Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): 211, 36 S.Ct. 595, 60 L.Ed. 961 (1916). Access to the courts is also not a fundamental right unless the denial of that access itself impinges on a recognized fundamental right. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658-60, 93 S.Ct. 1172, 1172-75, 35 L.Ed.2d 572, 76 (1973) (access to courts to seek welfare relief not a fundamental right). Being grounded in the common law, not the constitution, the right to receive compensation for tortious injury is simply not fundamental. See, e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 882, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 407, 506 P.2d 212, 231 (1973). Those few states which have applied strict scrutiny in a similar context are simply outside the mainstream of state constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 83, 688 P.2d 961, 973 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Under Texas case law, as in most states, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that right of access to recover damages for bodily injury was fundamental but noting that numerous other states have held otherwise (B) recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings (C) holding that the right to vote is fundamental (D) holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right (E) holding right to be fundamental
Output (English): holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right