Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): employee’s consent to enter the special employment relationship. Those courts have not, however, considered whether the employee must know the corporate identity of the special employer for whom she agreed to work or whether her consent to work for a borrowing entity is tantamount to consent to work for the corporate entity of which the borrower is a part. Rather, the cases have analyzed only whether the employee agreed to work for an entity other than the general employer, an issue that is undisputed in this ease. See Pacenti v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 245 N.J.Super. 188, 584 A.2d 843, 845 (App.Div.1991) (inferring requisite consent from the employee’s reporting to borrower’s place of business and accepting its supervisors’ decisions, policies and training); Murin, 573 A.2d at 991-94 (<HOLDING>); Chickachop v. Manpower, Inc., 84 N.J.Super. 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that existence of deliberate and informed consent turns on whether it is understood between the employee and his employers that he is to remain in the allegiance of the first employer  or is to be employed in the business and subject to the direction of the temporary employer (B) holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration (C) holding that section 319s mandate that the employer is subrogated  to the extent of compensation payable does not mean that the sole right to recover from the tortfeasor is in the employer rather the right of action against the tortfeasor remains in the injured employee and suit is to be commenced in his name (D) holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation (E) holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work
Output (English): holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation