Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): and Neglect Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-4-1 to-34 (1993, as amended through 2005), in using the wrong statutory standard. Grandmother asks that, based on this error, the case be remanded for a new hearing on the issues of placement and visitation. {11} Grandmother’s argument that the district court erred because it used an arbitrary and capricious standard in evaluating the placement of Child by CYFD fails. In reviewing whether CYFD properly placed Child, the district court stated that CYFD’s determination that Grandmother was not an appropriate adoptive placement for Child was not “arbitrary or capricious.” The district court did not err in using this standard because it was reviewing a discretionary act by CYFD. See In re Jacinta M., 107 N.M. 769, 771, 764 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>). CYFD has the discretion to place children 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the childrens services division decision to stop making child care payments for recipients of public assistance was not an internal management directive because the decision did not affect individuals solely in their capacities as members of the agency involved the plaintiff and others similarly situated were entitled to proper notice and an opportunity to be heard before childrens services division or the department of human resources could issue a rule terminating the program of direct childcare payments (B) holding that the trial court exceeded its power in ordering the department of mental retardation and developmental disabilities to provide daycare services when those services were being eliminated because of staff reductions because ordering the department to implement specific facilities and programs is beyond the judicial function and exceeds the power of the courts (C) holding that the childrens court exceeded its authority in prohibiting the human services department from placing a child with her brother (D) holding that the department of human services policy manual set forth ministerial duties to act to care for and protect children in its custody (E) holding that congress had exceeded its authority by using its section five power under the fourteenth amendment to enact the statute
Output (English): holding that the childrens services division decision to stop making child care payments for recipients of public assistance was not an internal management directive because the decision did not affect individuals solely in their capacities as members of the agency involved the plaintiff and others similarly situated were entitled to proper notice and an opportunity to be heard before childrens services division or the department of human resources could issue a rule terminating the program of direct childcare payments