Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): we proceed to the first step under Edwards-, whether SA KS’s communication with the appellee post-invocation of counsel — but prior - to the appellee’s subsequent waiver — constituted an interrogation. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880; Mil. R. Evid. 305(e)(1). Did SA KS’s Communication Constitute an Interrogation? For purposes of this Article 62, UCMJ, appeal, we review de novo the question of whether SA KS’s communication with the appellee post-invocation of counsel constituted an interrogation. Kosek, 41 M.J. at 63. The military judge ruled that SA KS’s request for consent to search did not constitute an interrogation. AE CXX at 14. We agree. A request to consent to search does not constitute an interrogation. See United States v. Burns, 33 M.J. 316, 320 (C.M.A.1991) (<HOLDING>) (citation and internal quotation marks 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of miranda  (B) holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent (C) holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime (D) holding under state constitution that validity of consent search requires knowledge of right to refuse consent (E) holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion
Output (English): holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of miranda