Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
tempted to favour its then-subsidiary, Cellnet, and instead proposed a separate price-cap on BT’s retention (i.e. the profit it made on fixed-to-mobile calls).

At the time of the 1998 inquiry, Vodafone and Cellnet between them had 72% of total mobile subscribers, which had fallen from 100% five years earlier (MMC, 1999, p147). The DGT therefore concluded that the two new entrants should be left unregulated (apart from the standard licence conditions), and they were not referred to the MMC, and not included in the proposed call termination charge price cap. This price cap would run until 2001/02.

In July 2000, Oftel began a review of competition in mobile termination to see whether the markets still experienced SMP. By then the two new entrants had secured half the market. Oftel concluded that there had been no technological change making call termination contestable, and the continuation of calling party pays reduced any competitive pressure that might exist on call termination. Oftel therefore concluded that each of the four MNOs had SMP in their respective markets for call termination, and proposed a new price cap for call termination charges. The MNOs appealed and the DGT referred the case to the Competition Commission (the successor to the MMC) in January 2002. $ ^{8} $

The case took a year, and spanned the publication of the EC Telecommunications Directives. These Directives required Oftel to review the telecommunications market listed in the Recommendation. Oftel published its own guidelines in August 2002, although it did not publish its Review of mobile wholesale voice call termination markets: EU Market Review until 15 May 2003, after the publication of the Competition Commission report (CC, 2003). By then there were five MNOs, one of which, called 3, was planning to roll out a 3G network later in 2003. $ ^{9} $ Oftel’s Review concluded “that each mobile network operator (“MNO”) in the UK has significant market power in a separate market for voice call termination on its network, and in the case of 3, wholesale 2G voice call termination provided to its subscribers, and can be expected to have market power for at least the next three years.”

The Competition Commission agreed with Oftel that the MNOs had SMP, that mobile call termination charges were excessive, and, as in the earlier inquiry, that the most appropriate remedy was a price cap on the call charges. The issue then resolved into how that price cap should be set. MNOs offer three services, subscription, associated with owning a hand-set, making and receiving calls. It is possible to measure the long-run incremental costs (LRIC) of providing each of these services, but pricing at LRIC would not cover the fixed and common costs of the mobile network. Even a competitive market would therefore have to mark up prices above LRIC if it were to break even. The MNOs argued that the admittedly high mark-up over long-run incremental costs of termination was used to subsidise hand-sets, which stimulated the development of the market and accelerated penetration. This in turn created beneficial network externalities to all callers (fixed as well as mobile), as it increased
July 2003 telecommunications licensing was abolished in the UK (and the rest of the EU) as a direct consequence of the new EU communications regime. Licenses will be replaced by General Conditions made under the British Communications Bill (which had not then been passed into law). $ ^{12} $ Third, regulation now has to be justified in relation to the objectives of the Directives, proportionate, and no more than that appropriate and necessary to achieve that end, as the Guidelines cited above requires.

The theoretical disagreements relate to how regulation should be designed to be compatible with competition policy. $ ^{13} $ Article 13(2) of the EU Access Directive (2002/19/EC) requires that “National regulatory authorities shall ensure that any cost recovery mechanism or pricing methodology that is mandated serves to promote efficiency and sustainable competition and maximise consumer benefits.” An economist would interpret this as requiring, if possible, the regulation to simulate the effects of a competitive market. For a lawyer like Justice Moses matters were more complicated: “…the term ‘maximum economic efficiency’ is itself protean. … The concept involves value judgements … As Professor Geroski of the Competition Commission says, at paragraph 175 of his first statement, there is no unique definition of economic efficiency and no necessary dichotomy between efficiency and the principles of equity which the Commission sought to apply.” (Moses, J. 2003, at para 122).

