### 12. notes that the transition to a low-carbon economy presents new challenges and risks related to the preference for sustainable investments; stresses the need for an in-depth analysis of the economic efficiency of sustainable investments in order to avoid a future bubble of green assets; calls for clear guidelines for banks based on economic data; ### 12. notes that the transition to a low-carbon economy poses new challenges and risks for the banking sector associated with the objectives of the eu’s green transition , which prioritises ‘sustainable’ investments; stresses the need for an in-depth analysis of the economic efficiency of such investments in order to avoid a future bubble of green assets; calls for providing banks with clear guidelines in this regard , based on hard economic data; while recognising the value of the climate risk stress tests , calls for them to be based on realistic assumptions (in particular as regards data on the real likelihood of climate change) and for consideration to be given to the risks associated with a possible green bubble;


### 13. recalls that the impact of special measures during the pandemic should be taken into account in the assessment of the current condition of banks; stresses that these measures distort the picture , as the decline in real economic activity does not fully translate into banks’ balance sheets; ### 13. recalls that the impact of special measures implemented during the pandemic by the governments of individual member states should be taken into account in the assessment of the current condition of banks; stresses that these measures , such as cover schemes for companies affected by covid , distort the picture , as the decline in real economic activity does not fully translate into banks’ balance sheets; considers that the delayed impact of this downturn on the future health of banks must be taken into account;


### 15. indicates that the trend towards consolidation in the banking sector is likely to increase as a result of the pandemic; recognises the challenges posed to banking supervision by large systemically important institutions , whose possible problems may affect financial stability in many jurisdictions; ### 15. indicates that the trend towards consolidation in the banking sector is likely to increase as a result of the pandemic; recognises the challenges posed to banking supervision by large systemically important institutions , whose possible problems may affect financial stability in many jurisdictions; stresses the benefits of preserving the diversity and multiplicity of financial sectors in maintaining financial stability;


### 16. notes the problems and challenges related to home/host issues; points out that greater market integration requires credible safeguards in eu law for host member states; ### 16. notes the problems and challenges related to home/host issues; notes that strengthening cross-border integration and allowing flexibility in the distribution of capital and its more free movement across the group requires credible , efficient and unconditional safeguards reflected in eu law for host member states; stresses that adequately capitalised subsidiaries are crucial for financial stability , the protection of deposits and the pursuit of macroprudential policies in host countries;


### 17. stresses the need for effective anti-money laundering supervision; notes the commission’s adoption of the anti-money laundering (aml) package of proposals; ### 17. stresses the need for effective anti-money laundering supervision and points to the need for cooperation and coordination between prudential supervision activities , anti-money laundering supervision activities and fius , in particular as regards the exchange of information on authorisation procedures , qualifying holding acquisitions , ongoing supervision and supervisory measures and sanctions; notes the commission’s adoption of the anti-money laundering (aml) package of proposals;


### 18. underlines the need to protect consumers from abuses and harmful practices; ### 18. underlines the need to protect consumers from abuses , unfair contract terms , harmful practices and harmful products; calls for consumer access to cross-border retail financial services to be ensured;


### 20. supports the specification of the public interest assessment criteria so that the srm is applied in a more consistent and predictable manner; proposes that an alternative liquidation regime for small and medium-sized banks be considered; asks for a more proportionate setting of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (mrel) level; ### 20. supports the clearer specification of the public interest assessment criteria so that the srm is applied in a more consistent and predictable manner; proposes that consideration be given to an alternative liquidation regime for small and medium-sized banks , for which bankruptcy - with its negative consequences for local communities and businesses - is currently the primary pathway; asks for a more proportionate setting of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (mrel) level;


### 21. supports the updating of state aid rules in order to ensure their greater adequacy and consistency with the srm framework; emphasises that one of the goals of such an update should be to enable quick and effective interventions under the srm or in the alternative liquidation regime; ### 21. supports the updating of state aid rules in order to ensure their greater adequacy and consistency with the srm framework and adapting them for different forms of restructuring; emphasises that one of the goals of such an update should be to enable quick and effective interventions under the srm or in the alternative liquidation regime;


### 22. recalls that the ssm and the srm operate at eu level , while deposit guarantee schemes (dgss) are operated at national level; recognises that a european deposit insurance scheme (edis) would improve protection for depositors in the eu; ### 22. recalls that the ssm and the srm operate at eu level , while deposit guarantee schemes (dgss) are operated and financed at national level;


### 22. recalls that the ssm and the srm operate at eu level , while deposit guarantee schemes (dgss) are operated at national level; recognises that a european deposit insurance scheme (edis) would improve protection for depositors in the eu; ### 22. recalls that the ssm and the srm operate at eu level , while deposit guarantee schemes (dgss) are operated at national level; underlines that depositors across the banking union are exposed to varying levels of credit , market and operational risk , which justifies varying levels of protection;


### 22. recalls that the ssm and the srm operate at eu level , while deposit guarantee schemes (dgss) are operated at national level; recognises that a european deposit insurance scheme (edis) would improve protection for depositors in the eu; ### 22. recalls that the ssm and the srm operate at eu level , while deposit guarantee schemes (dgss) are operated at national level; recognises that a european deposit insurance scheme (edis) would improve protection for depositors in the eu and their trust in the banking sector;


### 24. considers that the main obstacles for edis are concerns about risks in some banking systems; stresses that the implementation of credible and effective risk reduction measures could enable an agreement on edis; ### 24. considers that the main obstacles for edis are concerns about risks in some banking systems and the lack of political support for eu-level socialisation of resolution schemes; stresses that offering permanent opt-outs in combination with the implementation of credible and effective risk reduction measures could enable an agreement on edis;


### 24. considers that the main obstacles for edis are concerns about risks in some banking systems; stresses that the implementation of credible and effective risk reduction measures could enable an agreement on edis; ### 24. considers that the main obstacles for edis are concerns about risks in some banking systems and a general bail-out fatigue; stresses that opt-outs and the implementation of credible and effective risk reduction measures could enable an agreement on edis;


### 24. considers that the main obstacles for edis are concerns about risks in some banking systems; stresses that the implementation of credible and effective risk reduction measures could enable an agreement on edis; ### 24. considers that the main obstacles for edis are concerns about risks and the quality of risk monitoring in some banking systems; stresses that the implementation of credible and effective risk reduction measures could enable an agreement on edis;


### 24. considers that the main obstacles for edis are concerns about risks in some banking systems; stresses that the implementation of credible and effective risk reduction measures could enable an agreement on edis; ### 24. underlines that depositors across the banking union are exposed to varying levels of credit , market and operational risk , which justifies varying levels of protection;


### 25. points out that any edis should take into account clear rules for the participation of non-euro area member states; ### 25. points out that any edis should take into account clear rules for the participation or non-participation of non-euro area member states;


### 27. instructs its president to forward this resolution to the council , the commission , the ecb , the eba and the srb. ### 27. instructs its president to forward this resolution to the council , the commission , the ecb , all escb member banks , the eba and the srb.


### d. whereas new technological solutions , such as blockchain , can be used by tax administrations to better serve the needs of tax payers while such technologies can also be abused and serve as a vehicle for illicit activities , with the criminal intent to avoid paying taxes; ### d. whereas new technological solutions , such as blockchain , can be used by tax administrations to better serve the needs of tax payers; whereas such technologies can be particularly useful for exchanging information between jurisdictions and for various types of record-keeping , but whereas such technologies , like any new technology , can also be abused;


### h. whereas the union has already taken important steps towards a clear definition of crypto-assets and this definition must facilitate the fair and simple taxation of these assets; and whereas definitions of such crypto-assets must be highly aligned with international standards , namely with the financial action task force; ### h. whereas the union has already taken important steps towards a clear definition of crypto-assets and this definition must facilitate the fair and simple taxation of these assets; whereas definitions of such crypto-assets must be highly aligned with international standards , namely with the financial action task force and standards developed at oecd level; and whereas such a definition developed at eu level should , however , only serve as a guidance for member states;


### i. whereas tax policy is a national competence , but strong cooperation between member states is essential to respond to the challenges posed to the integrity of the single market , namely by the increasing the use of crypto-assets; whereas a framework of 27 significantly different approaches to crypto-assets taxation could lead to significant obstacles for the fulfilment of the objectives of the european digital single market; ### i. whereas tax policy is a national competence , but strong cooperation between member states is essential to respond to the challenges posed to the integrity of the single market , namely by the increasing use of crypto-assets;


### 8. acknowledges that the definition of the tax base for crypto-assets is one of the core issues for tax policy; notes that there is currently no internationally-agreed standard definition of crypto-assets and types of assets to be included; understands the need for such a definition as a main priority in the european legislative framework in order to guarantee a leading position for the union at international level; ### 8. acknowledges that the definition of the tax base for crypto-assets is one of the core issues for tax policy; notes that there is currently no internationally-agreed standard definition of crypto-assets and types of assets to be included; stresses that such a definition should be developed in cooperation with the oecd in order to guarantee a leading position for the union at international level;


### 9. notes that each country tends to use their own terminology when designing their national regulatory solutions to crypto-assets , which could cause legal uncertainty for citizens and companies , at the same time emerge as a threat to the integrity of the european single market; ### 9. notes that each country tends to use their own terminology when designing their national regulatory solutions to crypto-assets , which is an expression of the exclusive competence of the member states in the area of capital taxes;


### 10. emphasises that the rapid growth of crypto-assets4refers to the key question of the type of taxation to be applied , when a taxable event happens , and its valuation; ### 10. emphasises that the rapid growth of crypto-assets4 refers to the key question of the type of taxation to be applied , when and where a taxable event happens , and its valuation;


### 11. points out that the taxation of crypto-assets in cross-border situations is linked to several dimensions of tax policy and that such dimensions are distributed between national and european competences , but the benefit of a european approach is concentrated in instruments linked to administrative cooperation and corporate taxation; ### 11. points out that the taxation of crypto-assets in cross-border situations is linked to several dimensions of tax policy and that such dimensions are distributed between national and european competences , but the benefit of a european approach is concentrated in instruments linked to administrative cooperation and exchange of information;


### 13. calls on the member states to consider the dimension of crypto-assets in their national tax reforms , and to consider implementing more effective systems that ensure less compliance costs and administrative burden , but that guarantee , at the same time , the fair , transparent and effective taxation of crypto-assets; underlines the role of tax incentives and exemptions in promoting technological innovation and development; ### 13. calls on the member states to consider the dimension of crypto-assets in their national tax reforms , and to consider implementing more effective systems that ensure less compliance costs and administrative burden , but that guarantee , at the same time , the fair , transparent , non-burdensome and effective taxation of crypto-assets; underlines the role of tax incentives , reliefs and exemptions in promoting technological innovation and development , particularly of the blockchain technology sector;


### d. whereas , based on common practice and as has been done several times in the past , for the purpose of assessing the price stability criterion , the commission excludes from the best-performing countries those whose inflation rates could not be seen as a meaningful benchmark for other member states , and has therefore excluded two member states as the best performers from the assessment; ### d. whereas , based on common practice and as has been done several times in the past , for the purpose of assessing the price stability criterion , the commission excludes from the best-performing countries those whose inflation rates could not be seen as a meaningful benchmark for other member states , and has therefore excluded two member states as the best performers from the assessment; whereas data observations from all euro area member states shall be included in the assessment analysis as they represent data of proper members of the monetary union;


### — having regard to articles 127(1) and (2) , 130 and 284(3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union , ### — having regard to articles 123 , 127(1) and (2) , 130 and 284(3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union ,


### a. whereas according to the ecb projections of september 2022 , economic growth will decline from 3.1 % in 2022 to 0.9 % in 2023 , before recovering to 2.3 % in 2024; whereas the outlook for euro area activity is surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty , related to the development of the war in ukraine and the energy crisis , with a number of independent forecasts predicting a recession; ### a. whereas according to the ecb projections of september 2022 , economic growth will decline from 3.1 % in 2022 to 0.9 % in 2023 , before recovering to 2.3 % in 2024; whereas the outlook for euro area activity is surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty , related to the development of the war in ukraine , inflation and the energy crisis , with a number of independent forecasts predicting a recession;


### b. whereas russia’s unprovoked aggression against ukraine has severely hit confidence , caused energy and food prices to soar and , in conjunction with other supply-side disruptions in china , compounded existing supply chain pressures; ### b. whereas greenflation and russia’s unprovoked aggression against ukraine has severely hit confidence , caused energy and food prices to soar and , in conjunction with other supply-side disruptions in china , compounded existing supply chain pressures;


### d. whereas acting within its mandate , the ecb has committed to contributing to the objectives of the paris agreement; ### d. whereas , without any prejudice to the primary objective of price stability , the ecb should also support the general economic policies in the union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the union as laid down in article 3 teu;


### 1. is deeply concerned by the unprovoked russian invasion of ukraine and by its repercussions for the european economy; ### 1. is deeply concerned by the record high levels of inflation , the flawed interpretation by the ecb of the evolution of the inflation and the pace at which the ecb takes action against it , as well as by the unprovoked russian invasion of ukraine and by its repercussions for the european economy;


### 2. highlights that the statutory independence of the ecb , as laid down in the treaties , is a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate; ### 2. highlights , while respecting the ecb's statutory independence , as laid down in the treaties , that the primary objective of monetary policy and of the ecb's mandate is to maintain price stability; considers this as an absolute prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate and its most powerful tool to fight inflation;


### 4. notes that fiscal and monetary policies have reinforced each other during the pandemic; stresses that maintaining price stability today requires even closer coordination between fiscal , monetary and structural policies , as addressing supply-side shocks requires greater supply-chain resilience and a shift away from fossil fuels; ### 4. notes that fiscal and monetary policies have reinforced each other during the pandemic; stresses that maintaining price stability today requires even closer coordination between fiscal , monetary and structural policies , as addressing supply-side shocks requires greater supply-chain resilience and a more predictable investment framework;


### 5. welcomes president lagarde’s statement that the current geopolitical crisis requires us to progress on eu fiscal integration; recalls that the economic and monetary union cannot function smoothly without a fiscal capacity at european level to respond to external shocks; ### 5. disagrees with president lagarde’s statement that the current geopolitical crisis requires us to progress on eu fiscal integration; recalls that the economic and monetary union cannot function smoothly without sound budgets in the member states , as laid down in the treaties;


### 6. echoes president lagarde’s call for a swift revision and simplification of the stability and growth pact; ### 6. takes note of president lagarde’s call for a swift revision and simplification of the stability and growth pact; recognizes however the merits of the stability and growth pact in giving member states clarity with respect to its fiscal policies; deplores that the suspension of the budgetary framework risks causing harmful effects to the internal market;


### 8. takes note of recent ecb monetary policy decisions to raise rates by 50 and 75 basis points in july and september 2022; is concerned about the implications of such policy decisions for growth and employment; ### 8. takes note of recent ecb monetary policy decisions to raise rates by 50 and 75 basis points in july and september 2022; is concerned about the pace at which the ecb took these policy decisions in comparison with other central banks;


### 9. observes that there is little evidence that rising inflation is spurring a wage-price spiral , not least given the extent of wage restraint in recent years; ### 9. observes that there is evidence that rising inflation is spurring a wage-price spiral;


### 10. recalls that the ecb strategy review reconfirmed the medium-term orientation of inflation targeting; calls on the ecb to faithfully target this medium-term horizon; ### 10. recalls that the ecb strategy review reconfirmed the medium-term orientation of inflation targeting; calls on the ecb to faithfully target this medium-term horizon; invites the ecb to define the concept of "medium term";


### 11. welcomes the ecb’s decision not to engage in quantitative tightening; ### 11. deplores the ecb’s decision not to engage in quantitative tightening;


### 12. stresses that an even transmission of monetary policy is vital to the achievement of the ecb’s price stability mandate; notes the ecb’s decision on 15 june 2022 to apply flexibility in reinvesting redemptions that are due under the pandemic emergency purchase programme; welcomes the launch of the transmission protection instrument to support the effective transmission of monetary policy across the euro area; ### 12. stresses that an even transmission of monetary policy is vital to the achievement of the ecb’s price stability mandate; notes the ecb’s decision on 15 june 2022 to apply flexibility in reinvesting redemptions that are due under the pandemic emergency purchase programme; is critical of the launch of the transmission protection instrument to support the effective transmission of monetary policy across the euro area;


### 14. recalls that the treaty on the functioning of the european union requires the ecb to support the general economic policies of the union; ### 14. recalls that , with respect to the statutory independence of the ecb , the treaty on the functioning of the european union requires the ecb to support the general economic policies of the union as a secondary objective;


### 15. calls on the ecb to coordinate with the european parliament to specify the secondary objectives; suggests taking advantage of this resolution to specify and prioritise the policy areas where the ecb is expected to deliver on its secondary objectives; ### 15. calls on the ecb to deliver on its primary objective , as this will enable the ecb to deliver on its secondary objectives as well;


### 16. considers high levels of sustainable growth and investment to be key economic goals; calls on the ecb to consider how its monetary policy stance will impact those objectives; ### 16. considers high levels of sustainable growth and investment to be key economic goals; observes that years of low interest rates doped the economy;


### 17. underlines the pivotal role of small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) in the eu’s economy and economic and social convergence and employment; ### 17. underlines the pivotal role of the private sector in general and small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) specifically in the eu’s economy;


### 18. reaffirms that achieving the union’s climate goals and ensuring a just transition are the top priorities of the eu’s general economic policies , which the ecb is expected to support; ### 18. reaffirms that the union’s climate goals and ensuring a just transition are one of the many of the eu’s general economic policies , which the ecb is expected to support;


