Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
## 5 ．本研究により得られた成果

## （1） 科学的意義

本来、有機物は湖底へ沈降しながら分解されてゆくため、理論的には浅層での炭素フラックスより深層でのそれのほうが遙かに小さいはずである。しかし、本研究の結果は全く逆であり、水平方向からの物質輸送が湖沖帯における有機物フラックスに影響を与えている可能性を示唆した。これは、湖における物質輸送過程に湖水の流動が大きく関わっている可能性を示しており、湖底への有機物輸送を考えるとき、重要な要素となることを示唆する。そして、湖水の流動、特に内部波に関わる湖水の動きは風向風速に大きく依存するため、気候変動に大きく影響される可能性を内在している。即ち、気候変動の長期トレンドが湖の沈降フラックスに影響を与える可能性を示している点において重要な知見を与えたものと確信する。また、鉛直循環期における沈降フラックスが過大評価する証拠を得たことは、今後同様の観測をする際の注意点を与え、また、これまでの報告を再検討する際においても重要な示唆を与えることになるだろう。

## （２）環境政策への貢献

本研究の成果は、温暖化が大型湖沼の生態系と物質循環に及ぼす影響評価のうえで不可欠な基礎的情報であり、温暖化影響予測モデルの高精度化に貢献する。この意味において、環境政策に貢献している。今後、陸水学会等での発表を通じて、成果の広報・普及に努める。

### 6 \. 引用文献

1) Verburg P, Hecky RE and Kling H (2009) Ecological consequence of a century of warming in Lake Tanganyika. Science 301: 505-507.

2) O'Reilly CM, Alin SR, Plisnier P-D, Cohen AS and McKee BA (2003) Climate change decreases aquatic ecosystem productivity of Lake Tanganyika, Africa. Nature 424: 765-768.

3) Parsons TR, Maita Y and Lalli CM (1984) A manual of chemical and biological methods for seawater analysis. Pergamon Press, Oxford.

4) Goto N, Kihira M and Ishida N (2008) Seasonal distribution of photosynthetically active phytoplankton using pulse amplitude modulated fluorometry in the large monomictic Lake Biwa, Japan. J Plankton Res 30: 1169-1177.

5) Genty B, Briantais JM and Baker NR (1989) The relationship between quantum yield of photosynthetic electron transport and quenching of chlorophyll fluorescence. Biochem Bioph Acta 990: 87-92.

6) Platt T, Gallegos CL and Harrison WG (1980) Photoinhibition of photosynthesis in natural assemblages of marine phytoplankton. J Mar Res 38: 687-701.

7) Goto N, Miyazaki H, Nakamura N, Terai H, Ishida N, Mitamura O (2008) Relationships between electron transport rates determined by pulse amplitude modulated (PAM) chlorophyll fluorescence and photosynthetic rates by the traditional and common methods in natural freshwater phytoplankton. Fund Appl Limnol, 172: 121-134.

8) JIBP-PF Research Group of Lake Biwa (1975) Productivity of freshwater communities in Lake Biwa. In: Mori S and Yamamoto G (eds) Productivity of communities in Japanese Inland
waters. Kyoto University, Otsu, pp 1-45.

9) Nakanishi M, Tezuka Y, Narita T, mitamura O, Kawabata K and Nakano S-i (1992) Phytoplankton primary production and its fate in a pelagic area of Lake Biwa. Arch Hydrobiol Beih Ergebn Limnol 35: 47-67.

10) Takahashi M, Hama T, Matsunaga K and Handa N (1995) Photosynthetic organic carbon production and respiratory organic carbon consumption in the trophogenic layer of Lake Biwa. J Plankton Res 17: 1017-1025.

11) Urabe J, Nakanishi M and Kawabata K (1995) Contribution of metazoan plankton to the cycling of nitrogen and phosphorus in Lake Biwa. Limnol Oceanogr 40: 232–241.

12) Yoshimizu C, Urabe J, Sugiyama M, Maruo M, Nkayama E and Nakanishi M (2002) Carbon and phosphorus budgets in the pelagic area of Lake Biwa, the largest lake in Japan. Verh Internat Verein Limnol 28: 1409-1414.

7. 国際共同研究等の状況

特に記載すべき事項はない。

8. 研究成果の発表状況

（1）誌上発表

<論文（査読あり）>

特に記載すべき事項はない。

（2）口頭発表（学会等）

1）伴修平、後藤直成、由水千景、陀安一郎、石川俊之、熊谷道夫、永田俊：日本陸水学会第74回大会、大分（2009）「琵琶湖における一次生産と鉛直フラックスの連続測定」

（3）出願特許

特に記載すべき事項はない。

（４）シンポジウム、セミナーの開催（主催のもの）

特に記載すべき事項はない。

（５）マスコミ等への公表・報道等

特に記載すべき事項はない。

（６）その他

特に記載すべき事項はない。
# CPRC Discussion Paper Series

# Competition Policy Research Center Fair Trade Commission of Japan

# Corporate Leniency Programs and the Role of the Antitrust Authority in Detecting Collusion $ ^{*} $

Joseph E. Harrington Jr.

Professor, Department of Economics

Johns Hopkins University

CPDP-18-E January 2006

* This paper was written on the occasion of the Symposium “Towards an Effective Implementation of New Competition Policy” co-organized by the CPRC, 21 $ ^{st} $ Century COE/RES Program Hitotsubashi University and Nihon Keizai Shimbun on January 27, 2006.

1-1-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, TOKYO 100-8987 JAPAN

Phone:+81-3-3581-1848 Fax:+81-3-3581-1945

URL:www.jftc.go.jp/cprc.html

E-mail:cprcsec@jftc.go.jp
# Corporate Leniency Programs and the Role of the Antitrust Authority in Detecting Collusion $ ^{*} $

Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.

Department of Economics

Johns Hopkins University

Baltimore, MD 21218

410-516-7615, -7600 (Fax)

joe.harrington@jhu.edu

www.econ.jhu.edu/People/Harrington

January 31, 2006

## Abstract

The design, implementation, and measurement of corporate leniency programs are examined with a focus on how these programs impact the discovery and penalization of cartels. This is followed with a broader discussion of detection by considering other ways in which an antitrust authority can play an active role in this critical first stage to fighting cartels.
## 1 Introduction

It is a momentous time for the Fair Trade Commission of Japan (JFTC) in its battle against cartels. As of January 2006, the Japanese Antimonopoly Act went into effect which introduced a corporate leniency program and increased the severity of financial penalties for price-fixing, bid-rigging, and other collusive practices. The JFTC has been given significant instruments to reduce the extent of collusion in the Japanese economy.

In thinking about the battle against cartels, there are three essential stages. Cartels must be discovered, discovered cartels must be successfully prosecuted, and successfully prosecuted cartels must be penalized. Operating effectively in all three stages is crucial to disrupting existing cartels and deterring new cartels from forming. What has been the role of the antitrust authority with respect to these three tasks? In most countries, the antitrust authority has the exclusive power to penalize cartels. Typically, this is restricted to monetary penalties imposed on the corporation through a few countries allow for individual penalties including fines and even prison sentences. The U.S. is one of those few - along with Canada and, quite recently, the United Kingdom - and is also relatively unique in that penalties may also be imposed by non-government parties. Through private litigation, the customers of cartels can gain compensation for the damages inflicted and this is a significant source of financial retribution. Turning to the prosecution stage, the antitrust authority is once again the exclusive player in most countries with the exception of those countries that allow for private damage suits and, even there, the antitrust authority often plays a dominant role in getting a guilty plea or verdict. In sum, it is fair to say that the antitrust authority is the primary if not the exclusive source of prosecution and penalization.

It is a very different story, however, when it comes to the discovery of cartels. Here, the antitrust authority has historically played a minimal role. As is reflected in this statement from the early 1990s, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) was a passive agent responding to complaints:
As a general rule, the [Antitrust] Division follows leads generated by disgruntled employees, unhappy customers, or witnesses from ongoing investigations. As such, it is very much a reactive agency with respect to the search for criminal antitrust violations. … Customers, especially federal, state, and local procurement agencies, play a role in identifying suspicious pricing, bid, or shipment patterns. [McAnney, 1991, pp. 529, 530]

Going farther back in time, a classic study by Hay and Kelley (1974) examined DOJ price-fixing cases over the period of 1963 to 1972 and attributed only two out of 49 cases to an investigation by the Antitrust Division.

Table 1 (Hay and Kelley, 1974)

Method of Detection in 49 Cases $ ^{a} $

Method	Number of Cases
Grand Jury investigation in another case	12
Complaint by a competitor	10
Complaint by a customer	7
Complaint by Local, State or Federal Agency	6
Complaint by current or former employees	3
Complaint by Trade Association Official	2
Investigation of conduct or performance initiated by Antitrust Division	2
Newspaper account	2
Referred to Antitrust Division by the Federal Trade Commission	2
Complaint by anonymous informant	1
Merger investigation	1
Private suit	1
Total	49

$ ^{a} $ This information was not available for the remainder of the cases in the sample.

Sources of detection were more commonly due to customer complaints (which includes government agencies in their procurement capacity), competitors (who are not party to the cartel and may feel they are being mistreated by the cartel), and incidental discovery because of another government investigation. $ ^{1} $

Though today it is still the case that the antitrust authority is not the primary agent in the discovery of cartels, it is most definitely playing a more active role than in
the past. A few years ago, Gary Spratling, who at the time was the Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division, noted (Spratling, 2001):

... the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division ... has proactive efforts underway to detect international cartels. The proactive efforts are a targeted and focused undertaking, directed at markets in industries where the Division has information that collusion has occurred or where the Division has had leads or prosecution in adjacent industries.

This more active role can be traced to the revision of the Corporate Leniency Program in 1993. This program provides a tool with which the antitrust authority can be a more active participant in the detection of cartels.

In this paper, I’d like to discuss the antitrust authority as an active agent in the detection of collusion. It is comprised of two parts. First, I will explore corporate leniency programs by considering their design, implementation, and measurement. Here, I will be concerned not just with detection but also what it means with regards to penalization. Second, I will broaden the discussion of detection by considering other ways in which an antitrust authority can play an active role in this critical first stage to fighting cartels. Leniency programs are one way for an antitrust authority to generate cases but it is not the only avenue. In spite of the successes of the amnesty program in the U.S., cartels keep forming which means policies are still not sufficiently effective and aggressive. Hence, there remains a need for further policy improvements.

## 2 Design of a Corporate Leniency Program

When it comes to the design of a corporate leniency program, one wants to keep in mind the four ways in which a policy can fight collusion. First, it can help prosecute cartels by bringing forth evidence and thus making conviction more likely. Second, it can help detect cartels. Third, it can cause the desistance of cartels by making them less stable and thus more likely to collapse on their own. And, fourth, it
can deter cartel formation by making them less profitable. Thus, in designing a corporate leniency program, one wants to think about how it can help prosecute, detect, destabilize, and deter cartels.

My approach to discussing some design issues is to engage in a comparative analysis of the programs of Japan, the European Union (E.U.), and the United States (U.S.). To a large extent, policies vary in how they answer the following two questions. First, what are the criteria to be accepted into a leniency program? This deals with: i) the stage of the investigative process at which leniency can be received; ii) the number of firms that can receive leniency; and iii) restrictions on eligibility based on behavior during collusion (for example, whether the initiator of collusion is eligible). Second, to what extent are penalties waived when leniency is received?

### 2.1 Overview of Corporate Leniency Programs

In succinctly describing how these three government entities answer these questions, Table 2 depicts the fraction of government fines that are waived according to the order of a firm’s application with respect to other firms and whether or not an investigation had been launched by the antitrust authority. $ ^{2} $

Table 2 - Corporate Leniency Programs Amount of Leniency - Japan

Order

First	Second	Third	Fourth
Stage	Before Investigation	100%	50%	30%	0
After Investigation	30%	30%	30%	0

Amount of Leniency - E.U.

Order

First	Second	Third	Fourth
Stage	Before Investigation	100%	30-50%	20-30%	$ \leq $ 20%
After Investigation	30-100%	20-30%	$ \leq $ 20%	$ \leq $ 20%
### Amount of Leniency - U.S

Order

First	Second	Third	Fourth
Stage	Before Investigation	100%	0 $ ^{\dagger} $	0 $ ^{\dagger} $	0 $ ^{\dagger} $
After Investigation	100%	0 $ ^{\dagger} $	0 $ ^{\dagger} $	0 $ ^{\dagger} $

$ ^{\dagger} $ Officially, only one firm can receive a reduction in fines though, due to plea

bargaining, other firms can receive a reduction in exchange for a guilty plea.

The U.S. program, which was initiated in 1978 but then substantially revised in 1993, is comprised of two sections. Section A applies when, at the time of the application, the Antitrust Division had no previous knowledge of collusion. Under Section A, the awarding of leniency is automatic and full. This means that all corporate and individual penalties (imposed by the government) are waived. The corporation is still liable for customer damages which, if a firm is found guilty, the court is mandated to triple. In practice, most cases are settled out of court and single damages are typical (Lande, 1991). In fact, for international cartels since 1990, Connor (2004) calculates private and public recovery in the U.S. was only 115% of actual damages. Historically, government fines have been minor compared to damages though have recently become much more substantial due to the 1991 revision of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. And yet more recently, the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enforcement and Reform Act of 2004 expanded leniency in that a firm is now only liable for single, rather than the usual treble, damages and those cartel members that did not receive leniency are liable for double damages for the firm that received leniency. Hence, the difference between having and not having leniency has been accentuated with partial liability for damages being shifted from the former to the latter. Under Section B of the corporate leniency program, full leniency can still be awarded even after an investigation has begun if the Antitrust Division is lacking sufficient evidence that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction and the firm provides evidence that significantly advances the government's case. In conclusion, there are two features of the U.S. program that are worth highlighting. First, leniency can be received either before or after an investigation. Second, leniency can be received only by the first firm to come
forward. As written down, leniency is then all or nothing and can only be received by one firm. However, as is elaborated upon later, implicitly partial leniency is available through plea bargaining.

The E.U., which initiated its policy in 1996 and then made important revisions in 2002, similarly has two sections. $ ^{3} $ If a firm is accepted under Section A, it is then said to receive "immunity" and all fines are waived. Admittance under Section A requires that a firm is the first to provide evidence that allows the European Commission to start an investigation or, if an investigation is already in progress, is the first to provide evidence that enables them to find an infringement. Otherwise, Section B applies - which is referred to as providing "leniency" - and, in particular, is relevant when another firm has already been awarded immunity. A firm receives leniency under Section B if it delivers evidence representing "significant added value." The first firm awarded leniency (under Section B) receives a reduction in fines of 30-50%, the second firm a reduction of 20-30%, and subsequent firms no more than 20%. To be assured of having all fines waived, a firm must be the first firm to come forward and it must be prior to an investigation. Though full leniency can be received after an investigation, it is not assured. Partial leniency can be received either before or after an investigation and even if other firms have already received it.

Compared to the previous two programs, the corporate leniency program in Japan most starkly distinguishes between a firm applying before and after an investigation. If an investigation by the Fair Trade Commission of Japan (JFTC) has not been launched, the first firm to be awarded leniency has all penalties waived. As many as two other firms can receive partial leniency. If, however, an investigation has begun then as many as three firms can receive leniency, but it is necessarily partial and does not discriminate between when a firm comes forward as each firm has 30% of their fines waived. In contrast to both the U.S. and the E.U., full leniency requires not only being the first to apply but also the application being received prior to an investigation. Partial leniency can be received either before or after an investigation.
and even if other firms have received it.

Figure 1 summarizes this comparison as it identifies the position of these leniency programs with respect to the relative gain to reporting first and the relative gain to reporting before an investigation. The U.S. accentuates the former by only offering leniency to one firm (though let us not forget about plea bargaining) but moderates the latter by allowing full leniency to be awarded even after an investigation. In contrast, Japan moderates the relative gain from reporting first by allowing for partial leniency but accentuates the appeal to applying for leniency before an investigation begun which can be as great as the difference between having all fines waived and only 30% of fines waived. The E.U. lies somewhere in the middle.

Figure 1: Comparison of Corporate Leniency Programs

### 2.2 An Exploration into the Incentives to Apply for Leniency

The objective is to discuss how different policy designs might influence the incentives of firms to use the program and to what extent it enhances the discovery and penal-
ization of cartels. Starting with Motta and Polo (2003), there has recently been a growing body of work that theoretically models the impact of various leniency programs on the incentives of firms to collude and to apply for leniency. Rather than review that work, which is already nicely done in Spagnolo (2006), I will approach the matter from a different and more informal perspective. However, it is clear that some of my points draw on insight provided by that literature.

In examining the calculus of a cartel member regarding whether or not to apply for leniency, it is critical to identify the firm’s primary alternative. If it does not apply, will the cartel be discovered? Is it that another firm will come forward? Is it that the antitrust authority will launch an investigation? Ideally, policy wants to increase the payoff to a firm from coming forward relative to its payoff if it does not and the latter depends on what the firm perceives to be the likely outcome if it chooses not to apply for leniency. What the calculus is apt to look like might then well vary according to the particular situation.

In evaluating the relative merits of these different programs - and other ones that one might consider - I will consider how incentives are affected in three scenarios. The first scenario I refer to as the No Knowledge phase which is when the antitrust authority has no knowledge that there is a cartel (and let us suppose the cartel members are cognizant of that) and thus there is no investigation. The probability of conviction is probably quite low in the absence of a firm using a corporate leniency program. The second scenario, which I refer to as the Pre-Investigation phase, is when the antitrust authority has knowledge or at least some suspicions that there is a cartel (and let us suppose the cartel members are aware of these suspicions) but there is not yet an investigation. The probability of conviction is probably not low but still modest. The third and final scenario is the Investigation phase and is when the antitrust authority has begun a investigation and thus necessarily suspects there is a cartel. The probability of conviction at that point is probably moderate but could be quite high.

Prior to considering each of these three scenarios, let me briefly describe one theoretical construct that will be useful for framing some of the discussion. In many
cases, the situation faced by cartel members is apt to be represented by what game theorists call a Coordination Game. In this game, each firm is contemplating whether or not to apply for leniency and there are at least two solutions (or equilibria) to it. One solution is for all firms to not apply for leniency in the hope that the government will not discover collusion or, if they have discovered it, their case will fail. $ ^{4} $ To the dismay of the cartel members but the delight of the antitrust authority, there is always another solution in which firms race to report to the antitrust authority because each thinks one or more other firms intend to do so. If a firm expects some firm to receive leniency, it'll prefer that it be the one to get it and thus will try to preempt other firms. It is when there are multiple equilibria of this sort - one in which no firm reports to the antitrust authority and one in which firms race to report - that makes this a Coordination Game. If firms are at the "no report" equilibrium then a challenge of policy is to shift firms to the "race to report" equilibrium. Furthermore, when this situation is dynamic - as it surely is in reality - these incentives result in a waiting game among firms as each holds off applying in the hope that other firms will do the same but, upon recognition that it is imminent that another firm will report, a firm is ready to jump in and apply for leniency itself. DOJ officials like to refer to the latter as a "race to the courthouse" but it is important to recognize that it is preceded by this waiting game and the transition from "waiting" to "racing" is endogenous and, quite critically, can be influenced by the activities on the antitrust authority.

#### 2.2.1 The No Knowledge Phase

This is obviously the pertinent phase when one thinks about leniency programs as a tool for discovering cartels, as distinct from helping to achieve a conviction. In considering the incentive effects of a leniency program, we are immediately faced with a puzzle: Why would a cartel member come forward and apply for leniency when the antitrust authority doesn’t even suspect collusion? Given that firms chose