Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
The first competition agencies that indicated a possible use of UPP in merger review are the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In their 2010 “Horizontal Merger Guidelines”, they stated:

Diagnosing unilateral price effects based on the value of diverted sales need not rely on market definition or the calculation of market shares and concentration. The Agencies rely much more on the value of diverted sales than on the level of the HHI for diagnosing unilateral price effects in markets with differentiated products. If the value of diverted sales is proportionately small, significant unilateral price effects are unlikely. (US DOJ and FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 6.1)

JFTC’s Business Combination GL has not yet incorporated the concepts of diversion ratio and UPP. Still, there is a case in which JFTC estimated a measure of UPP called GUPPI (gross upward pricing pressure index). It is a case of integration of two convenience store chains and JFTC used the estimated GUPPI to select stores for which further scrutiny is required. $ ^{7} $

In addition, with the progress of estimation and simulation techniques, it has become more common that competition agencies (and sometimes the firms seeking merger approval) utilize merger simulations, by estimating the demand functions and cost functions using the available pre-merger data and then applying the estimates to predict the post-merger prices or quantities. Many of these analyses assume differentiated markets to estimate cross-elasticities across products of separate firms including the firms to be combined. $ ^{8} $
The use of merger simulation has occurred less frequently in Japan than in the US; still, in the recent petroleum merger case mentioned in Section 3 above, a simulation model assuming product differentiation was used to predict the effect of common ownership, as the merger (to be more precise, two combinations taking place simultaneously) was expected to create a complex and overlapping ownership structure in a number of subsidiaries in the LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) industry. $ ^{9} $

### 5. The Free-Rider Problem

Another development in economic theory took place in relation to vertical restraints. Vertical restraints, most typically the restriction placed by an upstream firm (say, a manufacturer) to a downstream firm (say, a retail store), has been traditionally considered to suppress competition in the downstream, thereby causing anti-competitive harm to consumers. Today, however, with the progress of relevant economic models, it is accepted that vertical restraints may have pro-competitive effects by, most importantly, eliminating or discouraging free riding.

The free-rider problem was first discussed in relation to public goods. Public goods, say, defense and police and, to a lesser extent, roads and parks, possess the peculiar characteristics of non-excludability. That is, one cannot exclude non-payers from using them. In consequence, everyone chooses to free-ride and no supply occurs in the market, which is why the supply of public goods has to be financed through taxation.

The free-rider problem also explains the need for an intellectual property rights (IPR) system to sustain creative activities and innovation because, without IPR protection, knowledge, like public goods, has the characteristics of non-excludability.

Services offered by retailers may also have the public-goods characteristics because a consumer may free-ride on the services provided by a retailer and then purchase the merchandise at another no-service low-price retailer. Vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance (RPM) may prevent such free riding and benefit consumers by ensuring competition on services. That is, vertical restraints can be pro-competitive
even if it may have anti-competitive effects in other aspects.

In this connection, probably the best known is the Leegin case, in which the US Supreme Court adopted the rule-of-reason approach in place of per-se illegality to evaluate the consequence of RPM. $ ^{10} $

In Japan, JFTC first published the “Guidelines Concerning Distribution Systems and Business Practices under the Antimonopoly Act” (hereafter Distribution GL) in 1991. It said that “restrictions by a manufacture of sales price of distributors (resale price) are in principle illegal as unfair trade practices” (Part II, Chapter 1, 2, (1)) and there was no consideration of the free-rider problem. After several revisions, the current version (published in June 2017) now explains the free-rider problem in detail:

Distributors may sell any enterprises’ product without their own promotional activities if other distributors have already implemented promotional activities for the product as pre-sales efforts, which thus have actually boosted demand for the product. In such a case, distributors may refrain from actively implementing voluntary promotional activities on their own expenses, resulting in a situation where consumers who would otherwise have purchased the product do not purchase it. This type of situation is called the “free-rider” problem. (JFTC, Distribution GL, 2017, Part 1, Sub-Section 3(3)a)

## And then it states that

For example, when an enterprise engages in RPM with respect to a product, such RPM is deemed to have “justifiable grounds” if the RPM actually has pro-competitive effects through avoiding the “free-rider” problem mentioned in Sub-Section 3(3)a of Part 1 above, promotes inter-brand competition, and increases demand of the product, thus benefiting consumers, and pro-competitive effects would not have resulted from less restrictive alternatives other than the RPM. (JFTC, Distribution GL, Part 1, Chapter 1, Sub-Section 2(2))
This important change clearly reflects the adoption by the competition community of the new thinking in economics. I also want to emphasize that this new thinking is indispensable in examining the performance of not only the traditional commercial sector (e.g., bricks-and-mortar stores) but also e-commerce as we will discuss in Section 7 below.

### 6. The Hold-Up Problem

The hold-up problem arises when one has to make a relation-specific investment, that is, the sort of investment that yields its full value only when a relationship is maintained with particular partners, such as particular suppliers of goods and services, particular suppliers of intangible assets (e.g., patented technology), and particular customers. The cost of investment is sunk, that is, it cannot be fully recovered even when the invested asset becomes no longer needed. $ ^{11} $

Because of these characteristics, a critical asymmetry arises between ex-ante and ex-post, namely, pre-investment and post-investment. Ex-ante, you can freely choose who to trade with, which product to make, and which production method to use. However, once you have made the investment, you are locked in with the specific partner, specific product, and specific production method because, to adopt another partner etc., you have to discard that invested asset and make another investment.

Because of this changing bargaining power between you and your partner ex post, your partner may hold you up by making a demand that you would have certainly refused if ex ante but now cannot do so. If you ex ante expect this to happen ex post, you would refrain from making the relation-specific investment. The result is an insufficient level of investment from the social viewpoint. This phenomenon is called the hold-up problem.

Take the case of a supplier of a certain component. The component is sold to a certain assembler and is manufactured to the assembler’s specification. Therefore, it cannot
be sold to other assemblers and the supplier’s production equipment, say, mould, can be useful only when this assembler keeps buying from this supplier. Then, by the reasoning above, the assembler would be in a “superior bargaining position” ex post and may abuse this position by demanding, say, a low price that is not sufficient to cover the investment cost. If the supplier expects this to happen, it will not invest, resulting in the collapse of a supplier-assembler relationship.

Japan’s Antimonopoly Act (AMA) prohibits the abuse of superior bargaining position, which is defined as “Engaging in any act specified in one of the following by making use of one's superior bargaining position over the counterparty unjustly, in light of normal business practices” (AMA, Article 2, (9), (v)), where “the following” refers, for instance, to “delaying payment to said counterparty or reducing the amount of payment, or otherwise establishing or changing trade terms or executing transactions in a way disadvantageous to said counterparty.”

JFTC published the “Guidelines Concerning the Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position under the Antimonopoly Act” (hereafter Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position GL) in 2010. It says

In order for one party to a transaction (Party A) to have superior bargaining position over the other party (Party B), it is construed that Party A does not need to have a market-dominant position nor an absolutely dominant bargaining position equivalent thereto, but only needs to have a relatively superior bargaining position as compared to the other transacting party. When Party A has superior bargaining position over Party B, who is a transaction counterpart, it means such a case where if Party A makes a request, etc., that is substantially disadvantageous for Party B, Party B would be unable to avoid accepting such a request, etc., on the grounds that Party B has difficulty in continuing the transaction with Party A and thereby Party B's business management would be substantially impeded. (Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position GL, II, 1)

That is, “superior bargaining position” need be clearly separated from market dominance or monopolization and for this reason economists in Japan have been
debating whether the regulation on its abuse is really needed from the competition viewpoint, aside from the fairness viewpoint (as the regulation was commonly applied to big firms in their transactions with much smaller subcontractors). Once one thinks of it as a regulation to deal with the hold-up problem, however, a new understanding can be made. That is, the party in a position to be able to hold up is considered to be in a superior bargaining position and the regulation purports to eliminate any hold-up behavior by this party. In consequence, the regulation will have the supplier (i.e., Party B) less worried about ex-post hold-up and will thus encourage them to make relation-specific investment ex ante.

Another area in which the hold-up problem can take place is IPR licensing, particularly in relation to standard essential patents (SEP). Once you decide to adopt a certain standard, you will have to make a substantial amount of investment to develop the product in accordance with this standard, to construct a production line, to distribute the product, and to make promotion efforts. Most of this investment is specific to the standard and will be sunk. Thus, ex post, any of the SEP holders is in a position to be able to hold up. To avoid such a behavior, a standard setting organization (SSO), before finalizing the standard, usually requests any SEP holder to declare to license the patents on a Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) term. Still, what is fair and what is reasonable has never been determined in advance and legal disputes between SEP holders and prospective implementers of the standard have been frequent.

JFTC published the “Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property under the Antimonopoly Act” (hereafter IP GL) first in 2007 but revised it in 2016 to add the following paragraph:

Refusal to license or bringing an action for injunction against a party who is willing to take a license by a FRAND-encumbered Standard Essential Patent holder, or refusal to license or bringing an action for injunction against a party who is willing to take a license by a FRAND-encumbered Standard Essential Patent holder after the withdrawal of the FRAND Declaration for that Standard Essential Patent may fall under the exclusion of business activities of other entrepreneurs (which AMA
prohibits as a case of private monopolization) by making it difficult to research & develop, produce or sell the products adopting the standards. (IP GL, Part 3, (1)(i)(e), parenthesis added).

Again, we can understand this regulation as an effort to minimize the danger of the hold-up problem that would lead to suboptimal diffusion of the standards and suboptimal R&D efforts to develop technologies, thereby lessening competition in the long run. $ ^{12} $

### 7. The Theory of Two-Sided Markets

“Two-sided (or more generally, multi-sided) markets are markets in which platforms offer interaction services to two (or several) categories of end-users.” $ ^{13} $ Economic theories of two-sided (or multi-sided) markets have been advanced in the 2000s by, among others, Tirole who, with Rochet, gave this definition and, for this and other contributions in industrial organization and competition policy, was awarded the Nobel Prize (formally the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel) in 2014.

What characterizes the two-sided markets is the presence of externalities through indirect network effects, which refer to usually positive, but possibly negative, effects of the volume of participation or usage in one category of the users to the utility of each user of the other category. Two-sided markets with indirect network effects have
been present from the old age. Brick-and-mortar stores faced two categories of users -- suppliers and consumers. The larger the number and variety of suppliers, the more attractive the store will be for each consumer while, the more the store attracts consumers, the more the suppliers will be tempted to sell at the store.

Yet, the arrival of internet and the spread of e-commerce made the two-sidedness an acute competition issue. Whereas transportation costs prevented even the most attractive brick-and-mortar store from attracting all the consumers in the market (whatever geographic market one defines), consumers can now order from any net store worldwide by simply clicking. This, on the one hand, made competition fiercer by increasing the choice for consumers. On the other, it tended to make a strong seller even stronger with the cyclic working of indirect network effects, that is, more customers attracting more suppliers, which in turn attract even more customers. The resulting concentration to a single or a limited number of e-commerce sites, or platforms in general, has been making competition authorities worried.

In principle, if monopolization is the result of a better service and consumers' choice, competition authorities should not intervene whereas, if the dominant firm undertakes any conduct aiming solely at excluding the rivals including potential entrants, such a conduct should be prohibited. In practice, however, it can be extremely difficult to distinguish between these two. One needs to make a careful economic study of the incentive for and the consequences of such conduct to analyze and evaluate the probable pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects.

Across platform parity agreements (APPA), a form of most-favored nations (MFN) clause applied to two-sided markets, is one example, in which the dominant platformer requires that the suppliers (e.g., hotels in the hotel booking site case and the publishers in the e-book case) set their retail prices listed at its site not higher than those listed in other sites including the suppliers' own sites. $ ^{14} $ On the one hand, APPA suppresses competition among the platformers and deters the rival platforms from offering lower commissions to the suppliers to entice them to set lower retail prices. On the other, the
free-rider problem mentioned in Section 5 above may occur without APPA, resulting in the disappearance of comparison sites to the ultimate inconvenience of consumers.

A number of European competition authorities regarded APPA by hotel booking sites, such as Booking.com and Expedia, anti-competitive and ended the investigation with these platformers' commitments not to impose APPA. However, some authorities allowed the so-called narrow APPA, in which the platformers make it a condition that the hotels do not set their retail prices at the platformers' sites higher than the prices at the hotels' own sites (but not necessarily than the prices at rival platformers' sites), presumably because the authorities considered the narrow APPA unavoidable for the purpose of discouraging free riding. $ ^{15} $

In Japan, Amazon Japan used to require the sellers at their Marketplace to accept an APPA clause (called price parity clause in the JFTC document). JFTC suspected that this restricted the business activities of the sellers and caused anti-competitive consequences. While JFTC was still investigating the case, Amazon Japan proposed to delete the price parity clauses from all seller contracts, which JFTC evaluated as satisfactory and thus dropped the case. $ ^{16} $

Two-sidedness is also making merger reviews more complicated. As discussed in Section 4 above, the conventional procedure for merger review has been first to define the relevant market and then to evaluate the effect of the proposed merger in this market. However, a merger between two platformers affects the two sides, say the supply market and the consumer market, with indirect network effects between them. Therefore, applying the conventional procedure to each of the two sides can be the first step but is insufficient to assess the full impact of the merger.
In Japan, there was a case of acquisition by Yahoo Japan of Ikyu, an online travel agency (OTA). Yahoo Japan is also an OTA but, in addition, provides a meta-search service for OTAs and other platforms. Thus, the acquisition was both horizontal (an OTA being combined with another) and vertical because the information on OTAs is listed in Yahoo Japan's meta-search service. JFTC looked at the market for online travel reservation service in Japan and found that neither Ikyu nor Yahoo Japan had more than five percent market share in terms of transaction volume. Thus the combined share is less than ten percent, whereas three rivals each had a share of ten percent or more. In view of this fact, JFTC considered the acquisition unlikely to cause anticompetitive effects. For the vertical aspect of the merger too, the small combined market share in the online travel reservation service suggested that Yahoo Japan will not have an incentive to foreclose the other OTAs from its meta-search service. In consequence, the acquisition was approved. $ ^{17} $

This has been one of a very few merger cases in Japan involving platforms. If a merger between more prominent platforms is to be proposed in the future, JFTC will have to make a more detailed analysis of the two-sidedness of the market.

### 8. Conclusion

In this paper I have discussed how new economic thinking has influenced and helped competition policy in Japan and in many other countries, taking six theories and problems as examples: the contestable market theory, the cartel theory, the oligopoly models, the free-rider problem, the hold-up problem, and the theory of two-sided markets. The discussion here, I hope, gives a clear message that understanding economics is essential in the implementation of competition policy.

Furthermore, economics is evolving: new thinking will appear and old thinking will be revised and updated reflecting the changing reality and the availability of more sophisticated analyses. Such new thinking has to be incorporated into competition policy and, in turn, the development in competition cases will give more materials on which economists endeavor to enrich the theory. That is, competition policy and
economic theory can co-evolve and must keep doing so.
# 各種施策の基盤、各主体の参加及び国際協力に係る施策

## 第6章

## 第1節 政府の総合的な取組

## 1 環境保全経費

政府の予算のうち環境保全に関係する予算について、環境保全に係る施策が政府全体として効率的、効果的に展開されるよう、環境省において見積り方針の調整を図り、環境保全経費として取りまとめています。平成28年度予算における環境保全経費の総額は、前年度比18.1％増の2兆1,337億円となりました(http://www.env.go.jp/policy/kihon_keikaku/keihi.html)。

## 2 環境基本計画の進捗状況の点検

中央環境審議会は、環境基本計画に基づく施策の進捗状況等を点検し、政府に報告しています。平成27年は、第四次環境基本計画の第3回目の点検として、「経済・社会のグリーン化とグリーン・イノベーションの推進」、「国際情勢に的確に対応した戦略的取組の推進」、「持続可能な社会を実現するための地域づくり・人づくり、基盤整備の推進」、「水環境保全に関する取組」、「大気環境保全に関する取組」の分野及び東日本大震災からの復旧・復興に際して環境の面から配慮すべき事項における施策の進捗状況を点検しました。その点検結果は、平成27年12月の閣議において報告されました。

「第3回点検結果」http://www.env.go.jp/policy/kihon_keikaku/plan/plan_4_check.html

## 3 予防的な取組方法の考え方に基づく環境施策の推進

化学物質による健康や生態系への影響、地球温暖化による環境への影響等、環境問題の多くには科学的な不確実性があります。しかし、一度問題が発生すれば、それに伴う被害や対策コストが非常に大きくなる可能性や、長期間にわたる極めて深刻な、あるいは不可逆的な影響をもたらす可能性があります。このため、環境影響が懸念される問題については、科学的証拠が欠如していることを理由に対策を遅らせず、知見の充実に努めながら、予防的な対策を講じるという「予防的な取組方法」の考え方に基づいて対策を講じていくべきです。この予防的取組は、第四次環境基本計画においても「環境政策における原則等」として、位置付けられており、様々な環境政策における基本的な考え方として取り入れられています。関係府省は、第四次環境基本計画に基づき、予防的な取組方法の考え方に関する各種施策を実施しました。

## 4 2020年東京オリンピック・パラリンピック競技大会を契機とした取組の推進

2020年東京オリンピック・パラリンピック競技大会に向けて、環境省は平成26年8月に「2020年オリンピック・パラリンピック東京大会を契機とした環境配慮の推進について」(http://www.env.go.jp/press/files/jp/24949.pdf)を取りまとめました。そこでは、電気自動車（EV）や燃料電池車（FCV）とその充電ステーションや水素ステーションの普及及びこれらに係る技術開発、大会関連施設の低炭素化の促進、ヒートアイランド対策の推進、良好な大気・水環境の実現、食品ロスの削減やドーピング検査に使用する注射針等の円滑な処理等を含めた各種の対策を進めていくなどの3R等の徹底、我が国の環境先進性を国
内外に広く PR するための環境情報の発信等について述べています。

平成27年度、環境省は、新たに開催した「持続可能な東京都市圏づくりに関する懇談会」での意見を受けつつ、東京都市圏（東京都、埼玉県、千葉県及び神奈川県）における環境対策モデル分析を行いました(http://pwcms.env.go.jp/policy/olypara/moderubunseki/post_2.html)。具体的には、2020年（平成32年）、2030年（平成42年）及び2050年（平成52年）における将来の環境負荷並びに対策の効果及び経済への影響を総合的に推計しました。これにより、これまで推計ができなかった、地球温暖化とヒートアイランド現象のような異なる環境問題について、分野間の相互効果も含めた多面的な分析が可能となるとともに、都市のコンパクト化による環境負荷の変化を明らかにしました。今後、この結果が2020年東京オリンピック・パラリンピック競技大会を契機とした環境対策を具体的に進める上での一助となることが期待されます。

## 第2節 経済・社会のグリーン化の推進

## 1 经济的措置

## （1） 政府関係機関等の助成

政府関係機関等による環境保全事業の助成については、表6-2-1のとおりでした。

表6-2-1 政府関係機関等による環境保全事業の助成

日本政策金融公庫	産業公害防止施設等に対する特別貸付
環境保全対策に必要な家畜排せつ物処理施設の設置等に要する資金の融通
独立行政法人中小企業基盤整備機構の融資制度	騒音、ばい煙等の公害問題等により操業に支障を来している中小企業者が、集団で適地に移転する工場の集団化事業等に対する都道府県を通じた融資等
独立行政法人石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構による融資	金属鉱業等鉱害対策特別措置法に基づく使用済特定施設に係る鉱害防止事業に必要な資金、鉱害防止事業基金への拠出金及び公害防止事業費事業者負担法（昭和45年法律第133号）による事業者負担金に対する融資

資料：財務省、農林水産省、経済産業省、環境省

## (2) 税制上の措置等

平成27年度税制改正において、[1] 地球温暖化対策のための税の着実な実施、[2] 車体課税のグリーン化の強化、[3] 住宅取得等資金に係る贈与税の非課税措置等の延長及び拡充（贈与税）、[4] 住宅ローン減税の延長（所得税）、[5] 既存住宅に係る特定の改修工事をした場合の所得税額の特別控除制度の延長（所得税）、[6] 特定の増改築等に係る住宅借入金等を有する場合の所得税額の特別控除の控除額に係る特例制度の延長（所得税）、[7] 廃棄物処理事業の用に供する軽油に係る課税免除の特例措置の延長（軽油引取税）、[8] 有害鳥獣捕獲従事者等に係る狩猟税の減免措置（狩猟税）、[9] 環境関連投資促進税制（グリーン投資減税）の延長（法人税、所得税）、[10] コージェネレーションに係る課税標準の特例措置の延長（固定資産税）、[11] 低公害車用燃料供給設備に係る課税標準の特例措置の延長（固定資産税）、[12] 試験研究を行った場合の法人税額等の特別控除の延長及び拡充（法人税、所得税、法人住民税）等の措置を講じました。

