Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 346-47 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865). Sgt. Lubelan testified that he saw an officer exposed through the hatch of the LAV before he fired at Rohm, and that he fired at Rohm in order to prevent Rohm from firing at the LAV. Even assuming that Rohm was not aiming his rifle at the LAV when he was shot, we nonetheless conclude that Sgt. Lubelan had probable cause to believe that Rohm posed a serious threat to the officers in the LAV — particularly Sgt. Homrich — due to his proximity to the LAV while armed with a rifle, his prior violent behavior, and his continued refusal to surrender and face arrest. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694 (<HOLDING>). Because Livermore has not shown that Sgt. 
 Holding statements: (A) recognizing that deadly force is only justified where a suspect poses an immediate threat (B) holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon (C) holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm (D) holding the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer or to others (E) holding that it would be clearly unreasonable to deny a police officer the ability to neutralize the threat of physical harm if he has reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous
Output (English): holding that it would be clearly unreasonable to deny a police officer the ability to neutralize the threat of physical harm if he has reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous