Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): of being performed by the estate representative. See TPS Freight Distribs., Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank-Dallas, 788 S.W.2d 456, 458-59 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1990, writ denied); see also Solomon v. Greenblatt, 812 S.W.2d 7, 17 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, no writ). Thus, to the extent there is a “presumption” regarding survival of a contractual obligation after the death of one of the parties, it is exactly the converse of that advanced by the Estate and adopted by the trial court. Neither the historical treatment of alimony in Texas, nor Texas case law, indicates that the general rules of alimony—i.e., court-ordered spousal support—should apply to contracts for spousal support, particularly the rule that alimony presumptively terminates on the obligor’s death. Cf. Hutchings, 406 S.W.2d at 421 (<HOLDING>). Because Texas law mandates that we apply 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation (B) holding that an obligors voluntary unemployment would not affect his child support payments (C) holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts (D) recognizing that payments to secured creditors are only required in equal monthly amounts if property to be distributed  is in the form of periodic payments (E) holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts and under contract principles payments survive obligors death absent agreement to contrary shown by provisions of contract or surrounding circumstances
Output (English): holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation