects on these public services. calls therefore upon the commission to continuously monitor , in all member states , whether the investments needed for the green deal , do not overshadow the other crucial investments a society needs.


### 4. calls therefore on the commission to extend the current semester approach to deliver on its political commitment to make it a governance tool supporting the achievement of the european green deal and the sustainable development goals; underlines the need to further integrate , without weakening the monitoring process of this extended european semester , the union’s climate , environmental , including biodiversity and social objectives in a more comprehensive manner to provide member states with analysis and indicators beyond economic indicators only , thus better reflecting the current challenges faced by member states in reducing their ecological footprint and making the process a driver of change towards a sustainable wellbeing for all in europe; ### 4. calls furthermore on the commission to carefully consider whether the current semester approach can be considered as a subject to deliver on its unattainable political commitment , such as a governance tool supporting the achievement of the european green deal and the sustainable development goals; underlines the need to further integrate , without weakening the monitoring process of this extended european semester , the union’s environmental , especially biodiversity and social , objectives in a more comprehensive manner to provide member states with analysis and indicators beyond economic indicators only , thus better reflecting the current challenges faced by member states in reducing their ecological footprint and making the process a driver of change towards a sustainable wellbeing for all in europe , calls on the commission to lower the burden on a member state if these indicators clearly show that these challenges undermine the wellbeing of present and the future of new generations;


### 4. recognises that the crisis triggered by the covid-19 pandemic has been especially severe for enterprises , mostly small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) , in tourism , hospitality and culture; recognises the notion of european solidarity underpinning the establishment of the rrf; ### 4. recognises that the crisis triggered by the covid-19 pandemic has been especially severe for enterprises , mostly small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) , in tourism , hospitality and culture; furthermore recognises the need for a decentralised approach to crisis management , rather than a centralised procedure based on increased redistribution of resources within the union;


### 5. stresses that the european semester should support the union’s effort to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; calls therefore on the commission to assess the discrepancy between the structure of the member states’ budgets and a paris-aligned scenario for each of their national budgets; thus enabling the commission to provide recommendations on member states’ climate debt and climate-friendly investment gap associated to the union’s 2030 objective and the objective of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; ### 5. stresses that the european semester should support the union’s effort in aiming towards to achieving climate neutrality by 2050; commission might feel free to provide recommendations to member states’ on climate-friendly investment gap associated to the union’s 2030 objective;


### 5. points out that the successful roll-out of the rrf will help to make eu economies and societies more sustainable , inclusive , resilient and better prepared for the green and digital transitions; ### 5. points out that the successful roll-out of the rrf will help to make eu economies and societies more sustainable , inclusive , resilient and better prepared for the green and digital transitions. highlights however , that the eu should always seek to favour all member states equally , rather than selectively. demands that moving forward , the eu's policy should be oriented around the principle of pareto optimality , and thus regulate with a primum non nocere approach;


### 6. notes that the general escape clause of the stability and growth pact will continue to be applied in 2022 and is expected to be deactivated as of 2023; ### 6. notes that the general escape clause of the stability and growth pact will continue to be applied in 2022 and urges the commission to deactivate the clause as soon as possible. recalls that member states must adhere to the debt and deficit budget limitations stipulated in the stability and growth pact in order for the eu to have a viable economic future. however sees with concern that these limitations may conveniently be undermined in the future by raising the debt level via the recovery and resilience facility;


### 7. believes that the review of the eu’s economic governance framework is necessary; agrees with the european fiscal board on the importance of having a clear pathway towards a reviewed fiscal framework , preferably prior to the deactivation of the general escape clause; ### 7. points out that the current fiscal framework has proven to provide flexibility in times of crisis; believes nonetheless that a review of the eu’s economic governance framework could be beneficial , in order to improve the enforcement of the rules as well as lowering the public debt levels in the member states; takes note of the position of the european fiscal board on the importance of having a clear pathway towards a reviewed fiscal framework , preferably prior to the deactivation of the general escape clause;


### d. whereas the crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic led to an increase in social , territorial , economic and gender-based inequalities; ### d. whereas the crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic and the subsequent lockdowns led to an increase in social , territorial and economic inequalities;


### 9. considers that it is crucial to coordinate national reform and investment efforts and the exchange of best practices in order to increase the convergence and resilience of our economies , promote sustainable and inclusive growth , and improve institutional frameworks; ### 9. considers that it is crucial that member states implement structural reforms , pursue targeted investments and exchange best practices in order to increase the convergence and resilience of our economies , promote sustainable and inclusive growth , and improve institutional frameworks;


### 11. highlights that the covid-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on women; emphasises the importance of increasing women’s participation in the economy , including inclusive participation in the digital economy and transformation , and ensuring more inclusive growth as part of the solution to the post-pandemic recovery , which will help to increase jobs , economic prosperity and competitiveness across the eu; ### 11. highlights that the covid-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on people , regardless of gender;


### 12. notes that many member states are having to contend with old and new structural challenges that are hindering their growth potential; highlights , therefore , that tackling structural challenges is crucial for a sustainable recovery and continued growth; takes the view that implementing reforms to address old and new structural vulnerabilities is key not only to improving the ability to withstand and cope with existing challenges , but also to accomplishing the twin transitions in a sustainable , fair and inclusive manner and to reducing social inequalities; points to the lack of national ownership as one of the main weaknesses in enacting reforms aimed at addressing structural deficiencies; ### 12. notes that many member states are having to contend with old and new structural challenges that are hindering their growth potential; highlights , therefore , that tackling structural challenges is crucial for a sustainable recovery and continued growth; takes the view that implementing growth enhancing reforms to address old and new structural vulnerabilities is key not only to improving the ability to withstand and cope with existing challenges , but also to accomplishing the twin transitions in a sustainable , fair and inclusive manner and to reducing social inequalities; points to the lack of national ownership as one of the main weaknesses in enacting reforms aimed at addressing structural deficiencies;


### 13. is concerned that the commission identified macroeconomic vulnerabilities related to imbalances and excessive imbalances in 12 member states; is worried that the nature and source of member states’ imbalances remain largely the same as before the pandemic and that the pandemic could also be exacerbating imbalances and economic divergences; calls on the member states to take advantage of the unprecedented opportunity provided by the rrf to significantly reduce existing macroeconomic imbalances , in particular by including ambitious reform measures in the national plans of all member states; stresses that sound execution is essential to make full use of this opportunity; ### 13. is concerned that the commission identified macroeconomic vulnerabilities related to imbalances and excessive imbalances in 12 member states; is worried that the nature and source of member states’ imbalances remain largely the same as before the pandemic and that the pandemic could also be exacerbating imbalances and economic divergences; calls on the member states to take advantage of the unprecedented opportunity provided by the rrf to significantly reduce existing macroeconomic imbalances , in particular by including ambitious reform measures in the national plans of all member states; stresses that sound execution is essential to make full use of this opportunity , nevertheless , continues to emphasise that there should be no liability in the eu for the debts of other member states;


### 1. takes note of the investment report 2021/2022; welcomes the focus on the eu’s long-term challenges of climate change , social cohesion and digital transformation; ### 1. takes note of the investment report 2021/2022; welcomes the focus on the eu’s long-term challenges of climate change , social cohesion and digital transformation; welcomes eib's record investment in 2021 of almost eur 95 billion euros of financing , compared to eur 77 billion in 2020; acknowledges almost half of this financing is directed to the support of 430 000 smes and mid-caps which employ 4.5 million people;


### 2. calls for an increase in the eib’s capitalisation to enable more long-term loans and innovative instruments to finance projects with great potential for sustainability , social and innovation gains; ### 2. calls for an increase in the eib’s capitalisation to enable more long-term loans and innovative instruments to finance projects with great potential for sustainability , social and innovation gains; applauds a record eur 20.7 billion of the eib's financing went to support innovation , including investment in digitalisation and the promotion of skills and training for the digital world; considers this kind of investment of paramount importance to maintain europe’s competitiveness and to pursue the eu’s strategic autonomy;


### 3. welcomes the new cohesion orientation , which commits to increasing eib lending activities to 45 % of total eu-27 lending in cohesion regions by 2025 and to 23 % in least developed regions; ### 3. welcomes the new cohesion orientation , which commits to increasing eib lending activities to 45 % of total eu-27 lending in cohesion regions by 2025 and to 23 % in least developed regions taking into account the preservation of the eib’s overall triple-a rating; recalls that the eib remains a market and demand driven instrument and that investments are selected based on financial , economic and technical merits , not following any pre-defined quotas;


### 4. applauds the timeliness of the european guarantee fund to help mitigate the negative social and economic impacts of the covid-19 pandemic; ### 4. applauds the timeliness of the european guarantee fund (egf) to help mitigate the negative social and economic impacts of the covid-19 pandemic , supporting smes; notes that as of 31 december 2021 , the eib approved eur 23.2 billion in egf operations or 95% of the available eur 24.4 billion , representing about one third of what the eib group normally invests in a year and on top of the rest of eib’s regular business;


### 6. welcomes the fact that 43 % of lending in 2021 was climate and environment related and applauds the intention to meet the climate lending target in 2022; stresses that the climate bank roadmap (cbr) alone is not enough to ensure alignment with the objective of the paris agreement of limiting global warming to 1.5°c; calls for an immediate halt to carbon markets and offsetting and for all action plans for the implementation of the cbr to be made public; ### 6. welcomes the fact that 43 % of lending in 2021 , up from 40% in 2020 , was climate and environment related and applauds the intention to meet the climate lending target of 50% in 2022; notes that this share amounts to 51% when disregarding the egf mandate that specifically targets sme's hit by the pandemic;


### 12. welcomes the updated essf standard 4 and calls for its diligent implementation; welcomes the efforts made to strengthen biodiversity risk assessment and due diligence; is concerned , however , at the use of outdated data; expects the eib to comply with articles 11 and 191 tfue and to stop disbursing funds , and , if necessary , withdraw them , if there is evidence or a serious risk of adverse impacts; ### 12. welcomes the updated essf standard 4 and calls for its diligent implementation; welcomes the efforts made to strengthen biodiversity risk assessment and due diligence; expects the eib to comply with articles 11 and 191 tfue and to stop disbursing funds , and , if necessary , withdraw them , if there is evidence or a serious risk of adverse impacts;


### 18. regrets that the new essf includes no significant improvement in human rights protection or procedures to prevent human rights violations; calls for this to be addressed in the statement on human rights; is very concerned that in some cases , the eib has continued to disburse loans despite clear human rights abuses; ### 18. welcomes the new essf which strengthens a risk-based approach that is more explicit on environment and social matters while having human rights as a key objective; recalls that this requires eib clients to ensure respect for human rights by taking a human-rights-responsive approach to the impact assessment process;


### 19. is very concerned by the decline of transparency at the eib: in 2010 , 96.1 % of all projects were published three weeks before board approval , falling to only 60 % in 2020; calls for more transparency and accountability , also towards eu institutions , in particular parliament; ### 19. recalls that investments with private counterparts usually come with a higher level of commercial interests that need to be protected; reminds that stock-exchange listed companies have to operate under applicable capital market regulations which have an implication on information sharing; understands therefor the decrease in the rate of pre-published projects over the last 15 years caused by the steadily increase in the amount of private sector clients , including those involved through instruments like efsi;


### 20. considers the new transparency policy (tp) a major setback; regrets that the eib has totally ignored parliament’s very clear demands to improve its tp in line with other financial institutions’ best practices and standards; calls for the tp to be aligned with that of the european bank for reconstruction and development on mandatory disclosure for intermediaries of projects with high environmental risks; ### 20. welcomes the new transparency policy (tp) including the publication of calendars of the regular meetings of the board of directors , management committee and audit committee; welcomes the eib's commitment to publish summaries of sub-projects financed through financial intermediaries with a total project cost greater than €50 million; equally welcomes the bank's commitment to publish additionality impact statements of eib operations as part of its additionality and impact measurement (aim) framework;


### 25. takes note of the new anti-fraud policy; is concerned about the opaque way in which it was adopted; ### 25. takes note of the new anti-fraud policy adopted following established approval procedures , targeted stakeholders engagement including exchanges with civil society organisations and in consultation with olaf and the eppo;


### 27. is very concerned that , at least once , the eib disbursed funding despite a very clear eib complaints mechanism report concluding that its environmental and social standards had been breached; calls for any such project to be halted immediately; ### deleted


### (3) whereas its general objective is still valid and should be retained , regulation (ec) no 1920/2006 as such no longer fits for addressing the current and future drug challenges. therefore , the mandate of the european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction should be revised , including its replacement and renaming into “european union drugs agency” (‘the agency’). since substantial amendments to regulation (ec) no 1920/2006 are needed to accommodate the common approach for union decentralised agencies48 and to take account of the developments of the drug phenomenon , in the interest of clarity that regulation should be replaced by a new regulation. ### (3) whereas its general objective is still valid and should be retained , regulation (ec) no 1920/2006 as such no longer fits for addressing the current and future drug challenges. therefore , the mandate of the european monitoring centre for drugs and drug addiction should be revised , including its replacement , reinforcement and renaming into “european union drugs agency” (‘the agency’). since substantial amendments to regulation (ec) no 1920/2006 are needed to accommodate the common approach for union decentralised agencies48 and to take account of the developments of the drug phenomenon , in the interest of clarity that regulation should be replaced by a new regulation.


### (4) the main focus of regulation (ec) no 1920/2006 was on health-related issues. however , addressing also drug markets and drug supply issues , is necessary to understand the impacts of the drug phenomenon on public health , reduce the availability of drugs in the union and curb drug demand. health- and supply-related issues are intrinsically linked. the agency should therefore address the drug phenomenon more holistically. ### (4) the main focus of regulation (ec) no 1920/2006 was on health-related issues. however , addressing also drug production , drug markets and drug supply issues , is necessary to understand the impacts of the drug phenomenon on public health , reduce the availability of drugs in the union and curb drug demand. health- and supply-related issues are intrinsically linked. in order to provide factual , objective , reliable , comparable and union-wide significant data and analysis , the agency should therefore address the drug phenomenon in a multidisciplinary way , taking into account drug use , drug addictions , prevention , treatment , care , risk and harm reduction , rehabilitation , social reintegration and recovery , drug supply , including illicit production and trafficking , and other relevant drug related issues such as violence , criminality and their consequences.


### (3) environmentally sustainable bonds are one of the main instruments for financing investments related to low-carbon technologies , energy and resource efficiency as well as sustainable transport infrastructure and research infrastructure. financial or non-financial undertakings or sovereigns can issue such bonds. various existing initiatives for environmentally sustainable bonds do not ensure common definitions of environmentally sustainable economic activities. this prevents investors from easily identifying bonds the proceeds of which are aligned with , or are contributing to environmental objectives as laid down in the paris agreement. ### (3) environmentally sustainable bonds are one of the main instruments for financing investments related to low-carbon technologies , energy and resource efficiency as well as sustainable transport infrastructure and research infrastructure. financial or non-financial undertakings or sovereigns can issue such bonds. various existing initiatives for environmentally sustainable bonds do not ensure common definitions of environmentally sustainable economic activities. this prevents investors from easily identifying bonds the proceeds of which are aligned with , or are contributing to environmental objectives as laid down in the paris agreement. there is therefore a need to synchronise green bond standards and link the european green bond standard to existing global standards such as the climate bonds standard and the green bond principles.


### (8) in accordance with article 4 of regulation (eu) 2020/852 , and in order to provide investors with clear , quantitative , detailed and common definitions , the requirements set out in article 3 of that regulation should be used to determine whether an economic activity qualifies as environmentally sustainable. proceeds of bonds that use the designation ‘european green bond’ or ‘eugb’ should exclusively be used to fund economic activities that either are environmentally sustainable and are thus aligned with the environmental objectives set out in article 9 of regulation (eu) 2020/852 , or contribute to the transformation of activities to become environmentally sustainable. those bonds can however be used both to finance such environmentally sustainable activities directly through the financing of assets and expenditures that relate to economic activities that meet the requirements set out in article 3 of regulation (eu) 2020/852 , or indirectly through financial assets that finance economic activities that meet those requirements. it is therefore necessary to specify the categories of expenditures and assets that can be financed with the proceeds of bonds that use the designation ‘european green bond’ or ‘eugb’. ### (8) in accordance with article 4 of regulation (eu) 2020/852 , and in order to provide investors with clear , quantitative , detailed and common definitions , the requirements set out in article 3 of that regulation should be used to determine whether an economic activity qualifies as environmentally sustainable. at least 90% of the proceeds of bonds that use the designation ‘european green bond’ or ‘eugb’ should be used to fund economic activities that either are environmentally sustainable and are thus aligned with the environmental objectives set out in article 9 of regulation (eu) 2020/852 , or contribute to the transformation of activities to become environmentally sustainable. those bonds can however be used both to finance such environmentally sustainable activities directly through the financing of assets and expenditures that relate to economic activities that meet the requirements set out in article 3 of regulation (eu) 2020/852 , or indirectly through financial assets that finance economic activities that meet those requirements. it is therefore necessary to specify the categories of expenditures and assets that can be financed with the proceeds of bonds that use the designation ‘european green bond’ or ‘eugb’.


