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we pause to note that even if congress sought, through the csra, to regulate the nonuse of interstate channels, it would still be within its constitutional command to do so. the supreme court has often held, in several contexts, that the defendants nonuse of interstate channels alone does not shield him from federal purview under the commerce clause. in heart of atlanta motel, inc. v. united states, 379 u.s. 241, 250, 85 s.c. 348, 353, 13 l.ed.2d 258 (1964), the court upheld commerce clause jurisdiction over a local motel that failed to engage in interstate commerce when it refused to rent rooms to black guests. the court held that by failing to rent the rooms, the hotel inhibited black travelers from crossing state lines and thus obstructed interstate commerce that otherwise would have occurred. id. at 253, 85 s.c. at 356. in standard oil co. v. united states, 221 u.s. 1, 68, 31 s.c. 502, 518, 55 l.ed. 619 (1911), the court upheld the sherman act, 15 u.s.c. 1, 2, as permissible congressional action under the commerce clause. the sherman act prohibits restraints of trade and obstructions of interstate commerce in order to facilitate commerce that otherwise would occur absent the defendants monopolistic behavior. finally, in united states v. green, 350 u.s. 415, 420, 76 s.c. 522, 525, 100 l.ed. 494 (1956), the court found constitutional the hobbs act, 18 u.s.c. 1951, which punishes interference with interstate commerce by extortion, robbery or physical violence [by] ... outlaw[ing] such interference in any way or degree. to accept baileys nonuse argument would mean, as emphasized by the second circuit, that congress would have no power to prohibit a monopoly so complete as to thwart all other interstate commerce in a line of trade[;] or to punish under the hobbs act someone who successfully prevented interstate trade by extortion and murder. sage, 92 f.3d at 105.	No
our primary area of concern with the district courts determination is its confident assertion that the language of 326(a) is unambiguous. see lan assoc., 237 b.r. at 56-57. in this day and age when we exchange by a keystroke or series of keystrokes what we used to handle only in cash, we do not think that the term moneys is so clear as the district court indicated. in fact, one of the definitions cited by the district court refers to money as a measure of value, see id. at 55-56 (citing websters third new intl dictionary 1458 (1986)), which surely is a concept that evolves along with and is dependent upon changing cultural, social, and economic practices and institutions. for example, in todays society the term money could easily encompass the concept of credit, which increasing numbers of people use as a method of payment. the term money might also encompass property, especially when property is used as a method of payment or a measure of wealth. see websters ii new college dictionary 707 (defining money as [a] medium that can be exchanged for goods and services and is used as a measure of their values on the market and as [p]roperty and assets considered in terms of monetary value); supra note 5 (describing the nabts argument that an exchange of property involves an exchange of value). but see in re brigantine beach hotel corp., 197 f.2d 296, 299 (3d cir.1952) (referring to precode statute governing receiver compensation and stating that [i]t is clear that the word moneys in the clause ... upon all moneys disbursed or turned over ... is not the equivalent of property.). these reasonable interpretations of the term moneys render it ambiguous for purposes of our interpretation of 326(a). see taylor v. continental group change in control severance pay plan, 933 f.2d 1227, 1232 (3d cir.1991) (a term is ambiguous if it is subject to reasonable alternative interpretations.); accord united states v. gibbens, 25 f.3d 28, 34 (1st cir.1994) (a statute is ambiguous if it reasonably can be read in more than one way.).	Yes