[44] Robert Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins, and Eli Upfal. Multi-armed bandits in metric spaces. In Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 681–690, 2008.
[45] Anton Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelyuk, and Ming Li. Persuasion of a privately informed receiver. *Econometrica*, 85(6):1949-1964, 2017.
[46] Ilan Kremer, Yishay Mansour, and Motty Perry. Implementing the "wisdom of the crowd". Journal of Political Economy, 122(5):988-1012, 2014.
[47] Yingkai Li. Selling data to an agent with endogenous information. In Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages 664-665, 2022.
[48] Shuze Liu, Weiran Shen, and Haifeng Xu. Optimal pricing of information. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages 693–693, 2021.
[49] Puneet Manchanda, Jean-Pierre Dubé, Khim Yong Goh, and Pradeep K Chintagunta. The effect of banner advertising on internet purchasing. Journal of Marketing Research, 43(1): 98-108, 2006.
[50] Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, and Vasilis Syrgkanis. Bayesian incentive-compatible bandit exploration. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages 565-582, 2015.
[51] Yishay Mansour, Alex Slivkins, Vasilis Syrgkanis, and Zhiwei Steven Wu. Bayesian exploration: Incentivizing exploration in bayesian games. Operations Research, 70(2):1105-1127, 2022.
[52] Paul Milgrom and John Roberts. Price and advertising signals of product quality. Journal of political economy, 94(4):796-821, 1986.
[53] Phillip Nelson. Information and consumer behavior. Journal of political economy, 78(2): 311-329, 1970.
[54] Phillip Nelson. Advertising as information. Journal of political economy, 82(4):729-754, 1974.
[55] Navdeep S Sahni and Harikesh S Nair. Does advertising serve as a signal? evidence from a field experiment in mobile search. The Review of Economic Studies, 87(3):1529-1564, 2020.
[56] Aleksandrs Slivkins. Contextual bandits with similarity information. In Proceedings of the 24th annual Conference On Learning Theory, pages 679-702. JMLR Workshop and Conference Proceedings, 2011.
[57] Wei Tang and Chien-Ju Ho. On the bayesian rational assumption in information design. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing, volume 9, pages 120-130, 2021.
[58] Jibang Wu, Zixuan Zhang, Zhe Feng, Zhaoran Wang, Zhuoran Yang, Michael I Jordan, and Haifeng Xu. Sequential information design: Markov persuasion process and its efficient reinforcement learning. In Proceedings of the 23th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2022.
[59] Shuran Zheng and Yiling Chen. Optimal advertising for information products. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages 888–906, 2021.
[60] Anton Zhiyanov and Alexey Drutsa. Bisection-based pricing for repeated contextual auctions against strategic buyer. In International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 11469-11480. PMLR, 2020.
[61] You Zu, Krishnamurthy Iyer, and Haifeng Xu. Learning to persuade on the fly: Robustness against ignorance. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages 927-928, 2021.