A Social-Neuroscience Perspective on Empathy
(2006)

In recent years, abundant evidence from behavioral and cognitive studies and functional-imaging experiments has indicated that individuals come to understand the emotional and affective states expressed by others with the help of the neural architecture that produces such states in themselves. Such a mechanism gives rise to shared representations, which constitutes one important aspect of empathy, although not the sole one. We suggest that other components, including people’s ability to monitor and regulate cognitive and emotional processes to prevent confusion between self and other, are equally necessary parts of a functional model of empathy. We discuss data from recent functional-imaging studies in support of such amodel and highlight the role of specific brain regions, notably the insula, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the right temporo-parietal region. Because this model assumes that empathy relies on dissociable informationprocessing mechanisms, it predicts a variety of structural or functional dysfunctions, depending on which mechanism is disrupted. KEYWORDS—empathy; intersubjectivity; affective sharing; perspective taking; emotion regulation Empathy refers to the capacity to understand and respond to the unique affective experiences of another person. At an experiential level of description, this psychological construct denotes a sense of similarity between one’s own feelings and those expressed by another person. At a basic level of description, empathy can be conceived of as an interaction between any two individuals, with one experiencing and sharing the feeling of the other. This sharing of feelings does not necessarily imply that one will act or even feel impelled to act in a supportive or sympathetic way. The social and emotional situations eliciting empathy can be quite complex, depending on the feelings experienced by the observed person (target), the relationship of the target to the observer, and the context in which they socially interact. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the cognitive-affective neuroscience of empathy. In this article, we first discuss what the components of this psychological construct are and then present empirical data that can cast some light on the neurocognitive mechanisms subserving empathy, with a special emphasis on the perception of pain in others. THE MAJOR COMPONENTS OF EMPATHY Despite the various definitions of empathy, there is broad agreement on three primary components: (a) an affective response to another person, which often, but not always, entails sharing that person’s emotional state; (b) a cognitive capacity to take the perspective of the other person; and (c) emotion regulation. Some scholars favor a particular aspect over the others in their definitions. For instance, Hoffman (1981) views empathy as a largely involuntary vicarious response to affective cues from another person, while Batson et al. (1997) emphasize people’s intentional role-taking ability, which taps mainly into cognitive resources. These two aspects represent the opposite sides of the same coin: Depending on how empathy is triggered, the automatic tendency to mimic the expressions of others (bottom-up processing) and the capacity for the imaginative transposing of oneself into the feeling and thinking of another (top-down processing) are differentially involved. Moreover, both aspects tap, to some extent, similar neural mechanisms that underpin emotion processing. It is unlikely, however, that the overlap between selfand other representations is absolute. Such a complete overlapping between self and other could lead to personal distress (i.e., a self-focused, aversive response to another’s emotional state). This would consequently hamper the ability to toggle between selfand other perspectives and would not constitute an adaptive behavior. Therefore, self-regulatory processes are at play to prevent confusion between selfand other feelings. Address correspondence to Jean Decety, Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, 5848 S. University Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637; e-mail: decety@uchicago.edu. CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 54 Volume 15—Number 2 Copyright r 2006 Association for Psychological Science Affective Sharing Between Self and Others A number of theorists have pointed out that empathy involves resonating with another person’s unconscious affect and experiencing that person’s experience along with him or her while keeping one’s own self-integrity intact. Notably, Basch (1983) speculated that, because their respective autonomic nervous systems are genetically programmed to respond in a like fashion, a given affective expression by a member of a particular species sometimes triggers a similar response in other members of that species. The view that unconscious automatic mimicry of a target generates in the observer the autonomic response associated with that bodily state and facial expression subsequently received empirical support from a variety of studies as well as observations from ethologists (Preston & de Waal, 2002). For instance, viewing facial expressions triggers similar expressions on one’s own face, even in the absence of conscious recognition of the stimulus. It was proposed that people may ‘‘catch’’ the emotions of others as a result of feedback generated by elementary motor mimicry of others’ expressive behavior, producing a simultaneous matching emotional experience. Interestingly, Levenson and Ruef (1992) found that a perceiver’s accuracy in inferring a target’s negative emotional states is related to the degree of physiological synchrony between the perceiver and the target. In other words, when the physiological state (e.g., heart rate, muscle activity) of two individuals is more closely matched, they are more accurate at perceiving each other’s feelings. Recently a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment confirmed these results by showing that when participants are required to observe or to imitate facial expressions of various emotions, increased neurodynamic activity is detected in the brain regions that are implicated in the facial expression of these emotions, including the superior temporal sulcus, the anterior insula, and the amygdala, as well as specific areas of the premotor cortex (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003). The similarity between the expression of an emotion and the perception of that emotion has also been demonstrated for disgust. Damage to the insula, a region crucial in monitoring body state, can impair both the experience of disgust and the recognition of social signals (e.g., facial and emotional expression) that convey disgust. Functional neuroimaging studies (see Decety & Jackson, 2004, for review) have later shown that observing facial expressions of disgust and feelings of disgust activated very similar sites in the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Altogether these results point to one basic mechanism for social interaction: the direct link between perception and action. Such a system automatically prompts the observer to resonate with the emotional state of another individual, with the observer emulating the motor representations and associated autonomic and somatic responses of the observed target (Preston& deWaal, 2002). This covert mimicry process is responsible for shared affects and feelings between self and other. Developmental research has demonstrated that motor and affective mimicry are active already in the earliest interactions between infants and caregivers, raising the possibility that these processes are hardwired. The expression of pain provides a crucial signal that can motivate helping behaviors in others. Finding out how individuals perceive others in pain is thus an interesting way to decipher the underlying neural mechanisms of empathy. Recently, a handful of fMRI studies have indicated that the observation of pain in others is mediated by several brain areas that are implicated in processing the affective and motivational aspects of one’s own pain. In one study, participants received painful stimuli and observed signals indicating that their partner, who was present in the same room, had received the same stimuli (Singer et al., 2004). The rostral (or anterior) ACC, the insula, and the cerebellum were active during both conditions. In another study, participants were shown photographs depicting body parts in painful or neutral everyday-life situations, and were asked to imagine the level of pain that these situations would produce (Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005). In comparison to neutral situations, painful conditions elicited significant activation in regions involved in the affective aspects of pain processing, notably the ACC and the anterior insula. Moreover, analyses taking into account the behavioral responses of participants revealed that the level of activity within the ACC correlated with ratings of pain that subjects ascribed to the different situations. This finding strongly suggests that this region plays a crucial role in affective modulation, which is triggered by the assessment of painful situations. Altogether, these results lend support to the idea that common neural circuits are involved in representing one’s own and others’ affective painrelated states (Fig. 1). Adopting the Perspective of the Other Humans have the capacity to intentionally adopt the subjective perspective of others by putting themselves into other people’s shoes and imagining what they feel. Such a capacity requires that one mentally simulate the other’s perspective using one’s own neural machinery. In one neuroimaging study, the participants were presented with short written sentences that depicted real-life situations likely to induce social emotions (e.g., shame) or other situations that were emotionally neutral (Ruby & Decety, 2004). Participants were each asked to imagine how they would feel if they were in those situatio