Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): 335, 112 S.Ct. at 1355; see United States v. Flanagan, 868 F.2d 1544, 1546 (11th Cir.1989) (per curiam) ("[T]he granting of credit for time served is in the first instance an administrative, not a judicial, function.”). In view of Wilson and our circuit precedent, it is troubling that the dissent advances the position that district courts can override the BOP's determination regarding sentence credits. “In Wilson, the Supreme Court held that the district court has no authority to grant a defendant credit for any time served in detention before sentencing, but rather the Attorney General has the sole authority to grant credit for time already served." United States v. Daggao, 28 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir.1994) (emphasis added), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1390, 131 L.Ed.2d 242 (1995) (<HOLDING>). 10 . A subsequent BOP program statement, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that where mandatory life sentence enhancement was the tail which wags the dog of defendants firearm conviction which raised constitutional due process issues the district court had authority to consider a downward departure under section 5k20 of the guidelines (B) holding that where a defendant malees a showing that the act of consenting to deportation carries unusual assistance to the administration of justice district court has authority under ussg  5k20 to depart downward in absence of the governments consent (C) holding that the district court could not circumvent attorney generals determination that inhome presentence detention of defendant pursuant to release on bond is not applicable for sentence credit by according a downward departure under ussg  5k20 based on this detention (D) holding that district court had authority to grant section 5k20 downward departure despite governments opposition (E) holding that after granting the governments motion for downward departure pursuant to both  3553e and  5k11 the district court did not err when it determined that the starting point for departing downward was the higher statutorily required minimum sentence and not the lower otherwise applicable guideline range
Output (English): holding that where mandatory life sentence enhancement was the tail which wags the dog of defendants firearm conviction which raised constitutional due process issues the district court had authority to consider a downward departure under section 5k20 of the guidelines