Task: Wrong Candidate Generation
Input (English): at 573 (I960)). Thus, where a movant’s sole claim is for monies paid based on a change in decisional law, the courts are hard pressed to find extraordinary circumstances or undue hardship under Rule 60(b)(6). For example, in In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 840 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir.1988), the court faced the question of “whether a final money judgment may be reopened [pursuant to a Rule 60(b)(6) motion] several years after the time for appeal has expired because of a favorable legal ruling in some other party’s appeal.” Finding that money judgments are inherently final and devoid of prospective application, the court denied relief. See id. at 194-95; but cf. Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Shalala (In re Blue Diamond Coal Co.), No. 3:93-CV-473, slip op. at 6-9 (E.D.Tenn. Nov. 4, 1998) (<HOLDING>). Under the Rule 60(b)(6) doctrine, a 
 Holding statements: (A) holding that the eastern enterprises decision was sufficiently extraordinary to warrant vacation of a final judgment (B) holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant (C) holding that such an order is not sufficiently final to be suitable for appellate review (D) recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment (E) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence
Output (English): holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence