Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): is superficially persuasive, the fundamental differences in the statutory scheme and legislative histories of the two acts require us to find federal pre-emption in the case of train speed limits. b. Vegetation Easterwood also claims that excessive vegetation on the side of the track obstructed the views of the train engineers and the decedent, thereby causing the accident. We find this claim to be partially pre-empted. Under 49 C.F.R. § 213.37 (1990), track owners must keep vegetation on or immediately adjacent to the tracks under control. Because the Secretary has chosen to regulate vegetation, Congress explicitly has pre-empted all state regulation in this area. See 45 U.S.C.A. § 434 (1986); See also Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Tex., 833 F.2d 570 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). However, while the Secretary has chosen to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that general maritime law preempts state law (B) holding that 49 usc  44112 applies to owners of aircraft and preempts state law that would hold owners vicariously liable in aircraft accidents (C) holding that the flsa preempts certain state law claims (D) holding that fifra preempts state law failure to warn claims (E) holding that 49 cfr  21337 preempts all state regulation of vegetation immediately adjacent to railbed
Output (English): holding that general maritime law preempts state law