Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): 909, 435 P.2d 248, 249 (1967). The plain language of I.R.E. 201(d) requires specificity in identifying what documents or items the district court is requested take notice of. See, e.g., Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 835, 243 P.3d 642, 651 (2010). The Idaho Supreme Court held that where a party is requesting that a court take judicial notice of a document or items, that party must state with particularity what he or she is asking the court to take notice of. Id. at 835, 243 P.3d at 652. Where a party does not meet this requirement, it is improper for a court to take judicial notice under I.R.E, 201(d). Taylor, 149 Idaho at 835, 243 P.3d at 652. If a party fails to specify which material from the underlying case he or she is requesting, judicial notice is not mandatory. See id. (<HOLDING>). Fortin argues that Taylor is not controlling 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice (B) holding that a notice to produce personal papers was unconstitutional and void and that the inspection by the district attorney of said invoice when produced in obedience to said notice and its admission in evidence by the court were erroneous and unconstitutional proceedings (C) recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket (D) holding that where it was erroneous for the district court to take judicial notice it certainly cannot be said that such notice was mandatory and therefore ire 201d is inapplicable (E) holding statute requiring parties in tax suit to take notice of subsequent pleadings was not unconstitutional when city failed to take such notice
Output (English): holding statute requiring parties in tax suit to take notice of subsequent pleadings was not unconstitutional when city failed to take such notice