Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
# CPRC Discussion Paper Series

# Competition Policy Research Center Fair Trade Commission of Japan

Pro-Innovation Competition Policy: Microsoft and Beyond $ ^{*} $

Timothy F. Bresnahan

Stanford University

CPDP-10-E December 2003

* This article is written text of the Panel Speech delivered at the Competition Policy Symposium on November 20, 2003.

1-1-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, TOKYO 100-8987 JAPAN

Phone:+81-3581-1848 Fax:+81-3-3581-1945

URL:www.jftc.go.jp/cprc.html

E-mail:cprcsec@jftc.go.jp
Pro-Innovation Competition Policy:

Microsoft and Beyond

Timothy Bresnahan $ ^{1} $

For presentation at:

Competition Policy Research Center, Fair Trade Commission of Japan Inaugural Symposium

How Should Competition Policy Transform Itself?

Designing the New Competition Policy

20 $ ^{th} $ November 2003

## Abstract

While the general principles behind wise competition policy are well understood, their application in particular industries and particular cases calls for careful analytical thinking. That thinking often includes economics. Pro-innovation competition policy can be analyzed using the same general principles as other parts of competition policy. It is important to understand pro-innovation competition policy, because several kinds of innovation are important in the modern economy. Technical innovation is one of those, of course. Another important example is business model or marketing innovation by overseas entrants into individual country markets. In this talk, I examine a recent instance of pro-innovation intervention, the Microsoft case. I draw the (heretofore badly understood) lessons of that case. I use those lessons to think about the main tasks of competition policy, specifically in several areas of potentially pro-innovation competition policy, where economics is particularly important.
follow, once you understand “why-to.” Economics forms a crucial part of competition policy formation at that juncture.

I will use a recent example of pro-innovation competition policy, U.S. vs. Microsoft, to frame the discussion. In a “why-to” analysis, that case has several advantages. The goals of the case were entirely pro-competitive and entirely pro-innovation at the same time. Examining what such a case looks like is helpful in thinking about future pro-innovation cases.

Competition policy implementation is not simple but a genuinely difficult task. Pro-innovation competition policy is no simpler. In the second half of this paper, I take up a series of challenges I believe competition policy will need to meet in order to be effectively pro-innovation. All of the challenges arise, I believe, in the modern economy with increasing frequency. That is because the main forms of innovation are growing more important. I refer not only to technical innovation, but to business model innovation and to innovative redeployment of existing product or service offerings in more countries.

### 1. a) Tasks of Competition Policy

Competition policy authorities have three main tasks. All are guided by the same principles, so the “why to” goals are broadly similar. Yet the analysis in specific industries or cases and the role of economics varies correspondingly.

#### 1. a.1) Horizontal Competition Task

One task of competition policy is blocking direct agreements, contracts, or combinations among competitors to reduce competition. These are the “horizontal” cases. By far the most common task for any competition authority, merger review, is of this type. (A far smaller number of matters arise in connection with other forms of agreement among competitors, such as collusion without a merger.) The principles behind merger review are the same as any other competition policy. Seek to interfere with the market process of mergers and acquisitions as little as possible while intervening to avoid mergers that reduce competition.

Most agreements among competitors, whether by merger or otherwise, will not involve innovation in any real way, and thus fall outside the scope of this paper. I focus on agreements among competitors which involve innovation, and call for thoughtful consideration of competition policy action. These include mergers with entrants (including entrants from overseas) and settlement of litigation between competitors by merger or contract, and also some innovation policy areas where agreements among competitors may be procompetitive. I also take up mergers where efficiency gains arise from innovation.

#### 1. a.2) Anti-Monopolization Task

A second, and far less frequent, task for competition policy authorities, is dealing with unilateral efforts by one firm to prevent or reduce competition. These cases are often labeled as “vertical,” since often the mechanisms used by one firm to reduce (horizontal!) competition involve complementors. That is the area in which I find my example, the Microsoft case, so I shall let my policy discussion in that area be largely contained in the discussion of that case.
quantitative methods are highly useful in competition policy, the idea of calculating future market outcomes and picking the best is a snare and a delusion. Well run competition policy is not a form of industrial policy – it is the abandonment of industrial policy as a principle.

For whatever motivation, it is a mistake to pick winners or pick the best outcome, principle 2.b). Especially when innovation is involved, the reason to use the market mechanism is that market outcomes are based on better decentralized information than any such central planning calculation.

2.c) Finally, competition policy is not regulation. Competition policy interventions should be infrequent and should re-instate or preserve market competition rather than manage or direct it. With a few, narrow, exceptions $ ^{2} $ , oversight of ongoing business decisions as part of competition policy is a mistake. Competition policy does not decide that prices are “too high” and make firms lower them; that would be making two mistakes (central planning, followed by regulation.) Instead, competition policy should attempt to intervene in ways that let the marketplace decide what is the right level of prices.

Many are tempted to think of competition policy and economic regulation in the same terms. Indeed, they are studied in the same field of Economics and often in the same course. This is a mistake. Regulatory, industrial policy, or other related thinking in competition policy is too arrogant. Competition policy should think of itself as eager to learn what the market will choose, not as choosing for the market.

There is a great deal of confusion about how to use the guiding principles to make 1, Reliance on the Competitive Mechanism into a policy guide. I put this second, because only after one understands the proper limits of government action in competition policy is it appropriate to discuss this. I focus this discussion on the parts of competition policy closest to innovation.

1.a) Future Matters, not the Past

1.b) Distinct Competitive Futures

1.c) Inventiveness and Incentives Both Matter

1.d) Patents and Copyrights Should be Paramount

1.e) Competition Policy is Obsoleted by Innovation

1a) Since the goal of competition policy interventions is to increase the economy’s reliance on the market mechanism, the policy should be forward looking. The role of the past and present status in an industry is to ground the inquiry about what will happen in the future in reality. An intervention should seek to move an industry toward a more competitive future.

For example, if there is about to be substantial entry, or if an effort by incumbent firms to lessen competition would draw new entry, looking only at the current industry participants is an error. The entrants contribute something to the future competitive status. It may be difficult to discern how much they contribute, a topic to which we shall
Internet to open up an opportunity. That opportunity was lost due to Microsoft’s suppression of competition.

Another analytical lesson from the Microsoft case is that “vertical” monopolization cases can and do happen. Microsoft’s most important anti-competitive tactics involved contracts with sellers of complements, i.e., were “vertical.” That will not surprise people who know some economics. It is surprising in the odd context of antitrust policy debates, which had invented an odd pseudo-economics which supposedly ruled out “vertical” cases.

I have de-emphasized, in this review of the narrow policy competition implications of the Microsoft case, two features of the case which have been heavily debated in the law journals. Before I go on to some of the other important lessons from the case for broader pro-innovation policy, let me address the two issues, which I believe are distractions from the main point.

The two distractions might be called the “technical tie” between Windows and the browser and, to be even more narrow and legal-rules oriented, the question of whether tying two products together should be illegal for two different reasons. $ ^{3} $

I view these as distractions for very different reasons. The “technical tie” between Windows and the browser came late in the browser war, after the clearly anticompetitive contracts had already done a great deal of harm to the free market process. It seems likely that there were policy questions in the future where the question of intervening turns on deciding questions of technical tying, but they were not central to the finding that Microsoft harmed competition. The question of whether tying should be illegal for two reasons seems to me to be one of those narrow and legalistic questions that distracts attention from the “why to” of antitrust policy. I am not arguing that the “how to” is unimportant. Obviously, it is important to define specific boundaries between the legal and the illegal, to the extent that it is feasible.

There are, however, another set of lessons, far broader, which are lost in the close analysis of the “how to.” More generally, however, the message of the Microsoft case has been lost by focusing on analysis of the legal rules themselves. Since the case was not much of a challenge to the legal rules – it was very simple and direct application of existing doctrine to find Microsoft harmed competition, that narrow analysis is not as important as the broader one, to which we now turn.

### 3. a) Lessons for Pro-Innovation Competition Policy

Let me now focus focus on what the Microsoft case tells us about why to undertake pro-innovation competition policy, not how to undertake it. I submit that this is very much the province of Economics, not narrowly of Law. It leads me to review the events debated in the Microsoft lawsuit which is very different from the legal view. My view is from the perspective of the economics of innovation.

### 3. b) Emphasis on the failure of MS to invent the browser

One aspect of the Microsoft case which played only a very small role in the trial but which is very important in its lessons for future policy has to do with the sources of
operating system, is a tax on innovation. It is a private tax, but it lowers the economic return to innovation just as much as if it were imposed by government.

Today, other innovators who would bring out new products like the browser know what Microsoft’s policy is, and therefore they know what will happen to the economic return to their innovation. Any complement to Windows which is widely distributed general purpose software and likely to be important to customers will come into the same anticompetitive spot as did the browser. The resulting lowering of innovation incentives is ongoing.

One last outcome of the Microsoft case is that the relief obtained by the US government fell vastly short of restoring competition to what it would have been if Microsoft had not violated the law. In the US system, it is (just barely) possible for competition policy to take on a national champion. The US system also uses the courts to make that possible. A defendant who plays for time, and who is extremely lucky, may therefore escape effective sanction even when its actions have harmed competition and innovation gravely.

As a result, innovators in PC software or hardware or in software and hardware that connects PCs to networks must gain Microsoft’s approval to proceed. Microsoft encourages them when they are purely complementary, for example, if they make applications which are not general purpose or if the general purpose part of their technology is based on Microsoft’s plan for the future. Firms who seek to participate in a distinct, competitive, plan for the future find themselves in need of Microsoft’s approval (because of the current PC monopoly) but unable to obtain it (to avoid long run competition).

### 3. e) Lessons from Microsoft

There is no necessary opposition between competition and innovation.

There is no necessary opposition between either competition or innovation on the one hand and government innovation on the other.

There are government interventions which favor both competition and innovation.

■ Monopolists do sometimes attempt to limit success of threatening innovations.

Schumpeterian competition sometimes needs government support.

An incumbent monopolist may expropriate the return to outsider innovation, lowering incentives to innovate.

■ Competition policy can lead to actions which are very difficult politically, very far from serving the interests of domestic national champions.

## 4 ) Policy Challenges

### 4. a) Nascent Markets and Nascent Competitors

Let me now turn to another part of pro-innovation competition policy, the assessment of future competition which is still in a nascent state. This is an area in which the use of a formalistic or narrowly rule-based approach can lead to inappropriate policy analysis.

Entry and new competition can be an important force in transforming markets for the benefit of consumers and in transforming a country’s or the world’s supply capability.
inventors and for later inventors of an improvement, right to the fore. The most important areas are areas of incomplete property rights.

That gives rise, naturally, to conflicts between competition policy and legal protections for inventors and creators. Protection for inventors and creators, if it takes the form of very clean property rights, can be an example of wise government policy. Like all other government regulations, “intellectual property” policy can also be subverted for anticompetitive ends. It is no more than the latest example of regulation to be so subverted. Protection for inventors and creators is the latest arena in which firms have sought to use the services of governments in order to reduce competition.

I mentioned above that it is important and sometimes useful for competition policy authorities to consult with the rest of the government to prevent anticompetitive government action. One of the most important, and least successful, of these during the Clinton administration (in which I served) concerned legal protection of inventors and creators. Pro-competition, pro-innovation forces inside the US government had little success in affecting those laws. The very strong political alliances forged by Hollywood, for example, meant that the anticompetitive and anticonsumer elements of such protectionist statutes as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act were deliberate political choices.

## 5 ) Conclusion: Innovation’s and Competition’s Future

There remain a number of difficult tasks for pro-innovation competition policy. Innovative entrants from overseas have long met entry barriers in the private economy and protectionist rather than pro-competitive responses from governments. Today, in many domains, innovative entrants from the world of the future are often blocked by the same forces. Permitting competition rather than protecting particular competitors is the goal of competition policy. The example of the largest competition policy action in recent times, the Microsoft case, shows us that pro-innovation competition policy is possible. There are instances when existing firms seek to raise entry barriers, and competition policy can oppose that. I have suggested three areas of competition policy in which valuing innovative entry and competition is a practical and immediate reality. There remains much work to be done, and I appreciate the opportunity today to contribute to that effort in Japan.
## ●減少を続けている企業倒産

最後に、企業の倒産件数についてみていこう。第1-(1)-6図により、(株)東京商工リサーチ調べによる倒産件数の推移をみると、リーマンショックの影響を受けた2008年に15,646件に達した以降減少が続いており、2016年で8,446件と、8年連続の減少となった。また、帝国データバンク「全国企業倒産集計」によると、2016年度は上場企業の倒産は1990年度以来26年ぶりに0件となった。

倒産件数の推移

☐ 景気が緩やかな回復基調にある中で倒産件数は減少を続けており、2016年で8,446件となった。

資料出所 （株）東京商工リサーチ「全国企業倒産状況」をもとに厚生労働省労働政策担当参事官室にて作成
# 平成 23 年度 環境研究総合推進費補助金 総合研究報告書

# バイオマス廃棄物を利用した希少元素含有スクラップからのレアメタルの 回収および適正処理技術の開発

K2115、K22088、K2316

平成24年3月

(代表研究者) 宫崎大学 馬場由成

宮崎大学 大島達也、大榮 薫、

中島 暉、金丸慎太郎

都城工業高等専門学校 岩熊美奈子

株式会社ロキテクノ高田義則
補助事業名 環境研究総合推進費補助金

研究事業（平成21年度～平成23年度）

所 管 環境省

国庫補助金 91,201,000 円

研究課題名 バイオマス廃棄物を利用した希少元素

含有スクラップからのレアメタルの回収

および適正処理技術の開発

研究期間 平成 21 年 4 月 1 日～平成 24 年 3 月 31 日

研究代表者名 馬場 由成（宮崎大学）

研究分担者名 大島 達也、大榮 薰、中島 暉、

金丸慎太郎（宮崎大学）

岩熊美奈子（都城工業高等専門学校）

高田義則 （株式会社ロキテクノ）
## 目次

## 第1章 序論

1.1 緒言
1.2 研究の背景と研究の目標
1.3 廃電子機器からのターゲットリーチング法の開発とその応用
1.4 バイオマスがもつ特異的な相互作用とその細孔構造制御によって革新的な分離機能を発現する新規吸着材の開発とその実用化技術の構築
1.4.1 [研究戦略 その1] 小型廃電子機器から高選択的なリーチング法（ターゲットリーチング法）の開発
1.4.2 [研究戦略 その2] キチン、あるいはキトサンを素材とした高選択的吸着材の分子設計と合成
1.4.3 [研究戦略 その3] 各吸着材による金属イオン吸着選択性および廃電子機器や廃触媒等からのレアメタル回収への応用
1.4.4 [研究戦略 その4] 貫通孔を有する超多孔性キトサン誘導体を充填剤としたパーフュージョンクロマトグラフィー開発と貴金属・レアメタルの高速分離、濃縮
1.4.5 [研究戦略 その5] キトサンコーティングフィルターの開発と貴金属・レアメタルの分離、回収
第2章 廃棄された携帯電話の基盤のターゲットリーチング法の開発
2.1 緒言
2.2 実験操作
2.2.1 遊星ボールミルによる粉砕条件の検討 14
2.3 携帯電話の基盤からのレアメタルターゲットリーチング液の検討 15
2.4 実験操作 15
2.5 結果と考察 16
2.5.1 3M塩酸と3M硝酸の混合液による貴金属・レアメタルの浸出 16
2.5.2 8M塩酸と過酸化水素水の混合液による貴金属・レアメタルの浸出 19

第3章 キチンおよびキトサンを原料とした高選択的吸着材の分子設計と合成

3.1 緒言 19
3.2 キチンを出発原料とした架橋キトサンおよび架橋キトサン誘導体の合成 20
3.2.1 キチンを出発原料とした架橋キトサン（CLAC）の合成 21
3.2.2 CLACを基体としたジメチル架橋キトサン誘導体（DMC）の合成 22
3.2.3 CLACを基体としたチオ尿素型キトサン誘導体（MTUC）の合成 22
3.2.4 CLACを基体としたグルコース型キトサン誘導体（GLC）の合成 23
3.2.5 CLACを基体とした4級化ピリジニウム化キトサン誘導体（[QPMC][Cl]および[QPBC][Cl]）の合成 24
3.2.6 CLACを基体とした3-（メチルチオ）プロピルキトサン誘導体（MTPC）の合成 26
3.2.7 CLACを基体としたポリオール型キトサン誘導体の合成 27
3.2.8 CLACを基体としたピリジルメチルキトサン誘導体（PMC）の合成 28
3.3 貫通孔を有する超多孔性架橋キトサン真球状（OWOC）の合成と
キレート配位子導入と架橋反応を同時に達成する方法の開発 30
3.3.1 O/W/Oエマルション法による超多孔性キトサン微粒子（OWOC）の調製 30
3.3.2 OWOCに1,2-エタンジチオールを固定化した架橋キトサン誘導体 (EDTCC) の合成 33

3.3.3 OWOCに2-アミノエタンチオールを固定化した架橋キトサン誘導体 (AETSC) の合成 34

3.3.4 OWOCにo-アミノフェニルチオメチルを固定化した架橋キトサン誘導体 (CAPTC) の合成 (架橋剤：エピクロロヒドリン) 35

3.3.5 OWOCにo-アミノフェニルチオメチルを固定化した架橋キトサン誘導体 (GAPTC) の合成 (架橋剤：グルタルアルデヒド) 36

3.3.6 OWOCにフェニルホスフィン酸を固定化した架橋キトサン誘導体 (PPAC) の調製 37

3.3.7 OWOCにジエチレントリアミン型フェニルホスフィン酸を固定化した架橋キトサン誘導体 (DPAC) の調製 38

3.3.8 グリシジルメタクリレート (GMA) をグラフト重合したOWOCに2-アミノメチルピリジンを固定化した架橋キトサン誘導体 (GAMPC) の合成 40

3.3.9 OWOCにホスフィン酸を固定化した架橋キトサン誘導体 (PHAC) の合成 41

3.3.10 OWOCにイソチオウレアを固定化した架橋キトサン誘導体 (POTUC) の合成 43

3.3.11 OWOCに8-キノリノールを固定化した架橋キトサン誘導体 (QNOC) の合成 44

41章 キチンを出発原料とした架橋キトサンおよび架橋キトサン誘導体による金属イオンの吸着特性 33

4．1 キチンを出発原料とした架橋キトサン（CLAC）によるレアメタルの吸着特性 45
4.2 緒言 45

4.3 実験操作 45

4.4 結果と考察 46

4.4.1 CLAC による Mo(VI)、W(VI)および Pd(II)の吸着平衡到達時間 46

4.4.2 CLAC による塩酸溶液からの金属の吸着選択性 46

4.4.3 CLAC による塩酸溶液からの Mo(VI)、W(VI)および Pd(II)の吸着等温線 48

4.4.4 CLAC による硝酸アンモニウム溶液からの金属の吸着選択性 50

4.4.5 CLAC による硝酸アンモニウム溶液からの Mo(VI)、W(VI)および V(V)の吸着等温線 51

4.4.6 CLAC からの Mo(VI)、W(VI)および V(V)の脱離 53

4.4.7 CLAC による W(VI)-Mo(VI)混合溶液からの W(VI)の選択的吸着分離 55

4.4.8 CLAC による Mo(VI)-Cu(II)混合溶液からの Mo(VI)の選択的吸着分離 56

4.5 CLAC を基体としたジメチル化キトサン誘導体（DMC）による金属の吸着 57

4.5.1 DMC による塩酸溶液からの金属イオンの吸着選択性 57

4.5.2 DMC による硝酸アンモニウム溶液からの金属イオンの吸着選択性 58

4.6 架橋キトサン（CLAC）を基体とするチオ尿素型キトサン誘導体（MTUC）による貴金属およびレアメタルの吸着特性 59

4.6.1 MTUC による貴金属の吸着平衡到達時間 59

4.6.2 MTUC による硝酸アンモニウム溶液からの貴金属およびレアメタル吸着選択性 60

4.6.3 MTUC による塩酸溶液からの貴金属の吸着選択性 61

4.6.4 MTUC による Pd(II)および Pt(IV)の吸着等温線 62

4.7 架橋キトサン（CLAC）を基体とするグルコース型キトサン誘導体（GLC）によるレアメタルの吸着 63

4.7.1 GLC によるレアメタルの吸着平衡到達時間 63
4．7．2 GLC による硝酸アンモニウム溶液からのレアメタルの吸着特性 64
4．7．3 GLC による硝酸アンモニウム溶液からのCu(II)、Mo(II)、W(VI)およびV(V)の吸着特性 66
4．7．4 GLC によるMo(VI)，W(VI)およびGe(IV)の吸着等温線 67
4．7．5 GLC によるMo(VI)，W(VI)，V(V)，B(III)およびGe(IV)を吸着したGLCからの各金属の脱着による再資源化 68
4．8 架橋キトサン（CLAC）を基体とする4級化ピリジニウムキトサン誘導体（[QPBC][Cl]および[QPMC][Cl]）によるレアメタルの吸着特性 70
4．9 架橋キトサン（CLAC）を基体とする3-（メチルチオ）プロピルキトサン誘導体（MTPC）による貴金属の吸着特性 73
4．9．1 MTPC による塩酸溶液からの金属の吸着選択性 73
4．9．2 MTPC によるPd(II)の吸着等温線 74
4．9．3 Pd(II)を吸着したMTPCからの脱離 75
4．10 各種ポリオールキトサンによるGe(IV)およびB(III)の吸着特性 76
4．10．1 各種ポリオールキトサンによるGe(IV)およびB(III)の吸着選択性 76
4．10．2 各種ポリオールキトサンによるGe(IV)およびB(III)の吸着等温線 78

第5章 超多孔性キトサン誘導体を用いた貴金属分離回収技術への応用

5．1 キトサンを出発原料(OWOC)としたキレート配位子導入と架橋反応を同時に達成する1,2-エタンジチオール架橋キトサン（EDTCC）および1,2-アミノエタンチオール架橋キトサン（AETSC）による貴金属イオンの吸着特性 80
5．2 緒言 80
5．3 実験操作 80
5．4 結果および考察 81
5.4.1 EDTCC および AETSC による塩酸溶液からの吸着選択性 83
5.4.2 EDTCC および AETSC による貴金属の吸着等温線（塩酸系） 84
5.4.3 Pd(II)を吸着した EDTCC および AETSC からの脱離 86
5.5 キトサンを出発原料(OWOC)としたキレート配位子導入と架橋反応を同時に達成する o-アミノフェニルチオール固定化キトサン（CAPTCC および GAPTC）による貴金属イオンの吸着特性 86
5.6 緒言 86
5.7 実験操作 86
5.8 結果と考察 88
5.8.1 CAPTC および GATPC による硝酸アンモニウム溶液からの吸着実験 88
5.8.2 CAPTC および GATPC による塩酸からの Pd(II)、Au(III)および Pt(IV)の吸着平衡到達時間 89
5.8.3 CAPTC および GATPC による塩酸からの金属の吸着選択性 90
5.8.4 CAPTC および GATPC による Pd(II)、Au(III)および Pt(IV)の吸着等温線 92
5.8.5 CAPTC および GATPC による Pd(II)と Fe(III)の混合溶液からの Pd(II)の選択的分離・回収 96
5.8.6 貴金属を吸着した CAPTC および GAPTC の再生および貴金属イオンの回収 97
5.8.7 Pd(II)および Pt(IV)の吸着/脱着プロセスにおける吸着材の耐久性の評価 101
5.8.8 CAPTC による Pd(II)および Pt(IV)の吸着平衡に及ぼす温度の影響 103
5.9 o-アミノフェニルチオールを固定化したキトサン(CAPTCC)による塩酸からの Pt(IV)の吸着平衡 107
5.10 実験操作 107
5.11 結果と考察 107
5.11.1 CAPTC による Pt(IV)の吸着におよぼす各イオン種濃度依存性 107
5. 12 キトサンを出発原料(OWOC)とした2-アミノメチルピリジンをグラフト重合法により固定化したキトサン誘導体（GAMPC）による吸着特性 113
5. 13 緒言 113
5. 14 実験操作 113
5. 15 結果および考察 114
5. 15.1 GAMPC による Pd(II)の吸着平衡到達時間 114
5. 15.2 GAMPC による硝酸アンモニウム溶液からの金属吸着に及ぼす pH の影響 115
5. 15.3 GAMPC による Pd(II)の吸着等温線 116
5. 15.4 GAMPC による硫酸アンモニウム溶液からの金属吸着に及ぼす pH の影響 118
5. 16 キトサンを出発原料(OWOC)としたイソチオウレア型キトサン誘導体 (POTUC)によるレアメタルの吸着特性 120
5. 17 結果と考察 120
5. 17.1 POTUC による硝酸アンモニウム溶液からの吸着選択性 120
5. 17.2 POTUC による塩酸溶液からの吸着選択性 121
5. 17.3 POTUC による Au(III)、Pt(IV)および Pd(II)の吸着等温線 122
5. 17.4 Pd(II)を吸着した POTUC からの脱離 123
5. 17.5 携帯電話基板からターゲットリーチング法による浸出された溶液からのレアメタルの選択的吸着 123

第6章 パーフュージョンクロマトグラフィーの実用化を目指した数種の超多孔性ホスフィン酸キトサン誘導体（PPAC, DPAC および PHAC）によるレアメタルの吸着特性とカラム分離
6.1 キトサンを出発原料(OWOC)としたフェニルホスフィン酸を固定化した

キトサン誘導体（PPAC）による硝酸アンモニウム溶液からの吸着特性 125

6.2 緒言 125

6.3 実験操作 125

6.4 結果および考察 126

6.4.1 PPAC による硝酸アンモニウム溶液からのレアメタルの吸着に及ぼす

pH の影響 126

6.4.2 PPAC による In(III)および Ga(III)の吸着平衡到達時間 127

6.4.3 PPAC による In(III)の吸着等温線 128

6.4.4 PPAC による Ga(III)の吸着等温線 129

6.4.5 PPAC による In(III)、Ga(III)および Zn(II)の相互分離 130

6.4.6 In(III)を吸着した PPAC からの In(III)の脱着 131

6.4.7 In(III)を吸着した PPAC の再生および In(III)の回収 132

6.5 キトサンを出発原料(OWOC)としたジェチレントリアミン型フェニルホスフィ

ン酸を固定化したキトサン誘導体（DPAC）の吸着特性 133

6.5.1 DPAC による In(III)の吸着平衡到達時間 133

6.5.2 DPAC による硝酸アンモニウム溶液からの各金属イオンの吸着に

及ぼす pH の影響 134

6.5.3 DPAC による In(III)の吸着等温線 135

6.5.4 DPAC による In(III)および Ga(III)混合溶液からの相互分離 136

6.6 DPAC 充填カラムを用いた In(III)のパーフュージョンクロマトグラフィーによる

高速回収システムの構築 137

6.7 緒言 137

6.8 実験操作 138

6.9 結果および考察 140
6.9.1 吸着破過曲線に及ぼす空間速度の影響 140
6.9.2 In(III)で飽和されたDPAC充填カラムからのIn(III)の濃縮・回収 143
6.10 キトサンを出発原料(OWOC)としたホスフィン酸を固定化したキトサン誘導体（PHAC）による吸着特性 144
6.10.1 PHACによるIn(III)およびGa(III)の吸着平衡到達時間 144
6.10.2 PHACによる硝酸アンモニウム溶液からの金属イオンの吸着に及ぼすpHの影響 145
6.10.3 PHACによるIn(III)を吸着したPHACからのIn(III)の脱離実験 146
6.10.4 PHACによる硫酸アンモニウム溶液からの各金属イオンの吸着に及ぼすpHの影響 147
6.10.5 PHACによるIn(III)およびGa(III)の吸着等温線 148
6.10.6 PHACによるIn(III)とGa(III)の混合溶液からの吸着におよぼすpHの影響 149
6.10.7 PHACによるIn(III)、Ga(III)およびZn(II)の相互分離 150

第7章 パーフュージョンクロマトグラフィーの実用化を目指した超多孔性8-キノリノールキトサン誘導体(QNOC)によるレアメタルおよび貴金属の吸着特性とカラム分離

7.1 緒言 151
7.2 QNOCによる硝酸アンモニウム溶液からの金属イオンの吸着特性 151
7.2.1 硝酸アンモニウム溶液からの金属イオンの吸着選択性 151
7.2.2 In(III)およびGa(III)を同時に吸着したQNOCからのIn(III)およびGa(III)の脱離 152
7.2.3 QNOCによるITOエッジング液からのIn(III)およびGa(III)の分離・回収 154