Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): recognized the “exceptional” nature of deific-command delusions, 200 N.J. at 249-50, 979 A.2d 312, and cited a few examples. See Diestel v. Hines, 506 F.3d 1249, 1272 (10th Cir.2007) (observing that a defendant could be found legally insane if “mental illness caused him to believe that he had a warrant from the President or a command from God to kill the victim”), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1079, 128 S.Ct. 2875, 171 L.Ed.2d 812 (2008); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 140 (Colo.1992) (determining that the insanity defense may be estab lished where “the defendant’s cognitive ability to distinguish right from wrong with respect to the act has been destroyed as a result of a psychotic delusion that God has decreed the act”); State v. Cameron, 100 Was A.2d 520, 674 F.2d 650, 653-54 (1983) (<HOLDING>). In considering the deific-command situation 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the state failed to meet its burden of showing the erroneous jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not address the issue on appeal (B) holding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to argue the trial court committed fundamental error in giving the thenstandard jury instruction for manslaughter by act even though controlling precedent in the district had approved the instruction when the instruction had been found fundamentally erroneous in another district and conflict between the two districts would have allowed defendant to seek relief in the supreme court (C) recognizing the need for amplification beyond the right and wrong instruction where the defendant claimed to have killed under the command of god (D) recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence (E) holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present
Output (English): holding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to argue the trial court committed fundamental error in giving the thenstandard jury instruction for manslaughter by act even though controlling precedent in the district had approved the instruction when the instruction had been found fundamentally erroneous in another district and conflict between the two districts would have allowed defendant to seek relief in the supreme court