Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): face,” id. at 61, 90 S.Ct. 1555, it held that the exception for any portrayal that “does not tend to discredit [the] armed force[s]” impermissibly restricted expression on the basis of viewpoint. See id. at 62-63, 90 S.Ct. 1555. Here, as in Schacht, defendants may be constitutionally permitted to prohibit all fraternal organizations from marching in uniform. But it does not follow from this premise that defendants have the seemingly lesser included authority to ban only some organizations from marching in uniform. Under Schacht, and under other Supreme Court cases involving selective prohibitions on expression, defendants’ selectivity must itself pass constitutional muster. Cf. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 425-28, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465, 100 S.Ct. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that cincinnati could not ban commercial newsracks from public property while allowing noncommercial newsracks even if  the city might entirely prohibit the use of newsracks on public property (B) holding ban on newsracks to be contentbased because determining whether a newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publications content (C) holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property (D) holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence (E) holding not only does cincinnatis categorical ban on commercial newsracks place too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech but in this case the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted
Output (English): holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence