### 2. is concerned about the limited focus on european and global citizenship in national curricula; ### 2. is concerned about the limited focus on the european and global aspects of citizenship in national curricula;


### 3. underlines that sociopolitical and global changes will require an increase in the current level of citizenship education; is concerned about the imbalances in terms of average civic knowledge across and within member states; ### 3. underlines that sociopolitical and global changes will require an increase in the current level of citizenship education; is concerned about the imbalances in terms of average civic knowledge across and within member states; notes that students living in rural areas face additional barriers when engaging with citizenship education programmes; affirms that that every single student must have access to high quality citizenship education; is concerned that male students score significantly below their female counterparts;


### 3. underlines that sociopolitical and global changes will require an increase in the current level of citizenship education; is concerned about the imbalances in terms of average civic knowledge across and within member states; ### 3. underlines that sociopolitical and global changes will require adaptations of the current approaches to citizenship education; is concerned about the imbalances in terms of average civic knowledge across and within member states;


### 4. points out that while some aspects of citizenship education are present in most national curricula , there are strong differences across member states; recalls that initial and continuous teacher training must be a priority in the field of citizenship education; ### 4. points out that while some aspects of citizenship education are present in most national curricula , there are strong differences across member states; acknowledges that such differences can be the result of national specificities and traditions; recalls that initial and continuous teacher training must be a priority in the field of citizenship education;


### 6. recalls the crucial pedagogical role of non-formal and informal learning , including youth work , volunteering and sport , in developing social and civic skills , competences and behaviours , and in shaping responsible and active european citizens; ### 6. recalls the crucial pedagogical role of non-formal and informal learning , including youth work , volunteering and sport , in developing social and civic skills , competences and behaviours , and in shaping responsible and active citizens;


### 7. regrets that the political consensus at european level on the need to advance citizenship education and the teaching of common european values has not been translated into concrete objectives , targets and benchmarks; concludes that citizenship education policies suffer from an implementation gap; ### 7. notes that the political consensus at european level on the need to advance citizenship education should be revisited and adapted to set more realistic , tangible and workable goals , which should be translated into concrete objectives , targets and benchmarks;


### 8. regrets that eu programmes have not been able to provide substantial and effective support for eu and global citizenship education; ### 8. notes that the majority of eu programmes are not intended to provide substantial support to member states in the field of citizenship education; underlines that , where appropriate , targeted actions could be pursued together with national authorities to promote citizenship education;


### 9. finds that eu programmes make a limited contribution to advancing certain dimensions of citizenship education , mainly because of a lack of explicit direct support , limited resources and uneven geographical coverage; regrets that so far , eu-funded projects in this area have not had a widespread long-term impact; ### deleted


### 10. affirms that on the basis of articles 9 , 10 , 165 and 166 teu , the eu has a primary responsibility to foster eu citizenship education as a way to ensure deeper knowledge among its citizens of the european project as a union of democratic states , thus guaranteeing its citizens the right to fully participate in political life and decision-making at eu level; ### 10. affirms that on the basis of articles 9 , 10 , 165 and 166 teu , the eu has a primary responsibility to foster eu citizenship education as a way to ensure deeper knowledge among its citizens of the european project as a union of democratic sovereign states , thus guaranteeing its citizens the right to fully participate in political life and decision-making at eu level;


### 14. calls for the development of concrete objectives and benchmarks on citizenship education in the european education area enabling framework , including european citizenship education; ### 14. calls for the development of concrete objectives and benchmarks on citizenship education in the european education area enabling framework , including european citizenship education; these objectives should contain specific targets which ensure the full involvement of all groups of people , and particularly people with disabilities and young people from the most vulnerable backgrounds and at a higher risk of dropping out of school;


### 18. calls for a comprehensive european strategy on european civic and citizenship education , as well as the creation of supporting platforms to promote its implementation , focusing notably on shared eu democratic values and principles; ### 18. calls for a comprehensive european strategy on european civic and citizenship education , as well as the creation of supporting platforms to promote its implementation , focusing notably on the interaction between citizens and the eu and participation in eu decision-making;


### 19. calls for coordination across eu programmes to be reinforced in order to increase the systemic impact of citizenship education; ### 19. calls for coordination across relevant eu programmes to be improved where possible , in order to increase the systemic impact of citizenship education;


### 20. asks the commission to propose a recommendation containing indicative primary and secondary school curricula on the eu and global civic education for its voluntary adoption by the member states , in full respect of treaty provisions; believes that said common demonstrative curricula should foster a better understanding of the existing eu institutions , the european electoral and decision-making processes , and the history and cultures of member states and the common links between them , combining different pedagogical approaches and methods , including theoretical and project-based learning; ### 20. asks the commission to propose a recommendation containing indicative primary and secondary school curricula on the eu and global civic education for its voluntary adoption by the member states , in full respect of treaty provisions; believes that said common demonstrative curricula should foster a better understanding of the existing eu institutions , the european electoral and decision-making processes , and the history and cultures of member states and the common links between them , combining different pedagogical approaches and methods , including theoretical and project-based learning; believes , finally , that education policies and reforms must make citizenship education a priority objective;


### 20. asks the commission to propose a recommendation containing indicative primary and secondary school curricula on the eu and global civic education for its voluntary adoption by the member states , in full respect of treaty provisions; believes that said common demonstrative curricula should foster a better understanding of the existing eu institutions , the european electoral and decision-making processes , and the history and cultures of member states and the common links between them , combining different pedagogical approaches and methods , including theoretical and project-based learning; ### 20. asks the commission to propose a recommendation containing indicative primary and secondary school curricula on the eu and global civic education for its voluntary adoption by the member states , in full respect of treaty provisions; believes that said common demonstrative curricula should foster a better understanding of the existing eu institutions , the european electoral and decision-making processes , combining different pedagogical approaches and methods , including theoretical and project-based learning;


### 21. calls for the establishment of a new eu agency on citizenship education to improve accessibility to and the quality of citizenship education in all member states and to support the development of a european dimension in citizenship education; ### deleted


### 22. considers the conference on the future of europe a timely opportunity to hold a multilevel discussion on policy development in the area of education and culture; calls on the member states and the commission to embrace and take forward the concluding reports of the conference’s working group on education , culture , youth and sport; ### 22. considers the conference on the future of europe a timely opportunity to hold a multilevel discussion on policy development in the area of education and culture; calls on the member states and the commission to carefully consider the concluding reports of the conference’s working group on education , culture , youth and sport;


### a. whereas culture has major potential to promote the eu’s values , solidify its identity and contribute to the fulfilment of its objectives worldwide , as well as addressing global challenges; ### a. whereas cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue form an integral part of the european union's values and play an important role in promoting human rights , artistic freedom , respect , mutual understanding , conflict prevention , reconciliation and contribute to democratisation , good governance and more peaceful societies;


### a. whereas culture has major potential to promote the eu’s values , solidify its identity and contribute to the fulfilment of its objectives worldwide , as well as addressing global challenges; ### a. whereas culture has major potential to promote european values;


### b. whereas clearly targeted resources for international cultural relations would greatly enhance its ability to fully develop; ### b. whereas the creative europe programme has funded the eunic network since 2014; notes that over eur 5.6 million has been granted in financial support to the network by the eu since 2016; calls for a special audit and cost-benefit-analysis of the entire cultural relations approach of the eu , including preparatory and pilot projects such as the european spaces of culture (formerly european 'houses' of culture);


### c. whereas the eu needs to engage in international cultural relations using its own instruments to shape the cultural face of the eu worldwide and complement the work of member states’ cultural institutes abroad; ### c. whereas the eu should let member states’ cultural institutes work without interference;


### c. whereas the eu needs to engage in international cultural relations using its own instruments to shape the cultural face of the eu worldwide and complement the work of member states’ cultural institutes abroad; ### c. whereas the 'european 'houses' of culture' project was launched to test and implement innovative models of cooperation between european actors and local stakeholders in non-eu countries;


### d. whereas illiberal and authoritarian regimes attempt to redefine international rules and values by challenging their universality and claiming them to be a weapon of cultural hegemony deployed by the eu; ### d. whereas culture , being first and foremost a value in itself , has positive socio-economic effects , improves the quality of life , and its positive role in external relations is gaining increasing recognition;


### 1. acknowledges the efforts of the commission and the european external action service to implement the eu strategy for international cultural relations , demonstrating the eu’s added value and advancing cultural cooperation with partner countries; ### 1. notes the cost of the commission and the european external action service actions to implement the eu strategy for international cultural relations;


### 2. welcomes the development of the cultural relations platform and the joint implementation of programmes allowing cultural actors and public stakeholders to develop innovative ideas and concrete projects , finance cultural relations and facilitate networks; ### 2. questions the need to develop a eu funded cultural relations platform; welcomes cooperation between cultural actors to develop and promote innovative ideas and concrete projects , enhance cultural relations and facilitate networks; emphasizes that these activities do not require funding from the eu budget to be successful;


### 3. calls for the development of strategies based on international cultural relations for eu delegations and other eu actors in their relations with third countries; ### 3. calls for the development of cost-saving strategies for eu delegations and other eu actors in their relations with third countries;


### 4. calls for the allocation of the necessary budgetary and personnel resources to the eu’s international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy in order to facilitate cultural cooperation with local actors and academia in third countries; ### 4. calls for budgetary and personnel resources for the eu’s international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy ambitions to be reduced substantially as citizens , businesses and member states are hard pressed by multiple crises;


### 5. calls for an update to the 2016 eu strategy for international cultural relations with a view to establishing a permanent structural and institutional eu dimension and developing and implementing a long-term strategy to be integrated permanently and horizontally within the eu’s external action toolbox. ### 5. calls for a cost-benefit analysis and independent audit to be carried out focusing on the 2016 eu strategy for international cultural relations; questions the need for establishing a permanent structural and institutional eu dimension and developing and implementing a long-term strategy to be integrated permanently and horizontally within the eu’s external action toolbox.


### 2. notes with regret that there has been a rise in violence towards journalists and media professionals , which is increasingly happening in countries officially at peace and is creating a general sense of insecurity; deplores that 57 journalists have been killed in 20221 , 78 journalists are being held hostage and 478 journalists are currently imprisoned2 ; demands that all detained journalists be released immediately; ### 2. notes with regret that there has been a rise in violence towards journalists and media professionals , which is increasingly happening in countries officially at peace and is creating a general sense of insecurity; deplores that 57 journalists have been killed in 20221 , 78 journalists are being held hostage and 478 journalists are currently imprisoned2 ; demands that all detained journalists and bloggers be released immediately;


### 3. highlights that the freedom of media and media pluralism have increasingly come under threat in recent years with globalisation of media streams , and that disinformation and propaganda are growing trends in the media landscape worldwide; notes that this trend has been intensified by the covid-19 pandemic and the war against ukraine; believes that this situation should be considered a general threat to the values the european union stands for as a global actor and to democracy as a whole; ### 3. highlights that the freedom of media and media pluralism have increasingly come under threat in recent years with globalisation of media streams , and that disinformation and propaganda are growing trends in the media landscape worldwide; notes that this trend has been intensified by the covid-19 pandemic and the russian war against ukraine; believes that this situation should be considered a general threat to the values the european union stands for as a global actor and to democracy as a whole;


### d. whereas professional journalists have a mission to provide the public with information on general or specialised topics of interest as responsibly and as objectively as possible; whereas it is important to consider the societal role played by all media workers and support staff , as well as community media workers and so-called citizen journalists; ### d. whereas professional journalists have a mission to provide the public with information on general or specialised topics of interest as responsibly and as objectively as possible; whereas the need to distinguish berween facts and opinion is a widely accepted standard of journalistic practice; whereas it is important to consider the societal role played by all media workers and support staff , as well as community media workers and so-called citizen journalists;


### f. whereas the challenges that journalists encounter in undertaking their work are manifold , including restrictions on movement , such as deportations and denial of access to a country or a particular area , arbitrary arrests and detention , torture , sexual violence , particularly against female journalists , confiscation of and damage to equipment , information theft , illegal surveillance and office break-ins , intimidation , harassment of family members , death threats , stigmatisation and smear campaigns to discredit journalists , abductions , enforced disappearances , killings and other cruel , inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; ### f. whereas the challenges that journalists encounter in undertaking their work are manifold , including restrictions on movement , such as deportations and denial of access to a country or a particular area , arbitrary arrests and detention , violation of due process guarantees; sentencing on trumped-up charges; torture , sexual violence , particularly against female journalists , confiscation of and damage to equipment , information theft , illegal surveillance and office break-ins , intimidation , harassment of family members , death threats , stigmatisation and smear campaigns to discredit journalists , abductions , enforced disappearances , killings and other cruel , inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;


### p. whereas in addition to violence against and intimidation and harassment of journalists , impunity and a lack of prosecution lead to self-censorship or have a chilling effect; ### p. whereas in addition to violence against and intimidation , harassment and killing of journalists , impunity and a lack of prosecution lead to self-censorship or have a chilling effect;


### 10. condemns , in the strongest possible terms , the attempts by public authorities to silence independent media or undermine their freedom and pluralism; warns against practices that indirectly subdue such media by means of financial patronage and condemns , in particular , attempts to control media public service; ### 10. condemns , in the strongest possible terms , the attempts by public authorities to silence independent media or undermine their freedom and pluralism and to restrict the public's access to reliable information via internet shutdowns , surveillance , blocking or filtering online content and through requests for content removal to platforms; warns against practices that indirectly subdue such media by means of financial patronage and condemns , in particular , attempts to control media public service;


### 20. calls on the commission and the member states to promote sustainable measures in all their agreements and partnerships with third countries aimed at financing and supporting independent journalism; calls , in this regard , on the commission and the member states to allocate funds to that end , including by increasing the allocation for the human rights and democracy thematic programme of the neighbourhood , development and international cooperation instrument – global europe (ndici); ### 20. calls on the commission and the member states to promote sustainable measures aimed at protecting independent journalism in third countries ; calls , in this regard , on the commission and the member states to allocate funds to that end , including by increasing the allocation for the human rights and democracy thematic programme of the neighbourhood , development and international cooperation instrument – global europe (ndici);


### 3. emphasises that the covid-19 pandemic has amplified the existing vulnerabilities in social services in africa , in particular in the field of education; ### 3. emphasises that the covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated the learning crisis and has amplified the existing vulnerabilities in social services in africa , in particular in the field of education and that the impact on the human capital of this generation of learners is likely to be long lasting;


### a. whereas the negative consequences of the covid-19 pandemic have disproportionately affected those from racial and ethnic minority communities , highlighting and exacerbating inequalities including in culture , media , education and sport; ### a. whereas the negative consequences of the covid-19 pandemic have impacted all of society , including those from racial and ethnic minority communities , highlighting and exacerbating inequalities including in culture , media , education and sport;


### a. whereas the negative consequences of the covid-19 pandemic have disproportionately affected those from racial and ethnic minority communities , highlighting and exacerbating inequalities including in culture , media , education and sport; ### a. whereas the negative consequences of the covid-19 crisis have disproportionately affected those from racial and ethnic minority communities , highlighting and exacerbating inequalities including in culture , media , education and sport;


### b. whereas according to the eu agency for fundamental rights , racial discrimination and harassment remain commonplace throughout the european union; whereas racial and ethnic minorities are subjected to harassment , violence and hate speech , both online and offline; whereas racial and ethnic minorities face structural discrimination in the eu in all areas , including housing , healthcare , employment and education; ### deleted


### c. whereas racist and xenophobic attitudes are embraced by certain opinion leaders and politicians across the eu , fomenting a social climate that provides fertile ground for racism , discrimination and hate crimes; whereas this environment is further fuelled by extremist movements which seek to divide our societies; whereas these acts run counter to the common european values which all the member states have undertaken to uphold; ### deleted


### c. whereas racist and xenophobic attitudes are embraced by certain opinion leaders and politicians across the eu , fomenting a social climate that provides fertile ground for racism , discrimination and hate crimes; whereas this environment is further fuelled by extremist movements which seek to divide our societies; whereas these acts run counter to the common european values which all the member states have undertaken to uphold; ### c. whereas racist and xenophobic attitudes are embraced by certain opinion leaders and politicians across the eu , fomenting a social climate that provides fertile ground for racism , discrimination and hate crimes;


### d. whereas the fight against racism and discrimination in our societies needs to be stepped up and is a shared responsibility; whereas the european union needs to further reflect on and commit to tackling the structural racism and discrimination faced by many minority groups; ### deleted


### e. whereas access to education and educational attainment is an issue for racialised communities throughout europe; whereas segregation in education remains an issue in certain member states; ### e. whereas access to education and educational attainment is an issue for many communities throughout europe , particularly racial or religious ones;


### f. whereas it is important for children and young people to see that they are represented throughout society , including in the classroom and on the media that they use; ### f. whereas it is important for children and young people to see that they are represented throughout society , including in the classroom and on the media that they use; whereas representation in culture must never subsume artistic freedom , because it leads to racialisation among children who consume it;


### g. whereas although sport has the power to unite communities , there is a serious issue of racism within sporting organisations across europe; ### g. whereas sport has the power to unite communities , and can be used to integrate peoples of various races , ethnicities and religions within within sporting organisations and communities across europe;


### h. whereas data collection has been proven to be the most effective way to analyse social problems both quantitatively and qualitatively and to develop evidence-based public policy responses; ### h. whereas data collection has been proven to be the most effective way to analyse social problems both quantitatively and qualitatively and to develop evidence-based public policy responses; whereas any data must be carefully scrutinised and analysed for biases before being used to drive policy-making;


### 1. acknowledges the eu anti-racism action plan; welcomes the inclusion of specific sections on education and media; calls on the commission to provide adequate funding and resources to ensure the achievement of the outlined commitments; ### 1. acknowledges the eu anti-racism action plan; takes note of the inclusion of specific sections on education and media; calls on the commission to provide adequate funding and resources to ensure the achievement of the outlined commitments without prejudice to the funding for already existing programmes and actions;


### 2. calls on the commission to ensure that the anti-racism coordinator is given adequate resources and that the work of mainstreaming racial equality throughout eu policies is shared by all dgs; ### 2. calls on the commission to ensure that the anti-racism coordinator is given adequate resources and that the work of maintaining racial equality throughout eu policies is shared by all dgs;


### 3. welcomes the commission’s dedication to ensuring that member states develop national action plans against racism; calls for specific targets on culture , education , media and sport to be included in the development of those plans; ### 3. takes note of the commission’s dedication to ensuring that member states develop national action plans against racism;


### 4. welcomes the publication and implementation of specific eu guidelines on the collection of equality data based on racial or ethnic origin; calls on the member states to adapt national statistics and to remove barriers in order to facilitate the collection of quality data on equality; calls on the commission and the member states to use this data to develop policies to attain racial justice; ### 4. welcomes the publication and implementation of specific eu guidelines on the collection of equality data based on racial or ethnic origin; calls on the member states to adapt national statistics and to remove barriers in order to facilitate the collection of quality data on equality;


### 5. welcomes the commitment to diversity and inclusion within erasmus+ , creative europe , the european solidarity corps , and the citizens , equality , rights and values programme; calls on the commission to ensure that the recently published inclusion strategies are mainstreamed across all educational , cultural , media and sporting initiatives; ### 5. welcomes the commitment to diversity and inclusion within erasmus+ , creative europe , the european solidarity corps , and the citizens , equality , rights and values programme;


### 6. welcomes the commission’s acknowledgement of the need for an intersectional approach to policymaking; calls on the commission and the member states to ensure that the relevant anti-racism objectives are implemented across all policy areas; ### deleted


### 7. acknowledges that racism is inherently a matter of culture , heritage and norms; highlights , therefore , the role that culture can play in combating discrimination and racism; ### deleted


### 8. calls for the commission and the member states to foster a more diverse cultural sector by removing barriers to participation in culture for racialised communities through funding from all the relevant programmes; encourages the creation of support networks and outreach activities , especially for those in rural and outermost regions; ### 8. calls for the commission and the member states to continue to foster a more diverse cultural sector by removing barriers to participation in culture for racialised communities; encourages the creation of support networks and outreach activities , especially for those in rural and outermost regions;


### 9. calls on the commission and the member states to improve monitoring and evaluation , including by testing and sharing participatory tools , which can demonstrate the effects of promoting inclusion and non-discrimination and combating racism through culture and help to create more inclusive policies; ### 9. calls on the commission and the member states to improve monitoring and evaluation , including by testing and sharing participatory tools;


### 10. welcomes the recent report by the open method of cooperation (omc) working group of member states’ experts on gender equality in the cultural and creative sectors; calls on the omc working group to produce a study on the role that culture plays in promoting racial equality within the cultural and creative sectors; ### 10. welcomes the recent report by the open method of cooperation (omc) working group of member states’ experts on gender equality in the cultural and creative sectors;


### 11. welcomes the acknowledgement by certain member states of the need to restore cultural works and artefacts to their places of origin; encourages the development of eu guidelines on restitution and calls for member states to continue or to initiate processes for the restitution of cultural works and artefacts in a more consistent and timely manner; ### 11. strongly supports the acknowledgement by certain member states of the need to restore cultural works and artefacts to their places of origin; encourages the development of eu guidelines on restitution and calls for member states to continue or to initiate processes for the restitution of cultural works and artefacts in a more consistent and timely manner;


### 12. underlines the lasting negative impact of european colonialism on today’s society , including in the development of educational curricula; ### deleted


### 12. underlines the lasting negative impact of european colonialism on today’s society , including in the development of educational curricula; ### 12. underlines the lasting negative impact of european colonialism carried out by some of the member states on today’s society , including in the development of educational curricula when appropriate;


### 12. underlines the lasting negative impact of european colonialism on today’s society , including in the development of educational curricula; ### 12. underlines the need for better contextualisation of historical facts , such as colonialism , and the resulting effects on today’s society and on the development of educational curricula;


### 13. calls on the member states to foster the development of diverse educational curricula to ensure that authors , historians , scientists and artists among other figures from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds are included in key materials; ### 13. calls on the member states to foster the development of diverse educational curricula to ensure that authors , historians , scientists and artists among other figures from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds are included in key materials without prejudice to national history and traditions and without impacting the quality of educational material;


### 13. calls on the member states to foster the development of diverse educational curricula to ensure that authors , historians , scientists and artists among other figures from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds are included in key materials; ### 13. invites the member states to foster the development of diverse educational curricula to ensure when appropriate that authors , historians , scientists and artists among other figures from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds are included in key materials;


### 14. calls for the history of all racial and ethnic communities living in europe to be included in all history curricula in order to encourage a broader perspective on world history centred on the interactions between different continents before and after european colonisation; ### 14. calls for the history of racial and ethnic communities living in europe to be included , where appropriate , in history curricula in order to encourage a broader perspective on world history;


### 14. calls for the history of all racial and ethnic communities living in europe to be included in all history curricula in order to encourage a broader perspective on world history centred on the interactions between different continents before and after european colonisation; ### 14. calls for the history of all racial and ethnic communities living in europe to be included in all history curricula when appropriate in order to encourage a broader perspective on world history centred on the interactions between different continents;


### 15. deplores the practice of segregation in schools; calls on all member states to introduce policies to prevent children from minority groups from being placed in separate schools or classes , whether intentionally or not; ### 15. deplores the practice of segregation in schools; encourages member states to introduce policies to prevent children from minority groups from being intentionally placed in separate schools or classes;


### 16. calls on the member states to ensure that teaching staff from minority groups are recruited at all levels and are protected from racial discrimination in the school system; ### 16. calls on the member states to ensure that teaching staff from minority groups are considered equally and fairly when recruiting at all levels;


### 18. underlines the importance of representation and diversity in the development of inclusive societies; calls on the relevant stakeholders to address diversity and representation within their organisations; regrets the lack of racial and ethnic diversity in the media; ### 18. underlines the importance of representation and diversity in the development of inclusive societies; calls on the relevant stakeholders to address diversity and representation within their organisations; regrets the lack of racial and ethnic diversity in the media; especially in member states that have prominent racial and ethnic minorities;


### 18. underlines the importance of representation and diversity in the development of inclusive societies; calls on the relevant stakeholders to address diversity and representation within their organisations; regrets the lack of racial and ethnic diversity in the media; ### 18. acknowledges the importance of representation and diversity in the development of inclusive societies; underlines that measures to address diversity and representation within all stakeholder organisations must not negatively impact the quality and freedom of expression;


### 19. welcomes the commission’s commitment to launching a communication campaign to foster diversity in the audiovisual sector; calls for this campaign to be centred on the diversity and history of racialised communities and on how achieving racial justice can contribute to a more democratic europe; ### 19. welcomes the commission’s commitment to launching a communication campaign to foster diversity in the audiovisual sector;


### 20. welcomes the practice established by certain international audiovisual providers to add disclaimers about harmful and racist content ahead of media broadcasts; encourages the development of such practices within the european audiovisual sphere; ### deleted


### 21. notes that some member states have audiovisual regulatory bodies with the power to issue sanctions following programmes that show discriminatory or racist content; encourages the member states to empower their regulatory agencies in this sense; calls for the european regulators group for audiovisual media services to be given a greater role in coordinating the national agencies and collecting and sharing data; ### 21. notes that some member states have audiovisual regulatory bodies with the power to issue sanctions following programmes that show discriminatory or racist content; encourages the member states to empower their regulatory agencies in this sense;


### 22. recalls the acknowledgement of sport as a driver of social inclusion , equality and the promotion of eu values in the erasmus+ regulation; laments the fact that the most recent regulation does not make the same explicit reference to racism as the previous programme; ### 22. recalls the acknowledgement of sport as a driver of social inclusion , equality and the promotion of values in the erasmus+ regulation;


### 23. calls on the commission to open a specific call for funding for grassroots sports initiatives focused on inclusion and the fight against racism; calls on the commission , furthermore , to systematically monitor the number and type of sports projects whose main focus is the fight against racism , and the amount of funding allocated to them; ### 23. calls on the commission to open a specific call for funding for grassroots sports initiatives focused on inclusion;


### 24. urges the commission to develop an eu code of ethics in sport in order to combat racism in sporting organisations and foster inclusion and respect at all levels of sport; invites sporting organisations at all levels to subscribe to such an eu code and to incorporate it within their statutes; encourages organisations to raise awareness of such a code and its content among their members and their families , and the wider public; ### deleted


### 12. highlights inclusiveness as a central dimension of an eea and a prerequisite for achieving quality education for all , ensuring that no talent is left behind; ### 12. highlights inclusiveness as a central dimension of an eea and a prerequisite for achieving quality education for all , ensuring that all individual differences are fully valued and are not left behind;


### 15. aims to foster media literacy and critical thinking at all stages of learning as a central means to empower responsible european citizens; ### 15. aims to foster critical thinking and media literacy at all stages of learning as a central tool for broad-based , responsible participation of all european citizens;


### 17. stresses the importance of enhancing competences and motivation in the education profession , especially supported through the improved recognition of educators’ value to society and by bolstering pedagogical autonomy; ### 17. stresses the importance of enhancing competences and motivation in the education profession , especially supported through the improved recognition of teachers’ value to society , by promoting and reinforcing pedagogical and teaching autonomy through initial and on-the-job training;


### 26. emphasises the need to provide learners with knowledge about european history and cultural heritage , both tangible and intangible , and to foster a critical european memory and historical consciousness; ### 26. emphasises the need to provide learners with knowledge about european history and cultural and artistic heritage , both tangible and intangible , and to foster a critical european memory and historical consciousness;


### e. whereas the eu should aim to further develop the european dimension of sport while respecting its specific nature; ### e. whereas the eu should aim to further develop the european dimension of sport while respecting its specific nature and autonomy;


### strengthening visibility , cooperation and mainstreaming in eu policies ### strengthening visibility , cooperation and mainstreaming sport in eu policies;


### enhancing the principles of a european sports model ### strengthening the principles of a european sports model;


### 6. acknowledges the importance of a european sports model based on values and looks forward to further developing it in the interest of citizens and stakeholders; ### 6. acknowledges the importance of a european sports model based on common values , voluntary activities and financial solidarity and looks forward to further developing it in the interest of citizens and stakeholders;


### 7. acknowledges the diversity of models and approaches across sports and countries while considering that the common foundation of european sport needs to be further enhanced and protected; ### 7. acknowledges the diversity of approaches across sports and countries while considering that the common foundation of european sport needs to be further strengthened and protected;


### 8. calls for a european sports model that recognises the need for a strong commitment to integrating the principles of solidarity , sustainability , inclusiveness , open competition and sporting merit; ### 8. calls for a european sports model that recognises the need for a strong commitment to integrating the principles of solidarity , sustainability , inclusiveness , open competition , sporting merit , fairness and accordingly strongly opposes breakaway competitions that undermine such principles and endanger the stability of the overall sports ecosystem;


### 8. calls for a european sports model that recognises the need for a strong commitment to integrating the principles of solidarity , sustainability , inclusiveness , open competition and sporting merit; ### 8. calls for the safeguarding of a european sports model and recognises its principles of solidarity , sustainability , inclusiveness , open competition , sporting merit and fairness;


### 10. highlights the need for increased solidarity and financial redistribution , especially between professional and grassroots sport; ### 10. highlights the need for more targeted and increased solidarity and financial redistribution , especially between professional and grassroots sport;


### 16. calls for the eu institutions to promote the fundamental rights of athletes , including freedom of association , collective bargaining and non-discrimination; ### 16. calls for the eu institutions to promote the fundamental rights of athletes , including athlete representation in decision-making , freedom of association , collective bargaining and non-discrimination;


### 24. calls on the commission to recognise the importance and support the social inclusion of refugees , ethnic minorities and the lgbtqi+ community in sport; ### 24. calls on the commission to recognise the importance and support the social inclusion of persons with fewer opportunities , refugees , ethnic minorities and the lgbtqi+ community in sport;


### 26. calls on the member states to step up efforts towards the inclusion in sports activities and programmes of persons with disabilities; ### 26. calls on the member states to step up efforts towards the inclusion in sport activities and programmes of persons with mental and physical disabilities , and to increase visibility in the media of competitions involving athletes with disabilities;


### 31. highlights the role of coaches and sport staff in developing the skills of and in educating young people; ### 31. highlights the role of coaches and sport staff in developing the skills of and in educating children and young people and stresses that the adequate training plays a key role in encouraging participation in sport and in ensuring a safe environment for all;


### 33. calls on the commission and the member states to create a system for the recognition of qualifications gained by volunteers; ### 33. recognises the valuable contributions that sports volunteers bring to a society and calls on the commission and the member states to create a system for the recognition of qualifications gained by volunteers , including coaches working as volunteers;


### 34. insists on the need for support mechanisms to get the sport sector back on track in the wake of covid-19; ### 34. insists on the need for support mechanisms to get the sport sector back on track in the wake of covid-19 , including through national support funds , the recovery and resilience facility and the structural funds;


### 36. welcomes the higher budget for sport under the new erasmus+ programme and supports further synergies between programmes and funds; ### 36. welcomes the higher budget for sport under the new erasmus+ programme and supports further synergies between programmes and funds and make a better use of this tool to support recovery in sport;


### 38. calls on national , regional and local authorities to recognise the key role of sport and physical activity in fields such as urban regeneration , tourism and territorial cohesion and to prioritise them in cohesion policy and investments under the recovery and resilience facility; ### 38. calls on national , regional and local authorities to recognise the key role of sport and physical activity in fields such as urban regeneration , tourism and territorial cohesion and to prioritise them in cohesion policy , specifically on european social fund plus and on european regional and development fund investments and under the recovery and resilience facility;


### 1. underlines that the translation centre for the bodies of the european union (the ‘centre’) , which celebrated its 25th anniversary in 2020 , makes a crucial contribution to upholding the key principle of multilingualism in the union , thus not only enabling the smooth functioning of union institutions , bodies , office and agencies but also empowering union citizens and organisations to access information and take full advantage of the social , cultural , economic and educational opportunities open to them; ### 1. underlines that the translation centre for the bodies of the european union (the ‘centre’) , which celebrated its 25th anniversary in 2020 , makes a crucial contribution to upholding the key principle of multilingualism in the union , thus not only enabling the smooth functioning of union institutions , bodies , office and agencies but also empowering union citizens and organisations to access information and take full advantage of the social , cultural , economic and educational opportunities open to them; congratulates the centre on the improvements in achieving its mission and calls on it to maintain its contribution to multilingualism in the union;


### 4. welcomes the centre’s continued efforts in 2020 to assure the quality of translations produced by its external language service providers; in that regard , welcomes the setting up , by august 2020 , of a fully revised client feedback system; ### 4. welcomes the centre’s continued efforts in 2020 to assure the quality of translations produced by its external language service providers; in that regard , welcomes the setting up , by august 2020 , of a fully revised client feedback system; calls on the centre to continuously update and adjust the system based on the received feedback;


### 5. notes the successful implementation of the centre’s 2019-2020 transformation plan; encourages the centre to continue on the path of technological transformation , with the aim of continuously adapting to clients’ needs and making full use of available new technologies; in that regard , encourages the centre to continue investing in staff training; ### 5. notes the successful implementation of the centre’s 2019-2020 transformation plan; encourages the centre to continue on the path of technological transformation , with the aim of continuously adapting to clients’ needs and making full use of available new technologies; in that regard , encourages the centre to strengthen its investment in staff training;


### 72. on 15 november 2021 , former minister of infrastructure and lawmaker for the syriza party christos spirtzis was targeted with the predator spyware on his mobile phone133 . ### 72. on 15 november 2021 , former minister of infrastructure and lawmaker for the syriza party christos spirtzis was allegedly targeted with the predator spyware on his mobile phone133 .


### 78. cyprus seems to have a very close collaboration with israel in the area of surveillance technologies. cyprus consulted with israel and the us about the reform of its legal framework. cyprus is a popular destination for many israeli spyware companies. ### 78. cyprus is belived to have a very close collaboration with israel in the area of surveillance technologies. cyprus consulted with israel and the us about the reform of its legal framework. cyprus is a popular destination for many israeli spyware companies.


### 99. cyprus appears to have a robust legal framework for the protection of personal data and privacy , for the authorisation of surveillance , and for exports. however , in practice it would seem that rules are easy to circumvent and there are close ties between politics , the security agencies and the surveillance industry. it seems to be the lax application of the rules that makes cyprus such an attractive place for the trade in spyware. cyprus is also of considerable strategic interest to russia , turkey and the us. furthermore , close relations with israel seem to be of particular mutual benefit with regard to the trade in spyware. export licenses for spyware have become a currency in diplomatic relations. ### 99. cyprus appears to have a robust legal framework for the protection of personal data and privacy , for the authorisation of surveillance , and for exports. however , in practice that rules are easy to circumvent and there are close ties between politics , the security agencies and the surveillance industry. the lax application of the rules that makes cyprus such an attractive place for the trade in spyware. cyprus is also of considerable strategic interest to russia , turkey and the us. furthermore , close relations with israel seem to be of particular mutual benefit with regard to the trade in spyware. export licenses for spyware have become a currency in diplomatic relations.


### 100. the july 2021 revelations by the pegasus project showed a large number of targets in spain. however , they seem to have been targeted by different actors and for different reasons. it is widely believed that the moroccan authorities targeted prime minister pedro sanchez , minister for defence margarita robles and minister of the interior fernando grande-marlaska , similarly to the case of the french president and government ministers185 . the targeting of a second group of victims is referred to as ‘catalangate’186 . it includes catalan parliamentarians , members of the european parliament , lawyers , civil society organisation members and some family and staff connected to those victims187 . the ‘catalangate’ surveillance scandal was first reported on in 2020 , but it was not until april 2022 that citizen lab completed their in-depth investigation that the scale of the scandal was revealed. the results of that probe showed that at least 65 persons were targeted188 . in may 2020 , the spanish authorities admitted to targeting 18 of those 65 victims with court authorisation189 . ### 100. the july 2021 revelations by the pegasus project showed a large number of targets in spain. however , they seem to have been targeted by different actors and for different reasons. it is widely believed that the moroccan authorities targeted prime minister pedro sanchez , minister for defence margarita robles and minister of the interior fernando grande-marlaska , similarly to the case of the french president and government ministers185 . the second group of persons allegedly targeted by this software includes catalan parliamentarians , members of the european parliament , lawyers , civil society organisation members and some individuals and staff with different degrees of involvement in the attempted coup d'etat in spain in 2017. the alleged surveillance by law enforcement authorities was first reported by some media outlets in 2020 , and was the object of an investigation carried out by citizen lab in 2022 in which they conclude that 65 persons were targeted. the results of this study have been contested and in december 2022 the director of citizen lab admitted errors with some of the allegedly targeted individuals which may reduce the total numbers. in may 2020 , the spanish authorities admitted to targeting 18 of those 65 victims with court authorisation189 . as for now the accusations made by some of the convicted criminals that attempted a coup d'etat in spain in 2017 and by some of the fugitives connected to the case or their accolites have not been proved in a court of law.


### 104. much of the surveillance conducted in spain was carried out by the cni , a body that has been embroiled in a number of scandals relating to surveillance in the past202 . the cni was established under law 11/2002 may 6 and it authorises the cni to conduct ‘security investigations’203 . however , there is little clarification on the means or limitations of such activities204 . law 11/2002 also established parliamentary , executive and legislative oversight control over the cni205 parliamentary oversight is to be carried out by the official secrets committee of the spanish congress , which was established in 1995206 . the delegated committee for intelligence affairs is in executive control of the body , and co-ordinates the intelligence activities of the cni207 . lastly , the defence committee of the congress of deputies conducts legislative oversight over the cni208 . the annual intelligence directive dictates the intelligence priorities of the cni for the year209 . ### 104. the cni was established under law 11/2002 may 6 and it authorises the cni to conduct ‘security investigations’203 . law 11/2002 also established parliamentary , executive and legislative oversight control over the cni205 parliamentary oversight is to be carried out by the official secrets committee of the spanish congress , which was established in 1995206 . the delegated committee for intelligence affairs is in executive control of the body , and co-ordinates the intelligence activities of the cni207 . lastly , the defence committee of the congress of deputies conducts legislative oversight over the cni208 . the annual intelligence directive dictates the intelligence priorities of the cni for the year209 .


### 105. the laws establishing the cni also established the defence committee of the congress of deputies and it is responsible for allocating the confidential funds for the cni and producing an annual report on the cni. however , the spanish constitution does not stipulate that access will be granted to documents or information relating to the work of the intelligence services and the requirement is also notably absent in the legal framework of the law on transparency. therefore , much of the work of the cni is kept secret and lacks transparency210 . ### 105. the laws establishing the cni also established the defence committee of the congress of deputies and it is responsible for allocating the confidential funds for the cni and producing an annual report on the cni.


### 106. the official secrets committee is required to submit an annual report on the activities of the intelligence services , however when it was convened as a result of the surveillance by the cni , it was the first meeting of the body in more than two years. head of the cni paz esteban appeared before the committee on 5 may 2022 to present the court authorisations for the 18 victims that the authorities have taken responsibility for targeting.211 the hearing was not public and those present were not allowed to enter with any electronic on them whatsoever212 . ### 106. the official secrets committee is required to submit an annual report on the activities of the intelligence services. head of the cni paz esteban appeared before the committee on 5 may 2022 to present the court authorisations for the 18 individuals that the authorities have taken responsibility for targeting. the hearing was not public and those present were not allowed to enter with any electronic on them whatsoever .


### 107. there has been a significant amount of public scrutiny on the ‘catalangate’ scandal since it came to light in april 2022. the spanish media and media outlets around the world have worked extensively in conjunction with civil society organisations to scrutinise the surveillance system in spain and advocate for the fundamental rights of the victims. inversely , some spanish politicians have tried to discredit citizenslab , suggesting their methods are unsound or that they are politically motivated. a collaborator of citizenslab , himself of catalan origin , was among the targets , along with his parents , who are not politically active at all213 . ### 107. there has been an attempt by the political parties involved in the attempted coup d'etat in spain in 2017 and by their affiliated media to use the so-called ‘catalangate’ to discredit the spanish judicial system since the information was published in 2020. the spanish media and media outlets around the world have published the information available and the fact that the surveillance is part of the criminal investigation around the attempted coup d'etat in spain in 2017. there is no proof of any wrongdoing or any action outside the law by the spanish law enforcement authorities or intelligence agencies so far.


### 24. per the act , surveillance carried out by the special services for national security (snss) using spyware is dependent on the permission of the minister of justice in the majority of instances , and on the judge designated by the president of the budapest-capital regional court in some specific cases61 62 . no appeal can be made against these decisions and there is virtually no oversight of the process63 64 . ### 24. per the act , surveillance carried out by the special services for national security (snss) using spyware is dependent on the permission of the minister of justice , and on the judge designated by the president of the budapest-capital regional court in some specific cases61 62 .


### 25. in november 2021 , at the insistence of the opposition , two committees in the senate conducted hearings into the use of spyware in hungary and the alleged politically motivated targeting of citizens by the government in particular. it was subsequently reported that the government representatives insisted that all surveillance was authorised through appropriate channels , but refused to comment as to whether or not journalists or politicians were targeted. it is not possible to know exactly what was said however , as the ruling party have classified the minutes of the meeting until the year 2050. ### 25. in november 2021 , at the insistence of the opposition , two committees in the senate conducted hearings into the use of spyware in hungary and the alleged politically motivated targeting of citizens by the government in particular.


### 26. when the pegasus scandal erupted in hungary , it became clear that journalists were one of the groups most targeted by the government , though it refuses to either confirm or deny this. as a result , in early 2022 a group of six journalists and activists initiated legal proceedings in hungary against both the state and the naih. the hungarian civil liberties union (hclu) will represent journalists brigitta csikász , dávid dercsényi , dániel németh and szabolcs panyi in addition to adrien beauduin , a belgian-canadian phd student and activist. the sixth party has chosen to remain anonymous. the hclu is also working with eitay mack in israel to file a case with the attorney general in order to trigger an investigation into nso group65 . ### 26. in early 2022 a group of six journalists and activists initiated legal proceedings in hungary against both the state and the naih. the hungarian civil liberties union (hclu) will represent journalists brigitta csikász , dávid dercsényi , dániel németh and szabolcs panyi in addition to adrien beauduin , a belgian-canadian phd student and activist. the sixth party has chosen to remain anonymous. the hclu is also working with eitay mack in israel to file a case with the attorney general in order to trigger an investigation into nso group65 .


### 27. the political control over the use of surveillance in hungary is complete and total. the orbán-led fidesz regime has made it so that they can target lawyers , journalists , political opponents and civil society organisations with ease and without fear of recourse. in addition , their control over almost all hungarian media outlets allows them to continue pushing their own version of the truth , stopping much of the public scrutiny conducted by the media from reaching hungarian citizen. ### 27. the political control over the use of surveillance in hungary remains in the hands of a democratically constituted government.


### 28. it has been very clear that the government’s actions were politically motivated from the moment that the spyware scandal broke in hungary. it was reported that the phone numbers of over 300 persons were included in the findings of the pegasus project66 . among those were at least five journalists , ten lawyers and an opposition politician as well as activists and high profile business owners67 . while the appearance of phone numbers on this list does not necessarily mean that hacking of those phones took place , it is a revealing insight into the methodical and systematic actions and attitude of orbán’s government towards fundamental rights and media freedom. since that time in 2021 , a number of targets have been confirmed as having been successfully hacked with spyware. ### 28. according to the pegasus project66 , at least five journalists , ten lawyers and an opposition politician as well as activists and high profile business owners67 is on the list of potentially hacked phones . it must be noted that the appearance of phone numbers on this list does not necessarily mean that hacking of those phones took place.


### szabolcs panyi ### deleted


### 29. the hacking of the phone of journalist and editor szabolcs panyi occurred through the course of his work at direkt36. as one of the few remaining independent news sources in hungary , it is a major target of the ruling party. panyi is a well-known , well-regarded journalist , so it follows that in addition to collecting key information directly from panyi himself , many of the contacts and sources on his phone would be valuable by-catch for the government. ### deleted


### zoltán varga ### deleted


### 30. as ceo and chairman of central media group , zoltán varga is the owner of hungary’s largest remaining independent news site 24.hu. after the orbán government initiated a takeover of its main competitor , index.hu , in 2020 , varga was left as ‘the last man standing’ in defiance of the ruling party. ### deleted


### adrien beauduin ### deleted


### 31. adrien beauduin appeared on the radar of the orbán regime in 2018 while completing a phd in gender studies at the central european university (ceu). the institution was founded by george soros and the government was trying to remove it from hungary at the time , along with the entire subject of gender studies68 . after attending a protest in budapest , beauduin was arrested in what is seen as a highly politically motivated move , and faced charges for assault of a police officer , which he vehemently denies69 . it was reported that there was essentially no evidence against beauduin , and the evidence that was submitted had been copied verbatim from the police testimony in another case70 . ### deleted


### ilona patócs ### deleted


### 32. lawyer ilona patócs was a suspected victim of pegasus surveillance in the summer of 2019 while she was representing a client in a high profile , long-running murder case71 . however , owing to the type of mobile device she was using , it was not possible to confirm whether the hack was fully successful or when exactly it occurred. her client , istván hatvani , had already served seven years for an assassination , which patócs claims was a ‘politically motivated’ conviction72 . despite another party later claiming responsibility for the murder , the hungarian court of appeal sent hatvani back to prison to complete his original sentence. many other lawyers’ phone numbers have been listed as potential targets of pegasus , including president of the hungarian bar association jános bánáti73 . this targeting in particular shows a clear disregard from the government for the privilege that exists between lawyers and their clients. ### deleted


### 109. in contrast to the fast-paced nature of the case taken by sanchez et al. in madrid , the cases that have been filed in barcelona by catalonian victims of spyware are moving at a slow pace217 218 . the first case in investigative court number 32 in barcelona was filed by two pegasus victims in 2020; former president of the catalonian parliament and current minister of business and work , roger torrent , and former minister of foreign action , institutional relations and transparency of catalonia and current erc president in barcelona city council , ernest maragall219 . andreu van den eynde is one of the lawyers representing torrent and maragall in this case , and is a victim of pegasus himself. van den eynde has criticised the courts consistently delaying proceedings and virtually ‘paralysing’ the case220 . omnium cultural and the popular unity candidacy party (cup) have also filed a case in the same court in barcelona. lawyer benet salellas , who is involved in both cases , is asserting that the spanish government is behind the targeting221 . ### deleted


### 110. as the snc has jurisdiction over cases concerning the most serious crimes in all territories , it is possible that the public prosecutor could request all pegasus cases to be unified222 . in other words , the cases of the victims from the spanish government and the ‘catalangate’ victims would all be heard in the snc in madrid. the lawyers representing the catalan victims assert that there is no link between the cases unless the perpetrator is proved to be the same in all instances of surveillance223 . ### deleted


### 111. there are a number of other pending legal cases linked to the 65 catalonian victims. one such case was filed by lawyer and pegasus victim gonzalo boye on behalf of at least 19 victims against nso , its three founders niv karmi , shalev hulio and omri lavie , q cyber technologies , and osy , a subsidiary company based in luxembourg224 225 . legal action is also underway in a number of other eu member states as a result of the surveillance carried out on those catalan separatists in exile , including france , belgium , switzerland , germany , and luxembourg226 . ### deleted


### 112. the targeting of catalan citizens with spyware reportedly began as early as 2015 , and has been carried out on a large scale since 2017227 . after initial media coverage in 2020 , the full scandal broke across europe in april 2022 with the publication of the university of toronto citizenlab report. given the significant passage of time since the beginning of the hacking and these revelations , a number of targets were unable to be identified or further investigated owing to various factors that occurred , including a number of targets who disposed of the phone in question228 . ### deleted


### 114. in total , 65 catalonians were confirmed to have been targeted with mercenary spyware , 63 with pegasus , four with candiru and at least two people were targeted by both233 . at least 51 individuals were successfully infected234 . the spanish government have refused to comment as to whether or not they were responsible for the surveillance any of the other victims outside of the 18 they admit to having targeted235 . the majority of those 18 persons were never charged with a crime , and yet were included on this list. minister for defence robles has relied heavily on the official secrets act rather than expand on what were the reasons for the surveillance of those specific targets236 . all 65 catalan targets have at some point in time been in contact with the catalan separatists living outside spain. ### deleted


### 115. one of the key groups revealed to have been targeted is the pro-independence catalan members of the european parliament. each of them were hacked with spyware either directly or indirectly through what citizenlab refer to as relational targeting237 : diana riba i giner , antoni comín i oliveres , jordi solé , carles puigdemont , and clara ponsati. ### 115. one of the groups allegedly targeted is the pro-independence catalan members of the european parliament. these meps are either fugitives from the spanish justice system or connected with the attempted coup d'etat in spain in 2017: diana riba i giner , antoni comín i oliveres , jordi solé , carles puigdemont , and clara ponsati.


### 116. former president of the catalonian parliament and current minister of business and work roger torrent was among the first persons to come forward as a victim of the 2019 whatsapp pegasus infections238 . shortly after , leader of the pro-independence republican left of catalonia party , ernest maragall and anna gabriel who was previously a regional member of parliament for the popular unity candidacy party also came forward as victims of pegasus239 . all of the presidents of catalonia since 2010 have been targeted with spyware either during or after their term in office240 . as many as 12 erc members were among the 65 targets , including the secretary general of the party marta rovira who was hacked at least twice in june 2020 according to citizenlab. it is highly significant that both gabriel and rovira were living in switzerland at the time of their surveillance following the fall out after the 2017 referendum. ### 116. in spain , a number of individuals were allegedly targeted by this software in connection with the criminal proceedings in the framework of the attempted coup d'etat in spain in 2017. some of them fled spain when they were called to cooperate with the justice system such as anna gabriel and marta rovira , others such as ernest maragall or roger torrent stayed to testify at the trial.


### civil society organisations ### deleted


### 117. jordi domingo was one of the first catalonian activists that was reported to be targeted in 2020. though a supporter of catalan independence , it was reported by the guardian that domingo believed himself to be a mistaken target. given that he did not play a major role in the events of 2017 , it is his belief that the intended target was a lawyer of the same name who contributed to the drafting of the constitution of catalonia241 . ### deleted


### lawyers ### deleted


### 118. gonzalo boye has represented many high profile catalan figures , including former presidents puigdemont and torras242 . over five months between january and may of 2020 , he was a victim of pegasus himself243 . boye was targeted as many as 18 times during that period via text messages that appeared as tweets from civil society organisations or prominent news outlets244 . citizenlab confirmed at least one successful infection on 30 october 2020. the infection came just 48 hours after the arrest of one of his clients245 . the targeting of boye has called in to question the legality of attacking the lawyer-client privilege. ### deleted


### 119. andreu van den eynde i adroer , was successfully infected with pegasus on 14 may 2020246 . the hacking occurred while he was acting as the lawyer of both raul romeva and oriol junqueras in their case before the supreme court. ### deleted


### 120. similarly , prominent lawyer jaume alonso-cuevillas was also infected while representing key catalan figures such as carles puigdemont. however , citizenlab were unable to determine the precise date of the successful infection. ### deleted


### 121. national authorities have so far shared very little official information about the acquisition and use of spyware in their countries , nor about the budgetary aspects or legal framework governing it. vendors and countries issuing export licenses (in particular israel) share no information about the customers. only austria , poland , cyprus have responded to the questionnaire sent by pega on 15 july 2022 , but mostly in a very general , even evasive way. ### 121. national authorities have so far shared very little official information about the acquisition and use of spyware in their countries , nor about the budgetary aspects or legal framework governing it. vendors and countries issuing export licenses (in particular israel) share no information about the customers. only austria , poland , cyprus have responded to the questionnaire sent by pega on 15 july 2022.


### 124. from information provided by nso group , we know that pegasus was sold in at least fourteen eu countries , until the contracts with two countries were terminated. it is not know which , but there is a general assumption it concerns poland and hungary. however , as long as nso group or the israeli government does not make any official statement regarding a termination of contract , it cannot be verified if this is true. ### 124. from information provided by nso group , we know that pegasus was sold in at least fourteen eu countries , until the contracts with two countries were terminated.


