Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): 71 (1984). Un der this elaboration, states have been shielded when engaged in activities such as purchasing, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808-10, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976), selling commodities produced in a state-owned facility, Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440, 100 S.Ct. 2271, 65 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980), and contracting for the construction of public buildings, White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 205-06, 214-15, 103 S.Ct. 1042, 75 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983). Withal, this shield has relatively modest dimensions; for example, it does not extend to hybrid proprietary/regulatory activities that have downstream effects in a market in which the state is not a participant. See, e.g., S.-Cent. Timber, 467 U.S. at 84-85, 104 S.Ct. 2237 (<HOLDING>). It is uncertain whether the market 
 Holding statements: (A) holding invalid alaskas practice of selling stateowned timber with a contractual condition requiring purchasers partially to process the timber before shipping it out of state (B) holding a state has a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the state (C) holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice (D) holding that the commission reasonably interpreted the statute as requiring it to assess the condition of the industry as a whole (E) holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state
Output (English): holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice