Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261, et seq. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that the summary judgment for Ronson “must be sustained because the FHSA preempts any state law warning requirements other than those imposed by the FHSA and its implementing regulations.” Id. Similar to Comeaux, the Court must inquire whether any of Plaintiffs’ claims are based on the theory that Mattel’s warning was inadequate. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524, 112 S.Ct. at 2621 (explaining that claims based upon a failure-to-warn theory which require a showing that “advertising or promotions should have included additional, or more clearly stated warnings” different from federal regulatory requirements are preempted); Netland v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 284 F.3d 895, 900 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 739-40 
 Holding statements: (A) holding state failuretowarn claims were preempted because any warning label linking said drugs to suicide would have been false and misleading (B) holding in a comparable case that statelaw claims premised upon failuretowarn or inadequate warning theories that would result in the imposition of additional or different labeling requirements are nonetheless preempted regardless of the guise under which the claim is presented (C) holding that failuretowarn claims based on theory that faarequired warnings are insufficient are preempted (D) holding that a failuretowarn claim against a pharmaceutical company was not impliedly preempted (E) holding that all claims premised upon a failure to warn after 1969 are preempted
Output (English): holding that a failuretowarn claim against a pharmaceutical company was not impliedly preempted