### 4. if the joint pay assessment reveals differences in average pay for equal work or work of equal value between female and male workers which cannot be justified by objective and gender-neutral criteria , the employer shall remedy the situation , in close cooperation with the workers’ representatives , labour inspectorate , and/or equality body. such action shall include the establishment of gender-neutral job evaluation and classification to ensure that any direct or indirect pay discrimination on grounds of sex is excluded. ### 4. if the joint pay assessment reveals differences in average pay for equal work or work of equal value between female and male workers which cannot be justified by objective and gender-neutral criteria , the employer shall remedy the situation. such action shall include the establishment of gender-neutral job evaluation and classification to ensure that any direct or indirect pay discrimination on grounds of sex is excluded.


### 4. if the joint pay assessment reveals differences in average pay for equal work or work of equal value between female and male workers which cannot be justified by objective and gender-neutral criteria , the employer shall remedy the situation , in close cooperation with the workers’ representatives , labour inspectorate , and/or equality body. such action shall include the establishment of gender-neutral job evaluation and classification to ensure that any direct or indirect pay discrimination on grounds of sex is excluded. ### 4. if the joint pay assessment reveals differences in average pay for equal work or work of equal value between female and male workers which cannot be justified by objective and sex-neutral criteria , the employer shall remedy the situation , in close cooperation with the workers’ representatives , labour inspectorate , and/or equality body. such action shall include the establishment of sex-neutral job evaluation and classification to ensure that any direct or indirect pay discrimination on grounds of sex is excluded.


### 1. to the extent that any information provided pursuant to measures taken under articles 7 , 8 , and 9 involves the processing of personal data , it shall be provided in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/679. ### 1. to the extent that any information provided pursuant to measures taken under this directive involves the processing of personal data , it shall be provided in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/679.


### 2. any personal data collected by employers pursuant to articles 7 , 8 or 9 , shall not be used for any other purpose than to implement the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value. ### 2. any personal data collected by employers pursuant to articles 7 , 8 or 9 , shall not be used for any other purpose than to implement the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value. this rule is without prejudice to data collections for statistical purposes as referred to in the regulation (ec) no 223/2009 on european statistics1a


### 2. any personal data collected by employers pursuant to articles 7 , 8 or 9 , shall not be used for any other purpose than to implement the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value. ### 2. any personal data collected by employers pursuant to articles 7 , 8 or 9 , shall not be used for any other purpose than to implement the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value. furthermore , the new regulations shall not result in the disclosure of data belonging to workers or sensitive data belonging to employers.


### 2. any personal data collected by employers pursuant to articles 7 , 8 or 9 , shall not be used for any other purpose than to implement the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value. ### 2. any personal data processed pursuant to this directive shall not be used for any other purpose than to implement the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value.


### 3. member states may decide that , where the disclosure of information pursuant to articles 7 , 8 and 9 would lead to the disclosure , either directly or indirectly , of the pay of an identifiable co-worker , only the workers’ representatives or the equality body shall have access to that information. the representatives or equality body shall advise workers regarding a possible claim under this directive without disclosing actual pay levels of individual workers doing the same work or work of equal value. the monitoring body referred to in article 26 shall have access to the information without restriction. ### 3. member states may decide that , where the disclosure of information pursuant to this directive would lead to the disclosure , either directly or indirectly , of the pay of an identifiable co-worker , only the workers’ representatives or the equality body shall have access to that information. the representatives or equality body shall advise workers regarding a possible claim under this directive without disclosing actual pay levels of individual workers doing the same work or work of equal value. the monitoring body referred to in article 26 shall have access to the information without any personal data protection restrictions other than those deriving from regulation (eu) 2016/679 and other legislation in force.


### without prejudice to the autonomy of social partners and in accordance with national law and practice , member states shall ensure that the rights and obligations under this directive are discussed with social partners. ### without prejudice to the autonomy of social partners and in accordance with national law and practice , member states shall ensure that the rights and obligations under this directive are discussed with social partners. specifically , when transposing this directive , member states shall favour dialogue with social partners regarding the remedies and enforcement laid down in the following chapter.


### member states shall ensure that , after possible recourse to conciliation , judicial procedures for the enforcement of rights and obligations related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value are available to all workers who consider themselves wronged by a failure to apply the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value. such procedures shall be easily accessible to workers and to those who act on their behalf , even after the labour relationship in which the discrimination is alleged to have occurred has ended. ### member states shall ensure that , after possible recourse to dialogue through social partners and conciliation , judicial procedures for the enforcement of rights and obligations related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value are available to all workers who consider themselves wronged by a failure to apply the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value. such procedures shall be easily accessible to workers and to those who act on their behalf , even after the labour relationship in which the discrimination is alleged to have occurred has ended.


### 1. member states shall ensure that associations , organisations , equality bodies and workers’ representatives or other legal entities which have , in accordance with the criteria laid down by national law , a legitimate interest in ensuring equality between men and women , may engage in any judicial or administrative procedure to enforce any of the rights or obligations related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value. they may act on behalf or in support of a worker who is victim of an infringement of any right or obligation related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value , with the latter’s approval. ### 1. member states shall ensure that equality bodies and workers’ representatives may engage in any judicial or administrative procedure to enforce any of the rights or obligations related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value. they may act on behalf or in support of a worker who is victim of an infringement of any right or obligation related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value , with the latter’s approval.


### 1. member states shall ensure that associations , organisations , equality bodies and workers’ representatives or other legal entities which have , in accordance with the criteria laid down by national law , a legitimate interest in ensuring equality between men and women , may engage in any judicial or administrative procedure to enforce any of the rights or obligations related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value. they may act on behalf or in support of a worker who is victim of an infringement of any right or obligation related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value , with the latter’s approval. ### 1. member states shall , pursuant to the national law and specific institutional practice , ensure that associations , organisations , equality bodies and workers’ representatives or other legal entities which have , in accordance with the criteria laid down by national law , a legitimate interest in ensuring equality between men and women , may engage in any judicial or administrative procedure to enforce any of the rights or obligations related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value. they may act on behalf or in support of a worker who is victim of an infringement of any right or obligation related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value , with the latter’s approval.


### 2. equality bodies and workers’ representatives shall also have the right to act on behalf or in support of several workers , with the latter’s approval. ### deleted


### 1. member states shall ensure that any worker who has suffered harm as a result of an infringement of any right or obligation related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value shall have the right to claim and to obtain full compensation or reparation , as determined by the member state , for that harm. ### (does not affect the english version.)


### 3. the compensation shall place the worker who has suffered harm in the position in which that person would have been if he or she had not been discriminated based on sex or if no infringement of any of the rights or obligations relating to equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value had occurred. it shall include full recovery of back pay and related bonuses or payments in kind , compensation for lost opportunities and moral prejudice. it shall also include the right to interest on arrears. ### 3. the compensation shall place the worker who has suffered harm in the position in which that person would have been if he or she had not been discriminated based on sex or if no infringement of any of the rights or obligations relating to equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value had occurred. it shall include full recovery of back pay and related bonuses or payments in kind and compensation for lost opportunities. it shall also include the right to interest on arrears.


### member states shall ensure that , in legal proceedings aimed at ensuring the enforcement of any right or obligation related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value , the courts or other competent authorities may order , at the request of the claimant and at the expense of the defendant: ### member states shall ensure that , in legal proceedings aimed at ensuring the enforcement of any right or obligation related to the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or work of equal value , the courts may order , at the request of the claimant and at the expense of the defendant:


### 1. member states shall take the appropriate measures , in accordance with their national judicial systems , to ensure that , when workers who consider themselves wronged because the principle of equal pay has not been applied to them , establish before a court or other competent authority , facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination , it shall be for the defendant to prove that there has been no direct or indirect discrimination in relation to pay. ### 1. member states shall take the appropriate measures , in accordance with their national judicial systems , to ensure that , when workers who consider themselves wronged because the principle of equal pay has not been applied to them , establish before a court or other competent authority , facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination , it shall be for the defendant to prove that there has been no direct or indirect discrimination in relation to pay. this presumption must be based on facts that , at first sight , make it possible to establish the existence of evidence of direct or indirect discrimination.


### 2. member states shall ensure that , in any legal or administrative proceedings concerning direct or indirect discrimination , where an employer failed to comply with any of the rights or obligations related to pay transparency set out in articles 5 through 9 of this directive , it shall be for the employer to prove that there has been no such discrimination. ### 2. member states shall ensure that , in any legal or administrative proceedings concerning direct or indirect discrimination , where an employer failed to comply with any of the rights or obligations related to pay transparency set out in articles 5 through 9 of this directive , it shall be for the employer to prove that it has acted in accordance with this directive and the other applicable legislation in force.


