Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): concurrence is not required.” Id. at 366; see Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 517 F.Supp. 390, 402 (S.D.W.Va.1981), aff'd, 674 F.2d 279, 283 (4th Cir.1982) (explaining that “courts ... [have] uniformly held that defendant need not have given personal consent to the motion terminating trial”); Jeffers v. United States, 461 F.Supp. 300, 305 (N.D.Ind.1978); State v. Engleman, 634 S.W.2d 466, 470 (Mo.1982); Poretta v. Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 763, 569 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1991) (“Following the [Supreme] Court’s ruling in Dinitz, there can be no doubt that the Federal Constitution does not condition the permissibility of retrial on the defendant’s personal, explicit assent to a mistrial motion brought by his attorney.”); People v. Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 494 N.E.2d 77, 80-82 (1986) (<HOLDING>); People v. Moore, 140 Cal.App.3d 508, 189 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that defense counsel validly waived a double jeopardy claim by assenting to a mistrial when defendant was not consulted or present (B) holding that defense counsel validly waived a double jeopardy claim by assenting to a mistrial after defendant was found incompetent to stand trial in the midst of trial (C) holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds (D) holding that defendant waived double jeopardy claim by obtaining severance of charges at first trial (E) holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted
Output (English): holding that defendant waived double jeopardy claim by obtaining severance of charges at first trial