### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission and the national authorities of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules.


### a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest. ### a gatekeeper shall inform the commission and the national authorities of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest.


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of end users that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3.


### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. the commission may , solely upon request of at least 3 member states’ national authorities , conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position over the next 18 months , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4.


### (17) a very significant turnover in the union and the provision of a core platform service in at least three member states constitute compelling indications that the provider of a core platform service has a significant impact on the internal market. this is equally true where a provider of a core platform service in at least three member states has a very significant market capitalisation or equivalent fair market value. therefore , a provider of a core platform service should be presumed to have a significant impact on the internal market where it provides a core platform service in at least three member states and where either its group turnover realised in the eea is equal to or exceeds a specific , high threshold or the market capitalisation of the group is equal to or exceeds a certain high absolute value. for providers of core platform services that belong to undertakings that are not publicly listed , the equivalent fair market value above a certain high absolute value should be referred to. the commission should use its power to adopt delegated acts to develop an objective methodology to calculate that value. a high eea group turnover in conjunction with the threshold of users in the union of core platform services reflects a relatively strong ability to monetise these users. a high market capitalisation relative to the same threshold number of users in the union reflects a relatively significant potential to monetise these users in the near future. this monetisation potential in turn reflects in principle the gateway position of the undertakings concerned. both indicators are in addition reflective of their financial capacity , including their ability to leverage their access to financial markets to reinforce their position. this may for example happen where this superior access is used to acquire other undertakings , which ability has in turn been shown to have potential negative effects on innovation. market capitalisation can also be reflective of the expected future position and effect on the internal market of the providers concerned , notwithstanding a potentially relatively low current turnover. the market capitalisation value can be based on a level that reflects the average market capitalisation of the largest publicly listed undertakings in the union over an appropriate period. ### (17) a very significant turnover in the union and the provision of a core platform service in at least two member states constitute sufficient indications that the provider of a core platform service has a significant impact on the internal market. this is equally true where a provider of a core platform service in at least two member states has a very significant market capitalisation or equivalent fair market value. therefore , a provider of a core platform service should be presumed to have a significant impact on the internal market where it provides a core platform service in at least two member states and where either its group turnover realised in the eea is equal to or exceeds a specific , high threshold or the market capitalisation of the group is equal to or exceeds a certain high absolute value. for providers of core platform services that belong to undertakings that are not publicly listed , the equivalent fair market value above a certain high absolute value should be referred to. the commission should , in cooperation with the member states and after consulting the advisory committee , develop an objective methodology to calculate that value , taking into account relevant quantitative and qualitative criteria. a high eea group turnover in conjunction with the threshold of users in the union of core platform services reflects a relatively strong ability to monetise these users. a high market capitalisation relative to the same threshold number of users in the union reflects a relatively significant potential to monetise these users in the near future. this monetisation potential in turn reflects in principle the gateway position of the undertakings concerned. both indicators are in addition reflective of their financial capacity , including their ability to leverage their access to financial markets to reinforce their position. this may for example happen where this superior access is used to acquire other undertakings , which ability has in turn been shown to have potential negative effects on innovation. market capitalisation can also be reflective of the expected future position and effect on the internal market of the providers concerned , notwithstanding a potentially relatively low current turnover. the market capitalisation value can be based on a level that reflects the average market capitalisation of the largest publicly listed undertakings in the union over an appropriate period.


### (20) a very high number of business users that depend on a core platform service to reach a very high number of monthly active end users allow the provider of that service to influence the operations of a substantial part of business users to its advantage and indicate in principle that the provider serves as an important gateway. the respective relevant levels for those numbers should be set representing a substantive percentage of the entire population of the union when it comes to end users and of the entire population of businesses using platforms to determine the threshold for business users. ### (20) a high number of business users that depend on a core platform service to reach a very high number of monthly active end users allow the provider of that service to influence the operations of a substantial part of business users to its advantage and indicate in principle that the provider serves as an important gateway. the respective relevant levels for those numbers should be set representing a substantive percentage of the entire population of the union when it comes to end users and of the entire population of businesses using platforms to determine the threshold for business users.


### (21) an entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. this is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least three member states to a very high number of business users and end users during at least three years. ### (21) an entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. this is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least two member states to a very high number of business users and end users during at least three years.


### (22) such thresholds can be impacted by market and technical developments. the commission should therefore be empowered to adopt delegated acts to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds are met , and to regularly adjust it to market and technological developments where necessary. this is particularly relevant in relation to the threshold referring to market capitalisation , which should be indexed in appropriate intervals. ### (22) such thresholds can be impacted by market and technical developments. the commission should therefore be empowered , in cooperation with the member states and after consulting the digital markets advisory committee , to take steps to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds are met , and to regularly adjust it to market and technological developments where necessary. this is particularly relevant in relation to the threshold referring to market capitalisation , which should be indexed in appropriate intervals.


