Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
## 【Case 10】Receipt of criminal proceeds related to a theft case

A male company employee who lives in Japan and who is a national of the Republic of Afghanistan and others purchased vehicles for ¥500,000 from a male acquaintance and others while knowing that the vehicles had been stolen by them. As a result, the male company employee was arrested for receiving stolen property with compensation and for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (receipt of criminal proceeds). (Aichi, in March)

## Paragraph 2 Cleared Cases of Money Laundering under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

The total number of cleared cases of money laundering under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in 2015 was 8 cases, an increase of 1 case (14.3%) from the previous year (see Table 5-3).

In some cases, money laundering is artfully committed for funds acquired through drug offences such as smuggling of stimulants, in which purchasers' payments are deposited into a bank account under the name of another party (Case 11). (Note)

Note: Drug criminal proceeds are comprised of drug criminal proceeds and proceeds stemming from drug offense proceeds, or a mix of said proceeds and other funds. (Article2, Paragraph 3 to 5 of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law).

Table 5-3 Number of arrests made for money laundering under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

Year Category	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Concealment of drug-related criminal proceeds etc. (Article 6)	5 (3)	5 (4)	10 (4)	5 (1)	8 (4)	8 (3)	8 (2)	6 (6)	5 (3)	5 (3)
Receipt of drug-related criminal proceeds etc. (Article 7)	5 (2)	2 (1)	2 (1)	5 (3)	1 (1)	0 (0)	3 (2)	4 (4)	2 (2)	3 (2)
Total	10 (5)	7 (5)	12 (5)	10 (4)	9 (5)	8 (3)	11 (4)	10 (10)	7 (5)	8 (5)

Note: Each number in brackets represents the number of cases conducted by Boryokudan gangsters.
## 【Case 11】Concealment of drug-related criminal proceeds related to trafficking of stimulants

A man who was engaging in trafficking of stimulants sold stimulants using letter pack service and arranged for customers to remit a total of ¥13.5 million in payment to an account opened in the name of another person. As a result, the man was arrested for violating the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Act (concealment of drug-related criminal proceeds. (Metropolitan Police Department, in January)

## Section 3 Temporary Restraining Order for Confiscation of Criminal Proceeds before Institution of Prosecution in 2015

In order to prevent criminal proceeds from being used to maintain and expand the powers of criminal organizations and being used to invest in future criminal activities, it is important to deprive them. Confiscation and collection of equivalent value of criminal proceeds are conducted based on the court order. To ensure that criminal proceeds are not concealed or spent before the order is given, the police use the system of “Temporary Restraining Order for Confiscation before Institution of Prosecution” (hereafter referred as Temporary Restraining Order) stipulated in the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in order to confiscate criminal proceeds effectively.

## Paragraph 1 Temporary Restraining Order under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

The number of "Temporary Restraining Orders" issued under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 2015 (on the request of judicial police officers) was 220 (an increase of 27 cases (14%) from the previous year), the largest number since the enforcement of the Act in 2000 (see Table 5-4).

A breakdown of this figure by type of offense includes 84 cases of unlicensed entertainment business, 40 cases of habitual gambling and running a gambling place for profit, 22 cases of prostitution offenses, and 11 cases each of fraud, loan-sharking and helping illegal employment.
Table 5-4 Numbers of Temporary Restraining Orders Issued and Amounts Confiscated Before Prosecution under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

Year	Cases	Total amount of credit	Others
2006	9 (3)	¥52,680,512
2007	21 (7)	¥268,801,546
2008	44 (21)	¥314,239,728
2009	54 (23)	¥270,188,760	Foreign currency: US$750
2010	70 (36)	¥160,597,150	Land: 605.95m²
Building: 1
Passenger vehicles: 2
Necklace: 1
2011	101 (30)	¥134,764,985
2012	148 (39)	¥3,380,337,707	Light vehicle: 1
Passenger vehicle: 1
Condominium: 1 unit
2013	160 (54)	¥362,399,577	Land: 522.64m²
Passenger vehicle: 1
2014	193 (45)	¥345,333,578	Pure silver bell: 1
2015	220 (44)	¥341,264,257	Passenger vehicle: 3

Note 1: Only the cases requested by judicial police officers.

Note 2: The number of cases in brackets represents the number of cases related to Boryokudan gangsters.

The number of the Orders has increased year by year. One of the reasons for this trend is that “Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value of the Crime Victim Property” related to crimes such as fraud, loan sharking offenses and theft, which had not been subjects to be confiscated or collected, are now available due to the amendment of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in December 2006. Another reason for the trend is that unauthorized adult entertainment business and unlicensed banking business were added to the predicate offenses and the range of assets subject to confiscation increased in July 2011. Therefore the opportunities to apply the procedures for “Temporary Restraining Order” specified in the Act are expected to increase in the future. The system of “Temporary Restraining Orders” under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes which allows the confiscation of criminal proceeds is an effective measure. The police, in good coordination with the public prosecutor’s office, will use the system effectively and prevent criminal organizations from using criminal proceeds.

The police will actively make use of “Temporary Restraining Orders” in order to ensure the enforcement of confiscation orders for the purpose of the recovery of crime victim property by the public prosecutor under the “Act on the Provision of Compensation for Crime Victim Property etc.”

“Temporary Restraining Orders” issued in 2014 include numerous orders against unlicensed entertainment business. Orders were also issued for pecuniary claims for the following,
which under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crime are subject to confiscation: claims on deposits, claims on advance payment on behalf of a third party for credit sales, and rights to claim the price of transferred receivables.

[Case 12] Temporary restraining order against fee revenue from dispatching of workers related to violation of the Act for Securing the Proper Operation of Worker Dispatching Undertakings and Improved Working Conditions for Dispatched Workers by a member of Boryokudan, Sumiyoshi-kai

A male member of Sumiyoshi-kai who was engaging in the worker dispatching business and others dispatched workers to engage in construction work, a type of work for which worker dispatching is prohibited, in violation of the Act for Securing the Proper Operation of Worker Dispatching Undertakings and Improved Working Conditions for Dispatched Workers. In relation to this case, a temporary restraining order was issued against around ¥110,000 in deposit claims held in an account into which fees for the dispatching of workers was paid. (Tochigi, in June)

【Case 13】Temporary restraining order against proceeds related to habitual gambling

A man who was managing a game café let customers engage in gambling by installing mahjong game machines in the store and stored around ¥17 million in cash obtained through the gambling business in a safe in the store. As a result, a temporary restraining order was issued against the cash. (Mie, in February)

【Case 14】Temporary restraining order against revenue related to violation of the Act on Control and Improvement of Amusement Business, etc.

A man managing restaurants was also managing a host club without authorization in violation of the Act on Control and Improvement of Amusement Business, etc., and he and others stored around ¥11 million in cash in revenue from the club in their homes and other locations. In addition, around ¥13 million were deposited in accounts opened in the name of their relatives. As a result, a temporary restraining order was issued against the cash and cash deposits. (Gunma, in February)

## Paragraph 2 Temporary Restraining Order under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

The number of Temporary Restraining Orders issued under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in 2015 was 14 cases, a decrease of 2 cases (12.5%) from the previous year (see Table 5-5).

For example, a Temporary Restraining Order was issued against proceeds (cash) obtained from trafficking of stimulant drugs which were sold illegally (Case 15).
Table 5-5 Number of Temporary Restraining Orders Issued and Amounts Confiscated Before Prosecution under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

Year	Cases	Total amount of credit	Others
2006	3 (2)	¥10,432,915
2007	4 (3)	¥45,032,829
2008	7 (5)	¥23,344,267
2009	8 (5)	¥29,215,674
2010	13 (7)	¥33,591,421	Travelers Cheque: US$11,500 Necklace: 1 Watch: 2 Passenger vehicle: 1
2011	14 (4)	¥11,678,611	Foreign currency: US$5,000 Passenger vehicle: 3 Key: 1
2012	16 (8)	¥30,026,428
2013	4 (4)	¥19,985,691
2014	16 (9)	¥40,625,322	Foreign currency: US$20,700 Foreign currency: CNY260 Land: 150.68m² Building: 1 Passenger vehicle: 1 Car seat: 3 Key: 2 Mobile phone: 1
2015	14 (10)	¥37,318,473	Mobile phone: 1

Note 1: Only the cases requested by police officers, among judicial police officers.

Note 2: The number of cases in brackets represents the number of cases related to Boryokudan gangsters.

## 【Case 15】A temporary restraining order against drug-related criminal proceeds related to organized trafficking of stimulants

A man who was a trafficker was identified through a undercover investigation of an Taiwanese stimulant trafficking organization and was arrested, and a temporary restraining order was issued against ¥8 million in cash obtained by the trafficker through trafficking of stimulants. (Kanagawa, in August)
## Section 4 Application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value in 2012

## Paragraph 1 Application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

The details of application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in general court procedures (first trials) are shown in the following Table 5-6.

Table5-6 Statistics of the application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in general first trials

Year	Confiscation	Collection	Total
Persons	Amount	Persons	Amount	Persons	Amount
2010	54	81,136	101	1,445,143	155	1,526,280
2011	93	60,899	93	819,683	186	880,582
2012	88	115,756	56	924,627	144	1,040,384
2013	119	701,489	47	16,431,835	166	17,133,324
2014	72	117,462	62	408,319	134	525,782

Note 1: Data is based on the White Paper on Crime.

