Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): a sex offender registration order generally must be made at sentencing, if at all. As we noted above, the statute authorizes “the judge who sentences” the defendant to order registration, § 13-3821(C), and it further provides that “the clerk of the superior court ... shall notify the sheriff’ of a discretionary registration order “within ten days after entry of the judgment.” § 13-3821(E). The entry of judgment occurs at sentencing. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 26.2; Whitman, 684 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 7, ¶ 1, 234 Ariz. at —, 324 P.3d at —, 2014 WL 1385396. Thus, the legislature has demonstrated a clear intent that any discretionary order that a person register as a sex offender must occur at the time of sentencing. See State ex rel. Corbin v. Pickrell, 136 Ariz. 589, 594, 667 P.2d 1304, 1309 (1983) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 14 By requiring such orders to be made at 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission (B) recognizing conflict between legislative intent and language of ors 309051 and 2 (C) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (D) recognizing language of statute as clearest indicator of legislative intent (E) holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only
Output (English): holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only