Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): with Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 103 (Tex.1992) (Cornyn, J., concurring) (arguing that officers’ decision to pursue at high speed was “an exercise of discretion”) and Carpenter v. Barner, 797 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex.App.—Waco 1990, writ denied) (noting, without discussion, that county constable was protected by immunity when he stopped a vehicle whose taillights were not operating) and Edgar v. Plummer, 845 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1993, no writ) (“The enforcement of traffic regulations by peace officers involves the exercise of their discretion.”). In other contexts, our courts have held that police officers are exercising discretion while performing their duties. See, e.g., Dent v. City of Dallas, 729 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 1272, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding officer was performing discretionary act in deciding when and how to arrest suspect (B) holding testimony of officer explaining how officer came to suspect appellant was not objectionable as hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but to show why the officer got an arrest warrant for and arrested appellant (C) holding that officers release of police dog to assist in arrest was discretionary act (D) holding that where arrest was unlawful police officer committed a battery when he touched plaintiff during arrest (E) holding that there was no arrest when suspect was moved from his own truck to a police car
Output (English): holding that officers release of police dog to assist in arrest was discretionary act