Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
#### 7.5. 分析

## (1) DRAM 業界を取り巻く環境

DRAM は単独で顧客に販売されることはない。DRAM は PC やメモリーモジュール，プリンター，サーバーなどの製品に組み込まれて販売される。DRAM だけでは何ら価値を生み出すことはない。価値を生み出すためには，DRAM と同様に PC などの最終財に組み込まれる部品とつながることが必要である。他の製品との互換性というものが重要となる。

こうした強い相互依存性が存在する場合，当該業界のみならず関連する業界を含めた範囲を一つの業界と捉えるべきである。こうした運命共同体的な状況にある場合，DRAM メーカー以外のパソコンメーカーやMPU メーカーなども自社の製品の売上，事業収益にDRAM 製品が与える影響が大きいためDRAM 業界の動向に無関心ではいられなくなる。いくら自社及び自分たちの業界の製品がパフォーマンスを向上させたとしても，関連する業界がそれに見合ったパフォーマンス向上を実現しなくては需要を拡大させることはできないからである。

90 年代の DRAM の需要を牽引したのはパソコンであった。そしてそのパソコン市場は IBM からマイクロソフトとインテルが主導権を奪ってから，事実上ソフトウェアはマイクロソフトが，ハードウェアはインテルが支配していた。アナベル・ギャワー，マイケル・A・クスマノ（2004）らは，インテルのこうしたポジションを「プラットホームリーダー」と呼んでいる。プラットホームリーダーとはアセンブラーから主導権を奪って新しくリーダーシップを発揮し，自社の製品だけでなく，それらと組み合わせることで機能する一連の補完製品にも急ピッチのイノベーションを促す部品メーカーのことである。インテルがパソコンのハードウェア機器全体を支配できた理由には，1) プラットホーム部品（MPU）が最終製品（パソコン）の中心的な機能を果たしており，技術上不可欠であった，2) プラットホーム部品が参入障壁が高いことで恩恵を受けている，3) アセンブラー（パソコンメーカー）によって付加される価値が減少し，その知的所有権に対する支配が脅かされ，リーダーシップが脆弱になる，4) 補完製品（DRAM など）のイノベーションを刺激し，巧みに導いた結果，かつてはアセンブラーによってコントロールされていた最終製品の用途が広がった，などが挙げられる。プラットホームリーダーであるインテルはパソコンのハードウェア機器全体のパフォーマンスを向上させるために，自社製品の進化スピードに遅れないように，補完企業へイノベーションを促した。DRAM メーカーもこのインテルが構築したプラットホームに組み込まれており，急速なイノベーションを要求されていたのである。
図 4. DRAM 業界を取り巻く環境

## (2) インテルの選択

プラットホームリーダーのインテルの選択は Direct RDRAM であった。それは，自身の製品の性能をより引き出すような高速 DRAM に対するニーズと DRAM 業界が当時直面していた互換性の確保という 2 つの問題を Direct RDRAM が解決するとの考えから行われた。

## 1 ）高速 DRAM に対するニーズ

MPU メーカーのインテルにとっては互換チップメーカーを振り切るために，MPU の性能を上げる必要があり，DRAM のバンド幅（データ転送速度）に関心があった。更に，現行の SDRAM では 100MHz を超える動作周波数では使用が困難になっていたため，より高速な次世代 DRAM を検討していた（にもかかわらず，DRAM メーカーは価格を下げること，集積度を上げることに注力していた。）。候補となったのは，EDO DRAM，SDRAM，DDR SDRAM，SLDRAM，Direct RDRAM の 5 つの仕様であった。

ポスト SDRAM を争う 3 つの規格，DDR SDRAM，SLDRAM，Direct RDRAM は，データ転送速度についていえば，インテルの基準である 1.6G バイト/秒をいずれも満たしていた。しかし，インテルはデータ転送速度に加えて互換性 $ ^{106} $ という面も考慮して Direct RDRAM を採用したのである。