Note 2: Units are yen in thousands (amounts less than one thousand yen are rounded down).

Note 3: When Confiscations and Collections of Equivalent Value were ordered in duplicate for accomplices, the amount was calculated excluding the duplicate amount.

Note 4: Foreign currencies were exchanged into Japanese yen at the exchange rate of the date of the ruling.

## Paragraph 2 Application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law

The details of application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in general court procedures (first trials) are shown in the following Table 5-7.
Table 5-7 Statistics of the application of Provisions of Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value under the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law in general first trials

Year	Confiscation	Collection	Total
Persons	Amount	Persons	Amount	Persons	Amount
2010	46	27,660	328	1,260,916	374	1,288,576
2011	69	21,277	273	850,882	342	872,160
2012	63	20,852	241	361,862	304	382,714
2013	61	16,407	214	506,150	275	522,558
2014	52	9,266	231	325,307	283	334,574

Note 1: Data is based on the White Paper on Crime.

Note 2: Units are yen in thousands (amounts less than one thousand yen are rounded down).

Note 3: When Confiscations and Collections of Equivalent Value were ordered in duplicate for accomplices, the amount was calculated excluding the duplicate amount.

Note 4: Foreign currencies were exchanged into Japanese yen at the exchange rate of the date of the ruling.

## Section 5 Cases of Cross-Border Money Laundering

## 【Case 16】Concealment of Criminal Proceeds related to an act of international fraud by a Nigerian and an associate that caused huge financial damage

A Nigerian man and a Japanese woman withdrew funds from an account at a Japanese bank opened in the name of the Nigerian into which victims of fraudulent commercial transactions deceived by falsified emails remitted money from Singapore and other places. When withdrawing the funds, they falsely explained to a bank employee that those funds were remittances related to normal commercial transactions, thereby disguising the money as legitimate business profit. As a result, they were arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds).

A total of around ¥300 million were paid from foreign countries, including the United States, into the account held by the Nigerian man over the preceding several years through a total of 51 remittances.

The funds withdrawn by the offenders were transferred to accounts held by the Japanese woman and others or remitted to overseas accounts.

(Niigata and Saitama, in January)
# Promotion of International Cooperation

As globalization of economy and financial services is remarkably spreading today, it has become quite easier to move money anytime and anywhere across borders. Consequently, financial services are likely to be exploited by criminal or terrorist organizations in an attempt to evade investigations of authorities in a way hiding criminal proceeds or terrorist funds through, among others, cross-border wire transactions.

To make matters worse, jurisdictions with non or insufficient compliance with global the AML/CFT regime would become a loophole and provide significant opportunity to those who are trying to commit ML/TF.

Taking these situations into consideration, it is essential for the international community to cooperate closely with each other in fighting against global scale ML/TF. In particular, in order to detect any illicit money and prevent the misuse of the world financial system, competent government authorities of all jurisdictions playing any role in AML/CFT have to share the latest trends involving ML/TF or anything undermining our efforts in timely manner, and take effective measures against ML/TF all together.

## Section 1 Activities of International Institutions

## Paragraph 1 FATF

## 1 FATF

FATF is an intergovernmental body established following the “Economic Declaration” of the 1989 Arche Summit Communiqué to promote international cooperation on anti-money laundering measures. After the US terrorist attacks of 2001, FATF has also taken the initiative in the promotion of international CFT measures.

FATF has 34 member jurisdictions (including Japan) and 2 international institutions as of December 2015.

## 2 Activities

## (1) Main Activities

1. Formulation and review of international standards in the “FATF Recommendations” concerning AML/CFT measures

2. Monitoring the status of compliance with the FATF Recommendations in FATF member jurisdictions (Mutual Evaluations)

3. Promotion of compliance with the FATF Recommendations to non-member jurisdictions
4. Study on trends and modus operandi of ML/TF.

(2) FATF Recommendations

a) FATF 40 Recommendations

In 1990, FATF devised standards in “the 40 Recommendations” to be applied by each jurisdiction in the field of law enforcement, legislation, and financial regulations. In 1996, FATF revised the Recommendations to make the Suspicious Transaction Report obligatory, and for other matters.

In 2003, FATF revised its recommendations to counter increasing sophistication and complexity of money laundering.

The “40 Recommendations” contained following additional elements (see Figure 6-1).

○Clear definition and expansion of scope of money laundering offense

○Undertaking customer due diligence including customer identification

Measures to prevent unlawful use of legal persons in relation to ML

○Application of preventive measures to designated non-financial businesses (real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones) and professions (lawyers, accountants and other professions)

○National and international cooperation among FIUs, supervisory authorities, law enforcement authorities and other governmental organizations handling issues related to money laundering

b) FATF 9 Special Recommendations

In October 2001, a month after the US terrorist attacks, FATF held an Emergency Session. The agreement of the session was reflected in “the Special Recommendations.” Since FATF added a new recommendation on “cash couriers” to this in 2004, it is now called “the 9 Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.” Main points of the 9 Special Recommendations are as follows (See Table 6-1):

○Criminalization of the financing of terrorism

○Requiring suspicious transaction reporting related to terrorism

○Requiring financial institutions to include accurate and meaningful originator information (name, address and account number) on fund transfers etc.

c) The new “40 Recommendations”

FATF had integrated the 40 Recommendations and the 9 Special Recommendations into its new "40 Recommendations" in 2012 in preparation for its fourth Mutual Evaluation.

The major points which are newly included to the new “40 Recommendations” are summarized as follows (see Table 6-2).

○Enhancing a risk-based approach

○Boosting transparency of corporations, entrustment, and wire transfer systems

Enhancing capacity of the relevant administrative authorities and bolstering a system of international cooperation on countermeasures against ML/TF.

(3) Mutual Evaluation

FATF employs a peer review approach to encourage its members to implement the Recommendations. Member jurisdictions are evaluated by other members from various view-
points such as law, regulation or control regime for anti-money laundering, and investigation of money laundering crime.

Summarily, the process of the mutual evaluation refers to the following:

1. Desk-based review of the country’s level of technical compliance, and the contextual factors and ML/TF risks

2. On-site visit to clarify issues relating to the country’s AML/CFT system

3. Discussion at the FATF Plenary Meeting

The scope of the evaluations will involve two inter-related components for technical compliance and effectiveness.

The scope of the evaluations involves two inter-related components for technical compliance (TC) and effectiveness. The TC component will assess whether the necessary laws, regulations or other required measures are in force and effect, and whether the supporting AML/CFT institutional framework is in place. The effectiveness component, which will be introduced in the fourth round evaluation for the first time, will assess whether the AML/CFT systems are working,

【FATF Plenary Meeting (France)】

and the extent to which the country is achieving the defined set of outcomes. There are four possible levels of TC: C (Compliant), LC (Largely Compliant), PC (Partially Compliant) and NC (Non-Compliant). There are four possible levels of effectiveness: High, Substantial, Moderate and Low.

The evaluation results are summarized in the Mutual Evaluation Report (MER), which is published after being discussed and adopted (MER adoption) at the FATF Plenary Meeting. After the finalization of the evaluation, the assessed countries are required to provide follow-up reports on the status of improvement regarding deficiencies. The assessed countries will also have a follow-up assessment after five years after the finalization of evaluation, where re-ratings on TC and effectiveness will be possible as part of the follow-up process. The assessed countries could be placed in either regular follow-up, which requires them to provide a report two and a half years after the MER adoption, or enhanced follow-up, which requires more frequent reporting following the first report to be made at a Plenary Meeting held around one year after the MER adoption. The assessed countries are expected to address deficiencies identified in the MER.

In response to the new 40 Recommendations, the fourth round of FATF Mutual Evaluation of its member jurisdictions started in 2013 based on the assessment methodology (evaluation standard for assessors) that was adopted in the same year.
## 3 Mutual Evaluation

FATF conducted Mutual Evaluations on Japan three times (in 1994, 1998 and 2008). In the third round Mutual Evaluation (TC), for each of the 40 Recommendations and the 9 Special Recommendations, Japan was rated at C (Compliant) on four recommendations, at LC (Largely Compliant) on 19 recommendations, at PC (Partially Compliant) on 15 recommendations and at NC (Non-Compliant) on 10 recommendations (See Table 6-1; besides those recommendations, there was one N/A (Not Applicable) with respect to Japan).

Japan, which has reported the progress in the work at the FATF Plenary Meeting with respect to its activities to address the deficiencies identified in the third round Mutual Evaluation.

The fourth round Mutual Evaluation of Japan is scheduled to be conducted in July or August 2019. Specifically, the evaluation team will make an on-site visit and the evaluation will be conducted at a Plenary Meeting in February 2020.

## 4 JAFIC's Participation

As one of the founding members of FATF, Japan has been a very active contributor to its work since its establishment in 1989. Japan had participated in tri-annual Plenary Meetings and working groups which conduct analysis of money laundering typologies, and chaired the plenary between July 1998 and June 1999. Since the National Public Safety Commission / National Police Agency started to take the responsibility as Japan FIU, JAFIC has continued robust efforts even more, to lead the global AML/CFT standard setter to a better way at every meeting of the Plenary or working group.