Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
significant (downward) changes in cost structure of airlines, the shuttle prices would be adjusted. Third, the explicit price fixing that would involve communication among the airline companies in the Tokyo-Osaka segment would not lead to tacit collusion in other markets.

On the first point, it was thought that train fares of sinkansen would not be affected by developments in the airline industry at all. If any, fares of the fastest trains were decreasing. However, in October 2003, shinkansen train fares were essentially raised by making expensive fastest train services more frequent. One may wonder whether the shinkansen fare hike was possible if airlines were fiercely competing. An answer to the counterfactual question may not be completely obvious. Second, changes in shuttle airfares have not occurred yet. Third, tacit collusion because of friendly relationship in the particular segment is a worry, and this should be monitored carefully in the future.

In sum, the shuttle service seems to have increased benefits of consumers who travel between Tokyo and Osaka, at least in the short run, by shortening waiting time at airports. However, it is a challenge for a regulatory authority how to define and monitor contestability from another means of transportation.

#### 2.2. Merger of JAL and JAS and Affiliation of ANA and Air Do

In the Japanese airline industry, three companies, JAL, ANA, and JAS, had been the Big Three companies. In the international markets, JAL has been dominant, and ANA is new to the market (it was allowed to enter international routes late 1980s). JAS had only a few, short-distance destinations. In the domestic market, ANA has been the largest
company. JAL was competing with ANA in major routes, but many routes were served by ANA only. JAS was a distant third. See Figure 1 for domestic market shares of ANA, JAL, JAS, and others in 2002, before the merger of JAL and JAS.

Insert Figure 1 about here

In 2002, JAL and JAS announced a plan to merge. This would not change a picture in the international markets, but create a network of domestic services that would rival ANA. The competitive situation in domestic market would significantly change.

In March 15, 2002, the FTCJ publicly published a concern over the planned merger of JAL and JAS. $ ^{4} $ In the published concern, the FTCJ raised several points.

(1) The number of major companies will decline from 3 to 2. This makes it easier for them to practice collusive pricing behavior.

(2) The ratio of special discount flights is less and the discount percentage of special discount flights is lower in the routes where the number of competing flights is smaller. Therefore, the reduction in the number of competing companies may reduce competitive pressure.

(3) Due to congested airports and restrictions on landing rights and check-in counter space, new entries are extremely difficult. Therefore, pressure from new entries cannot be counted on.

(4) As a result, consumers will suffer.
The data analysis to back up these concerns, especially point (2) above, is compelling. The relationship between competitive pressure (reverse of the number of competing airlines) and pricing is shown convincingly. In other words, contestability from potential entries is not necessarily working. The ratio of all of the flights in the routes being offering special discount fares is 48.3% for the routes with monopoly; 56.8% for the routes with duopoly; and 73.1% in routes with three companies competing. The average ratio of special discounts was 15% for monopoly routes, 18.9% for duopoly routes, and 26.0% in three-company routes; and 38.7% in four-company routes. This is quite an interesting result.

The restrictions on new entries, point (3), are serious from those who hope that contestability would be an answer to the problem of oligopoly that is inevitable for network industries such as the airline industry. Reading these points, one might thought that the approval of the merger as planned would not be easily obtainable.

However, JAL and JAS offered a modified proposal on April 26 with the following counter-measures, and those measures were regarded satisfactory by FTCJ.

(1) Normal airfares will be reduced by 10%. The airfare would not be raised in at least three years unless business environment changes drastically.

(2) Special discounts will be offered in all routes that are competing with another major airline, or new monopoly routes due to the merger of JAL and JAS. The degree of discounts would not change.

(3) The JAL-JAS will make efforts to enter ANA-only routes or increase the number of flights in routes dominated by ANA.
(4) 9 slots (landing rights) at the Haneda airport will be given up. Moreover, if new entrants are planned, additional 3 slots will be given up. The latter measure is until 2005 when overall slots will be reviewed.

(5) When new entrants are planned, JAL-JAS will make efforts to accommodate in airport facilities and maintenance of airplanes.

Of these measures, (1)-(3), corresponds to the FTCJ concerns on competitive pressure due to the number of competing companies. Even if the number of companies declines from 3 to 2, the market results (pricing) would not deteriorate, but improve (lower airfares). Counter measures (4)-(5) are an answer to the concern on physical restrictions on entry. The JAL-JAS will cooperate in efforts to encourage entry.

At this point, the promise of lowering airfares sounded significant in rebutting a criticism that a merger would lead to higher prices. But, it was then not known that airfare would be hiked only a year later. This will be explained in the next section.

It was argued that reverting back 9 slots (possible 3 more) is good enough to encourage new entries. In the case of US mergers, it was often frequent that some routes were required to be spun off. If contestability is taken seriously, then a regulatory policy on allocating and re-allocating landing slots should be developed.

In the end, the merger was approved on the condition of counter measures proposed by JAL and JAS. The names of the two airline companies remain as they were under the common stock holding company, but the routes were rearranged so that they divide the
market, and pricing and frequent flier programs were consolidated as of April 2003.

One of the new entries to the market was Air Do (ADO) in the route between Tokyo and Sapporo. It failed twice and on the brink of stopping services. It was rehabilitated with an affiliation with ANA: ANA put code-sharing flight number on ADO flights, help ADO in maintenance, and purchase a certain number of seats on ADO flights. (This will be explained in detail in Section 2.4 below.)

As a result of a merger by JAL and JAS, and code sharing (affiliation) of Air Do with ANA effectively reduced the number of competing airlines from 4 to 2. After the consolidation, JAL offered 21 round trips, and ANA (with ADO) offered 24 round trips a day as of April 2003. With these dense schedules by the two giants, it would be very difficult for any potential entrant to break in this market. Since 1972, the Tokyo-Sapporo routes were served by three or more companies. The duopoly situation with deregulated environment is quite new, and it should be monitored carefully. Figure 2 shows the market share of the Tokyo-Sapporo route before the JA L-JAS merger and ANA-ADO affiliation.

## I nsert Figure 2 about here

In sum, the process of merger approval poses a few questions. First, it is not logically clear whether FTCJ is truly satisfied with the counter proposal in dispelling concerns that FTCJ itself raised earlier. Second, it is a concern that JAL-JAS offer to give up 9 landing slots to new entrants at the Haneda airport are enough to keep contestability.
#### 2.3. Increases in Normal Airfares

The Ministry announced in January 2003 that it would raise the landing charges of airports starting April 2003. In response, JAL and ANA announced a plan to increase airfare that would shift the incidence of landing fees to passengers, effective in April. However, Minister Ougi, in charge of transportation, announced that she would oppose the airfare increase based on an increase in landing fees, stating that the cost increase should be absorbed by efforts in management. (Reported in Nihon Keizai Shinbun, January 20, 2003.) In response, JAL and ANA announced that they defer the date of airfare increase by two months. Basically, the Ministry denied JAL and ANA from raising airfares due to cost increases.

Then, in late March, JAL and ANA switched a strategy. They argued that the business environment had changed due to the higher jet fuel prices as a side effect of the Iraqi war, and fare increases were planned for June 2003. However, this argument was rejected by the FTCJ. The FTCJ argued that it would be premature to judge that the business environment had changed due to the Iraqi war. The fuel price increase might not last long. Recall that JAL had promised that it would not increase the airfare unless the business environment changes drastically. In the end, the March plan for fare increases was scrapped.

Finally, in April, JAL and ANA applied for fare increases on the basis of deterioration of the business environment due to SARS. (See JAL press release on April 28, and ANA
press release on April 30. $ ^{5} $ ) Then, this was approved. In the end, the airline companies got airfare increases (or re-winding of the airfare decreases, a condition for the JAL-JAS merger).

This episode poses three questions. First, would a similar amount of pressure for airfare increases have been possible had the JAL and JAS merger not taken place a year earlier? Second, was the reason (justification) for the airfare increase correct? Third, who and on what basis should the airfare increase be regulated?

First, one critical view is that, now that there are only two major airlines, an implicit collusion can be easier for them and the episode shows that it is a real threat. An opposing view is that what was raised is normal airfare, and most of the competition occurs at the discount airfare, so the availability and degree of discounts depends on competitive pressure, which comes from contestability (threat of new entry). An important part of regulation is to assure new entries. Second, the exchanges of the plan and rejection/approval between airline companies and the regulatory agencies (the Ministry and FTCJ) in the spring of 2003 shows inconsistencies in regulatory reasoning. If airlines plan to raise airfares for the justifiable reasons of cost increases that are rising for external reasons, such as landing fees and jet fuel price increases, then the plan of fare increase has an economic merit. This can be seen as in the simple demand-supply graph, like Figure 3, where the upward shift of the supply curve, reflecting an increase in marginal costs, should result in the fare increase in the case of perfect competition. The airline industry is not under perfect competition, but an analogy holds.
## I nsert Figure 3 about here

On the other hand, if airlines apply for airfare increases on the ground that demands are lower, such as effects of SARS, then the application should be rejected. The lower demand in the market should lower the price, not raise the price. The situation is depicted in Figure 4.

## I nsert Figure 4 about here

A shift of cost (supply curve) upward should raise the price, while a shift in demand curve (to left) should lower the price, in the competitive market. For this reason, the rejection of the first fare increase by the Ministry and FTCJ was wrong, and the acceptance of the second fare increase by the Ministry and FTCJ was also wrong. But, at the end, the airlines got fare increases that could be justified by the first reasoning. Would two wrong answers make one right?

Third, it should be clarified whether what kind of fare increases are subject to approval of the Ministry, and what kind by the FTCJ. It should be clear that the FTCJ should supervise the overall competitive environment, and any airfare matters related to competition should fall on the FTCJ’s supervision.

#### 2.4 . Entries of New Airlines

As the deregulation proceeded, Air Do entered the market of Tokyo-Sapporo route in
1998. The market was already crowded with three major airlines and frequent services. Air Do offer discount airfares but only two round trip flights. JAL, ANA and JAS countered the challenge of the new entry by lowering their airfares of the flights that are close in departure time to Air Do flights. This was close to predatory pricing. The FTCJ then did not act. Although Air Do did well in the first several months, their load factor deteriorated after 1999. Air Do never made profits and failed in 2002. Old stock holders including the Hokkaido government took losses, and new Air Do is operating in affiliation with ANA. (ANA buys a certain portion of seats on Air Do flights, and puts a code share flight number. Pricing of seats are done independently.)

Another new entry was made by the Skymark Airlines in 1998, for the Tokyo-Fukuoka route. The third new entry was planned in 2002 by Skynet Asia Airways (SNA) for the routes between Tokyo-Miyazaki. For the Tokyo-Miyazaki route, SNA set the normal airfare 21,000 yen, and two-coupon discount at 18,500 yen, when the majors had set normal airfares at 31,000 yen, and a discount airfare at 23,500 yen.

However, JAL, JAS, and ANA lowered airfares for the routes of Tokyo-Miyazaki, Tokyo-Fukuoka, and Tokyo-Kagoshima. For Miyazaki, the majors planned to lower normal airfare to 27,900 yen, and special discount at 22,000, and further reduction in November at 18,500 yen (matching the SNA flights). Moreover, the majors planned special bonus miles for their frequent flier (mileage) programs. Similar airfare reduction was planned for Tokyo-Fukuoka, and Tokyo-Kagoshima.

In response, the FTCJ warned the majors about the possibility that the pricing may
violate prohibition of monopoly (Anti-Trust Law, article 3). The warning was issued on September 26, 2002. The warning had an immediate impact. The three majors decided to increase special discount airfares from December.

The logic of the FTCJ warning, as explained in the FTCJ documents dated September 30, is as follows: A deeper discount by the majors was targeted only in the three routes that compete with new entries. Discount percentages are much higher for these three routes, as documented by the FTCJ. Moreover, bonus mileages are applicable only for the Tokyo-Miyazaki segment. These actions were regarded as unfair trading practices, similar to predatory pricing, on new entries.

I summarize two views on this episode.

One view is that the FTCJ’s action is over-regulation that deprive consumers from benefits of low-cost travel, fruits of competition, because special discount airfares (by the majors) were raised as a result of FTCJ warning. Applying a brake on lowering prices is misguided. Competition policy should promote competition, not restricting competition (that is, lowering prices by existing firms). New entries should not be treated any differently from existing companies. A typical predatory pricing would have a scenario in that low prices by a major company (incumbent) would drive out a minor company (new entry), and then prices would be raised after the exit of the minor company.

Another view based on the importance of contestability would support FTCJ’s decision.
For successful implementation of competition policy, it is important to make sure that pressure from potential new entry is applicable. In order to maintain pressure from potential entry, it is important that actual new entries would not be subject to unfair competition. The airline industry is inherently oligopolistic (since scale economies and network values are important), and it takes time for a new entry to develop a network. Targeting a new entry by reducing special discount airfare is indeed unfair, and would reduce the degree of contestability in the future. Maintaining contestability, sacrificing short-term lower prices, will lead to lower prices in the long run. However, this kind of restrictions on pricing behavior of existing airline companies should be temporary (say, two years). A similar restriction on existing airline company was established in Germany (Lufthansa vs. a new entry).

In summary, the tradeoff is whether to offer low prices now for consumers or to preserve contestability for the future. My view is that to put weight on the latter is prudent in the industry with large oligopoly firms. In this sense, the FTCJ has evolved in a desired direction from no action in 1998 to active involvement in 2002.

### 3. Challenges for the Future

The four episodes in the preceding section pose difficult choices in competition policy regarding the airline industry in Japan. Keeping competitive pressure, while allowing companies to pursue scale economies (network externality) is a well-known challenge. Different views, and my personal view, on actions by the Ministry and the FTCJ on each of the four cases are presented. Now that there are only two major airlines, it is most important to maintain competitive pressure through potential entry. Giving a new
entrant a preferential access to the common facility, such as facilities in the terminal building and landing slots, for some limited time (say, several years), may encourage the entries, and maintain competition. $ ^{6} $

In order to maintain competitive market practices, the FTCJ should play a greater role in monitoring pricing behavior and other business promotions and practices. Giving freedom to airline companies in developing new services and products is important, but that should not unfairly drive out competitors from the market. Whether the normal fares, essentially the ceiling of variety of airfares, can be increased can be judged in relation to competition policy, so that it falls on the role of the FTCJ. The Ministry's role is more basic, such as the safety, the international treaties, and the air traffic control system.

In the future, Japan will be more integrated in the Asian region. When the free trade agreements develop in Asia, regional competition may spill over into domestic markets, just like in the EU. Taking a model of EU, a subsidiary of a foreign carrier may be allowed to serve domestic routes. That would be an ultimate solution for maintaining contestability in the airline industries.
## References

Ito, Takatoshi (1992). Shohisha Jushi no Keizaigaku (trans. “Consumer-oriented Economics”), Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbun sha.

Ito, Takatoshi and Hirotaka Yamauchi, (1996). “Air Transport Policy in Japan,” in G. Huffbauer and C. Findlay (eds) Flying High, Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1996: 33 - 61.
Figure 1

Domestic Passenger Share by Airline groups 2002
Figure 2

Tokyo-Sapporo Routes before J AL/J AS merger and ANA-ADO affiliation
Figure 3: Cost Increase (landing fees) => Price goes up

P

Q
Figure 4: Demand Decrease (SARS) => price goes down

P

Q
## 利用者のために

## 1 調査の目的

畜産統計調査（以下「調査」という。）は、主要家畜（乳用牛、肉用牛、豚、採卵鶏及びブロイラー）に関する規模別・経営タイプ別飼養戸数及び飼養頭（羽）数等を把握し、我が国の畜産の現況を明らかにするとともに、畜産行政の推進に資する資料を整備することを目的とする。

## 2 調査の根拠

調査は、統計法（平成19年法律第53号）第19条第1項の規定に基づく総務大臣の承認を受けて実施した一般統計調査である。

## 3 調查機構

調査は、農林水産省大臣官房統計部及び地方組織を通じて実施した。

## 4 調査の体系

平成27年は2015年農林業センサス実施年のため、豚調査、採卵鶏調査及びブロイラー調査は休止した。

注：ブロイラー調査については、平成25年2月1日現在調査より調査を開始した。

## 5 調査の対象

全国の乳用牛飼養者（おすのみを飼養している場合を除く。）、肉用牛飼養者を対象とした。

なお、飼養者が複数の畜種を飼養している場合は、それぞれの畜種別に調査の対象とした。

また、複数の飼養地（畜舎）を持ち、個々に要員を配置して飼養を行う企業体のような場合、それぞれの飼養地（畜舎）を1飼養者とした。

ここでいう飼養者とは、家畜を飼養する全ての者（個人又は法人）のことであり、学校、試験場等の非営利的な飼養者を含む。
## 6 調査対象者の選定

## (1) 調査対象者

飼養者をその性格により一般階層（営利）と特殊階層（非営利）に区分し、一般階層では標本調査、特殊階層では全数調査により調査を行った。

調査に用いる飼養者の母集団リスト（以下「母集団リスト」という。）は、2010年に実施された世界農林業センサス結果から都道府県別、畜種別に飼養者をリストアップしたものを、毎年、牛個体識別全国データベース（牛の個体識別のための情報の管理及び伝達に関する特別措置法（平成15年法律第72号）第3条第1項の規定により作成される牛個体識別台帳に記録された事項その他関連する事項をデータベースとしたもの）に登録された飼養者ごとの種別・年齢別頭数データ及び情報収集により補正・補完して、作成した。

