Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): issue in question.” Bradley Ventures, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., 371 Ark. 229, 264 S.W.3d 485, 490 (2007). UAMS maintains that collateral estoppel applies to Dodson I and II, barring both of Dodson’s pending claims, but our discussion is considerably narrower. First, I would set aside Dodson I because I am uncertain that the court’s relevant finding was “essential to the judgment.” Powell, 289 S.W.3d at 444. Second, I would set aside Count II, which is Dodson’s impliedeontract claim. Importantly, Count II is premised on UAMS’s conduct after Dodson II, i.e., sending Dodson bills for the embryo storage fees, and therefore cannot be precluded by the earlier chancery court decision. See Ripplin Shoals Land Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); cf. id. at 1042 (“[R]es judicata does not 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an assignment does not modify the terms of the underlying contract (B) recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment (C) holding that a prior judgment regarding a permit to modify an existing bridge does not preclude a plaintiff from challenging a decision on a new application describing and a different bridge design (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit a design defect products liability expert to submit an untimely addendum stating a new claim of failure to warn after defense expert refuted the basis of original design defect opinion (E) holding untimeliness of motion to modify medical insurance payment did not preclude motion to modify maintenance
Output (English): holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit a design defect products liability expert to submit an untimely addendum stating a new claim of failure to warn after defense expert refuted the basis of original design defect opinion