This argument seems somewhat disingenuous. Competitive markets deliver efficiency, not equity or fairness. Equity is better pursued by explicitly designed redistributive taxation, and under reasonable assumptions (set out in Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971), taxation should not distort pre-tax market prices, except for correcting for externalities. Under additional and also reasonable assumptions taxes on goods and services should be uniform, with redistributive taxes concentrated on income. This optimal form of redistributive taxation leaves relative market prices exactly as they would have been under competition with no taxes. In practice, it is more effective to redistribute real income through the expenditure side of the budget. $ ^{14} $ More to the point, the spirit of the Communications Directive and, more generally, of achieving consistency between competition policy and regulation, is that regulation should only be employed where markets do not deliver competitive outcomes. Where regulation is required it should attempt to produce the result that markets would have delivered if they had been competitive.

To return to mobile call termination, economic principles provide useful guidance for setting the price cap to simulate the effect of a competitive market. First, the efficient way of recovering fixed and common costs is Ramsey pricing for all the various services, in which
monopoly precludes this, regulation should mimic the effect of competition. Price-cap regulation was developed precisely for this reason. Once it is accepted that Ramsey pricing would in fact mimic the workings of competitive markets for bundled services, it would follow that Ramsey pricing is appropriate (indeed, required) for the service (termination) that requires regulation. The principle has the additional advantage that as competition develops in the unregulated markets (through the market maturing, under competition from new services such as 3G, or as a result of competition policy), there is no need to re-adjust the form of regulation in the call termination market.

## Assessment on regulation and competition policy in telecoms

The Communications Directives have had a considerable impact on the form of telecoms regulation in Britain by ending the licence regime, and restricting the scope of regulation to markets suffering from Significant Market Power, and then only where regulation is required to achieve efficiency and sustainable competition. The evidence from telecoms liberalisation is that competition is indeed the key determinant of performance (Newbery, 2003) and so it seems natural to ensure that regulation does not impede the workings of otherwise competitive markets. The next question is whether the same approach would work as well for other network utilities. The most challenging such utility is the electricity supply industry, where, in contrast to telecoms, liberalisation is viewed with increasing scepticism in Europe and North America.

## Electricity regulation and competition policy

Electricity markets differ in one obvious way from telecoms markets. Telephone users wish to speak to a particular person, whereas electrons are anonymous and are equally attractive from any source. This distinction makes vertical integration much less important. $ ^{15} $ The fact that economies of scope between generation, transmission and distribution appear small suggests that it is desirable to separate the potentially competitive generation and supply (or retailing) functions from the natural monopoly high and lower tension networks. These networks should then be regulated The updated Energy Directive (2003/54/EC), which came into effect in August 2003, requires member states to set up national regulatory authorities, and to impose regulated Third Party Access on transmission and distribution. The traces of earlier objections from some member states remain in that the regulator can either set tariffs ex ante or publish the methodology under which they can be set. Nevertheless, the principle that charges for using the networks should be regulated has now been widely accepted. The relevant question is whether the potentially competitive segments of generation and supply should be dealt with under normal competition law, as in many countries, subject presumably to tests of significant market power, or whether they should be subject to stronger regulatory controls.
cost of generation, m. The generator would receive $ (s-m)M $ total profit if he generated, and a larger amount, $ (s-p)M $ , if p < m and he were not called to generate.

At privatisation, the Central Electricity Generating Board of England and Wales had been unbundled into a separate transmission company, National Grid, two fossil-fuel generating companies, National Power and PowerGen, and a nuclear generating company, Nuclear Electric, which remained in public ownership until 1996. The two fossil generating companies set the price of electricity in the Pool over 95% of the time in the first four years, but as they had been sold almost fully contracted, they had little incentive to raise prices until they came to renegotiate the contracts over the next three years. As the original contracts expired and had to be renegotiated, so they raised the prices relative to the rapidly declining fuel prices.

Fig. 1 shows the evolution of the wholesale electricity price. The cost of generating by coal and gas are also shown, so the margin of the price over the short-run avoidable fuel cost is readily seen. The prices are yearly moving averages of the half-hourly pool prices or the quarterly fuel prices, and are deflated by the Retail Price Index to the 2002 price level. The line with diamonds gives the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), defined as the sum of the squared percentage shares of coal-fired plant capacity (which set the price most of the time until 1999) owned by different companies, read on the RHS scale. An HHI of 5,000 represents a symmetric duopoly, and the initial concentration was somewhat higher than this as National Power was 50% larger than PowerGen.

Real electricity and fuel costs 1990-2002

Fig. 1 Evolution of the wholesale electricity market in England and Wales

The half-hourly and daily prices were dramatically more volatile than these annual average figures, and the numerous price spikes attracted particular attention. The early Pool inquiries by the Director General of Electricity Supply, the electricity regulator, found that the
charging consumers for, capacity. The resulting price formation rapidly becomes a regulatory artefact rather than a competitive market, with the players optimising against the regulatory price rather than competing to deliver best value. In concentrated markets the results may be less bad than unregulated price formation, although the latter might at least attract entry with the prospect of eventually reducing concentration.

A preferable alternative might be to require that generators be willing to offer contracts at prices related to the average cost of new entrants. That has the attraction of leaving the spot market to reflect supply and demand, while encouraging consumers to seek contracts where they are more attractive than relying on the spot market (i.e. when the spot market has prices higher than the entry price). The higher the degree of contract cover demanded, the less the incentive of the generators to exercise market power in the spot market. Wolak (2001) has suggested this as a remedy for market power in California.

The other alternative is to retain the licenses that the Telecommunications Directives abolished, recognising that electricity differs in important ways from telecoms. License conditions can require detailed operating information to be supplied to the regulator for better market surveillance, and can also impose additional restraints. Thus British generators above a certain size were required to offer for sale plant that would otherwise be scrapped, to ensure that the scrapping was not used to reduce capacity to increase prices above the competitive level. Grid codes in some countries specify rules for proper market behaviour and are clearly important. They may be an adequate substitute for licenses, although much depends on the institutional arrangements for modifying and enforcing them. $ ^{19} $

Licenses can be used to prevent companies vertically integrating or having interests in related activities (such as transmission or distribution for generation companies), and to include more restrictive interpretations of market abuse than normal competition legislation. Again, Britain provides an interesting and salutary example. Fig. 1 shows that although market concentration was falling quite rapidly by 1999, the price-cost margin remained high. In May 1999 Ofgem (the gas and electricity regulatory agency) published a decision document about price spikes in the Pool during winter 1998/99, warning that it would continue to monitor prices. In July 1999 Ofgem investigated the high prices at the beginning of that month. Ofgem was concerned about the limited competition in price setting despite the increase in the number of generators selling through the Pool (from 8 in 1990 to 38 in 1999). The gas-fired plant of the new entrant Independent Power Producers did not compete at the margin and only rarely set prices (3 percent of the time in 1998/99). Three companies (National Power, PowerGen and Eastern) set Pool price 86 percent of the time in 1998/99. Ofgem expected the recent divestments to increase competition in price setting, but remained
or suffer from Significant Market Power (SMP). Only in the latter case is ex ante regulation warranted, and then only if it is necessary, justified and proportionate. Electricity does not fit comfortably into this approach, in part because the wholesale market is more likely to suffer from collective dominance than single firm dominance that allows for an easier determination of SMP. Licence conditions are no longer needed under the Telecommunications Directives, but appear to retain advantages for electricity, where information and continuing market surveillance are desirable, and where it may be necessary to modify market rules in a timely and well-informed manner.