### (10) sovereigns are frequent issuers of environmentally sustainable bonds and should therefore also be allowed to issue ‘european green bonds’ , provided that the proceeds of such bonds are used to finance either assets or expenditure that meet the taxonomy , or assets or expenditure that will meet those requirements within a reasonably short period from the issuance of the bond concerned , which can be extended however where duly justified by the specific features of the economic activities and investments concerned. ### (10) sovereigns are frequent issuers of environmentally sustainable bonds and should therefore also be allowed to issue ‘european green bonds’ , provided that the proceeds of such bonds are used to finance either assets or expenditure that meet the taxonomy , or assets or expenditure that are to meet those requirements within a reasonably short period from the issuance of the bond concerned , which can be extended however where duly justified by the specific features of the economic activities and investments concerned. by way of exception , sovereigns should be able to use the proceeds of such bonds to fund environmentally sustainable assets or expenditure meeting the requirements of other classifications that are coherent with the taxonomy.


### (11) article 4 of regulation (eu) 2020/852 requires member states and the union to apply the criteria set out in article 3 of that regulation to determine whether an economic activity qualifies as environmentally sustainable for the purposes of any measure setting out requirements for financial market participants or issuers in respect of financial products or corporate bonds that are made available as environmentally sustainable. it is therefore logical that the technical screening criteria referred to in article 3 , point (d) , of regulation (eu) 2020/852 should determine which fixed assets , expenditures and financial assets can be financed by the proceeds of european green bonds. in view of the expected technological progress in the field of environmental sustainability , the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 are likely to be reviewed and amended over time. regardless of such changes , in order to provide legal certainty to issuers and investors and prevent amendments to the technical screening criteria from having a negative impact on the price of european green bonds that have already been issued , issuers should be able to apply the technical screening criteria applicable at the moment the european green bond was issued when allocating the proceeds of such bonds to eligible fixed assets or expenditures , until maturity of the bond. to ensure legal certainty for european green bonds whose proceeds are allocated to financial assets , it is necessary to clarify that the underlying economic activities funded by those financial assets should comply with the technical screening criteria applicable at the moment the financial assets were created. where the relevant delegated acts are amended , the issuer should allocate proceeds by applying the amended delegated acts within five years. ### (11) article 4 of regulation (eu) 2020/852 requires member states and the union to apply the criteria set out in article 3 of that regulation to determine whether an economic activity qualifies as environmentally sustainable for the purposes of any measure setting out requirements for financial market participants or issuers in respect of financial products or corporate bonds that are made available as environmentally sustainable. it is therefore logical that the technical screening criteria referred to in article 3 , point (d) , of regulation (eu) 2020/852 should determine which fixed assets , expenditures and financial assets should primarily be financed by the proceeds of european green bonds. in view of the expected technological progress in the field of environmental sustainability , the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 are likely to be reviewed and amended over time. regardless of such changes , in order to provide legal certainty to issuers and investors and prevent amendments to the technical screening criteria from having a negative impact on the price of european green bonds that have already been issued , issuers should be able to apply the technical screening criteria applicable at the moment the european green bond was issued when allocating the proceeds of such bonds to eligible fixed assets or expenditures , until maturity of the bond. to ensure legal certainty for european green bonds whose proceeds are allocated to financial assets , it is necessary to clarify that the underlying economic activities funded by those financial assets should comply with the technical screening criteria applicable at the moment the financial assets were created. any amendment to the relevant delegated acts shall not affect the issuer’s obligations; in particular , it shall not require the allocation of proceeds to be adapted to the new requirements.


### (12) the time needed to transform an asset to align the economic activity to which it relates with the taxonomy requirements should reasonably not exceed five years , except in certain circumstances where it may take up to ten years. for that reason , eligible capital expenditure should relate to economic activities that meet or will meet the taxonomy requirements within five years from the issuance of the bond , unless a longer period of up to ten years is justified by the specific features of the economic activities and investments concerned. ### deleted


### (15) issuers of european green bonds should abide by their commitments to investors and allocate the proceeds of their bonds within a reasonably short time after issuance. at the same time , issuers should not be penalised for allocating bond proceeds to economic activities that do not yet meet the taxonomy requirements , but will do so within the five year period (or extended ten year period). issuers should in any case allocate all proceeds of their european green bonds before the maturity of each bond. ### (15) issuers of european green bonds should abide by their commitments to investors and allocate the proceeds of their bonds within a reasonably short time after issuance. at the same time , issuers should not be penalised for allocating bond proceeds to economic activities that do not yet meet the taxonomy requirements , but will do so within the five year period (or extended ten year period). in that case , issuers should draft a taxonomy-alignment plan setting out when those activities will meet the taxonomy requirements , whereby any change in the tsc after the bonds have been issued shall not require correction of the plan. issuers should in any case allocate all proceeds of their european green bonds before the maturity of each bond.


