Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): Inc., 117 Misc.2d 960, 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 976 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1983) (emphasis supplied). However, New York’s First Department has cautioned that courts are not to lay aside traditional notions of remoteness, proximate cause, and duty when evaluating public nuisance claims. People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 309 A.D.2d 91, 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 199, 200-02 (1st Dep’t 2003); see also id. at 198 n. 2 (explaining that public nuisance claims generally may proceed where they “involve specific harm directly attributable to defendant or defendant’s activity”). Thus, the question here is whether UCC played a sufficiently direct role in causing the hazardous wastes to seep into the ground to be held liable. Cf. State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We conclude, substantially for the reasons 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (B) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (C) holding a corporate officer individually liable without piercing the corporate veil because he specifically directed sanctioned and actively participate in the maintenance of the nuisance (D) holding corporate officers and board members liable where they were actively engaged in the management supervision and oversight of the corporations affairs (E) holding that grand jury testimony of officer and inhouse counsel for corporate defendant was properly admitted as admission against the corporate defendant
Output (English): holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract