### (60) deficiencies in , or the collapse of , asylum systems , often aggravated or contributed to by particular pressures on them , can jeopardise the smooth functioning of the system put in place under this regulation , which could lead to a risk of a violation of the rights of applicants as set out in the union asylum acquis and the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , other international human rights and refugee rights. ### (60) deficiencies in , or the collapse of , asylum systems , often aggravated or contributed to by existing legal frameworks from a bygone era , causing additional pressures , can jeopardise the smooth functioning of the system put in place under this regulation.


### (62) in order to ensure a clear and efficient relocation procedure , specific rules for a benefitting and a contributing member state should be set out. the rules and safeguards relating to transfers set out in this regulation should apply to transfers for the purpose of relocation except where they are not relevant for such a procedure. ### deleted


### (62) in order to ensure a clear and efficient relocation procedure , specific rules for a benefitting and a contributing member state should be set out. the rules and safeguards relating to transfers set out in this regulation should apply to transfers for the purpose of relocation except where they are not relevant for such a procedure. ### (62) in order to ensure a clear and efficient relocation procedure , specific rules for a benefitting and a contributing member state should be set out. the rules and safeguards relating to transfers set out in this regulation should apply to transfers for the purpose of relocation to third country partner state reception centres except where they are not relevant for such a procedure.


### (63) to support member states who undertake relocation as a solidarity measure , financial support from the union budget should be provided. in order to incentivise member states to give priority to the relocation of unaccompanied minors a higher incentive contribution should be provided. ### (63) to support member states who undertake relocation to third country partner state reception centres , financial support from the union budget should be provided. in order to incentivise member states to give priority to the relocation of unaccompanied minors to third country partner state reception centres a higher incentive contribution should be provided.


### (63) to support member states who undertake relocation as a solidarity measure , financial support from the union budget should be provided. in order to incentivise member states to give priority to the relocation of unaccompanied minors a higher incentive contribution should be provided. ### (63) to support member states who receive a number of beneficiaries of international protection in the framework of the distribution measure , financial support from the union budget should be provided. in order to incentivise member states to give priority to the distribution of unaccompanied minors a higher incentive contribution should be provided.


### (64) the application of this regulation can be facilitated , and its effectiveness increased , by bilateral arrangements between member states for improving communication between competent departments , reducing time limits for procedures or simplifying the processing of take charge requests or take back notifications , or establishing procedures for the performance of transfers. ### (64) the application of this regulation can be facilitated , and its effectiveness increased , by bilateral or multilateral arrangements between member states , or the european union , and third country partner states establishing the ways in which reception centres are operated , funded and governed in the third country partner state.


### (65) continuity between the system for determining the member state responsible established by regulation (eu) no 604/2013 and the system established by this regulation should be ensured. similarly , consistency should be ensured between this regulation and regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [eurodac regulation]. ### (65) the continuity of the system for determining the member state responsible established by regulation (eu) no 604/2013 should be ensured.


### (66) a network of competent member state authorities should be set up and facilitated by the european union agency for asylum to enhance practical cooperation and information sharing on all matters related to the application of this regulation , including the development of practical tools and guidance. ### (66) competent member state authorities should , assisted by the european union agency for asylum facilitate enhanced practical cooperation and information sharing on all matters related to the application of this regulation , including the development of practical tools , guidance and best practices , especially with regard to the establishment of agreements between member states and third country partner states willing to host reception centres on their territory.


### (69) with respect to the treatment of persons falling within the scope of this regulation , member states are bound by their obligations under instruments of international law , including the relevant case-law of the european court of human rights. ### deleted


### (72) the examination procedure should be used for the adoption of a standard form for the exchange of relevant information on unaccompanied minors; of uniform conditions for the consultation and exchange of information on minors and dependent persons; of uniform conditions on the preparation and submission of take charge requests and take back notifications; of two lists of relevant elements of proof and circumstantial evidence , and the periodical revision thereof; of a laissez passer; of uniform conditions for the consultation and exchange of information regarding transfers; of a standard form for the exchange of data before a transfer; of a common health certificate; of uniform conditions and practical arrangements for the exchange of information on a person’s health data before a transfer , and of secure electronic transmission channels for the transmission of requests. ### (72) the examination procedure should be used for the adoption of a standard form for the exchange of relevant information on unaccompanied minors; of uniform conditions for the consultation and exchange of information on minors and dependent persons; of uniform conditions on the preparation and submission of take charge requests and take back notifications; of two lists of relevant elements of proof and circumstantial evidence , and the periodical revision thereof; of uniform conditions for the consultation and exchange of information regarding transfers to a third country partner state reception centre; of a standard form for the exchange of data before a transfer to a third country partner state reception centre; of a common health certificate; of uniform conditions and practical arrangements for the exchange of information on a person’s health data before a transfer to a third country partner state reception centre , and of secure electronic transmission channels for the transmission of requests.


### (72) the examination procedure should be used for the adoption of a standard form for the exchange of relevant information on unaccompanied minors; of uniform conditions for the consultation and exchange of information on minors and dependent persons; of uniform conditions on the preparation and submission of take charge requests and take back notifications; of two lists of relevant elements of proof and circumstantial evidence , and the periodical revision thereof; of a laissez passer; of uniform conditions for the consultation and exchange of information regarding transfers; of a standard form for the exchange of data before a transfer; of a common health certificate; of uniform conditions and practical arrangements for the exchange of information on a person’s health data before a transfer , and of secure electronic transmission channels for the transmission of requests. ### (72) the examination procedure should be used for the adoption of a standard form for the exchange of relevant information on unaccompanied minors; of uniform conditions for the consultation and exchange of information on minors and dependent persons; of uniform conditions on the preparation and submission of take charge requests and take back requests; of two lists of relevant elements of proof and circumstantial evidence , and the periodical revision thereof; of a laissez passer; of uniform conditions for the consultation and exchange of information regarding transfers; of a standard form for the exchange of data before a transfer; of a common health certificate; of uniform conditions and practical arrangements for the exchange of information on a person’s health data before a transfer , and of secure electronic transmission channels for the transmission of requests.


### (73) the commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in duly justified imperative grounds of urgency due to the situation of migratory pressure present in a member states. ### deleted


### (73) the commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in duly justified imperative grounds of urgency due to the situation of migratory pressure present in a member states. ### (73) following a unanimous decision by the council , the commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in duly justified imperative grounds of urgency due to the situation of migratory pressure present in a member state.


### (74) in order to provide for supplementary rules , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of the tfeu should be delegated to the commission in respect of the identification of family members or relatives of an unaccompanied minor; the criteria for establishing the existence of proven family links; the criteria for assessing the capacity of a relative to take care of an unaccompanied minor , including where family members , siblings or relatives of the unaccompanied minor stay in more than one member state; the elements for assessing a dependency link; the criteria for assessing the capacity of a person to take care of a dependent person and the elements to be taken into account in order to assess the inability to travel for a significant period of time. in exercising its powers to adopt delegated acts , the commission shall not exceed the scope of the best interests of the child as provided for in this regulation. it is of particular importance that the commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work , including at expert level and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of 13 april 2016. in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. ### deleted


### (75) a number of substantive changes are to be made to regulation (eu) no 604/2013. in the interests of clarity , that regulation should be repealed. ### (75) no substantive changes are to be made to regulation (eu) no 604/2013. in the interests of clarity , that regulation should not be repealed.


### (77) this regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles which are acknowledged , in particular , in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union. in particular , this regulation seeks to ensure full observance of the right to asylum guaranteed by article 18 of the charter as well as the rights recognised under articles 1 , 4 , 7 , 24 and 47 thereof. this regulation should therefore be applied accordingly. ### (77) this regulation respects the fundamental rights and principles underpinning the european way of life. this regulation should therefore be applied accordingly.


### (78) since the objective of this regulation , namely the establishment of criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the member states by a third-country national or a stateless person , and the establishment of a solidarity mechanism to support member states in addressing a situation of migratory pressure , cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore , by reason of the scale and effects of this regulation , be better achieved at union level , the union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union (teu). in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. ### deleted


### (78) since the objective of this regulation , namely the establishment of criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the member states by a third-country national or a stateless person , and the establishment of a solidarity mechanism to support member states in addressing a situation of migratory pressure , cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore , by reason of the scale and effects of this regulation , be better achieved at union level , the union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union (teu). in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. ### (78) since the objectives of this regulation , namely the establishment of criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an application for international protection , which has exceptionally been lodged in one of the member states rather than outside the territory of the european union and the establishment of cooperation measures cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore , by reason of the scale and effects of this regulation , be better achieved at union level , the union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union (teu). in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.


### (79) in accordance with articles 1 and 2 of protocol no 22 on the position of denmark annexed to the teu and to the tfeu , denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this regulation and is not bound by it or subject to its application. given that parts iii , v and vii of this regulation constitute amendments within the meaning of article 3 of the agreement concluded between the european community and the kingdom of denmark on the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the state responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in denmark or any other member state of the european union and ‘eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the dublin convention49 , denmark has to notify the commission of its decision whether or not to implement the content of such amendments at the time of the adoption of the amendments or within 30 days hereafter. ### (79) in accordance with articles 1 and 2 of protocol no 22 on the position of denmark annexed to the teu and to the tfeu , denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this regulation and is not bound by it or subject to its application. given that parts iii , v and vii of this regulation constitute amendments within the meaning of article 3 of the agreement concluded between the european community and the kingdom of denmark on the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the state responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in denmark or any other member state of the european union and ‘eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the dublin convention49 , denmark has to notify the commission of its decision whether or not to implement the content of such amendments at the time of the adoption of the amendments or within 30 days hereafter. the same shall apply to any other member state with a derogation from title v of part three of the treaty on the functioning of the european union.


### (80) [in accordance with article 3 of protocol no 21 on the position of the united kingdom and ireland in respect of the area of freedom , security and justice , annexed to the teu and to the tfeu , ireland has notified their wish to take part in the adoption and application of this regulation] ### (80) [in accordance with article 3 of protocol no 21 on the position of the united kingdom and ireland in respect of the area of freedom , security and justice , annexed to the teu and to the tfeu , ireland has notified their wish to take part in the adoption and application of this regulation] , but should nonetheless retain its right to not take part in the adoption by the council of proposed measures pursuant to title v of part three of the treaty on the functioning of the european union and the ability to adjust or rescind participation in the future.


### (82) as regards iceland and norway , parts iii , v and vii of this regulation constitute new legislation in a field which is covered by the subject matter of the annex to the agreement concluded by the european community and the republic of iceland and the kingdom of norway concerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the state responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in a member state or in iceland or norway50 . ### deleted


### (83) as regards switzerland , parts iii , v and vii of this regulation constitute acts or measures amending or building upon the provisions of article 1 of the agreement between the european community and the swiss confederation concerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the state responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in a member state or in switzerland51 . ### deleted


### (84) as regards liechtenstein , parts iii , v and vii of this regulation constitute acts or measures amending or building upon the provisions of article 1 of the agreement between the european community and the swiss confederation concerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the state responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in a member state or in switzerland to which article 3 of the protocol between the european community , the swiss confederation and the principality of liechtenstein on the accession of the principality of liechtenstein to the agreement between the european community and the swiss confederation concerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the state responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in a member state or in switzerland52 refers. ### deleted


### 3. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 68 concerning: ### deleted


### the requested member state shall carry out any necessary checks to examine the humanitarian grounds cited , and shall reply to the requesting member state within two months of receipt of the request using the electronic communication network set up under article 18 of regulation (ec) no 1560/2003. a reply refusing the request shall state the reasons on which the refusal is based. ### the requested member state shall carry out any necessary checks to examine the grounds cited , and shall reply to the requesting member state within two months of receipt of the request using the electronic communication network set up under article 18 of regulation (ec) no 1560/2003. a reply refusing the request shall state the reasons on which the refusal is based.


### take charge , under the conditions laid down in articles 29 , 30 and 35 , of an applicant whose application was registered in a different member state; ### deleted


### take back , under the conditions laid down in articles 31 and 35 of this regulation , an applicant or a third-country national or a stateless person in relation to whom that member state has been indicated as the member state responsible under article 11(1) of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [eurodac regulation]; ### deleted


### take back , under the conditions laid down in articles 31 and 35 of this regulation , a beneficiary of international protection in relation to whom that member state has been indicated as the member state responsible under article 11(1) of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [eurodac regulation]; ### deleted


### take back , under the conditions laid down in articles 31 and 35 of this regulation , a resettled or admitted person who has made an application for international protection or who is irregularly staying in a member state other than the member state which accepted to admit him or her in accordance with regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [union resettlement framework regulation] or which granted international protection or humanitarian status under a national resettlement scheme. ### deleted


### take back , under the conditions laid down in articles 31 and 35 of this regulation , a resettled or admitted person who has made an application for international protection or who is irregularly staying in a member state other than the member state which accepted to admit him or her in accordance with regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [union resettlement framework regulation] or which granted international protection or humanitarian status under a national resettlement scheme. ### take back , under the conditions laid down in articles 31 and 35 of this regulation , a resettled or admitted person who has made an application for international protection or who is irregularly staying in a member state other than the member state which accepted to admit him or her in accordance with regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [union resettlement framework regulation].


### take back , under the conditions laid down in articles 31 and 35 of this regulation , a resettled or admitted person who has made an application for international protection or who is irregularly staying in a member state other than the member state which accepted to admit him or her in accordance with regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [union resettlement framework regulation] or which granted international protection or humanitarian status under a national resettlement scheme. ### take back , under the conditions laid down in articles 31 and 35 of this regulation , a resettled or admitted person who has made an application for international protection or who is illegally staying in a member state other than the member state which accepted to admit him or her in accordance with regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [union resettlement framework regulation] or which granted international protection or humanitarian status under a national resettlement scheme.


### 3. in the situations referred to in paragraph 1 , points (a) and (b) , the member state responsible shall examine or complete the examination of the application for international protection pursuant to regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [asylum procedure regulation]. ### deleted


### 1. where a member state issues a residence document to the applicant , decides to apply article 25 , or does not transfer the person concerned to the member state responsible within the time limits set out in article 35 , that member state shall become the member state responsible and the obligations laid down in article 26 shall be transferred to that member state. where applicable , it shall inform the member state previously responsible , the member state conducting a procedure for determining the member state responsible or the member state which has been requested to take charge of the applicant or has received a take back notification , using the electronic communication network set up under article 18 of regulation (ec) no 1560/2003. ### 1. where a member state issues a residence document to the applicant , decides to apply article 25 , or does not transfer the person concerned to the member state responsible within the time limits set out in article 35 , that member state shall become the member state responsible and the obligations laid down in article 26 shall be transferred to that member state. where applicable , it shall inform the member state previously responsible , the member state conducting a procedure for determining the member state responsible or the member state which has been requested to take charge of or take back the applicant , using the electronic communication network set up under article 18 of regulation (ec) no 1560/2003 .


### 2. the obligation laid down in article 26(1) , point (b) , of this regulation to take back a third-country national or a stateless person shall cease where it can be established , on the basis of the update of the data set referred to in article 11(2)(c) of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [eurodac regulation] , that the person concerned has left the territory of the member states , on either a compulsory or a voluntary basis , in compliance with a return decision or removal order issued following the withdrawal or rejection of the application. ### 2. the obligation laid down in article 26(1) , point (b) , of this regulation to take back a third-country national or a stateless person shall cease where it can be established , on the basis of the update of the data set referred to in article 11(2)(c) of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [eurodac regulation] , that the person concerned has left the territory of the member states , on either a compulsory or a voluntary basis , whether or not in compliance with a return decision or removal order issued following the withdrawal or rejection of the application.


### an application registered after an effective removal has taken place shall be regarded as a new application for the purpose of this regulation , thereby giving rise to a new procedure for determining the member state responsible. ### deleted


### an application registered after an effective removal has taken place shall be regarded as a new application for the purpose of this regulation , thereby giving rise to a new procedure for determining the member state responsible. ### an application registered after the person concerned has left the territory of the member states shall be regarded as a new application for the purpose of this regulation , thereby giving rise to a new procedure for determining the member state responsible.


### 1. the member state where an application for international protection is first registered pursuant to regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [asylum procedure regulation] or , where applicable , the member state of relocation shall start the process of determining the member state responsible without delay. ### 1. the member state where an application for international protection is first registered pursuant to regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [asylum procedure regulation] shall start the process of determining the member state responsible without delay.


### 2. the member state where an application is first registered or , where applicable , the member state of relocation shall continue the process of determining the member state responsible if the applicant leaves the territory of that member state without authorisation or is otherwise not available to the competent authorities of that member state. ### 2. without prejudice to the cessation of responsibility provided in article 27(2) , the member state where an application is first registered shall continue the process of determining the member state responsible if the applicant leaves the territory of that member state without authorisation or is otherwise not available to the competent authorities of that member state.


### 5. an applicant who is present in a member state without a residence document or who there makes an application for international protection after another member state has confirmed to relocate the person concerned pursuant to article 57(7) , and before the transfer has been carried out to that member state pursuant to article 57(9) , shall be taken back , under the conditions laid down in articles 31 and 35 , by the member state of relocation. ### deleted


### 1. if a member state where an application for international protection has been registered considers that another member state is responsible for examining the application , it shall , without delay and in any event within two months of the date on which the application was registered , request that other member state to take charge of the applicant. ### 1. if a member state where an application for international protection has been registered considers that another member state is responsible for examining the application , it shall , without delay and in any event within three months of the date on which the application was registered , request that other member state to take charge of the applicant.


### notwithstanding the first subparagraph , in the case of a eurodac hit with data recorded pursuant to articles 13 and 14a of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [eurodac regulation] or of a vis hit with data recorded pursuant to article 21 of regulation (ec) no 767/2008 , the request to take charge shall be sent within one month of receiving that hit. ### notwithstanding the first subparagraph , in the case of a eurodac hit with data recorded pursuant to articles 13 and 14a of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [eurodac regulation] or of a vis hit with data recorded pursuant to article 21 of regulation (ec) no 767/2008 , the request to take charge shall be sent within two months of receiving that hit.


### the request shall state the reasons warranting an urgent reply and the period within which a reply is requested. that period shall be at least one week. ### the request shall state the reasons warranting an urgent reply and the period within which a reply is requested. that period shall be at least two weeks.


### 1. the requested member state shall make the necessary checks , and shall give a decision on the request to take charge of an applicant within one month of receipt of the request. ### 1. the requested member state shall make the necessary checks , and shall give a decision on the request to take charge of an applicant within two months of receipt of the request.


### 2. notwithstanding the first paragraph , in the case of a eurodac hit with data recorded pursuant to article 13 and 14a of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [eurodac regulation] or of a vis hit with data recorded pursuant to article 21(2) of regulation (ec) no 767/2008 , the requested member state shall give a decision on the request within two weeks of receipt of the request. ### 2. notwithstanding the first paragraph , in the case of a eurodac hit with data recorded pursuant to article 13 and 14a of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [eurodac regulation] or of a vis hit with data recorded pursuant to article 21(2) of regulation (ec) no 767/2008 , the requested member state shall give a decision on the request within one month of receipt of the request.


### 7. where the requesting member state has asked for an urgent reply pursuant to article 29(2) , the requested member state shall reply within the period requested or , failing that , within two weeks of receipt of the request. ### 7. where the requesting member state has asked for an urgent reply pursuant to article 29(2) , the requested member state shall reply within the period requested or , failing that , within at least two weeks of receipt of the request.


### 8. where the requested member state does not object to the request within the one-month period set out in paragraph 1 by a reply which gives full and detailed reasons , or where applicable within the two-week period set out in paragraphs 2 and 7 , this shall be tantamount to accepting the request , and entail the obligation to take charge of the person , including the obligation to provide for proper arrangements for arrival. ### 8. where the requested member state does not object to the request within the two-month period set out in paragraph 1 by a reply which gives full and detailed reasons , or where applicable within the one-month or two-week period set out respectively in paragraphs 2 and 7 , this shall be tantamount to accepting the request , and entail the obligation to take charge of the person , including the obligation to provide for proper arrangements for arrival.


### iii procedures for take back notifications ### iii procedures for take back requests


### 31 submitting a take back notification ### 31 submitting a take back request


### 1. in a situation referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) the member state where the person is present shall make a take back notification without delay and in any event within two weeks after receiving the eurodac hit. ### 1. in a situation referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) the member state where the person is present shall make a take back notification without delay and in any event within one month after receiving the eurodac hit.


### 1. in a situation referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) the member state where the person is present shall make a take back notification without delay and in any event within two weeks after receiving the eurodac hit. ### 1. in a situation referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) the member state where the person is present shall make a take back request without delay and in any event within two months after receiving the eurodac hit.


### 2. a take back notification shall be made using a standard form and shall include proof or circumstantial evidence as described in the two lists referred to in article 30(4) and/or relevant elements from the statements of the person concerned. ### 2. a take back request shall be made using a standard form and shall include proof or circumstantial evidence as described in the two lists referred to in article 30(4) and/or relevant elements from the statements of the person concerned , enabling the authorities of the requested member state to check whether it is responsible on the basis of the criteria laid down in chapter ii of this regulation.


### 3. the notified member state shall confirm receipt of the notification to the member state which made the notification within one week , unless the notified member state can demonstrate within that time limit that its responsibility has ceased pursuant to article 27. ### 3. the requested member state shall make the necessary checks and shall give a decision on the request to take back the person concerned no later than one month from the date on which the request was received unless the requested member state can demonstrate within that time limit that its responsibility has ceased pursuant to article 27.


### 1. the determining member state whose take charge request as regards the applicant referred to in article 26(1) , point (a) was accepted or who made a take back notification as regards persons referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) and (d) shall take a transfer decision at the latest within one week of the acceptance or notification. ### 1. the determining member state whose take charge request as regards the applicant referred to in article 26(1) , point (a) was accepted or who made a take back notification as regards persons referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) and (d) shall take a transfer decision at the latest within two weeks of the acceptance or notification.


### 1. the determining member state whose take charge request as regards the applicant referred to in article 26(1) , point (a) was accepted or who made a take back notification as regards persons referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) and (d) shall take a transfer decision at the latest within one week of the acceptance or notification. ### 1. the determining member state whose take charge request as regards the applicant referred to in article 26(1) , point (a) was accepted or who made a take back request as regards persons referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) and (d) shall take a transfer decision at the latest within two weeks of the acceptance or notification.


### 2. where the requested member state accepts to take charge of an applicant or to take back a person referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) , the requesting or the notifying member state shall notify the person concerned in writing without delay of the decision to transfer him or her to the member state responsible and , where applicable , of the fact that it will not examine his or her application for international protection. ### 2. where the requested member state accepts to take charge of an applicant or to take back a person referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) , the requesting member state shall notify the person concerned in writing without delay of the decision to transfer him or her to the member state responsible and , where applicable , of the fact that it will not examine his or her application for international protection.


### 3. the person concerned shall have the right to request , within a reasonable period of time from the notification of the transfer decision , a court or tribunal to suspend the implementation of the transfer decision pending the outcome of his or her appeal or review. member states shall ensure that an effective remedy is in place by suspending the transfer until the decision on the first suspension request is taken. any decision on whether to suspend the implementation of the transfer decision shall be taken within one month of the date when that request reached the competent court or tribunal. ### deleted


### 4. member states shall ensure that the person concerned has access to legal assistance and , where necessary , to linguistic assistance. ### deleted


### 5. member states shall ensure that legal assistance is granted on request free of charge where the person concerned cannot afford the costs involved. member states may provide that , as regards fees and other costs , the treatment of persons subject to this regulation shall not be more favourable than the treatment generally accorded to their nationals in matters pertaining to legal assistance. ### 5. member states shall ensure that legal assistance is granted but the person concerned must bear the costs involved. member states shall provide that , as regards fees and other costs , the treatment of persons subject to this regulation shall not be more favourable than the treatment generally accorded to their nationals in matters pertaining to legal assistance.


### where a decision not to grant free legal assistance and representation pursuant to the second subparagraph is taken by an authority other than a court or tribunal , member states shall provide the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal to challenge that decision. where the decision is challenged , that remedy shall be an integral part of the remedy referred to in paragraph 1. ### deleted


### 1. member states shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he or she is subject to the procedure established by this regulation. ### deleted


### 1. member states shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he or she is subject to the procedure established by this regulation. ### 1. member states can if they deem necessary for security or other reasons hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he or she is subject to the procedure established by this regulation.


### 2. where there is a risk of absconding , member states may detain the person concerned in order to secure transfer procedures in accordance with this regulation , on the basis of an individual assessment and only in so far as detention is proportional and other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied effectively , based on an individual assessment of the person’s circumstances. ### 2. where there is a risk of absconding , member states may detain the person concerned in order to secure transfer procedures in accordance with this regulation , on the basis of an individual assessment and only in so far as detention is proportional and other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied effectively , based on an individual assessment of the person’s circumstances. member states may also detain an applicant who represents a danger to national security or public order.


### 2. where there is a risk of absconding , member states may detain the person concerned in order to secure transfer procedures in accordance with this regulation , on the basis of an individual assessment and only in so far as detention is proportional and other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied effectively , based on an individual assessment of the person’s circumstances. ### 2. where there is a risk of absconding , member states may detain the person concerned in order to secure transfer procedures in accordance with this regulation , on the basis of an individual assessment and only in so far as detention is proportional , based on an assessment of circumstances.


### 3. detention shall be for as short a period as possible and shall be for no longer than the time reasonably necessary to fulfil the required administrative procedures with due diligence until the transfer under this regulation is carried out. ### 3. the length and conditions for detention shall be determined by national legislation.


### 3. detention shall be for as short a period as possible and shall be for no longer than the time reasonably necessary to fulfil the required administrative procedures with due diligence until the transfer under this regulation is carried out. ### 3. detention shall be for no longer than the time reasonably necessary to fulfil the required administrative procedures with due diligence until the transfer under this regulation is carried out.


### where an applicant or another person referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) is detained pursuant to this article , the period for submitting a take charge request or a take back notification shall not exceed two weeks from the registration of the application. where a person is detained at a later stage than the registration of the application , the period for submitting a take charge request or a take back notification shall not exceed one week from the date on which the person was placed in detention. the member state carrying out the procedure in accordance with this regulation shall ask for an urgent reply on a take charge request. such reply shall be given within one week of receipt of the take charge request. failure to reply within the one-week period shall be tantamount to accepting the take charge request and shall entail the obligation to take charge of the person , including the obligation to provide for proper arrangements for arrival. ### where an applicant or another person referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) is detained pursuant to this article , the period for submitting a take charge request or a take back notification shall not exceed two months from the registration of the application. where a person is detained at a later stage than the registration of the application , the period for submitting a take charge request or a take back notification shall not exceed one month from the date on which the person was placed in detention.


### where an applicant or another person referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) is detained pursuant to this article , the period for submitting a take charge request or a take back notification shall not exceed two weeks from the registration of the application. where a person is detained at a later stage than the registration of the application , the period for submitting a take charge request or a take back notification shall not exceed one week from the date on which the person was placed in detention. the member state carrying out the procedure in accordance with this regulation shall ask for an urgent reply on a take charge request. such reply shall be given within one week of receipt of the take charge request. failure to reply within the one-week period shall be tantamount to accepting the take charge request and shall entail the obligation to take charge of the person , including the obligation to provide for proper arrangements for arrival. ### where an applicant or another person referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) is detained pursuant to this article , the period for submitting a take charge request or a take back request shall not exceed one month from the registration of the application. where a person is detained at a later stage than the registration of the application , the period for submitting a take charge request or a take back request shall not exceed two weeks from the date on which the person was placed in detention. the member state carrying out the procedure in accordance with this regulation shall ask for an urgent reply on a take charge request. such reply shall be given within two weeks of receipt of the take charge request. failure to reply within the two -week period shall be tantamount to accepting the take charge request and shall entail the obligation to take charge of the person , including the obligation to provide for proper arrangements for arrival


### where the requesting or notifying member state fails to comply with the time limits for submitting a take charge request or take back notification or to take a transfer decision within the time limit laid down in article 32(1) or where the transfer does not take place within the period of four weeks referred to in the third subparagraph of this paragraph , the person shall no longer be detained. articles 29 , 31 and 35 shall continue to apply accordingly. ### where the requesting member state fails to comply with the time limits for submitting a take charge request or take back request or to take a transfer decision within the time limit laid down in article 32(1) or where the transfer does not take place within the period of eight weeks referred to in the third subparagraph of this paragraph , the person shall no longer be detained. articles 29 , 31 and 35 shall continue to apply accordingly.


### [...] ### deleted


### 1. the transfer of an applicant or of another person as referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) and (d) , from the requesting or notifying member state to the member state responsible shall be carried out in accordance with the national law of the requesting or notifying member state , after consultation between the member states concerned , as soon as practically possible , and at the latest within six months of the acceptance of the take charge request or of the confirmation of the take back notification by another member state or of the final decision on an appeal or review of a transfer decision where there is a suspensive effect in accordance with article 33(3). that time limit may be extended up to a maximum of one year if the transfer cannot be carried out due to imprisonment of the person concerned. ### 1. the transfer of an applicant or of another person as referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) and (d) , from the requesting member state to the member state responsible shall be carried out in accordance with the national law of the requesting member state , after consultation between the member states concerned , as soon as practically possible , and at the latest within six months of the acceptance of the take charge request or of the take back request by another member state or of the final decision on an appeal or review of a transfer decision where there is a suspensive effect in accordance with article 33(3). that time limit may be extended up to a maximum of one year if the transfer cannot be carried out due to imprisonment of the person concerned.


### where the transfer is carried out for the purpose of relocation , the transfer shall take place within the time limit set out in article 57(9). ### deleted


### if necessary , the applicant shall be supplied by the requesting or notifying member state with a laissez passer. the commission shall , by means of implementing acts , establish the design of the laissez passer. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 67(2). ### if necessary , the applicant shall be supplied by the requesting member state with a laissez passer. the commission shall , by means of implementing acts , establish the design of the laissez passer. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 67(2).


### the member state responsible shall inform the requesting or notifying member state , as appropriate , of the safe arrival of the person concerned or of the fact that he or she did not appear within the set time limit. ### the member state responsible shall inform the requesting member state , as appropriate , of the safe arrival of the person concerned or of the fact that he or she did not appear within the set time limit.


### 2. where the transfer does not take place within the time limits set out in paragraph 1 , first subparagraph , the member state responsible shall be relieved of its obligations to take charge of or to take back the person concerned and responsibility shall be transferred to the requesting or notifying member state. ### 2. where the transfer does not take place within the time limits set out in paragraph 1 , first subparagraph , the member state responsible shall be relieved of its obligations to take charge of or to take back the person concerned and responsibility shall be transferred to the requesting member state.


### notwithstanding the first subparagraph , where the person concerned absconds and the requesting or notifying member state informs the member state responsible before the expiry of the time limits set out in paragraph 1 , first subparagraph , that the person concerned has absconded , the transferring member state shall retain the right to carry out the transfer within the remaining time at a later stage , should the person become available to the authorities again , unless another member state has carried out the procedures in accordance with this regulation and transferred the person to the responsible member state after the person absconded. ### notwithstanding the first subparagraph , where the person concerned absconds and the requesting member state informs the member state responsible before the expiry of the time limits set out in paragraph 1 , first subparagraph , that the person concerned has absconded , the transferring member state shall retain the right to carry out the transfer within the remaining time at a later stage , should the person become available to the authorities again , unless another member state has carried out the procedures in accordance with this regulation and transferred the person to the responsible member state after the person absconded.


### 1. in accordance with article 17 of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [asylum and migration fund] , a contribution shall be paid to the member state carrying out the transfer for the transfer of an applicant or another person as referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) , pursuant to article 35. ### 1. in accordance with article 17 of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [asylum and migration fund] , a contribution of 10 000 eur shall be paid to the member state carrying out the transfer of an applicant or another person as referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) , pursuant to article 35 to a third country partner state for processing and potential facilitation of international protection.


