Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): leaving the corner and walking away from the officers after making eye contact with them. See United States v. Jones, 619 F.2d 494, 494 (5th Cir. 1980) (individual’s flight from uniformed law enforcement officer may be a fact used to support reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity is afoot”); Magda, 547 F.2d at 758-59 (defendant’s companion immediately moved away with a “rapid motion” after looking in direction of observing officer); State v. Belton, 441 So. 2d 1195, 1198 (La. 1983) (flight, nervousness, or a startled look at the sight of an officer may be a factor leading to reasonable suspicion), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953, 80 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1984). Id., 331 N.C. at 233-34, 415 S.E.2d at 722-23; See also State v. I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. 579, 585-86, 647 S.E.2d 129, 134-35 (2007) (<HOLDING>); State v. Crenshaw, 144 N.C. App. 574, 578-79, 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the officer had reasonable grounds to conduct an investigatory detention where a juvenile in a high drug area started walking away upon the approach of a law enforcement officer while keeping his head turned away from the officer and while moving his mouth as if he had something in it (B) holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had (C) holding fact that appellant immediately turned and started walking in opposite direction when confronted by police officer was factor to be considered in determining existence of probable cause to believe he was attempting to flee after committing offense (D) holding that absent probable cause to arrest a police officer may approach an individual to conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal conduct is afoot (E) holding that absent warrant or exigent circumstances an officer had no authority to demand that the juvenile keep the door open to his residence or demand entry into it and thus the juvenile could not be convicted of resisting a law enforcement officer for trying to close door even if the officer had probable cause to believe that the juvenile was sheltering a runaway
Output (English): holding fact that appellant immediately turned and started walking in opposite direction when confronted by police officer was factor to be considered in determining existence of probable cause to believe he was attempting to flee after committing offense