Task: Text Completion
Input (English): 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g); Nelson v. Regions Mortgage, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 858, 863 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). It is well settled that the DJA is not a grant of jurisdiction; rather, it is a procedural device for deciding cases already within a court’s jurisdiction. Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex.1996); City of Houston v. Buttitta, 274 S.W.3d 850, 853 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (op. on reh’g). Here, York claims that the justice court’s order awarding the property to the State for the benefit of the Wise County Sheriffs Office is void allas 2003, no pet.); Davis v. Boone, 786 S.W.2d 85, 87 n. 3 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ). But see S. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 736 S.W.2d 745, 749-50 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (<HOLDING>). To prevail on a collateral attack, the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack (B) recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack (C) holding that dormant judgment is voidable and therefore not subject to collateral attack (D) holding in dictum that extrinsic evidence should be permissible to show applicability of automatic stay in collateral attack against judgment (E) recognizing collateral attack on void order
Output (English): (D)