### (16) unlike issuers that are financial or non-financial undertakings , issuers that are sovereigns can use the proceeds of european green bonds to indirectly finance economic activities that are aligned with the taxonomy requirements through the use of programmes of tax expenditures or programmes of transfers , including subsidies. in such cases , sovereigns ensure that economic activities funded by such programmes comply with the terms and conditions of those programmes. for that reason , when providing pre- and post-issuance reviews of european green bonds issued by sovereigns and the proceeds of which are allocated to tax expenditures or subsidies in accordance with terms and conditions that are aligned with taxonomy requirements , external reviewers should not be required to assess the taxonomy-alignment of each economic activity funded by such programmes. where that is the case , it should be sufficient for external reviewers to assess the alignment of the terms and conditions of the funding programmes concerned with the taxonomy requirements. ### (16) unlike issuers that are financial or non-financial undertakings , issuers that are sovereigns can use the proceeds of european green bonds to indirectly finance economic activities that are aligned , or seeking alignment , with the taxonomy requirements through the use of programmes of tax expenditures or programmes of transfers , including subsidies. in such cases , sovereigns ensure that economic activities funded by such programmes comply with the terms and conditions of those programmes. for that reason , when providing pre- and post-issuance reviews of european green bonds issued by sovereigns and the proceeds of which are allocated to tax expenditures or subsidies in accordance with terms and conditions that are aligned with taxonomy requirements , external reviewers should not be required to assess the taxonomy-alignment of each economic activity funded by such programmes. where that is the case , it should be sufficient for external reviewers to assess whether the terms and conditions of the funding programmes concerned are sufficiently aligned with the taxonomy requirements.


### (25) it is necessary to avoid divergent applications of this regulation by national competent authorities. at the same time , it is necessary to lower transaction and operational costs of external reviewers , to strengthen investor confidence and to increase legal certainty. it is therefore appropriate to give esma general competence for the registration and ongoing supervision of registered external reviewers in the union. entrusting esma with the exclusive responsibility for those matters should ensure a level playing field in terms of registration requirements and on-going supervision and eliminate the risk of regulatory arbitrage across member states. at the same time , such exclusive responsibility should optimise the allocation of supervisory resources at union level , thus making esma the centre of expertise and enhancing the efficiency of supervision. ### deleted


### the use of proceeds referred to in article 4 shall relate to economic activities that meet the taxonomy requirements , or that will meet the taxonomy requirements within a defined period of time as set out in a taxonomy-alignment plan. ### at least 90% of proceeds referred to in article 4 (80% in the transitional period until final determination of the technical screening criteria (tsc)) shall be allocated to economic activities that meet the taxonomy requirements , or that are to meet the taxonomy requirements within a defined period of time as set out in a taxonomy-alignment plan.


### where the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 are amended following the issuance of the bond , the issuer shall allocate bond proceeds to the uses referred to in the first subparagraph by applying the amended delegated acts within five years after their entry into application. ### where the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 are amended following the issuance of the bond , the issuer shall not be required to amend the allocation of bond proceeds but shall continue to be bound by the provisions resulting from the delegated acts in force at the time of issuance of the bond.


### where the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 are amended following the creation of the debt referred to in the first subparagraph , the issuer shall allocate bond proceeds to the debt referred to in the first subparagraph by applying the amended delegated acts within five years after their entry into application. ### where the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 are amended following the creation of the debt referred to in the first subparagraph , the issuer shall not be required to amend the allocation of bond proceeds but shall be bound in this respect by the delegated acts applicable at the point in time when the debt was created.


### 1. issuers of european green bonds shall , after the full allocation of the proceeds of such bonds and at least once during the lifetime of the bond , draw up a european green bond impact report on the environmental impact of the use of the bond proceeds by using the template laid down in annex iii. ### 1. issuers of european green bonds shall , after the full allocation of the proceeds of such bonds at least once , draw up a european green bond impact report on the environmental impact of the use of the bond proceeds by using the template laid down in annex iii.