### exchange of relevant information before a transfer is carried out ### exchange of relevant information before a transfer to a third country partner state is carried out


### exchange of security-relevant information before a transfer is carried out ### exchange of security-relevant information before a transfer to a third country partner state is carried out


### exchange of health data before a transfer is carried out ### exchange of health data before a transfer to a third country partner state is carried out


### 5. the requested member state shall be obliged to reply within three weeks. any delays in the reply shall be duly justified. non-compliance with the three week time limit shall not relieve the requested member state of the obligation to reply. if the research carried out by the requested member state which did not respect the maximum time limit withholds information which shows that it is responsible , that member state may not invoke the expiry of the time limits provided for in article 29 as a reason for refusing to comply with a request to take charge. in that case , the time limits provided for in article 29 for submitting a request to take charge shall be extended by a period of time equivalent to the delay in the reply by the requested member state. ### 5. the requested member state shall be obliged to reply within five weeks. any delays in the reply shall be duly justified. non-compliance with the five week time limit shall not relieve the requested member state of the obligation to reply. if the research carried out by the requested member state which did not respect the maximum time limit withholds information which shows that it is responsible , that member state may not invoke the expiry of the time limits provided for in article 29 as a reason for refusing to comply with a request to take charge. in that case , the time limits provided for in article 29 for submitting a request to take charge shall be extended by a period of time equivalent to the delay in the reply by the requested member state.


### 1. each member state shall notify the commission without delay of the specific authorities responsible for fulfilling the obligations arising under this regulation , and any amendments thereto. the member states shall ensure that those authorities have the necessary resources for carrying out their tasks and in particular for replying within the prescribed time limits to requests for information , requests to take charge , take back notifications and , if applicable , complying with their obligations under chapters i-iii of part iv. ### 1. each member state shall notify the commission without delay of the specific authorities responsible for fulfilling the obligations arising under this regulation , and any amendments thereto. the member states shall ensure that those authorities have the necessary resources for carrying out their tasks and in particular for replying within the prescribed time limits to requests for information , requests to take charge , take back requests and , if applicable , complying with their obligations under chapters i-iii of part iv.


### solidarity contributions made pursuant to chapters i-iii of part iv. ### voluntary contributions made pursuant to chapters i-iii of part iv.


### a. whereas the eu facility for refugees in turkey (frt) was created in 2016 in the framework of the eu-turkey statement and manages eur 6 billion; whereas human rights violations have taken place under this agreement which are incompatible with the eu charter of fundamental rights; ### a. whereas the eu facility for refugees in turkey (frt) was created in 2016 in the framework of the eu-turkey statement and manages eur 6 billion; whereas human rights violations have taken place under this agreement which are incompatible with the eu charter of fundamental rights; whereas turkey has repeatedly used immigrants to blackmail the european union , provoking a number of humanitarian crises at the greek and bulgarian borders; whereas most of these funds are dedicated to directly or indirectly improving turkish service infrastructure and whereas this helps to strengthen the erdoğan government;


### a. whereas the eu facility for refugees in turkey (frt) was created in 2016 in the framework of the eu-turkey statement and manages eur 6 billion; whereas human rights violations have taken place under this agreement which are incompatible with the eu charter of fundamental rights; ### a. whereas the eu facility for refugees in turkey (frt) was created in 2016 in the framework of the eu-turkey statement and manages eur 6 billion; whereas human rights violations have taken place under this agreement which are incompatible with the eu charter of fundamental rights; notes that since the 2016 framework has been put in place , turkey has made a number of provocations towards the eu’s external border and most recently has decided to withdraw from the istanbul convention;


### 2. is concerned about the governance of the eutf: the composition of its board and regional operational committees , the opacity of the process for approving projects , the lack of dialogue with local and human rights csos , and the lack of ex ante and ongoing impact assessments on fundamental rights; ### 2. is concerned about the governance of the eutf: the composition of its board and regional operational committees , the opacity of the process for approving projects , the lack of institutional dialogue on the eu level;


### 3. highlights that the eutf is part of a trend of the securitisation and externalisation of eu border management aimed at reducing irregular migration to the eu; stresses the risks to development objectives and fundamental rights associated with this approach. ### 3. highlights that one of the main objectives of the eutf is to contribute to better migration management , including tackling illegal migration to the eu; stresses that the existing strategy is not working effectively as the current strength of human-trafficking mafias , the exponential increase of arrivals of irregular migrants , and the low return rates can prove;


### 3. highlights that the eutf is part of a trend of the securitisation and externalisation of eu border management aimed at reducing irregular migration to the eu; stresses the risks to development objectives and fundamental rights associated with this approach. ### 3. highlights that the eutf is supposed to contribute to the security and externalisation of eu border management aimed at reducing irregular migration to the eu.


### 4. continues to expresses concerns over the limited role of parliament in the supervision and scrutiny of the union contributions to the eutfs; recalls parliament’s request to monitor the activities of the operational committee , and calls on the commission to provide in good time detailed information on the decisions taken in that committee and to ensure that parliament is represented at its meetings; ### 4. notes the limited role of parliament in the supervision and scrutiny of the union contributions to the eutfs; recalls parliament’s request to monitor the activities of the operational committee , and calls on the commission to provide in good time detailed information on the decisions taken in that committee and to ensure that parliament is represented at its meetings; acknowledges eutf's are designed to swiftly respond to challenging circumstances and to increase the flexibility of funding;


### 9. notes that the emerging security challenges in the car will require well-targeted , flexible eu support under the ndici-global europe to enhance peace and security , democratisation and strengthening democratic institutions in the car; ### 9. notes that the emerging security challenges , as well as continued humanitarian crisis and poverty in the car will require well-targeted , flexible eu support under the ndici-global europe to enhance humanitarian response , peace and security , democratisation and strengthening democratic institutions in the car;


### 12. emphasises the importance of continuous support for refugees , internally displaced persons and for vulnerable host communities , both inside syria and in the wider region , affected by the continued conflict , by means of a mix of longer-term , predictable and rapidly deployable funding under instruments established for the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (mff) and potential contributions from the member states as external assigned revenue , taking into account all financial instruments provided under the financial regulation; ### 12. emphasises the importance of continuous support for refugees , internally displaced persons and for vulnerable host communities , both inside syria and in the wider region , affected by the continued conflict , by means of a mix of longer-term , predictable and rapidly deployable funding under instruments established for the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (mff) and potential contributions from the member states as external assigned revenue , taking into account all financial instruments provided under the financial regulation , in order to address longer term economic , educational , protection and social needs of syrian refugees and local communities in the region;


### 15. welcomes the generally strong degree of local ownership , the involvement of local authorities and civil society organisations (csos) in projects supported by the eutf for africa; ### 15. welcomes the generally strong degree of local ownership , the involvement of local authorities and civil society organisations (csos) in projects supported by the eutf for africa; underlines the importance of cooperation and dialogue with local partners in order to better understand and effectively address the causes of instability , migration and forced displacement;


### 17. considers that the trust fund for colombia has proven its value and represents , under the current circumstances , an important tool to support the implementation of the peace agreement between the colombian government and the revolutionary armed forces of columbia (farc); points out that the extension of the colombia eutf has further reaffirmed the eu’s commitment and provided much-needed support to the colombian peace process; ### 17. considers that the trust fund for colombia has proven its value and represents , under the current circumstances , an important tool to support the implementation of the peace agreement between the colombian government and the revolutionary armed forces of columbia (farc); points out that the extension of the colombia eutf has further reaffirmed the eu’s commitment and provided much-needed support to the colombian peace process; underlines also the important role of the fund in supporting colombia in the area of comprehensive rural development and economic growth;


### 23. underlines the necessity of better addressing the funding needs in situations of protracted crisis and with a view to the coordination and transition between humanitarian relief , reconstruction and development in a flexible and interconnected manner; ### 23. underlines the necessity of better addressing the funding needs in situations of protracted crisis and with a view to the coordination and transition between humanitarian relief , reconstruction and development in a flexible and interconnected manner; insist that decisions must be geared towards added value and real effects on the ground and be properly justified and monitored;


### 25. reiterates parliament’s long-standing insistence that external assistance be financed in full from the union budget and be implemented in a coherent way , following a streamlined set of rules , based on co-legislated instruments and in full respect of parliament’s legislative , budgetary and monitoring prerogatives , and of the principles of accountability , transparency , effectiveness and sound budgetary management; ### 25. reiterates parliament’s long-standing insistence that external assistance be financed in full from the union budget and be implemented in a coherent way , following a streamlined set of rules , based on co-legislated instruments and in full respect of parliament’s legislative , budgetary and monitoring prerogatives , and of the principles of accountability , transparency , effectiveness and sound budgetary management and recognizes that eu trust funds can remain a useful tool to react to a major sudden crisis and to situations where a multiple donor response needs to be well coordinated in countries with weak national or local administrations;


