Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): with NASD’s Motion to Dismiss Lugosch definitively reinforced Amodeo II’s ruling that documents submitted in connection with a motion for summary judgment are judicial documents for presumption-of-access purposes, 435 F.3d at 123, a principle that district courts have faithfully applied. See, e.g., Prescient, 487 F.Supp.2d at 374; Allen v. City of New York, 420 F.Supp.2d 295, 302 (S.D.N.Y.2006). Other courts in this Circuit have found the presumption applicable in other contexts, as well. See, e.g., In re San Francisco Chronicle, 07-00256-MISC (TCP), 2007 WL 2713859, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2007) (noting that presumption applies to “search warrant materials after an investigation is over”) (citing In re Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir.1990)); Sattar, 471 F.Supp.2d at 386 (<HOLDING>). It appears, however, that the post-Lugosch 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard (B) holding that letter and report filed in conjunction with defendants sentencing submission are judicial because they supported her argument at sentencing (C) holding defendants failure to object to the drug quantity assessment in the presentence report at sentencing was a waiver of the issue on appeal (D) holding that the right applies at capital sentencing in particular (E) holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing
Output (English): holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing