Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): 1603(b)(2). If either of these arguments holds true, the district court would have removal jurisdiction. Otherwise it would not. EOTT, in its supplemental brief, also argued to the Court that an alternative basis for jurisdiction is diversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. It was brought to our attention by Appellants that plaintiff EOTT and defendant Lexington Insurance Corporation are both incorporated in Delaware. If that is indeed the case — the record is silent on Lexington’s state of incorporation — there would be no diversity jurisdiction. On remand, the district court should determine whether there was complete diversity at the time removal was sought, or, if not, at the time it entered its final judgment. Harris v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also O’Halloran v. University of 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where a litigant objects to removal but fails to apply for an interlocutory appeal to preserve an attack on removal jurisdiction the district courts judgment can be upheld if the court would have had original jurisdiction of the case at final judgment (B) holding that district court had subjectmatter jurisdiction and yet that judgment void for lack of jurisdiction to render the particular judgment (C) holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct (D) holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial (E) holding that a motion brought under rule 60b6 two years after the district courts judgment was untimely where the reason for the attack upon that judgment was available for attack upon the original judgment
Output (English): holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct