Task: Text Completion
Input (English): school work. The district court thus correctly held that his due process claim accrued by that date and that the instant lawsuit, filed on January 13, 2009, was untimely. Even taking into account a 145-day tolling period— credited by the district court for the time when Storman’s adverse rating was on remand to the DOE under a state court order — the limitations period on Storman’s due process claim ran out in December 2009, one month before he filed his complaint. In urging otherwise, Storman argues, for the first time on appeal, that his due process claim “sounds in malicious prosecution,” Appellant’s Br. at 17-18, and thus did not accrue until the termination of disciplinary proceedings in his favor. See Palmer v. New York, 57 A.D.3d 364, 364, 870 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12 (1st Dep’t 2008) (<HOLDING>). In Storman’s view, this occurred on May 11, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding the same for malicious prosecution (B) holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor  (C) holding that section 1983 claims alleging due process violations stemming from malicious prosecution are unavailable when a state malicious prosecution action exists (D) holding that unlike malicious prosecution claim false arrest claim accrues on the date of the arrest (E) holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated
Output (English): (E)