Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): to use the latter route to circumvent Congress’s apparent intent in enacting the AEDPA to bar all review of such decisions. Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1046 (D.C.Cir.1998). In 1997, the Ninth Circuit held that the new restrictions on successive petitions do not prevent a petitioner from bringing a § 2241 claim after he has already brought a § 2255 claim. See United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278 (9th Cir.1997). Furthermore, in 1998, the Second Circuit held that a § 2255 petition that followed a § 2241 petition was not barred. See Corrao v. United States, 152 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir.1998), citing Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474 (2d Cir.1 the execution of a sentence are properly raised in a § 2241 petition”); United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 489 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Corrao, 152 F.3d at 191 (“a motion under § 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that subject matter jurisdiction under  2241 is present in the custodial court when the petition challenges the manner location or condition of a sentences execution (B) holding that a petition under  2241 attacks the execution of a sen tence while a  2255 petition attacks the validity of a judgment and sentence (C) holding that an attack on the computation and execution of a sentence must come in the form of a  2241 petition (D) holding that  2255 is unavailable to attack execution of sentence (E) holding that it is well settled in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that  2255 will lie only to attack the imposition of a sentence and that an attack on the execution thereof may be accomplished only by way of habeas corpus in the district of confinement
Output (English): holding that  2255 is unavailable to attack execution of sentence