Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
ではございます。

○阿部先生 ほかに何かございますか。

よろしいですか。

## (異議なし)

○阿部先生 それでは、先ほどの取りまとめコメント案を本事業に対する結論とさせていただきたいと思います。

どうもありがとうございました。

○寺門参事官 ありがとうございました。

本事業をもちまして、本日の議論は全て終了いたしました。

長時間にわたりまして、大変ありがとうございました。

閉会に当たりまして、大野参事官から御挨拶を申し上げます。

○大野参事官 ありがとうございました。

外部有識者の皆様方におかれましては、長時間にわたり精力的な御議論をいただきましたことに対し、心からお礼を申し上げます。

本日取りまとめをしていただきました貴重な御意見は、復興庁の行政事業レビュー推進チームとしてしっかりと受けとめさせていただきまして、今後の予算執行や来年度の予算要求に反映していきたいと考えております。

本日はまことにありがとうございました。

○寺門参事官 以上で終了でございます。

ありがとうございました。
# CPRC Discussion Paper Series

# Competition Policy Research Center Fair Trade Commission of Japan

Competition, Welfare, and Competition Policy $ ^{*} $

Kotaro SUZUMURA

Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Competition Policy Research Center,

Fair Trade Commission of Japan

CPDP-3-E December 2003

* This article is written text of the Keynote Speech delivered at the Competition Policy Symposium on November 20, 2003.

1-1-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, TOKYO 100-8987 JAPAN

Phone:+81-3581-1848 Fax:+81-3-3581-1945

URL:www.jftc.go.jp/cprc.html

E-mail:cprcsec@jftc.go.jp
# Competition, Welfare, and Competition Policy

Kotaro Suzumura $ ^{*} $

Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

and

Competition Policy Research Center, Fair Trade Commission of Japan

November 20, 2003

### 1. Introduction

It is my great pleasure as well as honour to deliver this Keynote Speech at the International Symposium on Competition Policy organized by the Competition Policy Research Center (CPRC) in the Fair Trade Commission of Japan. The need for such a research center had been widely felt over the years. However, it was only in June of this year that the CPRC finally took off the ground. The timing of its birth was fortunate. The antimonopoly law and competition policy in Japan are currently under careful public scrutiny, and some parts of the law, as well as the procedures for its implementation, are in the process of careful redesign and deliberate social choice. It is hoped that the Center will function as an open public forum for economic as well as legal discussions on the role of competition policy in general, and the design and implementation of antimonopoly law in particular.

As an economist in charge of the CPRC, I would like to engage in the Confucian exercise of learning a lesson from the past in the controversial arena of welfare and competition in order to orient our future research on the theory of competition policy. In view of the rapid and drastic changes which are recently taking place in the global arena of competition, as well as the unprecedented progress in information technology which seems to be exerting a strong influence on the types and extents of sustainable competition, another maxim, to the effect that you can’t put new wine in old bottles, may appear to be more appealing than the antient Confucian maxim. Whether or not the accumulated wisdom in the past on welfare and competition may still be able to generate new revelation, or they cannot but fade out in the face of dazzlingly novel realities, can be determined only by the end of the day.

It was Harold Demsetz who began his lectures on economic, legal, and political dimensions of competition with the following thoughtful remark: “Competition occupies so important a position in economics that it is difficult to imagine economics as a social discipline without it.
Stripped of competition, economics would consist largely of the maximizing calculus of an isolated Robinson Crusoe economy. Few economists complete a major work without referring to competition, and the classical economists found in competition a source of regularity and scientific propositions [Demsetz (1982, p.1)]. Not many economists would dare to disagree with Demsetz on the central place he assigned to competition, yet there may remain a broad spectrum of disageements among economists and, a fortiori, the public at large concerning the precise meaning of competition, the exact role competition plays as a decentralized resource allocation mechanism, and the social values attainable through the unconstrained working of competition. At one polar extreme of this broad spectrum lies the first conventional belief on the relationship between welfare and competition, which originates in Adam Smith’s invisible hand thesis. It is held by many, if not all, orthodox economists. At the other polar extreme of the spectrum lies the second conventional belief, which is widely held among the public at large, and the government officials in charge of industrial policies in particular. It regards competition as a kind of necessary evil to be kept under deliberate public control for it to be at all socially useful. Let us begin our discourse with these two conventional beliefs on welfare and competition.