### (25) such an assessment can only be done in light of a market investigation , while taking into account the quantitative thresholds. in its assessment the commission should pursue the objectives of preserving and fostering the level of innovation , the quality of digital products and services , the degree to which prices are fair and competitive , and the degree to which quality or choice for business users and for end users is or remains high. elements that are specific to the providers of core platform services concerned , such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration , can be taken into account. in addition , a very high market capitalisation , a very high ratio of equity value over profit or a very high turnover derived from end users of a single core platform service can point to the tipping of the market or leveraging potential of such providers. together with market capitalisation , high growth rates , or decelerating growth rates read together with profitability growth , are examples of dynamic parameters that are particularly relevant to identifying such providers of core platform services that are foreseen to become entrenched. the commission should be able to take a decision by drawing adverse inferences from facts available where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission. ### (25) such an assessment can only be done in light of a market investigation , while taking into account the quantitative thresholds. in its assessment the commission should pursue the objectives of preserving and fostering the level of innovation , the quality of digital products and services , the degree to which prices are fair and competitive , and the degree to which quality , availability or choice for business users and for end users is or remains high. elements that are specific to the providers of core platform services concerned , such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration , can be taken into account. in addition , a very high market capitalisation , a very high ratio of equity value over profit or a very high turnover derived from end users of a single core platform service can point to the tipping of the market or leveraging potential of such providers. together with market capitalisation , high growth rates , or decelerating growth rates read together with profitability growth , are examples of dynamic parameters that are particularly relevant to identifying such providers of core platform services that are foreseen to become entrenched. the commission should be able to take a decision by drawing adverse inferences from facts available where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission.


### (25) such an assessment can only be done in light of a market investigation , while taking into account the quantitative thresholds. in its assessment the commission should pursue the objectives of preserving and fostering the level of innovation , the quality of digital products and services , the degree to which prices are fair and competitive , and the degree to which quality or choice for business users and for end users is or remains high. elements that are specific to the providers of core platform services concerned , such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration , can be taken into account. in addition , a very high market capitalisation , a very high ratio of equity value over profit or a very high turnover derived from end users of a single core platform service can point to the tipping of the market or leveraging potential of such providers. together with market capitalisation , high growth rates , or decelerating growth rates read together with profitability growth , are examples of dynamic parameters that are particularly relevant to identifying such providers of core platform services that are foreseen to become entrenched. the commission should be able to take a decision by drawing adverse inferences from facts available where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission. ### (25) such an assessment can only be done in light of a market investigation , while taking into account the quantitative thresholds. in its assessment the commission should pursue the objectives of preserving and fostering the level of innovation , the quality of digital products and services , the degree to which prices are fair and competitive , and the degree to which quality or choice for business users and for end users is or remains high. elements that are specific to the providers of core platform services concerned , such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration , can be taken into account. potential negative impacts for small and medium-sized enterprises and consumers should always be taken into consideration. in addition , a very high market capitalisation , a very high ratio of equity value over profit or a very high turnover derived from end users of a single core platform service can point to the tipping of the market or leveraging potential of such providers. together with market capitalisation , high growth rates , or decelerating growth rates read together with profitability growth , are examples of dynamic parameters that are particularly relevant to identifying such providers of core platform services that are foreseen to become entrenched. the commission should be able to take a decision by drawing adverse inferences from facts available where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission.


### (26) a particular subset of rules should apply to those providers of core platform services that are foreseen to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in the near future. the same specific features of core platform services make them prone to tipping: once a service provider has obtained a certain advantage over rivals or potential challengers in terms of scale or intermediation power , its position may become unassailable and the situation may evolve to the point that it is likely to become durable and entrenched in the near future. undertakings can try to induce this tipping and emerge as gatekeeper by using some of the unfair conditions and practices regulated in this regulation. in such a situation , it appears appropriate to intervene before the market tips irreversibly. ### (26) a particular subset of rules should apply to those providers of core platform services that are foreseen to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in the near future. the same specific features of core platform services make them prone to tipping: once a service provider has obtained a certain advantage over rivals or potential challengers in terms of scale or intermediation power , its position may become unassailable and the situation may evolve to the point that it is likely to become durable and entrenched in the near future. undertakings can try to induce this tipping and emerge as gatekeeper by using some of the unfair conditions and practices regulated in this regulation. in such a situation , intervention may be necessary before the market tips irreversibly in favour of the largest competitor and adversely affects other operators.


### (27) however , such an early intervention should be limited to imposing only those obligations that are necessary and appropriate to ensure that the services in question remain contestable and allow to avoid the qualified risk of unfair conditions and practices. obligations that prevent the provider of core platform services concerned from achieving an entrenched and durable position in its operations , such as those preventing unfair leveraging , and those that facilitate switching and multi-homing are more directly geared towards this purpose. to ensure proportionality , the commission should moreover apply from that subset of obligations only those that are necessary and proportionate to achieve the objectives of this regulation and should regularly review whether such obligations should be maintained , suppressed or adapted. ### (27) however , such an early intervention should be strictly limited to imposing only those obligations that are necessary , justified and appropriate to ensure that the services in question remain contestable and allow to avoid the qualified risk of unfair conditions and practices. obligations that prevent the provider of core platform services concerned from achieving an entrenched and durable position in its operations , such as those preventing unfair leveraging , and those that facilitate switching and multi-homing are more directly geared towards this purpose. to ensure proportionality , the commission should moreover apply from that subset of obligations only those that are necessary and proportionate to achieve the objectives of this regulation and should regularly review whether such obligations should be maintained , suppressed or adapted.


### (30) the very rapidly changing and complex technological nature of core platform services requires a regular review of the status of gatekeepers , including those that are foreseen to enjoy a durable and entrenched position in their operations in the near future. to provide all of the market participants , including the gatekeepers , with the required certainty as to the applicable legal obligations , a time limit for such regular reviews is necessary. it is also important to conduct such reviews on a regular basis and at least every two years. ### (30) the very rapidly changing and complex technological nature of core platform services requires a regular review of the status of gatekeepers , including those that are foreseen to enjoy a durable and entrenched position in their operations in the near future. to provide all of the market participants , including the gatekeepers , with the required certainty as to the applicable legal obligations , transparent criteria and time limit for such regular reviews is necessary. it is also important to conduct such reviews at least every two years.


### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. ### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission and other particular competent national authorities of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations performed by the commission foreseen by this regulation.


### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any practices by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation. ### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any practices by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation. in particular , gatekeepers' actions should adequately ensure transparency , interoperability (including equitable use of and access to data) and equal treatment (for example , where anti-competitive self-preferencing , tying or bundling may arise).


### (33) the obligations laid down in this regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. therefore , the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained , for example in the enforcement of the eu competition rules , shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users. in addition , it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. the obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified , following an in-depth investigation , as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations. ### (33) the obligations laid down in this regulation are limited to what is necessary , proportionate and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. therefore , the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained , for example in the enforcement of the eu competition rules , shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users. in addition , it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. the obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified , following an in-depth investigation , as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price or other means , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services or the business owners own sales channel , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price or other means. such a restriction should apply to any similar measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing or de-ranking of the offers of business users.


### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching. ### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make transferring data or switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching.


### (62) in order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this regulation , the commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified. such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe , by using clear procedures and deadlines , in order to support the ex ante effect of this regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector , and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty. ### (62) in order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this regulation , the commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified and whether there has been a significant impact on small and medium-sized enterprises and consumers. such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe , by using clear procedures and deadlines , in order to support the ex ante effect of this regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector , and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty.


### (65) the services and practices in core platform services and markets in which these intervene can change quickly and to a significant extent. to ensure that this regulation remains up to date and constitutes an effective and holistic regulatory response to the problems posed by gatekeepers , it is important to provide for a regular review of the lists of core platform services as well as of the obligations provided for in this regulation. this is particularly important to ensure that behaviour that may limit the contestability of core platform services or is unfair is identified. while it is important to conduct a review on a regular basis , given the dynamically changing nature of the digital sector , in order to ensure legal certainty as to the regulatory conditions , any reviews should be conducted within a reasonable and appropriate time-frame. market investigations should also ensure that the commission has a solid evidentiary basis on which it can assess whether it should propose to amend this regulation in order to expand , or further detail , the lists of core platform services. they should equally ensure that the commission has a solid evidentiary basis on which it can assess whether it should propose to amend the obligations laid down in this regulation or whether it should adopt a delegated act updating such obligations. ### (65) the services and practices in core platform services and markets in which these intervene can change quickly and to a significant extent. to ensure that this regulation remains up to date and constitutes an effective and holistic regulatory response to the problems posed by gatekeepers , it is important to provide for a regular review of the lists of core platform services as well as of the obligations provided for in this regulation. this is particularly important to ensure that behaviour that may limit the contestability of core platform services or is unfair is identified. while it is important to conduct a review on a regular basis , given the dynamically changing nature of the digital sector , in order to ensure legal certainty as to the regulatory conditions , any reviews should be conducted within a reasonable and appropriate time-frame. market investigations should also ensure that the commission has a solid evidentiary basis on which it can assess whether it should propose to amend this regulation in order to expand , or further detail , the lists of core platform services. they should equally ensure that the commission has a solid evidentiary basis on which it can assess whether it should propose to amend the obligations laid down in this regulation.


### (66) in the event that gatekeepers engage in behaviour that is unfair or that limits the contestability of the core platform services that are already designated under this regulation but without these behaviours being explicitly covered by the obligations , the commission should be able to update this regulation through delegated acts. such updates by way of delegated act should be subject to the same investigatory standard and therefore following a market investigation. the commission should also apply a predefined standard in identifying such behaviours. this legal standard should ensure that the type of obligations that gatekeepers may at any time face under this regulation are sufficiently predictable. ### (66) in the event that gatekeepers engage in behaviour that is unfair or that limits the contestability of the core platform services that are already designated under this regulation but without these behaviours being explicitly covered by the obligations , the commission should be able to update this regulation. such updates should be subject to the same investigatory standard and therefore following a market investigation. the commission should also apply a predefined standard in identifying such behaviours. this legal standard should ensure that the type of obligations that gatekeepers may at any time face under this regulation are sufficiently predictable.


### (71) the commission should also be empowered to undertake onsite inspections and to interview any persons who may be in possession of useful information and to record the statements made. ### deleted


### (77) the advisory committee established in accordance with regulation (eu) no 182//2011 should also deliver opinions on certain individual decisions of the commission issued under this regulation. in order to ensure contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty should be delegated to the commission to supplement this regulation. in particular , delegated acts should be adopted in respect of the methodology for determining the quantitative thresholds for designation of gatekeepers under this regulation and in respect of the update of the obligations laid down in this regulation where , based on a market investigation the commission has identified the need for updating the obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair. it is of particular importance that the commission carries out appropriate consultations and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of 13 april 201636. in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. ### (77) the advisory committee established in accordance with regulation (eu) no 182//2011 should also deliver opinions on certain individual decisions of the commission issued under this regulation.