## 2 ）互換性問題の解決

EDO DRAM のあたりから異なるメーカーの DRAM を利用すると正常に作動しないという問題が生じてきた。パソコンなどで複数のメーカーの DRAM を使用すると正常に動作しないという問題が起きてきた。そしてそれは SDRAM になるとそうした問題が更に多くなり，本来沢用品であり完全な代替が可能である DRAM が互換性を失ってきていた。この DRAM がメーカー間の互換性を失いつつある原因は DRAM の高速化であった。

DRAM の互換性を確保できない要因は，1）タイミング・マージンの減少，2）
波形のゆがみ，3）規定以外の命令で誤作動，の三つである $ ^{107} $ 。

## ・ タイミング・マージン

DRAM の高速化が進み，DRAM を載せるボードの配線設計が難しくなってきていた。これまでであれば，各社の DRAM の仕様に多少のバラツキがあっても，ボード上のマージンがこれを吸収していた。しかし，高速化が進むにつれボード上のマージンが減少してきていた。高速になるほど短い周期内で所定の動作を終了させる必要があるためである。このマージンが少ないと，バラツキの一部がマージンの範囲を超えてしまい，DRAM の動作不良につながることになる。

## • 波形のゆがみ

DRAM 周辺の配線や DRAM の出力回路やパッケージのリードフレームの違いにより反射雑音が生じる。その反射雑音が波形をゆがませていた。

## 規定以外の命令で誤作動

この問題は SDRAM 特有の問題であった。

これらの問題，特にタイミング・マージンと波形のゆがみの問題，の解決策の一つとしてインターフェースの変更が考えられた。タイミング・マージンの問題を解決する他の案には，各社のDRAMの仕様を完全に統一することなども考えられるが，プロセス技術やセル構造が異なるため実際には無理があった。そこでインターフェースを変更することでDRAMの互換性を確保しようとして考えられたのがDirect RDRAMである。Direct RDRAMはタイミング・マージンの問題を原理的に解決することができた。また仕様が細かく規定されており，ボード設計のガイドラインもあったため，反射雑音を抑えることができ，波形のゆがみの問題を解決することが出来たのである。

プラットホームリーダーのインテルとしては，DRAMの互換性がなくなることで自分が属する業界及び関連業界を含めた“運命共同体”が縮小していくことは是が非でも避けなくてはならなかった。JEDECが策定する規格は仕様が厳密でないことや利害関係の異なるDRAMメーカー同士でそれぞれ独自のプロセス技術やセル構造を統一することは難しく，また実現するにしても時間のかかることであると考えられた。したがって，DRAMの問題であるからといって，DRAM業界に任せておくことは出来ず，イニシアチイブを取ったのである。

## (3) DRAM メーカーの反応

DRAM メーカーが規格，技術選択の際，過去の蓄積した技術，資産を活用できるかという点が大きな影響を及ぼす。DRAM の規格の多くは世代交代していく。実際にポスト SDRAM を争った規格の DDR SDRAM は SDRAM の延長線上の規格であり，Direct RDRAM も RDRAM の第三世代の規格であった。その前世代の規格の生産量が多ければ，デバイス・プロセス技術などに関する技術蓄積があり，低コストで製造可能であると推測できる。複数の候補となる規格が存在する場合，自分にとってなじみのある規格の方が好ましい。なじみのある規格が採用されれば，既に蓄積して
いるデバイス，プロセス技術を流用でき，早く市場投入できるからである。DRAMのように限られた時間内で確実にモノを仕上げていくことが重要視される製品開発においては，しばしばこうした保守的な技術選択が大きな意味を持つことがある（米山 1993，米山 1998）。製品の機能向上が達成されたとしても，それは製品として確実に量産されなければ意味を持たない。数多くのプロセスを経て製造されるDRAMのような製品ではこれまでとは大きく異なる方法で製造することは，リスクが高い選択である。したがって，なるべく不確実な部分を減らしたいと考え，同じパフォーマンスを実現できるのであれば，メーカーとしては確実に製造できる見込みのある規格を採用することは充分に予想される。確実に製造できる規格で早く開発・製造を行い，価格を下げて需要を喚起するという方向に考えるのが自然である。また生産コストという側面からも保守的な選択をすることが予想される。巨额な設備投資を必要とするDRAM業界であるから，なるべく設備投資額を抑制したいメーカーは，既存の設備を使用できるのであれば，それを最大限使用したいと考える。

