Task: Text Completion
Input (English): For instance, for some procedural purposes, habeas proceedings are considered “civil.” See, e.g., Browder v. Director, Illinois-Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 269, 98 S.Ct. 556, 563, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (“It is well settled that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding.”); Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559-60, 2 S.Ct. 871, 872-73, 27 L.Ed. 826 (1883) (habeas corpus review is a civil proceeding because its purpose is to enforce civil rights). Yet for other purposes, they are not. See, e.g., Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1087-88, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969) (“Essentially, the proceeding is unique. Habeas corpus practice in the federal courts has conformed with civil practice only in a general sense.”); Ewing v. Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967, 971 (10th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The same inconsistency exists in the 
 Holding statements: (A) holding habeas corpus is not a civil action for purposes of the equal access to justice act provision for award of attorney fees to prevailing party (B) holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees (C) holding buckhannon applicable to the equal access to justice act 28 usc  2412 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties (D) holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus (E) holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees
Output (English): (A)