Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
represent OEM suppliers and MS, respectively, as described in the previous sections. Each downstream firm needs one unit of input to produce one unit of final product. The upstream firm offers a common wholesale price, w, to the downstream firms. The marginal cost of the upstream firm is $ c_{u} $ , which is a positive constant.

To simplify the analysis, we assume that the products of the downstream firms are homogeneous and that the firms compete in quantity. The inverse demand function for the final products is given as:

$$ p=a-x_{1}-x_{2}, $$

where p is market price, a is a positive constant, and $ x_{k} $ represents the output of downstream firm k (k = 1, 2). Note that we assume a to be large enough to secure an interior solution in equilibrium. The constant marginal cost of downstream firm k is given as:

$$ c_{k}=\bar{c}_{k}-e_{k}-\gamma_{k}e_{j}, $$

where $ \bar{c}_{k} $ is the ex ante marginal cost, $ e_{k} $ and $ e_{j} $ represent the effort levels of downstream firms k and j, respectively, and $ \gamma_{k} $ represents the degree of R&D spillover from downstream firm j to k ( $ k,j=1,2,j\neq k $ ). The ex ante marginal costs of the firms are $ \bar{c}_{1}=c $ and $ \bar{c}_{2}=c+d $ , where c and d are positive constants. That is, downstream firm 1 is more efficient than downstream firm 2. These effort levels are endogenously determined by the downstream firms. When downstream firm k makes an effort $ e_{k} $ , it incurs an investment cost of $ \phi e_{k}^{2} $ where $ \phi $ is a positive constant. We impose the following assumptions.

Assumption 1 We assume that $ \phi \geq 1 $ to satisfy the second-order conditions of optimal $ e_{k} $ (k = 1, 2). We also assume that $ d \leq (a - c)(12\phi - 7)/(42\phi - 7) $ to ensure that the quantities supplied by the downstream firms are positive.

The upstream firm is able to choose the degree of R&D spillover, $ \gamma_{k} $ (k = 1, 2). If the upstream firm absorbs technology from downstream firm k, the degree of R&D spillover from downstream firm k to j becomes $ \gamma $ where $ \gamma $ is a positive constant ( $ 0 \leq \gamma \leq 1 $ ). This assumption captures the following technology leakage. Technology from a downstream firm (an OEM supplier) is incorporated into the input of the upstream firm (OS produced by
MS). The incorporation positively influences the marginal cost of another downstream firm (an OEM supplier). This means that this technological improvement in the input (OS) solves production problems that downstream firms (OEM suppliers) face. In this case, the upstream firm has four options regarding absorption of technology from downstream firms: (i) not absorbing the technology, (ii) absorbing the technology from downstream firm 1, (iii) absorbing the technology from downstream firm 2, and (iv) absorbing the technology from both downstream firms. Note that depending on the upstream firm's decision concerning technology absorption, asymmetric R&D spillover can occur. We also suppose that the upstream firm can commit to this choice. That is, given the choice by the upstream firm, each downstream firm engages in R&D investment. Figure 1 shows the market structure in this model.

## [Figure 1]

The decision-making process in this setting is as follows. First, the upstream firm decides the technological source from which it obtains the technology. Second, each downstream firm decides its investment level $ e_{k} $ . Third, the upstream firm decides the wholesale price w. Finally, each downstream firm decides its output $ x_{k} $ .

## 4 Analysis

We solve the game by backward induction.

In the final stage, given $ \gamma_{k} $ , $ e_{k} $ (k = 1, 2), and w, the profit of each downstream firm is as follows:

$$ \pi_{1}=(\boldsymbol{a}-\boldsymbol{x}_{1}-\boldsymbol{x}_{2}-(\boldsymbol{c}-\boldsymbol{e}_{1}-\gamma_{2}\boldsymbol{e}_{2})-\boldsymbol{w})\boldsymbol{x}_{1}-\phi\boldsymbol{e}_{1}^{2}, $$

$$ \pi_{2}=(a-x_{1}-x_{2}-(c-d-e_{2}-\gamma_{1}e_{1})-w)x_{2}-\phi e_{2}^{2}. $$

On the basis of the maximization condition for each downstream firm, the output of each
downstream firm is calculated as follows:

$$ \begin{aligned}x_{1}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2},e_{1},e_{2},w)&=\frac{a-c+d+(2-\gamma_{1})e_{1}-(1-2\gamma_{2})e_{2}-w}{3},\\x_{2}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2},e_{1},e_{2},w)&=\frac{a-c-2d+(2-\gamma_{2})e_{2}-(1-2\gamma_{1})e_{1}-w}{3}.\end{aligned} $$

