Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): law also can serve as a basis for revoking an arbitration contract, so long as it does not single out arbitration agreements for special treatment. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686-88, 116 S.Ct. 1652. Here, the only possible state statutory ground that Aspen cites for revoking the forum selection clause is N.C. Gen.Stat. § 22B-3, which provides in relevant part: “[A]ny provision in a contract entered into in North Carolina that requires the prosecution of any action or the arbitration of any dispute that arises from the contract to be instituted or heard in another state is against public policy and is void and unenforceable.” Aspen correctly concedes that the FAA preempts section 22B-3. See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 4; Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683, 687, 116 S.Ct. 1652 (<HOLDING>); Newman ex rel. Wallace v. First Atl. Res. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that montana law cannot require special notice provisions in arbitration contracts (B) holding membership in new york stock exchange with concomitant obligation to be bound by arbitration provisions of its constitution and rules sufficient to constitute consent to arbitration of covered disputes whether or not arbitration provisions are specifically incorporated in contract (C) holding that proposed invalidation of the entire arbitration agreement even if the court were convinced that the plaintiff could not afford to pay for the arbitration proceedings was unnecessarily radical because the court could instead simply nullify the fee provisions of the arbitration agreement and force the defendant employer to bear the expense of arbitration (D) holding that montana law requiring all arbitration provisions to be typed in underlined capital letters was preempted because congress precluded states from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status (E) holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable
Output (English): holding that proposed invalidation of the entire arbitration agreement even if the court were convinced that the plaintiff could not afford to pay for the arbitration proceedings was unnecessarily radical because the court could instead simply nullify the fee provisions of the arbitration agreement and force the defendant employer to bear the expense of arbitration