## ア 一般階層（営利）

飼養頭数規模による階層分けを行い、層別に系統抽出法により調査対象者を選定した（階層区分の設定等は都道府県別に行った。）。

なお、一般階層の中で飼養頭数がかけ離れて多い飼養者を含む最も規模の大きい階層は超大規模階層として設定することとし、超大規模階層は全ての飼養者を調査対象者とした。

また、肉用牛では、同一畜種でも経営タイプによりその飼養形態及び飼養頭数規模が大きく異なることがある。そのため、経営タイプ別に区分した階層を設定し、更に経営タイプに適した飼養頭数規模に基づいて階層分けを行い、層別に系統抽出法により調査対象者を選定した。

経営タイプ別一覧

畜種	区分1	区分2
肉用牛	肉用種	子取り
肉用種肥育
乳用種	乳用種（ホルスタイン種他）
交雑種

注：肉用牛については最大で区分2に示すまでの階層分けを行った。

## イ 特殊階層（非営利）

学校、試験場等の非営利的な飼養者は一般の飼養者と性格を異にするので特殊階層として区分した。

また、乳用牛飼養者にみられる子畜のみを飼養（育成）する公共団体、農協等の牧場は営利的な飼養者であっても飼養規模がかなり大きく、一般階層に分類すると推定上問題を生ずる場合があることから、便宜的にこの階層に含めた。

## (2) 標本数及び集計標本数

畜種別標本数等は、次のとおりである。

母集团飼養者数①	標本数②	抽出率③=②/①	有効回収数④	有効回収率⑤=④/②
乳用牛	24,400	6,100	%	3,958	%
肉用牛	77,800	6,700	8.6	5,038	75.2

注：有効回収数とは集計に用いた標本飼養者の数であり、回収はされたが調査対象としての要件を満たさなかった標本飼養者は含まれていない。
## 7 調査期日

平成27年2月1日現在で調査した。

## 8 調査事項

(1) 乳用牛調査・・状態別飼養頭数、月別経産牛頭数、分べん頭数、乳用向けめす出生頭数、経営耕地・飼料用作物の作付実面積状況及び放牧の状況

(2) 肉用牛調査・・ 目的別飼養頭数、肉用種子取り用め寸牛年齢別飼養頭数、経営タイプ、経営耕地・飼料用作物の作付実面積状況及び放牧の状況

## 9 調査方法

調査対象者が調査票に直接記入する自計調査とし、オンライン（特殊階層のみ）又は郵送調査により実施した。

## 10 集計方法

集計は、都道府県ごとに次の方法により行った。

全国結果は都道府県の積算により算出した。

## (1) 飼養戸数、経営耕地及び作付面積

飼養戸数は、母集団リストを用いて次に示す(3)のアの推定式により算出した一般階層の飼養戸数に特殊階層の飼養戸数を加えて算出した。経営耕地及び作付面積は、(3)のアの推定式により一般階層について算出した（特殊階層の算出なし。）。

## (2) 飼養頭数

飼養頭数のうち、牛の総頭数、牛の種類別及びめす・おす別の頭数（次の図に示すAからHまで）は、牛個体識別全国データベースのデータにより算出した。乳用牛調査（次の図に示す①から⑥まで）及び肉用牛調査（次の図に示す⑦から⑩まで）の調査項目については、それぞれの調査結果による推定値（(3)のイの推定式により算出した一般階層の飼養頭数に特殊階層の飼養頭数を加えて算出したもの）が牛個体識別全国データベースにより得られた集計値の内訳となるように、次のアからウまでの方法により補正を行った。
<飼養頭数の算出項目>

推定値の補正方法は、次のとおりである（①から⑩まで、C、E、G及びHは、上記表中の各項目を示す。）。

ア 乳用牛調査及び肉用牛調査結果の乳用種のめす牛に関する推定値（①から⑦までの各項目）

に、補正比率 $ \mathrm{M} \left( \mathrm{M} = \mathrm{E} / \left( \text { ①} + \text { ⑦} \right) \right) $ を乗じた。

