Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): vis-á-vis a jointly tried co-defendant. 391 U.S. at 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620. A statement is powerfully incriminating only when it is inculpatory on its face. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1702. The confession in Bruton fit that description because it identified both the declarant and his codefendant by name as the perpetrators of the crime. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Statements that are incriminating only when linked to other evidence in the case do not trigger application of Bruton’s preclusionary rule. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702. This criterion is easier to state than to apply; for example, it does not allow a prosecutor merely to delete a codefen-dant’s name. See, e.g., Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Zuñiga and Vega challenge 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a codefendants sentence is not relevant to an appellants guilt innocence or punishment (B) holding that simply replacing a codefendants name with a symbol or a blackedout space is insufficient to wrest an inculpatory statement from brutons precedential orbit (C) holding recording of eyewitnesss inculpatory statement made in custodial interrogation testimonial in nature (D) holding that a defendant was pot unduly surprised by the delayed disclosure of evidence showing that he made an inculpatory statement (E) holding that where a defendants name is replaced with a neutral pronoun as long as identification of the defendant is clear or inculpatory only by reference to evidence other than the redacted confession and a limiting instruction is given to the jury there is no bruton violation
Output (English): holding that where a defendants name is replaced with a neutral pronoun as long as identification of the defendant is clear or inculpatory only by reference to evidence other than the redacted confession and a limiting instruction is given to the jury there is no bruton violation