Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): terms, as Justice Holmes put it, a “conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes.” United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168 (1910). Because most conspiracies are “clandestine in nature,” 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 12.2(a), at 266 (2d ed.2003), by “the very nature of the offense, it often may be established only by indirect and circumstantial evidence,” Wright, 224 Va. at 505, 297 S.E.2d at 713 (quoting Floyd v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 575, 580, 249 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1978)). It is a rare case where any “formal agreement among alleged conspirators” can be established. Wilder Enter, v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135, 1141 (4th Cir.1980); see also Combs v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 802, 810, 520 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1999) (<HOLDING>). As often as not, conspirators play different 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that proof of an explicit agreement is not required (B) holding that a theory of recovery pleaded but not submitted to the jury by explicit agreement need not be considered on appeal (C) holding a party breaches a plea agreement by acting in a manner not specifically prohibited by the agreement but still incompatible with explicit promises made in the agreement (D) holding that expert proof was not required for an asserted claim of ordinary negligence (E) holding that proof of an overt act is not required in a  846 conspiracy
Output (English): holding that expert proof was not required for an asserted claim of ordinary negligence