Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): harm. Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373; see United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1989) (defining “threat” as an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage on another), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082 (1990). The Edwards court specifically held that RCW 9.61.160 does not require proof of a true threat. Edwards, 84 Wn. App. at 12. Rather, the court indicated that the statute prohibited fighting words. In its analysis, the court noted that RCW 9.61.160 proscribes some protected speech, stating that threats are protected by the First Amendment “unless they are likely to cause an immediate breach of the peace.” Edwards, 84 Wn. App. at 17. But the court concluded, without elaboration, that the majority of threats proscribed under RCW 9.61.160 are likely t 276 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373-74 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats (B) holding that there can be only one final appealable order (C) holding that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable because it is not listed in the uaa statute and because it is not final (D) holding that it is not (E) holding the court should only apply the doctrine narrowly and only under exceptional circumstances
Output (English): holding that there can be only one final appealable order