Kareem Amin, Afshin Rostamizadeh, and Umar Syed. Repeated contextual auctions with strategic buyers. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 27:622-630, 2014.
M-F Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, and Tuomas Sandholm. Learning within an instance for designing high-revenue combinatorial auctions. In *IJCAI Annual Conference*, 2021.
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D Hartline, and Yishay Mansour. Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 74 (8):1245-1270, 2008.
Maria-Florina F Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, and Ellen Vitercik. Sample complexity of automated mechanism design. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 29, 2016.
Richard Cole and Tim Roughgarden. The sample complexity of revenue maximization. In Proceedings of the forty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 243-252, 2014.
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Complexity of mechanism design. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI'02, page 103110, San Francisco, CA, USA, 2002. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc. ISBN 1558608974.
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 132-141, 2004.
Michael Curry, Ping-Yeh Chiang, Tom Goldstein, and John Dickerson. Certifying strategyproof auction networks. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 33:4987-4998, 2020.
Michael Curry, Tuomas Sandholm, and John Dickerson. Differentiable economics for randomized affine maximizer auctions. In Edith Elkind, editor, Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-23, pages 2633-2641. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 8 2023. doi: 10.24963/ijcai.2023/293. URL https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/293. Main Track.
Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, and Christos Tzamos. Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages 449-450, 2015.
Nikhil R Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, and Christos-Alexandros Psomas. The sample complexity of auctions with side information. In Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 426-439, 2016.
Alexey Drutsa. Optimal non-parametric learning in repeated contextual auctions with strategic buyer. In International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 2668-2677. PMLR, 2020.
Zhijian Duan, Jingwu Tang, Yutong Yin, Zhe Feng, Xiang Yan, Manzil Zaheer, and Xiaotie Deng. A context-integrated transformer-based neural network for auction design. In International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 5609-5626. PMLR, 2022.
Zhijian Duan, Yunxuan Ma, and Xiaotie Deng. Are equivariant equilibrium approximators beneficial? In Andreas Krause, Emma Brunskill, Kyunghyun Cho, Barbara Engelhardt, Sivan Sabato, and Jonathan Scarlett, editors, Proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Machine Learning, volume 202 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, pages 8747-8778. PMLR, 23-29 Jul 2023. URL https://proceedings.mlr.press/v202/duan23d.html.
Paul Dütting, Felix Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K Lai, Benjamin Lubin, and David C Parkes. Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers, 2015.