Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): the statutory restrictions were justified. See generally 696 F.3d at 458-⅜7. 209 . Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); 210 . Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). 211 . Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (quoting this statement of the principle — as the first sentence of the opinion — from Connick, 461 U.S. at 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 143-45, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (explaining that the first case in the line, Pickering, was rooted in same rationale as 1950s-era cases invalidating loyalty oaths and political disclosure requirements made a condition of government employment). 212 . See Connick, 461 U.S. at 144-45, 103 S.Ct. 1684; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419, 126-S.Ct. 1951 (<HOLDING>). 213 . See .Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418-19, 126 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that georgias revised death 4356 penalty sentencing scheme differed from that ruled unconstitutional in furman v georgia 408 us 238 92 sct 2726 33 led2d 346 1972 because it focused the jurys attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant (B) recognizing that the first amendment limits the ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to restrict incidentally or intentionally the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens citing perry v sindermann 408 us 593 597 92 sct 2694 33 led2d 570 1972 (C) holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties the employees are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes and the constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline (D) holding that if the harm alleged in fact affects the recreational or even the mere aesthetic interests of the plaintiff that will suffice for standing purposes citing sierra club v morton 405 us 727 73436 92 sct 1361 31 led2d 636 1972 (E) holding that a new york city family court judge had no constitutionally protected property right to reappointment after her tenyear term expired and the mayor decided not to reappoint her and explaining that the fact that many or even most incumbent judges have been reappointed cannot operate to raise appellants subjective expectation to a constitutionally protected right  appellant has failed entirely to demonstrate any mu tually explicit understanding sufficient to establish a property right citing perry 408 us at 601 92 sct 2694 bd of regents of state colls v roth 408 us 564 577 92 sct 2701 33 led2d 548 1972
Output (English): holding that a new york city family court judge had no constitutionally protected property right to reappointment after her tenyear term expired and the mayor decided not to reappoint her and explaining that the fact that many or even most incumbent judges have been reappointed cannot operate to raise appellants subjective expectation to a constitutionally protected right  appellant has failed entirely to demonstrate any mu tually explicit understanding sufficient to establish a property right citing perry 408 us at 601 92 sct 2694 bd of regents of state colls v roth 408 us 564 577 92 sct 2701 33 led2d 548 1972