第2次インティファーダ（ Al-Intifada al-Thaniya;  Ha-Intifāda ha-Shniya）またはアル＝アクサ インティファーダ（ ） は、イスラエルに対するパレスチナの蜂起である。イスラエルとパレスチナの和平を目指した2000年7月ので最終合意に失敗したことが引き金とされ、イスラエルのアリエル・シャロンが神殿の丘に挑発的に訪問したことで同年9月に勃発した。訪問自体は平和的なものだったが、予想された通り、抗議や暴動が起こり、イスラエル警察がゴム弾や催涙ガスで鎮圧した。

戦闘員だけでなく民間人にも多数の死傷者が出た。イスラエルは銃撃、、戦車攻撃と爆撃で戦い、パレスチナは自爆攻撃、投石、銃撃、ロケット攻撃で対抗した。非暴力的だった第1次インティファーダと対照的に、パレスチナの自爆攻撃が際立った特徴だった。戦闘員と民間人を含めた死者数は推定でパレスチナ3,000人、イスラエル1,000人、外国人64人とされる。

第2次インティファーダは、多くの場合、を以て終結したとされる パレスチナのマフムード・アッバースとイスラエルのアリエル・シャロンが、パレスチナ側がイスラエルに対するすべての暴力行為を止め、イスラエルは パレスチナに対するすべての軍事行動を終わらせることに合意し、また プロセスを再確認した。さらに、シャロンはパレスチナ捕虜7500人のうち900人を釈放し、インティファーダで再占領したヨルダン川西岸の町から撤退することに同意した。

語源
第2次インティファーダは、1987年12月から1993年までの最初のパレスチナ蜂起に続く第二の蜂起であることを指す。「インティファーダ () 」は「蜂起」「反乱」などと訳され、元々は「振り払う」という意味のアラビア語である。多くのアラブ国家では暴動という意味で使われており、例えば、は"パン暴動"と呼ばれる。この用語は、イスラエルのパレスチナ占領に対する反乱を指している。

アル＝アクサ・インティファーダは、インティファーダが勃発した場所であるアル＝アクサー・モスクを指している。この場所はエルサレム旧市街の神殿の丘（あるいはハラム・アル＝アッシャリーフ）として知られ、8世紀に建てられたモスクでありイスラーム聖地である。

オスロ合意後にイスラエルが行った譲歩の結果であると考える一部のイスラエル人によってオスロ戦争 (מלחמת אוסלו) 、また、インティファーダが全面戦争へとエスカレートした原因として、当初は投石をはじめとする非武装のデモ参加者による民衆蜂起であったにもかかわらず、イスラエル側がマシンガンなどを用いて不釣り合いな対応をとったことが原因と挙げる者もいる。

背景

オスロ合意
オスロ合意において、イスラエルはガザ地区とヨルダン川西岸地区からの段階的な撤退を約束し、パレスチナ自治政府の設立を通して、これらの地域におけるパレスチナの権利を確約した。その一方で、PLOが正式にイスラエルを承認し、避難地域における人口の中心の治安に対して責任を負うことを承諾した。暫定的に5年間のパレスチナの自治を認め、その間に恒久的合意について交渉することとした。しかし、現地の現実により、両者ともにオスロ合意の和平プロセスに失望することになり、お互いに失敗を非難した。締結から5年間で、パレスチナ人405人、 イスラエル人256人が亡くなった。

1996年以降、イスラエルは、万が一の和平交渉の決裂に備えて、総称して"Musical Charm" と名付けられた緊急時対応策と準備を行った。1998年、オスロ合意による5年の計画が完了しないと結論付け、イスラエル国防軍はエリアCとガザ地区の一部を占領する「の野原作戦(Operation Field of Thorns plan)」を実行に移すべく、連隊級の軍事演習を2000年4月に行った。パレスチナ側の準備は防御的で小規模であり、イスラエルによる攻撃に対処するより、地元民を安心させるためのものだった。作戦の激しさにより、Zvi Fogel准将は、イスラエルの軍事的な準備が自己達成的予言ではないかと疑問に思っていたという。

1995年、イガール・アミルに暗殺されたイツハク・ラビンに代わり、シモン・ペレスが就任した。1996年の選挙でベンヤミン・ネタニヤフの右翼連立政権が成立し、1999年にはエフード・バラックの労働党政権に交代した。

キャンプ・デービッド会談
2000年7月11日から25日まで、キャンプ・デービッドで、アメリカ合衆国のビル・クリントン大統領、イスラエルのエフード・バラック首相、パレスチナ自治政府のヤセル・アラファト執行委員会議長による中東和平会談が行われたが、非難の応酬で決裂した。

合意には、主に4つの障害が存在した。すなわち、領土、エルサレムと神殿の丘、避難民と帰還の権利、イスラエルの安全保障である。 夏の情勢に失望した多くのファタハ派がPLOを離れ、ハマースやイスラム聖戦に参加したため、PLOは大きく分裂した。

2000年9月13日、アラファトと立法評議会は予定していたパレスチナ国の独立宣言を延期した。

入植地の継続
ペレスはアメリカ合衆国のマデレーン・オルブライト国務長官の要請で入植地建設を控えていたが、ネタニヤフは既存の入植地で建設を続けて、東エルサレムに新たな地区Har Homaを建設する計画を提案した。しかし、イツハク・シャミル政権のレベルとは程遠く、オスロ合意で禁止されていなかったにもかかわらず、建設を取り止めた。 （オスロ体制以前の住宅建設, 1991–92年: 13,960; オスロ体制後, 1994–95: 3,840; 1996–1997: 3,570）。
バラックは、入植者の過激派を疎外する目的で、穏健な入植者の意見を取り入れ、1998年11月の以降に建設された12の新しい前哨基地を解体する合意を取り付けたが、ヨルダン川西岸地区に新たに3,000戸を建設する計画で、既存の入植地を拡大し続けたことは、パレスチナ側から強い非難を浴びた。既存の入植地内での建設はオスロ合意でも許可されていたが、パレスチナ人支持者たちは建設継続はその精神に反していると主張し 、最終的な地位交渉の結果を不利にすると共に、バラックの和平への意欲に対するパレスチナ人の信頼は損なわれた。

時系列

2000年

シャロンが神殿の丘を訪問
9月28日、イスラエルの野党党首アリエル・シャロンとリクード党の代表団は、数百人のイスラエル機動隊に守られながら、イスラム教で3番目に神聖な場所と広く考えられている神殿の丘を訪れた。イスラエルは1980年に東エルサレムをエルサレムに編入することで支配権を主張し、神殿の丘はユダヤ教で最も神聖なの１つ場所であった。
シャロンの訪問を許可したイスラエルの内相は後に、訪問前にパレスチナ自治政府の治安局長に電話し、シャロンがモスクに立ち入らない限り彼の訪問は何の問題も起こさないとの確約を得ていたと主張した一方、ラジューブ氏はそのような確約はしていないと強く否定した。

シャロンが現地を離れた直後、外にいたパレスチナ系エルサレム人の怒りのデモが暴動に発展、当時のワクフの責任者であったアブ・キュテイシュは、拡声器を使ってパレスチナ人にアル＝アクサー・モスクを守るよう呼びかけた罪で後にイスラエルによって起訴された。一方、イスラエル当局は、この行為がその後に起きた嘆きの壁方面への投石の原因だと主張している。イスラエル警察は催涙ガスとゴム弾で応戦し、デモ隊は石やその他の投擲物を投げつけた。これにより警官25人が負傷（そのうち1人は重症）し、少なくとも3人のパレスチナ人がゴム弾で負傷した。シャロンの訪問の目的は、すべてのイスラエル人が神殿の丘を訪問する権利を持つことの主張とされていた。しかしリクードのスポークスパーソンのによれば、実際の目的は「リクード政権下でも（神殿の丘は）イスラエルの主権下にあることを示す」ことだった。キャンプ・デービッド交渉でエフード・バラックは、神殿の丘が位置する東エルサレムはイスラエルの完全な主権下にあると主張していた。 シャロンが「政府はパレスチナにこの地を譲歩するつもりか」と政府を非難したことを受け、イスラエル政府はシャロンにこの地を訪問する許可を与えた。シャロンの意図を察知したヤーセル・アラファート、、らパレスチナの高官たちは、シャロンに訪問を中止するよう要請した。

暴動から10日前にはサブラー・シャティーラ事件の追悼日を迎えており、この事件の調査委員会であるは、当時国防相だったシャロンに個人的責任があると結論づけていた。 "流血と復讐の危険を無視し、流血を防ぐための適切な措置をとらなかったから"である。イスラエルの支配下に入ったベイルートの民間人を保護しなかったシャロンの怠慢は、"国防大臣に課せられた義務の不履行"に相当し、シャロンの国防大臣解任が勧告された。シャロンは当初辞任を拒否していたが、和平行進後にイスラエル人が死亡したためシャロンは国防相を辞任した。しかし無任所相としてイスラエルの閣僚には留まった。

パレスチナ人は、シャロンと武装したボディガードらの神殿の丘訪問は挑発行為であり侵略であると強く非難した。批評家たちも、シャロンはこの訪問が暴動の引き金になることを理解しており、彼の訪問の目的は政治的なものだったと主張している。また、あるオブザーバーによれば、シャロンが神殿の丘を歩くことは、"アラブ・イスラエル紛争で最も薄い氷の上を滑る"ことを意味したという。
ニューヨーク・タイムズによれば、エジプト人、パレスチナ人、レバノン人、ヨルダン人など多くのアラブ人は、シャロンの訪問が第二次インティファーダと和平プロセスの頓挫の始まりであると指摘している。安全保障の分野を研究するジュリアナ・オックスは、シャロンの訪問は第二次インティファーダにおける"象徴的な扇動"であるとし、パレスチナの政治的マルワン・バルグーティは「シャロンの挑発的な行動はパレスチナ人の結集点となったが、シャロンが訪問していなかったとしても第二次インティファーダは勃発していただろう」と述べた。

蜂起初日
シャロンが訪問して翌日の9月29日、金曜礼拝後にエルサレム旧市街周辺で大規模な暴動が発生した。イスラエル警察は嘆きの壁の上からユダヤ教の礼拝者に向かって石を投げるパレスチナ人に発砲した。エルサレムの警察署長が投げられた石で意識を失った後、彼らはゴム弾から実弾に切り替えてパレスチナ人の若者4人を殺害。その後も暴動は収まらず、パレスチナ人と警官合わせて200人以上が負傷、さらに3人のパレスチナ人が旧市街とオリーブ山で死亡した。この日だけで衝突によってパレスチナ人7人が死亡し300人が負傷、イスラエル警官70人が負傷した。

その後数日間、ヨルダン川西岸地区とガザ地区のいたるところでデモが発生しイスラエル警察は実弾やゴム弾で応戦した。最初の5日間で少なくとも47人のパレスチナ人が死亡し、1,885人が負傷した。パリではフランスの政治家ジャック・シラクが当事者間の調停を試みた際、彼はバラックに対して、1日のパレスチナ人とイスラエル人の死傷者の比率はパレスチナ人が侵略者であることを誰にも納得させることができないような数字であると抗議した。また、"石を投げる人々にヘリコプターから発砲し続けること"と"国際調査を拒否すること"は、アラファトからの3ヶ国間交渉参加の申し出を拒否することに等しいと告げた。暴動が起きて最初の数日間で、IDFは約130万発の銃弾を発射した。アムネスティ・インターナショナルによると、初期のパレスチナ人の犠牲者はデモに参加した人か傍観者だった。さらに、最初の1カ月間に殺害されたパレスチナ人の約80％はイスラエルの治安維持に致命的な危険を与えることのない規模のデモに参加していた人だったと述べている。

9月30日、ガザ地区の路地で父親の陰に隠れていたパレスチナ人の少年ムハンマド・アル＝ドゥラーが射殺される事件がビデオに収められた。少年の死と父親の負傷はイスラエル兵によるものとされ、この映像が世界中で報道されるとアラブのテレビでも繰り返し放送されたため、象徴的な存在となった。当初、イスラエル軍は少年殺害の責任を取って謝罪したが、2ヵ月後に内部調査によって当初の発表に疑義が生じたことを理由に撤回した。その後、本当にイスラエル国防軍が発砲したのか、それともパレスチナ人が発砲したのか、論争が巻き起こった。

2000年10月事件

2000年10月事件 (October 2000 events)とは、イスラエル国内で数日間にわたって発生した騒乱や衝突のことで、主にアラブ系市民とイスラエル警察の間で発生し、アラブ人とユダヤ人の双方による大規模な暴動も発生した。イスラエルのアラブ系市民12人とガザ地区のパレスチナ人1人がイスラエル警察によって殺害され、イスラエルのユダヤ人1人がテルアビブ-ハイファ間の高速道路で車に石が衝突して死亡した。最初の1ヵ月間でパレスチナ人は141人が死亡し5,984人が負傷、イスラエル人は12人が死亡し65人が負傷した。
10月1日から数日間、イスラエル北部全域でゼネラル・ストライキとデモが続いた。このデモは投石、火炎放射、実弾射撃を伴うイスラエル警察との衝突にエスカレートしたケースもあった。警察は催涙ガスを使用し、ゴム弾や後に実弾で発砲するケースもあり、暴動鎮圧を規定する警察の規約に反することが複数あった。その後この衝突の調査をするは、この実弾の使用が多くの死者を出した要因と位置付けた。

10月8日、数千人のユダヤ系イスラエル人がテルアビブやその他の場所で暴力行為に参加するとアラブ人へ投石し、所有物を破壊し、「アラブ人に死を 」と唱えるなどした。

衝突後、ユダヤ系市民とアラブ系市民の間には強い緊張が走り、アラブ系市民と警察の間には不信感が広がった。最高裁判所のテオドール・オル判事を委員長とする調査委員会が検証し、警察はこのような暴動に対処する準備が不十分であったとし、主要な警官を悪行で起訴した。委員会はバラック首相を叱責し、当時国内の公安大臣であったを二度と公安大臣にしないよう勧告した。また、委員会はアラブの指導者やクネセトの議員たちが雰囲気を煽り、暴動をより深刻なものにする一因になったと非難した。

ラマッラーでの集団リンチとイスラエルの対応

10月12日、パレスチナ自治政府の警察は自治政府が支配する都市ラマッラーに誤って侵入した2人のイスラエル国防軍予備兵を逮捕した。この数週間前には100人近く（そのうち約20人が未成年者）のパレスチナ人が殺されていた。がこの建物にいるという噂はたちまち広まり、1,000人以上の怒ったパレスチナ人の群衆は駅前に集まり、彼らの死を求めた。その後2人は殴られ、刺され、腹を切られ、1人の遺体は放火された。イタリアのテレビクルーは殺害の様子をビデオに収め、そのテープを国際放送した。イギリス人ジャーナリストは写真を撮ろうとするも、暴徒にカメラを破壊された。殺害の残忍さはイスラエル国民に衝撃を与え、イスラエルとユダヤ人に対するパレスチナ人の根深い憎悪の証拠とみなされた。これに対してイスラエルは、ヨルダン川西岸地区とガザ地区にあるパレスチナ自治政府の標的に一連の報復空爆を開始した。空爆の警告を受けると警察署から人々は避難し、建物は破壊された。その後、イスラエルは兵士殺害の責任者を探し出して逮捕した。

11月・12月
11月に入るとイスラエル軍とパレスチナ人の衝突は急増し、イスラエル兵3人とパレスチナ人6人が死亡、イスラエル軍兵士4人とパレスチナ人140人が負傷した。その後、イスラエル国防軍が治安を回復しようとしたためさらに死傷者は増加し、11月は連日衝突が発生。合計122人のパレスチナ人と22人のイスラエル人が死亡した。ラマダーン初日の11月27日、イスラエルはでの物資と燃料の通行規制を緩和した。 同じ日、エルサレムの入植地は、パレスチナ領のから重機関銃の銃撃を受けた。 1週間後にイスラエルは規制を再強化し、パレスチナ人はイスラエル国防軍や入植者と衝突を続け、12月には合計51人のパレスチナ人と8人のイスラエル人が死亡した。クリントン政権はイスラエルとパレスチナの和平合意を達成するための最後の試みとして、12月にエジプトのシャルム・エル・シェイクで首脳会談が計画したが、パレスチナ側がの受け入れを遅らせたため、イスラエルのバラック首相は出席を見送った。

2001年
2001年1月21日から27日まで、シナイ半島のタバでイスラエルとパレスチナ自治政府の間でが開催された。イスラエルのエフード・バラック首相とパレスチナのヤセル・アラファト議長は、過去やそれ以降のどの和平交渉よりも最終的な和解に近づいたが、結局は合意は達成できなかった。

2001年1月17日、イスラエルの男子高校生オフィール・ラフム(Ofir Rahum)16歳が、ファタハの武装組織のメンバーである24歳のパレスチナ人女性モナ・ジュード・アワナ(Mona Jaud Awana)に誘われ、ラマッラーで殺害された。彼女はICQでオフィールと連絡を取り、数ヶ月にわたってネット恋愛を装っていた。彼女はオフィールを説得してエルサレムで会う約束を取り付け、ラマッラーに移動するとオフィールはそこで待ち伏せしていた3人のパレスチナ人に至近距離から15発以上撃たれて殺害された。この事件により19日に予定されていた和平交渉再開は延期され、アワナはその後、軍と警察の大規模な捜索作戦で逮捕されて終身刑の判決を受けた。この月には、他に5人のイスラエル人と18人のパレスチナ人が殺害された。

当時リクード党の党首アリエル・シャロンが労働党のバラックに対抗して立候補し、2001年2月6日に特別選挙でイスラエルの新たな首相に選出された。そしてシャロンはアラファトとの直接会談を拒否した。

3月には、8人のイスラエル人（ほとんどが民間人）と26人のパレスチナ人が死亡した。ヘブロンでは、パレスチナ人スナイパーが生後10ヶ月のイスラエル人を殺害した。この殺人もイスラエル国民に衝撃を与え、イスラエル警察の調査によると狙撃手は故意に赤ん坊を狙ったという。

2001年4月30日、7人のパレスチナ人武装勢力が爆発で死亡したが、そのうちの1人はオフィール・ラフムの殺害に加担していた。IDFは、イスラエル側の攻撃であるというパレスチナ人からの非難を肯定も否定もしなかった。

2001年5月7日、IDFの海軍部隊は、パレスチナ自治区が支配するガザ地区に向けて国際水域を航行していたサントリーニ号を拿捕した。この船には武器が積まれており、その後のイスラエルの調査でこの積荷はパレスチナ解放人民戦線総司令部（PFLP-GC）のが購入したものだとされ、船と積荷の価値は1,000万ドルと見積もられた。乗組員は武器が詰まった樽の積荷を内容物とともに慎重に密封し防水加工を施した上で、ガザ沖のあらかじめ指定された場所で荷揚げしパレスチナ自治政府が回収する予定だったと伝えられている。

2001年5月8日、ヤーコフ・コビー・マンデル（13歳）とヨセフ・イシュラン（14歳）の2人のイスラエル人少年が、村の近くでハイキング中に誘拐された。翌朝、彼らが住んでいた場所の近くの洞窟で遺体となって発見された。USAトゥデイは、「警察の発表によれば、二人の少年は縛られ、刺され、石で殴り殺されていた」と報じた。さらに、ユダヤ砂漠の洞窟の壁は少年たちの血で覆われており、犯人がそこに塗りつけたと伝えられている。

2001年5月18日、後、それまではヘリコプターによる空爆が行われていたが、イスラエルは1967年以来初めて、ヨルダン川西岸とガザ地区にあるパレスチナのターゲットを攻撃するために戦闘機を使用して12人のパレスチナ人を殺害した。

2001年6月1日、テルアビブの海岸沿いのディスコ「ドルフィナリウム」で、イスラム聖戦による自爆テロが発生。イスラエルの民間人21人（そのほとんどが高校生）が死亡、132人が負傷した。このテロは、アメリカの停戦交渉の妨げとなった。

6月12日、ギリシャ正教会の修道士・司祭であり、聖ゲオルギオス修道院の院長が殺害されるが起き、のちにタンジムとアル・アクサ殉教者旅団のリーダーであるがこの殺害を指揮したとして有罪判決が下された。

2001年には合計469人のパレスチナ人と199人のイスラエル人が殺害された。インティファーダ1年目に関するアムネスティ・インターナショナルの報告書には次のように記されている。

イスラエルとその占領地における不法な殺傷事件の圧倒的多数は、過剰な武力を用いたイスラエル国防軍によるものである。特に、イスラエル国防軍は人命への差し迫った危険がないにもかかわらず、懲罰的なロケット攻撃に米国から供与されたヘリコプターを使用してきた。また、イスラエルは超法規的処刑を実行するためにガンシップを使用し、子どもを含む民間人殺戮を目的とするような発砲をしてきた。（中略）ハマスとイスラム聖戦は、多数のイスラエル国民を無差別に殺傷するために、公共の場所、たいていはイスラエル国内に爆弾を頻繁に設置してきた。両組織は殉教カルトを育成し、自爆テロを頻繁に行っている。

パレスチナのテロリストたちは2001年の後半に数多くの自爆テロを行い、具体的には、では16人の民間人（うち子供7人）が死亡。とで、いずれも3人のイスラエル人が犠牲になった。で11人の民間人が死亡。では15人の民間人が亡くなった。

2002

In January 2002, the IDF Shayetet 13 naval commandos captured the Karine A, a freighter carrying weapons from Iran towards Israel, believed to be intended for Palestinian militant use against Israel. It was discovered that top officials in the Palestinian Authority were involved in the smuggling, with the Israelis pointing the finger towards Yasser Arafat as also being involved.

Palestinians launched a spate of suicide bombings and attacks against Israel, aimed mostly at civilians. On 3 March, a Palestinian sniper killed 10 Israeli soldiers and settlers and wounded 4 at a checkpoint near Ofra, using an M1 Carbine. He was later arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. The rate of the attacks increased, and was at its highest in March 2002.

In addition to numerous shooting and grenade attacks, the month saw 15 suicide bombings carried out in Israel — an average of one bombing every two days. The high rate of attacks caused widespread fear throughout Israel and serious disruption of daily life throughout the country. March 2002 became known in Israel as "Black March." On 12 March United Nations Security Council Resolution 1397 was passed, which reaffirmed a Two-state solution and laid the groundwork for a Road map for peace.

On 27 March, the wave of violence culminated with a suicide bombing during a Passover celebration at the Park Hotel in Netanya in which 30 people were killed. The attack became known as the Passover massacre. In total, around 130 Israelis, mostly civilians, were killed in Palestinian attacks during March 2002. On 28 March, Arab leaders, whose constituencies were exposed to detailed television coverage of the violence in the conflict, set out a comprehensive Arab Peace Initiative that was endorsed by Arafat, but virtually ignoring by Israel.

On 29 March, Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield, which lasted until 3 May. The IDF made sweeping incursions throughout the West Bank, and into numerous Palestinian cities. Arafat was put under siege in his Ramallah compound. The UN estimated that 497 Palestinians were killed and 1,447 wounded by the Israeli incursion from 1 March to 7 May. A UN report cleared Israel of allegations of massacre, but criticized it for using excessive force on the civilian population. Israeli forces also arrested 4,258 Palestinians during the operation. Israeli casualties during the operation totaled 30 dead and 127 wounded. The operation culminated with the recapturing of Palestinian Authority controlled areas.

Jenin

Between 2 and 11 April, a siege and fierce fighting took place in the Palestinian refugee camp of the city of Jenin. The camp was targeted during Operation Defensive Shield after Israel determined that it had "served as a launch site for numerous terrorist attacks against both Israeli civilians and Israeli towns and villages in the area." The Jenin battle became a flashpoint for both sides, and saw fierce urban combat as Israeli infantry supported by armor and attack helicopters fought to clear the camp of Palestinian militants. The battle was eventually won by the IDF, after it employed a dozen Caterpillar D9 armored bulldozers to clear Palestinian booby traps, detonate explosive charges, and raze buildings and gun-posts; the bulldozers proved impervious to attacks by Palestinian militants.

During Israeli military operations in the camp, Palestinian sources alleged that a massacre of hundreds of people had taken place. A senior Palestinian Authority official alleged in mid-April that some 500 had been killed. During the fighting in Jenin, Israeli officials had also initially estimated hundreds of Palestinian deaths, but later said they expected the Palestinian toll to reach "45 to 55." In the ensuing controversy, Israel blocked the United Nations from conducting the first-hand inquiry unanimously sought by the Security Council, but the UN nonetheless felt able to dismiss claims of a massacre in its report, which said there had been approximately 52 deaths, criticising both sides for placing Palestinian civilians at risk. Based on their own investigations, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch charged that some IDF personnel in Jenin had committed war crimes but also confirmed that no massacre had been committed by the IDF. Both human rights organizations called for official inquiries; the IDF disputed the charges.

After the battle, most sources, including the IDF and Palestinian Authority, placed the Palestinian death toll at 52–56; Human Rights Watch documented 52 Palestinian deaths and claimed that it included at least 27 militants and 22 civilians, and an additional 3 Palestinians whose status as militants or civilians could not be ascertained, while the IDF said that 48 militants and 5 civilians had been killed. According to Human Rights Watch, 140 buildings had been destroyed. The IDF reported that 23 Israeli soldiers had been killed and 75 wounded during the battle.

Bethlehem

From 2 April to 10 May, a stand-off developed at the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. IDF soldiers surrounded the church while Palestinian civilians, militants, and priests were inside. During the siege, IDF snipers killed 8 militants inside the church and wounded more than 40 people. The stand-off was resolved by the deportation to Europe of 13 Palestinian militants whom the IDF had identified as terrorists, and the IDF ended its 38-day stand-off with the militants inside the church.

2003

Following an Israeli intelligence report stating that Yasir Arafat had paid $20,000 to al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, the United States demanded democratic reforms in the Palestinian Authority, as well the appointment of a prime minister independent of Arafat. On 13 March 2003, following U.S. pressure, Arafat appointed Mahmoud Abbas as Palestinian prime minister.

Following the appointment of Abbas, the U.S. administration promoted the Road map for peace—the Quartet's plan to end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict by disbanding militant organizations, halting settlement activity and establishing a democratic and peaceful Palestinian state. The first phase of the plan demanded that the Palestinian Authority suppress guerrilla and terrorist attacks and confiscate illegal weapons. Unable or unwilling to confront militant organizations and risk civil war, Abbas tried to reach a temporary cease-fire agreement with the militant factions and asked them to halt attacks on Israeli civilians.

On 20 May, Israeli naval commandos intercepted another vessel, the Abu Hassan, on course to the Gaza Strip from Lebanon. It was loaded with rockets, weapons, and ammunition. Eight crew members on board were arrested including a senior Hezbollah member.

On 29 June 2003, a temporary armistice was unilaterally declared by Fatah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which declared a ceasefire and halt to all attacks against Israel for a period of three months. Violence decreased somewhat in the following month, but suicide bombings against Israeli civilians continued as well as Israeli operations against militants.

Four Palestinians, three of them militants, were killed in gun battles during an IDF raid of Askar near Nablus involving tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APCs); an Israeli soldier was killed by one of the militants. Nearby Palestinians claimed a squad of Israeli police disguised as Palestinian labourers opened fire on Abbedullah Qawasameh as he left a Hebron mosque. YAMAM, the Israeli counter-terrorism police unit that performed the operation, said Qawasemah opened fire on them as they attempted to arrest him.

On 19 August, Hamas coordinated a suicide attack on a crowded bus in Jerusalem killing 23 Israeli civilians, including 7 children. Hamas claimed it was a retaliation for the killing of five Palestinians (including Hamas leader Abbedullah Qawasameh) earlier in the week. U.S. and Israeli media outlets frequently referred to the bus bombing as shattering the quiet and bringing an end to the ceasefire.

Following the Hamas bus attack, Israeli Defence Forces were ordered to kill or capture all Hamas leaders in Hebron and the Gaza Strip. The plotters of the bus suicide bombing were all captured or killed and Hamas leadership in Hebron was badly damaged by the IDF. Strict curfews were enforced in Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarem; the Nablus lockdown lasted for over 100 days. In Nazlet 'Issa, over 60 shops were destroyed by Israeli civil administration bulldozers. The Israeli civil administration explained that the shops were demolished because they were built without a permit. Palestinians consider Israeli military curfews and property destruction to constitute collective punishment against innocent Palestinians.

Unable to rule effectively under Arafat, Abbas resigned in September 2003. Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala) was appointed to replace him. The Israeli government gave up hope for negotiated settlement to the conflict and pursued a unilateral policy of physically separating Israel from Palestinian communities by beginning construction on the Israeli West Bank barrier. Israel claims the barrier is necessary to prevent Palestinian attackers from entering Israeli cities. Palestinians claim the barrier separates Palestinian communities from each other and that the construction plan is a de facto annexation of Palestinian territory.

Following a 4 October suicide bombing in Maxim restaurant, Haifa, which claimed the lives of 21 Israelis, Israel claimed that Syria and Iran sponsored the Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah, and were responsible for the terrorist attack. The day after the Maxim massacre, IAF warplanes bombed an alleged former Palestinian training base at Ain Saheb, Syria, which had been mostly abandoned since the 1980s. Munitions being stored on the site were destroyed, and a civilian guard was injured.

2004
In response to repeated shelling of Israeli communities with Qassam rockets and mortar shells from Gaza, the IDF operated mainly in Rafah – to search and destroy smuggling tunnels used by militants to obtain weapons, ammunition, fugitives, cigarettes, car parts, electrical goods, foreign currency, gold, drugs, and cloth from Egypt. Between September 2000 and May 2004, ninety tunnels connecting Egypt and the Gaza Strip were found and destroyed. Raids in Rafah left many families homeless. Israel's official stance is that their houses were captured by militants and were destroyed during battles with IDF forces. Many of these houses are abandoned due to Israeli incursions and later destroyed. According to Human Rights Watch, over 1,500 houses were destroyed to create a large buffer zone in the city, many "in the absence of military necessity", displacing around sixteen thousand people.

On 2 February 2004, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced his plan to transfer all the Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip. The Israeli opposition dismissed his announcement as "media spin", but the Israeli Labour Party said it would support such a move. Sharon's right-wing coalition partners National Religious Party and National Union rejected the plan and vowed to quit the government if it were implemented. Yossi Beilin, peace advocate and architect of the Oslo Accords and the Geneva Accord, also rejected the proposed withdrawal plan. He claimed that withdrawing from the Gaza Strip without a peace agreement would reward terror.

Following the declaration of the disengagement plan by Ariel Sharon and as a response to suicide attacks on Erez crossing and Ashdod seaport (10 people were killed), the IDF launched a series of armored raids on the Gaza Strip (mainly Rafah and refugee camps around Gaza), killing about 70 Hamas militants. On 22 March 2004, an Israeli helicopter gunship killed Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, along with his two bodyguards and nine bystanders. On 17 April, after several failed attempts by Hamas to commit suicide bombings and a successful one that killed an Israeli policeman, Yassin's successor, Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, was killed in an almost identical way, along with a bodyguard and his son Mohammed.

The fighting in Gaza Strip escalated severely in May 2004 after several failed attempts to attack Israeli checkpoints such as Erez crossing and Karni crossing. On 2 May, Palestinian militants attacked and shot dead a pregnant woman and her four young daughters. Amnesty International classified it as a crime against humanity and said it "reiterates its call on all Palestinian armed groups to put an immediate end to the deliberate targeting of Israeli civilians, in Israel and in the Occupied Territories". Additionally, on 11 and 12 May, Palestinian militants destroyed two IDF M-113 APCs, killing 13 soldiers and mutilating their bodies. The IDF launched two raids to recover the bodies, killing 20–40 Palestinians and greatly damaging structures in the Zaitoun neighbourhood in Gaza and in south-west Rafah.

Subsequently, on 18 May the IDF launched Operation Rainbow with a stated aim of striking the militant infrastructure of Rafah, destroying smuggling tunnels, and stopping a shipment of SA-7 missiles and improved anti-tank weapons. A total of 41 Palestinian militants and 12 civilians were killed in the operation, and about 45–56 Palestinian structures were demolished. Israeli tanks shelled hundreds of Palestinian protesters approaching their positions, killing 10. The protesters had disregarded Israeli warnings to turn back. This incident led to a worldwide outcry against the operation.

On 29 September, after a Qassam rocket hit the Israeli town of Sderot and killed two Israeli children, the IDF launched Operation Days of Penitence in the north of the Gaza Strip. The operation's stated aim was to remove the threat of Qassam rockets from Sderot and kill the Hamas militants launching them. The operation ended on 16 October, after having caused widespread destruction and the deaths of over 100 Palestinians, at least 20 of whom were under the age of sixteen. The IDF killed thirteen-year-old Iman Darweesh Al Hams as she strayed into a closed military area; the commander was accused of allegedly firing his automatic weapon at her dead body deliberately to verify the death. The act was investigated by the IDF, but the commander was cleared of all wrongdoing, and more recently, was fully vindicated when a Jerusalem district court found the claim to be libellous, ruled that NIS 300,000 be paid by the journalist and TV company responsible for the report, an additional NIS 80,000 to be paid in legal fees and required the journalist and television company to air a correction. According to Palestinian medics, Israeli forces killed at least 62 militants and 42 other Palestinians believed to be civilians. According to a count performed by Haaretz, 87 militants and 42 civilians were killed. Palestinian refugee camps were heavily damaged by the Israeli assault. The IDF announced that at least 12 Qassam launchings had been thwarted and many terrorists hit during the operation.

On 21 October, the Israeli Air Force killed Adnan al-Ghoul, a senior Hamas bomb maker and the inventor of the Qassam rocket.

On 11 November, Yasser Arafat died in Paris.

Escalation in Gaza began amid the visit of Mahmoud Abbas to Syria in order to achieve a Hudna between Palestinian factions and convince Hamas leadership to halt attacks against Israelis. Hamas vowed to continue the armed struggle, sending numerous Qassam rockets into open fields near Nahal Oz, and hitting a kindergarten in Kfar Darom with an anti-tank missile.

On 9 December five Palestinians weapon smugglers were killed and two were arrested in the border between Rafah and Egypt. Later that day, Jamal Abu Samhadana and two of his bodyguards were injured by a missile strike. In the first Israeli airstrike against militants in weeks, an unmanned Israeli drone plane launched one missile at Abu Samahdna's car as it travelled between Rafah and Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip. It was the fourth attempt on Samhadana's life by Israel. Samhadana is one of two leaders of the Popular Resistance Committees and one of the main forces behind the smuggling tunnels. Samhadana is believed to be responsible for the blast against an American diplomatic convoy in Gaza that killed three Americans.

On 10 December, in response to Hamas firing mortar rounds into the Neveh Dekalim settlement in the Gaza Strip and wounding four Israelis (including an 8-year-old boy), Israeli soldiers fired at the Khan Younis refugee camp (the origin of the mortars) killing a seven-year-old girl. An IDF source confirmed troops opened fire at Khan Younis, but said they aimed at Hamas mortar crews.

The largest attack since the death of Yasser Arafat claimed the lives of five Israeli soldiers on 12 December, wounding ten others. Approximately 1.5 tons of explosives were detonated in a tunnel under an Israeli military-controlled border crossing on the Egyptian border with Gaza near Rafah, collapsing several structures and damaging others. The explosion destroyed part of the outpost and killed three soldiers. Two Palestinian militants then penetrated the outpost and killed two other Israeli soldiers with gunfire. It is believed that Hamas and a new Fatah faction, the "Fatah Hawks", conducted the highly organised and coordinated attack. A spokesman, "Abu Majad", claimed responsibility for the attack in the name of the Fatah Hawks claiming it was in retaliation for "the assassination" of Yasser Arafat, charging he was poisoned by Israel.

2005
Palestinian presidential elections were held on 9 January, and Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was elected as the president of the PA. His platform was of a peaceful negotiation with Israel and non-violence to achieve Palestinian objectives. Although Abbas called on militants to halt attacks against Israel, he promised them protection from Israeli incursions and did not advocate disarmament by force.

Violence continued in the Gaza Strip, and Ariel Sharon froze all diplomatic and security contacts with the Palestinian National Authority. Spokesman Assaf Shariv declared that "Israel informed international leaders today that there will be no meetings with Abbas until he makes a real effort to stop the terror." The freezing of contacts came less than one week after Mahmoud Abbas was elected, and the day before his inauguration. Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat, confirming the news, declared "You cannot hold Mahmoud Abbas accountable when he hasn't even been inaugurated yet."

Following international pressure and Israeli threat of wide military operation in the Gaza Strip, Abbas ordered Palestinian police to deploy in the northern Gaza Strip to prevent Qassam rocket and mortar shelling over Israeli settlement. Although attacks on Israelis did not stop completely, they decreased sharply. On 8 February 2005, at the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of 2005, Sharon and Abbas declared a mutual truce between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority. They shook hands at a four-way summit that also included Jordan and Egypt at Sharm al-Sheikh. However, Hamas and Islamic Jihad said the truce is not binding for their members. Israel has not withdrawn its demand to dismantle terrorist infrastructure before moving ahead in the Road map for peace.

Many warned that truce is fragile, and progress must be done slowly while observing that the truce and quiet are kept. On 9–10 February night, a barrage of 25–50 Qassam rockets and mortar shells hit Neve Dekalim settlement, and another barrage hit at noon. Hamas said it was in retaliation for an attack in which one Palestinian was killed near an Israeli settlement. As a response to the mortar attack, Abbas ordered the Palestinian security forces to stop such attacks in the future. He also fired senior commanders in the Palestinian security apparatus. On 10 February, Israeli security forces arrested Maharan Omar Shucat Abu Hamis, a Palestinian resident of Nablus, who was about to launch a bus suicide attack in the French Hill in Jerusalem.

On 13 February 2005, Abbas entered into talks with the leaders of the Islamic Jihad and the Hamas, for them to rally behind him and respect the truce. Ismail Haniyah, a senior leader of the group Hamas said that "its position regarding calm will continue unchanged and Israel will bear responsibility for any new violation or aggression."

In the middle of June, Palestinian factions intensified bombardment over the city of Sderot with improvised Qassam rockets. Palestinian attacks resulted in 2 Palestinians and 1 Chinese civilian killed by a Qassam, and 2 Israelis were killed. The wave of attacks lessened support for the disengagement plan among the Israeli public. Attacks on Israel by the Islamic Jihad and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades increased in July, and on 12 July, a suicide bombing hit the coastal city of Netanya, killing 5 civilians. On 14 July, Hamas started to shell Israeli settlements inside and outside the Gaza Strip with dozens of Qassam rockets, killing an Israeli woman. On 15 July, Israel resumed its "targeted killing" policy, killing 7 Hamas militants and bombing about 4 Hamas facilities. The continuation of shelling rockets over Israeli settlements, and street battles between Hamas militants and Palestinian policemen, threatened to shatter the truce agreed in the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of 2005. The Israeli Defence Force also started to build up armored forces around the Gaza Strip in response to the shelling.

End of the Intifada
The ending date of the Second Intifada is disputed, as there was no definite event that brought it to an end. The general views is that it ended in 2005, while some sources include events and statistic for the intifada as far as 2007.

 Some commentators such as Sever Plocker consider the intifada to have ended in late 2004. With the sickness and then death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, the Palestinians lost their internationally recognised leader of the previous three decades, after which the intifada lost momentum and lead to internal fighting between Palestinian factions (most notably the Fatah–Hamas conflict), as well as conflict within Fatah itself.
 Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip, announced in June 2004 and completed in August 2005, is also cited, for instance by Ramzy Baroud, as signalling the end of the intifada.
 Some consider 8 February 2005 to be the official end of the Second Intifada, although sporadic violence still continued outside PA control or condonation. On that day, Abbas and Sharon met at the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit where they vowed to end attacks on each other. In addition, Sharon agreeing to release 900 Palestinian prisoners and withdraw from West Bank towns. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) refused to be parties to the agreement, arguing the cease-fire was the position of the PA only. Five days later Abbas reached agreement with the two dissenting organizations to commit to the truce with the proviso that Israeli violation would be met with retaliation.

Schachter addressed the difficulties in deciding when this intifada ended. He reasoned that suicide bombing was the best criterion, being arguably the most important element of second intifada-related violence, and that according to this criterion the intifada ended during 2005.

第2次インティファーダの原因
第2次インティファーダは、リクード所属の首相候補であるアリエル・シャロンが神殿の丘あるいはハラム・アッシャリーフとして知られるユダヤ教とイスラームの聖域に1000人以上の護衛とともに訪問したことがきっかけとなり、2000年9月28日に勃発した。訪問した際、シャロンは"the Temple Mount is in our hands and will remain in our hands. It is the holiest site in Judaism and it is the right of every Jew to visit the Temple Mount."と述べている。

この訪問は、パレスチナ側に非常に挑発的な行動と受け止められ、パレスチナのデモ隊は警察に対して投石したが、イスラエル軍にゴム弾や催涙ガスで追い払われ、その地でパレスチナの暴動が発生し、イスラエル軍と民衆が衝突する結果となった。

祈りの日である9月29日に勃発したとみなす場合もある。その日は、警察と軍が動員され、大規模な衝突が起こり多数の死者が発生した。

The Mitchell Report
The Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee（和平プロセスの断絶の原因を調査するための委員会。委員長はGeorge J. Mitchell）が2001年5月にレポートを発表した。 Mitchell Reportにおいて、イスラエル政府は以下の通りに主張した。

The immediate catalyst for the violence was the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations on July 25, 2000, and the "widespread appreciation in the international community of Palestinian responsibility for the impasse". In this view, Palestinian violence was planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at "provoking and incurring Palestinian casualties as a means of regaining the diplomatic initiative".

パレスチナ解放機構は、同じレポートによれば、インティファーダを計画したことを否定し、"Camp David represented nothing less than an attempt by Israel to extend the force it exercises on the ground to negotiations."と主張した。

The report also stated:

From the perspective of the PLO, Israel responded to the disturbances with excessive and illegal use of deadly force against demonstrators; behavior which, in the PLO's view, reflected Israel's contempt for the lives and safety of Palestinians. For Palestinians, the widely seen images of Muhammad al-Durrah in Gaza on September 30, shot as he huddled behind his father, reinforced that perception.

The Mitchell report concluded:

The Sharon visit did not cause the "Al-Aqsa Intifada". But it was poorly timed and the provocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited.

and also:

We have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity; or to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the [Government of Israel] to respond with lethal force.

Views on the Second Intifada
Palestinians have claimed that Sharon's visit was the beginning of the Second Intifada, while others have claimed that Yasser Arafat had pre-planned the uprising.

Some, like Bill Clinton, say that tensions were high due to failed negotiations at the Camp David Summit in July 2000. They note that there were Israeli casualties as early as 27 September; this is the Israeli "conventional wisdom", according to Jeremy Pressman, and the view expressed by the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Most mainstream media outlets have taken the view that the Sharon visit was the spark that triggered the rioting at the start of the Second Intifada. In the first five days of rioting and clashes after the visit, Israeli police and security forces killed 47 Palestinians and wounded 1885, while Palestinians killed 5 Israelis.

Palestinians view the Second Intifada as part of their ongoing struggle for national liberation and an end to Israeli occupation, whereas many Israelis consider it to be a wave of Palestinian terrorism instigated and pre-planned by then Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.

Some have claimed that Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA) had pre-planned the Intifada. They often quote a speech made in December 2000 by Imad Falouji, the PA Communications Minister at the time, where he explains that the Intifada had been planned since Arafat's return from the Camp David Summit in July, far in advance of Sharon's visit. He stated that the Intifada "was carefully planned since the return of (Palestinian President) Yasser Arafat from Camp David negotiations rejecting the U.S. conditions". David Samuels quotes Mamduh Nofal, former military commander of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who supplies more evidence of pre-28 September military preparations. Nofal recounts that Arafat "told us, Now we are going to the fight, so we must be ready". Barak as early as May had drawn up contingency plans to halt any intifada in its tracks by the extensive use of IDF snipers, a tactic that resulted in the high number of casualties among Palestinians during the first days of rioting.

Support for the idea that Arafat planned the Intifadah comes from Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar, who said in September 2010 that when Arafat realized that the Camp David Summit in July 2000 would not result in the meeting of all of his demands, he ordered Hamas as well as Fatah and the Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, to launch "military operations" against Israel. al-Zahar is corroborated by Mosab Hassan Yousef, son of the Hamas founder and leader, Sheikh Hassan Yousef, who claims that the Second Intifada was a political maneuver premeditated by Arafat. Yousef claims that "Arafat had grown extraordinarily wealthy as the international symbol of victimhood. He wasn't about to surrender that status and take on the responsibility of actually building a functioning society."

Arafat's widow Suha Arafat reportedly said on Dubai television in December 2012 that her husband had planned the uprising.

"Immediately after the failure of the Camp David [negotiations], I met him in Paris upon his return.... Camp David had failed, and he said to me, 'You should remain in Paris.' I asked him why, and he said, 'Because I am going to start an intifada. They want me to betray the Palestinian cause. They want me to give up on our principles, and I will not do so,'" the research institute [MEMRI] translated Suha as saying.

Israel's unilateral pullout from Lebanon in the summer of 2000 was, according to Philip Mattar, interpreted by the Arabs as an Israeli defeat and had a profound influence on tactics adopted in the Al Aqsa Intifada. PLO official Farouk Kaddoumi told reporters: "We are optimistic. Hezbollah's resistance can be used as an example for other Arabs seeking to regain their rights." Many Palestinian officials have gone on record as saying that the intifada had been planned long in advance to put pressure on Israel. It is disputed however whether Arafat himself gave direct orders for the outbreak, though he did not intervene to put a brake on it A personal advisor to Arafat, Manduh Nufal, claimed in early 2001 that the Palestinian Authority had played a crucial role in the outbreak of the Intifada. Israeli's military response demolished a large part of the infrastructure built by the PA during the years following the Oslo Accords in preparation for a Palestinian state. This infrastructure included the legitimate arming of Palestinian forces for the first time: some 90 paramilitary camps had been set up to train Palestinian youths in armed conflict. Some 40,000 armed and trained Palestinians existed in the occupied territories.

On 29 September 2001 Marwan Barghouti, the leader of the Fatah Tanzim in an interview to Al-Hayat, described his role in the lead up to the intifada.

I knew that the end of September was the last period (of time) before the explosion, but when Sharon reached the al-Aqsa Mosque, this was the most appropriate moment for the outbreak of the intifada.... The night prior to Sharon's visit, I participated in a panel on a local television station and I seized the opportunity to call on the public to go to the al-Aqsa Mosque in the morning, for it was not possible that Sharon would reach al-Haram al-Sharif just so, and walk away peacefully. I finished and went to al-Aqsa in the morning.... We tried to create clashes without success because of the differences of opinion that emerged with others in the al-Aqsa compound at the time.... After Sharon left, I remained for two hours in the presence of other people, we discussed the manner of response and how it was possible to react in all the cities (bilad) and not just in Jerusalem. We contacted all (the Palestinian) factions.

Barghouti also went on record as stating that the example of Hezbollah and Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon was a factor which contributed to the Intifada.

According to Nathan Thrall, from Elliott Abrams's inside accounts of negotiations between 2001 and 2005, it would appear to be an inescapable conclusion that violence played an effective role in shaking Israeli complacency and furthering Palestinian goals: the U.S. endorsed the idea of a Palestinian State, Ariel Sharon became the first Israeli Prime Minister to affirm the same idea, and even spoke of Israel's "occupation", and the bloodshed was such that Sharon also decided to withdraw from Gaza, an area he long imagined Israel keeping. However, Zakaria Zubeidi, former leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, considers the Intifada to be a total failure that achieved nothing for the Palestinians.

Casualties

The casualty data for the Second Intifada has been reported by a variety of sources and though there is general agreement regarding the overall number of dead, the statistical picture is blurred by disparities in how different types of casualties are counted and categorized.

The sources do not vary widely over the data on Israeli casualties. B'Tselem reports that 1,053 Israelis were killed by Palestinian attacks through 30 April 2008.  Israeli journalist Ze'ev Schiff reported similar numbers citing the Shin Bet as his source in an August 2004 Haaretz article where he noted:

The number of Israeli fatalities in the current conflict with the Palestinians exceeded 1,000 last week. Only two of the country's wars – the War of Independence and the Yom Kippur War – have claimed more Israeli lives than this intifada, which began on September 29, 2000. In the Six-Day War, 803 Israelis lost their lives, while the War of Attrition claimed 738 Israeli lives along the borders with Egypt, Syria and Lebanon.

There is little dispute as to the total number of Palestinians killed by Israelis. B'Tselem reports that through 30 April 2008, there were 4,745 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces, and 44 Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians. B'Tselem also reports 577 Palestinians killed by Palestinians through 30 April 2008.

Between September 2000 and January 2005, 69 percent of Israeli fatalities were male, while over 95 percent of the Palestinian fatalities were male. "Remember These Children" reports that as of 1 February 2008, 119 Israeli children, age 17 and under, had been killed by Palestinians. Over the same time period, 982 Palestinian children, age 17 and under, were killed by Israelis.

Combatant versus noncombatant deaths

Regarding the numbers of Israeli civilian versus combatant deaths, B'Tselem reports that through 30 April 2008 there were 719 Israeli civilians killed and 334 Israeli security force personnel killed.

B'Tselem reports that through 30 April 2008, out of 4,745 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces, there were 1,671 "Palestinians who took part in the hostilities and were killed by Israeli security forces", or 35.2%. According to their statistics, 2,204 of those killed by Israeli security forces "did not take part in the hostilities", or 46.4%. There were 870 (18.5%) who B'Tselem defines as "Palestinians who were killed by Israeli security forces and it is not known if they were taking part in the hostilities".

The B'Tselem casualties breakdown's reliability was questioned and its methodology has been heavily criticized by a variety of institutions and several groups and researchers, most notably Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs's senior researcher, retired IDF lieutenant colonel Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi, who claimed that B'Tselem repeatedly classifies terror operatives and armed combatants as "uninvolved civilians", but also criticized the Israeli government for not collecting and publishing casualty data. Caroline B. Glick, deputy managing editor of The Jerusalem Post and former advisor to Benjamin Netanyahu, pointed to several instances where, she claimed, B'Tselem had misrepresented Palestinian rioters or terrorists as innocent victims, or where B'Tselem failed to report when an Arab allegedly changed his testimony about an attack by settlers. The Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA), which said that B'Tselem repeatedly classified Arab combatants and terrorists as civilian casualties.

The Israeli International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (IPICT), on the other hand, in a "Statistical Report Summary" for 27 September 2000, through 1 January 2005, indicates that 56% (1,542) of the 2,773 Palestinians killed by Israelis were combatants. According to their data, an additional 406 Palestinians were killed by actions of their own side. 22% (215) of the 988 Israelis killed by Palestinians were combatants. An additional 22 Israelis were killed by actions of their own side.

IPICT counts "probable combatants" in its total of combatants. From their full report in September 2002:

A 'probable combatant' is someone killed at a location and at a time during which an armed confrontation was going on, who appears most likely – but not certain – to have been an active participant in the fighting. For example, in many cases where an incident has resulted in a large number of Palestinian casualties, the only information available is that an individual was killed when Israeli soldiers returned fire in response to shots fired from a particular location. While it is possible that the person killed had not been active in the fighting and just happened to be in the vicinity of people who were, it is reasonable to assume that the number of such coincidental deaths is not particularly high. Where the accounts of an incident appear to support such a coincidence, the individual casualty has been given the benefit of the doubt, and assigned a non-combatant status.

In the same 2002 IPICT full report there is a pie chart (Graph 2.9) that lists the IPICT combatant breakdown for Palestinian deaths through September 2002. Here follow the statistics in that pie chart used to come up with the total combatant percentage through September 2002:

On 24 August 2004, Haaretz reporter Ze'ev Schiff published casualty figures based on Shin Bet data. The Haaretz article reported: "There is a discrepancy of two or three casualties with the figures tabulated by the Israel Defense Forces."

Here is a summary of the figures presented in the article:
 Over 1,000 Israelis were killed by Palestinian attacks in the al-Aqsa Intifada.
 Palestinians sources claim 2,736 Palestinians killed in the Intifada.
 The Shin Bet has the names of 2,124 Palestinian dead.
 Out of the figure of 2,124 dead, Shin Bet assigned them to these organizations:
 466 Hamas members
 408 Fatah's Tanzim and al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades
 205 Palestinian Islamic Jihad
 334 of "Palestinian security forces – for example, Force 17, the Palestinian police, General Intelligence, and the counter security apparatus"

The article does not say whether those killed were combatants or not. Here is a quote:

The Palestinian security forces – for example, Force 17, the Palestinian police, General Intelligence, and the counter security apparatus – have lost 334 of its members during the current conflict, the Shin Bet figures show.

As a response to IDF statistics about Palestinian casualties in the West Bank, the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem reported that two-thirds of the Palestinians killed in 2004 did not participate in the fighting.

Prior to 2003, B'Tselem's methodology differentiated between civilians and members of Palestinian military groups, rather than between combatants and non-combatants, leading to criticism from some pro-Israel sources. B'Tselem no longer uses the term "civilian" and instead describes those killed as "participating" or "not participating in fighting at the time of death".

Others argue that Palestinian National Authority has, throughout the Intifada, placed unarmed men, women, children and the elderly in the line of fire, and that announcing the time and place of anti-occupation demonstrations via television, radio, sermons, and calls from mosque loudspeaker systems is done for this purpose.

In 2009, historian Benny Morris stated in his retrospective book One State, Two States that about one third of the Palestinian deaths up to 2004 had been civilians.

Palestinians killed by Palestinians
B'Tselem reports that through 30 April 2008, there were 577 Palestinians killed by Palestinians. Of those, 120 were "Palestinians killed by Palestinians for suspected collaboration with Israel". B'Tselem maintains a list of deaths of Palestinians killed by Palestinians with details about the circumstances of the deaths. Some of the many causes of death are crossfire, factional fighting, kidnappings, collaboration, etc.

Concerning the killing of Palestinians by other Palestinians, a January 2003 The Humanist magazine article reports:

Internal Palestinian violence has been called an Intra'fada during this Intifada and the previous one.

余波
2006年1月25日、パレスチナの立法評議会のが行われ、ハマースが74議席を勝ち取り、ファタハは45議席、その他の政党と無所属は13議席に終わった。ハマースはアメリカと欧州連合により正式にテロ組織として扱われているので、ハマースがパレスチナ自治政府で政権を握った場合は、テロ組織への支援を禁止する法令により自治政府への国際的な基金が危険にさらされる可能性がある。

6月9日、ガザの海岸でGhalia一家7人がが発生した。爆発の原因は不明だが、ハマースは2005年に交わした停戦協定の終了を宣言し、イスラエルへの攻撃を再開すると表明した。パレスチナは、イスラエルがガザ北部で砲撃を行ったことが事件につながったと非難した一方で、イスラエルの調査では潔白が明らかになった。

6月25日、パレスチナ過激派により前哨基地が攻撃され、銃撃戦によりイスラエル兵士2人、パレスチナ過激派3人が死亡した。イスラエルのギルアド・シャリート伍長が捕虜となり、イスラエルは無傷で解放せねば直ちに軍事的に報復すると警告した。6月28日の未明に、イスラエルの戦車、アチザリットと部隊がガザ地区に侵攻し、わずか数時間で空軍が主要な橋2つと唯一の発電所を破壊して効果的と水と電気を遮断した。の第一段階である夏の雨作戦が開始され、
インティファーダとは独立して継続した。

2006年11月26日、イスラエルとパレスチナ自治政府との間で停戦が発効した。2007年1月10日のロイターの記事では、「ハマースは11月26日の休戦協定に大いに従い、ガザ地区におけるイスラエルとパレスチナの暴力が落ち着いている。」と報じられた。

ガザ地区からのロケット攻撃の報復として、イスラエルがハマースの構成員と建物を目標とした「キャストレッド作戦」と呼ばれる軍事作戦を実行し、イスラエルとパレスチナの紛争が激化して、ガザ紛争が2008年12月27日（現地時間で11時30分、UTCで9時30分）に勃発した 。この作戦は、ハマース首脳やアラブ世界のメディアからは「ガザ虐殺」と呼ばれる。

2009年1月17日、イスラエルがガザ地区からのロケット攻撃や迫撃砲の攻撃をやめることを条件に一方的な停戦を表明し、数日後には撤退を開始した。ハマースもまた、撤退完了と検問所の開放を条件に停戦を表明した。これまでのところ、イスラエルは停戦違反と見なしていないが、ガザ地区からの迫撃砲攻撃が減少し続けている。攻撃頻度は上のグラフから読み取ることができる。データはに対応しており、主にハアレツの報道（2月1日 - 2月28日）を参考にしている。

2006年を通して暴力行為が続いた。12月27日、イスラエルの人権団体ベツェレムは、インティファーダに関する年次報告を発表した。それによると、パレスチナ人660人（2005年の3倍以上）とイスラエル人23人が2006年に亡くなった。12月28日のハアレツの記事で「死者のおよそ半数の322人は死亡時に戦闘に参加してはいなかった。そのうち22人が暗殺され、141人が未成年者だった。」と報じられた。660人のうち405人が2006年6月28日から11月26日まで続いたガザ侵攻で亡くなった。

Tactics
Unlike the First Intifada, a Palestinian civil uprising mainly focused on mass protests and general strikes, the Second Intifada rapidly turned into an armed conflict between Palestinian militant groups and the Israel Defense Forces. Palestinian tactics focused on Israeli civilians, soldiers, police and other security forces, and methods of attack included suicide bombings, launching rockets and mortars into Israel, kidnapping of both soldiers and civilians, including children, shootings, assassination, stabbings, stonings, and lynchings.

Israeli tactics included curbing Palestinians' movements through the setting up of checkpoints and the enforcement of strict curfews in certain areas. Infrastructural attacks against Palestinian Authority targets such as police and prisons was another method to force the Palestinian Authority to repress the anti-Israeli protests and attacks on Israeli targets .

Palestinians
Militant groups involved in violence include Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. The most lethal Palestinian tactic was the suicide bombing (see List). Conducted as a single or double bombing, suicide bombings were generally conducted against "soft" targets, or "lightly hardened" targets (such as checkpoints) to try to raise the cost of the war to Israelis and demoralize the Israeli society. Most suicide bombing attacks (although not all) targeted civilians, and were conducted in crowded places in Israeli cities, such as public transport, restaurants, shopping malls and markets.

One major development was the use of suicide bombs carried by children. Unlike most suicide bombings, the use of these not only earned condemnation from the United States and from human rights groups such as Amnesty International, but also from many Palestinians and much of the Middle East press. The youngest Palestinian suicide bomber was 16-year-old Issa Bdeir, a high school student from the village of Al Doha, who shocked his friends and family when he blew himself up in a park in Rishon LeZion, killing a teenage boy and an elderly man. The youngest attempted suicide bombing was by a 14-year-old captured by soldiers at the Huwwara checkpoint before managing to do any harm.

Militant groups also waged a high-intensity campaign of guerrilla warfare against Israeli military and civilian targets inside Israel and in the Palestinian Territories, utilizing tactics such as ambushes, sniper attacks, and suicide bombings. Military equipment was mostly imported, while some light arms, hand grenades and explosive belts, assault rifles, and Qassam rockets were indigenously produced. They also increased use of remote-controlled landmines against Israeli armor, a tactic that was highly popular among the poorly armed groups. Car bombs were often used against "lightly hardened" targets such as Israeli armored jeeps and checkpoints. Also, more than 1,500 Palestinian drive-by shootings killed 75 people in only the first year of the Intifada.

In May 2004, Israel Defense minister Shaul Mofaz claimed that United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East's ambulances were used to take the bodies of dead Israeli soldiers in order to prevent the Israel Defense Forces from recovering their dead. Reuters has provided video of healthy armed men entering ambulance with UN markings for transport. UNRWA initially denied that its ambulances carry militants but later reported that the driver was forced to comply with threats from armed men. UNRWA still denies that their ambulances carried body parts of dead Israeli soldiers.

In August 2004, Israel said that an advanced explosives-detection device employed by the IDF at the Hawara checkpoint near Nablus discovered a Palestinian ambulance had transported explosive material.

Some of the Palestinian reaction to Israeli policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has consisted of non-violent protest, primarily in and near the village of Bil'in. Groups such as the Palestinian Centre for Rapprochement, which works out of Beit Sahour, formally encourage and organize non-violent resistance. Other groups, such as the International Solidarity Movement openly advocate non-violent resistance. Some of these activities are done in cooperation with internationals and Israelis, such as the weekly protests against the Israeli West Bank Barrier carried out in villages like Bi'lin, Biddu and Budrus. This model of resistance has spread to other villages like Beit Sira, Hebron, Saffa, and Ni'lein. During the Israeli re-invasion of Jenin and Nablus, "A Call for a Non-violent Resistance Strategy in Palestine" was issued by two Palestinian Christians in May 2002.