### 2. Conventional Belief among Economists: Invisible Hand Thesis

It was Adam Smith who praised the role of competition in Book 1, Chapter 2 of The Wealth of Nations by saying that producers as well as consumers, pursuing their own private incentives, are guided, as if by an invisible hand, to accomplish what is socially desirable in terms of the common good. Most, if not all, orthodox economists accepted Smith’s invisible hand thesis, and applauded competition as a decentralized mechanism for socially good allocation of resources. For modern economists in the late 20th century, however, Smith’s invisible hand thesis seemed to be too mythical to be left unvindicated. Thus, a modern vindication of Smith’s invisible hand thesis was established in the mathematically sophisticated form of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics: with perfectly competitive and universal markets and provided that some environmental conditions including the non-existence of externalities, increasing returns, and public goods are satisfied, those resource allocations attainable at competitive equilibria are Pareto efficient, whereas any Pareto efficient resource allocation can be attained through the appropriate redistribution of initial resources and the use of perfectly competitive market mechanism.

A strong criticism against this interpretation of Smith’s invisible hand thesis was raised by the Austrian school of economics, however, which is forcefully put forward by Friedrich von Hayek (1948, p.92) as follows:

It appears to be generally held that the so-called theory of “perfect competition” pro-
Figure I: Excess Entry Theorem at the Margin
that have been tried from time to time [Winston Churchill’s speech in the House of Commons (November 1947)],” competition may be the worst form of economic mechanism except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time. We should add that the task of competition policy is precisely to make the functioning of this imperfect mechanism better than otherwise.

### 5. Consequential Value versus Procedural Value of Competition

There is one more aspect of our theoretical analysis of excessive competition which is in fact quite insidious. As Kenneth Arrow (1987, p.124) once observed, “[e]conomic or any other social policy has consequences for the many and diverse individuals who make up the society or economy. It has been taken for granted in virtually all economic policy discussions since the time of Adam Smith, if not before, that alternative policies should be judged on the basis of their consequences for individuals.” There is no way of denying that almost all, if not literally all, economists are consequentialist in the sense of Arrow, viz., they are ready to judge the goodness of economic mechanisms and/or economic policies on the informational basis of their consequences. As a matter of fact, their evaluative perspective is even narrower than consequentialism as such. This is because, more often than not, they are willing to judge the goodness of consequences of an economic mechanism and/or economic policy vis-à-vis another mechanism and/or policy exclusively in terms of the welfares which accrue to “the many and diverse individuals who make up the society or economy.” As a matter of fact, welfarist-consequentialism, so-called, or welfarism for short, permeates through the mainstream of contemporary welfare economics and social choice theory. It is clear that the excess entry theorem in the previous section is no exception to this general observation.

Recent years have witnessed an upsurge of criticisms against welfarism by some of the leading moral and/or political philosophers such as John Rawls (1971) and Ronald Dworkin (2001), as well as the leading scholar in welfare economics and social choice theory such as Amartya Sen (1985; 1999). They commonly emphasized the importance of non-welfaristic features of consequences, or even the non-consequentialist features, of economic mechanisms and/or economic policy in their evaluative exercises. Those alternative viewpoints which are emphasized along with the welfaristic viewpoint include procedural fairness, richness of opportunities, responsibility and compensation, and liberty and rights. In our present context of welfare and competition, however, there is even more classic criticism against welfarism than these recent criticisms by moral and/or political philosophers and normative economists. It was in fact voiced by one of the most celebrated neoclassical economists, viz., John Richard Hicks (1981, pp.137-140):
fair play of the competitive market game.

In the second place, drawing the boundary line between the private sphere and the public sphere, as well as the design of the fair market game, cannot be done once and for all. Quite to the contrary, depending on the state of technology, the boundary between the private sphere and the public sphere, as well as the structure of fair market game, must be subject to incessant review, and constant effort must be made for further improvement on the mechanism design for the promotion of public welfare. To lend concreteness to what we are discussing, let us cite a couple of examples.

