Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): supports the general proposition that consent to a search can be prospectively given pursuant to a contract. See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628-29, 66 S.Ct. 1277, 1279, 90 L.Ed. 1477, 1482 (1946), judgment vacated by 330 U.S. 800, 67 S.Ct. 857, 91. L.Ed. 1259 (1947). In other words, a person can contract away the constitutional right to be free from unconstitutional searches. See id. In Zap, an aeronautical engineer entered into a contract with the Department of the Navy to perform experimental work involving test flights of airplanes. Id. at 626, 66 S.Ct. at 1278, 90 L.Ed. at 1480. Under one of the terms of the contract, the engineer specifically agreed to permit the government to search the account and billing records of his business during the term of the contr p.1996) (<HOLDING>); People v. Hellenthal, 186 Mich.App. 484, 465 
 Holding statements: (A) holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence (B) holding warrantless search of probationers home by probation officers based on reasonable suspicion was constitutionally permissible when conditions of probation required probationer to submit to home visits but not searches (C) holding defendant contractually agreed to intensive probation to avoid prison (D) holding defendant agreed to submit to searches as a condition of probation (E) holding that a defendant is not entitled to credit for time served as a condition of probation
Output (English): holding defendant contractually agreed to intensive probation to avoid prison