The profit function of the upstream firm is given as:

$$ \begin{align*}\pi_{u}&=(w-c_{u})(x_{1}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2},e_{1},e_{2},w)+x_{2}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2},e_{1},e_{2},w))\\&=\frac{(w-c_{u})(2a-2c-d+(1+\gamma_{1})e_{1}+(1+\gamma_{2})e_{2}-2w)}{3}.\end{align*} $$

In the third stage, the upstream firm sets the optimal w:

$$ w(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2},e_{1},e_{2})=\frac{2(a-c+c_{u})-d+(1+\gamma_{1})e_{1}+(1+\gamma_{2})e_{2}}{4}. $$

By using the aforementioned calculation result on $ x_{k}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2},e_{1},e_{2},w) $ and $ w(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2},e_{1},e_{2}) $ , we calculate the investment levels and obtain the following result:

$$ e_{1}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2})=\frac{(7-5\gamma_{1})(6(2(a-c-c_{u})+5d)\phi-(7-5\gamma_{2})((1-\gamma_{2})(a-c-c_{u})+\gamma_{2}d))}{864\phi^{2}-6((7-5\gamma_{1})^{2}+(7-5\gamma_{2})^{2})\phi+(7-5\gamma_{1})(7-5\gamma_{2})(1-\gamma_{1}\gamma_{2})}, $$

$$ e_{2}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2})=\frac{(7-5\gamma_{2})(6(2(a-c-c_{u})-7d)\phi-(7-5\gamma_{1})((1-\gamma_{1})(a-c-c_{u})-d))}{864\phi^{2}-6((7-5\gamma_{1})^{2}+(7-5\gamma_{2})^{2})\phi+(7-5\gamma_{1})(7-5\gamma_{2})(1-\gamma_{1}\gamma_{2})}. $$

Substituting $ e_{k}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2}) $ (k = 1, 2) into the profit functions of the downstream firms, we have:

$$ \begin{align*}\pi_{1}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2})&\equiv\frac{\phi(144\phi-(7-5\gamma_{1})^{2})(e_{1}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2}))^{2}}{(7-5\gamma_{1})^{2}},\\\pi_{2}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2})&\equiv\frac{\phi(144\phi-(7-5\gamma_{2})^{2})(e_{2}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2}))^{2}}{(7-5\gamma_{2})^{2}}.\end{align*} $$

The profit of the upstream firm is

$$ \pi_{u}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2})\equiv\frac{216\phi^{2}K^{2}}{[864\phi^{2}-6((7-5\gamma_{1})^{2}+(7-5\gamma_{2})^{2})\phi+(7-5\gamma_{1})(7-5\gamma_{2})(1-\gamma_{1}\gamma_{2})]^{2}}, $$

$$ where K\equiv12(2(a-c-c_{u})-d)\phi-(a-c-c_{u})\sum_{i=1}^{2}(1-\gamma_{i})(7-5\gamma_{i})+((7-5\gamma_{1})-\gamma_{2}(7-5\gamma_{2}))d). $$

The consumer surplus and the social surplus are:

$$ C S(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2})=\frac{(x_{1}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2})+x_{2}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2}))^{2}}{2}=\frac{\pi_{u}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2})}{3}, $$

$$ SW(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2})\equiv CS(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2})+\pi_{u}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2})+\sum_{i=1}^{2}\pi_{i}(\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2}). $$
We must compare the profits of the upstream firm in the four cases: (i) $ \gamma_{1} = \gamma_{2} = 0 $ , (ii) $ \gamma_{1} = 0 $ and $ \gamma_{2} = \gamma $ , (iii) $ \gamma_{1} = \gamma $ and $ \gamma_{2} = 0 $ , (iv) $ \gamma_{1} = \gamma_{2} = \gamma $ . From the comparison, we find that $ \pi_{u}(\gamma, \gamma) $ is the largest value among the four cases if and only if $ \gamma \leq 2/5 $ and that $ \pi_{u}(0,0) $ is the largest value among the four cases if and only if $ \gamma \geq 2/5 $ (the calculation is given in the Appendix). This is summarized in Proposition 1.

Proposition 1 It is optimal for the upstream firm to use the technologies of both downstream firms if and only if $ \gamma \leq 2/5 $ . It is optimal for the upstream firm to do nothing if and only if $ \gamma \geq 2/5 $ .

From the above comparison, we only have to compare cases (i) and (iv). Comparing these two cases, we have the following proposition:

Proposition 2 $ CS(\gamma,\gamma) > CS(0,0) $ if and only if $ \gamma < 2/5 $ . $ \pi_{2}(\gamma,\gamma) > \pi_{2}(0,0) $ for any $ \gamma $ . $ \pi_{1}(\gamma,\gamma) > \pi_{1}(0,0) $ if and only if $ d < \tilde{d}_{p}(\gamma) $ such that $ \tilde{d}_{p}(\gamma) $ satisfies $ \pi_{1}(\gamma,\gamma) = \pi_{1}(0,0) $ . $ SW(\gamma,\gamma) > SW(0,0) $ if and only if $ d < \tilde{d}_{w}(\gamma) $ such that $ \tilde{d}_{w}(\gamma) $ satisfies $ SW(\gamma,\gamma) = SW(0,0) $ .

The difference between π1(γ, γ) and π1(0, 0) is shown in the following figure.

[Figure 2]

The difference between $ SW(\gamma,\gamma) $ and $ SW(0,0) $ is shown in the following figure.

## [Figure 3]

From the viewpoint of the downstream firms, the investment reduction through the technology spillover does not necessarily have a negative impact on their profitability. We now briefly explain the reason for this property. Basically, the downstream firms have incentives to make excessive investments to prevail over their competitors because the competition structure between the downstream firms is strategic substitution. This incentive will be reduced because of the technology leakage determined by the upstream firm. The mitigation of this intensive investment competition has a positive impact on the downstream firms. In
particular, it has a more advantageous impact on the inefficient downstream firm with less incentive for R&D. This is because the benefit of cost reduction for a downstream firm is proportional to its quantity supplied, whereas the investment cost does not depend on this quantity as it does in the standard setting of R&D. Anticipating this asymmetry of technological spillover, the efficient firm reduces its R&D investment more than the inefficient firm does. When the ex ante cost difference between the downstream firms is large, the diminished incentive of the efficient firm for R&D investment decreases its profit.

The upstream firm’s decision concerning this technology absorption has two effects: the strategic effect mentioned above, and the direct effect of technology leakage. The former decreases the total quantity supplied but the latter increases it. The latter positive effect is small when the spillover effect is large ( $ \gamma $ is large). We briefly explain the reason. The larger the degree of spillover effect, the smaller are the equilibrium effort levels of the downstream firms. The total amount of technology leakage is proportional to the equilibrium effort levels. The two properties imply that the positive effect of a marginal increase in the degree of spillover effect becomes weak as the degree of spillover effect becomes large. Therefore, when the degree of spillover effect is large, the technology spillover caused by the decision of the upstream firm decreases the total quantity supplied by the downstream firms. Anticipating this negative effect, the upstream firm does not absorb technologies from the downstream firms when the degree of spillover effect is large. Note that the decrease in this total quantity supplied also harms consumers.

The effect of technology absorption on the social surplus can be explained by the combination of the abovementioned effects. When the ex ante cost heterogeneity is large, technology absorption by the upstream firm has a negative impact on the efficient firm. When the degree of spillover effect is large, the technology absorption has negative impacts on the upstream firm and consumers. The right-hand side of Figure 3 shows the combination of those two properties.
## 5 Interpretation of analytical results

We derive the following results. It is only optimal for the upstream firm (MS) to use technology from both efficient and inefficient downstream firms (OEM suppliers) if the degree of technology spillover is small. If MS may not commit “not to take over technology after investment,” it will exploit OEM suppliers’ investment efforts. For this reason, if the leakage is large, MS should not introduce NAP provisions in some cases. If the preexisting cost gap is significant, technology leakage will erode the profits of the efficient OEM supplier. We now interpret the result.

