Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673. We assume, without deciding, that the Sexual Solicitation Statute may place some incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms, but we conclude that each of the O’Brien factors is met in this case. Thus, any incidental limitation on expression protected by the First Amendment is justified. We will address each factor in turn. First, it is within the power of the state to enact the Sexual Solicitation Statute. “The traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals, and [the U.S. Supreme Court has] upheld such a basis for legislation.” Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (<HOLDING>); see, e.g., Arcara, 478 U.S. at 711, 106 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that significant involvement of government agency charged with protecting public environmental interest satisfies public participation requirement in certain circumstances (B) holding that a public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality (C) recognizing michigans rape shield law furthers the legitimate state interests of protecting a sexual assault victim from surprise harassment and unnecessary invasions of privacy (D) holding that governments asserted interest in protecting the privacy of arrestees is substantial under central hudson (E) recognizing minnesotas interest in protecting the interests of the child
Output (English): recognizing michigans rape shield law furthers the legitimate state interests of protecting a sexual assault victim from surprise harassment and unnecessary invasions of privacy