Task: Text Completion
Input (English): irom May 5, 2003 through May 10, 2005.” Kensmoe argues on appeal that the time period to renew the judgment by affidavit under N.D.C.C. § 28-20-21 was not tolled and the “Georgia rulings should not be used in the decision of a North Dakota judgment.” In her reply brief, Kensmoe also distinguishes F/S Manufacturing’s reliance on In re Lobherr, 282 B.R. 912 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.2002). Kensmoe’s argument necessarily includes whether the district court erred in deciding the time period in N.D.C.C. § 28-20-21 was tolled by her prior bankruptcy proceedings, and we reject F/S Manufacturing’s claim about waiver. [¶ 14] We approach with caution the complexity of interpreting the Bankruptcy Code and its interplay with state law. See, e.g., Production Credit Ass’n v. Burk, 427 N.W.2d 108 (N.D.1988) (<HOLDING>), disagreed with by In re Hoffinger Indus., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding  108c2 applied to extend the deadline to file a notice of appeal in state court until at least 30 days after notice of the stays termination or expiration (B) holding  108b2 extended unexpired period for filing appeal but holding appeal was untimely (C) holding 11 usc  108b2 applied to extend unexpired 60day period to file notice of appeal to 60 days after order for relief but that appeal was untimely (D) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal after an untimely filing of a notice of appeal (E) holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal
Output (English): (C)