Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): but data-gathering that preceded it. See Seamon, supra, at 735-36 (quoting Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286). In the latter case, a court need not second-guess the decision's wisdom; it need only examine the decisionmaking process to determine whether the negligently produced data affected it. See id. 16 . The Court here used the term in its common-law sense, which distinguishes "discretionary” from "ministerial” acts, and not in its distinct but related FTCA sense. 17 . The Court has limited Mitchell, allowing immediate appeal only of denials of immunity turning on questions of law, not sufficiency of evidence. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995), lim'd in turn by Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312-13, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 18 . As illustrated by the opinion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact (B) holding that the protection of the double jeopardy clause does not preclude a defendant from being charged under a statute  defining as the criminal offense a discrete act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a distinguishable discrete act that is a separate violation of the statute (C) holding that genuine factual dispute does not preclude appeal of discrete ruling on pure legal issue (D) recognizing that order denying confirmation of a plan does not resolve a discrete issue (E) recognizing that ruling of one trial judge does not preclude another trial judge reconsidering interlocutory ruling
Output (English): recognizing that ruling of one trial judge does not preclude another trial judge reconsidering interlocutory ruling