Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): or that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.” Id. at 835. The dispositive issue in the instant case is whether, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs have pled sufficient allegations to show that drag racing is a “dangerous condition” as that term is used in § 537.600.1(2). See Johnson v. City of Springfield, 817 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo.App.1991). In Missouri, three major lines of case authority define the term “dangerous condition” as found in § 537.600.1(2). See parallel discussions in Johnson, supra. In the first line of case authority, “dangerous condition” has a narrow meaning and refers to defects in the physical condition of a public entity’s property. Kanagawa, 685 S.W.2d at 835; Chase v. City of St. Louis, 781 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Mo.App.1989) (<HOLDING>); Zubcic v. Mo. Portland Cement Co., 710 S.W.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire (B) holding that the land contract vendor was entitled to fire insurance benefits when the fire occurred after a judgment for possession was obtained by the vendor pursuant to summary forfeiture proceedings (C) holding that petition failed to allege fire hydrants were physically defective where fire hydrants did not work and plaintiffs decedent was killed in fire (D) holding that the relationship between fire insurance regulation and rating fire loss fire prevention and fire investigation is rational and reasonable (E) holding where the defendants conduct in setting a fire was a proximate cause of a fire fighters death the death occurred in course of and in furtherance of the arson
Output (English): holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire