Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): on James’ EEO complaint. James’ EEO complaint was filed on April 2, 1986. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1613.281(b), James was authorized to file suit in federal district court “[a]fter one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days from the date of filing a complaint with the agency if there has been no decision.” Thus, his original complaint was filed prior to the time of authorization. However, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on March 2,1987. More than 180 days had elapsed by this time. The court concludes that the 180-day requirement in 29 C.F.R. § 1613.281(b) is better viewed as a condition precedent rather than as a jurisdictional prerequisite. Cf Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983) (<HOLDING>); see also Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 
 Holding statements: (A) holding exhaustion of regulatory administrative process is jurisdictional prerequisite to district court hearing discrimination claim (B) holding that the filing deadline under title vii is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling (C) holding that the receipt of a righttosue letter in a title vii claim is a condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite (D) holding that the requirement of an actual case or controversy is a jurisdictional prerequisite under the constitution (E) holding that a coa is a jurisdictional prerequisite
Output (English): holding exhaustion of regulatory administrative process is jurisdictional prerequisite to district court hearing discrimination claim