Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): in keeping with the literal direction of the writ and order — not the mere fact of removal— that gives rise to Pahnke’s cause of action. We must therefore decide whether Pahnke’s immediate removal consistent with the express declaration of the writ and order is the kind of discretionary act that warrants the protection of official immunity. See Anderson, 678 N.W.2d at 656. A nondiscretionary, ministerial duty is one that is “absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” Id. at 659 (quotation omitted). Minnesota appellate courts have recently applied the distinction between discretionary and ministerial duties to various law-enforcement actions. See, e.g., Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 492 (Minn.2006) (<HOLDING>); Thompson, 707 N.W.2d at 675 (holding that 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers have no affirmative duty to search out favorable evidence for the defendant (B) holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report (C) holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search (D) holding that police officers sued in their official capacity are not liable for a violation of a privacy interest where the police department did not have a policy of deliberately failing to train its officers with respect to the confidentiality of records (E) holding that policy requiring police officers to discontinue vehicular pursuit if they could establish offenders identity imposed a ministerial duty and that officers did not have discretion to ignore the policy
Output (English): holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search