(1) There are many cases of regulatory reforms in Japan and elsewhere, which transformed the traditional state monopoly of, say, telecommunications industry by a public corporation into the mixture of liberalized competitive segments, where one of the competitors is the privatized ex-public corporation, on the one hand, and regulated segments with residual natural monopoly elements, on the other. With the further development of technology, however, even the regulated segments with residual natural monopoly factors had to be subject to gradual transfer to the competitive segments. The design and implementation of the fair market game must also adjust themselves to the need of this gradual process of regulatory reforms.

(2) Friedman’s emphasis on the procedural fairness of competitive market mechanism may be under serious threat by the rapidly developing devices of electric money. It should be recalled that the Friedmanian protection of individuals from being discriminated against for reasons unrelated to their productivities is closely connected with the so-called “anonymity of money”; it is because no one can be traced back after the completion of market exchange of commodities and/or services for money that individuals are warranted to be free from being discriminated against in the competitive market mechanism. Electric money, which is expected to be effective against such unlawful acts as money laundering and fraudulent product quality, may undermine one of the important procedural merits of the competitive market mechanism. In order to maintain the procedural fairness of the competitive market mechanism in the face of otherwise beneficial technological development, those who are in charge of designing and implementing the fair market game may have to confront a totally different ball game.

Thus, the story of competition policy is not like a fairy tale in which prince and princes marry, and then live happily forever; it is more like Alice’s Through the Looking-Glass [Lewis Carroll (1939, p.152)], where “it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!”

### 7. Interface Mechanism among Domestic Competition Policies

An important fact about competition policy is that there are not many countries which have competition laws rooted deeply in the spontaneous evolution of domestic rules and conventions. In the case of Japan, which has the second longest history in the world and next only
### 8. Concluding Remarks

Instead of summarizing the whole contents of this paper, let us conclude with a brief recapitulation of its main messages.

(1) There are two conventional beliefs concerning the relationship between social welfare and market competition. According to the first conventional belief, the more competition will there be, the better will be the welfare performance of market competition. According to the second conventional belief, the Confucian maxim to the effect that “to go beyond is as wrong as to fall short” applies to the welfare effect of market competition too. We have argued that either one of these two conventional beliefs, widely though they are respectively held, may turn out to be wrong upon careful scrutiny, depending on the type of market competition and the conditions under which the industry is operated. The design and implementation of competition policy should pay due attention to this subtle relationship which holds between social welfare and market competition.

(2) Even when it is theoretically verifiable that “[r]egulation by enlightened, but not omnipotent, regulators could in principle achieve greater efficiency than deregulation,” this does not in itself justify the intervention by the down-to-earth government. The social cost of regulation should be carefully gauged and weighed against the social benefit of regulation. In doing so, it is also of crucial importance to pay due attention to the distributional implications of regulation.

(3) In evaluating the social performance of regulation versus competition, we should pay due attention not only to the welfaristic effects and/or the non-welfaristic effects on consequences, but also to the non-consequentialist effects thereof as exemplified by the procedural fairness of regulation versus market competition, the richness of opportunities thereby opened, and the liberty and rights of individuals and private enterprises under these social contrivances.

(4) The main functions of competition policy consist of (i) drawing the separating line between the private sphere and the public sphere, (ii) designing and implementing the fair market game, and (iii) coordinating the domestic market games through the clever design and implementation of interface mechanisms. Although harsh disputes occurred on the international harmonization of domestic rules and conventions, the shift of focus from the unrealistic convergence of domestic rules of many countries to those rules prevailing in the hegemonic country to the coordination of domestic rules by means of a cleverly designed interface mechanism, thereby allowing idiosyncratic domestic rules to function together harmoniously, seems to be not only workable but also sensible.

There are already many dishes on the table. Still more I am sure are going to be served in this international symposium. I am looking forward to enjoying this exceptionally rich feast.
## Acknowledgement

* Text of the Keynote Speech delivered at the International Symposium on Competition Policy, November 20, 2003, which was organized by the Competition Policy Research Center in the Fair Trade Commission of Japan. Thanks are due to Professors Kenneth Arrow, Timoth-thy Besley, Akira Goto, Kazunori Ishiguro, Motoshige Itoh, Ryutaro Komiya, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Amartya Sen, and John Vickers, with whom I had several discussions on the topics related to this paper. Needless to say, they should not be held responsible for any opinion expressed in this paper.
## References

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Okuno-Fujiwara, M. and K. Suzumura (1993): “Symmetric Cournot Oligopoly and Economic Welfare: A Synthesis,” Economic Theory, Vol.3, pp.43-59.

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Suzumura, K. (1995): Competition, Commitment, and Welfare, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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# 平成 23 年度 項目別業務実績報告書

独立行政法人 国際交流基金
## 目次

I 業務実績の概要 …… i

Ⅱ 平成23年度項目別業務実績 …… 1
業務実績報告書で使用した事業実績額（調整値）について …… 2
No.1 一般管理費の平成18年度比15%削減 …… 3
No.2 業務経費の毎事業年度1.2%以上削減 …… 8
No.3 機動的かつ効率的な業務運営 …… 11
No.4 事業目的等の明確化・外部評価の実施 …… 31
No.5 外交政策を踏まえた事業の実施 …… 34
No.6 地域・国別の政策等に応じた事業の実施 …… 45
No.7 他団体との連携 …… 48
No.8 予算・収支計画・資金計画及び財務内容の改善に関する事項 …… 56
No.9 短期借入金の限度額 …… 64
No.10 重要な財産の処分 …… 65
No.11 剩余金の使途 …… 66
No.12 人事管理のための取組 …… 67
No.13 施設・設備の運営・改修 …… 72
No.14 文化芸術交流事業の重点化 …… 76
No.15 人物交流、市民青少年交流、文化協力 …… 84
No.16 文化芸術交流 …… 92
No.17 日本語事業の重点化 …… 108
No.18 多様化する日本語への関心やニーズを日本語教育へつなげるための施策、日本語教育の総合的ネットワーク構築 …… 115
No.19 日本語能力試験 …… 123
No.20 海外日本語教師に対する施策 …… 127
No.21 海外日本語学習者に対する施策 …… 139
No.22 海外日本研究の促進 …… 149
No.23 知的交流の促進 …… 159
No.24 国際交流に関する情報の収集・提供及び事業の積極的広報 …… 172
No.25 海外事務所・京都支部の運営状況 …… 179
No.26 国際文化交流のための施設の整備に対する援助 …… 189
<平成23年度国別事業実施状況> 191
韓国 192
中国 197
インドネシア 202
タイ 207
フィリピン 211
ベトナム 215
マレーシア 219
インド 224
オーストラリア 229
カナダ 234
米国 240
メキシコ 247
ブラジル 250
イタリア 253
英国 257
スペイン 261
ドイツ 265
フランス 269
ハンガリー 273
ロシア 277
エジプト 281

Ⅲ 資料編 285
資料1 評価指標の設定状況について 286
資料2 プログラム別外部専門評価について 287
資料3 「評価に関する有識者委員会」について 290
## I 業務実績の概要
平成23年度は、第2期中期目標・中期計画期間（平成19～23年度）の最終年であり、中期計画における組織の運営・管理面、事業面での目標達成に向け、費用の削減・効率化や求められる事業の実施を着実に行った。

平成23年度の独立行政法人国際交流基金の代表的な実績を要約すれば、次の通りである。

## 1 ．行政刷新会議による事業仕分け結果等への対応

平成22年4月に実施された行政刷新会議による事業仕分けの結果、及び平成22年12月7日に閣議決定された「独立行政法人の事務・事業の見直しの基本方針」において指摘された事項に関し、平成23年度までに必要とされた措置については着実にこれを実施した。

## 2 ．効率化

一般管理費を平成18年度に比し5年間で15％削減するとの中期目標については、23年度決算において目標を大きく上回る21.1％の削減（▲585百万円）を達成した。

平成22年度末までに平成17年度に比し5%の削減を行い、さらに平成23年度までに6%以上の削減を行うこととしている人件費についても、平成23年度決算において平成17年度比10.7%（▲315百万円）の削減を実現した。

運営交付金を充当して行う業務経費は、対平成22年度比6.1%（▲657百万円）の削減を行い、毎事業年度1.2%以上の削減を行うとの目標を達成した。

また、機動的かつ効率的な業務運営を進めるため、事業部門の再編や管理部門の整理による機能強化と業務の効率化を平成24年度当初より実現すべく準備を進め、契約関連については、自主点検及び契約監視委員会による点検を行うことで、随意契約等見直し計画の着実な実行を進め、競争入札等による契約金額の割合を高めるとともに、一者応札・応募に関しては、新規発生率を引き下げた。内部統制の強化についても、助成金確定事務の見直しや、コンプライアンス推進委員会の開催、事業分野別のリスクマネジメント・リストの作成等の措置を行った。また、監事監査の実施や監査結果にも適切に対応した。

## 3 ．各事業分野における取組み

文化芸術交流事業では、「ビジット・ジャパン・キャンペーン」、食文化紹介、ポップカルチャー紹介等、現在のわが国政府の政策に沿った事業を優先的に実施するよう努めるとともに、「日米同盟深化のための日米交流強化」の政府方針に即した事業に取組んだ。また、周年事業（ドイツ、クウェート、イスラエル、東ティモール）や外交上重要な要人往来・イベント（日中韓サミット、「ジャナドリヤ祭」等）に合わせた事業も行った。
海外日本語教育事業では、中期計画で掲げた「支援型事業から推進型事業への重点シフト」の方針を更に進めるため、「JF日本語教育スタンダード」の普及、「JFにほんごネットワーク（通称：さくらネットワーク）」を活用した各国・地域における日本語教育事業の拡充、海外事務所等における「JF日本語教育スタンダード」を用いた日本語講座運営を中心に事業を展開した。さくらネットワークは平成22年度末までにネットワークの中核機関を100機関とするとの目標を達成した後、平成23年度末時点で118機関まで拡大している。また、政府の「新成長戦略」に対応して実施を求められている経済連携協定（EPA）に基づくインドネシア人・フィリピン人看護師・介護福祉士に対する来日前の日本語予備教育事業を着実に実施した。

日本研究・知的交流事業では、世界の各地域の日本研究の中核となる拠点機関への援助を重点的に行うとともに、「対日理解の中核となる者への支援」として実施する日本研究フェローシップ事業では、日本研究が盛んで申請件数の多い米国・東アジア・欧州からの採用に加えて申請件数の少ない中南米、南アジア及びアフリカ地域からの採用にも留意した。また、政府の「日米同盟深化のための日米交流強化」の方針への対応も含め、知日層の拡大・充実を図るため、重点を置く米国、韓国、中国を中心に、政策提案に関わる機関や人物を対象にした事業を強化した。さらに、世界の共通課題の解決に向けた共同研究やシンポジウム等を行った。

なお、平成23年3月に起きた東日本大震災からの復旧・復興を図る「東日本大震災復興基本法」に基づく取り組みとして、大震災の教訓を踏まえた国づくりの推進を図り、日本の再生を海外の人々に文化芸術活動を通して知ってもらう事業を、平成23年11月に第3次補正予算で承認された財源に既存予算を加えて実施した。

本報告書の「Ⅱ 平成23年度項目別業務実績」は、「独立行政法人通則法」及び「外務省所管独立行政法人の業務実績評価に係る基本方針」等に基づいて、平成23年度の業務実績をまとめたものである。
Ⅱ 平成 23 年度項目別業務実績
業務実績報告書に記載されている事業実績額においては、前年度との比較を評価の観点から的確に行うために、以下の条件・調整により算出した金額を使っているものがある。

1. 使途を特定された寄附金（特定寄附金）を財源とする事業支出額については、基金自身の計画による国・地域別、分野別の事業実績額の比較を行う観点から実績額から除いた。

2. 海外拠点派遣職員人件費及び海外事務所借料については、平成19年度から「在外事業費」となっているが、拠点の具体的事業プロジェクトへの投入額を比較する観点から実績額から除いた。

3. 海外拠点が自身の企画によって実施する各種事業プロジェクト（「在外事業費」として支出）の支出実績額は、分野別の投入額の比較のため、プロジェクトの内容により「文化芸術交流事業」「日本研究・知的交流事業」「その他事業（広報・図書館運営・調査）」に算入した。

4. これら国・地域別、分野別の事業実績額は、年度終了後速やかに業務実績の評価を実施するために、決算確定前に暫定値として集計を行ったものであり、決算確定後に集計される正式な業務実績額とは、若干の異動が出る可能性もある。

5. 上記の条件、調整による事業実績額を記載したものについては、「*金額、シェアの根拠は「事業実績額調整値」による。」と注を付した。（管理費の削減に関する項目（No.1）、業務経費の削減に関する項目（No.2）、予算・決算等に関する項目（No.8）では同調整値は使用していない。）

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