Task: Text Completion
Input (English): 19, 28, 482 N.Y.S.2d 810, 818 (2d Dep’t 1984); Family Court Act § 439(e). Nevertheless, the issues underlying both orders were reviewable on appeal from the state court’s final order dated May 30, 2001. See Matter of Ise-Smith v. Orok-Edem, 296 A.D.2d 414, 414-15, 745 N.Y.S.2d 461, 461 (2d Dep’t 2002). To this extent, it appears that Edem was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the challenged orders, which suggests that his due process claim is frivolous. We do not, however, reach that issue. Rather, we summarize the state proceedings only to illustrate that Edem’s procedural due process claims are, in fact, inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment, and thus, outside our subject matter jurisdiction. See Phifer v. City of New York, 289 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). As we observed in Hoblock v. Albany County 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that this court may not review family court determinations that were decided after providing plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues (B) holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court (C) holding that representation issues are matters relegated to the board representation issues may not be decided by contract and thus may not be decided by an arbitrator (D) holding that the concept of collateral estoppel cannot apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case (E) holding that the petitioner who was denied further appellate review by the supreme judicial court had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claim in the state trial court and appeals court and thus stone precluded federal habeas relief
Output (English): (A)