Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): See Mitchell, 376 S.W.3d at 838 (quoting MacFarlane v. Burke, No. 01-10-00409-CV, 2011 WL 2503937, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 23, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). Rabatin v. Kidd, 281 S.W.3d 558 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2008, no pet;), which Johnson relies on to support her contention that the omissions did not render her authorization ineffective, is unavailing. See id. at 562. Since the El Paso court decided that case, the Texas Supreme Court has made clear that the plaintiff must provide both the statutory notice of claim and medical authorization to toll the statute of limitations in a health care liability claim. See Carreras, 339 S.W.3d at 74; see also Nicholson v. Shinn, No. 01-07-00973-CV, 2009 WL 3152111, at *5-6 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 1, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION We hold that the authorization 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice and authorization were ineffective to toll statute because release failed to include information on plaintiffs physicians for previous five years and portion requiring her to identify her treating physicians was also incomplete (B) holding the plaintiffs failure to identify an independently created right upon which her  1983 claim rested was fatal to her claim (C) holding that a defendants argument that her psr overstated the seriousness of her past conduct was not a sufficiently specific objection to the fact of her previous conviction (D) holding victim waived physicianpatient privilege by authorizing her doctor to release her medical records to the department of criminal investigation because the information contained in her medical records was no longer confidential between herself and her physician (E) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment
Output (English): holding that a defendants argument that her psr overstated the seriousness of her past conduct was not a sufficiently specific objection to the fact of her previous conviction