### 4. the eba shall take its final decision on whether an e-money token is a significant e-money token within three months after the notification referred to in paragraph 1 and immediately notify the issuers or applicant issuer of such e-money tokens and their competent authorities thereof. the decision shall be immediately notified to the issuer or applicant issuer of e-money tokens and to the competent authority of its home member state. ### 4. the eba shall take its final decision on whether an e-money token is a significant e-money token within three months after the notification referred to in paragraph 1 and immediately notify the offeror or applicant offeror of such e-money tokens and their competent authorities thereof. the decision shall be immediately notified to the offeror or applicant offeror of e-money tokens and to the competent authority of its home member state.


### specific additional obligations for issuers of significant e-money tokens ### specific additional obligations for offerors of significant e-money tokens


### issuers of at least one category of e-money tokens shall apply the following requirements applying to issuers of asset-referenced tokens or significant asset-referenced tokens: ### offerors of at least one category of e-money tokens shall apply the following requirements applying to issuers of asset-referenced tokens or significant asset-referenced tokens:


### 8. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised for the operation of a trading platform for crypto-assets shall complete the final settlement of a crypto-asset transaction on the dlt on the same date as the transactions has been executed on the trading platform. ### 8. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised for the operation of a trading platform for crypto-assets shall initiate the final settlement of a crypto-asset transaction within 24 hours after transactions has been executed on the trading platform.


### 1. issuers of crypto-assets shall inform the public as soon as possible of inside information which concerns them , in a manner that enables the public to access that information in an easy manner and to assess that information in a complete , correct and timely manner. ### 1. issuers and offerers of crypto-assets shall inform the public as soon as possible of inside information which concerns them , in a manner that enables the public to access that information in an easy manner and to assess that information in a complete , correct and timely manner. publication of such information on the blockchain shall be considered sufficient.


### 1. issuers of crypto-assets shall inform the public as soon as possible of inside information which concerns them , in a manner that enables the public to access that information in an easy manner and to assess that information in a complete , correct and timely manner. ### 1. issuers and offerors of crypto-assets shall inform the public as soon as possible of inside information which concerns them , in a manner that enables the public to access that information in an easy manner and to assess that information in a complete , correct and timely manner.


### 2. issuers of crypto-assets may , on their own responsibility , delay disclosure to the public of inside information provided that all of the following conditions are met: ### 2. issuers and offerors of crypto-assets may , on their own responsibility , delay disclosure to the public of inside information provided that all of the following conditions are met:


### immediate disclosure is likely to prejudice the legitimate interests of the issuers; ### immediate disclosure is likely to prejudice the legitimate interests of the issuers or offerors , as applicable;


### immediate disclosure is likely to prejudice the legitimate interests of the issuers; ### immediate disclosure is likely to prejudice the legitimate interests of the issuers or offerors;


### the issuers are able to ensure the confidentiality of that information. ### the issuers or offerors , as applicable are able to ensure the confidentiality of that information.


### the issuers are able to ensure the confidentiality of that information. ### the issuers or offerors are able to ensure the confidentiality of that information.


### to require issuers of crypto-assets , including asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens , or persons asking for admission to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets , and the persons that control them or are controlled by them , to provide information and documents; ### to require offerors of crypto-assets , including asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens , or persons asking for admission to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets , and the persons that control them or are controlled by them , to provide information and documents;


### to require issuers of crypto-assets , including asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens , to include additional information in their crypto-asset white papers , where necessary for consumer protection or financial stability; ### to require issuers (or , where appropriate , offerors) of crypto-assets , including asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens , to include additional information in their crypto-asset white papers , where necessary to ensure compliance with existing legislation on consumer protection or financial stability requirements in accordance with the union’s legislation;


### to make public the fact that an issuer of crypto-assets , including an issuer of asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , or a person asking for admission to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets is failing to comply with its obligations; ### to make public the fact that an issuer or offeror of crypto-assets , including an issuer or offeror of asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , is failing to comply with its obligations;


### to disclose , or to require the issuer of crypto-assets , including an issuer of asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , to disclose , all material information which may have an effect on the assessment of the crypto-assets offered to the public or admitted to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets in order to ensure consumer protection or the smooth operation of the market; ### to disclose , or to require the issuer or offeror , where applicable , including an issuer or offeror of asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , to disclose , all material information which may have an effect on the assessment of the crypto-assets offered to the public or admitted to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets in order to ensure consumer protection or the smooth operation of the market;


### supervisory and investigative powers exercised in relation to e-money token issuers are without prejudice to powers granted to relevant competent authorities under national laws transposing directive 2009/110/ec. ### supervisory and investigative powers exercised in relation to e-money token issuers are without prejudice to powers granted to relevant competent authorities under national laws transposing directive 2009/110/ec , with the exception of significant e-money tokens , where the powers are exercised only by the eba in accordance with article [98(3)(a)].


### 6. a person making information available to the competent authority in accordance with this regulation shall not be considered to be infringing any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative , regulatory or administrative provision , and shall not be subject to liability of any kind related to such notification. ### 6. a person making information available to the competent authority in accordance with this regulation shall not be considered to be infringing any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative , regulatory or administrative provision , and shall not be subject to liability of any kind related to such notification , unless it is established through the appropriate procedure that that person was acting in bad faith or with the intention of harming third parties.


### where the ecb is a member of the college pursuant to article 99(2) , point (i) , it shall have two votes. ### where the ecb is a member of the college pursuant to article 99(2) , point (i) , it shall have only a consultative , and not a binding vote on the opinion of the college.


### where the ecb is a member of the college pursuant to article 99(2) , point (i) , it shall have two votes. ### where the ecb is a member of the college pursuant to article 99(2) , point (i) , it shall have one vote.


### where the ecb is a member of the college pursuant to point (h) of article 101(2) , it shall have 2 votes. ### where the ecb is a member of the college pursuant to point (h) of article 101(2) , it shall have only a consultative , and not a binding vote on the opinion of the college.


### where the ecb is a member of the college pursuant to point (h) of article 101(2) , it shall have two votes. ### where the ecb is a member of the college pursuant to point (h) of article 101(2) , it shall have one vote.


### transparency and disclosure requirements for the issuance and admission to trading of crypto-assets; ### transparency and disclosure requirements for the issuance and offering and admission to trading of crypto-assets on a crypto-asset trading platform;


### 1. this regulation applies to persons that are engaged in the issuance of crypto-assets or provide services related to crypto-assets in the union. ### 1. this regulation applies to persons that are engaged in the issuance of crypto-assets , the offering of crypto-assets , or provide services related to crypto-assets in the union.


### 4. ‘electronic money token’ or ‘e-money token’ means a type of crypto-asset the main purpose of which is to be used as a means of exchange and that purports to maintain a stable value by referring to the value of a fiat currency that is legal tender; ### 4. ‘electronic money token’ or ‘e-money token’ means a type of crypto-asset the main purpose of which is to be used as a means of exchange and that purports to maintain a stable value by referring to the value of a fiat currency that is legal tender; electronic money tokens means electronic money as defined by directive 2009/110/ec;


### 6. ‘issuer of crypto-assets’ means a legal person who offers to the public any type of crypto-assets or seeks the admission of such crypto-assets to a trading platform for crypto-assets; ### 6. ‘issuer of crypto-assets’ means a legal person who controls the creation of crypto-assets;


### (7) ‘offer to the public’ means an offer to third parties to acquire a crypto-asset in exchange for fiat currency or other crypto-assets; ### (7) ‘offer to the public’ means a message to third parties providing sufficient information about the conditions of the offer and the crypto-assets that may be offered via the trading platform , in order to enable the third party to make a decision regarding the purchase of such crypto-assets;


### (18) ‘management body’ means the body of an issuer of crypto-assets , or of a crypto-asset provider , which is appointed in accordance with national law , and which is empowered to set the entity’s strategy , objectives , the overall direction and which oversees and monitors management decision-making and which includes persons who direct the business of the entity; ### (18) ‘management body’ means the body of an issuer of crypto-assets , offeror of crypto-assets or of a crypto-asset provider , as applicable , which is appointed in accordance with national law , and which is empowered to set the entity’s strategy , objectives , the overall direction and which oversees and monitors management decision-making and which includes persons who direct the business of the entity;


### the authority , designated by each member state in accordance with article 81 for issuers of crypto-assets , issuers of asset-referenced tokens and crypto-asset service providers; ### the authority , designated by each member state in accordance with article 81 for issuers and offerors of crypto-assets , issuers and offerors of asset-referenced tokens and crypto-asset service providers;


### the authority , designated by each member state , for the application of directive 2009/110/ec for issuers of e-money tokens; ### the authority , designated by each member state , for the application of directive 2009/110/ec for issuers and offerors of e-money tokens;


### (26) ‘qualifying holding’ means any direct or indirect holding in an issuer of asset-referenced tokens or in a crypto-asset service provider which represents at least 10 % of the capital or the voting rights , as set out in articles 9 and 10 of directive 2004/109/ec of the european parliament and of the council53 , taking into account the conditions regarding aggregation thereof laid down in paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 12 of that directive , or which makes it possible to exercise a significant influence over the management of the investment firm in which that holding subsists. ### (26) ‘qualifying holding’ means any direct or indirect holding in an issuer or offeror of asset-referenced tokens or in a crypto-asset service provider which represents at least 10 % of the capital or the voting rights , as set out in articles 9 and 10 of directive 2004/109/ec of the european parliament and of the council53 , taking into account the conditions regarding aggregation thereof laid down in paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 12 of that directive , or which makes it possible to exercise a significant influence over the management of the investment firm in which that holding subsists.


### 1. no issuer of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall , in the union , offer such crypto-assets to the public , or seek an admission of such crypto-assets to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets , unless that issuer: ### 1. no issuer of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall , in the union , offer such crypto-assets to the public , or seek an admission of such crypto-assets to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets , unless that offeror:


### over a period of 12 months , the total consideration of an offer to the public of crypto-assets in the union does not exceed eur 1 000 000 , or the equivalent amount in another currency or in crypto-assets; ### over a period of 12 months , the total consideration of an offer to the public of crypto-assets in the union does not exceed eur 5 000 000 , or the equivalent amount in any other currency or in crypto-assets;


### for the purpose of point (a) , crypto-assets shall not be considered to be offered for free where purchasers are required to provide or to undertake to provide personal data to the issuer in exchange for those crypto-assets , or where the issuer of those crypto-assets receives from the prospective holders of those crypto-assets any third party fees , commissions , monetary benefits or non-monetary benefits in exchange for those crypto-assets. ### for the purpose of point (a) , crypto-assets shall not be considered to be offered for free where purchasers are required to provide or to undertake to provide personal data to the issuer or offeror in exchange for those crypto-assets , or where the issuer or offeror of those crypto-assets receives from the prospective holders of those crypto-assets any third party fees , commissions , monetary benefits or non-monetary benefits in exchange for those crypto-assets.


### a detailed description of the issuer and a presentation of the main participants involved in the project's design and development; ### a detailed description of the issuer and offeror (if different entities) and a presentation of the main participants involved in the project's design and development;


### 3. the crypto-asset white paper shall contain the following statement: “the issuer of the crypto-assets is solely responsible for the content of this crypto-asset white paper. this crypto-asset white paper has not been reviewed or approved by any competent authority in any member state of the european union”. ### 3. the crypto-asset white paper shall contain the following statement: “the offeror of the crypto-assets is solely responsible for the content of this crypto-asset white paper. this crypto-asset white paper has not been reviewed or approved by any competent authority in any member state of the european union”.


### 4. the crypto-asset white paper shall not contain any assertions on the future value of the crypto-assets , other than the statement referred to in paragraph 5 , unless the issuer of those crypto-assets can guarantee such future value. ### 4. the crypto-asset white paper shall not contain any assertions on the future value of the crypto-assets , other than the statement referred to in paragraph 5 , unless the offeror of those crypto-assets can guarantee such future value.


### 6. every crypto-asset white paper shall contain a statement from the management body of the issuer of the crypto-assets. that statement shall confirm that the crypto-asset white paper complies with the requirements of this title and that , to the best knowledge of the management body , the information presented in the crypto-asset white paper is correct and that there is no significant omission. ### 6. every crypto-asset white paper shall contain a statement from the management body of the offeror of the crypto-assets. that statement shall confirm that the crypto-asset white paper complies with the requirements of this title and that , to the best knowledge of the management body , the information presented in the crypto-asset white paper is correct and that there is no significant omission.


### the marketing communications shall clearly state that a crypto-asset white paper has been published and indicate the address of the website of the issuer of the crypto-assets concerned. ### the marketing communications shall clearly state that a crypto-asset white paper has been published and indicate the address of the website of the issuer and offeror of the crypto-assets concerned.


### 2. issuers of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall notify their crypto-asset white paper , and , in case of marketing communications as referred to in article 6 , such marketing communications , to the competent authority of their home member state at least 20 working days before publication of the crypto-asset white paper. that competent authority may exercise the powers laid down in article 82(1). ### 2. offerors of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall notify their crypto-asset white paper , and , in case of marketing communications as referred to in article 6 , such marketing communications , to the competent authority of their home member state at least 20 working days before publication of the crypto-asset white paper. that competent authority may exercise the powers laid down in article 82(1).


### 4. issuers of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall , together with the notification referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 , provide the competent authority of their home member state with a list of host member states , if any , where they intend to offer their crypto-assets to the public or intend to seek admission to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets. they shall also inform their home member state of the starting date of the intended offer to the public or intended admission to trading on such a trading platform for crypto-assets. ### 4. offerors of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall , together with the notification referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 , provide the competent authority of their home member state with a list of host member states , if any , where they intend to offer their crypto-assets to the public or intend to seek admission to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets. they shall also inform their home member state of the starting date of the intended offer to the public or intended admission to trading on such a trading platform for crypto-assets.


### 1. issuers of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall publish their crypto-asset white paper , and , where applicable , their marketing communications , on their website , which shall be publicly accessible , by no later than the starting date of the offer to the public of those crypto-assets or the admission of those crypto-assets to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets. the crypto-asset white paper , and , where applicable , the marketing communications , shall remain available on the issuer’s website for as long as the crypto-assets are held by the public. ### 1. offerors of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall publish their crypto-asset white paper , and , where applicable , their marketing communications , on their website , which shall be publicly accessible , by no later than the starting date of the offer to the public of those crypto-assets or the admission of those crypto-assets to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets. the crypto-asset white paper , and , where applicable , the marketing communications , shall remain available on the issuer’s website for as long as the crypto-assets are held by the public.


### obligations of issuers of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens ### obligations of issuers and offerors of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens


### 1. issuers of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall: ### 1. issuers and offerors of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall:


### 2. issuers of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall act in the best interests of the holders of such crypto-assets and shall treat them equally , unless any preferential treatment is disclosed in the crypto-asset white paper , and , where applicable , the marketing communications. ### 2. offerors of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall act in the best interests of the holders of such crypto-assets and shall treat them equally , unless any preferential treatment is disclosed in the crypto-asset white paper , and , where applicable , the marketing communications.


### 3. where an offer to the public of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , is cancelled for any reason , issuers of such crypto-assets shall ensure that any funds collected from purchasers or potential purchasers are duly returned to them as soon as possible. ### 3. where an offer to the public of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , is cancelled for any reason , offerors of such crypto-assets shall ensure that any funds collected from purchasers or potential purchasers are duly returned to them as soon as possible.


### liability of issuers of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens for the information given in a crypto-asset white paper ### liability of offerors of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens for the information given in a crypto-asset white paper


### 1. where an issuer of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , or its management body has infringed article 5 , by providing in its crypto-asset white paper or in a modified crypto-asset white paper information which is not complete , fair or clear or by providing information which is misleading , a holder of crypto-assets may claim damages from that issuer of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , or its management body for damage caused to her or him due to that infringement. ### 1. where an offeror of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , or its management body has infringed article 5 , by providing in its crypto-asset white paper or in a modified crypto-asset white paper information which is not complete , fair or clear or by providing information which is misleading , a holder of crypto-assets may claim damages from that offeror of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , or its management body for damage caused to her or him due to that infringement.


### 2. it shall be the responsibility of the holders of crypto-assets to present evidence indicating that the issuer of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , has infringed article 5 and that such an infringement had an impact on his or her decision to buy , sell or exchange the said crypto-assets. ### 2. it shall be the responsibility of the holders of crypto-assets to present evidence indicating that the offeror of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , has infringed article 5 and that such an infringement had an impact on his or her decision to buy , sell or exchange the said crypto-assets.


### issuers of such asset-referenced tokens shall , however , produce a crypto-asset white paper as referred to in article 17 and notify that crypto-asset white paper , and where applicable , their marketing communications , to the competent authority of their home member state in accordance with article 7. ### offerors of such asset-referenced tokens shall , however , produce a crypto-asset white paper as referred to in article 17 and notify that crypto-asset white paper , and where applicable , their marketing communications , to the competent authority of their home member state in accordance with article 7.


### 4. the eba , esma , the ecb and , where applicable , a central bank as referred to in paragraph 3 shall , within 2 months after having received the draft decision and the application file , issue a non-binding opinion on the application and transmit their non-binding opinions to the competent authority concerned. that competent authority shall duly consider those non-binding opinions and the observations and comments of the applicant issuer. ### 4. the eba , esma , the ecb and , where applicable , a central bank as referred to in paragraph 3 shall , within 2 months after having received the draft decision and the application file , issue a non-binding opinion on the application and transmit their non-binding opinions to the competent authority concerned. that competent authority shall duly consider those non-binding opinions and the observations and comments of the applicant issuer. if the ecb (or the central bank in the relevant cases) delivers a negative opinion because of monetary policy considerations , the competent authority should refuse the application for authorisation and inform the applicant issuer of the decision.


### the applicant issuer fails to meet or is likely to fail to meet any of the requirements of this title; ### the applicant offeror fails to meet any of the requirements of this title;


### the applicant issuer’s business model may pose a serious threat to financial stability , monetary policy transmission or monetary sovereignty. ### the applicant issuer’s business model may pose a serious threat to financial stability , monetary policy transmission or monetary sovereignty of member states , based on criteria as shall be specified in a delegated or implementing act issued in accordance with article 121.


### 1. issuers of asset-referenced tokens shall at least every month and in a clear , accurate and transparent manner disclose on their website the amount of asset-referenced tokens in circulation and the value and the composition of the reserve assets referred to in article 32. ### 1. offerors of asset-referenced tokens shall at least every month and in a clear , accurate and transparent manner disclose on their website the amount of asset-referenced tokens in circulation and the value and the composition of the reserve assets referred to in article 32.


### the audits referred to in paragraph 11; ### the required auditable documentation and the audits referred to in paragraph 11;


### b. whereas although tax policy largely remains a member state responsibility , the single market requires a minimum degree of coordination in setting tax policy1 ; ### b. whereas although tax policy remains a member state responsibility , in order to achieve a better functioning single market while respecting the council unanimous acting in respect to the special legislation procedure , the single market requires a minimum degree of coordination in setting tax policy1 ;


### b. whereas although tax policy largely remains a member state responsibility , the single market requires a minimum degree of coordination in setting tax policy1; ### b. whereas tax policy largely remains , in principle , a member state responsibility , the single market can require a minimum degree of coordination in setting tax policy1;


### c. whereas tax policy fragmentation creates various obstacles for companies and citizens in the single market , including legal uncertainty , red tape , the risk of double taxation and difficulties claiming tax refunds; whereas these obstacles discourage cross-border economic activity in the single market; whereas policy fragmentation also creates risks for tax authorities such as double non-taxation and arbitrage possibilities (such as tax planning); ### c. whereas tax policy fragmentation creates various obstacles for companies and citizens in the single market , including legal uncertainty , red tape , the risk of double taxation and difficulties claiming tax refunds; whereas these obstacles discourage cross-border economic activity in the single market; whereas policy fragmentation also creates risks for digital administration in the field of taxation and tax authorities such as double non-taxation and arbitrage possibilities (such as tax planning);


### c. whereas tax policy fragmentation creates various obstacles for companies and citizens in the single market , including legal uncertainty , red tape , the risk of double taxation and difficulties claiming tax refunds; whereas these obstacles discourage cross-border economic activity in the single market; whereas policy fragmentation also creates risks for tax authorities such as double non-taxation and arbitrage possibilities (such as tax planning); ### c. whereas tax policy fragmentation can create various obstacles for companies and citizens in the single market , including legal uncertainty , red tape , the risk of double taxation and difficulties claiming tax refunds; whereas these obstacles can discourage cross-border economic activity in the single market; whereas policy fragmentation also creates risks for tax authorities such as double non-taxation and arbitrage possibilities (such as tax planning);


### 3. highlights that differences in national tax regimes present obstacles to smes trying to operate across borders; stresses that compared to multinational enterprises , smes have fewer resources to spend on tax compliance and tax optimisation; points out that the share of expenditure used for tax compliance purposes is higher for smes than for multinational enterprises; ### 3. highlights that differences in national tax regimes can present obstacles to smes trying to operate across borders; stresses that compared to multinational enterprises , smes have fewer resources to spend on tax compliance and tax optimisation; points out that the share of expenditure used for tax compliance purposes is higher for smes than for multinational enterprises;


### 4. notes that tax base harmonisation such as the common corporate tax base or the ‘business in europe: framework for income taxation’ could reduce the cost of tax compliance for smes that operate in more than one member state; ### deleted


### 4. notes that tax base harmonisation such as the common corporate tax base or the ‘business in europe: framework for income taxation’ could reduce the cost of tax compliance for smes that operate in more than one member state; ### 4. notes that tax base harmonisation such as the common corporate tax base agreed within the oecd could reduce the cost of tax compliance for smes that operate in more than one member state;


### 5. notes that many member states as well as the eu have introduced dedicated regimes favouring smes such as special vat rules in order to offset the higher effective tax rates and higher tax compliance costs for smes; stresses that such special treatment , while generally positive , could risk introducing further distortions and further increasing the overall complexity of the system; ### 5. notes that many member states as well as the eu have introduced dedicated regimes favouring smes such as special vat rules in order to offset the higher effective tax rates and higher tax compliance costs for smes; stresses that such special treatment , if utilised extensively , while generally positive , could risk introducing further distortions and further increasing the overall complexity of the system; while stresses that tax competition is the main mechanism helping member states to identify and close the loopholes and shortcomings responsible for tax evasion;


### 9. notes that digitalisation and a heavy reliance on intangible assets that pose challenges to the current tax system warrant a high degree of policy coordination; deplores the fact that some member states have pressed ahead with the introduction of national digital taxes despite ongoing negotiations at eu and oecd levels; stresses that these national measures should be phased out following the implementation of an effective international solution; ### 9. notes that digitalisation and a heavy reliance on intangible assets that pose challenges to the current tax system warrant a high degree of policy coordination in establishing a level playing field and ensuring that digital companies are fairly contributing to the societies where they do business; deplores the fact that some member states have pressed ahead with the introduction of national digital taxes despite ongoing negotiations at eu and oecd levels; stresses that these national measures should be phased out following the implementation of an effective international solution;


### 14. highlights that tax incentives for private research and development (e.g. via tax credits , enhanced allowances or adjusted depreciation schedules) can help to lift an economy’s overall spending towards research and development , which often comes with positive externalities; is concerned , however , that certain types of tax incentives such as patent box / intellectual property box regimes do little to increase research and development spending and may actually distort the single market; ### 14. highlights that tax incentives applied in fiscally responsible manner for private research and development (e.g. via tax credits , enhanced allowances or adjusted depreciation schedules) can help to lift an economy’s overall spending towards research and development , which often comes with positive externalities; is concerned , however , that certain types of tax incentives such as patent box / intellectual property box regimes do little to increase research and development spending and may actually distort the single market and social cohesion particularly if incentives for research and development become more centralised which leads to even greater distortion amongst member states;


### b. whereas the economic recovery and the climate crisis have increased the need to mobilise more resources and re-evaluate the current taxation policies; ### b. whereas the economic recovery after the covid-19 lockdowns and the challenges regarding climate change have increased the need to mobilise more resources and re-evaluate the current taxation policies;


### b. whereas the economic recovery and the climate crisis have increased the need to mobilise more resources and re-evaluate the current taxation policies; ### b. whereas the economic recovery , the lockdown of our economies and the climate crisis have increased the need to mobilise more resources and re-evaluate the current taxation policies;


### c. whereas tax morale is generally higher in countries that tax more heavily , which is evidence for the willingness of citizens to pay tax in return for effective public services9 ; ### c. whereas tax morale is higher in countries that tax more heavily and their governments are transparent and public sectors are efficient , like in the nordic countries , which is evidence for the willingness of citizens to pay tax in return for effective public services9 ;


### c. whereas tax morale is generally higher in countries that tax more heavily , which is evidence for the willingness of citizens to pay tax in return for effective public services9 ; ### c. whereas tax morale is generally higher in countries with transparent and efficient administrations , which is evidence for the willingness of citizens to pay tax in return for effective public services9 ;


### e. whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) are particularly affected by the complexities of the tax system and tax compliance , disproportionately so compared to multinational enterprises (mnes); ### e. whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) are particularly affected by the complexities of the tax system , tax compliance and unsuccessfully implemented lockdowns , disproportionately so compared to multinational enterprises (mnes);


### e. whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) are particularly affected by the complexities of the tax system and tax compliance , disproportionately so compared to multinational enterprises (mnes); ### e. whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) are particularly affected by the covid-19 crisis as well as the complexities of the tax system and tax compliance , disproportionately so compared to multinational enterprises (mnes);


### 1. considers that covid-19 has given the eu a unique chance for a proper and holistic analysis of tax systems , how individual taxes interact and how they can be better coordinated to produce more flexible , resilient , green and fairer tax systems; recommends that member states take this opportunity to build a new social-fiscal contract with citizens; underlines that this will help not only with raising revenues , but also with building trust and accountability between citizens and the state; stresses the need for coordination at eu level to avoid distortions and subsequent revenue losses; ### 1. considers that new technologies and covid-19 has given the eu a unique chance for a proper and holistic analysis of tax systems , how individual taxes interact and how they can be better coordinated to produce more flexible , resilient , green , growth-enhancing and fairer tax systems; recommends that member states take this opportunity to build a new social-fiscal contract with citizens; underlines that this will help not only with raising revenues , but also with building trust and accountability between citizens and the state; stresses the need for coordination at eu level to avoid distortions and subsequent revenue losses , whilst respecting the competence of the member-states;