### 125. an additional piece of information is the attendee list of the 2013 edition of the iss world (intelligence support systems) fair , aka ‘the wiretappers ball’. with the exception of portugal and luxemburg , all current eu member states were represented by a wide range of organisations , including local police forces247 . in recent years , nso group has become the main sponsor of the event , but the sponsor list also mentions intellexa , candiru , rcs and many others248 . ### deleted


### 127. spyware is clearly also used by law enforcement , not just by intelligence agencies. there is no information about the material obtained with the use of spyware , and how that can be , and has been used to detect , investigate , and prosecute crime in the context of eu police and justice cooperation. there are big question marks over the admissibility in court of such material as evidence in the context of eu police and justice cooperation , including within europol and eurojust. ### 127. spyware is clearly also used by law enforcement , not just by intelligence agencies.


### 128. the 2017 coalition agreement of the dutch government states that the dutch police is not allowed to acquire spyware from providers that provide their products to ‘dubious regimes’ , later specified as ‘countries guilty of grave violations of human rights or international humanitarian law’. before any acquisition of spyware , the dutch police has to ask the provider whether it has provided to eu- or un-sanctioned countries and performs a check if the country where the provider is based has an export control regime where human rights are assessed in the export license procedure. this assessment is repeated periodically. it should be noted that this restriction only seems to apply to spyware acquisitions by the police. the intelligence services are not explicitly mentioned. according to the government , the police does use hacking software since 2019 , although the authorities do not mention which type249 . it would appear that nso group and its spyware product pegasus do not meet the above-mentioned standards , in any case not before the tightening of the export regime of israel in december 2021250 . no insight is given into the expenditure by both police and intelligence services for the purchase and use of the spyware system. ### 128. the 2017 coalition agreement of the dutch government states that the dutch police is not allowed to acquire spyware from providers that provide their products to ‘dubious regimes’ , later specified as ‘countries guilty of grave violations of human rights or international humanitarian law’. it should be noted that this restriction only seems to apply to spyware acquisitions by the police. the intelligence services are not explicitly mentioned. according to the government , the police does use hacking software since 2019 , although the authorities do not mention which type249. no insight is given into the expenditure by both police and intelligence services for the purchase and use of the spyware system.


### 131. in september 2021 , it was reported that the german federal criminal police office (bka) had acquired pegasus in late 2020. it is important to note here that german law distinguishes two forms of spyware use254 : access all information (online-durchsuchung255 ) and access only live communication (quellen-tkü256 ). since the original pegasus software could access all information on a device , and not just live communication , its use by the bka would violate the law. the bka therefore asked nso to write a source code , so that pegasus would only be able to access only what was allowed by law. initially , nso declined to do so257 . only after new negotiations , nso agreed , so the bka acquired a modified version258 . it has allegedly been deployed since march 2021. the version purchased by the bka had certain functions blocked to prevent abuse , although it is unclear how that works in practice. the bka has written a report about this modified version , which remains classified259 . ### 131. in september 2021 , it was reported that the german federal criminal police office (bka) had acquired pegasus in late 2020. it is important to note here that german law distinguishes two forms of spyware use254 : access all information (online-durchsuchung255 ) and access only live communication (quellen-tkü256 ). since the original pegasus software could access all information on a device , and not just live communication , its use by the bka would violate the law. the bka therefore reportedly asked nso to write a source code , so that pegasus would only be able to access only what was allowed by law. initially , nso declined to do so257 . only after new negotiations , nso allegedly agreed , so the bka acquired a modified version258 . it has allegedly been deployed since march 2021. the version purchased by the bka would have certain functions blocked to prevent abuse , although it is unclear how that works in practice. the bka has written a report about this modified version , which remains classified259 .


### 132. in 2012 and 2013 , both the german federal police bka and berlin police lka independently purchased finfisher spyware (more about this spyware in chapter on the spyware industry). also here , just like in the case of pegasus , the bka told the company to develop the finfisher spyware in such a way that it could not access all data on a device , but only live communications , for it to be compliant with german law. ### 132. in 2012 and 2013 , both the german federal police bka and berlin police lka independently purchased finfisher spyware (more about this spyware in chapter on the spyware industry). this company became famous for illegally supplying spyware to authoritarian and despotic regimes. also here , just like in the case of pegasus , the bka allegedly told the company to develop the finfisher spyware in such a way that it could not access all data on a device , but only live communications , for it to be compliant with german law.


### 144. according to the commission , ‘it is impossible to attribute these indicators to a specific perpetrator with full certainty.’ the commission holds that it cannot elaborate on the investigation’s present-day findings , as ‘they would reveal to adversaries the commission’s investigation methods and capabilities , thus seriously jeopardizing the institution’s security’. the common , overarching topic that two of the known targeted commission officials , commissioner reynders and a cabinet member of commissioner věra jourová284 , are dealing with is the rule of law. in response to pega’s question about a possible correlation , the commission states that it does ‘not have enough information at its disposal allowing us to draw definitive conclusions about a link between geolocation and a possible device infection attempt via pegasus’285 . ### 144. according to the commission , ‘it is impossible to attribute these indicators to a specific perpetrator with full certainty.’ the commission holds that it cannot elaborate on the investigation’s present-day findings , as ‘they would reveal to adversaries the commission’s investigation methods and capabilities , thus seriously jeopardizing the institution’s security’.


### 167. governments have targeted eu citizens with powerful spyware. this poses threats to democracy and individual citizens’ rights. the eu has powers to act on these threats , albeit very few. when member states , however , invoke ‘national security’ , the eu is basically out of the game. member states define national security unilaterally , and can shut the door at any time. in addition to these legal constraints , there are political reasons that amount to eu-passiveness. the european commission , as guardian of the eu treaties , has grown reticent when it comes to enforcing eu law331 . this is not because there are legal constraints , but rather because it is a political choice. the commission tends to interpret its powers in the narrowest possible way. when faced with flagrant violations of the rule of law and fundamental rights , this stance becomes very problematic. subsidiarity and respect for the exclusive national competences risks turning in to impunity. below we will examine the powers that the eu institutions have at their disposal. the parliament , commission and council have the power and the duty to legislate , regulate and enforce and they have to do so with vigour and ambition , putting defence of our democracy over short-term political considerations. ### 167. the misuse of spyware poses threats to democracy and individual citizens’ rights. the eu has powers to act on these threats , albeit very few. it should be recalled that , according to the treaties , matters of national security remain the exclusive competence of the member states. however in addition to these legal constraints , there are political reasons that amount to eu-passiveness. the source of this passivity is submission and servility towards the largest european countries , while demonstrating strength towards the weakest countries. as a result , alleged abuses in weaker countries are publicized and exaggerated , while the biggest players remain completely beyond the reach of any disciplinary action by the eu. below we will examine the powers that the eu institutions have at their disposal.


### 168. the european commission , in its response to the spyware scandal , has so far limited itself to writing letters requesting clarification from the governments of poland , hungary , spain and greece. however , it would seem that this timid admonition by the commission will not be followed by further action. it is true that strictly speaking the commission has no powers to act in the area of national security. however , as the commission itself points out in those letters , ‘national security’ should not be interpreted as an unlimited carve out from european laws and treaties , and become an area of lawlessness. ### 168. the european commission , in its response to the spyware scandal , has so far limited itself to writing letters requesting clarification from the governments of poland , hungary , spain and greece. however , it would seem that this timid admonition by the commission will not be followed by further action. it is true that strictly speaking the commission has no powers to act in the area of national security.


### 170. the eu does have several laws that might serve as regulatory tools with regard to spyware. in addition to laws protecting the rights of citizens , such as the laws on data protection and privacy of communications (gdpr , e-privacy) , there are laws on exports (dual use regulation) and procurement. however , enforcement by the commission is weak. it tends to limit itself to verifying if a member state has correctly transposed eu laws in national laws. however , that says very little about the actual situation on the ground. thus , the commission implementation report332 of the dual use regulation seems to conclude that implementation is well on track , whereas there is ample evidence to prove that in practice it is weak and patchy , and in some countries even deliberately so. despite the rules laid down in the dual use regulation , cyprus appears to have become an attractive export hub for spyware vendors. without proper and meaningful enforcement , eu laws are mere paper tigers that create ample space for the illegitimate use of spyware. ### 170. the eu does have several laws that might serve as regulatory tools with regard to spyware. in addition to laws protecting the rights of citizens , such as the laws on data protection and privacy of communications (gdpr , e-privacy) , there are laws on exports (dual use regulation) and procurement. however , enforcement by the commission is weak. it tends to limit itself to verifying if a member state has correctly transposed eu laws in national laws. however , that says very little about the actual situation on the ground. thus , the commission implementation report332 of the dual use regulation seems to conclude that implementation is well on track , whereas there is ample evidence to prove that in practice it is weak and patchy , and in some countries even deliberately so. despite the rules laid down in the dual use regulation , cyprus appears to have become an attractive export hub for spyware vendors.


