Task: Text Completion
Input (English): or (2) establish an interest obligation pursuant to the court’s authority under 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1) (2009) (establishing the court’s authority to equitably “divide the marital property in proportions the court considers just”), in lieu of awarding post-judgment interest pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 1602-C(2), see Wormelle v. Howard, 526 A.2d 1390, 1391 (Me.1987), we conclude that Brown became a judgment debtor and became obligated to pay Habrle when the post-judgment grace period expired on or about November 2, 2007. The obligation to pay post-judgment interest began running upon the expiration of the court-ordered g discussing post-judgment interest due on child support arrearage, vacating only as to computation of such interest); Raymond v. Raymond, 480 A.2d 718, 723-26 (Me. 1984) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Because the September 2005 divorce 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that because divorce proceedings are civil actions resulting in an order for judgment postjudgment interest was due under the statute on withheld alimony payments (B) holding as a mutter of law that divorce actions are civil actions within the meaning of the postjudgment interest statute and that the wife was entitled to postjudgment interest under the statute with respect to unpaid spousal support payments ordered under a divorce judgment (C) holding that the trial court erred in denying as untimely a postjudgment motion to intervene filed promptly after judgment and noting that this holding was consistent with several decisions of the federal courts permitting postjudgment intervention for the purpose of appeal (D) holding that the insured was entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest and attorney fees as found by the jury (E) holding that the apparent denial of the husbands request for an order compelling the wife to deliver to him the personal property he had been awarded in their divorce judgment did not constitute a modification of the original divorce judgment
Output (English): (B)