not related to productive efficiency is at a disadvantage compared to other individuals who do not. Such an individual is in effect imposing higher costs on himself than are other individ-uals who do not have such preferences. Hence, in a free market they will tend to drive him out.

It may deserve emphasis that Friedman’s argument in favor of competitive market mechanism is non-welfaristic in nature, as his praise for it is based on the procedural fairness it confers to the market participants. However, this is not to deny the fact that his argument does not neglect consequences altogether, as he also invokes the fact that those producers who discriminate individuals for any reason other than their productivities would have to face dire consequences.

A general moral seems to be the following. In evaluating the social value of competition, and in designing and implementing competition policy in search for the better functioning of competitive market mechanism, we should pay due attention to procedural considerations as well as to consequential considerations. People seem prepared to accept this extended viewpoint and make regularly the following type of reasoning. Let x and y be the consequences of economic mechanisms $ m^{1} $ and $ m^{2} $ , respectively. According to Mr. A's judgements, having x through $ m^{1} $ is better than having y through $ m^{2} $ , but Ms. B may judge otherwise. Indeed, one is making such judgements when one says that it is better to obtain whatever commodity bundle which the free market enables one to choose than to be assigned another commodity bundle by the central planning board, even when the latter bundle contains more of all commodities than the former. One is also making such judgements when one asks for more bread, more wine and more whatnot, irrespective of how these commodities are made available to him. In the former case, the resource allocation mechanisms have clear lexicographic priority over the consequences emerging from these mechanisms, whereas, in the latter case, the consequences are given lexicographic priority over the mechanisms. Although such extreme lexicographic judgements are not at all inconceivable, it is presumably more realistic to think that people care not only about the intrinsic values of resource allocation mechanisms, but also about their instrumental values in bringing about desirable consequences, and they are prepared to strike a balance between these two rival considerations. This point should not be forgotten in the design, implementation, and evaluation of competition policies.

### 6. Boundary between Private Sphere and Public Sphere

Let us proceed from the analysis of competition to the analysis of competition policy. According to our perception, the economic analysis of competition policy should consist of the following three parts: (1) Drawing the boundary line between the private sphere and the public sphere; (2) Designing and implementing the fair market game; and (3) Coordinating domestic market games in the globalized world economy through the design and implementation of an interface mechanism. In the following two sections, let us list some of the basic agendas for