## (3) 地方公共団体における環境関連税の導入の動き

地方公共団体において、環境関連税の導入の検討が進められています。例えば、産業廃棄物の排出量又は処分量を課税標準とする税については、27の都道府県及び1の政令市で導入されています。税収は、主に産業廃棄物の発生抑制、再生、減量、その他適正な処理に係る施策に要する費用に充てられています。
また、森林環境税や森づくり税など、名称こそ違えど、森林整備等を目的とする税が35の県及び1の政令市で導入されています。例えば、高知県では、県民税均等割の額に500円を加算し、その税収を森林整備等に充てるために森林環境保全基金を条例により創設するなど、実質的に目的税の性格を持たせたものとなっています。

## 2 環境配慮型製品の普及等

## (1) グリーン購入

国等による環境物品等の調達の推進等に関する法律（平成12年法律第100号。以下「グリーン購入法」という。）に基づく基本方針に即して、国及び独立行政法人等の各機関は、環境物品等の調達の推進を図るための方針の策定・公表を行い、これに基づいて環境物品等の調達を推進しました。

また、グリーン購入の取組を更に促進するため、最新の基本方針について、国の地方支分部局、地方公共団体、事業者等を対象とした説明会を全国8か所において開催しました。

そのほか、地方公共団体等でのグリーン購入を推進するため、マニュアル等の作成や実務支援等による普及・啓発活動を行っています。

さらに、国際的なグリーン購入の取組を推進するため、グリーン購入に関する世界各国の制度・基準についての情報を収集するとともに、ヨーロッパや東南アジア諸国連合（ASEAN）地域のグリーン公共調達及び環境ラベルの担当者を招聘し、シンポジウムの開催等を行いました。

## (2) 環境配慮契約

国等における温室効果ガス等の排出の削減に配慮した契約の推進に関する法律（平成19年法律第56号）（環境配慮契約法）に基づく基本方針に従い、国及び独立行政法人等の各機関は、温室効果ガス等の排出の削減に配慮した契約（以下「環境配慮契約」という。）を推進しました。

また、環境配慮契約の取組を更に促進するため、最新の基本方針について、国の地方支分部局、地方公共団体、事業者等を対象とした説明会を全国8か所において開催しました。

そのほか、地方公共団体等での環境配慮契約の推進のため、マニュアル等の作成や実務支援等による普及・啓発活動を実施しています。

## (3) 環境ラベリング

消費者が環境負荷の少ない製品を選択する際に適切な情報を入手できるように、環境ラベル等環境表示の情報の整理を進めました。日本で唯一のタイプⅠ環境ラベル（ISO14024準拠）であるエコマーク制度では、ライフサイクルを考慮した指標に基づく商品類型を継続して整備しており、平成27年3月末現在、エコマーク対象商品類型数は58、認定商品数は5,486となっています。

事業者の自己宣言による環境主張であるタイプⅡ環境ラベルや民間団体が行う環境ラベル等については、各ラベリング制度の情報を整理・分類して提供する「環境ラベル等データベース」を引き続き運用しました。また、適切な環境表示の在り方をまとめた「環境表示ガイドライン」等についてのパンフレットを作成・配布しました。

なお、製品の環境負荷を定量的に表示するタイプⅢ環境ラベル（ISO14025準拠）にはカーボンフットプリント（CFP）制度等があり、平成27年3月末現在のCFP宣言認定製品数は1,054件となっています。

## (4) 標準化の推進

日本工業標準調査会（JISC）は、平成27年度はJIS Q14001（環境マネジメントシステム－要求事項及び利用の手引）の改正を行いました。