Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): days of that date. She further argues that prejudgment interest should be assessed on her punitive damage award. Id. at 4. She observes that the case relied upon by EMMC for the proposition that the Court has declined to assess prejudgment interest on punitive damages did not deal with Maine’s prejudgment interest statute. Id. She cites two cases in which she says the Maine Law Court upheld trial courts’ assessments of prejudgment interest on punitive damage awards. Id. at 5. II. DISCUSSION A. Timeliness Ms. Morin’s motion for prejudgment interest is timely. Ms. Morin brought her motion for prejudgment interest pursuant to Rule 59(e), the proper vehicle for such a motion. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e); Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 176, 109 S.Ct. 987, 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86, 90-93 (1st 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that any motion made within ten days of entry of judgment which seeks a substantive change in the judgment will be considered a rule 59e motion which suspends the finality of the judgment and tolls the time to appeal (B) holding that rule 59e applies to a motion to reconsider (C) holding that the insured was entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest and attorney fees as found by the jury (D) holding that a motion filed as a rule 59e was not a motion to alter or amend the judgment and did not toll the time to file an appeal because the motion for costs was wholly collateral to thejudgment on the merits (E) holding that a postjudgment motion for discretionary prejudgment interest involves the kind of reconsideration of matters encompassed within the merits of a judgment to which rule 59e was intended to apply
Output (English): holding that a motion filed as a rule 59e was not a motion to alter or amend the judgment and did not toll the time to file an appeal because the motion for costs was wholly collateral to thejudgment on the merits