Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): 215. As the modified categorical approach is “merely a ‘tool for implementing the categorical approach,’ ” we concluded that it too did not apply. Id. at 216 (quoting Descamps v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 2284, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013)). Contrary to Baboolall’s assertions, Rojas did not discard the modified categorical approach in drug possession and distribution cases. Rather, we held that neither the categorical nor the modified categorical approach was in play because there was no comparable federal statute and the record was silent as to the precise drug involved. Rojas, 728 F.3d at 215-16. In this case, N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39 is analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See Pascual v. Holder, 707 F.3d 403, 405 (2d Cir.2013) adhered to on reh’g, 723 F.3d 156 (2d Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). As the IJ recognized, because there are 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that a felony conviction in new york state court for possession of cocaine constituted an aggravated felony where the conviction would have also been punishable under the controlled substance act even though the crime would have only constituted a misdemeanor under federal law (B) holding that a conviction under  22039 for attempted sale of cocaine qualifies as an aggravated felony (C) holding second simple possession conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony regardless of whether it was actually prosecuted as recidivist possession (D) holding that a conviction under  22039 qualifies as an aggravated felony under the categorical approach (E) holding that conviction under  2702a3 or 4 is an aggravated felony under  101a43f
Output (English): holding second simple possession conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony regardless of whether it was actually prosecuted as recidivist possession