Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): D.H.’s genitals on or about August 20, 2005 (count nine); and (8) indecency with a child for causing D.H. to touch part of his genitals on or about August 20, 2005 (count ten). Hiatt argues “Counts 7 and 8 are lesser included offenses of Counts 1 and 2” and “Counts 9 and 10 are lesser included offenses of Counts 3 and 4.” He thus concludes: “[s]ince there was no proof that separate acts of assault and indecency happened on August 20, 2005 or June 18, 2005, Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10 all charged [him] with committing the same crime and result in multiple punishment.” Separate charges of indecency with a child and sexual assault of a child are proper when the evidence indicates separate offenses took place. See, e.g., Patterson v. State, 152 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); Bottenfield v. State, 77 S.W.3d 349, 358 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that when two penetrations were separated by a short period of time two independent assaults occurred (B) holding that two breaking and entering incidents that were separated by two days of time were not pursuant to a single scheme even though both may have occurred during a continuous drinking binge the court equated single scheme with a temporally integrated episode of continuous activity (C) holding evidence that county employees engaged in unconstitutional assaults on two occasions insufficient to support finding such assaults were pursuant to county policy (D) holding that two robberies of different people at the same time are two separate offenses calling for two judgments and two sentences when the defendants were convicted of taking a grandfathers wallet pistol and car and taking a grandsons fishing equipment (E) holding that a passenger in a stopped vehicle was seized when she was escorted from the car to the front of two police cars that had their overhead lights turned on separated from the driver by two officers and separated from her purse which remained in the car
Output (English): holding that two breaking and entering incidents that were separated by two days of time were not pursuant to a single scheme even though both may have occurred during a continuous drinking binge the court equated single scheme with a temporally integrated episode of continuous activity