Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
## (3) Surveillance of Terminal

All processing operated at the terminals, such as file inquiries and printing, is monitored and recorded by the surveillance software. This allows for tracing in case of wrongful operation, and prevents improper use of information within the organization.

## (4) Physical Measures of Terminals

Each terminal is firmly affixed to a desk with a security wire, to prevent theft.

## (5) Strengthening of Server Management

The server that contains reported information is located in a server room with adequate security measures, and only qualified staffs are allowed to enter.

## (6) Encryption of Terminal’s Hard Disk Drive Information

The hard disk drives on the terminals that are used to access the database system are all encrypted. Hence, even if the hard disk drives are removed and taken out, the information recorded in the hard disk drive and all related programs will still be inaccessible.

## (7) Encryption of Circuit

Transmission between the server and the terminals is encrypted with a special circuit.

## Section 2 Situation of STRs in 2012

## 1 Change in the Number of Reported Cases

Although the suspicious transaction reporting system was established with the enforcement of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in 1992, less than 20 reports were received each year between 1992 and 1998, largely because the subjects of reporting was limited to proceeds derived from drug-related crimes. Under these conditions, that reporting system could not be considered to be fully functional. However, since the enactment of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 1999, crimes which are subjects of suspicious transaction reports were expanded from drug-related crimes to serious crimes, and the number of reports received exceeded 1,000 cases in the same year. Since the enforcement of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in the year 2000, the number of reports has increased each year, and has rapidly increased since the partial enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2007. The number of reports received in 2012 was 364,366, an increase of 27,025 cases (8.0%) compared to the previous year (see Table 4-1 and Figure 4-3).

The number of cases in which information on suspicious transactions was eliminated by the Director for Prevention of Money Laundering was zero in 2012.

Table 4-1 Number of Suspicious Transaction Reports Received (1992-2002)

1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Yearly number of Reports Received	12	17	6	4	5	9	13	1,059	7,242	12,372	18,768

Note: The number of reports received in 1992 are those received after July, when the reporting system was established.
Figure 4-3 Trend Diagram of Number of STRs (2003-2012)

Note 1: “Number of Reports Received” (2003-2012) is the total number of the reports received by the Financial Services Agency(JAFIO) until March 2007 and those received by the National Public Safety Commission/the National Police Agency (JAFIC) after April 2007.

Note 2: "Number of Reports Disseminated" (2002-2011) is the total number of the reports disseminated by JAFIO to the National Police Agency until March 2007 and those disseminated by JAFIC to investigative authorities etc. after April 2007.

The factors contributing to the increase in reporting numbers can be thought to be

The monitoring system for anti-social forces and illegal funds transfer has been reinforced by financial institutions etc., with the progress of compliance awareness in society.

The education on the cases of suspicious transactions through seminars for financial institutions etc. in the past has a positive effect.

Moreover, financial institutions etc. have taken various measures, both tangibly and intangibly. In particular, financial institutions that submit numerous STRs have promoted training on countermeasures against money laundering by using resources, such as handbooks for employees, to improve the ability of individual employees, while having strengthened the system to identify suspicious transactions, by increasing the number of personnel in charge of money laundering countermeasures and the introduction of the detection systems for suspicious transactions.

## 2 Number of Reports by Business Types

The number of suspicious transaction reports that each category of business operators filed in 2012 is shown in table 4-2. Banks etc. have the highest number of reports with 333,868 cases, or 91.6% of all reports, followed by Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives (13,521 cases, or 3.7%), and financial instrument business operators (5,998 cases, or 1.6%) (see Table 4-2).
The number of reports filed by business operators who were newly required to report suspicious transactions in accordance with full enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in March 2008 (Financial Leasing Operators, Credit Card Operators, Real Estate Agents, Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones, Postal Receiving Service Providers, and Telephone Receiving Service Providers) totaled 3,853 cases, an increase of 1,415 cases (58.0%) from the previous year.

Table 4-2 Number of STRs by Each Business Type

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Category	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%
Financial Institutions etc.	234,745	99.8%	270,628	99.4%	292,529	99.4%	334,903	99.3%	360,513	98.9%
Depository Institutions	230,700	98.1%	265,051	97.3%	283,971	96.5%	324,600	96.2%	348,831	95.7%
Banks etc.	216,828	92.2%	253,668	93.1%	272,215	92.5%	311,298	92.3%	333,868	91.6%
Shinkin Banks and Credit Cooperative	13,218	5.6%	10,941	4.0%	11,156	3.8%	12,453	3.7%	13,521	3.7%
Labour Banks	234	0.1%	161	0.1%	243	0.1%	248	0.1%	357	0.1%
Norinchukin Banks etc.	420	0.2%	281	0.1%	357	0.1%	601	0.2%	1,085	0.3%
Insurance Companies	113	0.0%	183	0.1%	202	0.1%	677	0.2%	1,837	0.5%
Financial Instruments Business	3,264	1.4%	3,821	1.4%	5,666	1.9%	6,758	2.0%	5,998	1.6%
Money Lending Business	509	0.2%	1,148	0.4%	634	0.2%	581	0.2%	1,628	0.4%
Fund Trasnfer Companies	73	0.0%	344	0.1%	380	0.1%
Commodity Futures Traders	57	0.0%	7	0.0%	13	0.0%	5	0.0%	3	0.0%
Currency Exchanging Operators	102	0.0%	418	0.2%	1,970	0.7%	1,937	0.6%	1,835	0.5%
Electronic Monetary Claim Recording Institutions	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.0%	1	0.0%
Financial Leasing Operators	64	0.0%	60	0.0%	83	0.0%	45	0.0%	109	0.0%
Credit Card Operators	365	0.2%	1,510	0.6%	1,617	0.5%	2,350	0.7%	3,664	1.0%
Real Estate Agents	21	0.0%	33	0.0%	21	0.0%	5	0.0%	10	0.0%
Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones	8	0.0%	0	0.0%	19	0.0%	4	0.0%	28	0.0%
Postal Receiving Service Providers	57	0.0%	92	0.0%	36	0.0%	34	0.0%	42	0.0%
Telephone Receiving Service Providers	0	0.0%	2	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	235,260	100.0%	272,325	100.0%	294,305	100.0%	337,341	100.0%	364,366	100.0%

## 3 Number of Reports Classified by Methods

According to reports of suspicious transaction by method, report by electronic application using the e-governance on-line window (e-Gov), or other means (for example, sending documents etc. to the competent administrative authority) are described in Table 4-3.
Table 4-3 Number of Reports Classified by Method

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Notification Method	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%
Electronic Application	111,921	47.6%	156,291	57.4%	172,394	58.6%	184,774	54.8%	236,882	65.0%
Other Methods	123,339	52.4%	116,034	42.6%	121,911	41.4%	152,567	45.2%	127,484	35.0%
Total	235,260	100.0%	272,325	100.0%	294,305	100.0%	337,341	100.0%	364,366	100.0%

Report rate by electronic application in 2012 was 65.0%, an increase of 10.2 points from the previous year.

JAFIC has made efforts to publicize notification by electric application through workshops targeting specified business operators in order to reduce the load of the reporting entities.

## Section 3 Dissemination and Use of STRs in 2012

## Paragraph1 Dissemination

JAFIC collects, arranges, and analyzes all STRs and provides investigative authorities with the STRs reported by specified business operators that have been judged to be conducive to the investigation of money laundering offences, predicate offences, or other offenses. Investigative authorities etc. are the Prefectural Police, Public Prosecutors Office, Narcotics Control Department, Japan Coast Guard, Japan Customs and Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission.

The number of reports on suspicious transactions provided to investigative authorities etc. has grown every year, which was 281,425 in 2012, an increase of 46,639 cases (19.9%) from the previous year. (See figure 4-3). There were two requests for sending copies of records of the information on suspicious transactions made by investigative authorities etc.

## Paragraph 2 Use of STRs in the Prefectural Police

The number of cases cleared by prefectural police that were initiated with information in STRs (“STR initiated cases”) has increased every year. The number was 886 in 2012, an increase of 316 cases (55.4%) from the previous year.

Table 4-4 shows the STR-initiated cases categorized by crime type.
statements regarding manufacturing origin of clothing in violation of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act.

Offences related to corporations (violations of the Companies Act, obstruction of compulsory execution and breach of trust) totaled 3. Arrests were made on fraudulent accounting in the acquisition of corporate shares, in violation of the Companies Act, and on obstruction of court enforcement for concealing accounts receivable.

Offences related to professions such as certified administrative procedures specialists (violations of the Administrative Scrivener Act and the Attorney Act) totaled 2. Arrests were made on charges of failure to verify both concerned parties in the process of compiling documents and failure to enter information in legal ledgers in violation of the Administrative Scrivener Act, and on charges of earning compensation and/or operating law offices without the proper certification in violation of the Attorney Act.

Cases regarding underground banks (violation of the Banking Act) totaled 1, in which foreigners in Japan were arrested for violating the Banking Act by committing unauthorized overseas remittances.

Two arrests were made on theft, one in which the offender used an illegally obtained ATM card, and another in which the offender repeatedly shoplifted cosmetics from a storefront.

One arrest was made on bribery taken by a corrupt government official.

One arrest was made on the crime of aiding suicide.

There was one extortion case, in which an arrest was made for extortion committed by Boryokudan members on the pretext of debt collection.

One arrest was made on a gambling offence in violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (running a gambling place for profit), involving organized gambling by Boryokudan members.

☐ Six arrests were made on money laundering offences in violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment and receiving of criminal proceeds), specifically concealment of various types of criminal proceeds and receiving of such proceeds.

The number of money laundering cases from the STR-initiated cases in 2012 was 15. STR-initiated cases by predicate crime type shows that fraud, violation of the Money Lending Business Law, and violation of the Investment Deposit and Interest Rate Act come to 10 cases, and accounted for 66.7% of the total (see Table 4-5).
Table 4-5 The number of cases in which STRs led to arrests made for money laundering crimes

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Predicate offenses
Fraud	2	4	10	9	6
Violation of the Money Lending Business Act and the Investment Deposit and Interest Rate Act	6	4	5	5	3
Violation of the Money Lending Business Act	0	0	0	0	1
Theft	0	0	0	0	2
Computer fraud	0	0	0	0	1
Violation of the Stimulants Control Act	0	0	0	0	1
Violation of the Trademark Law	1	1	0	1	1
Others	0	0	2	2	0
Total	9	9	17	17	15

In 2012, the number of cases that reached confiscation and collection of equivalent value based on STRs stood at 4 (see Figure 4-6).

Table 4-6 Number of Cases that Reached Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value Based on STRs

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Confiscation	3	0	5	5	4
Collection of Equivalent Valve	(1)	0	(4)	1(4)	(1)
Total	3(1)	0	5(4)	6(4)	4(1)

Note 1: The number in parentheses indicates the number of the cases which overlap with confiscation.

Note 2: When the cases was cleared.

In the investigations not initiated with STRs, STRs are still a valuable source of information used by Prefectural Police in countermeasures against organized crime.

The number of STRs used for investigation by prefectural police has grown annually. The number was 188,321 in 2012, an increase of 82,544 cases (78.0%) from the previous year (see Table 4-7).

Table 4-7 Number of STRs Used for Investigative Purposes

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number of STRs used in investigation of initiated cases	668	1,261	1,642	2,674	3,811
Number of STRs used in investigation of cases other than the abovementioned cases	44,199	68,680	86,418	103,103	184,510
Total	44,867	69,941	88,060	105,777	188,321

Note 1: “Number of STRs used in investigation of initiated cases” includes the nuber of all STRs used for arrest.

Note 2: In cases where investigations have been initiated by STRs but are still ongoing, these STRs are counted under “Number of STRs used in investigation of cases other than the abovementioned cases”.
JAFIC tries to obtain a realistic view of the movement of funds of the anti-social forces such as Boryokudan by comprehensive analysis of information contained in the STRs of customers, by matching them with other STRs related to the same customers that were reported in the past, information accumulated as well as publicly available information.

These analyses have revealed that anti-social forces make use of Boryokudan affiliated companies and investment partnerships, utilize their funds in various ways and transfer a large amount of funds overseas.

Although it can be assumed that the resources of a large part of the funds handled by antisocial forces originate from criminal proceeds, there are many cases that their involvement in predicate offences is obscured because various fund activities or utilization in various ways make its source unclear.

As recent cases of arrests typically show, anti-social forces often use affiliated companies as cover, hiding any connection with anti-social forces, receive cooperation from others who have various information and specialized knowledge, and thus use their funds. This is one of the main factors which make the fund-raising activity by anti-social forces opaque.

Therefore, in order to have a clearer vision of the actual conditions of fund-raising activities by anti-social forces, JAFIC is convinced that it is important to continue to monitor and trace the movement of funds of anti-social forces, and to enhance the control of illegal activities committed through the utilization of the analysis of STRs as well as close cooperation with authorities concerned, such as, investigative authorities, etc. and foreign FLUs.

## Paragraph 3 Use of Reports by National Investigative Authorities etc

## 1 Utilization of STRs by Prosecutor’s Offices

STRs are used in cases sent by investigative authorities as well as in conducting its own secret investigation. STRs are useful in identifying further crimes and accomplices in combination with corroboration of statements by offenders and associated parties and identification of bank accounts suspected of use in crime.

In addition, the utilization of STRs facilitates sustained monitoring of information on the movement of money related to Boryokudan and other specified organizations, enabling assessment of trends on organizations that are highly likely to be involved in crime.

## 2 Utilization of STRs by Narcotics Control Department

The Health, Labour and Welfare Ministry’s Narcotics Control Department utilizes STRs to help identify bank accounts of narcotics dealers and their business partners and other associated parties, as well as to ascertain transactions. It also conducts investigations on information derived from materials obtained, and facilitates drug crime investigations including the arrest of offenders and confiscation of narcotics.

## 3 Utilization of STRs by the Japan Coast Guard

The Japan Coast Guard utilizes STRs to examine any correlation with other suspicious transactions, working to stop smuggling and illegal migration, and facilitating criminal
investigations and crackdowns on other types of illegal activities.

Information on possible smugglers such as the existence of accounts or transactions with financial institutions, suspicious transactions such as large overseas remittances, overseas remittances by suspicious companies, and the existence of business partners can be confirmed or refuted based on the information contained in STRs. This helps authorities to remain aware of the transfer of funds that could possibly be criminal proceeds.

In addition, the Coast Guard requests information on possible smugglers to foreign FlUs through the National Police Agency. Provided with information on the possible smugglers as well as parties (individuals and companies) associated with said possible smugglers, the Coast Guard is able to ascertain previously undetected relationships.

## 4 Utilization of STRs by Customs

Customs maintains and shares a database of STRs. By referencing STRs with various types of information otherwise obtained by customs, customs can identify associations and apply said associations to investigations on Customs Act offenders. This strengthens initiatives to stop smuggling of items that pose a threat to public safety and security.

## 5 Utilization of STRs by the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission

The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission conducts investigations of potentially criminal cases with a view to criminal prosecution on malicious activity in the financial instrument trading sector, including fraudulent securities reports (fraudulent accounting) and insider trading, as well as share manipulation and other fraudulent means.

As part of the process of criminal investigation, the Commission uses its own methods to identify and analyze relevant bank accounts or securities accounts that may be used in unfair trading. In addition, utilization of STRs helps to put the criminal cases in its proper light.
# Crackdown on Offences Related to Money Laundering

In order to take effective anti-money laundering (AML) measures, it is essential to understand the scale and modus operandi of money laundering.

In Japan, money laundering is criminalized as follows: the control of management of enterprises of legal persons and other entities through illicit proceeds (Article 9), the concealment of criminal proceeds etc. (Article 10) and the receipt of criminal proceeds etc. (Article 11) which are all stipulated in the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, and also the concealment of drug-related criminal proceeds etc. (Article 6) and the receipt of drug-related criminal proceeds etc. (Article 7) both stipulated in the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law. They include typical money laundering activities such as transferring criminal proceeds to a certain place so that these proceeds would not be traceable and depositing criminal proceeds in a bank account under the name of another person, although all the activities to transfer criminal proceeds are not yet covered.

In addition, penalties for the violation of supervision mechanisms issued by competent administrative authorities to specified business operators and penalties for the transfer or receiving of bank account passbooks are stipulated in the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

The AML achievements in Japan can be grasped to some extent by looking into the number of cleared cases related to money laundering. The amounts of criminal proceeds confiscated also reflects the effectiveness of the AML measures.

## Section 1 Arrests made for the violation of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2012

The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds stipulates penalties to ensure the effectiveness of supervisory mechanisms put in place by the competent administrative authorities over specified business operators and penalties on the trade of savings passbooks, and the police is enhancing its efforts to crack down on such practices. Numerous money laundering crimes involve the illicit use of savings passbooks in the name of another party. The number of arrests made for the illicit transfer of savings passbooks in 2012 was 1,544 (see Table 5-1).
In addition, Postal Receiving Service Providers were arrested for violations of Rectification Orders for the first time since the enforcement of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

Table 5-1 Number of punishments made under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Transfer etc. of savings passbooks (business)	56	68	30	18	32
Transfer etc. of savings passbooks (non-business)	474	851	727	1,221	1,487
Soliciting	9	25	8	22	24
Violation of rectification orders	0	0	0	0	1
Total	539	944	765	1,261	1,544

Note: For actions committed before March 1, 2008, the Customer Identification Act applies.

## Section 2 Cleared Cases of Money Laundering in 2012

## Paragraph 1 Cleared Cases of Money Laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

## 1 Number of Cleared Cases

There were 238 cases cleared of money laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 2012, consisting of 158 cases of concealment of criminal proceeds etc. (note) and 80 cases of receipt of criminal proceeds etc. (see Table 5-2)

(note) Criminal proceeds etc. means proceeds from criminal activities, assets deriving from criminal proceeds, or assets mixed with other assets.

Table 5-2 Number of Arrests Made for Money Laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Management Control through Illicit Proceeds (Article 9)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (1)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)
Concealment of Criminal Proceeds etc. (Article 10)	45 (25)	50 (29)	65 (21)	91 (18)	137 (35)	134 (41)	172 (49)	139 (46)	150 (43)	158 (27)
Receipt of Criminal Proceeds etc. (Article 11)	11 (10)	15 (11)	42 (27)	42 (35)	40 (25)	38 (21)	54 (41)	65 (44)	92 (38)	80 (28)
Total	56 (35)	65 (40)	107 (48)	134 (53)	177 (60)	173 (63)	226 (90)	205 (90)	243 (81)	238 (55)

Note: Each number in brackets represents the number of cases conducted by Boryokudan gangsters.