Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): need not be witnessed. See Dove v. Dove, 285 Ga. 647 (680 SE2d 839) (2009). However, such contracts were long deemed invalid as contrary to our State’s public policy favoring marriage, and while they are now enforceable under some circumstances, they must meet other requirements. See id. at 650-651; Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 641 (2 al agreements settling property rights of the parties at death are made in contemplation of marriage”). On the other hand, contracts that provide for alimony payments in the event of divorce, or that direct how property should be distributed if the parties divorce, are considered to be made in contemplation of divorce rather than marriage alone and thus are not subject to OCGA § 19-3-63’s attestation requirement. See Lawrence, 286 Ga. at 311-312 (<HOLDING>); Dove, 285 Ga. at 37 (“This Court has 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that an agreement that defined the parties respective rights in the property of the other and waived each spouses right in the others property either before or after death was a marriage contract (B) holding that an agreement which both addressed alimony and divided the parties property in the event of divorce was not a marriage contract subject to ocga  19363 (C) holding that parties can stipulate that they were both parties to a contract and thus the real parties in interest even when one party did not sign the contract (D) holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of  an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred (E) holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties
Output (English): holding that an agreement that defined the parties respective rights in the property of the other and waived each spouses right in the others property either before or after death was a marriage contract