Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): Division and New York Court of Appeals specifically declined to decide the issue of whether was properly precluded under C.P.L. § 250.10(2), the only court that adjudicated the claim on the merits was the County Court. Time has proven that the trial judge correctly construed C.P.L. § 250.10(2) as applying to lay evidence, such as a defendant’s own testimony, offered in support of an EED defense: Recently, the New York Court of Appeals answered in the affirmative the question it explicitly left open in Smith’s case— “whether a defendant seeking to raise an extreme emotional disturbance defense is required to provide notice pursuant to CPL 250.10 if the intent is to rely solely on lay testimony to prove the affirmative defense.” People v. Diaz, 904 N.Y.S.2d 343, 930 N.E.2d at 266 (<HOLDING>). Because the sanction of preclusion bears on a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that error in classifying agents testimony as lay opinion and failing to subject it to the disclosure requirements was harmless (B) holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace which was based upon personal knowledge of employees was properly admitted (C) holding that a defendant must demonstrate that the governments intrusion upon his relationship with his attorney created a possibility of either injury to his defense or benefit to the government in order to establish a violation of the right to counsel (D) holding that in a seconddegree murder prosecution defendant was required to provide statutory notice of his intent to rely upon the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance eed notwithstanding his stated intention to support that defense with lay testimony only the notice requirements goals of preventing unfair surprise and allowing the prosecution an opportunity to obtain evidence from any source were implicated whether defendant sought to establish mental infirmity through expert or lay testimony (E) holding that it was error to allow a police officer who was admitted as a lay witness after a prosecution motion to admit him as an expert was denied for lack of timeliness to give testimony as to a matter about which he had no personal knowledge
Output (English): holding that error in classifying agents testimony as lay opinion and failing to subject it to the disclosure requirements was harmless