### 3. the claimant shall benefit from any doubt that might remain. ### 3. the claimant shall benefit from any doubt that might remain , except where he or she has acted in bad faith.


### 5. member states need not apply paragraph 1 to proceedings in which it is for the court or competent body to investigate the facts of the case. ### 5. member states need not apply paragraphs 1 to 3 to proceedings in which it is for the court or competent body to investigate the facts of the case.


### 2. member states shall ensure that national courts have the power to order the disclosure of evidence containing confidential information where they consider it relevant to the claim. they shall ensure that , when ordering the disclosure of such information , national courts have at their disposal effective measures to protect such information. ### 2. member states shall ensure that national courts have the power to order the disclosure of evidence containing confidential information where they consider it relevant to the claim. they shall ensure that , when ordering the disclosure of such information , national courts have at their disposal effective measures to protect such information. the obligations based on this provision are without prejudice to confidentiality rules of the regulation (ec) no 223/2009 on european statistics1a.


### 2. member states shall ensure that national courts have the power to order the disclosure of evidence containing confidential information where they consider it relevant to the claim. they shall ensure that , when ordering the disclosure of such information , national courts have at their disposal effective measures to protect such information. ### 2. member states shall ensure that national courts have the power to order the disclosure of evidence containing confidential information where they consider it strictly necessary in order to resolve the dispute , in the absence of other probative elements and provided that it does not give rise to further injury. they shall ensure that , when ordering the disclosure of such information , national courts have at their disposal effective measures to protect such information.


### 2. limitation periods shall not begin to run before the violation of the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or for work of equal value or infringement of the rights or obligations under this directive has ceased and the claimant knows , or can reasonably be expected to know , about the violation or infringement. ### 2. limitation periods shall not begin to run before the violation of the principle of equal pay between men and women for equal work or for work of equal value or infringement of the rights or obligations under this directive has ceased and the claimant may know , or can reasonably be expected to know , about the violation or infringement.


### 3. member states shall ensure that the limitation periods for bringing claims are set at three years at least. ### 3. the limitation periods shall be established by member states in line with their procedural legislation.


### article 19 ### deleted


### 1. member states shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of national provisions adopted pursuant to this directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. the penalties provided for shall be effective , proportionate and dissuasive. member states shall , without delay , notify the commission of those rules and of those measures and of any subsequent amendment affecting them. ### 1. member states shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of national provisions adopted pursuant to this directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. the penalties provided for shall be effective , proportionate and dissuasive. member states shall , without delay , notify the commission of those rules and of those measures and of any subsequent amendment affecting them. the commission shall publish the rules and measures annually , so that member states may exchange best practice.


### 2. member states shall ensure that fines are applied to infringements of the rights and obligations relating to equal pay for the same work or work of equal value. they shall set a minimum level for such fines ensuring real deterrent effect. the level of the fines shall take into account: ### 2. member states shall ensure that fines are applied to infringements of the rights and obligations relating to equal pay for the same work or work of equal value. they shall set a minimum level for such fines , tailored to the respective size of the undertakings , ensuring real deterrent effect. the level of the fines shall take into account:


### 3. member states shall establish specific penalties to be imposed in case of repeated infringements of the rights and obligations relating to equal pay between men and women , such as the revocation of public benefits or the exclusion , for a certain period of time , from any award of financial inducements. ### 3. member states shall establish specific penalties to be imposed in case of repeated infringements of the rights and obligations relating to equal pay between men and women , such as the revocation of public benefits or the exclusion , for a certain period of time , from any award of financial inducements. infringements affecting different workers over the same period of time shall not be deemed to be repeated infringements.


### 2. member states shall consider for contracting authorities to introduce , as appropriate , penalties and termination conditions ensuring compliance with the principle of equal pay in the performance of public contracts and concessions. where member states’ authorities act in accordance with article 38(7)(a) of directive 2014/23/eu , article 57(4)(a) of directive 2014/24/eu , or article 80(1) of directive 2014/25/eu in conjunction with article 57(4)(a) of directive 2014/24/eu , they may exclude or may be required by member states to exclude any economic operator from participation in a public procurement procedure where they can demonstrate by any appropriate means the infringement of the obligations referred to in paragraph 1 , related either to a failure to comply with pay transparency obligations or a pay gap of more than 5 per cent in any category of workers which is not justified by the employer on the basis of objective , gender-neutral criteria. this is without prejudice to any other rights or obligations set out in directive 2014/23/eu , directive 2014/24/eu or directive 2014/25/eu. ### 2. member states shall consider for contracting authorities to introduce , as appropriate , penalties and termination conditions ensuring compliance with the principle of equal pay in the performance of public contracts and concessions. where member states’ authorities act in accordance with article 38(7)(a) of directive 2014/23/eu , article 57(4)(a) of directive 2014/24/eu , or article 80(1) of directive 2014/25/eu in conjunction with article 57(4)(a) of directive 2014/24/eu , they may exclude or may be required by member states to exclude any economic operator from participation in a public procurement procedure where they can demonstrate by any appropriate means the infringement of the obligations referred to in paragraph 1 , related either to a failure to comply with pay transparency obligations or a pay gap between female and male workers of more than 5 per cent in any category of workers which is not justified by the employer on the basis of objective , sex-neutral criteria. this is without prejudice to any other rights or obligations set out in directive 2014/23/eu , directive 2014/24/eu or directive 2014/25/eu.


### 2. member states shall consider for contracting authorities to introduce , as appropriate , penalties and termination conditions ensuring compliance with the principle of equal pay in the performance of public contracts and concessions. where member states’ authorities act in accordance with article 38(7)(a) of directive 2014/23/eu , article 57(4)(a) of directive 2014/24/eu , or article 80(1) of directive 2014/25/eu in conjunction with article 57(4)(a) of directive 2014/24/eu , they may exclude or may be required by member states to exclude any economic operator from participation in a public procurement procedure where they can demonstrate by any appropriate means the infringement of the obligations referred to in paragraph 1 , related either to a failure to comply with pay transparency obligations or a pay gap of more than 5 per cent in any category of workers which is not justified by the employer on the basis of objective , gender-neutral criteria. this is without prejudice to any other rights or obligations set out in directive 2014/23/eu , directive 2014/24/eu or directive 2014/25/eu. ### 2. member states shall consider for contracting authorities to introduce , as appropriate , penalties and termination conditions ensuring compliance with the principle of equal pay in the performance of public contracts and concessions. where member states’ authorities act in accordance with article 38(7)(a) of directive 2014/23/eu , article 57(4)(a) of directive 2014/24/eu , or article 80(1) of directive 2014/25/eu in conjunction with article 57(4)(a) of directive 2014/24/eu , they may exclude or may be required by member states to exclude any economic operator from participation in a public procurement procedure where they can demonstrate by any appropriate means the infringement of the obligations referred to in paragraph 1 , related either to a failure to comply with pay transparency obligations or a pay gap of more than 5 per cent in any category of workers which is not justified by the employer on the basis of objective criteria that do not discriminate between men and women. this is without prejudice to any other rights or obligations set out in directive 2014/23/eu , directive 2014/24/eu or directive 2014/25/eu.


### 2. member states shall introduce in their national legal systems such measures as necessary to protect workers , including those who are workers' representatives as provided for by national law and/or practice , against dismissal or other adverse treatment by the employer as a reaction to a complaint within the undertaking or to any legal proceedings aimed at enforcing compliance with any rights or obligations relating to equal pay between men and women. ### 2. member states shall introduce in their national legal systems such measures as necessary to protect workers as provided for by national law and/or practice , against dismissal or other adverse treatment by the employer as a reaction to a complaint within the undertaking or to any legal proceedings aimed at enforcing compliance with any rights or obligations relating to equal pay between men and women.


### 2. implementation of this directive shall under no circumstances constitute grounds for reducing the level of protection in the fields covered by this directive. ### deleted


### 3. member states shall provide equality bodies with the adequate resources necessary for effectively carrying out their functions with regard to the respect for the right to equal pay between men and women for the same work or work of equal value. member states shall consider allocating amounts recovered as fines pursuant to article 20 to the equality bodies for that purpose. ### 3. member states shall provide equality bodies with the adequate resources necessary for effectively carrying out their functions with regard to the respect for the right to equal pay between men and women for the same work or work of equal value.