### 171. the european parliament has set up the pega inquiry committee , which is working diligently and effectively within its powers and mandate. however , it has no powers to summon witnesses or hear them under oath , and it has no access to classified information. it lacks the full investigative powers that most national parliaments have. in addition , the influence of national governments is frequently present in the deliberations of pega , which on occasion is an obstacle to thorough , fully independent , and objective investigations. it is quite cynical that the european parliament does not have the full powers to investigate , when some of its own members are victims of illegal surveillance. ### 171. the european parliament has set up the pega inquiry committee , which is working within its powers and mandate. however , it has no powers to summon witnesses or hear them under oath , and it has no access to classified information. in addition , the influence of national governments is frequently present in the deliberations of pega - and manifests itself primarily in the unequal treatment of eu countries and channeling the investigation only around countries disliked in the eu - which on occasion is an obstacle to thorough , fully independent , and objective investigations.


### european council and council of ministers ### deleted


### 172. although the national governments claim that the spyware scandal is a purely national matter , it was actually discussed in the council of the european union and the national governments decided to respond collectively to the questionnaire of the european parliament333 . in doing so , they have fully acknowledged that it is in fact a matter for the council. however , responsibility is not a menu that you can pick and choose from: you cannot only selectively deal with procedural matters , but not the substance. ### deleted


### 173. to date , the european council has not responded publicly or substantively to the scandal. some of its members have a stake in the matter , as they themselves may be complicit in the illegitimate hacks , or they simply wish to keep the eu weak and powerless in this area. the omertà and lack of cooperation of the council does not bode well for any future regulatory initiatives. the council is a legislator , but it may well be reluctant to regulate its own members. ### deleted


### 174. even if illegal or criminal behaviour was ultimately to be proven , members of national governments cannot be impeached or made to resign from their eu jobs. this means that persons who are guilty of such acts may well continue with impunity to sit on eu bodies and take decisions affecting all european citizens. ### deleted


### 176. europol does not have any autonomous operational powers , and it cannot act without the consent and cooperation of the member state(s) concerned. that presents a problem when there is clear evidence of criminal acts - such as cybercrime , corruption and extortion - but national authorities fail to investigate. this problem is made worse when the member state authorities are themselves complicit in the crimes. ### 176. europol does not have any autonomous operational powers , and it cannot act without the consent and cooperation of the member state(s) concerned.


### 177. however , europol has recently obtained new powers allowing it to pro-actively propose an investigation , even when it concerns a crime committed only in one member state334 , but so far it has been reluctant to make use of those powers. europol wants to cherish the good relations with the governments , as it fears such an initiative would lead to a breakdown of cooperation in other areas. ### 177. however , europol has recently obtained new powers allowing it to pro-actively propose an investigation , even when it concerns a crime committed only in one member state334. however , according to its mandate , europol cannot act against the will of the authorities of a member state.


### 178. on 28 september 2022 , pega wrote a letter to europol335 , urging it to make use of its new powers under article 6 of the europol regulation336 . in a letter of reply dated 13 october 2022337 , europol stated that it has ‘contacted five member states to ascertain whether there is relevant information available at the national level for europol and whether there is an ongoing or envisaged criminal investigation (or , instead , another inquiry under the applicable provisions of national law). one of the five member states has meanwhile confirmed to europol the initiation of criminal investigations under the oversight of the competent judicial authorities , and this has also been verified by eurojust’. it is not known which countries the letter refers to , nor whether the aforementioned criminal inquiry by one member state concerns the abuse of spyware by eu member state governments or by third countries. ### deleted


### 180. paradoxically , contrary to europol , the us is actively investigating the use of spyware in the eu. on 5 november 2022 , it was reported that the fbi visited athens to investigate ‘how far the illegal surveillance has spread and who trafficked it.’338 . ### deleted


### 181. the court of justice of the european union (cjeu) and the european court of human rights (ecthr) play an important role in defending democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights. however , they can only act upon a complaint or pre-judicial question. proceedings are very lengthy and offer little concrete remedy in individual cases. over the years , the courts have created a vast body of relevant case law , for example establishing standards for surveillance. however , these courts have no means to ensure that their ruling are enforced. so far , one complaint about the illegitimate use of spyware has been submitted to the ecthr339 . however , the road to the strasbourg or luxembourg courts is often long , costly , and cumbersome , as all options for national judicial proceedings must first be exhausted. this is especially the case if national prosecutors or judges fail or refuse to take a case , the bar for passing the admissibility test is high. ### 181. the court of justice of the european union (cjeu) and the european court of human rights (ecthr) can only act upon a complaint or pre-judicial question. proceedings are very lengthy and offer little concrete remedy in individual cases. over the years , the courts have created a vast body of relevant case law , for example establishing standards for surveillance. so far , one complaint about the illegitimate use of spyware has been submitted to the ecthr339 .


### repealing all export licences that are not fully in line with both the letter and the spirit of the dual-use regulation; ### deleted


### 28. considers that the fulfilment of the conditions must be assessed by the commission; ### deleted


### — having regard to the venice commission report concerning the democratic oversight of the security services12 and the opinion on the act of 15 january 2016 amending the police act and certain other acts13 , ### deleted


### a. whereas it has been revealed that government bodies in several countries , both member states and third countries , have used pegasus and other brands of surveillance spyware against journalists , politicians , law enforcement officials , diplomats , lawyers , business people , civil society actors and other actors , for political and even criminal purposes; whereas such practices are extremely alarming and underscore the risk of abuse of surveillance technologies to undermine human rights and democracy; ### a. whereas there are suspicions that government bodies in several countries , both member states and third countries , have used pegasus and other brands of surveillance spyware against journalists , politicians , law enforcement officials , diplomats , lawyers , business people , civil society actors and other actors not only to prevent serious crime (including organized crime) , but possibly also for political and even criminal purposes; whereas these suspicions are more or less justified and whereas , due to the specificity of how software such as pegasus works , it is extremely difficult to say with certainty which software and by whom individual mobile devices have been hacked; whereas such practices , if they did occur , are extremely alarming and underscore the risk of abuse of surveillance technologies to undermine human rights and democracy;


### d. whereas the use of spyware surveillance should remain the exception and always subject to an effective and meaningful ex ante judicial authorisation by an impartial and independent judicial authority , which must ensure that the measure is necessary and proportionate and strictly limited to cases affecting national security , terrorism and serious crime; ### d. whereas the use of spyware surveillance should remain the exception and , as a rule , subject to an effective and meaningful ex ante judicial authorisation by an impartial and independent judicial authority , which must ensure that the measure is necessary and proportionate and strictly limited to cases affecting national security , terrorism and serious crime;


### e. whereas any spyware surveillance must be scrutinised by an independent ex post oversight authority , which must ensure that any authorised surveillance is carried out in compliance with fundamental rights and in accordance with the conditions set out by the court of justice of the european union (cjeu) , the european court of human rights (ecthr) and the venice commission and must be able to terminate the surveillance if it is not; ### e. whereas any spyware surveillance must be scrutinised by an independent ex post oversight authority , which must ensure that any authorised surveillance is carried out in compliance with fundamental rights and in accordance with the conditions set out by the court of justice of the european union (cjeu) and the european court of human rights (ecthr) and must be able to terminate the surveillance if it is not;


### f. whereas spyware surveillance failing to meet the requirements set out in union law and the jurisprudence of the cjeu and the ecthr would entail a violation of the values enshrined in article 2 teu and the fundamental rights enshrined in the charter and , in particular , articles 7 , 8 , 11 , 17 , 21 and 47 thereof that recognise the specific rights , freedoms and principles set out in it , such as respect for private and family life , the protection of personal data , freedom of expression and information , right to property , right to non-discrimination , as well as the right to effective remedy and fair trial; ### f. whereas not related to national security issues spyware surveillance failing to meet the requirements set out in union law and the jurisprudence of the cjeu and the ecthr would entail a violation of the values enshrined in article 2 teu and the fundamental rights enshrined in the charter and , in particular , articles 7 , 8 , 11 , 17 , 21 and 47 thereof that recognise the specific rights , freedoms and principles set out in it , such as respect for private and family life , the protection of personal data , freedom of expression and information , right to property , right to non-discrimination , as well as the right to effective remedy and fair trial;


### h. whereas it results from the testimonies of victims that even if legal remedy and civil rights may exist on paper , they mostly become void in the face of obstruction by government bodies , the absence of implementation of the right to be informed for victims and the administrative burden to prove the status as victim; ### h. whereas it results from the testimonies of victims that even if legal remedy and civil rights may exist on paper , they mostly become void in the face of obstruction by government bodies , the absence of implementation of the right to be informed for victims and the administrative burden to prove the status as victim; whereas statements and information provided by representatives of the national authorities present the matter differently , stating the correctness and legality of the procedures used;