イ 肉用牛調査結果の肉用種に関する推定値（⑧から⑩までの各項目）に、補正比率R₁（R₁=C／（⑧+⑨+⑩））を乗じた。

ただし、次の場合には、それぞれ次に示す補正を行った。

(7) 推定値（⑧）の補正について

補正後の推定値（⑧×R_{1}）＞ G のとき、Gと同数とした。

(イ) 推定値（⑨、⑩）の補正について

補正後の推定値の計（⑨×R_{1} + ⑩×R_{1}）＜ H のとき、補正比率R_{1}の代わりにR_{2}（R_{2}=H/（⑨+⑩））をそれぞれ乗じた。

ウ 階層区分別については、ア及びイにより算出した推定値を(3)により算出した階層区分別の推定値に比例して配分した。

(3) 統計表章に用いる階層別の推定式

ア戸数、経営耕地及び作付面積

$ \stackrel{\wedge}{M}k = \sum_{i=1}^{L} \frac{Ni}{ni} \quad nik + Mok $
$ M_{k} $ · · · k 階層（統計表章に用いる階層をいう。以下同じ。）に属する戸数の推定値
L · · · 抽出階層の階層数
Ni · · · i 抽出階層の母集団リスト戸数
ni · · · i 抽出階層の標本の数（戸数）
未経産牛分べん頭数出生頭数乳用向けめす乳用種おす交雑種	なお、搾乳経験のある牛であって肉用に肥育中のもの（乳廃牛）はこれに含めた。
出生してから、初めて分べんするまでの牛をいう。
分べんした頭数をいい、正常な分べんのほか、早流産及び死産も含めた。
生きて生まれた子牛の頭数をいう。
出生した子牛のうち乳用に仕向けるめすをいう。
出生した子牛のうち乳用種のおすをいう。
出生した子牛のうち乳用種のめすに和牛等の肉用種のおすを交配して生産された、いわゆるF1牛をいう。F1めす牛に肉用種のおすを交配し生産されたF1クロス牛も含めた。
2) 肉用牛調査
肉用牛	肉用を目的として飼養している牛をいう。
本調査において肉用牛と乳用牛の別は、品種区分ではなく利用目的によって区分するため、乳用種のおすばかりでなく、未経産牛も肥育を目的として飼養している場合は肉用牛とした。
ただし、搾乳経験のある牛を肉用目的に肥育しても肉用牛に含まない。
乳用種以外の肉用牛をいう。黒毛和種、褐毛（あか毛）和種及びその他に分類した。
毛色・角・ひづめは黒色。肉質は他の品種より優れている。
毛色は黄褐色から赤褐色。角・ひづめはべっこう色や黒色である。
黒毛和種及び褐毛和種以外の肉用種。無角和種、日本短角種等の和牛のほか、外国牛の肉専用種（ヘレフォード、アバディーンアンガス等）及び肉用種の雑種も含む。
肉用として販売することを目的に飼養している肉用種の牛をいう。したがって、ほ乳・育成中の牛でも引き続き自家で肥育する予定のものは肥育用牛とした。
子牛を生産することを目的として飼養している肉用種のめす牛をいう。過去に種付けしたことのあるめす牛及び将来種付けすることが確定している牛である。
ホルスタイン種等の乳用種のうち肉用を目的として飼育している牛をいう。
交雑種を除く乳用種において肉用を目的として肥育している牛のうち、おす牛及び未経産のめす牛をいう。
乳用種のめすに和牛等の肉用種のおすを交配して生産された、いわゆるF1牛をいう。F1めす牛に肉用種のおすを交配して生産されたF1クロス牛も含めた。
調査時点における肉用牛飼養者（学校、試験場等の非営利的な飼養者を除く。）の主な経営形態によって、次の経営タイプのいずれかに分類した。
肉用種の子取り・育成・肥育を主目的とする経営をいう。
子牛の生産を目的とする経営をいう。
もと牛を肉用に肥育することを目的とする経営をいう。
子牛の育成（育成経営）又は子牛の生産から育成・肥育まで行うもの（一貫経営）等の経営をいう。
乳用種経営育成経営	乳用種のほ育・育成・肥育を主目的とする経営をいう。
ほ育から育成を主とする経営をいう。ただし、ほ育のみを含む。ほ育は、生後1～2週間程度のもの（出生子牛を含む。）を導入し、3か月程度飼育する