Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): (1981); W. Page Keeton, Pros-ser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 128, at 972 (5th ed.1984). [¶ 27] Although Brown, 2011 SD 21, ¶ 39, 798 N.W.2d 422, suggests attorney fees through appeal may be appropriate for slander of title under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 633(l)(b), we have found no cases, and the parties have cited none, explicitly addressing the propriety of awarding attorney fees on appeal in a quiet title action involving slander of title under a statutory provision comparable to N.D.C.C. § 49-19.1-09. In another context, however, this Court has decided statutory provisions authorizing an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party entitle that party to attorney fees in successfully defending a judgment on appeal. Troutman v. Pierce, Inc., 402 N.W.2d 920, 925 (N.D.1987) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 28] The plain language of N.D.C.C. § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a summary judgment was final and appealable even though a request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the alaa remained pending because any award of attorney fees is collateral to the judgment (B) holding that offer of judgment statute does not provide a basis for an award of attorney fees and costs unless dismissal is with prejudice (C) holding that prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants seeking attorney fees are to be treated alike (D) holding a prevailing consumers attorneyfee award under the magnusonmoss act at the trial level should not be dissipated by uncompensated costs expenses and attorney fees in successfully defending a judgment on appeal (E) holding parties agreement provided clear contractual justification for the award of costs and expenses including attorneys fees to the prevailing party
Output (English): holding that a summary judgment was final and appealable even though a request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the alaa remained pending because any award of attorney fees is collateral to the judgment