したがって，どの規格を選定するかという段階におけるDRAMメーカーの意思決定には製造面も大きな影響を与えていると推測できる。こうした観点で観ると，DDR SDRAMはEDO，SDRAMなどこれまでのスタンダードの延長線上にあり，それらに改良を加えた規格であり，製造可能性が高くかつ低コストであったのに対し，Direct RDRAMは全くアーキテクチャーが異なり，不確実な部分が多かった。そのため，同等のパフォーマンスを得られるのであれば，あえてリスクを冒さずになじみのあるDDR SDRAMが好ましいと考えるのが自然である。更に，Direct RDRAMの場合は，ラムバスへのロイヤルティなどもあり，そうした点がDRAMメーカーに受け入れられにくかったのではないかと考えられる。

DRAM 業界に大きな影響力を持つインテルのサポートによって一旦は Direct RDRAM はデファクトスタンダードの座を獲得したかに思われたが，保守的な技術選択をする傾向を持ち，買い手からの価格プレッシャーを受けている DRAM メーカーには最終的には受け入れらず，ポスト SDRAM の次のスタンダードは SDRAM の延長線上の規格である DDR SDRAM が獲得することになったのである。

## <参考文献>

## · 日本語文献

アナベル・ギャワー，マイケル・A・クスマノ（2004）「プラットホームリーダーシップに必要とされるものは何か」一橋ビジネスレビュー52巻1号

柴田高(1992)「ハードウェアとソフトウェアの事業統合と戦略形成」『組織科学』Vol.26

直野典彦(1996)「転換期の半導体・液晶産業」日経 BP 出版センター

森谷正規編（2003）「高度部品産業（半導体産業）」『日本の産業システム④ 機械産業の新展開』NTT 出版

米山茂美（1993）「競争的並列主義」西南学院大学商学論集 第 39 巻 第 3・4 合併号

米山茂美（1998）「製品開発における技術戦略 東芝と三菱電機の1M・DRAM開発」「ケースブック 日本企業の経営行動2 企業家精神と戦略』有斐閣

日経マイクロデバイス 日経 BP 出版センター

日経エレクトロニクス 日経 BP 出版センター
## · 外国語文献

Grindley, P.C., D.J. Teece (1997) "Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and Cross-licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics" California Management Review, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 8-41
### V III. Guidelines for Implementation of the ANSI Patent Policy: An Aid to More Efficient and Effective Standards Development In Fields That May Involve Patented Technology

Copyright $ \copyright $ 1997 by American National Standards Institute

All rights reserved.

Updated March 2003 to reflect the replacement of the ANSI Procedures with the ANSI Essential Requirements

Printed in the United States of America

## About the

## American National Standards Institute

ANSI is a nonprofit, privately funded membership organization that coordinates the development of U.S. voluntary national standards and is the U.S. member body to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and, via the United States National Committee (USNC), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).

The Institute was founded in 1918, prompted by the need for an “umbrella” organization to coordinate the activities of the U.S. voluntary standards system and eliminate conflict and duplication in the development process. For over seventy years, this system has been successfully administered by the private sector, via ANSI, with the cooperation of federal, state and local governments. The Institute serves a diverse membership of over 1300 companies, 250 professional, technical, trade, labor and consumer organizations and some 30 government agencies. Standards exist in all industries, including safety and health, telecommunications, information processing, petroleum, medical devices, etc.

Some of the Institute’s key functions include:

- Coordinating the self-regulating, due process consensus based U.S. voluntary standards system;

- Administering the development of standards and approving them as American National Standards;

- Providing the means for the U.S. to influence development of international and regional standards;

- Promoting awareness of the growing strategic significance of standards technology to U.S. global competitiveness.

