Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): consider first whether misdemeanor battery is an “infamous crime” for purposes of the Infamous Crimes Clause. Indiana courts have been asked on a handful of occasions to determine whether a particular offense falls within the Infamous Crimes Clause, and in each of those cases the offense was held to be an infamous crime. See Crampton v. O’Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 139 N.E. 360 (1923) (restraining freedom of elections); Baum v. State, 157 Ind. 282, 61 N.E. 672 (1901) (vote selling); Crum v. State, 148 Ind. 401, 47 N.E. 833 (1897) (felony larceny); “each of Taylor’s class D felony convictions was a felony which was punishable by imprisonment for a term of years[, e]ach was, therefore, an infamous crime” (citations omitted)); cf. Sutherlin v. Sutherlin, 27 Ind.App. 301, 61 N.E. 206, 206 (1901) (<HOLDING>). Compare Crampton, 193 Ind. at 557,139 N.E. at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an infamous crime under the arkansas constitution is a crime involving elements of deceit and dishonesty (B) holding that larceny being a felony is an infamous crime (C) holding that manslaughter was an infamous crime under a divorce statute because it was a felony (D) holding that seconddegree manslaughter was not a crime of violence and thus was not an aggravated felony warranting an aliens removal (E) holding that conviction of dueling was not an infamous crime under former state constitutional provision disenfranchising persons convicted of an infamous crime but concluding that the right to hold public office was separate from the right of suffrage
Output (English): holding that conviction of dueling was not an infamous crime under former state constitutional provision disenfranchising persons convicted of an infamous crime but concluding that the right to hold public office was separate from the right of suffrage