Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): later, Bain filed the rule 3.853 motions that are the subject of this appeal. In summarily denying both motions, the postconviction court found that they were untimely, in part because Bain’s delay in refiling was an abuse of process. However, due to an amendment to section 925.11, Florida Statutes, enacted on June 23, 2006, no time limit applies to rule 3.853 motions for postconviction DNA testing filed on or after October 1, 2005. See Ch. 2006-292, §§ 1, 4, at 2204-7, Laws of Fla. (codified in § 925.11, Fla. Stat. (2006)). Moreover, in dismissing Bain’s 2003 rule 3.853 motion without prejudice, the postconviction court set no filing deadline. Consequently, the postconviction court erroneously denied the 2006 motions as untimely. See Jumper v. State, 903 So.2d 264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>) Because Bain timely filed his pro se motion 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion (B) holding defendant was not barred from raising sentencing issue in rule 3850 motion by virtue of prior rule 3850 motion which did not raise any sentencing issues (C) holding that the remedy of habeas corpus is not available as a substitute for postconviction relief under rule 3850 (D) holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion (E) holding that postconviction court could not deny a refilled rule 3850 motion as untimely when postconviction court did not set a filing deadline in dismissing defendants first rule 3850 motion without prejudice to refiling
Output (English): holding that the remedy of habeas corpus is not available as a substitute for postconviction relief under rule 3850