5. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Nova Gorica.
6. The applicant was working as a cleaning lady when she allegedly developed serious medical complications in her left wrist, which could only partly have been addressed by surgery. This resulted in her using predominantly her right arm, which in turn resulted in the overburdening of that arm, giving rise to a number of medical problems. Because of these medical issues she was found, in 2006, to be incapable of further work and officially recognised as having a partial disability.
7. On 30 December 2011 the applicant applied to the Pensions and Disability Insurance Institute of the Republic of Slovenia (“the Institute”) for a disability allowance in respect of a physical impairment (nadomestilo za invalidnost – hereinafter “disability allowance”).
8. On 12 March 2012 the first-instance disability commission of the Institute, located in Nova Gorica, issued a report to the effect that the applicant was not suffering from any physical impairment stipulated in the Self-Management Agreement on the List of Physical Impairments (Samoupravni sporazum o seznamu telesnih okvar – hereinafter “the List”; see paragraph 22 below). The commission – composed of an occupational medicine specialist, an orthopaedic specialist and a physical medicine and rehabilitation physician – based its opinion on an examination of the medical records submitted by the applicant and a clinical examination of the applicant.
9. On 15 March 2012 the Nova Gorica unit of the Institute, relying on the opinion of the first-instance disability commission, dismissed the applicant’s application for a disability allowance. A copy of the first-instance disability commission’s opinion was attached to the decision. The applicant appealed.
10. On 15 May 2012 the second-instance disability commission of the Institute, located in Ljubljana, composed of an occupational medicine specialist and an orthopaedic specialist, examined the applicant’s medical file and again issued a report to the effect that no physical impairment stipulated in the List could be found.
11. On 7 June 2012 the Central Office of the Institute, referring to the conclusions of the second-instance disability commission, dismissed the applicant’s appeal. A copy of the second-instance disability commission’s opinion was attached to the decision.
12. On 12 July 2012 the applicant initiated court proceedings against the Institute before the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court seeking the annulment of the above-mentioned decisions taken by the Institute, arguing that the facts had been wrongly established, and that the procedure had not been properly conducted. She argued that because of the incapacity of her arms the functioning of her body was inhibited and greater efforts were required to satisfy her daily needs. She also argued that the opposing party should have more seriously examined all her medical problems. In her view her physical impairment amounted to at least 50% incapacity; however, the exact degree could only be determined by a medical expert. She accordingly proposed that a medical expert be appointed.
13. On 6 September 2013 the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court, sitting in a single-judge formation, dismissed the applicant’s application for a disability allowance. It observed that its role was to check whether the impugned administrative decisions had been issued in a procedure that had complied with the procedural rules, and had been based on a proper establishment of fact and proper application of the law. It furthermore observed that the claimed physical impairment was a legally relevant fact, whose degree of severity under the relevant legal provisions (see paragraph 22 below) had to be proved in order for entitlement to a disability allowance to be established. After taking into account the documents in the file and the hearing of the applicant, the court found that the Institute had correctly established the facts. Referring to the findings of the disability commissions and its own direct observation of the applicant at the hearing, it concluded that the impairment to the applicant’s health did not amount to a physical impairment within the meaning of the law.
14. Considering the above-mentioned findings sufficient to reach its conclusion, the court refused the applicant’s request for the appointment of a medical expert as unnecessary.
15. On 17 October 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal against the first-instance court’s finding. She argued that the impairment to both of her arms, her psychological illness and her headaches meant that the normal functioning of her organism was inhibited and that she had to exert greater efforts in order to perform daily tasks; that the List, which was out of date, could not possibly contain a complete list of all illnesses and injuries; that the first-instance court should not have relied on the opinions of the disability commissions and a doctor (opinions which the applicant had disputed); that the first-instance court should have appointed a medical expert, as requested by the applicant; that the applicant could not have explained all her medical issues at the hearing and that the court had not been in a position to assess the flexibility of her arms.
16. On 6 February 2014 the Higher Labour and Social Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, finding that the facts had been sufficiently established and the substantive law applied correctly. It also found that the refusal of the applicant’s request for the appointment of an expert had not undermined the legality of the decision as that decision would not have been any different had an expert been appointed. The Higher Labour and Social Court further found the following:
“A court in a judicial social dispute ... assesses the correctness and lawfulness of the impugned administrative decisions [in question] and having regard to the dispute of the full jurisdiction [the court] when quashing [the administrative decisions] alone decides on the merits. Within the context of the judicial review of the administrative decisions [the court] is of course not obliged to accept evidence [submitted by] a forensic medical expert if the expert opinions of the disability commissions at first and second instance allow for the conclusion that the negative administrative decisions are correct and lawful because they are based on an assessment by both commissions which is convincing in view of the available medical documentation and the report of [the relevant] medical examination. Such a procedural situation is found in the present case, because in the opinion of the appeal court the expert bodies in the pre-judicial administrative proceedings correctly determined that the applicant had no physical impairment.”
17. The court furthermore found that physical impairments could not be determined contrary to what was provided in the List. Moreover, the question of whether a particular condition amounted to an impairment was different to the question of whether it amounted to a disability. In the applicant’s case, although she had a recognised disability, this fact alone – without any functional problems in respect of inflexibility of joints – could not suffice to categorise her condition as one of physical impairment. The Higher Labour and Social Court agreed with the court of first instance that the disability commissions in the pre-judicial administrative proceedings had made the right assessment when concluding that the applicant had not suffered from any physical impairment. It also pointed out that the court had not been obliged to appoint an independent expert if it had been possible to conclude from the disability commissions’ opinions that the Institute’s decisions had been well-founded, as had been so in the instant case.
18. The applicant lodged an application for leave to appeal on points of law. She argued that her right to a fair trial had not been respected because the court had refused to appoint a medical expert and had assessed the applicant’s condition itself, despite lacking the necessary medical knowledge. She had thereby been deprived of her only possibility to challenge the Institute’s decisions. The applicant also drew attention to the fact that in numerous cases court-appointed experts had found the disability commissions’ fact-finding to be erroneous. She moreover argued that the first-instance court should not have based its decision on the List.
19. On 10 June 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s application, holding that there were no grounds for allowing an appeal on points of law.
20. On 21 July 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. She complained that the Supreme Court’s decision had not been reasoned. She further argued that she could not have explained all her medical issues at the hearing and that the court had not been in a position to assess the flexibility of her arms. Her only way of effectively challenging the Institute’s decision would have been by way of appointing an independent medical expert; as had been proved in the past, independent medical experts had often reached findings contrary to those of disability commissions. She invoked Article 22 (equal protection of rights) and Article 23 (the right to judicial protection) of the Constitution. She also reiterated her complaint about the reliance on the List.
21. On 10 December 2014 the Constitutional Court decided to not accept the applicant’s constitutional complaint for consideration, finding that it did not concern an important constitutional question or entail a violation of human rights which would have serious consequences for the applicant.