### 26. expects the commission to fully make use of the possibilities afforded by the programme-based approach under the geographic pillar of the ndici-global europe and ipa iii , complemented by global thematic programming , rapid response funding and the large unprogrammed reserve under the ndici-global europe; ### 26. expects the commission to fully make use of the possibilities afforded by the programme-based approach under the geographic pillar of the ndici-global europe and ipa iii , which may no longer be used to finance pre-accession assistance to turkey except for support to turkish civil society organisations through the financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights , complemented by global thematic programming , rapid response funding and the large unprogrammed reserve under the ndici-global europe;


### — having regard to the judgment of the court of justice of the european union (cjeu) of 16 july 2020 in case c-311/18 , data protection commissioner v facebook ireland limited and maximillian schrems (schrems ii judgment)1 , ### deleted


### — having regard to the judgment of the cjeu of 6 october 2015 in case c-362/14 , maximillian schrems v data protection commissioner (schrems i judgment)2 , ### deleted


### — having regard to its resolution of 12 march 2014 on the us nsa surveillance programme , surveillance bodies in various member states and their impact on eu citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in justice and home affairs4 , ### deleted


### — having regard to its resolution of 5 july 2018 on the adequacy of the protection afforded by the eu-us privacy shield5 , ### deleted


### — having regard to the commission proposal of 10 january 2017 for a regulation of the european parliament and of the council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing directive 2002/58/ec (regulation on privacy and electronic communications – com(2017)0010) and the european parliament’s position thereon adopted on 20 october 201712 , ### deleted


### a. whereas the ability to transfer personal data across borders has the potential to be a key driver of innovation , productivity and economic competitiveness; ### a. whereas the ability to transfer personal data across borders is a key driver of innovation , productivity and economic competitiveness and facilitates interpersonal contact and cultural relations;


### b. whereas in its schrems i judgment , the cjeu pointed out that indiscriminate access by intelligence authorities to the content of electronic communications violates article 7 of the charter , and that the united states do not provide sufficient legal remedies for non-us persons against mass surveillance , in violation of article 47 of the charter; ### deleted


### 1. notes that the uk is a signatory to the european convention on human rights (echr) and the council of europe convention for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data; expects the uk to ensure the same minimum framework of data protection , despite having left the european union; ### 1. recalls that the uk is a signatory to the european convention on human rights (echr) and the council of europe convention for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data; expects the uk to ensure the same minimum framework of data protection , despite having left the european union;


### 2. welcomes the uk’s commitment to respect democracy and the rule of law , and protect and give domestic effect to fundamental rights such as those set out in the echr , including high levels of data protection; recalls that this is a necessary precondition for the eu’s cooperation with the uk; recalls that despite article 8 of the echr on the right to privacy being part of uk domestic law via the human rights act 1998 and common law via the new tort of misuse of privacy information , efforts to include a fundamental right to data protection were voted down by the government; ### 2. welcomes the uk’s commitment to respect democracy and the rule of law , and protect and give domestic effect to fundamental rights such as those set out in the echr , including high levels of data protection; recalls that despite article 8 of the echr on the right to privacy being part of uk domestic law via the human rights act 1998 and common law via the new tort of misuse of privacy information , efforts to include a fundamental right to data protection were voted down by the government;


### 3. is concerned about public statements by the uk prime minister declaring that uk will seek to diverge from eu data protection rules and establish its own ‘sovereign’ controls in this field; considers that the 2020 uk national data strategy represents a shift from the protection of personal data towards a wider use and sharing of data that is incompatible with the principles of fairness , data minimisation and purpose limitation under the gdpr; ### 3. notes public statements by the uk prime minister declaring that the uk will establish its own sovereign controls in the area of data protection; considers that the 2020 uk national data strategy could represent a shift from the protection of personal data towards a wider use and sharing of data; underlines that it is important to monitor any legislative changes based on the strategy and assess their compatibility with the gdpr;


### 4. expresses its concern about the lack and sometimes non-existent enforcement of the gdpr by the uk when it was still a member of the eu; points to the lack of proper enforcement by the uk information commissioner’s office in the past; ### deleted


### 5. is concerned that uk data protection law contains a broad derogation from aspects of the fundamental data protection principles , such as the right of access and the right of a data subject to know with whom their data has been shared , if such protection would ‘prejudice effective immigration control’15 ; points out that this exemption is available to all data controllers in the uk; is concerned about the recently revealed information that the immigration exemption was used in over 70 % of data subject requests to the home office in 202016 ; ### 5. is concerned that uk data protection law contains a derogation from aspects of the fundamental data protection principles , such as the right of access and the right of a data subject to know with whom their data has been shared , if such protection would ‘prejudice effective immigration control’15 ; points out that this exemption is available to all data controllers in the uk; is concerned about the recently revealed information that the immigration exemption was used in over 70 % of data subject requests to the home office in 202016 ;


### 9. recalls its resolution of 12 march 2014 , which found that the indiscriminate and non-suspicion-based mass surveillance programmes conducted by the uk intelligence agency gchq are incompatible with the principles of necessity and proportionality in a democratic society and are not adequate under eu data protection law; ### deleted


### 11. is concerned that the draft adequacy decisions fail to take into account either the actual use of uk bulk data powers or uk-us surveillance operations; points out that furthermore , in relation to the us , uk citizens are subject to some informal safeguards between gchq and the national security agency (nsa); expresses deep concern that these safeguards would not protect eu citizens or residents whose data may be subject to onward transfers and sharing with the nsa; ### deleted


### 12. takes note of the fact that the european union (withdrawal) act 2018 provides that cjeu case law generated before the end of the transition period will become ‘retained eu law’ and thus legally binding for the uk; points out that the uk is bound by the principles and conditions defined in the schrems ii judgment of the cjeu when assessing the adequacy of other non-eu countries; considers this an important safeguard to ensure the legality of onward transfers; ### 12. welcomes the fact that the european union (withdrawal) act 2018 provides that cjeu case law generated before the end of the transition period will become ‘retained eu law’ and thus legally binding for the uk; points out that the uk is bound by the principles and conditions defined in the schrems ii judgment of the cjeu when assessing the adequacy of other non-eu countries; considers this an important safeguard to ensure the legality of onward transfers;


### 13. points out that the uk rules on the sharing of personal data under the digital economy act 2017 and on onward transfers of research data are clearly not ‘essentially equivalent’ to the rules set out in the gdpr , as interpreted by the cjeu; ### deleted


### 14. is strongly concerned that a uk adequacy status would therefore lead to the bypassing of the eu rules on transfers to countries or territories not deemed adequate under eu law; ### deleted


### 15. takes note that on 1 february 2021 , the uk sent a request to join the comprehensive and progressive trans-pacific partnership (cpttp) , in particular to ‘benefit from modern digital trade rules that allow data to flow freely between members , remove unnecessary barriers for businesses [etc.]’; notes with concern that there are eleven members of the cpttp , eight of which do not have an adequacy decision from the eu; is strongly concerned about potential onward transfers of personal data from eu citizens and residents to these countries if the uk is granted an adequacy decision20 ; ### 15. takes note that on 1 february 2021 , the uk sent a request to join the comprehensive and progressive trans-pacific partnership (cpttp) , in particular to ‘benefit from modern digital trade rules that allow data to flow freely between members , remove unnecessary barriers for businesses [etc.]’; notes with concern that there are eleven members of the cpttp , eight of which do not have an adequacy decision from the eu; is strongly concerned about potential onward transfers of personal data from eu citizens and residents to these countries if the uk is granted an adequacy decision[1]; stresses that any personal data of eu citizens can only be transferred from the uk to another third country , if the data protection standards that govern that onward transfer of data , is deemed to provide an adequate and equivalent level of protection as the eu;


### 16. is concerned that if the uk includes provisions on data transfers in any future trade agreements , inter alia us-uk trade agreements , the level of protection offered by the gdpr would be undermined; ### deleted


### 17. highlights that the uk is the first country for which the commission has suggested adopting an adequacy decision under directive (eu) 2016/680; underlines that this is particularly important given the close partnership with the uk in the area of security and law enforcement; ### 17. highlights that the uk is the first country for which the commission has suggested adopting an adequacy decision under directive (eu) 2016/680; underlines that this is particularly important given the close partnership with the uk in the area of security and law enforcement and the essential contribution of the uk to eu security and law enforcement;


### 18. notes the uk’s cross-border data access agreement with the us21 , under the us cloud act , which facilitates transfers for law enforcement purposes; is concerned that this will allow undue access to the personal data of eu citizens and residents by us authorities; ### 18. notes the uk’s cross-border data access agreement with the us21 , under the uk’s crime (overseas production orders) act 2019 ( “opo act”) and the us’ clarifying lawful overseas use of data act (“cloud act”) , which facilitates transfers for law enforcement purposes; is concerned that this will allow undue access to the personal data of eu citizens and residents by us authorities;


### 20. notes that in this case , the cjeu ruled that the bulk data collection carried out in the uk under the regulation of investigatory powers act 2000 was illegal; points out that the regulation has since been replaced by the investigatory powers act (the ipa 2016) in order to strengthen the principles of necessity and proportionality; underlines that the ipa 2016 makes interception subject to judicial oversight and empowers individuals to access their data and lodge complaints before the investigatory powers tribunal; deplores , however , the fact that the ipa 2016 continues to enable the practice of bulk data retention; ### 20. notes that in this case , the cjeu ruled that the bulk data collection carried out in the uk under the regulation of investigatory powers act 2000 was illegal; points out that the regulation has since been replaced by the investigatory powers act (the ipa 2016) in order to strengthen the principles of necessity and proportionality; underlines that the ipa 2016 makes interception subject to judicial oversight and empowers individuals to access their data and lodge complaints before the investigatory powers tribunal;


### 21. is concerned about recent reports that a mass data collection and retention scheme is part of a trial by the uk home office conducted under the ipa 2016; ### deleted


### 23. notes that the draft adequacy decision fails to take account of the uk’s actual surveillance practices and reflects an inaccurate and limited understanding of the types of communications data that fall under uk data retention and lawful interception powers; ### deleted


### 25. calls on the commission to assure eu businesses that the adequacy decision will provide a solid , sufficient and future-oriented legal basis for data transfers; underlines the importance of making sure that this adequacy decision will be deemed acceptable if reviewed by the cjeu and stresses that all recommendations made in the edpb opinion should therefore be taken on board; ### 25. calls on the commission to assure eu businesses that the adequacy decision will provide a solid , sufficient and future-oriented legal basis for data transfers; underlines the importance of making sure that this adequacy decision will be deemed acceptable if reviewed by the cjeu and stresses that all recommendations made in the edpb opinion should therefore be taken into serious consideration;


### 27. calls for the commission to consult with parliament on any future changes to the uk data protection regime , and for a scrutiny role for parliament in the new institutional framework , including for relevant bodies such as the specialised committee on law enforcement and judicial cooperation; ### 27. calls for the commission to consult with parliament on any future changes to the uk data protection regime , and for an appropriate role for parliament in the new institutional framework , including regarding relevant bodies such as the specialised committee on law enforcement and judicial cooperation;


### (1) the schengen information system (‘sis’) constitutes an essential tool for maintaining a high level of security within the area of freedom , security and justice of the union by supporting operational cooperation between national competent authorities , in particular border guards , the police , customs authorities , immigration authorities , and authorities responsible for the prevention , detection , investigation or prosecution of criminal offences or execution of criminal penalties. regulation (eu) 2018/1862 of the european parliament and of the council28 constitutes the legal basis for sis in respect of matters falling within the scope of chapters 4 and 5 of title v of part three of the treaty on functioning of the european union (tfeu). ### (1) the schengen information system (‘sis’) constitutes an important tool for maintaining a high level of security within the area of freedom , security and justice of the union by supporting operational cooperation between national competent authorities , in particular border guards , the police , customs authorities , immigration authorities , and authorities responsible for the prevention , detection , investigation or prosecution of criminal offences or execution of criminal penalties. regulation (eu) 2018/1862 of the european parliament and of the council28 constitutes the legal basis for sis in respect of matters falling within the scope of chapters 4 and 5 of title v of part three of the treaty on functioning of the european union (tfeu).


### (5) in order to bridge the gap in information sharing on serious crime and terrorism , in particular on foreign terrorist fighters – where the monitoring of their movement is crucial – it is necessary to ensure europol is able to make this information available directly and in real-time to front-line officers in member states. ### (5) in order to bridge the gap in information sharing on serious crime and terrorism , in particular on foreign terrorist fighters – where the monitoring of their movement , apprehension and prosecution are crucial – it is necessary to ensure europol is able to make this information available directly and in real-time to front-line officers in member states.


### (6) europol should therefore be authorised to enter alerts in sis pursuant to regulation (eu) 2018/1862 , in full respect of fundamental rights and data protection rules. ### deleted


### (7) to that end , a specific category of alert should be created in sis , to be issued exclusively by europol , in order to inform end-users carrying out a search in sis that the person concerned is suspected of being involved in a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent , and in order for europol to obtain confirmation that the person who is subject to the alert has been located. ### (7) to that end , a specific category of alert should be created in sis , allowing the competent authorities of the member states to report that the alert has been initiated by europol , in order to inform end-users carrying out a search in sis that the person concerned is suspected of being involved in a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent , and in order for europol to obtain confirmation that the person who is subject to the alert has been located.


### (8) in order to assess whether a concrete case is adequate , relevant and important enough to warrant the entry of an alert in sis , and in order to confirm the reliability of the source of information and the accuracy of the information on the person concerned , europol should carry out a detailed individual assessment of each case including further consultations with the third country or international organisation that shared the data on the person concerned , as well as further analysis of the case , in particular by cross checking it against information it already holds in its databases , to confirm the accuracy of the information and complement it with other data on the basis of its own databases. the detailed individual assessment should include the analysis of whether there are sufficient grounds for considering that the person has committed or taken part in , or will commit a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent. ### (8) in order to assess whether a concrete case is adequate , relevant and important enough to warrant the entry of an alert in sis , and in order to confirm the reliability of the source of information and the accuracy of the information on the person concerned , europol should carry out a detailed individual assessment of each case including further consultations with the third country or international organisation that shared the data on the person concerned , as well as further analysis of the case , in particular by cross checking it against information it already holds in its databases , in order to vouch for the reliability of the information it delivers and complement it with other data on the basis of its own databases. the detailed individual assessment should include the analysis of whether there are sufficient grounds for considering that the person has committed or taken part in , or will commit a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent.


### (9) europol should only be able to enter an alert in sis if the person concerned is not already subject to a sis alert issued by a member state. a further precondition for the creation of such an alert should be that member states do not object to the alert being issued in sis. therefore , it is necessary to establish rules on the obligations of europol prior to entering data in sis , in particular the obligation to consult the member states in line with regulation (eu) 2016/794. it should also be possible for member states to request the deletion of an alert by europol , in particular if they obtain new information about the person who is the subject of the alert , if their national security requires so or when it is likely that the alert would represent a risk for official or legal inquiries , investigations or procedures. ### deleted


### (10) europol should keep records of the individual assessment of each case , which should include the grounds for entering the alert , for the purposes of verifying the lawfulness of the data processing , self-monitoring and ensuring proper data integrity and security. in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/794 , europol should co-operate with the european data protection supervisor and make these records available upon request , so that they can be used for monitoring processing operations. ### (10) europol should keep records of the individual assessment of each case in respect of which it requests an alert from the competent authorities of the member states , and this should include the grounds for entering the alert , for the purposes of verifying the lawfulness of the data processing , self-monitoring and ensuring proper data integrity and security. in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/794 , europol should co-operate with the european data protection supervisor and make these records available upon request , so that they can be used for monitoring processing operations.


