Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
## Paragraph 2 Calling for Actions by Specified Business Operators upon the Adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions

When the United Nations Security Council adopts a resolution requiring countries to freeze the funds or other assets related to any persons or entities in order to prevent and suppress terrorism and terrorist financing, the National Police Agency, in cooperation with relevant Ministries and Agencies, shall disseminate the content to specified business operators (excluding lawyers, judicial scriveners, certified administrative procedures specialists, certified public accountants and tax accountants; the same applies in this paragraph) and request the thorough CDD and reporting of suspicious transactions on persons or entities subject to the resolutions concerned. And, the targeted persons or entities shall be listed on the website of JAFIC.

### 1. Measures based on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs)

Japan implements targeted financial sanctions to freeze assets of persons or entities associated with the Taliban according to UNSCRs concerned. Every time the list of such parties is revised, the National Police Agency requires specified business operators through supervisory authorities to ensure CDD and reporting of all suspicious transactions. Such a requirement was made a total of 17 times in 2017.

### 2. Measures based on the FATF Public Statement

The FATF Plenary held in February, June and November 2017 adopted the Statement which called on all FATF members and other jurisdictions to apply countermeasures to protect the international financial system from ML/TF risks emanating from Islamic Republic of Iran and North Korea. In response, the National Police Agency has issued a notice through supervisory authorities that specified business operators should properly perform CDD and reporting suspicious transactions.

## Paragraph 3 National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

### 1. Backgrounds

In modern society, where the advance of IT and the globalization of economic activities and financial services are proceeding, the situation surrounding ML/TF is constantly changing. To strenuously implement AML/CFT, global actions based on cooperation between countries need to be taken.

The FATF Recommendations revised in February 2012 (new FATF 40 Recommendations) call on individual countries to identify and assess risks of ML/TF for the country.

In light of the fact that legal persons and legal arrangements are being misused for money laundering and tax evasion due to a lack of transparency over their ownership and control, at the G8 Lough Erne Summit held in June 2013, an agreement was reached on the G8 Action
Plan Principles to prevent the misuse of legal persons and legal arrangements, which calls for concrete actions including that authorities should understand the risks to which their AML/CFT regime is exposed and implement proportionate measures to target those risks.

Japan formulated the national action plan in the same month to establish an inter-ministerial working team consisting of the Financial Service Agency and other relevant ministries and agencies under the chair of the National Police Agency and conduct the national risk assessment. Based on this national action plan, relevant ministries and agencies published the “National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing” in December 2014.

Furthermore, through the partial amendment of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2014, the National Public Safety Commission has been required to prepare and publish the National Risk Assessment Report every year since 2015, and the Commission published the report for 2017 in November.

### 2. Purpose

The national risk assessment should serve as a basis of the risk-based approach which specified business operators apply in order to perform AML/CFT measures more effectively and efficiently in a way commensurate with the level of risk of each transaction and the customer or business relationship identified through the NRA.

### 3. Overview of National Risk Assessment Report

The National Risk Assessment Report, published in November 2017, analyzed the specific characteristics of the following risk factors, measures to mitigate the risk and example cases of arrest, and indicated the risk level.

The National Risk Assessment Report is available on JAFIC's website.

Factors related to products and services

Transactions related to deposit and savings accounts, domestic exchange, safe deposit boxes, bills, cheques, etc.

☐ Factors related to transaction type

Non-face-to-face transactions, cash transactions, etc.

Factors related to countries and jurisdictions

Countries and jurisdictions indicated in the FATF Public Statement of their deficiencies on measures against ML/TF

Factors related to customers

Anti-social forces, international terrorists, non-residents, etc.

## Section 3 Requests to Submit Reports and Opinion Statements in 2017

When suspicion surfaces during the investigation of cases including special fraud cases by the Prefectural Police with regard to the possibility that a specific business operator (excluding lawyers; the same applies in this section) violates the obligation of customer identity
verification and other matters prescribed in the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, the National Public Safety Commission/the National Police Agency make requests to the alleged specified business operators for submission of reports, and make opinion statements to competent administrative authorities.

### 1. Requests to Submit Reports and Opinion Statements by the National Public Safety Commission/the National Police Agency

In 2017, the National Public Safety Commission/the National Police Agency made 7 requests to submit reports to Postal Receiving Service Providers, etc. In addition, based on the past reports submitted, they issued to competent administrative authorities in charge of supervising specified business operators opinion statements to the effect that necessary measures should be implemented in order to rectify violations of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds by specified business operators in 2017; specifically, seven statements to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, which is the authority over postal receiving service providers.

No onsite inspections by police officers were performed.

Table 3-1 Number of Supervisory Actions

Year	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Category
Number of requests to submit reports to specified business operators	11	10	11	9	7
Postal receiving service providers	10	8	9	9	6
Telephone receiving service providers	0	0	0	0	0
Telephone forwarding service providers	0	2	0	0	1
Providers of both postal receiving service and telephone forwarding service	1	0	2	0	0
Number of directions to conduct inquiry to prefectural police	1	5	2	0	0
Postal receiving service providers	0	4	2	0	0
Telephone forwarding service providers	0	1	0	0	0
Providers of both postal receiving service and telephone receiving service	1	0	0	0	0
Number of opinion statements made to competent administrative authorities	10	11	10	8	7
Postal receiving service providers	9	9	8	8	7
Telephone receiving service providers	1	0	0	0	0
Telephone forwarding service providers	0	2	2	0	0
### 2. Issuing of Rectification Order by Competent Administrative Authorities Based on Opinion Statements

In 2017, one rectification order was issued by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry against a postal receiving service provider based on Opinion Statements issued by the National Public Safety Commission/the National Police Agency thus far.

Table 3-2 Number of Rectification Orders by Competent Administrative Authorities

Year	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Category
Number of rectification orders based on Opinion Statements	7	3	5	0	1
Postal receiving service providers	6	3	5	0	1
Telephone receiving service providers	1	0	0	0	0
## Chapter 4

# Reports of Suspicious Transactions

The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds requires specified business operators to file a report to competent administrative authorities when a transaction is suspected to be related to criminal proceeds (lawyers, judicial scriveners, certified administrative procedures specialists, certified public accountants and certified public tax accountants are not subject to this obligation). The Suspicious Transaction Reporting System was specified for the first time under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in light of developments related to international countermeasures against money laundering. As it was later expanded to cover crimes other than drug-related ones, the system was specified under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, and it is now specified under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds. This measure was made an obligation for the first time in the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law and was taken over in the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds through the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes.

## Section 1 System Outline

### 1. Purpose

The Suspicious Transaction Reporting System aims to support investigation on money laundering and its predicate offences as well as terrorist financing, to prevent the misuse of financial or other services provided by specified business operators and to trust of business activity.

### 2. Flow of Suspicious Transaction Reporting

Suspicious transactions reported by specified business operators are collected at JAFIC and NPSC via their competent administrative authorities. JAFIC collates and analyzes suspicious transaction reports (STRs) to disseminate those deemed valuable to receiving investigative authorities such as the Prefectural Police, the Public Prosecutors Office, etc. for their use.

The receiving investigative authorities utilize STRs as clues for initiating an investigation against a specific suspicious activity, or identifying criminal proceeds or sources of illicit funds. JAFIC also provides interested foreign FLUs with information on cross border transactions as necessary, in order to facilitate their analysis or investigation into global scale money laundering.

Furthermore at JAFIC, a detailed analysis of STRs is carried out by using the information accumulated by the police, and the outcomes are supposed to be disseminated to interested investigative authorities.
Figure 4-1 Flow of STRs from Specified Business Operators, through JAFIC to Investigative Authorities

### 3. When STRs are Required

Under Article 8 of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, it is required that specified business operators promptly file an STR with the competent administrative authorities when there is any suspicion that assets they received could be criminal proceeds or that the customer could commit acts that constitute crimes under Article 10 of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds) or Article 6 of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law (concealment of drug-related criminal proceeds) with respect to specified businesses.

Figure 4-2 Cases where STRs are Required
### 4. Identification of Suspicious Transactions

Under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, it is provided that specified business operators are required to determine whether there is any suspicious activity behind the transaction concerned by considering the details of NRA in addition to the results of verification at the time of transactions, means of transactions and other matters and by the method specified by the ordinance of the competent ministry (Note).

Subject to the provision mentioned in the preceding sentence, specified business operators should, based on their own knowledge and experience in their particular field of operations, determine the nature of transactions or types of customers and whether the transactions are suspected of being related to ML/TF. However, not all of them identify ML/TF risks in every transaction and they may find it difficult to make an appropriate determination. Therefore, competent administrative authorities that oversee specified business operators have announced “reference cases of suspicious transactions,” based on the characteristics of respective specified business operators. These cases are provided as a reference to help specified business operators find or identify suspicious transactions in their day-to-day operations. Although all the transactions that appear to match the listed samples in the reference cases do not necessarily have to be reported as suspicious, any transaction that specified business operators determine as should be reported.

Note: Methods, etc. of verification whether there is a suspicion of ML through comparison of the nature of transactions with those of usual transactions, comparison with past transactions with the same customer, and checking of the consistency with the content verified at the time of transactions, etc.

## Section 2 Situation of STR Filings in 2017

### 1. Transition of the Number of STR Filings

Although the suspicious transaction reporting system was established with the enforcement of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in 1992, less than 20 reports were received each year between 1992 and 1998, largely because the subjects of reporting was limited to proceeds derived from drug-related crimes. Under these conditions, that reporting system could not be considered to be fully functional. However, since the enactment of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 1999, crimes subject to suspicious transaction reports were extended besides drug-related crimes to include other serious crimes as specified by the act, and the number of reports received exceeded 1,000 cases in the same year. Since the enforcement of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in the year 2000, the number of reports has increased every year, and has kept increasing since the partial enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2007. The number of reports received in 2017 was 400,043, decreasing by 1,048 cases (0.3%) from the previous year.
Figure 4-3 Trend Diagram of Number of STRs (2008-2017)

Note 1: “Number of Reports Received” is the number of the reports received by the National Public Safety Commission/the National Police Agency (JAFIC).

Note 2: “Number of Reports Disseminated” is the number of the reports disseminated by JAFIC to investigative authorities etc.

Note 3: The number of reassessed cases refers to the number of cases concerning which it was judged that information that had been withheld from dissemination for such reasons as that the information is relating to a case under investigation could be disseminated as a result of the review and analysis of the information (data collection of the number of reassessed cases started in 2012).

As a possible underlying factor of this trend, the following can be raised.

○Spreading compliance culture among the general public has encouraged financial institutions’ efforts in fighting against anti-social forces and applied stringent monitoring over their financial or other economic activities.

The effect of education on the necessity of reporting suspicious transactions, via seminars, etc. held for financial institutions, etc.

Specifically, financial institutions have allocated much more resources to various AML/CFT measures. In particular, financial institutions with larger submission of STRs are promoting training programs for their employees to improve the individual AML/CFT capability, while having strengthened the IT system to identify suspicious transactions, by increasing the number of personnel in charge of money laundering countermeasures and the introduction of the detection systems for suspicious transactions.

The number of STRs deleted in 2017 was 5,868 and the number of STRs stored as of the end of 2017 was 3,959,057.

### 2. Number of Received Reports by Business Types

The number of suspicious transaction reports that each category of business operators filed in 2017 is shown in Table 4-1. Banks etc. have the highest number of reports with 346,595
cases, or 86.6% of all reports, followed by credit card operators (15,448 cases, or 3.9%) and Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives (13,259 cases, or 3.3%) (see Table 4-1).

Table 4-1 Number of Received STRs by Each Business Type

Year Category	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%
Financial Institutions etc.	344,147	98.5%	366,779	97.2%	385,639	96.5%	387,399	96.6%	384,331	96.1%
Depository Institutions	329,127	94.2%	349,204	92.5%	366,965	91.9%	369,936	92.2%	363,347	90.8%
Banks etc.	313,435	89.7%	332,443	88.1%	351,009	87.9%	354,346	88.3%	346,595	86.6%
Shinkin Banks and Credit Cooperative	14,089	4.0%	15,018	4.0%	13,188	3.3%	13,070	3.3%	13,259	3.3%
Labour Banks	290	0.1%	298	0.1%	371	0.1%	453	0.1%	476	0.1%
Norinchukin Banks etc.	1,313	0.4%	1,445	0.4%	2,397	0.6%	2,067	0.5%	3,017	0.8%
Insurance Companies	3,002	0.9%	3,817	1.0%	2,918	0.7%	2,310	0.6%	2,382	0.6%
Financial Instruments Business	7,373	2.1%	7,732	2.0%	8,951	2.2%	8,528	2.1%	8,436	2.1%
Money Lending Business	1,872	0.5%	3,349	0.9%	4,427	1.1%	5,263	1.3%	7,512	1.9%
Fund Transfer Companies	363	0.1%	807	0.2%	585	0.2%	539	0.1%	1,282	0.3%
Virtual Currency Exchange Service Providers	669	0.2%
Commodity Futures Traders	53	0.0%	16	0.0%	9	0.0%	16	0.0%	17	0.0%
Currency Exchanging Operators	2,119	0.6%	1,574	0.4%	1,633	0.4%	627	0.2%	490	0.1%
Electronic Monetary Claim Recording Institutions	1	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	3	0.0%	4	0.0%
Other	237	0.1%	280	0.1%	151	0.0%	177	0.0%	192	0.1%
Financial Leasing Operators	62	0.0%	86	0.0%	160	0.1%	214	0.1%	109	0.0%
Credit Card Operators	5,086	1.5%	10,608	2.8%	13,666	3.4%	13,436	3.3%	15,448	3.9%
Real Estate Agents	1	0.0%	1	0.0%	9	0.0%	8	0.0%	7	0.0%
Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones	7	0.0%	5	0.0%	10	0.0%	27	0.0%	146	0.0%
Postal Receiving Service Providers	57	0.0%	34	0.0%	24	0.0%	6	0.0%	2	0.0%
Telephone Receiving Service Providers	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.0%	0	0.0%
Telephone Forwarding Service Providers	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Other	1	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	349,361	100.0%	377,513	100.0%	399,508	100.0%	401,091	100.0%	400,043	100.0%

Note: The number of STRs received for virtual currency exchange service providers is the number of STRs received after April 2017.
### 3. Number of Received Reports Classified by Methods

According to reports of suspicious transaction by method, report by electronic application using the e-governance on-line window (e-Gov), or other means (for example, sending documents etc. to the competent administrative authorities) are described in Table 4-2.

Table 4-2 Number of Received Reports Classified by Method

Year	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Notification Method	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%
Electronic Application	255,258	73.1%	295,640	78.3%	366,843	91.8%	387,724	96.7%	391,657	97.9%
Other Methods	94,103	26.9%	81,873	21.7%	32,665	8.2%	13,367	3.3%	8,386	2.1%
Total	349,361	100.0%	377,513	100.0%	399,508	100.0%	401,091	100.0%	400,043	100.0%

JAFIC will continue working on further prevalence of the online reporting at all opportunities in order to reduce burdens on specified business operators associated with the reporting obligation.

## Section 3 Dissemination and Use of STRs in 2017

## Paragraph 1 Dissemination

JAFIC collects, arranges and analyzes all STRs that will contribute to the investigation of money laundering, predicate offences or other offences, and disseminates them to LEAs.

The number of STRs disseminated to LEAs has kept growing every year. The number of STRs disseminated to LEAs was 446,085, a record high, in 2017, an increase of 2,380 (0.5%) from the previous year. (See figure 4-3)

In 2017, there was no request from an investigative authority to view or copy an STR or to have a copy sent to it.

## Paragraph 2 Use of STRs in the Prefectural Police

The number of cases cleared by Prefectural Police that were initiated with information in STRs (“STR-initiated cases”) was 1,097, a record high, in 2017, an increase of 6 cases (0.5%) from the previous year.
Table 4-3 Number of STR-initiated Cases by Type of Crime

Crime	Year	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
(i) Fraud-related crimes	781	833	900	925	933
Violation of Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceed	321	322	397	429	511
Fraud	460	511	503	496	421
Computer Fraud	0	0	0	0	1
(ii) Illegal stays	123	74	68	42	60
Violation of Immigration Act	123	74	68	42	60
(iii) Drug crimes	19	27	38	41	42
Violation of Stimulants Control Act	17	16	31	33	35
Violation of Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law	0	7	3	4	4
Violation of Cannabis Control Act	0	1	0	3	2
Violation of Act on Ensuring the Quality, Efficacy and Safety of Drug and Medical devices, etc.	0	2	4	1	1
Violation of Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Act	2	1	0	0	0
(iv) Money laundering offences	4	16	23	21	17
Violation of Organized Crime Punishment Act(concealment of criminal proceeds,etc.)	3	8	13	16	13
Violation of Organized Crime Punishment Act(receipt of criminal proceeds,etc.)	1	8	10	5	3
Violation of Organized Crime Punishment Act (business management control of companies, etc.)	0	0	0	0	1
(v) Counterfeiting crimes	11	21	27	19	12
Illegal preparation and supply of false entries in original electromagnetic notarized deed	8	10	12	8	4
Forgery of signed public documents	0	7	8	3	4
False statement on licenses	1	4	5	8	3
Illegal Preparation and Supply of Private Electromagnetic Records	0	0	1	0	1
Others	2	0	1	0	0
(vi) Loan sharks	9	9	6	14	11
Violation of Money Lending Business Act	8	6	4	8	9
Violation of Investment Deposit and Interest Rate Act	1	3	2	6	2
(vii) Gambling-related offences	0	0	2	5	2
Habitual gambling	0	0	0	2	1
Operating a gambling site for profit	0	0	2	2	1
Gambling	0	0	0	1	0
(viii) Entertainment business-related offences	0	0	4	4	4
Distribution of obscene materials	0	0	3	2	4
Violation of Amusement Business Act	0	0	1	2	0
(ix) Other criminal offences	7	6	15	11	8
Theft	3	4	3	10	7
Extortion	1	1	4	0	1
Others	3	1	8	1	0
(x) Other special criminal offences	8	15	13	9	8
Violation of Tradmark Act	1	2	1	1	2
Violation of Employment Security Act	0	0	0	0	2
Violation of Construction Business Act	0	0	1	0	1
Violation of Secondhand Articles Dealer Act	0	0	0	0	1
Violation of Banking Act	5	5	4	3	1
Violation of Financial Instruments and Exchange Act	0	0	1	1	1
Others	2	8	6	4	0
Total	962	1,001	1,096	1,091	1,097

Note 1: The violations of the Act on Ensuring the Quality, Efficacy and Safety of Drugs and Medical Devices, etc. in the table include cases in which the predecessor Act before the name change, the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, was applied).