Non-violent tactics have sometimes been met with Israeli military force. For example, Amnesty International notes that "10-year-old Naji Abu Qamer, 11-year-old Mubarak Salim al-Hashash and 13-year-old Mahmoud Tariq Mansour were among eight unarmed demonstrators killed in the early afternoon of May 19, 2004 in Rafah, in the Gaza Strip, when the Israeli army open fire on a non-violent demonstration with tank shells and a missile launched from a helicopter gunship. Dozens of other unarmed demonstrators were wounded in the attack." According to Israeli army and government officials, the tanks shelled a nearby empty building and a helicopter fired a missile in a nearby open space in order to deter the demonstrators from proceeding towards Israeli army positions.

Israel

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) countered Palestinian attacks with incursions against militant targets into the West Bank and Gaza Strip, adopting highly effective urban combat tactics. The IDF stressed the safety of their troops, using such heavily armored equipment as the Merkava heavy tank and armored personnel carriers, and carried out airstrikes with various military aircraft including F-16s, drone aircraft and helicopter gunships to strike militant targets. Much of the ground fighting was conducted house-to-house by well-armed and well-trained infantry. Due to its superior training, equipment, and numbers, the IDF had the upper hand during street fighting. Palestinian armed groups suffered heavy losses during combat, but the operations were often criticized internationally due to the civilian casualties often caused. Palestinian metalworking shops and other business facilities suspected by Israel of being used to manufacture weapons were regularly targeted by airstrikes, as well as Gaza Strip smuggling tunnels.

Israeli Caterpillar D9 armored bulldozers were routinely employed to detonate booby traps and IEDs, to demolish houses along the border with Egypt that were used for shooting at Israeli troops, to create "buffer zones", and to support military operations in the West Bank. Until February 2005, Israel had in place a policy to demolish the family homes of suicide bombers after giving them a notice to evacuate. Due to the considerable number of Palestinians living in single homes, the large quantity of homes destroyed, and collateral damage from home demolitions, it became an increasingly controversial tactic. Families began providing timely information to Israeli forces regarding suicide bombing activities in order to prevent the demolition of their homes, although families doing so risked being executed or otherwise punished for collaboration, either by the Palestinian Authority or extrajudicially by Palestinian militants. The IDF committee studying the issue recommended ending the practice because the policy was not effective enough to justify its costs to Israel's image internationally and the backlash it created among Palestinians.

With complete ground and air superiority, mass arrests were regularly conducted by Israeli military and police forces; at any given time, there were about 6,000 Palestinian prisoners detained in Israeli prisons, about half of them held temporarily without a final indictment, in accordance with Israeli law.

The tactic of military "curfew" – long-term lockdown of civilian areas – was used extensively by Israel throughout the Intifada. The longest curfew was in Nablus, which was kept under curfew for over 100 consecutive days, with generally under two hours per day allowed for people to get food or conduct other business.

Security checkpoints and roadblocks were erected inside and between Palestinian cities, subjecting all people and vehicles to security inspection for free passage. Israel defended those checkpoints as being necessary to stop militants and limit the ability to move weapons around. However some Palestinian, Israeli and International observers and organizations have criticized the checkpoints as excessive, humiliating, and a major cause of the humanitarian situation in the Occupied Territories. Transit could be delayed by several hours, depending on the security situation in Israel. Sniper towers were used extensively in the Gaza Strip before the Israeli pullout.

The Israeli intelligence services Shin Bet and Mossad penetrated Palestinian militant organizations by relying on moles and sources within armed groups, tapping communication lines, and aerial reconnaissance. The intelligence gathered allowed the IDF, Israel Border Police, and Israel Police, including Yamam and Mistaravim special forces units, to thwart hundreds of planned suicide bombings. The intelligence gathered also helped create a list of Palestinians marked for targeted killings.

Israel extensively used targeted killings, the assassinations of Palestinians involved in organizing attacks against Israelis, to eliminate imminent threats and to deter others from following suit, relying primarily on airstrikes and covert operations by Shin Bet to carry them out. The strategy of targeted killings had been proposed by Shin Bet, which determined that while it was impossible to stop every single suicide bomber, suicide bombings could be stopped by directly attacking the conspiratorial infrastructure behind them by killing operational commanders, recruiters, couriers, weapons procurers, maintainers of safehouses, and smugglers of money which financed the bombings. Israel was criticized for the use of helicopter gunships in urban assassinations, which often resulted in civilian casualties. Israel criticized what it described as a practice of militant leaders hiding among civilians in densely populated areas, thus turning them into unwitting human shields. Throughout the Intifada, the Palestinian leadership suffered heavy losses through targeted killings.

The practice has been widely condemned as extrajudicial executions by the international community, while the Israeli High Court ruled that it is a legitimate measure of self-defense against terrorism. Many criticize the targeted killings for placing civilians at risk, though its supporters believe it reduces civilian casualties on both sides.

In response to repeated rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip, the Israeli Navy imposed a maritime blockade on the area. Israel also sealed the border and closed Gaza's airspace in coordination with Egypt, and subjected all humanitarian supplies entering the Strip to security inspection before transferring them through land crossings. Construction materials were declared banned due to their possible use to build bunkers. The blockade has been internationally criticized as a form of "collective punishment" against Gaza's civilian population.

Although Israel's tactics also have been condemned internationally, Israel insists they are vital for security reasons in order to thwart terrorist attacks. Some cite figures, such as those published in Haaretz newspaper, to prove the effectiveness of these methods (Graph 1: Thwarted attacks (yellow) vs successful attacks (red) – Graph 2: Suicide bombing within the "green line" per quarter).

国際社会の関与

国際社会は長らくパレスチナ問題に関与しており、第2次インティファーダが勃発してからもひたすら拡大している。現在のイスラエルは、アメリカ合衆国から軍事支援として毎年30億ドルを融資保障なしに受けており、産業国家として発展しつつも、1976年以降、アメリカ合衆国による毎年の外国への支援で最大の規模を保っていて、かつ、唯一、用途の報告義務が存在しない。パレスチナ自治政府は、アメリカ合衆国からの軍事支援として毎年1億ドル、世界の財政支援として20億ドルを受けており、その中にはアラブ連盟からの5億2600万ドル、欧州連合からの6億5100万ドル、アメリカ合衆国からの3億ドル、世界銀行からの約2億3800万ドルが含まれる。国際連合によれば、パレスチナ自治区は人道支援の対象で上位に入っている。

さらに, International Solidarity Movement（パレスチナ側）、American Israel Public Affairs Committee（イスラエル側）といった民間団体が関与を深めつつある。

1980年代後半の第1次インティファーダを支援したのと同じように、2001年と2002年のアラブ連盟サミットで、アラブ国家は第2次インティファーダに対する支援を誓約した。

オスロ合意の影響
第2次インティファーダが勃発してから、バスなどの公共交通機関の利用者を意図的に狙った自爆攻撃が強調され、オスロ合意に対してイスラエル社会で不満が高まりつつある。2000年5月（オスロ合意から7年後、第2次インティファーダ勃発の5ヶ月前）、テルアビブ大学のthe Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Researchによる調査によれば、イスラエル人の39%が支持し、32%が数年以内に和平がなされると考えていたという。しかし、2004年5月では、26%がオスロ合意を支持し、18%が数年以内に和平がなされると考えていた（それぞれ13%、16%減少している）。さらに、その後の調査で、80%以上がイスラエル国防軍による第2次インティファーダへの軍事的な対処が成功であると考えていたことが判明した。

経済的な損失

イスラエル
イスラエルの商業は、特に観光の激減で、莫大な悪影響を被った。イスラエルの商工会議所の代表の推計によれば、 イスラエル経済の累積損失は、2002年の年間GDP1220億ドルに対して、1500億から2000億シェケル（35億から45億ドル）の危機によるとされる。イスラエル国防軍やイスラエル総保安庁の取り組みの結果、自爆攻撃が大幅に減少して、2005年以降は回復している。

パレスチナ自治政府
の推計によれば、パレスチナ経済の損失は、年間のGDP45億ドルに対して、2002年の第1四半期で11億ドルとされる。

脚注

注釈

引用

出典

書籍

論文

記事

関連項目

 
 :en:House demolition in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
 
 :en:1990 Temple Mount riots
 :en:Silent Intifada
 :en:Israeli–Palestinian conflict (2015)
 
 
 パレスチナ自治区
 中東の現代の紛争一覧
第2次インティファーダとその余波に直結するもの
 :en:List of Palestinian suicide attacks
 :en:Civilian casualties in the Second Intifada
 :en:List of Israeli civilian casualties in the Second Intifada
 :en:List of Palestinian civilian casualties in the Second Intifada
 :en:Violence in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 2000
 :en:Violence in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 2001
 :en:Violence in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 2002
 :en:Violence in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 2003
 :en:Violence in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 2004
 :en:Violence in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 2005
 :en:Violence in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 2006
 :en:Violence in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 2007
 :en:Violence in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict 2008

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