Competition policy remedies are likely to be too slow in electricity, where rapid, knowledgeable and intelligent actions may be necessary to avoid very costly outcomes. That said, one should not underestimate the difficulty of ensuring that wholesale electricity markets work well, in delivering competitive outcomes that are sustainable in the long run. FERC, with extensive powers under the 1935 Federal Power Act, failed to avoid the Californian crisis, and Ofgem’s Market Abuse Licence Condition was found unsuitable for at least some of its target clients. The fall in concentration coming after excess entry induced by the earlier exercise of market power caused a collapse in British wholesale electricity prices and a subsequent withdrawal of plant that halved the reserve margin and has caused concern for supply adequacy in the winter months. All this suggests that ensuring workable competition in electricity supply continues to remain a challenge to regulators and competition authorities.
Newbery, D.M. (2003) ‘Privatising network utilities’, mimeo, Cambridge (paper for CESifo conference on privatisation, Cadenabbia, Oct 31-Nov 3, 2003)

Offer (1992), Review of Pool Prices, Office of Electricity Regulation, Birmingham, December 1992.

Offer (1998) Review of Electricity Trading Arrangements: Background paper 1 - Electricity Trading Arrangements in England and Wales, February, Birmingham: Office of Electricity Regulation

Ofgem (1999) Rises in Pool Prices in July: A Decision Document, October, London: Office of Gas and Electricity Markets

Ofgem (2000a) Introduction of a ‘market abuse’ condition into the licences of certain generators, Ofgem’s initial submission to the Competition Commission, May, London: Office of Gas and Electricity Markets

Ofgem (2000b) Ofgem’s investigation of Edison First Power under the market abuse licence condition: Initial Findings, July, London: Office of Gas and Electricity Markets

Oftel (2002) Otel’s market review guidelines: criteria for the assessment of significant market power, London: Oftel, 5 Aug

Oftel (2003) Review of mobile wholesale voice call termination markets: EU Market Review London: Oftel, 15 May

Patrick, R.H. and F.A. Wolak (1999), 'Customer Response to Real-Time Prices in the England and Wales Electricity Market: Implications for Demand-Side Bidding and Pricing Options Design under Competition' in Crew, M. A., (ed.) Regulation under increasing competition. Boston; Dordrecht and London: Kluwer Academic, p155-82.

Peltzman, S. (1976) 'Toward a more general theory of regulation', Journal of Law and Economics, 19:211-240.

Stigler, G.J. (1971) 'The Theory of Economic Regulation', Bell Journal of Economic and Management Science, 2:3-21.

Stoft, S (2002). Power System Economics, New York: Wiley-Interscience.

Sweeting, A. (2001) ‘The effect of falling market concentration on prices, generator behaviour and productive efficiency in the England and Wales electricity market’, MIT Department of Economics.

Temin, P., with Galambos, L. (1987) The fall of the Bell system: A study in prices and politics, Cambridge; New York and Sydney: Cambridge University Press.

Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow (1988) Privatization: An economic analysis, Cambridge: MIT Press

Willig, R.D. (1979) 'The theory of network access pricing', in H.M. Trebing, ed. Issues in Public Utility Regulation, Michigan State University Public Utilities Papers

Wolak (2001) 'A comprehensive market power mitigation plan for the California electricity market', California ISO Market Surveillance Committee, Apr. 24 available from http://www.stanford.edu/~wolak
行政事業レビュー 概要説明資料

（市場の公正確保のための経費）

平成29年6月

証券取引等監視委員會
### 1. 事業の概要 $ ^{①} $ （証券監視委の組織・目的）

☑ 証券監視委は、委員長及び委員2名で構成される合議制の機関として金融庁に設置(平成4年発足)。

◆ 委員長及び委員は、内閣総理大臣により任命され、独立してその職権を行使(任期3年)。

市場の公正性・透明性確保、投資者保護等を目的に活動。

➢インサイダー取引・相場操縦等の不公正取引に対する調査

上場会社のディスクロージャー違反に対する開示検査

金融商品取引業者の不正行為に対する証券検査

上記の調査・検査結果を踏まえた課徴金納付命令・行政処分の勧告や刑事告発を実施等

## 內閣総理大臣
### 1. 事業の概要②（全体像）

【証券監視委の使命】

①市場の公正性・透明性の確保及び投資者保護

②資本市場の健全な発展への貢献

③国民経済の持続的な成長への貢献

【監視委が目指す公正・透明な市場の姿】全ての市場利用者がルールを守り、誰からも信頼される市場
### 2 ．デジタルフォレンジック関連システム経費【H28年度予算額：45.2百万円】

【経費の概要】IT技術の高度化や不公正取引の複雑化等に対応するため、電磁的記録の保全・復元・解析等（デジタルフォレンジック）といった検査・調査支援のための環境整備に係る経費
市場監視を取り巻く内外の環境変化	対応方針
○ 調査対象となる電子機器（スマートフォン・タブレット等）の多様化・高度化
○ 記憶媒体の大容量化、データのクラウド化
○ 新たなITサービス（SNSやファイル共有サービス等）の普及に伴うデータ取得対象の多様化
○ 調査対象の電子機器等における暗号化技術の高度化	○ 多様な電子機器に係るデータを保全・復元・解析するためのデジタルフォレンジック機器・システムの整備
○ 大量のデータを処理するためのデジタルフォレンジック機器・システムの性能の向上
○ 様々なITサービス等に係るデータを保全・復元・解析するための技術の向上
○ 暗号化された電子機器等のデータを保全・復元・解析するための技術の向上
## 3 ．インターネット巡回監視システム運用経費【H28年度予算額：13百万円】

【経費の概要】株価に影響を与えるような不適切な書込みなどを確認することを目的として、インターネット上のサイトを巡回してデータを収集・蓄積し、その検索を可能とすることで、効率的な市場監視のための支援となるインターネット巡回監視システムに係る経費

指定したサイトを特定の頻度で巡回・収集

SNS

ブログ

揭示板

インターネット

巡回·收集

収集・蓄積

インターネット巡回監視システム
### 4 ．情報収集・分析態勢強化経費【H28年度予算額：13.8百万円】

【経費の概要】機動的な市場監視を実施するため、一般投資家等から有用な情報を収集するための情報提供受付窓口の整備に係る経費

(情報提供窓口業務の補助等を行う非常勤職員手当、ナビダイヤルなど)

不公正取引？

(不公正取引を察知)

投資

## 【一般投資家等】

【証券市場】

情報提供

☆ポスター・リーフレット配付

☆駅などへのポスターの掲示

☆金融機関等ウェブサイトに、監視委の

情報提供窓口サイトへのリンクを設置

非常勤職員

にて電話受付

市場監視に活用

【情報提供窓口】

分析·確認

非常勤職員にて相場情報等を確認
③－2 日本語指導が必要な外国籍の児童生徒の母語別在籍状況（都道府県別）

(児童・生徒数：人)
## 平成29年度厚生労働省予算概算要求の姿

(28年度予算額)

30兆3,110億円

(29年度要求・要望額)

31兆1,217億円

（対28年度増額）

（+8,108億円）

## 一 般会计

(单位: 億円)

区 分	平成28年度予算額(A)	平成29年度要求·要望額(B)	増△減額(C)(B)-(A))	増△減率(C)/(A)
一般会計	303,110	311,217	8,108	2.7%
うち年金・医療等に係る経費	284,459	291,060	6,601	2.3%
うち新しい日本のための優先課題推進枠	-	2,167	2,167	-

[計数整理の結果、異動を生ずることがある。]

（注1）平成28年度予算額は当初予算額である。

（注2）計数は、それぞれ四捨五入によっているので、端数において合計と合致しないものがある。

（注3）平成28年度予算額及び平成29年度要求額は、B型肝炎の給付金等支給経費（平成28年度予算 572億円、平成29年度要求 572億円）を含む。
## 特別会計

(单位: 億円)

区分	平成28年度予算額(A)	平成29年度要求額(B)	増△減額(C)(B)-(A))	増△減率(C)/(A)
労働保険特別会計	35,268	36,159	891	2.5%
年金特別会計	640,231	647,573	7,342	1.1%
東日本大震災復興特別会計	441	656	216	49.0%

[計数整理の結果、異動を生ずることがある。]

（注1）平成28年度予算額は当初予算額である。

（注2）各特別会計の額は、それぞれの勘定の歳出額の合計額から他会計・他勘定への繰入分を除いた純計額である。

（注3）年金特別会計の額は、内閣府と共管である子ども・子育て支援勘定を含む。

（注4）計数は、それぞれ四捨五入によっているので、端数において合計と合致しないものがある。
## 平成27年行政事業レビュー説明資料 国際交流基金運営費交付金(日本語普及)

### 1 -1. 国際交流基金による日本語普及事業

### 1. 海外における日本語教育の現状と課題

● マンガ・アニメ等の日本文化への関心、初等中等教育への日本語教育の導入、日本企業の進出等により、日本語学習のニーズは拡大。

●海外における日本語学習者数は約399万人（2012年）。過去3年間で約33万人（9.2%）増加。

● しかし、特に東南アジアを中心に、教師・教材の不足（質・量）が顕在化。

●また、中国（孔子学院）や韓国（世宗学堂）の自国語普及活動が活発化し、相対的に日本語の地位が低下。

### 2. 国際交流基金による日本語普及事業の意義と目的

日本語は対日関心の入り口として重要。日本語学習を通じて、より広範な日本の文化や政治、経済、社会等への理解を促進し、より多数の親日家・知日家、日本との交流の担い手、日本研究者等日本の専門家の育成を図る。これは文化芸術交流、知的・草の根等人的交流の活性化にも大いに資するもの。

● 上記の意義・目的を踏まえ、国際交流基金は日本語普及事業を事業の主要な柱の一つとして重点的に取り組んできている。
## 平成27年行政事業レビュー説明資料 国際交流基金運営費交付金(日本語普及)

### 1 -2. 国際交流基金による日本語普及事業

### 3. 日本語普及事業の地域別方針

●重点地域・重点国：東南アジア、中南米、米国、英国

● これら重点地域・重点国においては、主に以下の方針に基づいて事業を実施する。

英国：教師会ネットワークとの連携や日本語教育機関への支援を通じ日本語教育の深化を図るほか、初等・中等教育機関における日本語教育の導入促進・維持・強化を図る。

【平成27年度重点地域・重点国】

米国：学習者数に占める割合が大きい

初中等・高等教育段階への支援を拡大し、次世代の知日派の育成を図る。また、日本語教育環境の違いに応じた支援の配分を行うとともに、学会等と連携し、地域ネットワークを強化する。

東南アジア：中等教育での日本語学習者増加が見込まれる国については、各国政府と連携しつつ、基盤整備と質の向上を図る。中等教育での日本語学習停滞、後退が懸念される国については日本語学習の需要を高めるために、各国政府・教育機関に働きかけ、学習者・教員招へい、教材支援を重点的に強化する。

※平成26年度より、ASEAN諸国に向けて「日本語パートナーズ」派遣事業を開始するなどして事業を強化。

中南米：各国の実情に応じた日本語教育の基盤強化を行う。また、「継承日本語教育」に囚われず、非日系人をも対象として意識した「外国語としての日本語教育」の発展を図る。
平成27年行政事業レビュー説明資料 国際交流基金運営費交付金(日本語普及)

1-3. 国際交流基金による日本語普及事業

各国・地域の状況に応じた日本語普及

国や地域ごとの事情・課題に応じて、

スキームを組み合わせて効果的な支援を実施

5.日本語専門家の派遣

6.訪日招へい研修

組み合わせて

効果的な支援

を実施

7.教育機関への助成

8. 基金海外

拠点事業

9. 双方向の

草の根交流事業

1.日本語教授法の普及、

教材・教育ツールの制作・提供

2.日本語講座の

運営

3.日本語能力試験

4.日本語教育機関調査

日本語普及の基盤・環境整備

## 日本語普及事業に関する 実績の推移

年度	H21	H22	H23	H24	H25	H26
2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
支出実績 (百万円)	2、733	3、002	3、828	3、620	3、903	3、819
日本語専門家ポスト数 (ポスト)	102	101	108	123	124	126
招へい研修参加者数 (人)	734	781	825	989	1042	824
教育機関への助成支援 (件)	155	192	222	224	226	206
基金海外拠点事業 (件)	511	153	164	176	199	205
## 平成27年行政事業レビュー説明資料 国際交流基金運営費交付金(日本語普及)

### 1 -4. 国際交流基金による日本語普及事業

## 日本語普及のための基盤・環境整備

### 1. 質の高い日本語教授法の普及、教材・教育ツールの制作・提供

国際交流基金がこれまでに培った日本語教育のノウハウに基づき、学びやすく教えやすい質の高い日本語教育の普及を推進。その一環として学習教材「まるごと 日本のことばと文化」の制作などを実施。

また、インターネット等を通じて自習を可能とし、幅広く日本語学習のニーズに対応するため、「エリンが挑戦！にほんごできます。」等の教育サイトを開発・提供。

### 2. 日本語講座の運営

質の高い日本語教育の普及のモデルケースとして、国際交流基金が海外拠点等で直営の日本語講座を運営。平成26年度には28カ国31都市で運営。

約2.2万人が受講。

### 3. 日本語能力試験の安定的実施・拡大

日本語能力試験

JLP T Japanese Language Proficiency Test

日本語を母語としない者の日本語能力を測定し、認定する日本語能力試験を世界各地で実施。平成26年度には世界の67の国・地域の258都市で実施し、約59万人が受験。

### 4.3 年に1度の大規模調査日本語教育機関調査

各国の日本語教育機関数、学習者数や教師数、学習動機や課題などを調査

注:2009年は旧試験の最終年であったことから、駆け込み需要により、受験者数が伸びた。
### 1 -5. 国際交流基金による日本語普及事業

## 各国・地域の状況に応じた日本語普及

### 5. 日本語専門家の派遣

教育カリキュラムや教材作成の助言、現地教師の育成などを担う日本語専門家を各国教育省、国際交流基金海外拠点、中等・高等教育機関などに派遣。平成26年度には40の国・地域の126ポストに派遣。

### 6. 招へい研修

海外の日本語教師の日本語力と日本語教授能力の向上、学習者の学習意欲向上のために、海外から日本語教師・学習者を招へいし研修を実施。平成26年度には824名を招へい。

## 西欧

上級専門家:6

専門家:3

指導助手:3

中東

上級専門家：1

専門家：4

アフリカ

専門家：1

## 日本語専門家の派遣状況

## (平成26年度実績)

## 東欧

上級専門家：4

専門家：15

指導助手：5

## 南アジア

## 東アジア

上級專門家:3

専門家:3

指導助手:2

上級專門家:4

専門家:5

## 東南アジア

上級専門家:15

専門家:28

指導助手:12

## 大洋洲

上級專門家：2

専門家：3

指導助手：2

## 北米 上級専門家：1

## 中南米

上級専門家:2

専門家:2

### 7. 教育機関への助成支援

海外の日本語教育機関が必要とする教師謝金や日本語教材の購入費、弁論大会等のイベントの開催経費の一部を助成支援。平成26年度には78の国・地域で206件に助成。

### 8. 基金海外拟点事業

日本語教師の能力向上や教育機関・教師のネットワークの構築を目的として、教師セミナー等の主催事業を実施。平成26年度は28か国205件を実施。

### 9. 双向の草の根交流事業

シニア・学生等の人材を、現地の日本語教師や生徒の日本語学習のパートナーとしてASEAN諸国に派遣。平成26年度には5か国に100名を派遣。