### (9) the proceeds of european green bonds should be used to finance economic activities that have a lasting positive impact on the environment. such lasting positive impact can be attained in several ways. since fixed assets are long-term assets , a first way is to use the proceeds of such european green bonds to finance fixed tangible or fixed intangible assets that are not financial assets , provided that those fixed assets relate to economic activities that meet the requirements for environmentally sustainable economic activities set out in article 3 of regulation (eu) 2020/852 (‘taxonomy requirements’). since financial assets can be used to finance economic activities with a lasting positive impact on the environment , a second way is to use those proceeds to finance financial assets , provided that the proceeds from those financial assets are allocated to economic activities that meet the taxonomy requirements. since the assets of households can also have a long-term positive impact on the environment , those financial assets should also include the assets of households. since capital expenditure and selected operating expenditure can be used to acquire , upgrade , or maintain fixed assets , a third way is to use the proceeds of such bonds to finance capital and operating expenditures that relate to economic activities that meet the taxonomy requirements or that will meet those requirements within a reasonably short period from the issuance of the bond concerned , which can be extended however where duly justified by the specific features of the economic activities and investments concerned. for the reasons outlined above , the capital and operating expenditures should also include the expenditures of households. ### (9) the proceeds of european green bonds should be used to finance economic activities that have a lasting positive impact on the environment. such lasting positive impact can be attained in several ways. since fixed assets are long-term assets , a first way is to use the proceeds of such european green bonds to finance fixed tangible or fixed intangible assets that are not financial assets , provided that at least 90% of those fixed assets relate to economic activities that meet the requirements for environmentally sustainable economic activities set out in article 3 of regulation (eu) 2020/852 (‘taxonomy requirements’). since financial assets can be used to finance economic activities with a lasting positive impact on the environment , a second way is to use those proceeds to finance financial assets , provided that the proceeds from those financial assets are allocated to economic activities that meet the taxonomy requirements. since the assets of households can also have a long-term positive impact on the environment , those financial assets should also include the assets of households. since capital expenditure and selected operating expenditure can be used to acquire , upgrade , or maintain fixed assets , a third way is to use the proceeds of such bonds to finance capital and operating expenditures that relate to economic activities that meet the taxonomy requirements or that will meet those requirements within a reasonably short period from the issuance of the bond concerned , which can be extended however where duly justified by the specific features of the economic activities and investments concerned. for the reasons outlined above , the capital and operating expenditures should also include the expenditures of households.


### (27) to enable esma to perform its supervisory tasks , and in particular to compel external reviewers to put an end to an infringement , to supply complete and correct information or to comply with an investigation or an on-site inspection , esma should be able to impose penalties or periodic penalty payments. ### deleted


### where the european green bonds are offered to the public or are listed on a market in only one member state , in a language accepted by the competent authority , as referred to in article 36 of this regulation , of that member state; ### where the european green bonds are offered to the public or are listed on a market in only one member state , in the official language of that member state;


### where the european green bonds are offered to the public or are listed on a market in two or more member states , either in a language accepted by the competent authority , as referred to in article 37 of this regulation , of each member state , or in a language customary in the sphere of international finance , at the choice of the issuer. ### where the european green bonds are offered to the public or are listed on a market in two or more member states , in the official languages of each member state , or in english or in the official language of the state of the issuer , at the choice of the issuer.


### (21) to improve transparency on how external reviewers reach their conclusions , to ensure that external reviewers have adequate qualifications , professional experience , and independence , and to reduce the risk of potential conflicts of interests , and thus to ensure adequate investor protection , issuers of european green bonds should only make use of external reviewers , including from third-countries , that have been registered and are subject to ongoing supervision by the european securities and markets authority (esma). ### deleted


### (26) esma should be able to require all information necessary to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively. it should therefore be able to demand such information from external reviewers , persons involved in external review activities , reviewed entities and related third parties , third parties to whom the external reviewers have outsourced operational functions and persons otherwise closely and substantially related or connected to external reviewers or external review activities. ### deleted


### carry out periodic reviews to ensure that all financial supervisors have adequate resources and powers necessary for the performance of their tasks in the area of aml/cft; ### deleted


### perform assessments of the strategies , capacities and resources of financial supervisors in the area of aml/cft and make the results of such assessments available to all financial supervisors; ### deleted


### 2. where an authorisation as referred to in paragraph 1 is applied for , the national judicial authority shall control that the decision of the authority is authentic and that the coercive measures envisaged are neither arbitrary nor excessive having regard to the subject matter of the inspection. in its control of the proportionality of the coercive measures , the national judicial authority may ask the authority for detailed explanations , in particular relating to the grounds the authority has for suspecting that an infringement of the acts referred to in article 1(2) , first subparagraph has taken place , the seriousness of the suspected infringement and the nature of the involvement of the person subject to the coercive measures. however , the national judicial authority shall not review the necessity for the inspection or demand to be provided with the information on the authority’s file. the lawfulness of the authority’s decision shall be subject to review only by the court of justice of the european union. ### 2. where an authorisation as referred to in paragraph 1 is applied for , the national judicial authority shall control that the decision of the authority is authentic and compliant with both union and national law , and that the coercive measures envisaged are neither arbitrary nor excessive having regard to the subject matter of the inspection. in its control of the proportionality of the coercive measures , the national judicial authority may ask the authority for detailed explanations , in particular relating to the grounds the authority has for suspecting that an infringement of the acts referred to in article 1(2) , first subparagraph has taken place , the seriousness of the suspected infringement and the nature of the involvement of the person subject to the coercive measures. however , the national judicial authority shall not review the necessity for the inspection or demand to be provided with the information on the authority’s file. the lawfulness of the authority’s decision shall be subject to review only by the court of justice of the european union.


### (3) therefore , a european authority for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism , the anti-money laundering authority (‘the authority’) should be established. the creation of this new authority is crucial to ensure efficient and adequate supervision of obliged entities having high inherent money laundering/terrorist financing (ml/tf) risk , strengthening common supervisory approaches for non-selected obliged entities and facilitating joint analyses and cooperation between financial investigation units (fius). ### (3) therefore , a european authority for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism , the anti-money laundering authority (‘the authority’) should be established. the creation of this new authority is crucial to ensure efficient and adequate supervision of obliged entities having high inherent money laundering/terrorist financing (ml/tf) risk , strengthening common supervisory approaches for non-selected obliged entities and facilitating joint analyses and cooperation between financial investigation units (fius). the authority should not in any way undermine the activities of national supervisory authorities or fius , or enter into hierarchical relationships with them.


### (14) in addition to giving cert-eu more tasks and an expanded role , an interinstitutional cybersecurity board (iicb) should be established , which should facilitate a high common level of cybersecurity among union institutions , bodies and agencies by monitoring the implementation of this regulation by the union institutions , bodies and agencies and by supervising implementation of general priorities and objectives by cert-eu and providing strategic direction to cert-eu. the iicb should ensure representation of the institutions and include representatives of agencies and bodies through the union agencies network. ### (14) in addition to giving cert-eu more tasks and an expanded role , an interinstitutional cybersecurity board (iicb) should be established , which should facilitate a high common level of cybersecurity among union institutions , bodies and agencies by monitoring the implementation of this regulation by the union institutions , bodies and agencies and by supervising implementation of general priorities and objectives by cert-eu and providing strategic direction to cert-eu. the iicb should ensure representation of the institutions and include representatives of agencies and bodies through the union agencies network. taking into account number of staff members and dimension of their ict environment , the european parliament , the council of the european union and the european commission should be represented by two representatives. as regards the european parliament , one representative should be nominated by its general secretariat , and one by the competent committee. similarly , one representative of the council should be nominated by its general secretariat , and one by the presidency of the council.


### members may be assisted by an alternate. other representatives of the organisations listed above or of other union institutions , bodies and agencies may be invited by the chair to attend iicb meetings without voting power. ### deleted


### the commission shall propose the reallocation of staff and financial resources from relevant union institutions , bodies and agencies to the commission budget. the reallocation shall be effective at the same time as the first budget adopted following the entry into force of this regulation. ### 1. the commission shall in its proposal for the first budget to be adopted following the entry into force of this regulation take into account an increased budgeting and staffing needs of all union entities , and particularly the small ones , associated with the new obligations stemming from this regulation.


### (2) the cyber threat landscape faced by union institutions , bodies and agencies is in constant evolution. the tactics , techniques and procedures employed by threat actors are constantly evolving , while the prominent motives for such attacks change little , from stealing valuable undisclosed information to making money , manipulating public opinion or undermining digital infrastructure. the pace at which they conduct their cyberattacks keeps increasing , while their campaigns are increasingly sophisticated and automated , targeting exposed attack surfaces that keep expanding and quickly exploiting vulnerabilities. ### (2) the cyber threat landscape faced by union entities is in constant evolution. the tactics , techniques and procedures employed by threat actors are constantly evolving , while the prominent motives for such attacks change little , from stealing valuable undisclosed information to making money , manipulating public opinion or undermining digital infrastructure. the pace at which they conduct their cyberattacks keeps increasing , while their campaigns are increasingly sophisticated and automated , targeting exposed attack surfaces that keep expanding and quickly exploiting vulnerabilities.