### 2. each member state shall designate a body (‘monitoring body’) for the monitoring and support of the implementation of national legal provisions implementing this directive and shall make the necessary arrangements for the proper functioning of such body. the monitoring body may be part of existing bodies or structures at national level. ### 2. the monitoring and implementation of national legal provisions implementing this directive shall be carried out by each member state’s equality body , in collaboration with the labour inspectorate.


### to raise awareness among public and private undertakings and organisations , social partners and the general public to promote the principle of equal pay and the right to pay transparency; ### to raise awareness among public and private undertakings and organisations , social partners and the general public to promote the principle of equal pay for men and women for equal work or work of equal value;


### to tackle the causes of the gender pay gap and devise tools to help analyse and assess pay inequalities; ### to tackle the causes of the pay gap between female and male workers and devise tools to help analyse and assess pay inequalities;


### to tackle the causes of the gender pay gap and devise tools to help analyse and assess pay inequalities; ### to tackle the causes of the pay gap between men and women and devise tools to help analyse and assess pay inequalities;


### to aggregate data on the number and types of pay discrimination claims brought before the courts and complaints brought before the competent public authorities , including equality bodies. ### to aggregate data on the number and types of pay discrimination claims brought before the courts and complaints brought before the competent public authorities , including equality bodies;


### 4. member states shall provide the commission with the data referred to in paragraph 3 , points (c) , (d) , and (e) to the commission annually. ### 4. member states shall provide the commission with the data referred to in paragraph 3 , points (c) , (d) , (e) and (f) to the commission annually. the commission shall publish those data annually , so that member states may exchange best practice.


### this directive shall not affect in any way the right to negotiate , conclude and enforce collective agreements and to take collective action in accordance with national law or practice. ### this directive shall not affect in any way the right to negotiate , conclude and enforce collective agreements and to take collective action in accordance with national law or practice , but shall be interpreted in such a way that , once the directive enters into force and has been transposed , the actions of the social partners are reinforced.


### member states shall provide the commission (eurostat) with up-to-date gender pay gap data annually and in a timely manner. these statistics shall be broken down by gender , economic sector , working time (full-time/part-time) , economic control (public/private ownership) and age and be calculated on an annual basis. ### member states shall provide the commission (eurostat) with up-to-date data on the pay gap between men and women annually and in a timely manner. these statistics shall be broken down by sex , economic sector , working time (full-time/part-time) , economic control (public/private ownership) and age and be calculated on an annual basis. in addition , a distinction shall be drawn between elements that can be explained and elements where the difference cannot be explained using objective criteria that do not discriminate between men and women. the commission shall publish this up-to-date information annually , for the purposes of assessing the success of this directive.


### member states shall provide the commission (eurostat) with up-to-date gender pay gap data annually and in a timely manner. these statistics shall be broken down by gender , economic sector , working time (full-time/part-time) , economic control (public/private ownership) and age and be calculated on an annual basis. ### member states shall provide the commission (eurostat) with up-to-date pay gap between female and male workers data annually and in a timely manner. these statistics shall be broken down by sex , economic sector , working time (full-time/part-time) , economic control (public/private ownership) and age and be calculated on an annual basis.


### member states may entrust the social partners with the implementation of this directive , where the social partners jointly request to do so , provided that member states take all the necessary steps to ensure that the results sought by this directive are guaranteed at all times. ### member states may entrust the social partners with the implementation of this directive , where the social partners jointly request to do so , provided that member states take all the necessary steps to ensure that the results sought by this directive are guaranteed at all times. such a joint request shall be deemed to have been made if the most representative social organisations in each member state have expressed an opinion.


### 1. by [eight years after the entry into force] member states shall communicate to the commission all information on how this directive has been applied and what has been its impact in practice. ### 1. by eight years after the entry into force member states shall communicate to the commission all information on how this directive has been applied and what has been its impact in practice , including , in particular , the following parameters:


### 2. on the basis of the information provided by member states , the commission shall submit a report to the european parliament and the council on the implementation of this directive and propose , where appropriate , legislative amendments. ### 2. on the basis of the information provided by member states following its transposition in the respective member states , the commission shall submit a report to the european parliament and the council on the implementation of this directive and propose , where appropriate , legislative amendments.


### where methane does not meet the gathering pipeline specifications , provided the operator analyses methane samples twice per week to determine whether the specifications have been achieved and routes the methane into a gathering pipeline as soon as the pipeline specifications are met; ### deleted


### during commissioning of pipelines , equipment or facilities , only for as long as necessary to purge introduced impurities from the pipeline or equipment; ### during (re)commissioning of pipelines , facility equipment or gas storage wells , only for as long as necessary to purge introduced impurities from the pipeline or equipment;


### during pigging , blow-down to repair or purging a gathering pipeline for repair or maintenance , and only where the gas cannot be contained or redirected into an unaffected portion of the pipeline. ### during pigging , blow-down to repair or purging a pipeline for repair or maintenance , and only where the gas cannot be contained or redirected into an unaffected portion of the pipeline;


### 4. where venting is allowed pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 , operators shall vent only where flaring is not technically feasible or risks endangering safety of operations or personnel. in such a situation , as part of the reporting obligations set out in article 16 , operators shall demonstrate to the competent authorities the necessity to opt for venting instead of flaring. ### 4. where venting is allowed pursuant to paragraphs 2(b) and 3 , operators shall vent only in the following cases: where flaring is not technically feasible; where risks endangering safety of operations or personnel; when flaring is not allowed by other legal obligations.


### 5. flaring shall only be allowed where either re-injection , utilisation on-site or dispatch of the methane to a market are not feasible for reasons other than economic considerations. in such a situation , as part of the reporting obligations set out in article 16 , operators shall demonstrate to the competent authorities the necessity to opt for flaring instead of either re-injection , utilisation on-site or dispatch of the methane to a market. ### 5. flaring shall only be allowed where either re-injection or utilisation on-site or dispatch of the methane are not technically feasible or risks endangering safety of operations or personnel or security of supply.


### operators shall notify the competent authorities of venting and flaring events: ### operators shall notify the competent authorities of venting and flaring events of more than 5000 kg of methane caused by an incident , emergency or a malfunction.


### caused by an emergency or a malfunction; ### deleted


### caused by an emergency or a malfunction; ### caused by an emergency or a malfunction , and


### lasting a total of 8 hours or more within a 24 hour period from a single event. ### deleted


### the notification referred to in the first subparagraph shall be made without delay after the event and at the latest within 48 hours from the start of the event or the moment the operator became aware of it. ### the notification referred to in the first subparagraph shall be made without delay after the event and at the latest within 96 hours from the start of the event or the moment the operator became aware of it. the above-mentioned notifications of such events should only be mandatory if both conditions described in article 16 paragraph 1 points and b are met.


### the notification referred to in the first subparagraph shall be made without delay after the event and at the latest within 48 hours from the start of the event or the moment the operator became aware of it. ### the notification referred to in the first subparagraph shall be made without any unnecessary delay after the event. the requirements applicable for this notification will be in accordance to national or local legislation regarding notification of incidents , emergencies or other unusual occurrences , when already existing.


### the notification referred to in the first subparagraph shall be made without delay after the event and at the latest within 48 hours from the start of the event or the moment the operator became aware of it. ### the notification referred to in the first subparagraph shall be made without delay after the event and at the latest within 96 hours from the start of the event or the moment the operator became aware of it.


### 2. operators shall submit to the competent authorities quarterly reports of all venting and flaring referred to in paragraph 1 and in article 15 in accordance with the elements set out in annex ii. ### 2. operators shall submit to the competent authorities annual reports of all venting and flaring referred to in paragraph 1 and in article 15 in accordance with the elements set out in annex ii. this will be included in he annual emissions report referred in article 15.


### 2. operators shall submit to the competent authorities quarterly reports of all venting and flaring referred to in paragraph 1 and in article 15 in accordance with the elements set out in annex ii. ### 2. operators shall submit to the competent authorities annual reports of all venting and flaring referred to in paragraph 1 and in article 15 in accordance with the elements set out in annex ii.


### 1. where a facility is built , replaced or refurbished , or where new flare stacks or other combustion devices are installed , operators shall install only combustion devices with an auto-igniter or continuous pilot and a complete destruction removal efficiency for hydrocarbons. ### 1. where a facility is built , replaced or refurbished , or where new flare stacks or other combustion devices are installed , operators shall install only combustion devices with an auto-igniter or continuous pilot and at least 95% destruction and removal efficiency for hydrocarbons.


### 2. operators shall ensure that all flare stacks or other combustion devices comply with the requirements of paragraph 1 by … [12 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation]. ### 2. operators shall ensure that all flare stacks or other combustion devices used in normal operations comply with the requirements of paragraph 1 by … [36 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation].


### 2. operators shall ensure that all flare stacks or other combustion devices comply with the requirements of paragraph 1 by … [12 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation]. ### 2. operators shall ensure that all flare stacks or other combustion devices comply with the requirements of paragraph 1 by … [36 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation].


### 3. operators shall conduct weekly inspections of flare stacks in accordance with the elements set out in annex iii. ### 3. operators shall conduct quarterly inspections of flare stacks or conduct continuous monitoring of flares in accordance with the elements set out in annex iii.


### 3. operators shall conduct weekly inspections of flare stacks in accordance with the elements set out in annex iii. ### 3. operators shall conduct quaterly inspections of flare stacks or conduct continuous monitoring of flares in accordance with the elements set out in annex iii.


### by … [36 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 30 march every year thereafter , operators shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for operated assets referred to in paragraph 2 , complemented by measurements of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site. ### by … [48 months from the date of publication of the relevant implementing act referred to in paragraph 6] and by 30 march every year thereafter , operators shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing quantifications of source-level methane emissions for operated assets referred to in paragraph 2 , with the exception of low-risk sources. these quantifications shall be complemented by quantifications of site-level methane emissions , starting from the year when technologies allowing for site-level methane emissions became available and respective methodologies developed and described in cen standards , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site.


### by … [36 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 30 march every year thereafter , operators shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for operated assets referred to in paragraph 2 , complemented by measurements of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site. ### by … [48 months from the date of publication of the reporting template described in the last subparagraph of ] and by 31 may every year thereafter , operators shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing quantifications of source-level methane emissions for all sources for operated assets referred to in paragraph 2 , complemented by quantifications of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site.


### by … [36 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 30 march every year thereafter , operators shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for operated assets referred to in paragraph 2 , complemented by measurements of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site. ### by … [36 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 30 march every year thereafter , operators shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing quantification of source-level methane emissions for operated assets referred to in paragraph 2 , complemented by measurements of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site. if the technologies for site-level measurement do not reach satisfactory technology readiness levels or market availability an operator can request the competent authority to postpone site-level measurements by one year.


### by … [36 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 30 march every year thereafter , operators shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for operated assets referred to in paragraph 2 , complemented by measurements of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site. ### by … [36 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 30 march every year thereafter , operators shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing quantification of source-level methane emissions for operated assets referred to in paragraph 2 , complemented by measurements of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site.


### before submission to the competent authorities , operators shall ensure that the reports set out in this paragraph are assessed by a verifier and include a verification statement issued in accordance with articles 8 and 9. ### in parallel , operators shall send the reports set out in this paragraph to a verifier to ensure that the reports are assessed and receive a verification statement issued in accordance with articles 8 and 9.


### 4. by … [36 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , undertakings established in the union shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for non-operated assets. reporting at such level may involve the use of source-level measurement and sampling as the basis for establishing specific emission factors used for emissions estimation. ### deleted


### 4. by … [36 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , undertakings established in the union shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for non-operated assets. reporting at such level may involve the use of source-level measurement and sampling as the basis for establishing specific emission factors used for emissions estimation. ### 4. by … [36 months from the date of publication of the reporting template described in the last subparagraph of article 12 paragraph 6] , undertakings established in the union shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct quantifications of source-level methane emissions for non-operated assets , except for low-risk sources according to article 2(8a). reporting at such level may involve the use of source-level quantifications and sampling as the basis for establishing specific emission factors used for emissions estimation.


### 4. by … [36 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , undertakings established in the union shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for non-operated assets. reporting at such level may involve the use of source-level measurement and sampling as the basis for establishing specific emission factors used for emissions estimation. ### 4. by … [36 months from the date of publication of the relevant implementing act referred to in paragraph 6] , undertakings established in the union shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing quantifications of source-level methane emissions for non-operated assets , with the exception of low-risk sources. reporting at such level may involve the use of source-level measurement and sampling as the basis for establishing specific emission factors used for emissions estimation.


### 5. by … [48 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 30 march every year thereafter , undertakings established in the union shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for non-operated assets as set out in paragraph 4 , complemented by measurements of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site. ### deleted


### by … [48 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 30 march every year thereafter , undertakings established in the union shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for non-operated assets as set out in paragraph 4 , complemented by measurements of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site. ### by … [48 months from the date of publication of the reporting template described in the last subparagraph of article 12 paragraph 6] and by 30 march every year thereafter , undertakings established in the union shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct quantifications of source-level methane emissions for non-operated assets as set out in paragraph 4 , complemented by quantifications of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site.


### by … [48 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] and by 30 march every year thereafter , undertakings established in the union shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing direct measurements of source-level methane emissions for non-operated assets as set out in paragraph 4 , complemented by measurements of site-level methane emissions , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site. ### by … [48 months from the date of publication of the relevant implementing act referred to in paragraph 6] and by 30 march every year thereafter , undertakings established in the union shall submit a report to the competent authorities containing quantifications of source-level methane emissions for non-operated assets as set out in paragraph 4 , with the exception of low-risk sources. these quantifications shall be complemented by site-level methane emissions quantifications , starting from the year when technologies allowing for site-level methane emissions became available and respective methodologies developed and described in cen standards , thereby allowing assessment and verification of the source-level estimates aggregated by site.


### before submission to the competent authorities , undertakings shall ensure that the reports set out in this paragraph are assessed by a verifier and include a verification statement issued in accordance with articles 8 and 9. ### in parallel , undertakings shall send the reports set out in this paragraph to a verifier to ensure that the reports are assessed and receive a verification statement issued in accordance with articles 8 and 9.


### the commission shall , by means of implementing acts , lay down a reporting template for the reports under paragraphs 2 , 3 , 4 and 5. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 32(2). ### the commission shall , by means of implementing acts , lay down a reporting template for the reports under paragraphs 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 and 5. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 32(2).


### 7. for site-level measurements referred to in paragraphs 3 and 5 , appropriate quantification technologies shall be used which can provide such measurements. ### deleted


### 8. in the case of significant discrepancies between the emissions quantified using source-level methods and those resulting from site-level measurement , additional measurements shall be carried out within the same reporting period. ### 8. in the case of significant discrepancies between the emissions quantified using source-level methods and those resulting from site-level measurement , operators shall provide reasoning for the discrepancy. if the discrepancy is not due to the technological limits of employed quantification methods , the competent authority may request an additional measurement within the same reporting period.


### 8. in the case of significant discrepancies between the emissions quantified using source-level methods and those resulting from site-level measurement , additional measurements shall be carried out within the same reporting period. ### 8. in the case of significant discrepancies between the emissions quantified using source-level methods and those resulting from site-level measurement , the comparative analysis shall be carried out within the same reporting period.


### 8. in the case of significant discrepancies between the emissions quantified using source-level methods and those resulting from site-level measurement , additional measurements shall be carried out within the same reporting period. ### 8. in the case of significant discrepancies between the emissions quantified using source-level methods and those resulting from site-level measurement , comparative analysis shall be carried out within the same reporting period.


### 9. methane emissions measurements for gas infrastructure shall be conducted according to appropriate european (cen) or international (iso) standards for methane emissions quantification. ### 9. methane emissions measurements or quantifications for gas infrastructure shall be conducted according to appropriate european (cen) or international (iso) standards for methane emissions quantification.


### 9. methane emissions measurements for gas infrastructure shall be conducted according to appropriate european (cen) or international (iso) standards for methane emissions quantification. ### 9. methane emissions measurements or quantification for gas infrastructure shall be conducted according to appropriate european (cen) or international (iso) standards for methane emissions quantification.


### 9. methane emissions measurements for gas infrastructure shall be conducted according to appropriate european (cen) or international (iso) standards for methane emissions quantification. ### 9. methane emissions measurements or quantification for gas infrastructure shall be conducted according to appropriate european or international standards.


### operators shall take all measures available to them to prevent and minimise methane emissions in their operations. ### operators shall take all appropriate and reasonable mitigation measures to prevent and minimise methane emissions in their operations.


### by … [3 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall submit a leak detection and repair programme to the competent authorities which shall detail the contents of the surveys to be carried out in accordance with the requirements in this article. ### by … [12 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall submit a leak detection and repair programme to the competent authorities which shall detail the contents of the surveys to be carried out in accordance with the requirements in this article , excluding low-risk sources in accordance with the definition in article 2(8a).


### by … [3 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall submit a leak detection and repair programme to the competent authorities which shall detail the contents of the surveys to be carried out in accordance with the requirements in this article. ### by … [12 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall submit a leak detection and repair programme to the competent authorities which shall detail the contents of the surveys to be carried out in accordance with the requirements in this article.


### by … [3 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall submit a leak detection and repair programme to the competent authorities which shall detail the contents of the surveys to be carried out in accordance with the requirements in this article. ### by … [6 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall submit a leak detection and repair programme to the competent authorities which shall detail the activity to be carried out in accordance with the requirements in this article and the cen standard referred in [paragraph 1 a new] or the corresponding technical specification document.


### by … [3 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall submit a leak detection and repair programme to the competent authorities which shall detail the contents of the surveys to be carried out in accordance with the requirements in this article. ### by … [6 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall submit a leak detection and repair programme to the competent authorities which shall detail the performance requirements , methodology and activities to be carried out in accordance with the requirements in this article.


### the competent authorities may require the operator to amend the programme taking into account the requirements of this regulation. ### the competent authorities may require that the leak detection and repair programme ensure no amount of significant methane emissions goes undetected and continues unabated. the competent authorities may require the operator to amend the programme taking into account the requirements of this regulation.


### the competent authorities may require the operator to amend the programme taking into account the requirements of this regulation. ### the competent authorities may require the operator to amend the programme taking into account the requirements of this regulation and the cen standard or the corresponding cen technical specification document.


### by … [6 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall carry out a survey of all relevant components under their responsibility in accordance with the leak detection and repair programme referred in paragraph 1. ### by … [12 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall carry out a survey of all relevant components , excluding low-risk sources in accordance with the definition in article 2(8a) under their responsibility in accordance with the leak detection and repair programme referred in paragraph 1.


### by … [6 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall carry out a survey of all relevant components under their responsibility in accordance with the leak detection and repair programme referred in paragraph 1. ### by … [12 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall carry out a survey of all relevant components under their responsibility , with the exception of low-risk sources , in accordance with the leak detection and repair programme referred in paragraph 1.


### by … [6 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall carry out a survey of all relevant components under their responsibility in accordance with the leak detection and repair programme referred in paragraph 1. ### by … [12 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall carry out a survey of all relevant components under their responsibility in accordance with the leak detection and repair programme referred in paragraph 1.


### by … [6 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall carry out a survey of all relevant components under their responsibility in accordance with the leak detection and repair programme referred in paragraph 1. ### by … [12 months from the date of entry into force of this regulation] , operators shall initiate a survey of all relevant components under their responsibility in accordance with the leak detection and repair programme referred in paragraph 1.


### thereafter , leak detection and repair surveys shall be repeated every three months. ### thereafter , leak detection and repair surveys shall be repeated every three months , unless surveys are complemented by more frequently deployed advanced equipment and monitoring methods that allow detection of leaks ensuring no amount of significant methane emissions goes undetected and continue unabated..


### thereafter , leak detection and repair surveys shall be repeated every three months. ### thereafter , leak detection and repair surveys shall be repeated every six months.


### thereafter , leak detection and repair surveys shall be repeated every three months. ### thereafter , leak detection and repair surveys shall be repeated every six months. operators may use continuous monitoring systems in place of or in combination with periodical surveys.


### 1. this regulation lays down rules for the accurate measurement , reporting and verification of methane emissions in the energy sector in the union , as well as the abatement of those emissions , including through leak detection and repair surveys and restrictions on venting and flaring. this regulation also lays down rules on tools ensuring transparency of methane emissions from imports of fossil energy into the union. ### 1. this regulation lays down rules for the accurate measurement , quantification , monitoring , reporting and verification of methane emissions in the energy sector in the union , as well as the abatement of those emissions , including through leak detection and repair surveys and restrictions on venting and flaring. this regulation also lays down rules on tools ensuring transparency of methane emissions from imports of fossil energy into the union.


### 1. highlights that taxation is one of the few areas that remain subject to unanimity voting in council; stresses that it has become increasingly evident over recent years that stronger coordination in the field of taxation is needed at eu and global levels in the light of economic developments and the new challenges created by digitalisation and globalisation; regrets , in this regard , hungary’s misuse of its veto right to block the council negotiations on the commission proposal of 22 december 2021 for a council directive on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational groups in the union (com(2021)0823); ### 1. highlights that taxation is one of the few areas that remain subject to unanimity voting in council; stresses that it has become increasingly evident over recent years that coordination and greater responsibility and solidarity in the field of taxation is needed at eu and global levels in the light of economic developments and the new challenges created by digitalisation and globalisation;


### 2. regrets the fact that the current situation often leads to delays and a lack of progress in the harmonisation and coordination of tax rules across the union , even though such harmonisation and coordination would benefit everyone; notes that some legislative proposals , such as the debt-equity bias reduction allowance (debra) or the business in europe: framework for income taxation (befit) , will be key to supporting the competitiveness of european companies; ### 2. recognises that the current situation often leads to delays and a lack of progress in the coordination of tax rules across the union , even though such coordination would in some cases benefit everyone; calls , therefore , on the commission to propose solutions that have a chance of broad support in the council , and on the council to act in a spirit of responsibility and solidarity; notes that some legislative proposals , such as the debt-equity bias reduction allowance (debra) or the business in europe: framework for income taxation (befit) , could be key to supporting the competitiveness of european companies;


### 3. recalls that article 48(7) of the treaty on european union provides for two general passerelle clauses that allow the decision-making procedures to be changed in order to adopt measures in council through qualified majority voting (qmv) in areas that are currently subject to unanimity; regrets the fact that these passerelle clauses have never been used; recalls that activating the passerelle clauses would in any case require unanimity in the european council and parliament’s consent; ### 3. recognises that article 48(7) of the treaty on european union provides for two general passerelle clauses that allow the decision-making procedures to be changed in order to adopt measures in council through qualified majority voting (qmv) in areas that are currently subject to unanimity; stresses the dangers and risks for member states that may result from removing their freedom of decision in tax matters , which are highly important for economic and social policy-making; recalls that activating the passerelle clauses would in any case require unanimity in the european council and parliament’s consent;


### 4. recommends using the two general passerelle clauses for selected treaty articles concerning the eu’s competences in the area of taxation; recalls that the commission communication of 15 january 2019 entitled ‘towards a more efficient and democratic decision making in eu tax policy’ (com(2019)0008) and the conclusions of the conference on the future of europe both recommended moving from unanimity voting to qmv on tax matters. ### 4. does not recommend using passerelle clauses in tax matters; stresses the risks to host and founding member states of the eu from the central eu institutions’ agenda of increasing centralisation and weakening the powers of national governments; notes , in this context , the commission communication of 15 january 2019 entitled ‘towards a more efficient and democratic decision making in eu tax policy’ (com(2019)0008) and the conclusions of the conference on the future of europe , whose legitimacy is highly problematic , which recommended moving from unanimity voting to qmv on tax matters; calls for respect for the treaty competences of the member states and for the principle of unanimity in tax matters;


### — having regard to the blog post from brugel of 5 june 2020 entitled ‘is the covid-19 crisis an opportunity to boost the euro as a global currency?’ , ### — having regard to the blog post from bruegel of 5 june 2020 entitled ‘is the covid-19 crisis an opportunity to boost the euro as a global currency?’ ,


### (1) article 2 is amended as follows: ### (1) (- a) the following paragraph is inserted:


### (2) the following article 23a is inserted: ### (2) the following chapter is added:


### — having regard to the statute of the european system of central banks (escb) and of the ecb , in particular article 15 thereof , ### — having regard to the statute of the european system of central banks (escb) and of the ecb , in particular articles 15 and 21 thereof ,


### — having regard to the statute of the european system of central banks (escb) and of the ecb , in particular article 15 thereof , ### — having regard to the statute of the european system of central banks (escb) and of the ecb , in particular article 15 and 21 thereof ,


### — having regard to articles 127(1) and (2) , 130 and 284(3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) , ### — having regard to articles 123 , 127(1) and (2) , 130 and 284(3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) ,


### — having regard to the monetary dialogues with the president of the european central bank , christine lagarde , of 6 february and 8 june 2020 , ### — having regard to the monetary dialogues with the president of the european central bank , christine lagarde , of 6 february , 8 june 2020 and 28 september 2020 ,


### a. whereas the commission’s summer 2020 economic forecast , taking into account economic shocks caused by the covid-19 pandemic , projects that the euro area economy will contract by 8.7 % in 2020 and grow by 6.1 % in 2021 , and the eu-27 economy will contract by 8.3 % in 2020 and grow by 5.8 % in 2021; ### a. whereas the commission’s summer 2020 economic forecast , taking into account economic shocks caused by the national and regional lockdown measures in response to the covid-19 pandemic , projects that the euro area economy will contract by 8.7 % in 2020 , which is .4 percentage points worse than the eu as a whole , implying that those member states whose currency is not the euro absorbed the economic shock better , and grow by 6.1 % in 2021 , and the eu-27 economy will contract by 8.3 % in 2020 and grow by 5.8 % in 2021;


### a. whereas the commission’s summer 2020 economic forecast , taking into account economic shocks caused by the covid-19 pandemic , projects that the euro area economy will contract by 8.7 % in 2020 and grow by 6.1 % in 2021 , and the eu-27 economy will contract by 8.3 % in 2020 and grow by 5.8 % in 2021; ### a. whereas the commission’s summer 2020 economic forecast , taking into account economic shocks caused by the covid-19 pandemic , projects that the euro area economy will contract by 8.7 % in 2020 and grow by 6.1 % in 2021 , and the eu-27 economy will contract by 8.3 % in 2020 and grow by 5.8 % in 2021; whereas the structural contribution that monetary policy makes to sustainable growth is however limited and policy makers should therefore undertake productivity-enhancing reforms and pursue sound fiscal policies;


### b. whereas , according to the eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections of june 2020 , annual inflation for the euro area in the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp) will be 0.3 % in 2020 , 0.8 % in 2021 and 1.3 % in 2022; ### b. whereas , according to the eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections of june 2020 , annual inflation for the euro area in the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp) will be 0.3 % in 2020 , 0.8 % in 2021 and 1.3 % in 2022 on average , while inflation projections show substantial variance across the euro area;


### b. whereas , according to the eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections of june 2020 , annual inflation for the euro area in the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp) will be 0.3 % in 2020 , 0.8 % in 2021 and 1.3 % in 2022; ### b. whereas , according to the eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections of june 2020 , annual inflation for the euro area in the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp) will be 0.3 % in 2020 , 0.8 % in 2021 and 1.3 % in 2022; whereas inflation projections show substantial variance across the euro area;


### 1. welcomes the role of the ecb in safeguarding euro stability; highlights that the statutory independence of the ecb , as laid down in the treaties , is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability; ### 1. deplores the role of the ecb in massively inflating m1 and m3 and expanding its balance sheet up to almost 70% of euro area gdp , while some member states have slipped into deflation; highlights that the statutory independence of the ecb , as laid down in the treaties , is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability; insists that the objective of price stability aims only at safeguarding price stability and not the integrity of the euro area as it is , for which the ecb has no mandate;


### 1. welcomes the role of the ecb in safeguarding euro stability; highlights that the statutory independence of the ecb , as laid down in the treaties , is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability; ### 1. welcomes the role of the ecb in safeguarding euro stability; highlights that the statutory independence of the ecb , as laid down in the treaties , is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability; notes that such independence requires that the ecb shall not seek or take instructions from union institutions or bodies , from any government of a member state or from any other body; considers that the independence of the ecb cannot in any way be reconciled with political campaigning;


### 4. calls for an urgent re-evaluation of systemic risk in the financial sector following the pandemic; welcomes , in this regard , the establishment of a working board relating to the pandemic at the european systemic risk board; advises that a qualitative assessment of idiosyncratic risk be included in future stress tests; ### 4. calls for an urgent re-evaluation of systemic risk in the financial sector following the unlawful expansion of the money supply by the ecb , the inflation of the ecb´s balance sheets , rapidly increasing target 2-imbalances , and the further zombification of the european economy and deterioration of real income prospects , especially of young europeans through the (t)ltros; doubts the independence of the working board relating to the pandemic , which has been established at the european systemic risk board; advises that a qualitative assessment of idiosyncratic risk be included in future stress tests;


### 5. notes that inflation is underestimated in the euro area due to an inadequate share of housing costs in the hicp basket2 ; calls for a re-adjustment of the basket to reflect the fact that european households spend 24 % of their income on housing-related expenditure; ### 5. underlines that the inflation target set by the ecb has no legal base in the treaties and , moreover , should urgently be revised by taking into account the development of asset prices; notes that inflation is underestimated in the euro area due to an inadequate share of housing costs in the hicp basket2 ; calls for a re-adjustment of the basket to reflect the fact that european households spend 24 % of their income on housing-related expenditure;


### 6. acknowledges president lagarde’s strong call for ‘full alignment of fiscal and monetary policies’; ### 6. acknowledges president lagarde’s strong call for ‘full alignment of fiscal and monetary policies’; stresses however that it is not the role of fiscal policy to enhance the impact of monetary policy or to reduce its possible side effects; considers that fiscal policy and monetary policy need to compensate for each other: an expansive monetary policy should go hand in hand with a restrictive fiscal policy and the other way around , only in crisis situations they should strengthen each other;


### 7. notes the quick and substantial ecb monetary policy response to the covid-19 crisis in a context of emergency; ### 7. deplores the dangerous and unlawful ecb monetary policy response to the covid-19 crisis under the pretence of "emergency" , notes that the treaties do not provide for an emergency clause to drastically increase m1 and m3 and the balance sheet of the ecb;


### 7. notes the quick and substantial ecb monetary policy response to the covid-19 crisis in a context of emergency; ### 7. notes the quick and substantial ecb monetary policy response to the covid-19 crisis in a context of emergency , yet underlines the temporary nature of the measure;


### 8. stresses that monetary policy alone will not suffice to achieve a sustainable economic recovery; emphasises that far-reaching structural reforms and initiatives are necessary to restore and enhance competitiveness across the union; believes that the impact of monetary policy on the recovery is limited and , while respecting the independence and mandate of the ecb , expresses caution regarding the further expansion of monetary measures; ### 8. stresses that monetary policy alone will not achieve a sustainable economic recovery but only ensure the further decline of the euro and the enhance the systemic risks in the european financial sector; emphasises that far-reaching structural reforms and initiatives are necessary to restore and enhance competitiveness across the union , including curbing the ecb´s ultra-accommodative monetary policy; believes that the impact of monetary policy on the recovery is detrimental and , while respecting the independence and mandate of the ecb , calls on the ecb to immediately cease the further expansion of monetary measures;


### 8. stresses that monetary policy alone will not suffice to achieve a sustainable economic recovery; emphasises that far-reaching structural reforms and initiatives are necessary to restore and enhance competitiveness across the union; believes that the impact of monetary policy on the recovery is limited and , while respecting the independence and mandate of the ecb , expresses caution regarding the further expansion of monetary measures; ### 8. stresses that monetary policy alone will not suffice to achieve a sustainable economic recovery; emphasises that far-reaching structural reforms and initiatives are necessary to restore and enhance competitiveness across the union; believes that the impact of monetary policy on the recovery is limited and , while respecting the independence and mandate of the ecb , expresses caution regarding any further expansion of monetary measures;


### 9. notes the importance of active monetary policy in alleviating the pressure of financial constraints on small and medium-sized enterprises; acknowledges that the percentage of smes facing financial constraints decreased from 18 % in 2009-12 to 8 % in 2016-19; ### 9. notes the adverse effect of active monetary policy on alleviating the pressure of financial constraints on small and medium-sized enterprises since the interest rate on long-term refinancing operations is based on the interest rate of the ecb deposit facility , which is currently-0.5% , and the ecb has established a one-year special interest rate period of -1% , if the commercial banks do not reduce net lending in the period from march 2020 to march 2021; thus allowing banks to receive particularly large subsidies from the ecb if they take out additional loans from the ecb and pass them on to companies and households; this “funding for lending” supports the enterprises in the euro area , because more favorable loans are available and investment projects with low profitability can be continued , and bankruptcies are avoided; calls for the ecb to immediately end this policy of zombification of the economy;


### 9. notes the importance of active monetary policy in alleviating the pressure of financial constraints on small and medium-sized enterprises; acknowledges that the percentage of smes facing financial constraints decreased from 18 % in 2009-12 to 8 % in 2016-19; ### 9. notes the short term effect of monetary policy in alleviating the pressure of financial constraints on small and medium-sized enterprises; acknowledges that the percentage of smes facing financial constraints decreased from 18 % in 2009-12 to 8 % in 2016-19;


### 10. asks the ecb to monitor the proportionality of quantitative easing to the risks in its balance sheets , asset price inflation and the potential misallocation of resources; ### 10. asks the ecb to end its quantitative easing operations immediately , and focus all its energy to lowering the risks in its balance sheets , asset price inflation and the potential misallocation of resources;


### 10. asks the ecb to monitor the proportionality of quantitative easing to the risks in its balance sheets , asset price inflation and the potential misallocation of resources; ### 10. asks the ecb to monitor quantitative easing to the risks in its balance sheets , asset price inflation and the potential misallocation of resources;


### 11. regrets the detrimental impact of long-term low interest rates on insurers and pension funds and expresses concern about the potential impacts on solvency; stresses the financial burden this places on many citizens across the union; ### 11. regrets the detrimental impact of long-term low interest rates on the purchasing power of consumers , the increase of zombie firms , the reduced incentive for governments to pursue structural reforms , the growth of shadow banking , lower productivity growth , as well as their effect on insurers and pension funds and expresses concern about the potential impacts on solvency; stresses the financial burden this places on many citizens across the union;


### 12. notes the linkage between monetary policy and increasing housing prices in the euro area; emphasises that the persistently high housing cost overburden rate of 9.6 % in 2018 is expected to increase due to the pandemic , and asks the ecb to evaluate the regional and sectoral impact of its quantitative easing programme on the cost of living across the union; ### 12. notes the linkage between monetary policy and increasing housing prices in the euro area; emphasises that the persistently high housing cost overburden rate of 9.6 % in 2018 is expected to increase due to the pandemic , and urges the ecb to evaluate the regional and sectoral impact of its quantitative easing programme on the cost of living across the union;


### 14. notes the impact of climate change on inflation dynamics and transmission risks in monetary policy; recalls the impact of the ecb in maintaining price stability; emphasises that this mandate must not be confounded with climate policy; ### 14. recalls that the mandate of the ecb is maintaining price stability; emphasises that this mandate must not be confounded with climate policy;


### 14. notes the impact of climate change on inflation dynamics and transmission risks in monetary policy; recalls the impact of the ecb in maintaining price stability; emphasises that this mandate must not be confounded with climate policy; ### 14. notes the impact of climate change on inflation dynamics and transmission risks in monetary policy; recalls the impact of the ecb in maintaining price stability; emphasises that this mandate must not be confounded with climate policy and underlines in that sense that , as an eu institution , the ecb has a narrowly defined mandate enshrined in article 127 tfeu that should be reflected in its policies;


### 15. notes that the purchases of green bonds and their share of the ecb’s portfolio continue to increase; ### 15. regrets that the purchases of green bonds and their share of the ecb’s portfolio continue to increase; warns therefore for the creation of green asset bubbles;


### 15. notes that the purchases of green bonds and their share of the ecb’s portfolio continue to increase; ### 15. notes that the purchases of green bonds and their share of the ecb’s portfolio continue to increase; understands however that according to a study by the bank for international settlements green bonds do not lead to decarbonisation;


### 16. encourages efforts to increase research capabilities regarding the impact of climate change on financial stability and the euro area; ### 16. encourages efforts to increase research capabilities regarding the impact of migration , the common currency and accomodative monetary policies on financial stability and the euro area;


### 18. expresses concern about the steadily increasing divergence of target2 balances within the escb; notes that the interpretation of these divergences is contested; ### 18. expresses concern about the steadily increasing divergence of target2 balances within the escb;


### 19. calls on the ecb to increase its monitoring of the development of crypto-currencies and the increased cyber-security risks , and to assess the possible need for central bank digital currencies; calls on the ecb to ensure an adequate balance between allowing regulatory financial innovation in the fintech area and ensuring financial stability; ### 19. underlines that the development of a cbdc misses the point of decentralised and encrypted safe stores of value , unless its issuance algorithm is completely separated from central banking policy , and it is untraceable and anonymous; recalls that the development of cbdcs does not fall within the mandate of the ecb;


### 19. calls on the ecb to increase its monitoring of the development of crypto-currencies and the increased cyber-security risks , and to assess the possible need for central bank digital currencies; calls on the ecb to ensure an adequate balance between allowing regulatory financial innovation in the fintech area and ensuring financial stability; ### 19. calls all supervisory authorities to increase its monitoring of the development of crypto-currencies , crypto-assets and the increased cyber-security risks , and to assess the possible need for central bank digital currencies , taking into account that such a system may not enhance the risk of a bank run , should not jeopardise consumers privacy and must respect the competition in the banking landscape; calls on the ecb to ensure an adequate balance between allowing regulatory financial innovation in the fintech area and ensuring financial stability;


### 20. shares the ecb’s concerns regarding the rapid growth of the non-bank financial sector; stresses the need for adequate regulation in this field; ### 20. shares the ecb’s concerns regarding the rapid growth of the non-bank financial sector , also known as shadow banking; stresses the need for adequate regulation in this field;


### 22. calls on the ecb to explore ways of strengthening the international role of the euro , as this would increase the eu’s ability to frame its policy stance independently vis-à-vis other global powers and is a key element in safeguarding european economic sovereignty; ### 22. calls on the ecb to explore ways of organising an orderly brake-up of the euro area;


### 24. echoes president lagarde’s openness to greater dialogue and stresses the need to further enhance the ecb’s accountability and transparency arrangements; emphasises the need to reflect on how scrutiny of the ecb’s monetary policy may be enhanced at eu level; ### 24. echoes president lagarde’s openness to greater dialogue and stresses the need to further enhance the ecb’s accountability and transparency arrangements; emphasises the need of national parliaments to scrutinize the ecb’s monetary policy;


### 27. recalls the german federal constitutional court decision of 5 may 2020 on the ecb , as well as the ecb governing council statement of the same day; notes the continuous proportionality assessment of all programmes; lauds the ecb’s subsequent decision to disclose non-public documents related to the public sector purchase programme (pspp) to the bundesbank; ### 27. welcomes the german federal constitutional court (fcc) decision of 5 may 2020 on the ecb , and takes note of the subsequent ecb governing council statement and decision not to comply with the fcc´s instructions; regrets the insufficient marginal proportionality assessment of the programmes; takes note of the ecb’s subsequent decision to disclose non-public documents related to the public sector purchase programme (pspp) to the bundesbank;


### 28. acknowledges , and congratulates the ecb and president lagarde on , the ongoing efforts to improve communication and transparency with the european parliament; ### 28. looks forward to the ongoing efforts of the ecb to improve communication and transparency with the european parliament and national parliaments;


### 28. acknowledges , and congratulates the ecb and president lagarde on , the ongoing efforts to improve communication and transparency with the european parliament; ### 28. acknowledges , and congratulates the ecb and president lagarde on , the ongoing efforts to improve communication and transparency with the european parliament; regrets in this respects the comments made by ecb board member isabel schnabel in her hearing before the european parliament on 3 december 2019 , who labelled worries about negative interest rates "a dangerous narrative that needs to be dispelled"; underlines that such comments do not contribute to a credible communication environment;


### 3. highlights the importance for the commission to closely align its work with international fora and regulatory bodies in developing international standards given the cross-jurisdictional nature of digital finance; ### 3. highlights the importance for the commission to closely align its work with international fora and regulatory bodies in developing international standards given the cross-jurisdictional nature of digital finance; recalls in particular the need to ensure interoperability of the eu’s regulatory framework with internationally agreed principles from the basel committee on banking supervision and the financial stability board;


### 5. calls on the commission to act as first mover in order to create a favourable environment for european fintech hubs and firms to scale up; ### 5. calls on the commission to act as first mover in order to incentivize an accelerated take-up of innovative technologies by the eu financial sector and create a favourable environment for european fintech hubs and firms to scale up;


### 6. stresses that law and supervision in the area of fintech should be based on the following principles: ### 6. stresses that any update of law and supervision in the area of fintech should reflect the following principles:


### 14. points out that with the increasing digitalisation of financial services , as well as outsourcing to external it solution or maintenance providers , such as cloud providers , the exposure of financial institutions and markets to disruption caused by internal failures or external attacks is becoming more pronounced; ### 14. points out that the increasing digitalisation of financial services , as well as outsourcing to external it solution or maintenance providers such as cloud providers , can help in particular financial start-ups to innovate and have access to technology that they would otherwise not have; highlights at the same time that the exposure of financial institutions and markets to disruption caused by internal failures or external attacks is becoming more pronounced; considers that guiding objectives of any proposed legislation in this regard should therefore be security , resiliency and efficiency;


### 16. considers that these changes should focus on four key areas: ### 16. considers that any legislative changes should be proportionate to the risks and specificities of the respective financial services sector , take into account internationally agreed standards , and focus on four key areas:


### 17. stresses the need for further information sharing , in particular on incidents , and enhanced coordination between relevant regulatory and supervisory authorities; ### 17. stresses the need for further information sharing and enhanced coordination among regulatory and supervisory authorities , in particular on cyber incidents , whereby the focus should be on incidents of material importance rather than attempting to capture all possible events regardless of their impact;


### 23. believes that the lack of accessible data and information regarding fintech activities can be a detriment to growth; advocates for increased transparency and enhanced reporting of fintech activity so as to reduce asymmetries and risks; ### 23. believes that the lack of sufficient investments and upgrades in critical it-infrastructure and software platforms and the lack of accessible data and information regarding fintech activities can be detrimental to growth; advocates for increased transparency and enhanced reporting of fintech activity so as to reduce asymmetries and risks;


### (10) the application of ifrs 9 during the economic downturn caused by the covid-19 pandemic may lead to a sudden significant increase in expected credit loss provisions , as for many exposures expected losses over their lifetime may need to be calculated. the bcbs agreed on 3 april 2020 to allow more flexibility in the implementation of the transitional arrangements that phase in the impact of ifrs 9. in order to limit the possible volatility of regulatory capital that may occur if the covid-19 crisis results in a significant increase in expected credit loss provisions , it is necessary to extend the transitional arrangements also in union law. ### (10) the application of ifrs 9 during the economic downturn caused by the covid-19 pandemic may lead to a sudden significant increase in (i) expected credit loss provisions , as for many exposures expected losses over their lifetime may need to be calculated , for assets at amortized cost; and (ii) net unrealised losses on assets measured at fair value through other comprehensive income(oci). the bcbs agreed on 3 april 2020 to allow more flexibility in the implementation of the transitional arrangements that phase in the impact of ifrs 9. in order to limit the possible volatility of regulatory capital that may occur if the covid-19 crisis results in a significant increase in expected credit loss provisions , it is necessary to extend the transitional arrangements also in union law.


### (11) to mitigate the potential impact that a sudden increase in expected credit loss provisions may have on institutions’ capacity to lend to clients at times when it is most needed , the transitional arrangements should be extended by two years and institutions should be allowed to fully add-back to their common equity tier 1 capital any increase in new expected credit loss provisions that they recognise in 2020 and 2021 for their financial assets , which are not credit-impaired. this would bring additional relief to the impact of the covid-19 crisis on institutions’ possible rise in provisioning needs under ifrs 9 while maintaining the transitional arrangements for the expected credit loss amounts established before the pandemic of covid-19. ### (11) to mitigate the potential impact that a sudden increase in expected credit loss provisions and net unrealised losses on assets measured at fair value through oci may have on institutions’ capacity to lend to clients at times when it is most needed , the transitional arrangements should be extended by two years and institutions should be allowed to fully add-back to their common equity tier 1 capital any increase in new expected credit loss provisions and net unrealised losses on assets measured at fair value through oci that they recognise in 2020 and 2021 for their financial assets , which are not credit-impaired. this would bring additional relief to the impact of the covid-19 crisis on institutions’ possible rise in provisioning needs and unrealised losses under ifrs 9 while maintaining the transitional arrangements for the expected credit loss amounts established before the pandemic of covid-19.


### by way of derogation from article 47c(3) , until [date of entry into force of this amending regulation + 7 years] the factors set out in article 47c(4) shall also apply to the part of the non-performing exposure guaranteed by an eligible provider referred to in points (a) to (e) of article 201(1) , where , subject to compliance with union state aid rules , where applicable , the guarantee or counter-guarantee is provided as part of support measures to assist borrowers amid the covid-19 pandemic. ### by way of derogation from article 47c(3) , until [date of entry into force of this amending regulation + 7 years] the factors set out in article 47c(4) shall also apply to the part of the non-performing exposure guaranteed or counter-guaranteed by an eligible provider referred to in points (a) to (e) of article 201(1) , where , subject to compliance with union state aid rules , where applicable , the guarantee or counter-guarantee is provided as part of support measures to assist borrowers amid the covid-19 pandemic.


### by way of derogation from article 47c(3) , until [date of entry into force of this amending regulation + 7 years] the factors set out in article 47c(4) shall also apply to the part of the non-performing exposure guaranteed by an eligible provider referred to in points (a) to (e) of article 201(1) , where , subject to compliance with union state aid rules , where applicable , the guarantee or counter-guarantee is provided as part of support measures to assist borrowers amid the covid-19 pandemic. ### by way of derogation from article 47c(3) , the factors set out in article 47c(4) shall also apply to the part of the non-performing exposure guaranteed by an eligible provider referred to in points (a) to (e) of article 201(1) , where , subject to compliance with union state aid rules , where applicable , the guarantee or counter-guarantee is provided as part of support measures to assist borrowers amid the covid-19 pandemic.


### (1) the covid-19 pandemic is severely affecting people , companies , health systems and the economies of member states. the commission , in its communication to the european parliament , the european council , the council , the european economic and social committee and the committee of the regions of 27 may 2020 entitled ‘europe's moment: repair and prepare for the next generation’8 stressed that liquidity and access to finance will be a continued challenge in the months to come. it is therefore crucial to support the recovery from the severe economic shock caused by the covid-19 pandemic by introducing targeted amendments to existing pieces of financial legislation. this package of measures is adopted under the label “capital markets recovery package”. ### (1) the covid-19 pandemic is severely affecting people , companies , health systems and the economies and financial systems of member states. the commission , in its communication to the european parliament , the european council , the council , the european economic and social committee and the committee of the regions of 27 may 2020 entitled ‘europe's moment: repair and prepare for the next generation’8 stressed that liquidity and access to finance will be a continued challenge in the months to come. it is therefore crucial to support the recovery from the severe economic shock caused by the covid-19 pandemic by cutting red tape through introducing limited targeted amendments to existing pieces of financial legislation. this package of measures is adopted under the label “capital markets recovery package”.


### (62a) ‘electronic format’ means any durable medium other than paper; ### (62a) ‘electronic format’ means any durable medium other than paper or by means of a website;


### where the agreement to buy or sell a financial instrument is concluded using means of distance communication , the investment firm may provide the information on costs and charges in an electronic format without undue delay after the conclusion of the transaction , provided that all of the following conditions are met: ### where the agreement to buy or sell a financial instrument is concluded using means of distance communication which prevents the prior delivery of the information on costs and charges in an electronic format , the investment firm may provide the information on costs and charges in an electronic format without undue delay after the conclusion of the transaction , provided that all of the following conditions are met:


### (ii) the client has agreed to receive the information shortly after the conclusion of the transaction.; ### (ii) the client has agreed to receive the information shortly after the conclusion of the transaction and has been provided such information over the phone prior to the conclusion of the transaction.;


### 1a. before 31 december 2021 , the commission shall review the impact of the exemption laid down in article 2(1) , point (j) , with regard to emission allowances or derivatives thereof , and shall accompany that review , where appropriate , with a legislative proposal to amend that exemption. in this context , the commission shall assess the trading in eu emission allowances and derivatives thereof in the eu and in third countries , the impact of the exemption under article 2(1) , point (j) , on investor protection , the integrity and transparency of the markets in emission allowances and derivatives thereof and whether measures should be adopted in relation to trading that takes place on third country trading venues.. ### 1a. within 3 years from amending the eu ets framework , the commission shall review the impact of the exemption laid down in article 2(1) , point (j) , with regard to emission allowances or derivatives thereof , and shall accompany that review , where appropriate , with a legislative proposal to amend that exemption. in this context , the commission shall assess the trading in eu emission allowances and derivatives thereof in the eu and in third countries , the impact of the exemption under article 2(1) , point (j) , on investor protection , the integrity and transparency of the markets in emission allowances and derivatives thereof and whether measures should be adopted in relation to trading that takes place on third country trading venues.