### (11) it is necessary to establish rules concerning the deletion of alerts entered in sis by europol. an alert should be kept only for the time required to achieve the purpose for which it was entered. it is therefore appropriate to set out detailed criteria to determine when the alert should be deleted. an alert entered by europol in sis should be deleted in particular if a member state objects , another alert is entered in sis by a member state , or if europol becomes aware that the information received from the third country or international organisation was incorrect or was communicated to europol for unlawful purposes , for example if sharing the information on the person was motivated by political reasons. ### deleted


### (12) when entering alerts in sis , europol should be bound by the same requirements and obligations applicable to the member states pursuant to regulation (eu) 2018/1862 when they enter alerts in sis. in particular , europol should comply with common standards , protocols and technical procedures established to ensure the compatibility of its technical interface with central sis for the prompt and effective transmission of data. requirements concerning general data processing rules , proportionality , data quality , data security , reporting and obligations related to collecting statistics applicable to member states when entering alerts in sis should apply to europol as well. ### deleted


### (14) since the objectives of this regulation , namely the establishment and regulation of a specific alert category issued by europol in sis in order to exchange information on persons who represent a threat to the internal security of the european union , cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states , but can rather , by reason of their nature be better achieved at union level , the union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity , as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union (teu). in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. ### (14) since the objectives of this regulation , namely the establishment and regulation of a specific alert category issued by the member states at the instigation of europol in sis in order to exchange information on persons who represent a threat to the internal security of the european union , cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states , but can rather , by reason of their nature be better achieved at union level , the union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity , as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union (teu). in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.


### alerts entered by europol on persons of interest ### alerts entered at the instigation of europol on persons of interest


### 1. europol may enter alerts on persons in sis for the purpose of informing end-users carrying out a search in sis of the suspected involvement of those persons in a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent in accordance with article 3 of regulation (eu) 2016/794 , as well as for the purpose of obtaining information in accordance with article 37b of this regulation that the person concerned has been located. ### 1. europol may request the competent authorities of the member states to enter alerts on persons in sis and introduce a special category indicating that the alert concerned was initiated by europol. the aim of this shall be to inform end-users carrying out a search in sis of the suspected involvement of those persons in a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent in accordance with article 3 of regulation (eu) 2016/794 , as well as for the purpose of obtaining information in accordance with article 37b of this regulation that the person concerned has been located.


### 2. europol may only enter an alert in sis on persons who are third-country nationals on the basis of information received from a third country or an international organisation in accordance with article 17(1)(b) of regulation (eu) 2016/794 , where the information relates to one of the following: ### 2. europol may only request the competent authorities of a member state to enter an alert in sis and introduce the special category in respect of persons who are third-country nationals on the basis of information received from a third country or an international organisation in accordance with article 17(1)(b) of regulation (eu) 2016/794 , where the information relates to one of the following:


### 3. europol may only enter an alert in sis after it has ensured all of the following: ### 3. europol may only request competent authorities to enter a europol-instigated alert in sis after it has ensured all of the following:


### a consultation , involving the sharing of information on the person concerned with member states participating in regulation (eu) 2016/794 in accordance with article 7 of that regulation , confirmed that: ### deleted


### 4. europol shall keep detailed records relating to the entry of the alert in sis and the grounds for such entry to permit verification of compliance with the substantive and procedural requirements laid down in paragraphs 1 , 2 and 3. such records shall be available for the european data protection supervisor on request. ### 4. europol shall keep detailed records relating to the entry of an alert in sis that has been initiated by europol , and is registered as such in the relevant category , and the grounds for such entry to permit verification of compliance with the substantive and procedural requirements laid down in paragraphs 1 , 2 and 3. such records shall be available for the european data protection supervisor on request.


### 5. europol shall inform all member states of the entry of the alert in sis through the exchange of supplementary information in accordance with article 8 of this regulation. ### 5. europol shall inform all member states of the entry of an alert in sis that has been registered in the europol-instigated category through the exchange of supplementary information in accordance with article 8 of this regulation.


### 6. the requirements and obligations applicable to the issuing member state in articles 20 , 21 , 22 , 42 , 56 , 59 , 61 , 62 and 63 shall apply to europol when processing data in sis. ### deleted


### 1. in the event of a hit on an alert entered by europol , the executing member state shall: ### 1. in the event of a hit on an alert registered in the europol-instigated category , the executing member state shall:


### in accordance with national law , decide whether it is necessary to take any further measures. ### (does not affect the english version.)


### 7. the commission shall adopt a decision setting the date on which europol shall start entering , updating and deleting data in sis pursuant to this regulation as amended by regulation [xxx] , after verification that the following conditions have been met: ### 7. the commission shall adopt a decision setting the date from which europol may start entering , updating and deleting alerts in sis pursuant to this regulation as amended by regulation [xxx] , after verification that the following conditions have been met:


### 6. welcomes the critical role of civil society organisations in fighting corruption; emphasises that the success of any emergency response greatly depends on the active participation of all actors in society; believes that the current covid-19 crisis has highlighted the importance of maintaining a robust system of citizen participation in public decision-making; ### deleted


### 7. acknowledges the current role and future potential of using artificial intelligence and big data in fighting corruption and the misuse of public funds; points out that all information and data must be processed in a proper way to ensure data protection and the privacy of citizens; ### 7. acknowledges the current role and future potential of using artificial intelligence and big data in fighting corruption and the misuse of public funds; points out that all information and data must be processed in a proper way to ensure data protection and the privacy of citizens; stresses that enforcement authorities have to be ahead of criminal who increasingly use new technologies and seize any opportunity to expand their illegal activities , online or offline;


### 1. refuses to give its consent to the conclusion of the agreement; ### 1. gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;


### 21. notes a satisfactory geographical distribution of the overall staff , considering the size of the institution , with 20 member states represented in 2020; welcomes the introduction of 3 nationalities compared to 2019 , and notes a reduction in the disproportionate share of posts occupied by belgian nationals (from 27 to 23 %); notes that there is no change in the geographical distribution of the middle and senior management; understands that the specialised profiles needed to fulfil the supervisor mandate can limit selection panels when considering the geographical aspect; ### 21. notes the change in the geographical distribution of the overall staff , considering the size of the institution , with 20 member states represented in 2020; welcomes the introduction of 3 nationalities compared to 2019 , and notes a reduction in the disproportionate share of posts occupied by belgian nationals (from 27 to 23 %); notes that there is no change in the geographical distribution of the middle and senior management;


### 22. calls on the supervisor to continue paying attention to issues related to gender balance and equal opportunities , in particular during selection procedures; suggests that the supervisor consider mandatory training for managers and for selection panellists on unconscious gender bias and equal opportunity policy implementation; ### 22. calls on the supervisor to continue paying attention to issues related to gender balance , equal opportunities and geographical balance , in particular during selection procedures; suggests that the supervisor consider mandatory training for managers and for selection panellists on unconscious gender bias and equal opportunity policy implementation;


### — having regard to the european pillar of social rights , in particular principles 5 , 10 , 12 and 16 thereof , ### deleted


### — having regard to directive 2003/86/ec of 22 september 2003 on the right to family reunification8 , ### deleted


### — having regard to directive 2011/95/eu of the european parliament and of the council of 13 december 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection , for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection , and for the content of the protection granted9 , ### deleted


### — having regard to regulation (eu) 2019/1149 of the european parliament and of the council of 20 june 2019 establishing a european labour authority , amending regulations (ec) no 883/2004 , (eu) no 492/2011 , and (eu) 2016/589 and repealing decision (eu) 2016/34411 , ### deleted


### — having regard to the commission communication of 13 may 2015 entitled ‘a european agenda on migration’ , ### deleted


### — having regard to the commission communication of 24 november 2020 entitled ‘action plan on integration and inclusion 2021-2027’ , ### deleted


### — having regard to the commission communication of 6 april 2016 entitled ‘towards a reform of the common european asylum system and enhancing legal avenues to europe’ , ### deleted


### — having regard to the commission communication of 12 september 2018 entitled ‘enhancing legal pathways to europe: an indispensable part of a balanced and comprehensive migration policy’ , ### deleted


### — having regard to the commission communication of 23 september 2020 on a new pact on migration and asylum (com(2020)0609) , ### deleted


### — having regard to the action plan and political declaration adopted at the eu-africa summit on migration , held in valletta on 11 and 12 november 2015 , in particular their respective parts on legal migration and mobility , ### deleted