Task: Text Completion
Input (English): the Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits that actual innocence applies to a sentencing enhancement. Even assuming it does, courts applying actual innocence for non-capital sentencing have noted that for purposes of the actual innocence exception, “ ‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604. Thus, some circuits have held that “for the actual innocence exception to apply in the noncapital sentencing context, a movant must show that he is factually innocent of the conduct or underlying crime that serves as the predicate for the enhanced sentence.” McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1198-99 (11th Cir.2011) (involving career offender guidelines). See also United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 284 (4th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); cf. Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 381-82 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the actual innocence exception applies to a sentencing enhancement in a noncapital sentence (B) holding that no complete innocence exception to the doench doctrine exists (C) holding under acca that the actual innocence of sentence exception applies in the context of habitual offender provisions only where the challenge to eligibility stems from factual innocence of the predicate crimes and not from the legal classification of the predicate crimes (D) holding that as to each predicate act the plaintiff must allege the time place and contents of the misrepresentations (E) holding that presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt standard are constitutionally required in criminal cases
Output (English): (C)