Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): N.Y. Dep’t of Fin., 620 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir.2010). a. Malpractice Claim An action for professional malpractice requires proof of damages actually and proximately caused by the malpractice. Kaminsky v. Herrick, Feinstein LLP, 59 A.D.3d 1, 9, 870 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5-6 .(1st Dep’t 2008). Here, Solin’s claim for malpractice damages fails because it falls within New York’s proscription on the recovery of tax liability. See Gertler v. Sol Masch & Co., 40 A.D.3d 282, 283, 835 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (1st Dep’t 2007) (“[Tjaxes ... are not recoverable under New York law.”). Indeed, New York applies this rule even when the tax liability is allegedly attributable to the defendant’s mistaken advice. See Fownes Bros. & Co. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 92 A.D.3d 582, 583, 939 N.Y.S.2d 367, 367 (1 st Dep’t 2012) (<HOLDING>); see also Gaslow v. KPMG LLP, 19 A.D.3d 264, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that consequential damages are not to be considered (B) holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it (C) holding that plaintiffs consequential damages were too speculative because no evidence connected damages to defendants breach of contract (D) holding that operates as a charge of debtors in personam tax liability not debtors in rem tax liability (E) holding where plaintiffs transfer between employee benefit plans generated tax liability that fact that plaintiffs may have performed the transfer pursuant to advice from defendants does not convert plaintiffs tax liability into consequential damages
Output (English): holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it