Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): a qualified right of access to criminal trials, see id. at 580, 100 S.Ct. 2814, to the examination of jurors during voir dire, see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) (“Press-Enterprise I”), and to preliminary hearings, see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (“Press-Enterprise II”). The circuits, including ours, have concurred in holding that this right applies to civil as well as criminal proceedings. See Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir.1984) (asserting that “the First Amendment does secure to the public and to the press a right of access to civil proceedings”); see also Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed (B) holding that the first amendment limits judicial discretion to seal documents in a civil case (C) holding that the first amendment right of access applies to a summary judgment motion in a civil case (D) holding that the rigorous first amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case (E) holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed
Output (English): holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed