Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
Table 4-1 Number of Received STRs by Each Business Type

Year Category	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%
Financial Institutions, etc.	292,529	99.4%	334,903	99.3%	360,513	98.9%	344,147	98.5%	366,779	97.2%
Depository Institutions	283,971	96.5%	324,600	96.2%	348,831	95.7%	329,127	94.2%	349,204	92.5%
Banks, etc.	272,215	92.5%	311,298	92.3%	333,868	91.6%	313,435	89.7%	332,443	88.1%
Shinkin Banks and Credit Cooperative	11,156	3.8%	12,453	3.7%	13,521	3.7%	14,089	4.0%	15,018	4.0%
Labour Banks	243	0.1%	248	0.1%	357	0.1%	290	0.1%	298	0.1%
Norinchukin Banks, etc.	357	0.1%	601	0.2%	1,085	0.3%	1,313	0.4%	1,445	0.4%
Insurance Companies	202	0.1%	677	0.2%	1,837	0.5%	3,002	0.9%	3,817	1.0%
Financial Instruments Business	5,666	1.9%	6,758	2.0%	5,998	1.6%	7,373	2.1%	7,732	2.0%
Money Lending Business	634	0.2%	581	0.2%	1,628	0.4%	1,872	0.5%	3,349	0.9%
Fund Transfer Companies	73	0.0%	344	0.1%	380	0.1%	363	0.1%	807	0.2%
Commodity Futures Traders	13	0.0%	5	0.0%	3	0.0%	53	0.0%	16	0.0%
Currency Exchanging Operators	1,970	0.7%	1,937	0.6%	1,835	0.5%	2,119	0.6%	1,574	0.4%
Electronic Monetary Claim Recording Institutions	0	0.0%	1	0.0%	1	0.0%	1	0.0%	0	0.0%
Other	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	237	0.1%	280	0.1%
Financial Leasing Operators	83	0.0%	45	0.0%	109	0.0%	62	0.0%	86	0.0%
Credit Card Operators	1,617	0.5%	2,350	0.7%	3,664	1.0%	5,086	1.5%	10,608	2.8%
Real Estate Agents	21	0.0%	5	0.0%	10	0.0%	1	0.0%	1	0.0%
Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones	19	0.0%	4	0.0%	28	0.0%	7	0.0%	5	0.0%
Postal Receiving Service Providers	36	0.0%	34	0.0%	42	0.0%	57	0.0%	34	0.0%
Telephone Receiving Service Providers	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Telephone Forwarding Service Providers	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Other	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	294,305	100.0%	337,341	100.0%	364,366	100.0%	349,361	100.0%	377,513	100.0%

## 3 Number of Received Reports Classified by Methods

According to reports of suspicious transaction by method, report by electronic application using the e-governance on-line window (e-Gov), or other means (for example, sending documents etc. to the competent administrative authorities) are described in Table 4-3.
Table 4-2 Number of Received Reports Classified by Method

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Notification Method	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%	Number of reports	%
Electronic Application	172,394	58.6%	184,774	54.8%	236,882	65.0%	255,258	73.1%	295,640	78.3%
Other Methods	121,911	41.4%	152,567	45.2%	127,484	35.0%	94,103	26.9%	81,873	21.7%
Total	294,305	100.0%	337,341	100.0%	364,366	100.0%	349,361	100.0%	377,513	100.0%

Report rate by electronic application in 2014 was 78.3%, an increase of 5.2 points from the previous year.

JAFIC will continue working on further prevalence of the online reporting at all opportunities in order to reduce burdens on the reporting entities associated with the obligation.

## Section 3 Dissemination and Use of STRs in 2014

## Paragraph 1 Dissemination

JAFIC collects, arranges and analyzes all STRs reported by specified business operators that will contribute to the investigation of money laundering, predicate offenses or other offenses, and disseminates them to LEAs. The receiving LEAs are the Prefectural Police, Public Prosecutors Office, Narcotics Control Department, Japan Coast Guard, Japan Customs and SESC.

The number of STRs disseminated to LEAs has kept growing every year, which was 348,778 in 2014, an increase of 52,277 cases (17.6%) from the previous year. (See figure 4-3).

JAfic also responded to one query from an investigative authority seeking a copy of a STR.

## Paragraph 2 Use of STRs in the Prefectural Police

The number of cases cleared by Prefectural Police that were initiated with information in STRs (“STR-initiated cases”) has increased every year. The number was 1,001 in 2014, an increase of 39 cases (4.1%) from the previous year.

Table 4-3 shows the STR-initiated cases categorized by crime type.
The following describes each type of the violation.

○Fraud-related crimes (fraud and violations of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds) totaled 828 cases, the largest number that comprises 82.7% of all cases, which included arrests for bank passbook smuggling, fraud over internet forums or online auctions, fraudulent receipt of welfare benefits and so forth.

Olllegal stays (violations of the Immigration Control Act) totaled 74 cases, which included foreign nationals who had overstayed or engaged in activities otherwise as supposed by the visa granted.

Counterfeiting crimes (false entries in the original of an electromagnetic notarized deed and use of such deed, counterfeiting private documents, use of counterfeiting private documents and related fraud, uttering counterfeit official documents bearing a seal or signature and related fraud) totaled 27 cases, which included arrests for fraud related to deposit and savings accounts using forged identification documents, and sham marriage.

Drug crimes (violation of the Stimulants Control Act and the Act Concerning Special Provisions for the Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Act for the Prevention of Activities Encouraging Illicit Conducts and Other Activities Involving Controlled Substances through International Cooperation) totaled 27 cases, which included arrests for the possession and/or smuggling of stimulants, etc.

○Money laundering offenses (violation of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds (concealment and receiving of criminal proceeds) totaled 16 cases, which included arrests for concealment and receiving of criminal proceeds from various sources.

Loan sharks (violation of the Money Lending Business Act and the Act Regulating the Receipt of Contributions, Receipt of Deposits and Interest Rates) totaled 9 cases, which included arrests for unregistered business operation and loan-sharking.

Underground banking (violation of the Banking Act) totaled 5 cases, which included arrests for unauthorized overseas remittances by foreign residents in Japan in violation of the Banking Act.

Onfringements of intellectual property rights (violations of the Trademark Act, the Copyright Act and the Unfair Competition Prevention Act) totaled 5 cases, including arrests for the sale of counterfeit brand products in violation of the Trademark Act, unauthorized copying and sale of commercial movie DVDs in violation of the Copyright Act and sale of illegal B-CAS cards in violation of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act.

OTheft totaled 4 cases, which included fraudulent cash withdrawal from ATMs using a cash card that had been obtained through ID theft.

Offenses related to labor affairs (Worker Dispatching Act) totaled 2 cases, which included the dispatch of workers for engagement in construction work in violation of the Worker Dispatching Act.

There was one case of extortion, in which a Boryokudan member was arrested for extortion of protection money.

There was one case of embezzlement, in which an arrest was made for unauthorized sale of a leased car.
In 2014, there were 25 money laundering offense arrests which were also STR-initiated cases, of which in addition to the above 16 cases, there were another 9 arrests for STR-initiated predicate offenses which finally led to an arrest for money laundering as well. By predicate offense type, fraud accounted for 64% of the total and violation of the Banking Act 12.0%, respectively. (See Table 4-4)

Table 4-4 The number of cases in which STRs led to arrests made for money laundering crimes

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Predicate offenses
Fraud	10	9	6	6	16
Violation of Banking Act	0	0	0	3	3
Violation of Unfair Competition Prevention Act	0	0	0	0	2
Violation of Money Lending Business Act	0	1	1	1	1
Violation of Investment Deposit and Interest Rate Act	0	1	0	0	1
Violation of Trademark Act	0	1	1	1	1
Violation of Attorney Act	0	0	0	0	1
Others	7	5	6	1	0
Total	17	17	14	12	25

In 2014, the number of cases that reached confiscation and collection of equivalent value based on STRs stood at 1 (see Table 4-5).

Table 4-5 Number of Cases that Reached Confiscation and Collection of Equivalent Value Based on STRs

Year Classification	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Confiscation	5	5	8	5	1
Collection of Equivalent Value	(4)	1 (4)	(5)	(1)	(1)
Total	5 (4)	6 (4)	8 (5)	5 (1)	1 (1)

Note 1: The numbers in brackets are the number of cases that fall under both “confiscation” and “collection of equivalent value” cases. These numbers are not included in the numbers in the “confiscation” columns.

2: The years show the years in which arrests were made.

In the investigations not initiated with STRs, STRs are still a valuable source of information used by Prefectural Police in countering organized crime.

The number of STRs used for investigation by Prefectural Police was 243,476 in 2014, an increase of 49,632 cases (25.6%) from the previous year (see Table 4-6).
Table 4-6 Number of STRs Used for Investigative Purposes

Year Classification	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Number of STRs used in investigation of initiated cases	1,642	2,674	3,811	3,781	4,608
Number of STRs used in investigation of cases other than above-mentioned cases	86,418	103,103	184,510	190,063	238,868
Total	88,060	105,777	188,321	193,844	243,476

Note 1: The number of STRs used in investigation of initiated cases shows the number of such information used when making an arrest.

Note 2: In cases where an investigation was started using STRs but did not lead to an arrest, said STRs are counted as STRs used in investigation of cases other than the abovementioned cases.

JAFIC tries to have a clear picture of fund movement resulting from illicit activities of anti-social forces such as Boryokudan by employing various sophisticated and comprehensive analysis methods against STRs in a way, for example, linking separated STRs by customer IDs indicating identical particulars and making use of information accumulated by police or publicly available information.

To date, JAFIC has come to recognize the fact that anti-social forces were involved in the legitimate financial services behind affiliated businesses, or repeatedly conducted a large amount of cross border wire transfers.

Although it can be assumed that sources of the funds handled by anti-social forces originate mainly from criminal activities, in most cases, the connection with the predicate offenses is obscured by sophisticated fund manipulation creating considerable layers of fund operation. Its recent study showed that anti-social forces managed to cover up the true nature behind affiliated businesses and engaged in fund management in consultation with experts of that area, and thus it has been made quite difficult to locate the financing activity of anti-social forces.

JAFIC is taking strong initiatives to combat anti-social forces, coordinating various cooperative works with investigative authorities, customs, SESC or foreign FLUs.

## Paragraph 3 Utilization of Reports by National Investigative Authorities

## 1 The Public Prosecutor's Offices

STRs are used in cases sent by investigative authorities such as the police as well as in conducting secret investigation. STRs are useful for identifying criminal facts in investigating further crimes and accomplices in the context of their utilization such as for corroborating statements by offenders and associated parties and identifying bank accounts suspected of use in crime.

STRs are also useful for monitoring the activities of Boryokudan and other specified potential organizations.
## 2 The Narcotics Control Department

The Health, Labour and Welfare Ministry’s Narcotics Control Department utilizes STRs in a wide range of activities, from secret investigations to post-arrest corroborative investigations. For example, it uses STRs to obtain identification information concerning offenders and other relevant people and account information and also uses them as reference materials for corroborating evidence of criminal facts in investigations of narcotics smuggling cases.

## 3 The Japan Coast Guard

The Japan Coast Guard utilizes STRs to analyze the relationship with those which are reported to bear a high risk of committing a crime, as well as to promote the prevention of organized smuggling of restricted items and immigrants.

It also utilizes foreign Flu information provided through the National Public Safety Commission and the National Police Agency at its request for investigations into such smuggling organizations.

## 4 Customs

Customs makes and shares a database of STRs. STRs can be used for investigations on violation of the Customs Act by associating them with various types of information obtained by Customs. Customs takes strong initiatives to stop smuggling of items such as ones that may threaten public safety and security.

## 5 The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC)

SESC conducts investigations with a view to criminal prosecution of malicious activities, which harm the fairness of transactions including financial instrument transactions, such as fraudulent securities reports (fraudulent accounting), insider trading, market manipulation and other fraudulent means.

SESC engages in identifying criminal facts such as unfair transactions by independently identifying and analyzing relevant bank accounts or securities accounts in the course of investigations. STRs are also utilized for identifying the facts of the offences.

SESC also utilizes foreign FIU information provided through the National Public Safety Commission and the National Police Agency at its request for investigations of its own.
## Chapter 5

# Crackdown on Money Laundering

In order to take effective anti-money laundering (AML) measures, it is essential to understand the scale and modus operandi of money laundering.

In Japan, money laundering is criminalized as follows: the control of management of enterprises of legal persons and other entities through illicit proceeds (Article 9), the concealment of criminal proceeds (Article 10) and the receipt of criminal proceeds (Article 11) which are all stipulated in the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, and also the concealment of drug-related criminal proceeds (Article 6) and the receipt of drug-related criminal proceeds (Article 7) both stipulated in the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law. They include typical money laundering activities such as transferring criminal proceeds to a certain place so that these proceeds would not be traceable and depositing criminal proceeds in a bank account under the name of another person, although all the activities to transfer criminal proceeds are not yet covered.

In addition, penalties for the violation of supervision mechanisms issued by competent administrative authorities to specified business operators (excluding lawyers) and penalties for the transfer or receiving of bank account passbooks are stipulated in the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.

The AML achievements in Japan can be grasped to some extent by looking into the number of cleared cases related to money laundering and the amounts of criminal proceeds confiscated.

## Section 1 Arrests made for the violation of the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in 2014

The Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds stipulates penalties to ensure the effectiveness of supervisory mechanisms put in place by the competent administrative authorities over specified business operators (excluding lawyers) and penalties on the trade of savings passbooks, and the police are enhancing its efforts to crack down on such practices. Numerous money laundering crimes involve the illicit use of savings passbooks and foreign exchange cards, etc. in the name of another party. The number of arrests made for the illicit transfer of savings passbooks in 2014 was 1,651 (see Table 5-1).
Table 5-1 Number of punishments made under the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Transfer etc. of savings passbooks (business)	30	18	32	18	19
Transfer etc. of savings passbooks (non-business)	727	1,221	1,487	1,570	1,584
Soliciting the transfer of passbooks, etc.	8	22	24	17	14
Transfer of foreign exchange cards, etc.	0	0	0	0	33
Others	0	0	1	0	1
Total	765	1,261	1,544	1,605	1,651

Note: For actions committed before March 1, 2008, the amended Customer Identification Act applies.

## Section 2 Cleared Cases of Money Laundering in 2014

## Paragraph 1 Cleared Cases of Money Laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

## 1 Number of Cleared Cases

There were 293 cases cleared of money laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes in 2014, consisting of 1 case of management control through illicit proceeds, 180 cases of concealment of criminal proceeds (note), and 112 cases of receipt of criminal proceeds. (See Table 5-2)

(note) Criminal proceeds means proceeds from criminal activities, assets deriving from criminal proceeds, or assets mixed with other assets.

Table 5-2 Number of Arrests Made for Money Laundering under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes

Year Category	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Management Control through Illicit Proceeds (Article 9)	0 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (1)	0 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	0 (0)	2 (0)	1 (1)
Concealment of Criminal Proceeds etc. (Article 10)	65 (21)	91 (18)	137 (35)	134 (41)	172 (49)	139 (46)	150 (43)	158 (27)	171 (35)	180 (26)
Receipt of Criminal Proceeds etc. (Article 11)	42 (27)	42 (35)	40 (25)	38 (21)	54 (41)	65 (44)	92 (38)	80 (28)	99 (40)	112 (28)
Total	107 (48)	134 (53)	177 (60)	173 (63)	226 (90)	205 (90)	243 (81)	238 (55)	272 (75)	293 (55)

Note: Each number in brackets represents the number of cases conducted by Boryokudan gangsters.
Looking at the types of money laundering crimes under the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes, the number of theft cases was the highest at 85, followed by 79 cases of fraud, 23 cases of illegal loaning, 16 cases of unauthorized entertainment business, and 13 cases of computer fraud.

## 2 Modus Operandi of Money Laundering observed in Cleared Cases

## (1) Management control with funds of illicit proceeds

The cases of management control through illicit proceeds in 2014 had fraud as the predicate offense. In these cases, offenders obtained the position of an originator when establishing stock companies with illicit proceeds (Note) gained through fraud and appointed board directors of the companies by exercising their authority as the originator.

(Note) “Illicit proceeds” refers to proceeds from criminal activities, including drug-related ones, assets deriving therefrom and such assets mixed with other assets (Article 2(2)(i) and (iii) and Article 9 of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and each item of Article 2(2) of the Anti-Drug Special Provisions Law.

## 【Case 1】Management control with funds of illegal proceeds generated through a loan fraud case in which a financial institution was defrauded

A man close to Rokudaime Yamaguchi-gumi arranged for an acquaintance to obtain the position of an originator by making payments for shares issued at the time of the establishment of a stock company using 9 million yen out of some 16 million yen defrauded on the pretext of a loan for fictitious purchase of equipment of a company managed by himself. The man also arranged for the acquaintance to be appointed as a director of the stock company at the time of foundation, to make foundation registration of the company at a regional legal affairs bureau, thereby making the foundation effective, and to be appointed as the representative director of the company. As a result, the man was arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (management control through illicit proceeds). (Hiroshima and Okayama, in November)

## (2) Examples of Concealment of Criminal Proceeds

Instances of concealment of criminal proceeds in 2014 consisted largely of cases in which offenders attempted to transfer funds to bank accounts under the name of other persons. This is a major form of infrastructure used in money-laundering crimes. In addition, criminals use various methods to keep investigative authorities off the track, including selling stolen items using a false name, disguising reasons with respect to acquiring criminal proceeds, and more.
## 【Case 2】Concealment of criminal proceeds through disguised product purchase related to the violation of the Money Lending Control Act

A man engaging in loan sharking sold products to persons applying for loans through disguised installment sale by a product sales company (Company A) effectively managed by himself. Later, the man arranged for a company disguised as a secondhand goods dealer (Company B) to purchase the products at prices lower than the sale prices by Company A and remitted funds equivalent to the purchase prices from the secondhand goods dealer's account to the borrowers' accounts as loans. In addition, the man arranged for repayment funds to be remitted from the borrowers to an account opened in the name of Company A through disguised installment payment and received the difference between the amount of the sale prices of Company A and the amount of the purchase prices by Company B as interest. Fictitious product orders and bills were compiled jointly by a company disguised as a product wholesale company (Company C) which the man founded with a third-party man as its representative. Ultimately, a total of around ¥49.4 million in repayment funds was remitted into the account managed by the man. As a result, the man was arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds). (Fukuoka and Saga, in July)
## 【Case 3】Concealment of criminal proceeds related to fraudulent resale of metal for dental treatment

A male dentist, in an attempt to defraud a company selling dental treatment materials of metal and to gain profits by selling it, falsely stated to the company that he needed the metal for treatment and defrauded it of the metal. The dentist arranged for an acquaintance unaware of the situation to sell the metal for around ¥9.3 million. As a result, the dentist was arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds). (Okayama, in July)

## 【Case 4】Concealment of criminal proceeds related to an “It’s me” fraud case involving impersonation as a bank employee

In an “it’s me” fraud case involving impersonation as a bank employee professing to protect deposits and savings, an unemployed man acted as a “receiver,” visiting targeted victims and receiving cash. The man concealed ¥3 million in cash received from the victims in a flower bed of a public facility. As a result, the man was arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (concealment of criminal proceeds). (Hokkaido, in May)

## (3) Examples of Receipt of Criminal Proceeds etc

In the cases on receipt of criminal proceeds which were cleared in 2014, there are cases where offenders received criminal proceeds derived from theft, computer and other frauds through bank transfer and purchase of stolen items, which shows these criminal proceeds can be transferred to other individuals in diverse ways.

【Case 5】Receipt of criminal proceeds related to violation of the Anti-Prostitution Act

A male executive of a company provided a building owned by a subsidiary company to a man managing a massage parlor and arranged for the man to remit around ¥11.4 million into the account opened in the name of the subsidiary company as rents while knowing that the rent payment was made out of profits earned through prostitution. As a result, the executive was arrested for violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (receiving of criminal proceeds). (Okinawa, in August)

## 【Case 6】Purchase of stolen goods with compensation and receiving of criminal proceeds related to an account fraud case

A male company employee made an acquaintance an offer to purchase bank passbooks, and purchased for ¥40,000 multiple passbooks which the acquaintance defrauded from financial institutions. As a result, the company employee was arrested for purchasing stolen goods with compensation and violating the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes (receiving of criminal proceeds). (Hyogo, in January)