## 1 Purpose

These Guidelines are intended to assist voluntary standards developers, and those that participate in the standards development process, in understanding and implementing the ANSI Patent Policy (the "Patent Policy", see Exhibit A). Drafted by a task force formed by ANSI for the
purpose of studying the Patent Policy, the Guidelines seek to encourage the early disclosure and identification of patents that may relate to standards under development, so as to thereby promote greater efficiency in standards development practices.

By definition, guidelines are suggestions -- adherence is not essential for standards developers to be found in compliance with ANSI's Patent Policy. Rather, this is an effort to identify possible procedures that a standards developer may wish to adopt, either in whole or in part, for purposes of effectively implementing the Patent Policy. Additional or different steps may also be selected for such purposes.

## 2 An Overview of the ANSI Patent Policy

The Patent Policy is set forth in Section 3.1 of ANSI’s “Essential Requirements: Due process requirements for American National Standards” as approved by the ANSI Board of Directors (the “ANSI Essential Requirements”). Compliance (or non-compliance) with the Patent Policy is one of the criteria to be considered by ANSI’s Board of Standards Review (“BSR”) in determining whether to approve (or withdraw approval of) an American National Standards. See ANSI Essential Requirements, Section 4.2.

## As set forth in the ANSI Procedures:

There is no objection in principle to drafting a proposed American National Standard in terms that include the use of a patented item, if it is considered that technical reasons justify this approach. ANSI Essential Requirements, Section 3.1.

However, where a candidate standard may require the use of a patented invention, the procedures detailed in Sections 3.1 – 3.4 must be followed.

In particular, the identified party or patent holder must supply ANSI with either:

a general disclaimer to the effect that such party does not hold and does not anticipate holding any invention the use of which would be required for compliance with the
proposed standard

a written assurance that either:

(1) a license will be made available without compensation to applicants desiring to utilize the license for the purpose of implementing the standard,

(2) a license will be made available to applicants under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination.

ANSI Essential Requirements, Section 3.1.1.

The Patent Holder’s statement of intent to comply shall be retained in the files of the Institute. ANSI Essential Requirements, Section 3.1.2.

While ANSI’s counsel will verify that the information required from the patent holder has been supplied, counsel will not undertake to evaluate whether the terms and conditions satisfy the substantive test set forth in Section 3.1 (i.e. whether the terms and conditions are “reasonable” and/or “free of any unfair discrimination”). Such a decision is the exclusive province of the Board of Standards Review (or, on appeal, the ANSI Appeals Board) if the issue is raised during the approval process or in a petition for withdrawal of approval. In making its decision, the BSR shall consider all information of record it finds relevant.

Neither the standards developer submitting a standard for approval nor ANSI is responsible for identifying patents for which a license may be required by an American National Standard or for conducting inquiries into the legal validity or scope of any patents brought to their attention. (ANSI Essential Requirements, Section 3.1.4.)

A standards developer seeking approval of a proposed American National Standard should take steps that it reasonably concludes are sufficient to permit a representation to ANSI that the
Patent Policy has been met. In turn, ANSI, through its BSR, will take those steps that it reasonably concludes are sufficient to determine that the Patent Policy has been met based on the record before the BSR. Upon publication, the standard shall bear a notice in form specified in Section 3.1.3.

## 3 Possible Procedures for Implementing the Policy

## A Early Disclosure of Patent Rights

Experience has indicated that early disclosure of patents is likely to enhance the efficiency of the process used to finalize and approve standards. Early disclosure permits notice of the patent to the standards developer and ANSI in a timely manner, provides participants the greatest opportunity to evaluate the propriety of standardizing the patented technology, and allows patent holders and prospective licensees ample time to negotiate the terms and conditions of licenses outside the standards development process itself.

Accordingly, during the development period, standards developers may wish to adopt procedures whereby one or more requests are made to participants for the disclosure of patents that may be required for use of standards in process. Such a request could be made, for example, by including it on letter ballots used in connection with the development of a proposed standard. Alternatively, other means could be adopted so that requests are repeated throughout the course of the standards development process -- e.g., by a semi-annual notice mailed to each participant in the development process or appropriate working group(s).

This is not to suggest that a standards developer should require any participant in the development process to undertake a patent search of its own portfolio or of any other. The objective is to obtain early disclosure concerning the existence of patents, where known.

A standard developer may also consider taking steps to make it clear that any participant in the process -- not just patent holder -- is permitted to identify or disclose patents that may be required for implementation of the standard. Generally, it is desirable to encourage disclosure of as much information as possible concerning the patent, including the identity of the patent holder, the
patent's number, and information regarding precisely how it may relate to the standard being developed. Further, to assist in international standardization, a standards developer may deem it appropriate to encourage the disclosure of relevant unexpired foreign patents.

Similarly, a standards developer may wish to encourage participants to disclose the existence of pending U.S. patent applications relating to a standard under development. Of course, in such a situation the extent of any disclosure may be more circumscribed due to the possible need for confidentiality and uncertainty as to whether an application will mature into a patent and what its claimed scope will ultimately be.

## B Early Indication of a Willingness to License

The early identification of relevant patents should also increase the likelihood of an early indication from the patent holder that it is willing to license its invention, that it is prepared to do so on reasonable terms and conditions demonstrably free of unfair discrimination, or that the patent in question is not required for compliance with the proposed standard. A patent holder may have a strong incentive to provide an early assurance that the terms and conditions of the license will be reasonable and demonstrably free of unfair discrimination because of its inherent interest in avoiding any objection to the standardization of its proprietary technology. As a consequence, patent holders and prospective licensees would be provided greater opportunities to negotiate acceptable license terms.

It should be reiterated, however, that the determination of specific license terms and conditions, and the evaluation of whether such license terms and conditions are reasonable and demonstrably free of unfair discrimination, are not matters that are properly the subject of discussion or debate at a development meeting. Such matters should be determined only by the prospective parties to each license or, if necessary, by an appeal challenging whether compliance with the Patent Policy has been achieved.

It should also be emphasized that, notwithstanding the incentive for patent holders to indicate any early willingness to license, it may not be possible for potential patent holders to give such an
assurance until the standards development process has reached a relatively mature stage. It might be that only at that time will the patent holder be aware that its patent may be required for use of the proposed standard. This should not, however, preclude a patent holder from giving an assurance that if its patent is required for use of the standard it will license on reasonable terms and conditions demonstrably free of unfair discrimination.

Thus, standards developers may wish to adopt procedures that would permit and encourage the early indication by patent holders of their willingness to comply with the Patent Policy by providing one of the assurances specified therein. Such encouragement might take the form of simply advising participants in the development effort that assurances may be made at an early stage, explaining the advantages of early negotiations, or through other means. While participants in the standards development effort might consider a refusal to provide assurances (or a refusal to commit to offer acceptable licensing terms and conditions) as a ground for favoring an alternative technology, the patent holder is only required to provide assurances called for by the Patent Policy prior to the final approval of the proposed standard as an American National Standard.

## C Subsequently Discovered Patents

The Patent Policy applies with equal force to situations involving (1) the discovery of patents that may be required for use of a standard subsequent to its adoption and (2) the initial issuance of a patent after adoption. Once disclosure is made, the holder is obligated to provide the same assurances to ANSI as are required in situations where patents exist or are known prior to approval of a proposed standard as an American National Standard.

Thus, if notice is given of a patent that may be required for use of an already approved American National Standard, a standard developer may wish to make it clear to its participants that the ANSI procedures require the patent holder to provide the assurances contained in the Patent Policy or suffer the withdrawal of ANSI’s approval of the standard as an American National Standard.
## 4 Conclusion

Good standards development is often time consuming and demands considerable effort by those participating in the process. In fields that may involve the use of patented technology in a standard, therefore, it is particularly important that a patent holder's willingness and intention to comply with ANSI's Patent Policy be ascertained as soon as possible. Doing so, however, does not require participants in standards development meetings to be come involved in negotiating the terms and conditions of a possible license with the patent holder. To the contrary, what is required is the use of effective procedures designed to assure an understanding of the Patent Policy and to foster prompt compliance with it.

