Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
not result in the desired outcome. I will leave case (ii) aside, since a discussion of it would lead us to a detailed discussion of specific industries. The requirements for case (iii) are typically met in many network industries, since expansion of the network creates network effects that are typically not fully internalized by markets. However, it would be foolish to advocate regulation as the standard solution in network industries because of the existence of network effects. Often, a much smaller intervention, such as subsidization of the network to help network effects will be enough.

In case (i), where it is clear that competition and its benefits cannot be achieved by market forces, regulation may be a solution. The significant advantage of industry-specific regulation is that it can be tailored to the specifics of the industry, and specific rules on pricing and availability of particular products and services. Regulators, such as the FCC also have staffs that can provide impartial technical advice that would be unavailable to a court.

However, regulation has a number of drawbacks. First, it is best suited for industries with well-defined and slow-changing products and services. With stable product definitions, rules can be devised and specific pricing can be implemented if necessary. Second, as a corollary to the first observation, regulation is not well suited in industries with rapid technological change and frequently changing product definitions. Moreover, in an industry with fast technical progress, regulation can be used by the regulated companies to keep prices relatively high, as exemplified by telecommunications regulation. Third, often regulators are very close to the interests of the regulated parties rather than to the interests of the public. Fourth, experience has shown that often regulators are not well informed about key variables as well as changes in the industry. Fifth, regulators at both the state and federal levels are under pressure and influence by both the executive and the legislative part of government, and cannot be as impartial as a court. Sixth, there is a tendency for regulators to expand their reach into related and new markets. For example, the California Public Service Commission has recently asserted its authority over the Internet! $ ^{18} $ These drawbacks can create significant surplus loss due to regulation.

In summary, regulation should be used sparingly in industries with stable products, if it is clear that antitrust has failed, and keeping in mind that regulation can also cause a significant surplus loss.

### 5. Conclusion

This paper is a start of an in-depth discussion of public policy in network industries. I believe that it is fair to say that the legal system does not yet have a
framework for analysis of competition policy issues in network industries. This was to a large extent exemplified in United States v. Microsoft. I will not go into the details of this case, but will use it as an example of a case that failed to create such a framework. $ ^{19} $

The Microsoft case has certainly been the most important antitrust case of the “new economy” this far. Unfortunately, its legal battle was fought to a large extent without the use of the economics tools discussed above that are at the foundation of the new economy and were key to the business success of Microsoft. There are a number of reasons for this. First, often, legal cases are created and filed before an economist is found who will create the appropriate economic model to support the case. Second, the economic theory of networks is so inadequate and unsettled that there is no commonly accepted body of knowledge on market structure with network externalities, based on which one could evaluate deviations toward anti-competitive behavior. Third, the legal system has tremendous inertia to new ideas and models. Fourth, the legal system is ill-equipped to deal with complex technical matters. Fifth, given all these facts, lawyers on both sides find it easier to fight the issues on well-trotted ground even if the problems are really of a different nature. It is as if there is a dispute among two parties in the middle of a heavily forested area, but the lawyers of both parties fight it as if the dispute happened on the open plains, because they know the way disputes on the plains are resolved while the law of dispute resolution in forests has yet to be established.

I hope that, with further academic analysis of antitrust issues, when the next major new economy antitrust case appears, there will be a deeper understanding and application of the economics of networks and of the way that the law should apply to network industries.
### 6. Bibliography

David, Paul A., (1986), “Understanding the Economics of QWERTY,” in Economic History and the Modern Economist, edited by W. N. Parker. Basil Blackwell: 1986.

Economides, Nicholas, (1996a), “The Economics of Networks,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 675-699, pre-publication copy at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/94-24.pdf.

Economides, Nicholas, (1996b), “The Incentive for Non-Price Discrimination by an Input Monopolist,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 16 (May 1998), pp. 271-284, pre-publication copy at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/1136.pdf.

Economides, Nicholas, (1999), “The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its Impact,” Japan and the World Economy, vol. 11 (1999), pp. 455-483, pre-publication copy at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/98-08.pdf.

Economides, Nicholas, (2001a), “The Microsoft Antitrust Case,” Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade: From Theory to Policy, pre-publication copy at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Microsoft_Antitrust.final.pdf.

Economides, Nicholas, (2001b), “The Microsoft Antitrust Case: Rejoinder,” Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade: From Theory to Policy (August 2001), vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 71-79, pre-publication copy at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Microsoft_Antitrust.Rejoinder.pdf.

Economides, Nicholas, (2002), “Amicus Brief of Nicholas S. Economides on the Revised Proposed Final Judgment in the Microsoft case,” submitted to the United States Department of Justice, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_tuncom/major/mtc-00022465.htm.

Economides, Nicholas, (2003), “The Tragic Inefficiency of M-ECPR,” (Ed) Shampine, A. (2003), Down to the Wire: Studies in the Diffusion and Regulation of Telecommunications Technologies. Nova Science Publishers, Inc., New York, NY, pre-publication copy at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/tragic.pdf.

Economides, Nicholas and Fredrick Flyer, (1998), “Compatibility and Market Structure for Network Goods,” Discussion Paper EC-98-02, Stern School of Business, N.Y.U., available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/98-02.pdf.

Economides, Nicholas and Charles Himmelberg, (1995), “Critical Mass and Network Evolution in Telecommunications,” in Toward a Competitive Telecommunications Industry: Selected Papers from the 1994 Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Gerard Brock (ed.), 1995, pre-publication copy at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/tprc.pdf.
Economides, Nicholas, Giuseppe Lopomo, and Glenn Woroch, (1996a), “Regulatory Pricing Policies to Neutralize Network Dominance,” Industrial and Corporate Change, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 1013-1028, pre-publication copy at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/96-14.pdf.

Economides, Nicholas, Giuseppe Lopomo, and Glenn Woroch, (1996b), “Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing,” Discussion Paper EC-96-13, Stern School of Business, at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/96-13.pdf.

Economides, Nicholas and Robert Schwartz, (1995a), “Electronic Call Market Trading,” Journal of Portfolio Management, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 10-18, pre-publication copy at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Electronic_Call_Market_Trading.pdf.

Economides, Nicholas and Robert Schwartz, (1995b), “Equity Trading Practices and Market Structure: Assessing Asset Managers’ Demand for Immediacy,” Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, vol. 4, no. 4, (November 1995) pp. 1-46, pre-publication copy at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Equity_Trading_Practices.pdf.

Economides, Nicholas, and Aloysius Siow, (1988), “The Division of Markets is Limited by the Extent of Liquidity,” American Economic Review, vol. 78, no. 1 (March 1988), pp. 108-121, at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/aer88.pdf.

Economides, Nicholas and Lawrence J. White, (1994), “Networks and Compatibility: Implications for Antitrust,” European Economic Review, vol. 38, pp. 651-662.

Economides, Nicholas and Lawrence J. White, (1995), “Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule?” The Antitrust Bulletin, vol. XL, no. 3, pp. 557-579, pre-publication copy at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/95-04.pdf.

Economides, Nicholas and Lawrence J. White, (1998), “The Inefficiency of the ECPR Yet Again: A Reply to Larson,” The Antitrust Bulletin vol. XLIII (1998), no. 2, pp. 429-444, pre-publication copy at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/96-07.pdf.

Gabel, David, and David F. Weiman, (1994), “Historical Perspectives on Interconnection between Competing Local Operating Companies: The United States, 1894-1914,” mimeo.

Posner, Richard A., (2000), “Antitrust In The New Economy,” Tech Law Journal, at http://www.techlawjournal.com/atr/20000914posner.asp.

Rohlfs, Jeffrey, (2003), Bandwagon Effects in High Technology Industries.
Shaked, Avner and John Sutton, (1983), “Natural Oligopolies,” Econometrica, vol. 51, pp. 1469-1484.
# 參 考 資 料

平成29年8月

人事院
## 目

## 次

1 国家公務員給与関係

第1表 国家公務員の適用俸給表別人員、平均年齢、平均経験年数 …… 1
第2表 国家公務員の適用俸給表別、学歴別、性別人員構成比 …… 2
第3表 国家公務員の平均給与月額 …… 3
第4表 行政職俸給表(一)の経験年数階層別、給与決定上の
学歴別人員及び平均俸給額 …… 4
第5表 国家公務員の扶養親族数別人員 …… 4
第6表 国家公務員の俸給の特別調整額の支給状況 …… 5
第7表 国家公務員の単身赴任手当の支給状況 …… 5
第8表 国家公務員の本府省業務調整手当の支給状況 …… 5
第9表 国家公務員の地域手当の支給状況 …… 5
第10表 国家公務員の広域異動手当の支給状況 …… 6
第11表 国家公務員の住居手当の支給状況 …… 6
第12表 国家公務員の通勤手当の支給状況 …… 6
第13表 国家公務員の平均年間超過勤務時間数 …… 7
第14表 国家公務員の都道府県別在勤人員及び構成比 …… 7
第15表 国家公務員の適用俸給表別、級別、号俸別人員 …… 8
第16表 再任用職員の適用俸給表別、級別人員 …… 41
第17表 組織区分別、年齢階層別人員構成比（全職員）
（平成29年と平成19年との比較） …… 42

2 民間給与関係

平成29年職種別民間給与実態調査の概要 …… 43
第18表 企業規模別調査事業所数 …… 44
第19表 職種別、学歴別、企業規模別初任給 …… 46
第20表 企業規模別、職種別、学歴別給与額等 …… 47
第21表 民間における初任給の改定状況 …… 66
第22表 民間における定期昇給制度の状況 …… 66
第23表 民間における家族手当の支給状況 …… 67
第24表 民間における住宅手当の支給状況 …… 67
第25表 民間における冬季賞与の考課査定分の配分状況 …… 68
第26表 民間における月45時間を超え60時間を超えない時間外労働の
割増賃金率の状況 …… 68
3 役員報酬関係
平成29年民間企業における役員報酬（給与）調査の概要 …… 69
第27表 平成28年民間における役員（比較対象役員）の年間報酬額 …… 69

4 生計費関係
平成29年4月の標準生計費算定方法 …… 70
第28表 費目別、世帯人員別標準生計費（平成29年4月） …… 71
<参考> 費目別、世帯人員別生計費換算乗数 …… 71

5 労働経済関係
第29表 労働経済指標 …… 72
政府統計

報道関係者 各位

平成27年9月4日

【照会先】

国立社会保障·人口問題研究所

人口構造研究部長 鈴木 透 （内線 4460）

人口構造研究部室長 菅 桂太 (内線 4464)

人口構造研究部室長 小山泰代 (内線 4465)

(代表電話) 03(3595)2984

## 「第7回世帯動態調査」結果の概要を公表します

#### ～ 親子同居の割合は前回調査（平成21年）の56.5%から52.3%へ低下傾向～

厚生労働省の研究機関である国立社会保障・人口問題研究所（所長：森田朗、住所：東京都千代田区）は、このたび、平成26（2014）年に実施した「第7回世帯動態調査」の結果概要をとりまとめましたので、公表します。

世帯動態調査は、世帯数の将来推計の基礎資料を得るための調査で、昭和60（1985）年の第1回調査からほぼ5年ごとに実施しています。今回の調査結果からは、世帯の形成・解体とその動向が見て取れます。

調査対象は、「平成26年国民生活基礎調査」で設定された調査区から無作為に選ばれた300調査区に居住するすべての世帯主です。調査対象世帯数16,388世帯に対し、有効回収票（18歳未満の世帯主を除く）は11,011票であり、有効回収率は67.2%でした。

## 【集計結果のポイント】

## ● 親子の同居傾向 ※ P 2 「2．親族の居住関係」参照

・18歳以上の子を持つ成人のうち、子と同居している割合は52.3％で、前回調査（平成21（2009）年）の56.5％より低下しており、子と離れて暮らす傾向が強まっている。

・少なくともひとりの親が生存している成人のうち、親と同居している割合は36.0%で、前回調査の39.7%より低下しており、親と離れて暮らす傾向が強まっている。

・ただし、65歳以上に限って言えば、生存している親との同居割合は26.7%で、前回調査の25.5%よりわずかに上昇しており、高齢者がさらに高齢の親と同居する傾向が続いている。

## ● 世帯の継続と変化 ※P4「3．世帯の継続と変化」参照

・現在世帯主である人のうち、5年前も世帯主であった者の割合は87.5%で、前回調査の87.6%とほとんど変化していない。

・5年前と比べた家族類型の変化を見ると、同じ家族類型にとどまる割合は、「単独世帯」が86.1％、「夫婦のみ」が76.1％、「親と子」が79.8％、「その他」が71.3％となっている。

前回調査と比べると、「単独世帯」にとどまる割合は83.8%から上昇し、また他の家族類型から「単独世帯」へ移る割合もそれぞれ上昇しており、「単独世帯」の増加傾向が強まっている。

・とりわけ世帯主が65歳以上の場合、「単独世帯」にとどまる割合は93.6％と非常に高く、また前回調査の92.5％より上昇している。

## ● 親世帯からの離家 ※P6「4．親世帯からの離家」参照

・40歳未満の者について親元を離れたことがある割合をみると、20〜24歳から25〜29歳にかけて、男性では46.7%から69.7%へ、女性では34.7%から63.1%へと、ともに大きく上昇している。

・子どもが全員親元を離れる「エンプティ・ネスト」への移行は、親が55～64歳の時期に最も多い。

※詳細は別添の概要をご覧ください。
# Outline of the 2017 NPA Remuneration Recommendation

## ○ Main Points of the 2017 NPA Remuneration Recommendation

## Raise of Monthly Remuneration and Bonuses

1. To make up for the remuneration differential between the public and private sectors (0.15%), the salary schedule level should be raised, and the rise of Headquarters Duty Adjustment Allowance planned in the Comprehensive Review of the Remuneration System should be conducted.

2. Bonuses should be raised by 0.10 times as much as the monthly remuneration; an increment should be allocated to Diligence Allowance, considering the payment situation in the private sector, etc.

## Comprehensive Review of the Remuneration System

1. Headquarters Duty Adjustment Allowance should be raised.

2. The pay step increase which was restrained on January 1, 2015 should be restored targeting mainly the young employees by utilizing the resources generated as a result of the abolition of a transitional measure, etc.
### I. Basic Concepts of the Remuneration Recommendation

## (The Significance and the Role of the Remuneration Recommendation)

The remuneration of national public employees may be changed at any time by the Diet to better suit the general conditions of society. It is NPA’s duty, stipulated in the National Public Service Act, to report at least once a year and recommend such changes as needed.

The NPA Remuneration Recommendation ensures appropriate remuneration for national public employees as a compensatory measure for restrictions placed on basic labor rights. It provides the basis upon which efficient administration is maintained.

Since the public sector is exempt from the deterrent of market mechanism which serves as a restriction to determine remuneration, the most rational standard to determine public-sector remuneration is to maintain accordance with the private sector, where remuneration is concluded by labor-management negotiations, etc. and reflects factors such as economic and employment circumstances.

### (Current Method to Compare the Remuneration of the Private and Public Sectors, etc.)

- It is appropriate to compare the remuneration of the public and private sectors by considering the remuneration-determining factors, such as position, working area, educational background and age. It is inappropriate to compare them by the simple average amount.

• Most private enterprises with 50 or more employees have such positions as department director, division director, and unit chief, which enables the NPA to compare the remuneration in these enterprises with that in the public sector, between persons with the equivalent major remuneration-determining factors. Furthermore, the NPA’s field survey method, which underpins the accuracy of the survey data, is only possible with the manageable number of offices subject to the survey under the existing criteria.
### I I. Remuneration Revision Based on the Remuneration Differential between the Public and Private Sectors

### 1. Remuneration Comparison between the Public and Private Sectors

A field survey was conducted of approximately 530,000 individual remunerations in about 12,400 private offices. (Survey Completion rate: 87.8%)

##

The NPA compared remuneration for April 2017 in both the public and private sectors.

☐ The remuneration differential between the public and private sectors: 631 yen, i.e. 0.15%

The average remuneration of national public employees to whom Salary Schedule for the Administrative Service (I) (hereinafter referred to as “Admin. (I) Schedule”) is applied is 410,719 yen, and their average age is 43.6.

The revision described in 2 will fill the differential by raising the monthly remuneration of public employees by the average of 631 yen, whose breakdown is as follows:

Basic Salary: 456 yen

Headquarters Duty Adjustment Allowance: 119 yen

• Rebound: 56 yen

(The consequential change in allowances which are calculated with fixed rates on basic salary, etc.)

## *"Bonuses" in the public sector refer to End-of-Term Allowance and Diligence Allowance

The NPA compared the payment rate (ratio to monthly remuneration) in the private sector from August 2016 through July 2017 with the annual payment rate in the public sector.

○ Payment rate of bonuses paid in the private sector: 4.42

○ Payment rate of bonuses paid in the public sector: 4.30
### 2. Contents and Concepts of Remuneration Revision

##

## (1) Salary Schedules

#### ① Admin. (I) Schedule (Average revision rate: 0.2%)

The monthly salary amounts at the steps that serve as initial salary step for those recruited by the Comprehensive Service Examination and the General Service Examination (for university graduate level and for high school graduates) should be raised by 1,000 yen considering that there is a differential of initial salary between the public and the private sectors, etc. As for the steps applied to young employees, the monthly salary amounts should be raised by the same amount. For others, the monthly salary amounts should be raised basically by 400 yen.

## ② Other Salary Schedules

Other salary schedules should be revised in balance with the Admin. (I) Schedule. (No revision for the Salary Schedule for Designated Service)

## (2) Headquarters Duty Adjustment Allowance

The amount of the allowance should be raised by 900 yen for those at the Unit Chief level and 600 yen for the Officer level from the viewpoint of promoting the Comprehensive Review of the Remuneration System smoothly.

## (3) Recruitment Incentive Allowance

The amount of the allowance should be raised, considering the revision of the Salary Schedule for Medical Service (I), from the viewpoint of securing appropriate working conditions for medical doctors.

## < Bonuses >

Bonuses should be raised to match the private sector (from 4.30 to 4.40 times as much as the monthly remuneration).

An increment should be allocated to Diligence Allowance for the promotion of remuneration based on performance considering the payment situation in the private sector, etc.
(Revised payment rates for general employees)

Time of payment Fiscal Year	June	December
FY 2017End-of-Term AllowanceDiligence Allowance	1.225 (Paid)0.85 (Paid)	1.375 (No revision)0.95 (Currently 0.85)
FY 2018 onwardEnd-of-Term AllowanceDiligence Allowance	1.2250.90	1.3750.90

[Time of Implementation]

○Revision of Monthly Remuneration: April 1, 2017

Revision of Bonuses: Date of promulgation of the act to realize this recommendation

### I II. Comprehensive Review of the Remuneration System etc

### 1. Comprehensive Review of the Remuneration System

- In order to deal with issues involved in the remuneration of national public employees, the NPA released its plan in the 2014 NPA Remuneration Recommendation for the review of the distribution of remuneration among regions and age groups, and the distribution of remuneration based on one's duty and performance. This comprehensive review of the remuneration system, including the review of the salary schedules and allowances, has been implemented since April 2015, stepwise for 3 years.

The reduced payment measures of salary, etc. by 1.5% for employees over the age of 55 (not lower than the 6th grade of the Admin. (I) Schedule and its equivalent in other salary schedules) should be abolished on March 31, 2018, and the transitional measure for mitigating radical changes as a result of the lowering of the salary schedule levels caused by the review should also be withdrawn on the said date.

- In FY 2018, Headquarters Duty Adjustment Allowance should be raised to the amount equivalent to 6% of the standard monthly salary amount for those at the Unit Chief level, and to 4% for the Officer level.

- The pay step increase which was restrained on January 1, 2015 should be restored targeting mainly the young employees by utilizing the surplus of the
resources generated as a result of the abolition of the transitional measure, etc. The pay step of employees under the age of 37 as of April 1, 2018 should be raised by one step on the said date.

### 2. Others

## (1) Housing Allowance

The NPA will consider necessary reviews on Housing Allowance based on the actual status of employees' rent coverage and payment situation in the private sector, etc., taking into account the trend of the increasing number of employees who receive the allowance.

## (2) Remuneration for Reappointed Employees

The NPA will continue to consider reviews on the remuneration for reappointed employees from the viewpoint of ensuring smooth human resources management in each ministry. In this regard, the NPA will take into consideration the remuneration trend of reappointed employees in the private sector and operational status of the reappointment system in each ministry while paying attention to the consistency with the concrete review toward the raise of the mandatory retirement age.

## (3) Remuneration for Part-time Employees

The NPA revised the guideline on the remuneration of part-time employees in July, 2017 to encourage each ministry to make efforts to provide their part-time employees with remuneration equivalent to the Diligence Allowance, etc. The NPA will guide each ministry to make early improvements of their part-time employees' working conditions in line with the guideline.
# マルティパーティー・ライセンスと競争政策

公正取引委員會

競争政策研究センター

2006 年 12 月
# マルティパーティー・ライセンスと競争政策

【執筆者】

長岡貞男

一橋大学イノベーション研究センター教授

（公正取引委員会競争政策研究センター主任客員研究員）

nagaoka@i.r.hit-u.ac.jp

和久井理子

大阪市立大学大学院法学研究科助教授

wakui @ aw osaka- cu. ac. j p

伊藤隆史

知的財産研究所特別研究員

jfff.ryushi@3.di on.ne.jp

## 【この研究報告書における役割分担と位置付けについて】

1．本報告書は，要約と研究の示唆及び第1章を長岡貞男，第2章を伊藤隆史，第3章を和久井理子が担当し，執筆を行った。

2. 本共同研究をとりまとめるに当たっては,競争政策研究センターの事務局, 公正取引委員会事務総局経済取引局取引部取引企画課, 同課相談指導室, 米国司法省, 連邦取引委員会の方等多くの方々にお世話になった。また, 競争政策研究センターワークショップで報告し, 参加者に議論をいただくとともに, 有益なコメントをいただいた。

3．本稿の内容は筆者たちが所属する組織の見解を表すものではなく，記述中のあり得べき誤りは筆者たちのみの責任に帰する。
## はじめに

知的財産権のライセンスは，その対象技術の利用を拡大し，また研究開発からの利益を高めることから，市場供給を拡大し消費者利益を高める効果があり，こうした点において「競争促進的」である。しかしながら，ライセンス契約においてライセンシー（場合によってはライセンサー）の行動を制限する条項が盛り込まれることによって，全体として（ライセンス契約がされない場合と比較して）市場競争が制限され経済厚生が低下する危険性も存在する。ライセンス契約の中でも，各企業が同一市場においてライセンサーでもあり同時にライセンシーでもあるクロス・ライセンス契約においては，その市場での行動に相互に制約を課すことで競争を制限して企業利潤を高めることが可能になる危険性がある。またライセンスを利用する者が多数である場合にはライセンシー間の外部性が存在することから，ライセンサーがこのような外部性を利用して市場競争を制限するライセンス契約を結ぶことができる可能性もある。本稿では，このようにライセンス契約の制限的条項によって行動が制約される可能性がある企業が複数以上存在する契約をマルティパーティー・ライセンス契約と呼んでいる。

クロス・ライセンス，パテントプールなどマルティパーティー・ライセンス契約は，情報通信分野などにおける累積的な技術革新分野の発展，知的財産権の強化に伴う特許権の増加，侵害訴訟の拡大などによってその重要性が高まっている。また，市場で支配的な企業とその多数の CEM 企業との間のクロス・ライセンス契約あるいは不争契約は，独禁法上の係争事件にもなってきた。

本研究の目的は，クロス・ライセンスの実態分析，経済理論による分析，米国の判例分析，国際比較法の視点からの法理論分析などを踏まえて，マルティパーティー・ライセンスへの競争政策の在り方を探求することである。本報告書は以下の三つの研究成果をとりまとめている。第一は，クロス・ライセンス契約を中心に，日本における実態を分析し，それを踏まえながら，クロス・ライセンスの経済的な役割，また競争政策の在り方について，主として経済学の観点からの研究である。第二は，米国におけるクロス・ライセンス，パテントプール，標準化と競争政策における40の判例を包括的に分析しその教訓を分析している。第三は，これらを踏まえつつ，日米欧における知的財産権のライセンスへの規制の在り方を比較研究し，今後の日本における規制の在り方を研究している。

なお，本研究は，昨年度の公正取引委員会競争政策研究センターの研究(『技術標準と競争政策：コンソーシアム型技術標準に焦点を当てて』)と補完的な関
係にある。まだ研究途上の課題も多く，本報告は中間報告的性格も持っている。法学者と経済学者が協力して，また競争政策担当者の方の鋭い指摘に刺激を受けながら，研究を行ったことも本研究の重要な特徴である。

本研究の遂行に当たっては，個別にお名前を記載しないが公正取引委員会の競争政策研究センターの事務局，取引部取引企画課及び同課相談指導室，米国司法省，連邦取引委員会の方等多くの方にお世話となった。残っているかも知れない誤りは各執筆者の責任であることを明確にしておきたい。鈴村興太郎所長を始めとして競争政策研究センターの研究員各位には貴重なコメントを頂いたことを感謝申し上げたい。

2006 年 10 月

一橋大学 イノベーション研究センター教授 長岡貞男

大阪市立大学 大学院法学研究科助教授 和久井 理子

知的財産研究所 特別研究員 伊藤 隆史
## 目次

要約と研究の示唆.....1
1. クロス・ライセンス契約の経済分析.....10
1.1 はじめに.....10
1.2 ライセンス契約の類型とマルティパーティー・ライセンスの特徴.....10
1.2.1 片務的な単独ライセンス.....10
1.2.2 双務的なライセンス.....12
1.2.3 複数のライセンシー.....12
1.3 クロス・ライセンス契約の特徴.....15
1.3.1 クロス・ライセンス契約の重要性.....15
1.3.2 有価証券報告書による開示情報等に見るクロス・ライセンス契約の特徴.....17
1.3.3 クロス・ライセンス契約の対価.....20
1.3.4 いくつかのケース.....22
1.4 クロス・ライセンスの競争促進効果.....25
1.4.1 補完的な技術の相互利用.....25
1.4.2 ホールドアップ・リスクの回避：包括的なクロス・ライセンスの目的.....26
1.4.3 研究開発への誘因.....27
1.5 クロス・ライセンスにおける競争制限的契約条項及びライセンス対象技術の代替性の競争への影響.....28
1.5.1 モデル.....29
1.5.2 競争制限的契約条項.....30
(1) 代替技術の利用制限.....30
(2) 製品市場の地域・用途制限による市場分割.....30
(3) 製品価格の制限.....31
1.5.3 技術の代替性.....31
(1) 代替技術についての取決めの影響.....31
(2) 地域・用途制限による市場分割及び製品価格の制限の影響.....32
1.5.4 一般的なケースととりまとめ.....32
1.6 クロス・ライセンス契約への競争規律.....34
1.6.1 クロス・ライセンス契約への競争規律.....34
1.6.2 第三者との競争.....34
1.6.3 競争企業間のバイで逐次的なライセンス契約の影響.....35
1.7 独占的な企業によるクロス・ライセンス強制による独占化戦略の可能性についての考察.....36
1.8 結論と含意.....39