### 2. highlights that current tax systems , and the fiscal capacities of member states , are already facing and will increasingly face severe shocks , such as the need for large public investments to sustain the economic recovery and the green transition , the ageing of our societies and the consequent reduction in the working-age population , the digital transformation of our labour markets , increased tax competition and the existing tax gap10 ; ### 2. highlights that current tax systems , and the fiscal capacities of member states , are already facing and will increasingly face severe shocks , such as the need for large public investments and leverage private capital to sustain the economic recovery and the green and digital transition , the ageing of our societies and the consequent reduction in the working-age population , the digital transformation of our labour markets , increased tax competition and the existing tax gap10 ;


### 2. highlights that current tax systems , and the fiscal capacities of member states , are already facing and will increasingly face severe shocks , such as the need for large public investments to sustain the economic recovery and the green transition , the ageing of our societies and the consequent reduction in the working-age population , the digital transformation of our labour markets , increased tax competition and the existing tax gap10 ; ### 2. highlights that current tax systems , and the fiscal capacities of member states , are already facing and will increasingly face severe shocks , such as the need for large public investments to sustain the economic recovery and the green transition , the lack of policies encountering low birth-rates and the consequent reduction in the working-age population , the digital transformation of our labour markets , increased tax competition and the existing tax gap10 ;


### 2. highlights that current tax systems , and the fiscal capacities of member states , are already facing and will increasingly face severe shocks , such as the need for large public investments to sustain the economic recovery and the green transition , the ageing of our societies and the consequent reduction in the working-age population , the digital transformation of our labour markets , increased tax competition and the existing tax gap10 ; ### 2. highlights that current tax systems , and the fiscal capacities of member states , are already facing and will increasingly face severe shocks , such as the need for large public investments and leverage private capital to sustain the economic recovery , the ageing of our societies and the consequent reduction in the working-age population , the digital transformation of our labour markets , increased tax competition and the existing tax gap10 ;


### 7. notes that covid-19 has demonstrated that the current disproportionate reliance on labour income taxes and social contributions , which puts the onus on continued high levels of employment and consumption to fund government spending and policies , is neither sustainable nor economically effective; ### 7. notes that covid-19 has demonstrated that the current disproportionate reliance on labour income taxes and social contributions , which puts the onus on continued high levels of employment and consumption to fund government spending and policies , is , just as high tax levels or complex tax systems , neither sustainable nor economically effective;


### 12. calls on member states to revise tax expenditure in all tax areas; calls on member states to perform annual , detailed and public cost-benefit analyses of each tax provision; ### 12. calls on member states to revise tax expenditure in all tax areas; calls on member states to perform annual , detailed and public cost-benefit analyses of each tax provision; calls on the member states to submit an annual report to the commission on the extent that the digital transition has led to the reduction public sector costs and the simplification of the procedures for citizens and businesses;


### 13. observes that there is also room for significant revenue and efficiency gains at tax administration level; notes that an effective and efficient tax administration , as well as a high degree of tax certainty , can encourage investment and foster competitiveness; ### 13. observes that there is also room for significant revenue and efficiency gains at tax administration level , e.g. by using modern technology; underlines that an effective and efficient tax administration , as well as a high degree of legal and tax certainty , encourages investment and foster competitiveness;


### 14. welcomes initiatives taken by the commission within the framework of the green deal; notes with concern that no clear and holistic guidance exists on how taxation should contribute to achieving the goals set out in the green deal and considers that the taxation system should therefore be reformed; ### 14. welcomes initiatives taken by the commission within the framework of the green deal; notes that no clear and holistic guidance exists on how taxation should contribute to achieving the goals set out in the green deal and considers that the taxation system should therefore be reformed , whilst respecting the competences of the member-states regarding taxation;


### 16. welcomes the commission’s soon-to-be-published revision of the energy taxation directive17 ; calls on member states to agree to close tax exemptions for aviation and maritime fuels , increase minimum rates and restore the level playing field; calls on the commission to launch a proposal for a progressive european kerosene tax; ### 16. welcomes the commission’s soon-to-be-published revision of the energy taxation directive17 ; calls on member states to agree to reassess their tax exemptions for aviation and maritime fuels , aiming not to lose these business to third countries , reconsider the minimum rates and restore the level playing field; calls on the commission to launch a proposal for a progressive european kerosene tax;


### 17. calls on the commission to propose an sme tax simplification package that aims to make tax compliance more streamlined and easier for small and medium-sized businesses; ### 17. calls on the commission to , within its competences , propose an sme tax simplification package that aims to make tax compliance more streamlined and easier for small and medium-sized businesses;


### 18. recalls on the commission and the member states to carry out regular gender impact assessments of fiscal policies from a gender equality perspective; ### 18. recalls on the commission and the member states to carry out regular impact assessments of fiscal policies from a geographic , social inequalities and a gender equality perspective , intra-state and on the eu level;


### 18. recalls on the commission and the member states to carry out regular gender impact assessments of fiscal policies from a gender equality perspective; ### 18. recalls on the commission and the member states to carry out regular gender and economic impact assessments of its fiscal policies;


### f. whereas in 2020 , member states provided total fiscal support estimated at more than 6.5 % of gdp , and as a result , the euro area and eu aggregate government deficit increased from historically low levels of around 0.5 % of gdp in 2019 to around 7 % in 2020 , which will inevitably be reflected in the aggregate debt levels; ### deleted


### 5. notes that the general escape clause of the stability and growth pact will continue to be applied in 2022 and is expected to be deactivated as of 2023; notes , furthermore , that the decision to deactivate the general escape clause should be taken as an overall assessment of the state of the economy based on quantitative criteria , with the level of economic activity in the eu compared to pre-crisis levels as the key quantitative criterion; points out that country-specific situations will continue to be taken into account after the deactivation of the general escape clause; ### 5. is concerned that the general escape clause of the stability and growth pact will continue to be applied in 2022 and is expected to be deactivated as of 2023; stresses in this regard that fiscal rules and their proper and equal enforcement by the commission are essential to increase fiscal discipline in the monetary union; notes , furthermore , that the decision to deactivate the general escape clause should be based on quantitative criteria , with the level of economic activity in the eu compared to pre-crisis levels as the key quantitative criterion;


### 7. is convinced that coordination of national fiscal policies remains crucial in underpinning the recovery; notes that the overall fiscal stance , taking into account national budgets and the rrf , should remain supportive in 2021 and 2022; ### 7. is convinced that coordination of national fiscal policies remains crucial in underpinning the recovery; notes that the overall fiscal stance , taking into account national budgets and the rrf , should remain supportive in 2021 and 2022; calls on the commission to share the best practices of fiscal consolidation efforts between member states;


### 9. notes that member states with high debt should use the rrf to finance additional investment to support the recovery , while pursuing a prudent fiscal policy; stresses the importance of the member states using the potential of the rff to support the necessary structural changes and the transformation to more globally competitive , future-proof , agile industries; agrees that the growth of nationally financed current expenditure should be kept under control and be limited for member states with high debt , allowing fiscal measures to maximise support to the recovery without pre-empting future fiscal trajectories and creating a permanent burden on public finances; ### 9. notes that member states with high debt should use the rrf to finance additional investment to support the recovery , while pursuing a prudent fiscal policy; warns that boosting public investment should not be seen as an alternative to productivity-enhancing reforms; stresses the importance of the member states using the potential of the rrf to support the necessary structural changes and the transformation to more globally competitive , future-proof , agile industries; agrees that the growth of nationally financed current expenditure should be kept under control and be limited for member states with high debt , allowing fiscal measures to maximise support to the recovery without pre-empting future fiscal trajectories and creating a permanent burden on public finances;


### 13. highlights that the rrf is an unprecedented opportunity for all member states to address key structural challenges and investment needs , while embracing the green and digital transitions; ### 13. highlights that the rrf is an unprecedented opportunity for all member states to address key structural challenges and investment needs , while embracing the green and digital transitions; underlines the long-term responsibility of member states to build their own fiscal capacities on national level in order to maintain stability and counter economic shocks;


### 14. calls for a focus on fiscal structural reforms , including reforms enhancing efficient spending , and acknowledges that high-quality public finance resource management is crucial; ### 14. calls for a focus on fiscal , growth-enhancing [growth-maximizing] structural reforms , including reforms enhancing efficient spending , and acknowledges that high-quality public finance resource management is crucial; underlines the need to define result-oriented performance indicators measuring efficiency of promoted public policies;


### 19. recalls that member states , in their recovery and resilience plans , are required to effectively address all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the relevant csrs , including the fiscal aspects thereof , and that beyond the scope of the rrf , those recommendations that are not addressed remain valid and will continue to be monitored under the european semester framework; ### 19. recalls that member states , in their recovery and resilience plans , are required to effectively address all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the relevant csrs , including the fiscal aspects thereof , and that beyond the scope of the rrf , those recommendations that are not addressed remain valid and will continue to be monitored under the european semester framework; regrets low rate of full or substantial implementation of semester’s relevant recommendations , which remains a challenge1a;


### — having regard to articles 113 and 115 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) , ### — having regard to articles 113 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) ,


### 2. notes that simplifying vat with the introduction of a single rate and revenue neutrality could reduce the standard rate in the eu by an average of 7% , thus bringing the standard rate down from 13% to 2%; ### 2. notes that simplifying vat with the introduction of a single rate and revenue neutrality could reduce the standard rate in the eu by an average of 7 percentage points , thus bringing the standard rate down from 13 to 2 percentage points; encourages member states to explore the benefits which such a single reduced standard rate would have for fair competition on their market;


### 3. takes the view that applying a multitude of reduced rates aggravates the complexity and opacity of the tax system , facilitates fraud and increases compliance costs; ### 3. takes the view that applying a multitude of reduced rates aggravates the complexity and opacity of the tax system , facilitates fraud and increases compliance costs; stresses that tax competition is the main mechanism helping member states to identify and close the loopholes and shortcomings responsible for tax evasion;


### 4. observes that the vat gap fluctuates in line with the business cycle , and that low tax compliance is correlated with high standard vat rates and multiple vat rates as well as lower legal and judicial efficiency; ### 4. observes that the vat gap fluctuates in line with the business cycle , and that low tax compliance is correlated with high standard vat rates and multiple vat rates as well as lower legal and judicial efficiency; encourages the commission and member states to share the best practices in this regard;


### 5. takes the view that the current diversity of reduced rates imposes particularly high compliance costs on businesses; and that compliance costs are estimated to be an average of 2.5% of company turnover and vary considerably from member state to member state22 ; ### 5. takes the view that the current diversity of reduced rates imposes additional compliance costs on businesses; and that total enterprise tax compliance costs are estimated to be an average of 2.5% of company turnover and vary considerably from member state to member state22 , while vat , corporate income tax , and wage related taxes and contributions are rated the most burdensome , followed by property and real estate taxes22b;


### 6. observes that smes must pay proportionately higher compliance costs , as these costs are fixed and independent of company size , and that high compliance costs constitute a barrier to entry into the eu internal market; takes the view , therefore , that differentiated vat regimes within the eu may act as a disincentive to exports; ### 6. observes that smes must pay proportionately higher total enterprise tax compliance costs , as these costs are fixed and independent of company size , and that high compliance costs constitute a barrier to entry into the eu internal market; notes that empirical evidence on the effect of vat systems on international trade is inconclusive22c;


### 7. notes digitalisation’s potential to reduce compliance costs; maintains that digital innovations23 are likely to reduce compliance costs and help increase the transparency of commercial transactions; stresses the need to ensure data security and individual and corporate privacy; ### 7. notes digitalisation’s potential to reduce compliance costs; maintains that digital innovations23 are likely to reduce compliance costs , help increase the transparency of commercial transactions and reduce red tape; stresses the need to ensure data security and individual and corporate privacy;


### 8. observes that the wide variety of rates causes price distortion in the internal market , creating incentives for cross-border purchases and giving rise to increased tax competition between member states; recalls that companies need clear and unambiguous vat rules to encourage cross-border business and reduce their administrative burdens; ### 8. observes that the wide variety of rates can cause price distortion in the internal market , creating incentives for cross-border purchases and giving rise to increased tax competition between member states; notes that 26 out of 27 member states use the reduced rates as part of their tax and social policies; recalls that one common web information portal about the implementation of vat system in different member states would encourage cross-border business and reduce administrative burdens of companies;


### 9. stresses that a well-designed vat system is neutral and should not affect trade , but that in practice this principle is difficult to verify at global level given the application of vat exemptions , the ineffectiveness of refund systems , the wide variety of rates – incurring higher compliance costs – and the fact that vat has superseded income taxes with a view to encouraging trade; ### 9. stresses that an effective vat system with low average tax rates is less vulnerable to tax evasion and tax optimisation;


### 10. observes that the application of reduced rates does not systematically give rise to permanent price reductions for the consumer; that the effectiveness of a reduced rate depends on a number of factors , such as the extent to which businesses pass it on to consumers , its duration over time , the size of the reduction and the complexity of the rate system; that the passing-on of reductions in their entirety is therefore a random process and should not be the basis for policy-making; that it is impossible to target low-income households; ### deleted


### 11. recalls that for it to have a leverage effect , green taxation must be inclusive , strive for social equity and not undermine businesses’ international competitiveness; observes that the effectiveness of reduced rates in promoting this type of goods and services or , in a broader sense , merit goods (e.g. culture , health , biodiversity) is chiefly a function of the extent to which they are used to promote such goods; ### 11. recalls that for it to have a leverage effect , green taxation must not undermine businesses’ international competitiveness; observes that the effectiveness of reduced rates in promoting this type of goods and services or , in a broader sense , merit goods (e.g. culture , health , biodiversity) is chiefly a function of the extent to which they are used to promote such goods;


### 12. stresses that reduced rates are not an effective way of achieving social or environmental objectives since they incur high costs for governments owing to the size of the rate gap , reduced tax revenues , increased administrative costs , costly checks and inspections , pressure from lobby groups , compliance costs , economic distortions or even tax evasion , and the difficulty of reaching the target groups; ### deleted


### 13. takes the view that direct tax incentives , such as direct grants or tax credits targeting specific consumers and producers , are more effective , flexible , visible and cost-effective tools for achieving these social and environmental objectives; ### deleted


### 14. stresses that a uniform vat system , combined with a direct tax incentive tool such as the income-based tax credit scheme for low-income households , together with a raft of social reforms , would be a winning strategy; recalls that new zealand has a flat-rate vat system and applies tax credit for low-income households; points out that flat-rate subsidies and information campaigns are an option for the promotion of merit goods; ### 14. recalls that new zealand has an uniform 15% flat-rate vat system;


### 15. recalls that vat revenue is one of the chief sources of public revenue , accounting for some 21% of total tax revenue in the eu on average; that the vat gap stands at 10% on average; and that vat also constitutes an own resource for the eu budget; stresses that any reduction in the vat base leads to less revenue for public finances; calls on national tax authorities to take initiatives to reduce the vat gap in order to help lift member states out of the current socio-economic crisis; ### 15. recalls that vat revenue is one of the chief sources of public revenue , accounting for some 21% of total tax revenue in the eu on average; that the vat gap stands at 10% on average; and that vat also constitutes an own resource for the eu budget; stresses that any reduction in the vat base may lead to less revenue for public finances , however , theoretical and empirical evidence shows lower tax rate may also lead to higher revenue; calls on national tax authorities to take initiatives to reduce the vat gap in order to help lift member states out of the current socio-economic crisis;


### 16. endorses the findings of the diw econ study which stresses that on average the standard rate was applied to 71% of the total tax base in the member states in 2019; points out that diversified vat systems impose costs on businesses , particularly smes via increased compliance costs , create distortions in the internal market and trade , and incur costs on government through lost revenue; adds that reduced rates are an insufficient means of achieving revenue-distribution or environmental objectives; ### 16. notes the findings of the diw econ study which stresses that on average the standard rate was applied to 71% of the total tax base in the member states in 2019; points out that compliance costs of diversified vat systems can be significantly reduced by continuing digitization of businesses and public administrations;


### 17. notes the difficulties in reducing the vat gap between member states owing to the need to maintain a number of vat exemptions for certain goods and services and the willingness of member states to maintain reduced rates of at least 5%; acknowledges that member states need to conserve the flexibility to set their own vat rates given the importance of this tax as a budgetary instrument; ### 17. acknowledges that member states need to conserve the flexibility to set their own vat rates given the importance of this tax as a budgetary instrument;


### 18. calls for a simplified vat system with limits on exemptions and non-standard rates to be introduced with a view to promoting competitiveness; ### 18. calls for a simplified vat system with limits on exemptions to be introduced with a view to promoting competitiveness; takes the view that limiting the exemptions should go hand-in-hand with lowering the standard and minimum 15% vat rate;


### 19. stresses that the vat gap is chiefly attributable to the ineffectiveness of enforcement and control measures , particularly those against tax evasion and avoidance and aggressive tax planning; ### 19. stresses that the vat gap is chiefly attributable to the ineffectiveness of enforcement and control measures , particularly those against tax evasion and avoidance and aggressive tax planning; stresses that fighting tax fraud and tax evasion should not breach the principle of tax sovereignty and tax competition;


### 20. recalls that the effectiveness of reduced rates as a policy tool must always be assessed in the specific context of other existing policy tools; adds that reduced rates are often complementary to existing social and environmental policy tools; and that direct tax incentives are instruments that better target low-income households and are generally less costly; ### 20. recalls that the effectiveness of reduced rates as a policy tool must always be assessed in the specific context of other existing policy tools; adds that reduced rates are often complementary to existing social and environmental policy tools;


### 1. welcomes the entry of bulgaria and croatia into the banking union; ### 1. regrets the entry of bulgaria and croatia into the banking union; especially in the light of both countries' sharp drop in the corruption perception index 2020 , where bulgaria now takes last place , and increasing worries about corruption in croatia , such as the contested government order forcing banks to retroactively convert loans from swiss francs to euros and pay out over € 1.1 billion in reimbursement to customers it had lent money to , as well as ongoing corruption charges against the hdz party (epp) , the agrokor scandal involving finance minister maric , or the sanader case; calls on the eu not to expand the euro area with such corrupt regimes;


### 2. recalls that the banking union has delivered the institutional set-up for greater market integration , through the ssm and the srm , while a european deposit insurance scheme (edis) is still lacking; ### 2. whereas the banking union will further disintegrate due to moral hazard and lead to a permanent transfer union if mechanisms such as the backstop for the single resolution fund (srf) and a european deposit insurance scheme (edis) are implemented; regrets that insufficient progress in risk reduction in some member states serves as an argument for mutualisation of deposit insurance schemes , creating incentives for some member states not to reduce risk , or even engage in even more excessive risk-taking; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the edis proposal is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound governance;


### 2. recalls that the banking union has delivered the institutional set-up for greater market integration , through the ssm and the srm , while a european deposit insurance scheme (edis) is still lacking; ### 2. recalls that the banking union has delivered the institutional set-up for greater market integration , through the ssm and the srm;


### 3. considers that banks’ response to the current crisis demonstrates that the regulatory reforms in the past decade , as well as the institutional set-up , have resulted in better-capitalised and less-leveraged banks; ### 3. considers that banks’ response to the current crisis demonstrates that the regulatory reforms in the past decade , as well as the institutional set-up , have resulted in better-capitalised and less-leveraged banks , proving that equity and not debt is the solution to solve crises and build up resilience against economic and financial shocks;


### 3. considers that banks’ response to the current crisis demonstrates that the regulatory reforms in the past decade , as well as the institutional set-up , have resulted in better-capitalised and less-leveraged banks; ### 3. considers that banks’ response to the current crisis demonstrates that the regulatory reforms in the past decade , as well as the institutional set-up , have resulted in better-capitalised and less-leveraged banks; notes , however , that the high level of non-performing loans remains a serious problem in several member states;


### 4. considers that while the good relationship between the ssm and the srb has been fundamental from the inception of the system , a strengthened approach to cooperation between the two pillars is particularly important in the current context; ### deleted


### 5. underlines the vital contribution to addressing the crisis of public guarantee schemes , moratoria on loan repayments for borrowers in financial difficulty , the central banks’ liquidity programmes and the ecb’s targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltro) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp); ### 5. deplores the ecb's role in massively inflating the money supply and expanding its balance sheet up to over 70% of euro area gdp; recalls that banks in the northern euro area hold a disproportionately high amount of deposits with the ecb , and pay disproportionately high penalty interest to the ecb; by contrast , banks in the southern euro area benefit disproportionally from the negative interest rates on tltro loans;


### 5. underlines the vital contribution to addressing the crisis of public guarantee schemes , moratoria on loan repayments for borrowers in financial difficulty , the central banks’ liquidity programmes and the ecb’s targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltro) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp); ### 5. underlines the vital contribution to addressing the crisis of public guarantee schemes , moratoria on loan repayments for borrowers in financial difficulty , the central banks’ liquidity programmes and the ecb’s targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltro) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp); warns in this regard over the risk of overshooting the inflation target due to loose monetary policy which could affect the functioning of banking union;


### 6. notes the ‘quick fix’ to the capital requirements regulation31 extending transitional arrangements in order to support banks’ lending capacity32 ; ### 6. expresses concern about the the ‘quick fix’ to the capital requirements regulation31 extending transitional arrangements in order to support banks’ lending capacity32 ; seriously doubts whether supporting further debt-financing is a sustainable way to recapitalize the european economy and to fostering economic growth;


### a. whereas overall , the banking sector has responded to the covid-19 pandemic with resilience , mostly founded on the regulatory reforms enacted since the global financial crisis and further supported by extraordinary public policy relief measures and capital conservation practices; ### a. whereas overall , the banking sector has responded to the covid-19 pandemic with resilience , mostly founded on the regulatory reforms enacted since the global financial crisis and increased capital requirements , indicating that equity and solvency are key to tackle financial and economic shocks instead of ever-increasing debt financing;


### d. whereas climate change , environmental degradation and the transition to a low-carbon economy bring new risks to banks’ balance sheets; ### d. whereas climate change , environmental degradation , increased red tape in the context of climate reporting for financial institutions , which could be referred to as "green tape" , and the transition to a low-carbon economy bring new risks to banks’ balance sheets;


### e. whereas consumer protection varies across the banking union; ### e. whereas article 169 of the tfeu states that eu measures shall not prevent any member state from maintaining or introducing more stringent consumer protection measures provided that they are compatible with the treaties; in this way eu law provides a common basic level of protection to all consumers residing in the eu; recalls that there is no consistent and uniform definition of consumer protection in eu law , which justifies divergences amongst the member states;


### f. whereas prudential and anti-money laundering supervision is necessary; ### f. whereas there are still important loopholes in the eu aml framework , such as the explicit exemption of the non-profit sector from anti-money laundering reporting requirements , even though certain ngos and other non-financial entities (nfes) operate with larger amounts of money than numerous european banks;


### f. whereas prudential and anti-money laundering supervision is necessary; ### f. whereas prudential and anti-money laundering supervision is necessary and equally important;


### g. whereas the withdrawal of the uk from the eu has resulted in the relocation of banking services to the eu; ### g. whereas the withdrawal of the uk from the eu has resulted in the relocation of certain banking services to the eu;


### j. whereas depositors across the banking union should enjoy the same level of protection; ### j. whereas depositors across the banking union are exposed to varying levels of credit , market and operational risk , which justifies varying levels of protection;


### — having regard to the commission proposals pending for adoption , in particular on the common corporate tax base (cctb) , the common consolidated corporate tax base (ccctb)1 , and the digital taxation package2 , as well as the european parliament’s positions on these proposals , ### deleted


### 4. recalls that any tax measures , temporary or not , should foster and not hamper the competitiveness of european businesses; stresses that the reporting requirements should not generate higher administrative costs for economic actors , notably for small and medium-sized enterprises (smes); notes that to effectively address lost tax revenues , better quality and possible higher quantities of data may be needed , but only data effectively used , and collected from taxpayers only once with utmost security , should be collected; notes that data should aim to simplify various obligations of taxpayers , while artificial intelligence (ai) and various softwares should be used to maximise the effectiveness of the use of data; ### 4. recalls that any tax measures , temporary or not , should foster and not hamper the competitiveness of european businesses; stresses that the reporting requirements should therefore not generate higher administrative costs for economic actors , notably for small and medium-sized enterprises (smes); notes that to effectively address lost tax revenues , better quality and possible higher quantities of data may be needed , which should , however , be obtained once and only if they are necessary , while ensuring their effective use and an appropriate level of security; notes that data should aim to simplify various obligations of taxpayers , while artificial intelligence (ai) and various softwares should be used to maximise the effectiveness of the use of data;


### 5. is of the opinion that better estimates of overall tax losses in the union are essential for efficient proposals on ways to effectively reduce tax losses; ### 5. is of the opinion that better estimates of overall tax losses in the union and a detailed investigation of their systemic causes are essential for efficient proposals on ways to effectively reduce tax losses;


### 7. notes that the union decision-making process is not promoting change , as tax policy is a national prerogative and subject to unanimity; regrets that the current situation sometimes leads to an uneven or inconsistent application of tax regulations; calls on the commission and the member states to ensure more harmonised and consistent tax rules and their implementation , to protect the functioning of the single market and to assure the principle of “taxing where profit is generated”; ### 7. recalls that tax policy is a national prerogative and subject to unanimity;


### 7. notes that the union decision-making process is not promoting change , as tax policy is a national prerogative and subject to unanimity; regrets that the current situation sometimes leads to an uneven or inconsistent application of tax regulations; calls on the commission and the member states to ensure more harmonised and consistent tax rules and their implementation , to protect the functioning of the single market and to assure the principle of “taxing where profit is generated”; ### 7. notes that tax policy is a national prerogative and subject to unanimity , and that this guiding principle should be maintained , even though the current situation sometimes leads to an uneven or inconsistent application of tax regulations; calls on the commission and the member states to reach a consensus on ensuring more harmonised and consistent tax rules and their implementation , to protect the functioning of the single market and to assure the principle of “taxing where profit is generated”;


### 8. takes note of the existing limits on decision making in the council and calls for exploring all legal options as provided in the treaties on taxation especially in order to ensure functionality of the single market and preserve union competitiveness in the global market; ### 8. takes note of the existing limits on decision making in the council and calls for the principle of unanimity in tax matters laid down in the treaties to be complied with when seeking solutions to ensure functionality of the single market and preserve union competitiveness in the global market;


### 9. observes that the current eu vat system remains too complex and vulnerable to fraud , while generating high compliance costs for economic operators8; notes that the different measures to tackle tax fraud are adopted in the member states; recalls that the modernisation of the vat system and the shift towards a more coherent vat system across the union should be addressed urgently9; ### 9. observes that the current eu vat system remains too complex and vulnerable to fraud , while generating high compliance costs for economic operators8 , and that it is an unfair system given the privileged position of certain member states in terms of freedom to set vat rates; notes that the different measures to tackle tax fraud are adopted in the member states; recalls that the modernisation of the vat system and the shift towards a more coherent vat system across the union should be addressed urgently9; calls for a system that is fair and equal for all and ensures transparency and consistency , while allowing member states flexibility in setting vat rates , which is particularly important in the period of economic recovery following the covid-19 pandemic.


### 14. welcomes the two-pillar agreement reached at the g7/g20 levels on the allocation of taxing rights and the application of a minimum effective tax rate of at least 15% on the global profits of mnes; notes the need for effective implementation; calls on the commission to make the necessary legislative proposals to implement the agreement into union law as quickly as possible after the finalisation of the technical work on the oecd approach; ### 14. welcomes the two-pillar agreement reached at the g7/g20 levels on the allocation of taxing rights and the application of a minimum effective tax rate of 15% on the global profits of mnes; notes the need for effective implementation; calls on the commission to make the necessary legislative proposals to implement the agreement into union law as quickly as possible after the finalisation of the technical work on the oecd approach;


### 17. considers , however , that the befit initiative should be supported by the political process in building political support for change and that the initiative should be accompanied by a thorough impact assessment to shape future proposals , which should contribute to reaching a consensus between member states; ### 17. considers , however , that the befit initiative should be supported by the political process , including with full respect for the unanimity principle , in building political support for change and that the initiative should be accompanied by a thorough impact assessment to shape future proposals , which should contribute to reaching a consensus between member states;


### the european parliament calls on the european commission to introduce measures to further reduce costs and complexity of taxation of smes and ses by 2023. ### the european parliament calls on the european commission to introduce measures to further reduce costs and complexity of taxation of smes and ses by 2024.


### b1 the european parliament calls on the european commission to bring forward initiatives to ensure a more consistent determination of tax residency within the single market by 2022. ### deleted


### - set-up a harmonised common standard for e-invoicing across the union without delay and by 2022 to reduce the cost of the creation of fragmented , different system across the member states. ### - set-up a harmonised common standard for e-invoicing across the union by the end of 2023 to reduce the cost of the creation of fragmented , different system across the member states.


### - explore the possibility of a gradual introduction of obligatory e-invoicing across the union by 2023 , focused on significant reduction of costs of compliance , especially for smes. issuing invoices should be administered only via state-operated/certified “system(s)” with full data protection ensured. ### - explore the possibility of a gradual introduction of obligatory e-invoicing across the union , focused on significant reduction of costs of compliance , especially for smes. issuing invoices should be administered only via state-operated/certified “system(s)” with full data protection ensured.


### — having regard to the oecd action plan on base erosion and profit shifting (beps) of 19 july 2013 , ### deleted


### b. whereas the difficulties encountered in the council in agreeing on the improvements put forward by the commission demonstrates the need to move to a qualified majority in tax matters; ### deleted


### 2. notes , however , that some types of income and assets are still excluded from the scope , which presents a risk of circumventing tax obligations; calls on the commission to assess the need and the most appropriate way to include the following ownership information , items of income and non-financial assets in the automatic exchange of information (aeoi): (a) the beneficial owners of immovable property and companies; (b) capital gains related to immovable property and capital gains related to financial assets , in particular to find ways for tax administrations to be better informed to identify realised capital gains; (c) non-custodial dividend income; (d) non-financial assets such as cash , art , gold or other valuables held at free ports , customs warehouses or safe deposit boxes; and (e) ownership of yachts and private jets; ### 2. notes , however , that some types of income and assets are still excluded from the scope , which presents a risk of circumventing tax obligations;


### 3. observes that the effectiveness of dac1 is seriously constrained by the fact that member states are only required to report at least two categories of income; calls on the commission to make it mandatory to report on all categories of income and assets in the scope; ### 3. observes that the effectiveness of dac1 is seriously constrained by the fact that member states are only required to report at least two categories of income;


### 4. observes that the definition of reporting financial institutions (fis) and types of accounts that need to be reported in dac2 involves a risk of circumvention and increased bureaucracy; calls for an assessment by the commission of the need to extend the reporting obligations to other relevant types of fis , to review the definition of excluded accounts and to remove the thresholds applicable to pre-existing entity accounts; ### 4. observes that the definition of reporting financial institutions (fis) and types of accounts that need to be reported in dac2 involves a risk of circumvention and increased bureaucracy;


### 5. observes that dac3 contains certain blind spots; therefore calls for the scope of eoi under dac3 to be widened to include informal arrangements , post-transaction agreements , natural persons and rulings which are still valid , but which were issued , amended or renewed before 2012; ### 5. observes that dac3 contains certain blind spots;


### 6. notes that the information exchanged is of limited quality; calls for stronger enforcement procedures at member state level; calls on the commission to include on the spot visits in member states and to assess the effectiveness of their monitoring schemes; calls on the member states to establish a system of quality and completeness checks of dac data , as well as procedures for the audit of reporting obliged entities regarding the quality and completeness of data sent; ### 6. notes that the information exchanged is of limited quality; calls for stronger engagement of the commission and member states; reminds the recommendations of european court of auditors to the commission to include on the spot visits in member states and to assess the effectiveness of their monitoring schemes; recommends the member states to establish a system of quality and completeness checks of dac data , as well as procedures for the audit of reporting obliged entities regarding the quality and completeness of data sent;


### 7. points out that there are no prescribed sanctions for fis which either do not report or which report information falsely or incorrectly , and that measures vary significantly across member states; calls for more harmonised and effective sanctions for non-compliance , with a deterrent effect; ### 7. points out that there are no prescribed sanctions for fis which either do not report or which report information falsely or incorrectly , and that measures vary significantly across member states; reminds that the effective compliance falls under the competence of member states tax , administrative , corporate and criminal laws;


### 9. observes that increasingly complex structures are being used to conceal the ultimate beneficial owners and therefore thwart the effective implementation of aml rules; believes there should be no threshold for reporting the beneficial owners; ### 9. observes that increasingly complex structures are being used to conceal the ultimate beneficial owners and therefore thwart the effective implementation of aml rules; believes that the aml rules should be fully enforced in all member states;


### 10. notes that the commission monitors the transposition of the dac legislation in the member states; points out , however , that it has so far neither taken direct and effective action to address the lack of quality of the data sent between member states , nor carried out visits to member states , nor has it ensured the effectiveness of sanctions imposed by member states for breaches of the dac reporting provisions; calls on the commission to step up its activities in this regard and to launch infringement procedures , using , among others , the global forum13 and financial action task force reviews; ### 10. notes that the commission monitors the transposition of the dac legislation in the member states; points out , however , that it has so far neither taken direct and effective action to address the lack of quality of the data sent between member states , nor carried out visits to member states , nor has it ensured the effectiveness of sanctions imposed by member states for breaches of the dac reporting provisions;


### 11. notes with concern that the global forum has recently assessed the legal implementation of the common reporting standard (crs)14 and deplores the fact that 10 member states are not fully compliant; ### 11. notes with concern that the global forum has recently assessed the legal implementation of the common reporting standard (crs)14 and notes the fact that 10 member states are not fully compliant;


### 15. deplores the fact that one member state , malta , has received an overall ‘partially compliant’ score in the peer review by the global forum for eoir; regrets the fact that material deficiencies have been identified in 18 member states15 ; ### 15. notes that one member state , malta , has received an overall ‘partially compliant’ score in the peer review by the global forum for eoir; notes the fact that material deficiencies have been identified in 18 member states15 ;


### 16. notes that the use of information under the dac for non-tax matters requires prior authorisation from the sending member state , which is not always granted; insists that the use of information exchanged under the dac should always be authorised for purposes other than tax matters where this is allowed under the laws of the receiving member state; ### 16. notes that the use of information under the dac for non-tax matters requires prior authorisation from the sending member state , which is not always granted;


### 20. calls on the member states to communicate the statistics , tax revenue gains and all other relevant information to properly assess the effectiveness of all exchanges to the commission on an annual basis , and , in the case of eoir , requests that the information provided be disaggregated on a country-by-country basis; ### 20. asks the member states to consider to communicate the statistics , tax revenue gains and all other relevant information to properly assess the effectiveness of all exchanges to the commission on an annual basis while respecting the data protection rules , tax and trade secrets , in line with the national and european law , and , in the case of eoir , requests that the information provided be disaggregated on a country-by-country basis in compliance with the existing eu and national legislative and administrative rules;


### 22. deeply regrets the fact that all member states – with exception of finland and sweden – have refused to grant parliament access to the relevant data to assess the implementation of dac provisions; deplores the fact that the commission has decided to refuse parliament access to the respective data in its possession; considers that parliament is thereby in effect being hindered in exercising its function of political scrutiny over the commission; notes that this implementation report therefore has significant shortcomings; calls on the member states and the commission to put an end to their refusal to share the relevant documents in line with regulation 1049/200116 which applies directly , and the principle of sincere cooperation in article 13(2) of the teu; calls for parliament to use all legal means at its disposal to ensure that it receives all documents needed for a complete assessment of the implementation of the dac; ### 22. notes that all member states – with exception of finland and sweden – have refused to grant parliament access to the relevant data to assess the implementation of dac provisions; recognises the risks that access to sensitive data would represent to business confidentiality , data security , and possible rise of bureaucratic apparatus and its competences; remains cautious in accessing the respective data given their legal and political sensitivity; notes that this implementation report therefore has significant , however acceptable shortcomings;


### — having regard to articles 127(1) and (2) , 130 and 284(3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) , ### — having regard to articles 123 , 127(1) and (2) , 130 and 284(3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) ,


### a. whereas , according to the commission’s summer 2021 economic forecast , gdp contracted in 2020 by 6 % in the eu and 6.5 % in the euro area; whereas gdp is forecast to grow by 4.8 % in 2021 and 4.5 % in 2022 in both the eu and the euro area , with significant growth inequalities persisting between and within the member states; ### a. whereas , according to the commission’s summer 2021 economic forecast , gdp contracted in 2020 by 6 % in the eu and 6.5 % in the euro area; whereas gdp is forecast to grow by 4.8 % in 2021 and 4.5 % in 2022 in both the eu and the euro area , with significant differences in the pace of growth between the member states;


### c. whereas , according to the eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections of june 2021 , annual inflation for the euro area in the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp) will be 1.9 % in 2021 , 1.5 % in 2022 and 1.4 % in 2023 on average; whereas inflation projections show substantial variance across the euro area; ### c. whereas , according to the eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections of june 2021 , annual inflation for the euro area in the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp) will be 1.9 % in 2021 , 1.5 % in 2022 and 1.4 % in 2023 on average; whereas inflation projections show substantial variance across the euro area; whereas many eu citizens and industries are now confronted with even higher inflation rates and doubt that this figures are temporary and transitionary;


### d. whereas , at the end of 2020 , the size of the eurosystem balance sheet had reached its all-time peak of eur 6 979 324 million , an increase of almost 50 % (eur 2 306 233 million) compared with the end of 2019 , mainly due to the increase in eurosystem refinancing operations; ### d. whereas , at the end of 2020 , the size of the eurosystem balance sheet had reached its all-time peak of eur 6 979 324 million , an increase of almost 50 % (eur 2 306 233 million) compared with the end of 2019;


### e. whereas , without prejudice to the objective of price stability , the ecb should support the general economic policies in the union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the union as laid down in article 3 teu; whereas these objectives include the promotion of peoples’ well-being , economic , social and territorial cohesion , balanced economic growth , a highly competitive social market economy aiming at full employment and social progress , and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment; ### e. whereas , without prejudice to the objective of price stability , the ecb should support the general economic policies in the union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the union as laid down in article 3 teu;


### 1. highlights that the statutory independence of the ecb is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate; ### 1. welcomes the role of the ecb in safeguarding euro stability; highlights that the statutory independence of the ecb is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate; notes that independence requires that the ecb must not seek or take instructions from union institutions or bodies , from any government of a member state or from any other body; stresses that this independence must not be infringed on , and highlights that central bank independence should always be complemented by a corresponding level of accountability;


### 3. is deeply concerned about the unprecedented healthcare , social and economic crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic , resulting in a sharp contraction of the euro area economy , a sharp increase in economic and social inequalities , and rapidly deteriorating labour market conditions; notes that euro area activity is expected to rebound , although the speed , scale and evenness of the rebound remains highly uncertain; ### 3. is deeply concerned about the unprecedented healthcare , social and economic crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic and the economic lockdowns , resulting in a sharp contraction of the euro area economy , a sharp increase in economic and social inequalities , and rapidly deteriorating labour market conditions; notes that euro area activity is expected to rebound , although the speed , scale and evenness of the rebound remains uncertain;


### 4. stresses that sustainable growth , resilience and price stability cannot be achieved by monetary policy alone and that supportive and discretionary fiscal policy and socially balanced and productivity-enhancing reforms and investments are also necessary; acknowledges president lagarde’s call for full alignment of fiscal and monetary policies in tackling the covid-19 crisis; ### 4. stresses that sustainable growth , resilience and price stability will be achieved by a comprehensive response , by calibrated mix of monetary policy and fiscal policy and socially balanced and productivity-enhancing reforms and investments; takes note president lagarde’s call for full alignment of fiscal and monetary policies in tackling the covid-19 crisis;


### 5. agrees with the ecb president’s statement of 10 june 2021 that ‘an ambitious and coordinated fiscal stance remains crucial , as a premature withdrawal of fiscal support would risk weakening the recovery and amplifying the longer-term scarring effects’; ### 5. takes note of the ecb president’s statement of 10 june 2021 that ‘an ambitious and coordinated fiscal stance remains crucial , as a premature withdrawal of fiscal support would risk weakening the recovery and amplifying the longer-term scarring effects’; points at the same time however at possible severe side effects , such as the increase of zombie firms , which leads to lower levels of productivity growth and a higher number of non-performing loans;


### 5. agrees with the ecb president’s statement of 10 june 2021 that ‘an ambitious and coordinated fiscal stance remains crucial , as a premature withdrawal of fiscal support would risk weakening the recovery and amplifying the longer-term scarring effects’; ### 5. takes note of ecb president’s statement of 10 june 2021 that ‘an ambitious and coordinated fiscal stance remains crucial , as a premature withdrawal of fiscal support would risk weakening the recovery and amplifying the longer-term scarring effects’;


### 6. underlines the importance of a central fiscal capacity capable of providing a counter-cyclical stabilisation function and timely and adequate support in the event of economic shocks; ### deleted


### 7. echoes president lagarde’s call for the revision and simplification of the stability and growth pact to be carried out before the deactivation of the general escape clause; ### deleted


### 8. welcomes the ecb’s substantially eased monetary policy stance in response to the covid-19 crisis , which includes the introduction of the pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp) , the relaxation of the eligibility and collateral criteria and the offer of new longer-term refinancing operations; welcomes , moreover , the ecb’s decision to maintain instruments , such as forward guidance , asset purchases and longer-term refinancing operations , as an integral part of its toolkit; ### 8. welcomes the quick and substantial ecb monetary policy response to the covid-19 crisis in a context of emergency; acknowledges the positive impact of this response on the economic situation of the euro area; which includes the introduction of the pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp) , the relaxation of the eligibility and collateral criteria and the offer of new longer-term refinancing operations; welcomes , moreover , the ecb’s decision to maintain instruments , such as forward guidance , asset purchases and longer-term refinancing operations , as an integral part of its toolkit;


### 9. welcomes the ecb’s decision to continue to conduct net asset purchases at a significantly higher pace under the pepp until at least the end of march 2022; ### 9. welcomes the ecb’s decision to continue to conduct net asset purchases at a significantly higher pace under the pepp until at least the end of march 2022; recalls the temporary nature of the pepp;


### 9. welcomes the ecb’s decision to continue to conduct net asset purchases at a significantly higher pace under the pepp until at least the end of march 2022; ### 9. highlights that the ecb recently has slowed down the pace of its pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp); reminds that pepp remains on track to end next march;


### 10. welcomes the ecb’s expectation that monthly net asset purchases under the asset purchase programme (app) will continue to run for as long as necessary to reinforce the accommodative impact of its policy rates; ### 10. takes note of the ecb’s expectation that monthly net asset purchases under the asset purchase programme (app) will continue to run for as long as necessary to reinforce the accommodative impact of its policy rates;