### 5.1 The JFTC decision

Arguments by the respondent (MS) (from Section 1) The NAP provisions are reasonable provisions commonly used among technology-related firms, including those in the AV consumer electronics industry, to mitigate risks of patent infringement lawsuits and reduce the cost necessary to mitigate such risks while disseminating new technologies. Because the NAP provisions would, by definition, prevent patent infringement lawsuits, they could potentially reduce corporate willingness to engage in R&D efforts. In principle, if such an abstract possibility is illegal, this is tantamount to recognizing that the NAP provisions are in themselves illegal.

## Decision by hearing examiners

This hearing is to examine whether the NAP provisions would violate the Antimonopoly Act and does not make decisions concerning the legality of the NAP provisions. For this reason, the arguments made by MS are inappropriate.

### 5.2 Applicability

The NAP provisions generally suggest that if MS may use OEM technologies, it is assumed to employ a large quantity of OEM technologies. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of OEM suppliers, a quality gap may erode the profits of a high-quality OEM supplier; incentives for investment may also be compromised with a cost gap between the efficient
and inefficient firms. In other words, if we discuss the contracts containing these provisions in relation to the Antimonopoly Act, and OEM suppliers have a technology gap, then it is necessary to pay due attention to the possibility that the NAP provisions erode the profits of efficient OEM suppliers or interfere with OEM suppliers' incentives to invest. This is also related to OEM suppliers' viewpoints expressed in the JFTC decision.

The JFTC decision (taken from the hearing examiners' judgment, page 114, JFTC Decisions) As recognized in 3(1)A above, because the NAP provisions will be applicable in the future, they will apply to licensed products as well as future products and will be in effect for a very long time. In addition, because a wide variety of patent rights may fall under free licenses as a result of the expansion of the Windows series capabilities, the JFTC determines as follows. [...] MS has expanded/enhanced the AV capabilities of Windows series, and several OEM suppliers have expressed their concern that the NAP provisions would have an impact on their patent rights in relation to their own PC AV technologies (Panasonic has expressed concerns about AV technology patents in general; Sony has concerns about the standard specifications of "MPEG-1," "MPEG-2," "IEEE1394," "MPEG-4" AV, digital video broadcasting and its multimedia platform; Toshiba has expressed concerns about the standard specifications of "IEEE1394," "MPEG-2" AV and "MPEG-4" AV—Attachment (1), Written Statement (2), Respondent's Brief (3)) and they requested that MS remove the NAP provisions. From these viewpoints, while recognizing that their PC AV technologies would be incorporated into the Windows series, OEM suppliers had no choice but to develop their own PC AV technologies.

We have shown that the diminishment in the efficient firm’s incentive for R&D decreases its profit if the ex ante cost difference between the downstream firms is large. Because the JFTC decision recognizes that large corporations such as Panasonic, Sony, and Toshiba and perhaps other highly efficient firms had concerns about NAP provisions, the above analysis is on point in its theoretical implications. In response to NAP provisions, Sharp and Sotec did not request MS to remove or amend the NAP provisions; Sharp had few patent rights in PC-use OS and Sotec specialized in selling PCs without customizing the Windows series.

As for the negative impacts of NAP provisions on competition policies, it is suggested that a dominant firm in the PC OS market such as MS would occupy a more advantageous position.
position than new entrants that do not use NAP provisions. However, if NAP provisions are “reasonable provisions commonly used among technological firms, including the AV consumer electronics industry,” it is difficult to imagine new entrants not using NAP provisions in reality. Furthermore, concerning the negative impacts of NAP provisions on competition policies, MS may have had problems in introducing the NAP provisions or negotiating possible amendments with OEM suppliers; however, this paper does not analyze this topic.

## 6 Conclusion

This paper analyzes a theoretical background to the JFTC decision on the MS case in which JFTC decided to commence hearing proceedings on September 1, 2004, delivering its decision on September 16, 2008, in accordance with the Antimonopoly Act. This JFTC decision ruled that the Act had been violated in the following way. When MS directly negotiated with personal computer production/sales firms in Japan from January 1, 2001, to July 31, 2004, to enter into contracts licensing OEM sales of MS Windows (“OS”), it forced the licensed OEM suppliers to accept NAP provisions. MS set contract terms with OEM suppliers that would unduly restrain OEM suppliers’ business activities. Some issues in the MS case remain in dispute. We analyze the case by setting up simple theoretical models, focusing on the following three points:

1. Whether OEM suppliers were very likely to become less motivated in their R&D activities concerning PC/AV technologies before July 31, 2004.

2. Whether OEM suppliers were very likely to become less motivated in their R&D activities concerning PC/AV technologies even after August 1, 2004.

3. Whether NAP provisions have a negative impact on competition in PC/AV technology trading or PC markets.

The theoretical model yielded the following result. If the technology of an OEM supplier is introduced into MS' OS, and the marginal cost of the other OEM supplier decreases, then using the technologies of these two OEM suppliers is optimal for MS as long as technology
leakage is small. If technology leakage is large, MS should not introduce NAP provisions. In addition, if the preexisting cost gap is significant, technology leakage will erode the profit of the efficient OEM supplier.

This analysis implies that OEM suppliers face different impacts depending on their position in the downstream market and that OEM suppliers should offer factual evidence that considers such perspectives. For example, if OEM suppliers have a technology gap, they should clarify possible problems in competition policies, because these problems might damage the profits of efficient OEM suppliers or remove their incentive to invest. On the other hand, our analysis also reveals that quantification of these impacts requires careful review.

In addition, with regard to the negative impacts of NAP provisions on competition policies from different viewpoints, it is suggested that a dominant firm in the PC OS market, such as MS, would have a more advantageous position than new entrants that do not use NAP provisions. However, if NAP provisions are “reasonable provisions commonly used among technological firms, including the AV consumer electronics industry,” it is rather difficult to imagine new entrants not using NAP provisions in reality. Furthermore, concerning the negative impacts of NAP provisions on competition policies, MS had problems in introducing NAP provisions or negotiating possible amendments with OEM suppliers; however, this paper does not analyze this topic.

It may be necessary to examine how to respond to the dominant position of MS in the market, although this paper does not cover such a topic. The JFTC decision argues that MS has a problem because it “keeps using” NAP provisions despite having achieved dominance in the market. The decision also indicates that it is a problem that a dominant supplier uses NAP provisions and that the network effect would serve to further enhance MS’ dominant status. Antimonopoly Act experts often state that it is no problem, from the viewpoint of the Antimonopoly Act, for new entrants to adopt such an approach because it encourages competition, but it becomes a problem if it is used by a supplier with dominant status.
## References

[1] d'Aspremont, Claude and Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers, American Economic Review 78, 1133–37.

[2] Ishii, Akira, 2004. Cooperative R&D between vertically related firms with spillovers. International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, 1213–1235.

[3] Milliou, Chrysovalantou, 2004. Vertical integration and R&D information flow: is there a need for ‘firewalls’? International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, 25–43.

[4] Milliou, Chrysovalantou, 2009. Endogenous protection of R&D investments. Canadian Journal of Economics 42, 184–205.

[5] Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna, 1999. A note on endogenous spillovers in a non-tournament R&D duopoly. Review of Industrial Organization 15, 253–262.

[6] Sutton, John, 1991. Technology and Market Structure, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

[7] Suzumura, Kotaro, 1992. Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in oligopoly with spillovers. American Economic Review 82, 1307–1320.

[8] Versaevel, Bruno and Vencatachellum, Désiré, 2009. R&D delegation in a duopoly with spillovers, The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (Contributions) 9, Article 55.
Figure 1: The market structure
$$ \pi_{1}(\gamma,\gamma)>\pi_{1}(0,0) $$

Figure 2: The effect of technology spillover on the efficient OEM supplier (Left-hand) x-axis: $ \gamma $ , y-axis: d, z-axis: $ \pi_{1}(\gamma,\gamma)-\pi_{1}(0,0) $ , (Right-hand) x-axis: $ \gamma $ , y-axis: d, Shaded region: $ \pi_{1}(\gamma,\gamma) > \pi_{1}(0,0) $ .
$$ \pi_{1}(\gamma,\gamma)>\pi_{1}(0,0) $$

Figure 3: The effect of technology spillover on the social surplus (Left-hand) x-axis: $ \gamma $ , y-axis: d, z-axis: $ SW(\gamma,\gamma)-SW(0,0) $ , (Right-hand) x-axis: $ \gamma $ , y-axis: d, Shaded region: $ SW(\gamma,\gamma) > SW(0,0) $ .
課題名	E-0904 低炭素車両の導入によるCO₂削減策に関する研究
課題代表者名	近藤美則（独立行政法人国立環境研究所 社会環境システム研究領域 交通・都市環境研究室）
研究実施期間	平成21～22年度
累計予算額	78,784千円（うち22年度 37,319千円）
予算額は、間接経費を含む。
研究体制
（1）実使用燃費の見える化と電動車両導入効果の推計に関する研究（独立行政法人国立環境研究所）
（2）電動車両用充電設備の設置における問題とその解決策に関する研究（独立行政法人産業技術総合研究所）
（3）次世代電動車両の性能評価と導入における問題と解決に関する研究（独立行政法人国立環境研究所）
研究概要
1.はじめに
低炭素社会づくりに向けて、都市、農村、交通等の多様な分野でのビジョンの構築と実現に関する研究が急務とされている。提案者らが環境省地球環境研究総合推進費「S-3-(5)技術革新と需要変化を見据えた交通部門のCO₂削減中長期戦略に関する研究」を介して作成した「低炭素社会に向けた12の方策」では、運輸部門（旅客）の方策として、「歩いて暮らせる街づくり」を提案し、目指すべき将来像として中心市街地をつなぐ公共交通機関の導入、安心して歩ける地域の実現、乗用車の電動化を挙げている。こうした将来像の実現には、交通行動の転換を促す街づくり面の対応と車両等技術の開発普及面での対応との融合が極めて重要である。
また、中央環境審議会地球環境部会のH20.4.3付け報告「低炭素社会づくりに向けて」においても、低炭素型の都市・地域づくりとして、「LRTやバス等の公共交通の走行空間や徒歩・自転車による移動環境の整備、環境的に持続可能な交通の実現」と、消費者の低炭素選択の実践のために、「使用している機器のCO₂排出量の『見える化』の推進」が重点戦略として掲げられている。さらに、低炭素型の交通システムの構築として、「交通インフラの結飾性の向上などによりシームレスな交通を促進」するとともに制度的インフラ整備において、「低炭素を実践する主体を表彰」するなどの奨励的手法を「適材適所で組み合わせ、効率的に対策を推進することが重要」と述べられている。
低炭素型の社会の実現の一翼を担う低炭素型車両の開発と普及を着実に進めていくためには、短期的には、販売される車両の実使用条件下でのCO₂排出量の「見える化」が極めて重要である。低炭素型車両としては、既存のハイブリッド車(HEV)に加え、プラグインハイブリッド車（PHEV）、電気自動車（BEV）などの電動車両が有力視されている。ただ、BEVへの転換は電池の性能とコストの面で容易ではないと考えられる。電動車両の広範な普及を実現するためには、電力会社が取組みつつある郊外型大型商業施設や時間貸駐車場への充電設備の設置だけでなく、中期的には、家庭等での充電設備の設置可能性に関して具体的な検討が必要である。また、中長期的には、電動車両の特性を生かすとともに、交通行動の転換を同時に促すことを想定すると、小型パーソナルモビリティ（1人乗り移動機械）や、架線から常時給電しなくても充電済の二次電池等で走行可能な軽量軌道交通（LRT）等を含めた、広義の意味での電動車両の導入が有力な選択肢となる可能性が高いと考えられる。
2.研究目的
低炭素社会に向けた低炭素型の交通システムの実現に資することを目指して、低炭素型車両の導入によるCO₂削減策の視点から、以下の研究を行う。短期的削減策として、低炭素型車両の普及と開発をより確実とするため、販売される車両の実使用条件下でのCO₂排出量の評価を行い、信頼性の高い数値の「見える化」を行う。短中期的削減策として、電動車両の大量普及に際して課題になると考えられる家庭等の端末における充電設備の整備に関して、居住形態と電動車両の利用形態に応じて必要かつ実現可能な充電設備の性能を明らかにし、電動車両の着実な普及を担保する方法を充電インフラ側から提案する。中長期的削減策として、パーソナルモビリティとLRT等の組み合わせによる次世代型交通システムの評価を通して、地域特性に応じた実現可能性の高い提案を行う。