## Exhibit A

ANSI Essential Requirements, Section 3.1

ANSI's Patent Policy

### 3.1 ANSI patent policy - Inclusion of Patents in American National Standards

There is no objection in principle to drafting a proposed American National Standard in terms that include the use of a patented item, if it is considered that technical reasons justify this approach.

If the Institute receives a notice that a proposed American National Standard may require the use of a patented invention, the procedures in this clause shall be followed.

#### 3.1.1 Statement from patent holder

Prior to approval of such a proposed American National Standard, the Institute shall receive from the identified party or patent holder (in a form approved by the Institute) either: assurance in the form of a general disclaimer to the effect that such party does not hold and does not currently intend holding any invention the use of which would be required for compliance with the proposed American National Standard or assurance that:

a) a license will be made available without compensation to the applicants desiring to utilize the license for the purpose of implementing the standard; or

b) a license will be made available to applicants under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination.
#### 3.1.2 Record of statement

A record of the patent holder’s statement shall be placed and retained in the files of the Institute.

#### 3.1.3 Notice

When the Institute receives from a patent holder the assurance set forth in a) or b) above, the standard shall include a note as follows:

NOTE – The user’s attention is called to the possibility that compliance with this standard may require use of an invention covered by patent rights.

By publication of this standard, no position is taken with respect to the validity of this claim or of any patent rights in connection therewith. The patent holder has, however, filed a statement of willingness to grant a license under these rights on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions to applicants desiring to obtain such a license. Details may be obtained from the standards developer.

#### 3.1.4 Responsibility for identifying patents

The Institute shall not be responsible for identifying all patents for which a license may be required by an American National Standard or for conducting inquiries into the legal validity or scope of those patents that are brought to its attention.
IX. CEN/CENELEC Guide 8: Standardization and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Edition 1 / December 2001 $ ^{*} $

The CEN Administrative Board decided to replace CEN/CENELEC Memoranda by CEN/CENELEC Guides with the corresponding document number (resolution CEN/CA 18/2001). As a result, CEN/CENELEC Memorandum 8 was converted into CEN/CENELEC Guide 8. No change was made to the text of the original document (1992/03).

The CENELEC General Assembly agreed by correspondence to convert the CEN/CENELEC Memoranda listed in the CENELEC Catalogue into CEN/CENELEC Guides with the corresponding document number.

As a result, CEN/CENELEC Memorandum 8 was converted into CEN/CENELEC Guide 8. No change was made to the text of the original document (1992/03).

NOTE: This CEN/CENELEC Memorandum (now Guide) was initially approved:

- for CEN, by its Administrative Board, on 10-11 December 1991;

- for CENELEC, by its General Assembly, on 29-30 October 1991.

In both cases, the policy was approved for interim use, pending the outcome of further discussions between CEN, CENELEC and ETSI.

'Rules for Mariners caught on a lee shore: Rule 1. Don't get caught on a lee shore!' ...English Seamen's Manual, 18th century

### 0. Introduction

The purpose of this Memorandum is to define an interim policy in relation to the difficult question of the relationship between standardization and intellectual property rights (IPR). The policy is firmly based on the rules developed at international level by ISO and IEC (see Directives; Part 2: 1989) and this Memorandum sets out a more systematic procedure for the implementation of the policy at European level.

It is proposed to establish a new IPR Task Force, comprising one officer (e.g. a Vice-President) and one member of staff from each of the three European standards organizations (CEN, CENELEC and ETSI), supported by a single IPR expert acting in an advisory capacity. It is proposed that this IPR Task Force should act as a forum for the exchange of information about the practical implementation of the policy and as a custodian of the 'case-law' relating to standardization and IPR. This proposal is made on the clear understanding that it is for each of the three organizations to solve its own problems concerning IPR, but that the Task Force will be informed of those solutions.