### 19. considers that the ecb should contribute to reducing inequality; calls on the ecb to ensure that the costs of its monetary policy operations are not disproportionately borne by lower income strata; invites the ecb to assess the effects of its monetary policy decisions on employment; ### 19. calls on the ecb to ensure that the costs of its monetary policy operations do not disproportionately benefit higher income strata; invites the ecb to properly assess the effects of its monetary policy decisions;


### 20. stresses that addressing the climate emergency and the euro area’s dependence on fossil fuels touches not only upon the ecb’s secondary mandate , but also its primary mandate , given the serious threat these issues pose to price stability; ### 20. stresses that the energy policies of the last decade fuels greenflation and thus touches not only upon the ecb’s secondary mandate , but also its primary mandate , given the serious threat these issues pose to price stability;


### 21. welcomes the governing council’s decision to take further steps to include climate change considerations in the eurosystem’s monetary policy framework; ### 21. notes the governing council’s decision to take further steps to include climate change considerations in the eurosystem’s monetary policy framework;


### 22. welcomes the ecb’s announcement to decarbonise its corporate bond holdings; calls for the ‘tilting’ of the ecb’s portfolio to be swift rather than gradual; ### 22. notes the ecb’s announcement to decarbonise its corporate bond holdings; calls on the ecb to look into the risk of green asset bubbles and its possible effect on price stability;


### 23. welcomes , furthermore , the announcement on the greening of the ecb’s collateral framework; regrets , however , that this will be limited to instruments issued by non-financial corporations , which represent only a small fraction of the instruments that banks pledge as collateral; ### 23. takes note of the announcement on the greening of the ecb’s collateral framework;


### 24. regrets that the climate roadmap does not include greening of the ecb’s targeted long-term refinancing operations; stresses that providing cheap liquidity to financial institutions investing in brown activities works against the fight against inflation and is not consistent with the objectives of the paris agreement; ### 24. understands that the climate roadmap does not include greening of the ecb’s targeted long-term refinancing operations; stresses that diversification in energy sources works against inflation and could perfectly be consistent with the objectives of the paris agreement;


### 25. is concerned about the implications of higher interest rates for green investments; calls on the ecb to assess the possibility of applying differentiated rates to support green investments and disincentivise brown investments; ### 25. notes the higher interest rates for green investments; calls on the ecb to respect the principle of market neutrality;


### 26. welcomes the ecb climate risk stress test aimed at assessing the climate risk preparedness of the european banking sector; is concerned that the results published on 8 july 2022 show that banks do not have robust climate risk stress-testing frameworks and lack the relevant data; calls on the ecb to use all its available tools to ensure that banks take climate risk seriously; ### 26. welcomes the ecb climate risk stress test aimed at assessing the climate risk preparedness of the european banking sector; observes that the results published on 8 july 2022 show that not all banks have robust climate risk stress-testing frameworks and lack the relevant data; calls on the ecb to provide workable guidance and reduce red tape;


### 28. regrets that only two members of the ecb’s executive board and governing council are women; reiterates that the nominations to the executive board should be gender-balanced , with shortlists submitted to parliament; ### 28. takes note of the fact that only two members of the ecb’s executive board and governing council are women; reiterates that the nominations to the executive board should be gender-balanced , with shortlists submitted to parliament; insists that a job should always be appointed to the best woman or man;


### 31. welcomes the ecb’s progress on the digital euro project , as well as the dialogue with parliament in this regard; looks forward to the governing council reaching a decision on launching the digital euro; ### 31. takes note of the ecb’s progress on the digital euro project , yet welcomes the dialogue with parliament in this regard; underlines that a decision on launching the digital euro should be based on a sound legal basis , must respect competition in the banking landscape , must not endanger the existence or use of cash , must respect the privacy of citizens and business and it should provide a solution to a real problem;


### (18) ‘controlling interest’ means an ownership interest in an entity whereby the interest holder is required , or would have been required , to consolidate the assets , liabilities , income , expenses and cash flows of the entity on a line-by-line basis , in accordance with an acceptable financial accounting standard; ### (18) ‘controlling interest’ means an ownership interest in an entity such that the interest holder:


### (20) ‘ownership interest’ means any rights to the profits , capital or reserves of an entity , or a permanent establishment; ### (20) ‘ownership interest’ means any equity interest that carries rights to the profits , capital or reserves of an entity , including the profits , capital or reserves of a main entity’s permanent establishment;


### it is designed to pool financial or non-financial assets from a number of mostly non-related investors; ### it is designed to pool assets which may be financial and non-financial , from a number of investors some of which are not connected;


### its investors have a right to return from the assets of the fund or income earned on those assets , based on the contribution they made; ### its investors have a right to return from the assets of the fund or income earned on those assets , based on the contributions made by those investors;


### a refundable tax credit designed in such a way that it is payable as a cash payment or a cash equivalent to a constituent entity within four years from the date when the constituent entity is entitled to receive the refundable tax credit under the laws of the jurisdiction granting the credit; or ### a refundable tax credit designed in a way such that it must be paid as cash or available as cash equivalents within four years from when a constituent entity satisfies the conditions for receiving the credit under the laws of the jurisdiction granting the credit;


### if the tax credit is refundable in part , the portion of the refundable tax credit that is payable as a cash payment or a cash equivalent to a constituent entity within four years from the date when the constituent entity is entitled to receive the partial refundable tax credit; ### a tax credit that is refundable in part is a qualified refundable tax credit to the extent it must be paid as cash or available as cash equivalents within four years from when a constituent entity satisfies the conditions for receiving the credit under the laws of the jurisdiction granting the credit.


### 1. the iir top-up tax due by a parent entity in respect of a low-taxed constituent entity pursuant to articles 5 , 6 and 7 shall be equal to the top-up tax of the low-taxed constituent entity , as computed in accordance with article 26 , multiplied by the parent entity’s allocable share in such top-up tax for the fiscal year. ### 1. a parent entity’s allocable share of the top-up tax of a low-taxed constituent entity is an amount equal to the top-up tax of the low-taxed constituent entity multiplied by the parent entity’s inclusion ratio for the low-taxed constituent entity for the fiscal year.


### 2. a parent entity’s allocable share in the top-up tax with respect to a low-taxed constituent entity shall be the proportion of the parent entity’s interest in the income of the low-taxed constituent entity. ### 2. a parent entity’s inclusion ratio for a low-taxed constituent entity for a fiscal year is the ratio of:


### 6. the number of employees shall be the number of employees on a full-time equivalent basis of all constituent entities located in the relevant jurisdiction , including independent contractors provided that they participate in the ordinary operating activities of the constituent entity. ### 6. number of employees , for the purposes of the utpr percentage , means the total number of employees on a full-time equivalent basis of all the constituent entities resident for tax purposes in the relevant tax jurisdiction. for this purpose , independent contractors participating in the ordinary operating activities of the constituent entity are reported as employees.


### covered taxes accrued as an expense; ### any covered taxes accrued as an expense and any current and deferred covered taxes included in the income tax expense , including covered taxes on income that is excluded from the globe income or loss computation;


### an ownership interest in an entity of less than 10% (a “portfolio shareholding”) in respect of which a constituent entity is entitled to all or substantially all of the rights to profits , capital or reserves , irrespective of whether the constituent entity owns the legal ownership of such portfolio , for less than one year at the date of the distribution; and ### defined as ownership interests in an entity that are held by the mne group and that carry rights to less than 10% of the profits , capital , reserves , or voting rights of that entity at the date of the distribution or disposition; and


### 2. a constituent entity that does not comply with the requirement to file a top-up tax information return pursuant to article 42 for a tax year within the prescribed deadline or makes a false declaration shall be charged an administrative pecuniary penalty amounting to 5 % of its turnover in the relevant fiscal year. this penalty shall only apply after the constituent entity has not provided the top-up tax information return pursuant to article 42 , following any reminder issued , within a period of 6 months. ### 2. a constituent entity that does not comply with the requirement to file a top-up tax information return pursuant to article 42 for a tax year within the prescribed deadline or makes a false declaration shall be charged an administrative pecuniary penalty specified by member state in accordance with the national law. administrative pecuniary penalties shall be effective , proportionate and dissuasive. this penalty shall only apply after the constituent entity has not provided the top-up tax information return pursuant to article 42 , following any reminder issued , within a period of 6 months.


### for mne groups that are within the scope of this directive when it enters into force , the five-year period referred to in paragraph 1 shall start on 1 january 2023. ### for mne groups that are within the scope of this directive when it enters into force , the five-year period referred to in paragraph 1 shall start on 1 january 2024.


### for mne groups that are within the scope of this directive when it enters into force , the five-year period referred to in paragraph 2 shall start on 1 january 2024. ### for mne groups that are within the scope of this directive when it enters into force , the five-year period referred to in paragraph 2 shall start on 1 january 2025.


### 2. for large-scale domestic groups that are in scope of this directive when it enters into force , the five-year period abovementioned shall start on 1 january 2023. ### 2. for large-scale domestic groups that are in scope of this directive when it enters into force , the five-year period abovementioned shall start on 1 january 2024.


### member states shall bring into force the laws , regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this directive by 31 december 2022. ### member states shall bring into force the laws , regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this directive by 31 december 2023 provided that globe model rules were implemented by at least ten g20 members , including the usa.


### they shall apply those provisions from 1 january 2023. ### they shall apply those provisions in respect of the fiscal years beginning as from 31 december 2023.


### however , they shall apply the provisions necessary to comply with articles 11 , 12 and 13 from 1 january 2024. ### however , they shall apply the provisions necessary to comply with articles 11 , 12 and 13 in respect of the fiscal years beginning as from 31 december 2024.


### a stand-alone institution in the eu and , for the purposes of complying with the obligations of this regulation on the basis of its consolidated situation in accordance with part one , title ii , chapter 2 , an eu parent institution , an eu parent financial holding company and an eu parent mixed financial holding company shall calculate the total risk exposure amount as follows: ### institutions shall calculate the total risk exposure amount as follows:


### for the purposes set out in points (i) and (ii) , the total risk exposure amount shall be calculated in accordance with paragraph 6: ### deleted


### for the purposes of complying with the obligations of this regulation on an individual basis , the total risk exposure amount of an institution which is neither a stand-alone institution in the eu nor a stand-alone subsidiary institution in a member state shall be the un-floored total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with paragraph 4. ### deleted


### 6. the total risk exposure amount of an entity ‘i’ for the purposes set out in paragraph 3 , point (b) , shall be calculated as follows: ### deleted


### 4. for contractual arrangements offered by an institution , but not yet accepted by the client , that would become commitments if accepted by the client , and contractual arrangements that would qualify as commitments but meet the conditions for not being treated as commitments , the percentage applicable to that type of contractual arrangement shall be that provided for in accordance with paragraph 2. ### deleted


### 4. for contractual arrangements offered by an institution , but not yet accepted by the client , that would become commitments if accepted by the client , and contractual arrangements that would qualify as commitments but meet the conditions for not being treated as commitments , the percentage applicable to that type of contractual arrangement shall be that provided for in accordance with paragraph 2. ### 4. for contractual arrangements offered by an institution , but not yet accepted by the client , that would become commitments if accepted by the client , the percentage applicable shall be the one provided for in accordance with paragraph 2. for contractual arrangements that would qualify as commitments but meet the conditions specified in article 5 , point (9) , second subparagraph , for not being treated as commitments , the percentage applicable to that type of contractual arrangement shall be 0 %.”


### exposures for which such a credit assessment is not available shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 %.; ### exposures for which such a credit assessment is not available shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 % , except for exposures to smes as defined in article 5 point (8) which shall be assigned a risk weight of 85%;


### where the purpose of a specialised lending exposure is to finance the acquisition of physical assets , including ships , aircraft , satellites , railcars , and fleets , and the income to be generated by those assets comes in the form of cash flows generated by the specific physical assets that have been financed and pledged or assigned to the lender by one or several third parties (‘object finance exposures’) , institutions shall apply the following risk weights: ### where the purpose of a specialised lending exposure is to finance the acquisition of physical assets , including ships , aircraft , satellites , railcars , and fleets , and the income to be generated by those assets comes in the form of cash flows generated by the specific physical assets that have been financed and pledged or assigned to the lender by one or several third parties (‘object finance exposures’) , institutions shall apply a risk weight of 100%.


### 80 % where the exposure is deemed to be high quality when taking into account all of the following criteria: ### deleted


### (ii) 100 % where the exposure is not deemed to be high quality as referred to in point (i); ### deleted


### for the purposes of point (c) , the operational phase shall mean the phase in which the entity that was specifically created to finance the project meets both of the following conditions: ### for the purposes of point (c) , the operational phase shall mean the phase in which the entity that was specifically created to finance the project or which is economically comparable meets both of the following conditions:


### the immovable property securing the exposure is the obligor’s primary residence , either where the immovable property as a whole constitutes a single housing unit or where the immovable property securing the exposure is a housing unit that is a separated part within an immovable property; ### the exposure is to an individual and secured by a residential property , either where the immovable property as a whole constitutes a single housing unit or where the immovable property securing the exposure is a housing unit that is a separated part within an immovable property;


### 3. member states shall ensure that institutions draw up , maintain and update individual statements setting out the roles and duties of each member of the management body , senior management and key function holders and a mapping of duties , including details of the reporting lines and the lines of responsibility , and the persons who are part of the governance arrangements as referred to in article 74 (1) and their duties approved by the management body. ### 3. member states shall ensure that institutions draw up , maintain and update individual statements setting out the roles key function holders , and the persons who are part of the governance arrangements as referred to in article 74 (1).


### member states shall ensure that the statements of duties and the mapping of the duties are made available and communicated in due time , upon request , to the competent authorities. ### member states shall ensure that the statements of roles are made available and communicated in due time , upon request , to the competent authorities.


### eba shall issue guidelines , in accordance with article 16 of regulation (eu) no 1093/2010 , ensuring the implementation of this paragraph and its consistent application. eba shall issue those guidelines by [op please insert the date = 12 months from date of entry into force of this amending directive]. ### deleted


### 2. the entities shall assess the suitability of members of the management body before those members take up their positions. where the entities conclude , based on the suitability assessment , that the member concerned does not fulfil the criteria and requirements set out in paragraph 1 , the entities shall ensure that the member concerned does not take up the position considered. ### 2. the timing of the suitability assessment is subject to national law and takes place before or after the members of the management body take up their positions. where the entities conclude , based on the suitability assessment , that the member concerned does not fulfil the criteria and requirements set out in paragraph 1 , the entities shall ensure that the member concerned does not take up the position considered.


### however , where it is strictly necessary to replace a member of the management body immediately , the entities may assess the suitability of such replacement members after they have taken up their positions. the entities shall be able to duly justify such immediate replacement. ### without prejudice to the timing provided for in national law , where it is strictly necessary to replace a member of the management body immediately , the entities may assess the suitability of such replacement members after they have taken up their positions. the entities shall be able to duly justify such immediate replacement.


### competent authorities shall complete the assessment referred to in paragraph 1 within 80 working days (‘assessment period’) as from the date of the written acknowledgement referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph. ### competent authorities shall complete the assessment referred to in paragraph 1 within 40 working days (‘assessment period’) as from the date of the written acknowledgement referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph.


### 4. competent authorities that request from the entities additional information or documentation , including interviews or hearings , may extend the assessment period for a maximum of 40 working days. however , the assessment period shall not exceed 120 working days. request for additional information or documentation shall be made in writing and shall be specific. the entities shall acknowledge receipt of request for additional information or documentation within two working days and provide the requested additional information or documentation within 10 working days as of the date of the written acknowledgement of the request from competent authorities. ### 4. competent authorities that request from the entities additional information or documentation , including interviews or hearings , may extend the assessment period for a maximum of 20 working days. however , the assessment period shall not exceed 60 working days. request for additional information or documentation shall be made in writing and shall be specific. the entities shall acknowledge receipt of request for additional information or documentation within two working days and provide the requested additional information or documentation within 10 working days as of the date of the written acknowledgement of the request from competent authorities.


### 8. in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 7 , competent authorities shall carry out the suitability assessment before members of the management body take up their positions in the following entities: ### deleted


### 3. eba shall issue guidelines , in accordance with article 16 of regulation (eu) no 1093/2010 , to specify how competent authorities may identify that the credit valuation adjustment (cva) risks of institutions , referred to in article 381 of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 , pose excessive risks to the soundness of those institutions.; ### deleted


### — having regard to the commission communication of 17 june 2015 entitled ‘a fair and efficient corporate tax system in the european union: 5 key areas for action’ (com(2015)0302) , ### deleted


### (2) in finance , crypto-assets are one of the major dlt applications. crypto-assets are digital representations of value or rights that have the potential to bring significant benefits to both market participants and consumers. by streamlining capital-raising processes and enhancing competition , issuances of crypto-assets can allow for a cheaper , less burdensome and more inclusive way of financing small and medium-sized enterprises (smes). when used as a means of payment , payment tokens can present opportunities in terms of cheaper , faster and more efficient payments , in particular on a cross-border basis , by limiting the number of intermediaries. ### (2) in finance , crypto-assets are one of the major dlt applications. crypto-assets are digital representations of value or rights that have the potential to bring significant benefits to both market participants and consumers. by streamlining capital-raising processes and enhancing competition , issuances of crypto-assets can allow for a cheaper , less burdensome and more inclusive way of financing small and medium-sized enterprises (smes). when used as a means of payment , payment tokens can present opportunities in terms of cheaper , faster and more efficient payments , in particular on a cross-border basis , by limiting the number of intermediaries. it is expected that numerous applications of blockchain technology that have not yet been fully studied will create new types of business activity and business models which , together with the crypto-asset sector itself , will lead to economic growth and new employment opportunities for eu citizens.


