Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): 887 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Ramirez, 770 F.2d 1458, 1461 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519, 522 (9th Cir.1983). Because dangerous people do not differentiate between misdemeanors and felonies, the law should not either. It is a fact that many officers are killed during traffic stops for mere infractions. But, here’s the rub: the facts are disputed, and the disputed facts here should have been submitted to the jury, even when qualified immunity from suit was an issue. Issues of credibility belong to the trier of fact. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution so requires. Thompson v. Mahre, 110 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir.1997) makes this as clear as the proverbial bell. See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317-18, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (<HOLDING>). As for LaLonde’s claims of excessive force, I 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity (B) holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate (C) holding that a denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision (D) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (E) recognizing that ortiz did not address the issue of whether a denial of a summary judgment motion was appealable after a final judgment if the denial was based on a legal question rather than on the existence of material facts in issue
Output (English): recognizing that ortiz did not address the issue of whether a denial of a summary judgment motion was appealable after a final judgment if the denial was based on a legal question rather than on the existence of material facts in issue