Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): found in this case, that the determinative weight of marijuana for purposes of the trafficking statute is when the marijuana is usable or suitable for consumption. We disagree. Defendant cites United States v. Lipp, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Kan. 1999), aff’d, 215 F.3d 1338 (2000), as guidance for their interpretation of “marijuana” as read in the North Carolina statutes. The Lipp case, also dealing with moist marijuana and its weight for the purpose of federal sentencing, interpreted 1993 and 1995 amend ments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (FSG). These amendments came in response to district courts that were issuing sentences for trafficking based on a weight of marijuana that included its natural water content. See United States v. Pinedo-Montoya, 966 F.2d 591 (10th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Garcia, 925 F.2d 170 (7th 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencing courts drugquantity calculation can exceed the jurys drugquantity calculation  by over fifty times  so long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the maximum allowed by the jurys calculation and the sentencing courts calculation was supported by sufficient evidence (B) holding that the weight of the blotter paper used as the distribution medium for lsd is included in the weight of the drug for sentencing purposes (C) holding that where defendant objected in the district court only to the loss calculation and not specifically to the calculation of restitution the issue of restitution was not properly presented  to the district court (D) holding that the district court properly considered the moisture content in the calculation of the weight of the marijuana for sentencing purposes (E) holding that district courts calculation of drug quantity under guidelines for purposes of sentencing did not violate stare decisis under neal because such calculation did not conflict with any controlling sentencing precedent
Output (English): holding that district courts calculation of drug quantity under guidelines for purposes of sentencing did not violate stare decisis under neal because such calculation did not conflict with any controlling sentencing precedent