### 7. national authorities shall not take decisions which would run counter to a decision adopted by the commission under this regulation. the commission and member states shall work in close cooperation and coordination in their enforcement actions. ### 7. the commission and member states shall work in close cooperation and coordination in their enforcement actions in respect of this regulation.


### 7. national authorities shall not take decisions which would run counter to a decision adopted by the commission under this regulation. the commission and member states shall work in close cooperation and coordination in their enforcement actions. ### 7. the commission and member states shall work in close cooperation and coordination in their enforcement actions.


### (14) ‘ancillary service’ means services provided in the context of or together with core platform services , including payment services as defined in point 3 of article 4 and technical services which support the provision of payment services as defined in article 3(j) of directive (eu) 2015/2366 , fulfilment , identification or advertising services; ### (14) ‘ancillary service’ means services provided in the context of or together with core platform services , including payment services as defined in point 3 of article 4 and technical services which support the provision of payment services as defined in article 3(j) of directive (eu) 2015/2366 , fulfilment services , parcel delivery services , as defined in article 2(2) of regulation (eu) 2018/644 , freight transport services and identification or advertising services;


### (23) ‘control’ means the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking , as understood in regulation (eu) no 139/2004. ### (23) ‘control’ means the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking , as understood in article 12 of regulation (eu) no 139/2004.


### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users; and ### it provides a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users; and


### it enjoys an entrenched and durable position in its operations or it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future. ### it enjoys an entrenched and durable position in its operations or it is foreseeable , on the basis of available quantitative and qualitative data , that it will enjoy such a position over the next 18 months.


### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where the undertaking to which it belongs achieves an annual eea turnover equal to or above eur 6.5 billion in the last three financial years , or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking to which it belongs amounted to at least eur 65 billion in the last financial year , and it provides a core platform service in at least three member states; ### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where the undertaking to which it belongs achieves an annual eea turnover equal to or above eur 6.5 billion in the last three financial years , or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking to which it belongs amounted to at least eur 65 billion in the last financial year , and it provides a core platform service in at least two member states;


### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within three months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). ### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within three months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2. the notification shall be updated in respect of other core platform services no later than three months after those services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2. where core platform services fall below those thresholds after being notified , the provider shall notify the commission thereof within three months after those thresholds no longer apply.


### a failure by a relevant provider of core platform services to notify the required information pursuant to this paragraph shall not prevent the commission from designating these providers as gatekeepers pursuant to paragraph 4 at any time. ### should the commission consider that an undertaking providing core platform services meets all the thresholds provided in paragraph 2 , but has failed to notify the required information pursuant to the first subparagraph of this paragraph , the commission shall require that undertaking pursuant to article 19 to provide the relevant information relating to the quantitative thresholds identified in paragraph 2 within 30 days. the failure by the undertaking providing core platform services to comply with the commission’s request pursuant to article 19 shall not prevent the commission from designating that undertaking as a gatekeeper based on any other information available to the commission. where the undertaking providing core platform services complies with the request , the commission shall apply the procedure set out in paragraph 4.


### 5. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 37 to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds laid down in paragraph 2 are met , and to regularly adjust it to market and technological developments where necessary , in particular as regards the threshold in paragraph 2 , point (a). ### 5. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 37 to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds laid down in paragraph 2 are met.


### 5. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 37 to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds laid down in paragraph 2 are met , and to regularly adjust it to market and technological developments where necessary , in particular as regards the threshold in paragraph 2 , point (a). ### deleted


### where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper. ### where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission , at the request of the member states , shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper.


### where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available. ### where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission , at the request of the member states , shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available.


### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; ### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service , or an ancillary service , of the gatekeeper or of third parties which are part of the same undertaking , in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;


### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; ### refrain from requiring business users or end users to use , and in the case of business users , also to offer or interoperate with , an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;


### [...] ### deleted


### 1. in respect of each of its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3(7) , a gatekeeper shall: ### 1. in respect of each of its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3(7) , and ancillary services , a gatekeeper shall:


### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of these business users , of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users; ### refrain from using , directly or through third parties which are part of the same undertaking , in competition with business users and with ancillary service providers , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of business users , of its core platform services or provided by the business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users;


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services - core platform and ancillary services - and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking;


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking;


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### refrain from treating in a preferential or more favourable manner in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services. the gatekeeper shall not be prevented from taking necessary and proportionate measures to ensure that third party ancillary services do not endanger the integrity of the operating system , hardware or software features provided by the gatekeeper , provided that such proportionate measures are duly justified by the gatekeeper;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services where such interoperability does not present a disproportionate technical obstacle;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , including personal data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where the data are directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of article 6 of regulation (eu) 2016/679;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , granular , continuous and real-time access equivalent to that conferred upon the gatekeeper itself and use of non-aggregated data , including personal data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services or of ancillary services offered by the gatekeeper by those business users and the end users engaging with the those business users via the core platform services; this shall include at the request of the business user , the possibility and necessary tools to access and analyse data “in-situ” without a transfer from the gatekeeper; for personal data , provide access only when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679 , while ensuring no data advantage is conferred upon the gatekeeper’s own core platform services as a result , including where necessary by placing restrictions on its own access to such data;


### 1. the measures implemented by the gatekeeper to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. the gatekeeper shall ensure that these measures are implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety. ### 1. the measures implemented by the gatekeeper to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. the gatekeeper shall ensure that these measures are implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety. in the implementation of these measures , the gatekeeper may take reasonable , proportionate and adequately justified steps to ensure service integrity , user security and core functionality of its core platform services.


### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. ### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision , provided that consultations with gatekeepers as part of the regulatory dialogue do not result in an agreement , specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18.


### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. ### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it shall by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18.


### 3. the commission may , acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative , provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1. ### 3. the commission , in cooperation with the member states and after consulting the advisory committee , may , acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative , provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1.


### 3. the commission may , acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative , provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1. ### 3. the commission may , acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on a court order or upon the request of the member states , provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1.


### be accompanied by a delegated act amending articles 5 or 6 as provided for in article 10. ### deleted


### 1. the commission may conduct on-site inspections at the premises of an undertaking or association of undertakings. ### 1. at the request of the commission , the competent authorities of the member states may conduct on-site inspections at the premises of an undertaking or association of undertakings.


### 3. during on-site inspections the commission and auditors or experts appointed by it may require the undertaking or association of undertakings to provide access to and explanations on its organisation , functioning , it system , algorithms , data-handling and business conducts. the commission and auditors or experts appointed by it may address questions to key personnel. ### 3. during on-site inspections the competent authorities of the member states may require the undertaking or association of undertakings to provide access to and explanations on its organisation , functioning , it system , algorithms , data-handling and business conducts. the commission and auditors or experts appointed by it which are participating in the inspections may address questions to key personnel.


### 4. undertakings or associations of undertakings are required to submit to an on-site inspection ordered by decision of the commission. the decision shall specify the subject matter and purpose of the visit , set the date on which it is to begin and indicate the penalties provided for in articles 26 and 27 and the right to have the decision reviewed by the court of justice. ### 4. undertakings or associations of undertakings are required to submit to an on-site inspection ordered at the request of the commission. the request shall specify the subject matter and purpose of the visit , set the date on which it is to begin and indicate the penalties provided for in articles 26 and 27 and the right to have the decision reviewed by the court of justice.


### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 25 , the commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper , intentionally or negligently , fails to comply with: ### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 25 , the commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 20% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper , intentionally or negligently , fails to comply with:


### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 25 , the commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper , intentionally or negligently , fails to comply with: ### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 25 , the commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10% of its total global turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper , intentionally or negligently , fails to comply with:


### 2. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of undertakings fines not exceeding 1% of the total turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently: ### 2. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of undertakings fines not exceeding 5% of the total turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently:


### 2. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of undertakings fines not exceeding 1% of the total turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently: ### 2. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of undertakings fines not exceeding 1% of the total global turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently:


### 1. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings , including gatekeepers where applicable , periodic penalty payments not exceeding 5 % of the average daily turnover in the preceding financial year per day , calculated from the date set by that decision , in order to compel them: ### 1. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings , including gatekeepers where applicable , periodic penalty payments not exceeding 10 % of the average daily turnover in the preceding financial year per day , calculated from the date set by that decision , in order to compel them:


### 1. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings , including gatekeepers where applicable , periodic penalty payments not exceeding 5 % of the average daily turnover in the preceding financial year per day , calculated from the date set by that decision , in order to compel them: ### 1. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings , including gatekeepers where applicable , periodic penalty payments not exceeding 10 % of the average daily global turnover in the preceding financial year per day , calculated from the date set by that decision , in order to compel them:


### 1. the commission shall be assisted by the digital markets advisory committee. that committee shall be a committee within the meaning of regulation (eu) no 182/2011. ### 1. the commission shall take decisions after consulting the digital markets advisory committee. that committee shall be a committee within the meaning of regulation (eu) no 182/2011.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. when two or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within three months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. when two or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation.


### 2. the power to adopt delegated acts referred to in articles 3(6) and 9(1) shall be conferred on the commission for a period of five years from dd/mm/yyyy. the commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of power not later than nine months before the end of the five-year period. the delegation of power shall be tacitly extended for periods of an identical duration , unless the european parliament or the council opposes such extension not later than three months before the end of each period. ### 2. the power to adopt delegated acts referred to in article 3(5) shall be conferred on the commission for a period of 5 years from dd/mm/yyyy. the commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of power not later than nine months before the end of the five-year period. the delegation of power shall be tacitly extended for periods of an identical duration , unless the european parliament or the council opposes such extension not later than three months before the end of each period.


### 3. the delegation of power referred to in articles 3(6) and 9(1) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council. a decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. it shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the official journal of the european union or at a later date specified therein. it shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force. ### 3. the delegation of power referred to in article 3(5) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council. a decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. it shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the official journal of the european union or at a later date specified therein. it shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.


### 6. a delegated act adopted pursuant to articles 3(6) and 9(1) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the european parliament or by the council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the european parliament and to the council or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the commission that they will not object. that period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the european parliament or of the council. ### 6. a delegated act adopted pursuant to article 3(5) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the european parliament or the council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the european parliament and the council or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the commission that they will not object. that period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the european parliament or of the council.


### (38) to prevent further reinforcing their dependence on the core platform services of gatekeepers , the business users of these gatekeepers should be free in promoting and choosing the distribution channel they consider most appropriate to interact with any end users that these business users have already acquired through core platform services provided by the gatekeeper. conversely , end users should also be free to choose offers of such business users and to enter into contracts with them either through core platform services of the gatekeeper , if applicable , or from a direct distribution channel of the business user or another indirect distribution channel such business user may use. this should apply to the promotion of offers and conclusion of contracts between business users and end users. moreover , the ability of end users to freely acquire content , subscriptions , features or other items outside the core platform services of the gatekeeper should not be undermined or restricted. in particular , it should be avoided that gatekeepers restrict end users from access to and use of such services via a software application running on their core platform service. for example , subscribers to online content purchased outside a software application download or purchased from a software application store should not be prevented from accessing such online content on a software application on the gatekeeper’s core platform service simply because it was purchased outside such software application or software application store. ### (38) to prevent further reinforcing their dependence on the core platform services of gatekeepers , the business users of these gatekeepers should be free in promoting and choosing the distribution channel they consider most appropriate to interact with any end users that these business users have already acquired through core platform services provided by the gatekeeper and for which the core platform service has already been remunerated. conversely , end users should also be free to choose offers of such business users and to enter into contracts with them either through core platform services of the gatekeeper , if applicable , or from a direct distribution channel of the business user or another indirect distribution channel such business user may use. this should apply to the promotion of offers and conclusion of contracts between business users and end users. moreover , the ability of end users to freely acquire content , subscriptions , features or other items outside the core platform services of the gatekeeper should not be undermined or restricted. in particular , it should be avoided that gatekeepers restrict end users from access to and use of such services via a software application running on their core platform service. for example , subscribers to online content purchased outside a software application download or purchased from a software application store should not be prevented from accessing such online content on a software application on the gatekeeper’s core platform service simply because it was purchased outside such software application or software application store.


### 2. this regulation shall apply to core platform services provided or offered by gatekeepers to business users established in the union or end users established or located in the union , irrespective of the place of establishment or residence of the gatekeepers and irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the provision of service. ### 2. this regulation in order to strenghten the proper functioning of the internal market shall apply to core platform services provided or offered by gatekeepers to business users established in the union or end users established or located in the union , irrespective of the place of establishment or residence of the gatekeepers and irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the provision of service


### 5. member states shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws , regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. this is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests , in compliance with union law. in particular , nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing obligations , which are compatible with union law , on undertakings , including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this regulation in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition. ### 5. nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing obligations , which are compatible with union law , on undertakings , including providers of core platform services in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition.


### 5. member states shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws , regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. this is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests , in compliance with union law. in particular , nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing obligations , which are compatible with union law , on undertakings , including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this regulation in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition. ### 5. nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing obligations , which are compatible with union law , on undertakings , including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this regulation in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition.


### refrain from preventing or restricting business users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers; ### refrain from preventing or restricting business users from raising issues with any relevant public authority , including national courts relating to any practice of gatekeepers;


### refrain from preventing or restricting business users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers; ### refrain from preventing or restricting business users from raising issues with any relevant public or national court authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers;


### refrain from requiring business users or end users to subscribe to or register with any other core platform services identified pursuant to article 3 or which meets the thresholds in article 3(2)(b) as a condition to access , sign up or register to any of their core platform services identified pursuant to that article; ### refrain from requiring business users or end users to use any other gatekeeper product or service as a condition to using any of their core platform services identified pursuant to article 3;


### provide advertisers and publishers to which it supplies advertising services , upon their request , with information concerning the price paid by the advertiser and publisher , as well as the amount or remuneration paid to the publisher , for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper. ### provide advertisers and publishers to which it supplies advertising services , with free of charge , high-quality , granular , effective , continuous and real-time access , equivalent to that conferred upon the gatekeeper itself , to information on the visibility and availability of advertisement portfolio as well as pricing conditions concerning the bids placed by advertisers and advertising intermediaries , the price paid by the advertiser and publisher , as well as the amount and remuneration paid to the publisher , for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper , and on a basis that enables a clear understanding of the cost of the services provided and comparison against the cost of third-party services.


### provide advertisers and publishers to which it supplies advertising services , upon their request , with information concerning the price paid by the advertiser and publisher , as well as the amount or remuneration paid to the publisher , for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper. ### provide each advertiser and publisher to which it supplies advertising services , with free of charge high-quality granular , effective , continuous and real-time access , equivalent to that conferred upon the gatekeeper itself , to information on the visibility and availability of advertisement portfolio as well as pricing conditions concerning the bids placed by advertisers and advertising intermediaries the price paid by the advertiser or advertising intermediary , as well as the amount and remuneration paid to the publisher , for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper , and on a basis that enables a clear understanding of the cost of the services provided and comparison against the cost of third-party services.


### provide advertisers and publishers , upon their request and free of charge , with access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the ad inventory; ### provide advertisers and publishers , and/or their designated third-party advertising technology vendors , upon their request and free of charge , with access to the same granular data accessible to the gatekeeper , for the measurement and verification of advertising , in a format that is reconcilable with equivalent data from other sources , to enable advertisers , publishers and/or their third-party advertising technology vendors to carry out their own independent measurement and verification of the ad inventory.


### provide advertisers and publishers , upon their request and free of charge , with access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the ad inventory; ### provide advertisers and publishers , or third parties authorised by advertisers and publishers , upon their request and free of charge , with effective and real time access to the same granular data accessible to the gatekeeper , for the measurement and verification of advertising in a format that is reconcilable with equivalent data from other sources , to enable advertisers publishers and/or their third-party advertising technology vendors to carry out their own independent measurement and verification of the ad inventory , including aggregated data and performance data in a manner that would allow advertisers and publishers to run their own verification and measurement tools to assess performance of the core services provided for by the gatekeepers;


### provide effective portability of data generated through the activity of a business user or end user and shall , in particular , provide tools for end users to facilitate the exercise of data portability , in line with regulation eu 2016/679 , including by the provision of continuous and real-time access ; ### provide end users or third parties authorised by an end user , free of charge , with effective portability and interoperability of data provided by the end user or generated through his or her activity in the context of their use on the relevant core platform service , including by providing tools for business users and end users to facilitate the effective exercise of such data portability and interoperability , in line with regulation eu 2016/679 , including by the provision of continuous and real time access , while ensuring no data advantage is conferred upon the gatekeeper’s own core platform services as a result , including where necessary by placing restrictions on its own access to such data.”


### provide effective portability of data generated through the activity of a business user or end user and shall , in particular , provide tools for end users to facilitate the exercise of data portability , in line with regulation eu 2016/679 , including by the provision of continuous and real-time access ; ### provide end users or third parties authorised by an end user , free of charge , with effective portability and interoperability of data provided by the end user or generated through his or her activity in the context of their use on the relevant core platform service , including by providing free of charge and technically accessible tools for business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , and end users to facilitate the effective portability and interoperability , in line with regulation eu 2016/679 , including by the provision of continuous and real-time access while ensuring no data advantage is conferred upon the gatekeeper’s own core platform services as a result , including where necessary by placing restrictions on its own access to such data;


### provide to any third party providers of online search engines , upon their request , with access on fair , reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to ranking , query , click and view data in relation to free and paid search generated by end users on online search engines of the gatekeeper , subject to anonymisation for the query , click and view data that constitutes personal data; ### provide to any third party providers of online search engines , upon their request , with access on fair , reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to ranking , query , click and view data in relation to free and paid search generated by end users on online search engines of the gatekeeper , subject to anonymisation for the query , click and view data that constitutes personal data. the relevant data is anonymized if personal data is irreversibly altered in such a way that information does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable;


### apply fair and non-discriminatory general conditions of access for business users to its software application store designated pursuant to article 3 of this regulation. ### apply fair and non-discriminatory general conditions of access and treatment for business users to its core platform service , in particular its software application store , its online search engine and its social network service designated pursuant to article 3 of this regulation.


### 1. a provider of core platform services shall be designated as gatekeeper if: ### 1. an undertaking shall be designated as gatekeeper if:


### 2. a provider of core platform services shall be presumed to satisfy: ### 2. an undertaking shall be presumed to satisfy:


### 3. when sending a simple request for information to an undertaking or association of undertakings , the commission shall state the purpose of the request , specify what information is required and fix the time-limit within which the information is to be provided , and the penalties provided for in article 26 for supplying incomplete , incorrect or misleading information or explanations. ### 3. when sending a simple request for information to an undertaking or association of undertakings , the commission shall state the legal basis , the purpose of the request , specify what information is required and fix a reasonable time-limit within which the information is to be provided , and the penalties provided for in article 26 for supplying incomplete , incorrect or misleading information or explanations.


### 4. where the commission requires undertakings and associations of undertakings to supply information by decision , it shall state the purpose of the request , specify what information is required and fix the time-limit within which it is to be provided. where the commission requires undertakings to provide access to its data-bases and algorithms , it shall state the legal basis and the purpose of the request , and fix the time-limit within which it is to be provided. it shall also indicate the penalties provided for in article 26 and indicate or impose the periodic penalty payments provided for in article 27. it shall further indicate the right to have the decision reviewed by the court of justice. ### 4. where the commission requires undertakings and associations of undertakings to supply information by decision , it shall always respect confidentiality and the provisions of directive 2016/943 on trade secrets , state the purpose of the request , specify what information is required and fix the time-limit within which it is to be provided. where the commission requires undertakings to provide access to its data-bases and algorithms , it shall state the legal basis and the purpose of the request , and fix the time-limit within which it is to be provided. it shall also indicate the penalties provided for in article 26 and indicate or impose the periodic penalty payments provided for in article 27. it shall further indicate the right to have the decision reviewed by the court of justice. at any rate , in the event that certain confidential information provided to the commission is leaked , voluntarily or erroneously , directly or indirectly , the commission shall be subsidiarily liable for remedying any actual or potential damage caused to the undertaking.


