Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): (Bankr.N.D.Iowa 1998); see also MCorp Management Solutions, Inc. v. Thurman (In re Thurman), 901 F.2d 839, 841 (10th Cir.1990); see also Northeast Neb. Econ. Dev. Dist. v. Wagner (In re Wagner), 305 B.R. 472, 475-76 (8th Cir. BAP 2004). 12 . Cassis, 220 B.R. at 984. 13 . Retz, 606 F.3d at 1204 n. 10. 14 . Equitable Bank v. Miller (In re Miller), 39 F.3d 301, 307 (11th Cir.1994); 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 727.02[3][c] (16th ed. 2014). 15 . The Supreme Court has recently reminded bankruptcy courts to follow the statutory text. Law v. Siegel, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014) (“[I]n exercising ... statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions.”); see also Gannett v. Carp (In re Carp), 340 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also First Tex. Sav. Ass’n, Inc. v. Reed 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that even if an insurance broker is the agent of the insurance company for purposes of soliciting and procuring the policy that would not necessarily make the broker the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of receiving notice of suits and claims (B) holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor (C) holding that the employer was not the insurers agent (D) holding that absent an actionable injury to one spouse the other spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium (E) holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that the code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse
Output (English): holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that the code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse