Task: Text Completion
Input (English): trustee which would be property of the estate. See generally In re Si Yeon Park, Ltd., 198 B.R. 956 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1996). Such a turnover requirement may undermine the Barton Doctrine to some degree. Neither statutory provision, however, is germane to this proceeding. As mentioned above, the former statute is inapplicable because it is limited to receivers that operate businesses. The trustee concedes that Mr. Freeman was appointed solely as a liquidating receiver. The latter statute is inapplicable because its directives are addressed to “custodians” — a term defined by section 101(11) to include receivers — whose duties involve controlling property of the debtor for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors. See Matter of Miami General Hosp., Inc., 1111 B.R. 363, 366 (S.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>); see generally Matter of Cash Currency 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the receiver of assets not the subsequent purchaser of the assets retained all liabilities not specifically enumerated in a similar purchase and assumption agreement (B) holding that a receiver of insurance policies did not have standing because it failed to prove it was the assignee of the policyholders claims (C) holding that the receiver for a corporation had no standing to sue for inter alia receipt of funds fraudulently obtained fraud and unjust enrichment even though he was appointed on behalf of all the creditors because those were claims of the creditors not of the corporation (D) recognizing that the bangor punta doctrine was not applicable to suit brought by receiver of insolvent insurance company for the benefit of creditors (E) holding that a receiver appointed for the parent corporation of the debtor was not a custodian of the debtorsubsidiary because the receiver was not appointed to take control of the debt ors assets for the benefit of the debtors creditors
Output (English): (E)