Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. In this case, Hill has alleged that Britt (1) sexually abused her in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) spoke "with her about her pending case outside the presence of an attorney in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and (3) unlawfully searched her and her home without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 194-227, 274. Accordingly, Hill has alleged sufficient facts that Britt violated her constitutional rights to state a claim for relief plausible on its face. Cf., e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330-31, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and its various exceptions); United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 482 (4th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 628 (4th 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel (B) holding that the same waiver standard applies when assessing whether a defendant has waived his sixth amendment right to counsel during a postindictment interrogation as when assessing whether a defendant has waived his fifth amendment right to counsel preindictment (C) holding that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of an allegedly coerced interrogation where the taped interrogation was played for jurors and the defendant crossexamined the witness at length about the interrogation (D) holding that the sixth amendment generally permits interrogation of a represented person only 1 if it was the defendant and not the government who initiated the interrogation and 2 if the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel (E) holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation
Output (English): holding that the same waiver standard applies when assessing whether a defendant has waived his sixth amendment right to counsel during a postindictment interrogation as when assessing whether a defendant has waived his fifth amendment right to counsel preindictment