Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): I believe Alvarez has established enough facts to survive summary judgment. That is because “[o]nce there is evidence of improper conduct and subjective offense, the determination of whether the conduct rose to the level of abuse is largely in the hands of the jury.” Howard v. Burns Bros., Inc., 149 F.3d 835, 840 (8th Cir.1998). I recognize that the hostile environment factor is difficult to analyze in light of our varying jurisprudence. Compare Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir.2002) (finding that a single request for a relationship, four or five isolated touching incidents, a request to draw a phallic symbol and teasing in the form of a gender-based poster were not severe enough to meet this element); with Eich v. Bd. of Regents, 350 F.3d 752 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). However, “[ejach case must stand on its own 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that conduct of supervisor who grabbed plaintiff on the buttocks and made suggestive comments while she was conversing with another employee was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a term or condition of plaintiffs employment (B) recognizing that a plaintiff can demonstrate that samesex harassment is because of sex by showing that the conduct was motivated by the coworkers sexual desire for persons of the same sex (C) holding that several touching incidents standing behind the plaintiff simulating a sex act and another incident of simulating a sex act were severe or pervasive enough to affect a term or condition of employment (D) holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where over twoweek period a coworker stood behind the plaintiff to create physical contact surreptitiously looked at the plaintiffs genitals in the restroom and engaged in unwanted touching (E) holding that conduct that a jury finds to be based on sex and not motivated by nondiscriminatory reasons cannot later be found by a district court to lack an intent to discriminate on the basis of sex
Output (English): holding that conduct that a jury finds to be based on sex and not motivated by nondiscriminatory reasons cannot later be found by a district court to lack an intent to discriminate on the basis of sex