Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): for mailing to the court. Fed. R.App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988). 2 . In his notice of appeal, Poyer stated that he did not receive notice of the denial of relief in a timely manner, see Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6)(A), and he sought leave to proceed with his appeal. However, he filed the notice of appeal requesting additional time, at the earliest, on January 12, 2016 — 266 days after the court entered the dismissal order. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6)(B) (requiring that motion to reopen be "filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after the moving party receives notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry, whichever is earlier”); Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); Hensley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 651 F.2d 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that notice of appeal was not effectively taken where appeal was filed simultaneously with timely motion for reconsideration because when timely motion for reconsideration is filed a notice of appeal filed prior to disposition of the motion to reconsider has no effect (B) holding that tenday time limit to appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional and an appellate court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal (C) holding that the 180day filing deadline applicable to motions to reopen from removal orders filed in absentia is not jurisdictional (D) holding  under section 1144s predecessor statute  that the 180day period runs from the date of the confirmation order even if the fraud is not discovered in the 180day period (E) holding that district court had no authority to reopen appeal period when motion was filed beyond 180day limit
Output (English): holding  under section 1144s predecessor statute  that the 180day period runs from the date of the confirmation order even if the fraud is not discovered in the 180day period