Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): address the precise language of the agreement. See id. at 1018. That case cannot stand for the proposition that any contractual rate of interest applies postjudgment, because that would conflict with the merger rule and would have made it unnecessary for the court in Hymel to emphasize that the contractual rate of interest applied both before and after judgment. 23 .See also Steven H. Reisberg & Kristin M. Pauley, An Arbitrator’s Authority to Award Interest on an Award Until "Date of Payment”: Problems and Limitations, 2013 Int’l Arb. L.Rev. 25, 29-30 ("To successfully ‘contract out’ of the statutory post-judgment interest rates, it is therefore critical that the language used specifically refer to the post-judgment period.”). 24 . Cf. also Carte Blanche, 888 F.2d at 264, 268-70 (<HOLDING>) 25 . See also Hosier v. Citigroup Global 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that arbitration award of postaward interest at 8 accruing from the 31st day after service of this award  until final payment of the award  was insufficient to displace federal rate (B) holding that rule 60a is the proper vehicle for correcting a judgment in order to provide for an award of prejudgment interest where among other things governing law would make the interest award automatic or the district court clearly intended to make the interest award in its prior order (C) holding that arbitral award of 10 interest to the date or dates of payment merged into the judgment (D) holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict (E) holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due
Output (English): holding that arbitration award of postaward interest at 8 accruing from the 31st day after service of this award  until final payment of the award  was insufficient to displace federal rate