Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004); Kennedy v. Lubar, 273 F.3d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir.2001). In this case, the court did not remand based on § 1447(c), but rather on the basis that it was declining to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs pendent state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Review of a district court’s discretionary decision to remand under § 1367(c)(3) is not treated as a § 1447(c) remand, and therefore it is not subject to § 1447(d)’s statutory bar to review. Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 152-53 (10th Cir.1995). As a logical corollary, then, § 1447(d) likewise does not deprive this court of jurisdiction to reconsider its prior orders in this case. See Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgage Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 158 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction to 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a district courts power to remand pendent state claims to state court is inherent in statutory authorization to decline supplemental jurisdiction under  1367c (B) holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss (C) holding the district court retained jurisdiction to reconsider its order granting the defendants motion to dismiss notwithstanding the fact that the district court had remanded the remaining pendent state claims to state court pursuant to 28 usc  1367c (D) holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court (E) holding that district court appropriately retained pendent jurisdiction over state claims where it had invested time and resources in the case
Output (English): holding a district courts power to remand pendent state claims to state court is inherent in statutory authorization to decline supplemental jurisdiction under  1367c