### the financial liability of each undertaking in respect of the payment of the fine shall not exceed 10 % of its total turnover in the preceding financial year. ### the financial liability of each undertaking in respect of the payment of the fine shall not exceed 10 % of its total global turnover in the preceding financial year.


### 1. the commission may upon request or its own initiative reconsider , amend or repeal at any moment a decision adopted pursuant to article 3 for one of the following reasons: ### 1. the commission may upon request reconsider , amend or repeal at any moment a decision adopted pursuant to article 3 for one of the following reasons:


### 4. in view of adopting the decision under paragraph 2 , the commission shall communicate its preliminary findings within three months from the opening of the proceedings. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain the measures it considers to take or it considers that the provider of core platform services concerned should take in order to effectively address the preliminary findings. ### 4. in view of adopting the decision under paragraph 2 , the commission shall communicate to the gatekeeper its preliminary findings within three months from the opening of the proceedings. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain the measures it considers to take or it considers that the provider of core platform services concerned should take in order to effectively address the preliminary findings. the commission may consult interested third parties demonstrating sufficient interest when drafting the preliminary findings. the preliminary findings shall be public.


### 3. the commission may , acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper , provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1. ### 3. the commission may , acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on a court order , provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1.


### 1. the commission may by simple request or by decision require information from undertakings and associations of undertakings to provide all necessary information , including for the purpose of monitoring , implementing and enforcing the rules laid down in this regulation. the commission may also request access to data bases and algorithms of undertakings and request explanations on those by a simple request or by a decision. ### 1. the commission , acting only upon request of a member state and providing due justification for its actions while respecting the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of proportionality , may require information from undertakings and associations of undertakings to provide all necessary information , including for the purpose of monitoring , implementing and enforcing the rules laid down in this regulation. the commission may also request access to data bases and algorithms of undertakings and request explanations on those in full respect of confidentiality and directive 2016/943 on trade secrets.


### 6. at the request of the commission , the governments and authorities of the member states shall provide the commission with all necessary information to carry out the duties assigned to it by this regulation. ### 6. at the request of the commission , the governments and authorities of the member states may provide the commission with additional information to carry out the duties assigned to it by this regulation.


### the commission may interview any natural or legal person which consents to being interviewed for the purpose of collecting information , relating to the subject-matter of an investigation , including in relation to the monitoring , implementing and enforcing of the rules laid down in this regulation. ### the commission may interview any natural or legal person which consents to being interviewed for the purpose of collecting information , relating to the subject-matter of an investigation , including in relation to the monitoring , implementing and enforcing of the rules laid down in this regulation. the reason for the interview shall be stated in the summons and under no circumstances shall the interview be compulsory for the interviewee.


### 1. in case of urgency due to the risk of serious and irreparable damage for business users or end users of gatekeepers , the commission may , by decision adopt in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , order interim measures against a gatekeeper on the basis of a prima facie finding of an infringement of articles 5 or 6. ### 1. in case of urgency due to the risk of serious and irreparable damage for business users or end users of gatekeepers , the commission may , by decision adopt in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , order interim measures against a gatekeeper on the basis of a prima facie finding of an infringement of articles 5 or 6. the commission’s decision shall not encompass national competences and shall be strictly in line with the principle of subsidiarity.


### article 37 ### deleted


### 1. by dd/mm/yyyy , and subsequently every three years , the commission shall evaluate this regulation and report to the european parliament , the council and the european economic and social committee. ### 1. by dd/mm/yyyy , and subsequently every year , the commission shall evaluate this regulation and report to the european parliament , the council and the national parliaments and authorities.


### (17) ‘business user’ means any natural or legal person acting in a commercial or professional capacity using core platform services for the purpose of or in the course of providing goods or services to end users; ### (17) ‘business user’ means any natural or legal person acting in a commercial or professional capacity using core platform services on the basis of contractual relationships with the provider of those services for the purpose of or in the course of providing goods or services to end users;


### [...] ### deleted


### (11) depending on the sector in which they operate or the type of service they provide , the entities falling within the scope of this directive should be classified into two categories: essential and important. that categorisation should take into account the level of criticality of the sector or of the type of service , as well as the level of dependency of other sectors or types of services. both essential and important entities should be subject to the same risk management requirements and reporting obligations. the supervisory and penalty regimes between these two categories of entities should be differentiated to ensure a fair balance between requirements and obligations on one hand , and the administrative burden stemming from the supervision of compliance on the other hand. ### (11) depending on the sector in which they operate or the type of service they provide , the entities falling within the scope of this directive should be classified into three categories: essential , important , and public administration. that categorisation should take into account the level of criticality of the sector or of the type of service , as well as the level of dependency of other sectors or types of services. essential and important entities and public administration entities should be subject to the same risk management requirements and reporting obligations. member states should have right to exclude obligations for public administration entities. the supervisory and penalty regimes between essential and important entities should be differentiated to ensure a fair balance between requirements and obligations on one hand , and the administrative burden stemming from the supervision of compliance on the other hand. the supervisory and penalty regimes for public administration entities should be foreseen in line with the national legislation and legal system.