Story Normality and actual causal strength (Dropbox) (Icard, Kominsky, Knobe, 2017). Experiment 1, Vignette 1. (Same as Kominsky et al. 2015). Condition: normative vs. abnormal, conjunctive. M=3.37 vs. M=5.61.
Story Normality and actual causal strength (Dropbox) (Icard, Kominsky, Knobe, 2017). Experiment 1, Vignette 1: Motion detector. Condition: normative vs. abnormal, disjunctive. M=3.25 vs. M=4.18. Prescriptive norm.
Story Normality and actual causal strength (Dropbox) (Icard, Kominsky, Knobe, 2017). Experiment 1, Vignette 3: Train. We skip "battery" because it's a moral Condition: normative vs. abnormal, conjunctive. Prescriptive norm.
Story Normality and actual causal strength (Dropbox) (Icard, Kominsky, Knobe, 2017). Experiment 1, Vignette 3: Train. We skip "battery" because it's a moral Condition: normative vs. abnormal, disjunctive. Prescriptive norm.
Story What you foresee isn't what you forget: No evidence for the influence of epistemic states on causal judgments for abnormal negligent behavior. (Murray, et al., 2021) (Dropbox). Experiment 1: Epistemic advantage is not necessary for abnormal inflation, Vignette 1 (No knowledge), 2 (Knowledge) x 2 (Normality). Normal vs. abnormal.  $(\mathbf{M} = 7.50$ $\mathrm{SD} = 1.50$  n = 85) vs.  $(\mathbf{M} = 3.32$ $\mathrm{SD} = 2.47$  n = 77). Changed (Henne et al. 2017), add whether Kate noticed or not.
Story What you foresee isn't what you forget: No evidence for the influence of epistemic states on causal judgments for abnormal negligent behavior. (Murray, et al., 2021) (Dropbox). Experiment 1: Epistemic advantage is not necessary for abnormal inflation, Vignette 1 (No knowledge), 2 (Knowledge) x 2 (Normality).  $(\mathbf{M} = 7.48$ $\mathrm{SD} = 1.74$  n = 85) vs.  $(\mathbf{M} = 4.79$  SD  $= 2.60$  n = 101). Changed (Henne et al. 2017), add whether Kate noticed or not.
Story What you foresee isn't what you forget: No evidence for the influence of epistemic states on causal judgments for abnormal negligent behavior. (Murray, et al., 2021) (Dropbox). Experiment 2: Outcome expectation is not necessary for abnormal inflation, 2 (Knowledge) x 2 (Normality), Vignette 1 (No knowledge). (Mean = approx. 8) vs. (Mean = approx. 3).
Story What you foresee isn't what you forget: No evidence for the influence of epistemic states on causal judgments for abnormal
Story Degrading causation (O'Neill, et al., 2019). Experiment 2. Conjunctive Electricity, Number of Causes 3. Normal vs. Abnormal. We only picked out ones where we can binarize  $(>0.5)$ . We modified the question from "To what extent did X cause Y" ("totally vs. "not at all") to "Did X cause Y" ("Yes" vs. "No"). Testing abnormal inflation.
Story Crossed Wires: Blaming Artifacts for Bad Outcomes (Sytsma, 2021), Study 1: Machine Case with Responsibility Attributions.  $(\mathbf{M} = 4.89$ $SD = 1.94)$  vs.  $(\mathbf{M} = 2.83$ $SD = 1.86)$
Story Crossed Wires: Blaming Artifacts for Bad Outcomes (Sytsma, 2021), Study 3: Machine Case with Movement.  $(\mathbf{M} = 5.03$ $\mathrm{SD} = 2.24)$  vs.  $(\mathbf{M} = 2.88$ $\mathrm{SD} = 2.07)$
Story Causation, norm violation, and culpable control (Dropbox) (Alicke, et al., 2011), Study 2, condition 1. Cheat vs. Did not Cheat condition is not so interesting (moral violation is judged as more causal). However, in Did not Cheat condition, norm vs. counternorm is more nuanced. Norm vs. Counternorm.  $(\mathbf{M} = 4.12$  vs.  $\mathbf{M} = 2.62)$  Figure 5.
Story Counterfactual thinking and recency effects in causal judgment (Dropbox) (Henne, et al., 2021). Experiment 1, Vignette 1 (Overdetermination, Early vs. Late).  $(\mathbf{M} = 35.33$  vs.  $\mathbf{M} = -3.44)$