Task: Text Completion
Input (English): 318 (1987)). However, “not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of the federal labor law.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). “It is only ‘when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that [the] claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim ... or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.’” Brittingham, 526 F.3d at 278 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp., at 471 U.S. at 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904); see also Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (<HOLDING>). A careful reading of the complaint in this 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that petitions for confirmation or vacatur must show how the ultimate disposition of the matter by the federal court necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law (B) holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit (C) holding that if the resolution of a statelaw claim depends upon the meaning of a collectivebargaining agreement the application of state law  is preempted and federal laborlaw principles  necessarily uniform throughout the nation  must be  employed to resolve the dispute (D) holding that a statelaw claim is preempted and removable from state court if resolution of the claim depends on an interpretation of the collectivebargaining agreement (E) recognizing that moving to the second stage of the saucier analysis is appropriate when the existence of a constitutional violation depends upon the resolution of uncertain state law
Output (English): (C)