### (4) the lack of an overall union framework for crypto-assets can lead to a lack of users’ confidence in those assets , which will hinder the development of a market in those assets and can lead to missed opportunities in terms of innovative digital services , alternative payment instruments or new funding sources for union companies. in addition , companies using crypto-assets will have no legal certainty on how their crypto-assets will be treated in the different member states , which will undermine their efforts to use crypto-assets for digital innovation. the lack of an overall union framework on crypto-assets could also lead to regulatory fragmentation , which will distort competition in the single market , make it more difficult for crypto-asset service providers to scale up their activities on a cross-border basis and will give rise to regulatory arbitrage. the crypto-asset market is still modest in size and does not yet pose a threat to financial stability. it is , however , likely that a subset of crypto-assets which aim to stabilise their price by linking their value to a specific asset or a basket of assets could be widely adopted by consumers. such a development could raise additional challenges to financial stability , monetary policy transmission or monetary sovereignty. ### (4) the lack of an overall union framework for crypto-assets can lead to a lack of users’ confidence in those assets , which will hinder the development of a market in those assets and can lead to missed opportunities in terms of innovative digital services , alternative payment instruments or new funding sources for union companies. in addition , companies using crypto-assets will have no legal certainty on how their crypto-assets will be treated in the different member states , which will undermine their efforts to use crypto-assets for digital innovation. the lack of an overall union framework on crypto-assets could also lead to regulatory fragmentation , which will distort competition in the single market , make it more difficult for crypto-asset service providers to scale up their activities on a cross-border basis and will give rise to regulatory arbitrage. the crypto-asset market is still modest in size and does not yet pose a threat to financial stability. it is , however , likely that a subset of crypto-assets which aim to stabilise their price by linking their value to a specific asset or a basket of assets could be widely adopted by consumers. such a development could raise additional challenges to financial stability , monetary policy transmission or monetary sovereignty. regulation should be seen as a way of protecting consumers but also as a way of facilitating , rather than hindering , innovation and economic initiative. failure to provide appropriate union regulation of crypto currencies would threaten the competitiveness of the union and its member states at a global level and would jeopardise the union’s ambitions of becoming a leader in the field of sustainable development , technology and digitisation.


### (5) a dedicated and harmonised framework is therefore necessary at union level to provide specific rules for crypto-assets and related activities and services and to clarify the applicable legal framework. such harmonised framework should also cover services related to crypto-assets where these services are not yet covered by union legislation on financial services. such a framework should support innovation and fair competition , while ensuring a high level of consumer protection and market integrity in crypto-asset markets. a clear framework should enable crypto-asset service providers to scale up their business on a cross-border basis and should facilitate their access to banking services to run their activities smoothly. it should also ensure financial stability and address monetary policy risks that could arise from crypto-assets that aim at stabilising their price by referencing a currency , an asset or a basket of such. while increasing consumer protection , market integrity and financial stability through the regulation of offers to the public of crypto-assets or services related to such crypto-assets , a union framework on markets in crypto-assets should not regulate the underlying technology and should allow for the use of both permissionless and permission-based distributed ledgers. ### (5) a dedicated framework is therefore necessary to provide specific rules for crypto-assets and related activities and services and to clarify the applicable legal framework. such dedicated harmonised framework should cover services related to crypto-assets where these services are not yet covered by union legislation on financial services. such a framework should support innovation and fair competition , while ensuring a high level of consumer protection and market integrity in crypto-asset markets. a clear framework should enable crypto-asset service providers to scale up their business on a cross-border basis and should facilitate their access to banking services to run their activities smoothly. it should ensure proportionate treatment of crypto-asset issuers and service providers , allowing equal opportunities for new market entry and development in the member states. it should also ensure financial stability and address monetary policy risks that could arise from crypto-assets that aim at stabilising their price by referencing a currency , an asset or a basket of such. while increasing consumer protection , market integrity and financial stability through the regulation of offers to the public of crypto-assets or services related to such crypto-assets , a union framework on markets in crypto-assets should not regulate the underlying technology and should allow for the use of both permissionless and permission-based distributed ledgers. at the same time , it shall be recognised that some tokens do not represent payment means or investment assets and as such , shall be allowed to be issued and offered freely in the union in so far as they are not offered as an investment or payment. union legislation shall not set unnecessary and disproportionate regulatory burden on all use cases of the technology , if the union and the member states aim to remain competitive in a market which is naturally global. sound regulation would preserve member states’ competitiveness in the global financial and technology markets , and provide considerable benefits to their customers accessing cheaper , faster , and safer financial and asset-management services.


### (5) a dedicated and harmonised framework is therefore necessary at union level to provide specific rules for crypto-assets and related activities and services and to clarify the applicable legal framework. such harmonised framework should also cover services related to crypto-assets where these services are not yet covered by union legislation on financial services. such a framework should support innovation and fair competition , while ensuring a high level of consumer protection and market integrity in crypto-asset markets. a clear framework should enable crypto-asset service providers to scale up their business on a cross-border basis and should facilitate their access to banking services to run their activities smoothly. it should also ensure financial stability and address monetary policy risks that could arise from crypto-assets that aim at stabilising their price by referencing a currency , an asset or a basket of such. while increasing consumer protection , market integrity and financial stability through the regulation of offers to the public of crypto-assets or services related to such crypto-assets , a union framework on markets in crypto-assets should not regulate the underlying technology and should allow for the use of both permissionless and permission-based distributed ledgers. ### (5) a dedicated and harmonised framework is therefore necessary at union level to provide specific rules for crypto-assets and related activities and services and to clarify the applicable legal framework. such harmonised framework should also cover services related to crypto-assets where these services are not yet covered by union legislation on financial services. such a framework should support innovation and fair competition , while ensuring a high level of consumer protection and market integrity in crypto-asset markets. a clear framework should enable crypto-asset service providers to scale up their business on a cross-border basis and should facilitate their access to banking services to run their activities smoothly. we should ensure the proportionate treatment of issuers of crypto-assets and service providers , guaranteeing an equal chance of market access and development in the member states. it should also ensure financial stability and address monetary policy risks that could arise from crypto-assets that aim at stabilising their price by referencing a currency , an asset or a basket of such. while increasing consumer protection , market integrity and financial stability through the regulation of offers to the public of crypto-assets or services related to such crypto-assets , a union framework on markets in crypto-assets should not regulate the underlying technology and should allow for the use of both permissionless and permission-based distributed ledgers. union legislation does not impose unnecessary and disproportionate regulatory burdens in all cases of the use of technology since the union and the member states seek to maintain competitiveness on a global market. correct regulation maintains the competitiveness of the member states on international financial and technological markets and provides clients with significant benefits in terms of access to cheaper , faster and safer financial services and asset management.


### (6) union legislation on financial services should not favour one particular technology. crypto-assets that qualify as ‘financial instruments’ as defined in article 4(1) , point (15) , of directive 2014/65/eu should therefore remain regulated under the general existing union legislation , including directive 2014/65/eu , regardless of the technology used for their issuance or their transfer. ### (6) union legislation on financial services should not favour one particular technology. crypto-assets that qualify as ‘financial instruments’ as defined in article 4(1) , point (15) , of directive 2014/65/eu should therefore remain regulated under the general existing union legislation , including directive 2014/65/eu , regardless of the technology used for their issuance or their transfer. eu consumers will certainly still use blockchain technology and services provided via crypto-assets. the use of dlt is not compulsory since the technology is still being developed but crypto-asset service providers should have the option to use off-chain business models when this is appropriate and safe.


### (8) any legislation adopted in the field of crypto-assets should be specific , future-proof and be able to keep pace with innovation and technological developments. ‘crypto-assets’ and ‘distributed ledger technology’ should therefore be defined as widely as possible to capture all types of crypto-assets which currently fall outside the scope of union legislation on financial services. such legislation should also contribute to the objective of combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. any definition of ‘crypto-assets’ should therefore correspond to the definition of ‘virtual assets’ set out in the recommendations of the financial action task force (fatf)34 . for the same reason , any list of crypto-asset services should also encompass virtual asset services that are likely to raise money-laundering concerns and that are identified as such by the fatf. ### (8) any legislation adopted in the field of crypto-assets should be specific , future-proof , be able to keep pace with innovation and technological developments , and to be founded on an incentive-based approach to secure continued legal adequacy of member states alongside the rapid innovation of the industry. ‘crypto-assets’ and ‘distributed ledger technology’ should therefore be defined as widely as possible to capture all types of crypto-assets which currently fall outside the scope of union legislation on financial services. such legislation should also contribute to the objective of combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. any definition of ‘crypto-assets’ should therefore correspond to the definition of ‘virtual assets’ set out in the recommendations of the financial action task force (fatf)34 . for the same reason , any list of crypto-asset services should also encompass virtual asset services that are likely to raise money-laundering concerns and harm the monetary policies of member states.


### (8) any legislation adopted in the field of crypto-assets should be specific , future-proof and be able to keep pace with innovation and technological developments. ‘crypto-assets’ and ‘distributed ledger technology’ should therefore be defined as widely as possible to capture all types of crypto-assets which currently fall outside the scope of union legislation on financial services. such legislation should also contribute to the objective of combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. any definition of ‘crypto-assets’ should therefore correspond to the definition of ‘virtual assets’ set out in the recommendations of the financial action task force (fatf)34. for the same reason , any list of crypto-asset services should also encompass virtual asset services that are likely to raise money-laundering concerns and that are identified as such by the fatf. ### (8) any legislation adopted in the field of crypto-assets should be specific , future-proof , should be able to keep pace with innovation and technological developments and should be based on incentives by providing adequate legal solutions for innovation within the sector. ‘crypto-assets’ and ‘distributed ledger technology’ should therefore be defined as widely as possible to capture all types of crypto-assets which currently fall outside the scope of union legislation on financial services. such legislation should also contribute to the objective of combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. any definition of ‘crypto-assets’ should therefore correspond to the definition of ‘virtual assets’ set out in the recommendations of the financial action task force (fatf)34. for the same reason , any list of crypto-asset services should also encompass virtual asset services that are likely to raise money-laundering concerns and damage the monetary policy of the member states.


### (10) despite their similarities , electronic money and crypto-assets referencing a single fiat currency differ in some important aspects. holders of electronic money as defined in article 2 , point 2 , of directive 2009/110/ec are always provided with a claim on the electronic money institution and have a contractual right to redeem their electronic money at any moment against fiat currency that is legal tender at par value with that currency. by contrast , some of the crypto-assets referencing one fiat currency which is legal tender do not provide their holders with such a claim on the issuers of such assets and could fall outside the scope of directive 2009/110/ec. other crypto-asset referencing one fiat currency do not provide a claim at par with the currency they are referencing or limit the redemption period. the fact that holders of such crypto-assets do not have a claim on the issuers of such assets , or that such claim is not at par with the currency those crypto-assets are referencing , could undermine the confidence of users of those crypto-assets. to avoid circumvention of the rules laid down in directive 2009/110/ec , any definition of ‘e-money tokens’ should be as wide as possible to capture all the types of crypto-assets referencing one single fiat currency that is legal tender. to avoid regulatory arbitrage , strict conditions on the issuance of e-money tokens should be laid down , including the obligation for such e-money tokens to be issued either by a credit institution as defined in regulation (eu) no 575/2013 of the european parliament and of the council36 , or by an electronic money institution authorised under directive 2009/110/ec. for the same reason , issuers of such e-money tokens should also grant the users of such tokens with a claim to redeem their tokens at any moment and at par value against the currency referencing those tokens. because e-money tokens are also crypto-assets and can also raise new challenges in terms of consumer protection and market integrity specific to crypto-assets , they should also be subject to rules laid down in this regulation to address these challenges to consumer protection and market integrity. ### (10) despite their similarities , electronic money and crypto-assets referencing a single fiat currency differ in some important aspects. holders of electronic money as defined in article 2 , point 2 , of directive 2009/110/ec are always provided with a claim on the electronic money institution and have a contractual right to redeem their electronic money at any moment against fiat currency that is legal tender at par value with that currency. by contrast , some of the crypto-assets referencing one fiat currency which is legal tender do not provide their holders with such a claim on the issuers of such assets and could fall outside the scope of directive 2009/110/ec. other crypto-asset referencing one fiat currency do not provide a claim at par with the currency they are referencing or limit the redemption period. the fact that holders of such crypto-assets do not have a claim on the issuers of such assets , or that such claim is not at par with the currency those crypto-assets are referencing , could undermine the confidence of users of those crypto-assets. to avoid regulatory arbitrage , strict conditions on the issuance of e-money tokens should be laid down , including the obligation for such e-money tokens to be issued either by a credit institution as defined in regulation (eu) no 575/2013of the european parliament and of the council36 , or by an electronic money institution authorised under directive 2009/110/ec. for the same reason , issuers of such e-money tokens should also grant the users of such tokens with a claim to redeem their tokens at any moment and at par value against the currency referencing those tokens. e-money tokens may be linked to any global fiduciary currency classed as legal tender. because e-money tokens are also crypto-assets and can also raise new challenges in terms of consumer protection and market integrity specific to crypto-assets , they should also be subject to rules laid down in this regulation to address these challenges to consumer protection and market integrity. however , since different crypto-assets are associated with different risks and challenges , the stabilisation of crypto-assets to a single fiduciary currency allows for its safe use for both consumers and investors.


### (10) despite their similarities , electronic money and crypto-assets referencing a single fiat currency differ in some important aspects. holders of electronic money as defined in article 2 , point 2 , of directive 2009/110/ec are always provided with a claim on the electronic money institution and have a contractual right to redeem their electronic money at any moment against fiat currency that is legal tender at par value with that currency. by contrast , some of the crypto-assets referencing one fiat currency which is legal tender do not provide their holders with such a claim on the issuers of such assets and could fall outside the scope of directive 2009/110/ec. other crypto-asset referencing one fiat currency do not provide a claim at par with the currency they are referencing or limit the redemption period. the fact that holders of such crypto-assets do not have a claim on the issuers of such assets , or that such claim is not at par with the currency those crypto-assets are referencing , could undermine the confidence of users of those crypto-assets. to avoid circumvention of the rules laid down in directive 2009/110/ec , any definition of ‘e-money tokens’ should be as wide as possible to capture all the types of crypto-assets referencing one single fiat currency that is legal tender. to avoid regulatory arbitrage , strict conditions on the issuance of e-money tokens should be laid down , including the obligation for such e-money tokens to be issued either by a credit institution as defined in regulation (eu) no 575/2013 of the european parliament and of the council36 , or by an electronic money institution authorised under directive 2009/110/ec. for the same reason , issuers of such e-money tokens should also grant the users of such tokens with a claim to redeem their tokens at any moment and at par value against the currency referencing those tokens. because e-money tokens are also crypto-assets and can also raise new challenges in terms of consumer protection and market integrity specific to crypto-assets , they should also be subject to rules laid down in this regulation to address these challenges to consumer protection and market integrity. ### (10) despite their similarities , electronic money and crypto-assets referencing a single fiat currency differ in some important aspects. holders of electronic money as defined in article 2 , point 2 , of directive 2009/110/ec are always provided with a claim on the electronic money institution and have a contractual right to redeem their electronic money at any moment against fiat currency that is legal tender at par value with that currency. by contrast , some of the crypto-assets referencing one fiat currency which is legal tender do not provide their holders with such a claim on the issuers of such assets and could fall outside the scope of directive 2009/110/ec. other crypto-asset referencing one fiat currency do not provide a claim at par with the currency they are referencing or limit the redemption period. the fact that holders of such crypto-assets do not have a claim on the issuers of such assets , or that such claim is not at par with the currency those crypto-assets are referencing , could undermine the confidence of users of those crypto-assets. to avoid circumvention of the rules laid down in directive 2009/110/ec , any definition of ‘e-money tokens’ should be as wide as possible to capture all the types of crypto-assets referencing one single fiat currency that is legal tender. to avoid regulatory arbitrage , strict conditions on the issuance of e-money tokens should be laid down , including the obligation for such e-money tokens to be issued either by a credit institution as defined in regulation (eu) no 575/2013 of the european parliament and of the council36 , or by an electronic money institution authorised under directive 2009/110/ec. for the same reason , issuers of such e-money tokens should also grant the users of such tokens with a claim to redeem their tokens at any moment and at par value against the currency referencing those tokens. e-money tokens can be referenced to any global fiat currency that is a legal tender. because e-money tokens are also crypto-assets and can also raise new challenges in terms of consumer protection and market integrity specific to crypto-assets , they should also be subject to rules laid down in this regulation to address these challenges to consumer protection and market integrity. however , as different crypto-assets raise different risks and challenges , stabilising crypto-assets to a fiat currency allows for safer uses for both consumers and investors.


### (16) small and medium-sized enterprises and start-ups should not be subject to excessive administrative burdens. offers to the public of crypto-assets in the union that do not exceed an adequate aggregate threshold over a period of 12 months should therefore be exempted from the obligation to draw up a crypto-asset white paper. however , eu horizontal legislation ensuring consumer protection , such as directive 2011/83/eu of the european parliament and of the council38 , directive 2005/29/ec of the european parliament and of the council39 or the council directive 93/13/eec of 5 april 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts , including any information obligations contained therein40 , remain applicable to these offers to the public of crypto-assets where involving business-to-consumer relations. ### (16) small and medium-sized enterprises and start-ups should not be subject to excessive and disproportionate administrative burdens. offers to the public of crypto-assets in the union that do not exceed an adequate aggregate threshold over a period of 12 months should therefore be exempted from the obligation to draw up a crypto-asset white paper. however , eu horizontal legislation ensuring consumer protection , such as directive 2011/83/eu of the european parliament and of the council38 , directive 2005/29/ec of the european parliament and of the council39 or the council directive 93/13/eec of 5 april 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts , including any information obligations contained therein40 , remain applicable to these offers to the public of crypto-assets where involving business-to-consumer relations.


### (29) a competent authority should refuse authorisation where the prospective issuer of asset-referenced tokens’ business model may pose a serious threat to financial stability , monetary policy transmission and monetary sovereignty. the competent authority should consult the eba and esma and , where the asset-referenced tokens is referencing union currencies , the european central bank (ecb) and the national central bank of issue of such currencies before granting an authorisation or refusing an authorisation. the eba , esma , and , where applicable , the ecb and the national central banks should provide the competent authority with a non-binding opinion on the prospective issuer’s application. where authorising a prospective issuer of asset-referenced tokens , the competent authority should also approve the crypto-asset white paper produced by that entity. the authorisation by the competent authority should be valid throughout the union and should allow the issuer of asset-referenced tokens to offer such crypto-assets in the single market and to seek an admission to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets. in the same way , the crypto-asset white paper should also be valid for the entire union , without possibility for member states to impose additional requirements. ### (29) a competent authority should refuse authorisation where the prospective issuer of asset-referenced tokens’ business model may pose a serious threat to financial stability , monetary policy transmission and monetary sovereignty. refusal should be based on comprehensive and clear criteria established in any secondary legislation. the competent authority shall consult the eba and esma and , where the asset-referenced tokens is referencing union currencies , the european central bank (ecb) and the national central bank of issue of such currencies before granting an authorisation or refusing an authorisation. the eba , esma , and , where applicable , the ecb and the national central banks should provide the competent authority with a non-binding opinion on the prospective issuer’s application. any opinions of the ecb should be non-binding. where authorising a prospective issuer of asset-referenced tokens , the competent authority should also approve the crypto-asset white paper produced by that entity. the authorisation by the competent authority should be valid throughout the union and should allow the issuer of asset-referenced tokens to offer such crypto-assets in the single market and to apply for admission to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets. in the same way , the crypto-asset white paper should also be valid for the entire union , without possibility for member states to impose additional requirements.


### (34) issuers of asset-referenced tokens should have robust governance arrangements , including a clear organisational structure with well-defined , transparent and consistent lines of responsibility and effective processes to identify , manage , monitor and report the risks to which they are or might be exposed. the management body of such issuers and their shareholders should have good repute and sufficient expertise and be fit and proper for the purpose of anti-money laundering and combatting the financing of terrorism. issuers of asset-referenced tokens should also employ resources proportionate to the scale of their activities and should always ensure continuity and regularity in the performance of their activities. for that purpose , issuers of asset-referenced tokens should establish a business continuity policy aimed at ensuring , in the case of an interruption to their systems and procedures , the performance of their core payment activities. issuers of asset-referenced tokens should also have a strong internal control and risk assessment mechanism , as well as a system that guarantees the integrity and confidentiality of information received. ### (34) issuers of asset-referenced tokens should have robust governance arrangements , including a clear organisational structure with well-defined , transparent and consistent lines of responsibility and effective processes to identify , manage , monitor and report the risks to which they are or might be exposed. the management body of such issuers and their shareholders should have good repute and sufficient expertise and be fit and proper for the purpose of anti-money laundering and combatting the financing of terrorism. issuers of asset-referenced tokens should also employ resources proportionate to the scale of their activities and should always ensure continuity and regularity in the performance of their activities. for that purpose , issuers of asset-referenced tokens should establish a business continuity policy aimed at ensuring , in the case of an interruption to their systems and procedures , the performance of their core payment activities. issuers of asset-referenced tokens should also have a strong internal control and risk assessment mechanism , as well as a system that guarantees the integrity and confidentiality of information received. fulfilment of this obligation aims to ensure the protection of basic rights and freedoms within the union , not to create unnecessary barriers on the crypto-asset market.


### (36) to address the risks to financial stability of the wider financial system , issuers of asset-referenced tokens should be subject to capital requirements. those capital requirements should be proportionate to the issuance size of the asset-referenced tokens and therefore calculated as a percentage of the reserve of assets that back the value of the asset-referenced tokens. competent authorities should however be able to increase or decrease the amount of own fund requirements required on the basis of , inter alia , the evaluation of the risk-assessment mechanism of the issuer , the quality and volatility of the assets in the reserve backing the asset-referenced tokens or the aggregate value and number of asset-referenced tokens. ### (36) to address the risks to financial stability of the wider financial system , issuers of asset-referenced tokens should be subject to capital requirements. those capital requirements should be proportionate to the issuance size of the asset-referenced tokens and therefore calculated as a percentage of the reserve of assets that back the value of the asset-referenced tokens. competent authorities should however be able to increase or decrease the amount of own fund requirements required on the basis of , inter alia , the evaluation of the risk-assessment mechanism of the issuer , the quality and volatility of the assets in the reserve backing the asset-referenced tokens or the aggregate value and number of asset-referenced tokens. in any case , it is recognised that excessive and disproportionate capital requirements may make the union crypto-asset environment less attractive compared with rival external markets. there should be a sensible central management mechanism at a union level in terms of openness of the market to new players and the avoidance of non-competitive regulation imposed at a regional level.


### (56) to ensure consumer protection , crypto-asset service providers should comply with some prudential requirements. those prudential requirements should be set as a fixed amount or in proportion to their fixed overheads of the preceding year , depending on the types of services they provide. ### (56) to ensure consumer protection , crypto-asset service providers should comply with some prudential requirements. those prudential requirements should be set as a fixed amount or in proportion to their fixed overheads of the preceding year , depending on the types of services they provide. nevertheless , this requirement must be proportionate and must not deter potential investors from the union market.


### (64) it is necessary to ensure users’ confidence in crypto-asset markets and market integrity. it is therefore necessary to lay down rules to deter market abuse for crypto-assets that are admitted to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets. however , as issuers of crypto-assets and crypto-asset service providers are very often smes , it would be disproportionate to apply all the provisions of regulation (eu) no 596/2014 of the european parliament and of the council44 to them. it is therefore necessary to lay down specific rules prohibiting certain behaviours that are likely to undermine users’ confidence in crypto-asset markets and the integrity of crypto-asset markets , including insider dealings , unlawful disclosure of inside information and market manipulation related to crypto-assets. these bespoke rules on market abuse committed in relation to crypto-assets should be applied , where crypto-assets are admitted to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets. ### (64) it is necessary to ensure users’ confidence in crypto-asset markets and market integrity. it is therefore necessary to lay down rules to deter market abuse for crypto-assets that are admitted to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets. however , as issuers of crypto-assets and crypto-asset service providers are very often smes , it would be disproportionate to apply all the provisions of regulation (eu) no 596/2014 of the european parliament and of the council 44 to them. it is therefore necessary to lay down specific rules prohibiting certain behaviours that are likely to undermine users’ confidence in crypto-asset markets and the integrity of crypto-asset markets , including insider dealings , unlawful disclosure of inside information and market manipulation related to crypto-assets. these bespoke rules on market abuse committed in relation to crypto-assets should be applied , where crypto-assets are admitted to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets. the principles should be proportionate and should not constitute an excessive burden , especially for smes , which could easily set up their headquarters in another jurisdiction whilst still providing union consumers with access to crypto-assets.


### 1 requirements to be fulfilled by all issuers of electronic money tokens ### 1 requirements to be fulfilled by all offerors of electronic money tokens


### 1. no electronic money tokens shall be offered to the public in the union or shall be admitted to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets unless the issuer of such electronic money tokens: ### 1. no electronic money tokens shall be offered to the public in the union or shall be admitted to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets unless the offerors of such electronic money tokens:


### issuance and redeemability of electronic money tokens ### offering and redeemability of electronic money tokens


### 1. by derogation of article 11 of directive 2009/110/ec , only the following requirements regarding the issuance and redeemability of e-money tokens shall apply to issuers of e-money tokens. ### 1. by derogation of article 11 of directive 2009/110/ec , only the following requirements regarding the offering and redeemability of e-money tokens shall apply to issuers of e-money tokens.


### 2. holders of e-money tokens shall be provided with a claim on the issuer of such e-money tokens. any e-money token that does not provide all holders with a claim shall be prohibited. ### 2. holders of e-money tokens shall be provided with a claim on the issuer or offeror of such e-money tokens. any e-money token that does not provide all holders with a claim shall be prohibited. the white paper clearly establishes the party against which the e-money token holders may file a claim.


### 3. issuers of such e-money tokens shall issue e-money tokens at par value and on the receipt of funds within the meaning of article 4(25) of directive 2015/2366. ### 3. offerors of such e-money tokens shall offer e-money tokens at par value and on the receipt of funds within the meaning of article 4(25) of directive 2015/2366.


### 4. upon request by the holder of e-money tokens , the respective issuer must redeem , at any moment and at par value , the monetary value of the e-money tokens held to the holders of e-money tokens , either in cash or by credit transfer. ### 4. upon request by the holder of e-money tokens , the respective offeror or issuer , as applicable , must redeem , at any moment and at par value , the monetary value of the e-money tokens held to the holders of e-money tokens , either in cash or by credit transfer.


### 5. issuers of e-money tokens shall prominently state the conditions of redemption , including any fees relating thereto , in the crypto-asset white paper as referred to in article 46. ### 5. offerors of e-money tokens shall prominently state the conditions of redemption , including any fees relating thereto , in the crypto-asset white paper as referred to in article 46.


### 7. where issuers of e-money tokens does not fulfil legitimate redemption requests from holders of e-money tokens within the time period specified in the crypto-asset white paper and which shall not exceed 30 days , the obligation set out in paragraph 3 applies to any following third party entities that has been in contractual arrangements with issuers of e-money tokens: ### 7. where issuers or offerors of e-money tokens do not fulfil legitimate redemption requests from holders of e-money tokens within the time period specified in the crypto-asset white paper and which shall not exceed 30 days , the obligation set out in paragraph 3 applies to any following third party entities that has been in contractual arrangements with offerors of e-money tokens:


### entities ensuring the safeguarding of funds received by issuers of e-money tokens in exchange for e-money tokens in accordance with article 7 of directive 2009/110/ec; ### entities ensuring the safeguarding of funds received by offerors of e-money tokens in exchange for e-money tokens in accordance with article 7 of directive 2009/110/ec;


### any natural or legal persons in charge of distributing e-money tokens on behalf of issuers of e-money tokens. ### any natural or legal persons in charge of distributing e-money tokens on behalf of issuers or offerors of e-money tokens.


### 1. before offering e-money tokens to the public in the eu or seeking an admission of such e-money tokens to trading on a trading platform , the issuer of e-money tokens shall publish a crypto-asset white paper on its website. ### 1. before the offeror offers e-money tokens to the public in the eu or seeks an admission of such e-money tokens to trading on a trading platform , the issuer of e-money tokens shall publish a crypto-asset white paper on its website.


### the risks relating to the issuer of e-money issuer , the e-money tokens and the implementation of the project , including the technology; ### the risks relating to the issuer of e-money issuer , offerors of e-money , the e-money tokens and the implementation of the project , including the technology;


### 4. every crypto-asset white paper shall also include a statement from the management body of the issuer of e-money confirming that the crypto-asset white paper complies with the requirements of this title and specifying that , to their best knowledge , the information presented in the crypto-asset white paper is correct and that there is no significant omission. ### 4. every crypto-asset white paper shall also include a statement from the management body of the offeror of e-money confirming that the crypto-asset white paper complies with the requirements of this title and specifying that , to their best knowledge , the information presented in the crypto-asset white paper is correct and that there is no significant omission.


### the conditions of redemption , including any fees relating thereto. ### the conditions of redemption , including any fees relating thereto and the parties against which redemption rights may be exercised. .


### 9. the issuer of e-money tokens shall notify its draft crypto-asset white paper , and where applicable their marketing communications , to the relevant competent authority as referred to in article 3(1) point (24)(b) at least 20 working days before its date of its publication. ### 9. the offeror of e-money tokens shall notify its draft crypto-asset white paper , and where applicable their marketing communications , to the relevant competent authority as referred to in article 3(1) point (24)(b) at least 20 working days before its date of its publication.


### 1. where an issuer of e-money tokens or its management body has infringed article 46 , by providing in its crypto-asset white paper or in a modified crypto-asset white paper information which is not complete , fair or clear or by providing information which is misleading , a holder of such e-money tokens may claim damages from that issuer of e-money tokens or its management body for damage caused to her or him due to that infringement. ### 1. where an offeror of e-money tokens or its management body has infringed article 46 , by providing in its crypto-asset white paper or in a modified crypto-asset white paper information which is not complete , fair or clear or by providing information which is misleading , a holder of such e-money tokens may claim damages from that offeror of e-money tokens or its management body for damage caused to her or him due to that infringement.


### any exclusion of civil liability shall be deprived of any legal effect. ### any contractual exclusion of civil liability contrary to this paragraph shall be deprived of any legal effect.


### 2. it shall be the responsibility of the holders of e-money tokens to present evidence indicating that the issuer of e-money tokens has infringed article 46 and that such an infringement had an impact on his or her decision to buy , sell or exchange the said e-money tokens. ### 2. it shall be the responsibility of the holders of e-money tokens to present evidence indicating that the offeror of e-money tokens has infringed article 46 and that such an infringement had an impact on his or her decision to buy , sell or exchange the said e-money tokens.


### 2. the marketing communications shall contain a clear and unambiguous statement that all the holders of the e-money tokens have a redemption right at any time and at par value on the issuer. ### 2. the marketing communications shall contain a clear and unambiguous statement that all the holders of the e-money tokens have a redemption right at any time and at par value on the offeror.


### funds received by issuers of e-money tokens in exchange of e-money tokens and that are invested in secure , low-risk assets in accordance with article 7(2) of directive 2009/110/ec shall be invested in assets denominated in the same currency as the one referenced by the e-money token. ### funds received by issuers or offerors of e-money tokens in exchange of e-money tokens and that are invested in secure , low-risk assets in accordance with article 7(2) of directive 2009/110/ec shall be invested in assets denominated in the same currency as the one referenced by the e-money token.


### 1. the eba shall classify e-money tokens as significant e-money tokens on the basis of the criteria referred to in article 39(1) , as specified in accordance with article 39(6) , and where at least three of those criteria are met. ### 1. the eba shall classify e-money tokens as significant e-money tokens on the basis of the criteria referred to in article 39(1) , as specified in accordance with article 39(6) , and where at least three of those criteria are met , and where the cross-border criterion for a given e-money token has been met (it is used in more than one member state).


### 2. competent authorities of the issuer’s home member state shall provide the eba with information on the criteria referred to in article 39(1) of this article and specified in accordance with article 39(6) on at least a yearly basis. ### 2. competent authorities of the offeror’s home member state shall provide the eba with information on the criteria referred to in article 39(1) of this article and specified in accordance with article 39(6) on at least a yearly basis.


### 3. where the eba is of the opinion that e-money tokens meet the criteria referred to in article 39(1) , as specified in accordance with article 39(6) , the eba shall prepare a draft decision to that effect and notify that draft decision to the issuers of those e-money tokens and the competent authority of the issuer’s home member state. the eba shall give issuers of such e-money tokens and their competent authorities the opportunity to provide observations and comments in writing prior the adoption of its final decision. the eba shall duly consider those observations and comments. ### 3. where the eba is of the opinion that e-money tokens meet the criteria referred to in article 39(1) , as specified in accordance with article 39(6) , the eba shall prepare a draft decision to that effect and notify that draft decision to the offerors of those e-money tokens and the competent authority of the offeror’s home member state. the eba shall give offerors of such e-money tokens and their competent authorities the opportunity to provide observations and comments in writing prior the adoption of its final decision. the eba shall duly consider those observations and comments.


### 4. the eba shall take its final decision on whether an e-money token is a significant e-money token within three months after the notification referred to in paragraph 3 and immediately notify the offerors of such e-money tokens and their competent authorities thereof. ### 4. the eba shall take its final decision on whether an e-money token is a significant e-money token within three months after the notification referred to in paragraph 3 and immediately notify the offerors of such e-money tokens and their competent authorities thereof.


### 1. an issuer of e-money tokens , authorised as a credit institution or as an ‘electronic money institution’ as defined in article 2(1) of directive 2009/110/ec or applying for such authorisation , may indicate that they wish to classify their e-money tokens as significant e-money tokens. in that case , the competent authority shall immediately notify the request from the issuer or applicant issuer to eba. ### 1. an offeror of e-money tokens , authorised as a credit institution or as an ‘electronic money institution’ as defined in article 2(1) of directive 2009/110/ec or applying for such authorisation , may indicate that they wish to classify their e-money tokens as significant e-money tokens. in that case , the competent authority shall immediately notify the request from the offeror or applicant offeror to eba.


### for the e-money tokens to be classified as significant , the issuer or applicant issuer of e-money tokens shall demonstrate , through a detailed programme of operations , that it is likely to meet at least three criteria referred to in article 39(1) , as specified in accordance with article 39(6). ### for the e-money tokens to be classified as significant , the offeror or applicant offeror of e-money tokens shall demonstrate , through a detailed programme of operations , that it is likely to meet at least three criteria referred to in article 39(1) , as specified in accordance with article 39(6) and that it will be of a cross-border nature.


### the eba shall give the issuer or applicant issuer and the competent authority of its home member state the opportunity to provide observations and comments in writing prior the adoption of its final decision. the eba shall duly consider those observations and comments. ### the eba shall give the offeror or applicant offeror and the competent authority of its home member state the opportunity to provide observations and comments in writing prior the adoption of its final decision. the eba shall duly consider those observations and comments.