Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, the complaints against Telmex for anti-competitive behavior read like a textbook of anti-competitive strategy. These include: anti-competitive cross-subsidization, anti-competitive pricing, discriminatory tariffs to regions where Telmex maintains a monopoly, unregistered tariff and discount plans, requiring competitors to lease unnecessary private lines, discriminatory billing and collection practices, use of information obtained from competitors towards anti-competitive ends, failure to make available technical information necessary for operation, refusal to provide private lines and circuits, denials of private lines to internet service providers, and discriminatory treatment for calls to internet service providers by Telmex. Though the opinion itself has not yet been released in the case, the results from the case have been reported and show that Telmex was guilty of various anti-competitive practices.

Telmex’s anti-competitive cross-subsidization has served to prevent other providers from effectively competing in the long-distance market. The irony is that because of the consequences of these anti-competitive problems, AT&T Latin America was recently sold to its rival Telmex.

### b. Other Telecom Issues

There are other areas where similar competition concerns exist regarding the regulations that apply to other regulated industries centered around specific issues related in particular regulated industries.

In the case of telecom where there has been extensive work done, particular problems are (a) network access and (b) anti-competitive cross-subsidization. In the leading cases, such as AT&T v. MCI, the court noted that mere pervasiveness of a regulatory scheme did not immunize an industry from anti-trust liability. In that case, AT&T asserted that its public interest assertions should offset any anti-trust liability. In terms of prevention of anti-competitive cross-subsidization, the challenge is to avoid predatory pricing where the measurement of cost is on an incremental (rather than a fully distributed costs basis). However, as noted below, if it is the state that is engaged in predatory pricing, then we must bear in mind that governments tend to be at best revenue maximizers, not profit maximizers.

The great challenge in dealing with cross-subsidization issues turns on whether it can accurately be detected. This in turn depends on how extensive the SOE’s internal accounting system is. Certain things are critical to ensuring that cases of cross-subsidization can be detected. These are summarized below:

### i. Structural Separation

Structural separation refers to the process where different lines of business are not structurally separated, it is much easier for businesses to engage in anti-competition cross-subsidization. A price cap over each line of business prevents one line of business being used to subsidize others, since the potential cross-subsidizer cannot increase its prices in one area in order to support below-cost pricing in another area.
junior finance minister, and who made it a focal issue in the special elections held last September. Postal reform has been at the very “heart of the reforms” that the Prime Minister has advanced since taking office in 2001 in line with the policies of “no growth without reform” and “leave to the private sector what it can do.” $ ^{66} $ The Prime Minister thus understands that privatization will lead to “more diverse and better products and services [to be] developed and provided through ingenuity and knowledge.” $ ^{67} $ The Prime Minister’s strong support for these policies will add important credibility for competition advocates against those opposed to bringing about the benefits of a competitive postal sector.

### b. Costs in Private Firms

There is strong evidence that there is upward pressure on costs in SOEs, leading to higher prices, unless some form of subvention or subsidy is applied. Unlike in private companies, there is no share price reduction element to discipline behavior. The twin threat of bankruptcy or takeover that changes the behavior of a private firm simply does not exist in the case of an SOE. Data suggests that in the U.S., the monopoly of USPS itself accounts for 2.5bn in excess costs to mailers in the third class bulk regular mail service. $ ^{68} $

### c. Reserved Sector Analysis

Based upon the premise that universal service in the postal sector constitutes a public good, postal privatizations in other countries typically have reserved to the incumbent SOE a limited sector of postal services in which the SOE remains the monopoly provider. The goal here generally has been to ensure that, at some basic level of service, all customers in all regions retain access to postal services at affordable prices. Because private companies are restricted from competing within this reserved sector, however, the reserved sector remains unaffected by market forces that apply downward pressure on prices and encourage innovation in competitive sectors of the postal service.

A key issue, therefore, is the appropriate scope of the reserved sector, as a larger reservation than necessary could have a very negative impact on competition in the market. Typically postal companies reserve as part of their postal monopoly all goods up to a certain weight limit. This weight limit varies considerably around the world (among postal agencies). Recent European directives set the reservation at 100g, declining to 30g over time.

Clearly a reservation that is significantly broader than this will have competitive impacts. Such reservations can lead to the following effects:

1. Where there is competition between the postal company and other providers of non-postal services. The reservation prevents the non-postal service providers from functioning in the market at all.
5. Benefits associated with ubiquity

6. Avoidance of business loss because carrier is deemed to discourage or even disconnect customers.

7. Avoidance of disconnection costs, and planning costs (because the carrier has to provide service and cannot engage in modeling and planning to determine where to provide service).

OFCOM calculated that USO costs were in the region of £58m - £89m. The net benefits of the above were in the region of £54m to £64m, suggesting an actual USO net cost of only £4m - £25m. OFCOM therefore decided that these numbers were not significant enough to merit a USO subsidy for BT. $ ^{71} $

The International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”) has published a set of Draft Model Universal Service/Universal Access Policies, Regulations and Procedures. $ ^{72} $ These policies, regulations and procedures are intended to ensure that there is access to information and communication technologies (“ICTs”), while also recognizing the importance of opening up the market to competition, as a way of “stimulating network development, encouraging the spread of innovative technologies and promote high quality, affordable service.” $ ^{73} $ The ITU Draft notes that universal service funds are not the only means of reaching service/access goals, and that rapid technological change has laid the foundation for alternative technologies (such as mobile telephony) to provide access to information without the necessity of guaranteeing a particular service. $ ^{74} $ The ITU Draft further notes that “it is generally recognized that . . . the market is proving to be the best mechanism for serving nearby all levels of user needs.” $ ^{75} $

According to the ITU Draft, there also is a need for interim measures to deal with the fact that market-based remedies tend to help the higher end of the spectrum (businesses and wealthier consumers) while market solutions may take time to percolate down to the poorer people. These points underline Universal Service Funds (USE) and Telecommunications Development Funds (“TDFs”) principles. The ITU Draft goes on to state that it believes that “it is a fundamental right of all citizens to have access to diverse and unrestricted sources of information and means of communications.” $ ^{76} $ This language is potentially problematic as making something a fundamental right opens up the potential for services market distortions to occur. The ITU principles also note, however, that the “first objective of this policy shall be the provision of access to a basic level of telephone service in all rural and low-income urban areas.” $ ^{77} $ Note the emphasis on the provision of access, not necessarily service. This ties-in to the Chilean approach, which is discussed below.
mail routes. The problem here is how to avoid cream skimming where new entrants simply leave the Post with all the high cost routes.

One question that arises is what should be the cost of access pricing if a parcel delivery company needs to use the network. Most postal reform requires the unbundling of downstream access – so-called unbundled access at reasonable prices. The key question is naturally what constitutes a reasonable price. Another question is to what extent should the postal service factor in its USO in considering what that price should be (as some commentators have suggested).

We would argue, based on the fact that the USO may have both benefit and costs characteristics, that the access price should not factor in the USO, otherwise access pricing simply becomes another USO subsidy. Instead the access price should be a cost-based access price, based on the unbundled elements that actually constitute the real cost of provision of the particular service. This would be analogous to the cost-oriented interconnection charges that are mandated by the WTO Basic Telecoms Agreement. It is important to note that the language used in the WTO Agreement – cost-oriented, as opposed to cost-based – is the result of a compromise. Hence it is very important that a consumer welfare enhancing goal is achieved by cost-based access pricing.

POSTCOMM in the UK has identified six different sectors within postal services that may need to be accessed by private providers:

(i) Collection

(ii) Outward sorting

(iii) Transportation

(iv) Inward Setting

(v) Delivery

(vi) Support activities

The above elements omit certain key issues such as marketing and sale of stamps. Of these, delivery takes up the highest attributable cost, but this is largely because its cost tends to be inflated because of the Universal Service Commitment. One significant issue is that the incumbent company has economies of scope and size, not because it has out-competed its competitors in an open marketplace, but rather because it has been given a statutory grant of a monopoly.

Article 12 of the European Postal Directive sets out the rules for setting access prices in the EU. The three general principles from which one can choose are (1) incremental pricing, (2) retail minus, or efficient component pricing, or (3) Ramsey pricing. Retail minus access pricing tends to be favored by incumbents, since it is the furthest from a cost-based pricing mechanism. However, retail minus is not strictly necessary for the survival of the universal service obligation.

There is also a question as to which of these elements in the network the incumbent must grant access. We would argue that access must be granted anywhere in the network at any one of the network elements.

Access pricing has been studied extensively in the context of the UK Postal system. Indeed when UK Mail, Ltd (a new postal operator) entered into an access agreement with Royal Mail to use
### 13. Further Cost Considerations: How to Avoid the Cross-Subsidization Problem

While we have already set out the general cross-subsidization test (see above), we have noted that it needs to be modified on the case of state-owned companies. Because we are dealing with a State-Owned company, there are many factors that must be addressed. The Brooke Group test, which generally applies in predatory pricing situation, requires the following two elements to prove predatory pricing:

1. Price below costs. Typically average variable cost is used as a proxy for marginal cost.

2. Predator must be able to recoup lost profits. In order for this to occur, predator must have market power.

In the contest of State-owned companies, we need to unpack these two tests further.

### a. Bellow-Cost Pricing

In order for below-cost pricing to occur, there must be an agreed measure of cost. We have noted that state ownership, or legacy government ownership, can have a profound impact. We will now analyze some of these impacts.

The usual measure of cost in determining competitive pricing is marginal cost. Marginal cost, being difficult to compute, is usually proxied by average variable cost. The precise measure of cost used is absolutely key to the determination of whether pricing constitutes an anti-competitive practice. This measure then will drive the entire determination of whether there has been an anti-competitive practice.

In order to ensure that the market and related markets are kept competitive, it will be necessary to be extremely careful in the analysis of costs. The following factors must be borne in mind as we analyze costs.

1. Shared Infrastructure Cost. In the case of the Post, there are a number of shared costs, which can be attributed both to the letter mail monopoly infrastructure as well as the parcel service. This issue of shared infrastructure cost was considered in the case of Deutsche Post v. Commission $ ^{85} $ . In that case, in looking at the costs of providing services, Deutsche Post (“DP”) argued that it needed the 33 freight centers that were used in the postal system to provide its parcel service. It therefore sought to include in the cost calculations the capital cost of setting up the freight centers. There is also some shared staffing between these two functions. It was also found in the DP case that some dedicated B-to-B parcels were delivered jointly with B-to-C parcels in standard delivery rounds. In other words, there were a number of areas where DP’s express arm benefited from certain sunk cost items that it had as a result of its letter mail system. Since that system was a monopoly, its express delivery arm had artificially lower costs than a hypothetical competitor would have. Hence these costs must be added to the stated cost of providing the service. It will be necessary in the case of JPCo to ascertain how it conducts its parcel delivery arm, and whether it uses some
parcels up to 20 Kg. This is a very high weight limit. The notion of what the universal service function covers is naturally linked to what is covered by the Reserved Sector. The Universal Service Obligation should only cover what truly constitutes essential mail - hence we advocate that a 30g target. Allowing the reserved sector size to increase will allow the Universal Service Obligation to be used to defend anti-competitive activity and to lead to a calculation of costs attributed to provision of the express service that understates the actual costs. This will in turn make it much harder to demonstrate that pricing on the express sector is below some measure of cost.

While average variable cost is generally a proxy for marginal cost, incremental cost may be a proxy for cost evaluations in the case of network industries. Costs will be average incremental cost, plus elements to account for various government privileges, including the USO benefit. This can be described by the following schematic:

Total Cost:

Cost Elements, $ C_{n} $ where n=1 to x

Long-Run Average Incremental Cost (“LRAIC”)

Total Cost = Hypothetical Benchmark Cost (“HBC”) = LRAIC + $ \sum_{n=1}^{x} C_{n} $

where $ C_{1}= $ USO benefit(as described), $ ^{87} $ $ C_{2}= $ parking privileges, $ C_{3}= $ tax privileges etc.

$$ x $$

and $ \sum C_{n} $ is the summation of Cost Elements relating to Governmental Benefits (“CEGB”)

n=1

In order for below-cost pricing to be maintained, it must be below the Hypothetical Benchmark Cost. In practice, there will be many cases of pricing above LRAIC but below HBC. The greater the CEGB, the greater will be the difference between HBC and LRAIC ( $ \Delta $ (HBC-LRAIC)). Some elements of CEGB will be relatively easy to compute. Other benefits will be much more difficult to compute. However, the CEGB cost elements must include all privileges and benefits that accrue from the state-ownership. This includes any benefits that the SOE derives from the taxpayer. In the case of the Japan postal privatization, we understand that the proceeds of the privatization will partially be used to create a universal service fund. These amounts may be significant (of the order of billions of dollars) and hence constitute a significant USO benefit for JPCo. CEGB will therefore include an element $ C_{uso} $ that represents the benefit of this particular fund.

### b. Market Power and Recouping Costs

The second limb of the Brooke Group test is the presence of market power, and the associated ability to recoup the costs incurred in below-cost pricing. Here, market share typically is used as a proxy for market power. If an entity has market power, then, under the second limb of the Brooke
### 15. Conclusion

There is clearly a strong link between the approaches of competition agencies and regulatory agencies. There is demonstrable evidence that competition agencies have an important role to play in ensuring pro-competitive regulation, i.e. regulation that maximizes overall consumer welfare and efficiency. This is particularly true where privatization and regulation of former SOEs is taking place. Through this role, competition agencies can ensure that regulatory reform will create a more competitive marketplace. This is part of a larger role that the JFTC should play in privatization and pro-competitive regulatory reform in Japan. The goal must be competition in the postal, insurance and express delivery markets in the case of Japan Post but liberalization more generally as well. A pro-competitive regulatory approach in telecom is also likely to yield substantial consumer and business gains. The most recent US-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative $ ^{89} $ offers a number of recommended areas for further liberalization to create a more competitive environment: telecommunications, information technologies, energy, medical devices and pharmaceuticals, financial services, competition policy transparency, privatization, legal systems reform, commercial law and distribution. We hope that a more active JFTC role in competition advocacy in the Japan Post privatization process will continue into these other areas as well.

Shanker A. Singham

Chairman, International Roundtable for Trade & Competition Policy, Inc.

Partner, Squire Sanders & Dempsey L.L.P.

Dated: February 13, 2006
# ネットワーク産業に関する競争政策 〜日米欧のマージンスクイーズ規制の 比較分析及び経済学的検証〜

公正取引委員會

競争政策研究センター
# ネットワーク産業に関する競争政策 〜日米欧のマージンスクイーズ規制の 比較分析及び経済学的検証〜

【執筆者】

泉水 文雄

C P R C 客員研究員・神戸大学大学院法学研究科教授

柳川 隆

神戸大学大学院経済学研究科教授

品川 武

元 C P R C 研究員・公正取引委員会事務総局審査局第四審査長

木村 智彦

元 C P R C 研究員・公正取引委員会事務総局審査局第四審査

植田 真太郎

元 C P R C 研究員

川崎 豊

元 C P R C 研究員

【本研究報告書における役割分担と位置付けについて】

1 本報告書は，第1部を第四審査，第2部1ア〜オを植田，力を泉水，キ及びクを木村，第2部2を植田，同3を川崎，同4を泉水，第3部1を柳川，同2アを川崎，同イを泉水，同ウを品川，同エを植田が，それぞれ執筆を担当した。

2 本報告書の内容は執筆者が所属する組織の見解を示すものではなく，記述中の責任は執筆者のみに帰する。
## 目次

第1部 総論・・・
2 EU・米国からの示唆
## 第 1 部 総論

## 1 研究の目的及び問題意識

川下市場で事業活動を行うために必要な商品を供給する川上市場における事業者が、自ら川下市場においても事業活動を行っている場合において、供給先事業者に供給する川上市場における商品の価格について、自らの川下市場における商品の価格よりも高い水準に設定したり、供給先事業者が経済的合理性のある事業活動によって対抗できないほど近接した価格に設定したりする行為は、マージンスクイーズと呼ばれ、我が国の排除型私的独占ガイドラインにおいて独占禁止法上の考え方が明らかされている $ ^{1} $ 。

マージンスクイーズについては，米国，EUを中心に海外において幾つもの判例，決定等が出ているところ，特に米国とEUにおいて顕著な違いがあることが注目され，比較研究がなされてきた。その代表的なものに，OECDの2009年報告書²及びICNの2010年報告書³がある。

そのような中で，ここ数年においては判例の展開を中心に更に活発な動きがみられる。すなわち，2009年2月のlinkLine事件連邦最高裁判所判決（米国），2010年10月のDeutsche Telekom事件欧州司法裁判所判決（EU），2011年2月のTeliaSonera事件欧州司法裁判所判決（EU），2012年3月のTelefónica事件欧州一般裁判所判決（EU）が相次いで出され，従来の判決等と異なる判示等がみられる。

具体的には，EUにおいては，欧州委員会が82条ガイダンス4においてマージンスクイーズを取引拒絶の一形態と位置付けつつ，その要件を明らかにしていた。しかしその後，前記のように，2010年以降3つの重要な判決が出ており，これらの判決は，欧州委員会の82条ガイダンスとは部分的に異なる立場を採り，またTeliaSonera事件判決では後述のとおり法務官意見で示された重要な部分を判決は採用しなかった。これらのトピックをめぐって現在も活発な議論がなされている。一方，米国では，マージンスクイーズというよりもプライススクイーズと呼ばれることが多いが，この問題は川上市場では反トラスト法上の一方的・無条件の取引拒絶の問題，川下市場では不当廉売（略奪的価格設定）の問題とし，独自の行為類型と考えない傾向が強く，したがってプライススクイーズに対する規制には消極的な傾向があるといえる。この点，EUと米国において顕著な違いがあるようにみえるのは，理論的にも全く異なる見解によるものであるのか，あるいは競争法上の考え方は似ているもののそれぞれの法域の事業法規制の在り方や市場の状況などの他の事情によって結論が異なるのかなど，関心が持たれている。
このように，米国及び EU におけるマージンスクイーズ規制を比較する研究に関心が持たれているところ，我が国においても，マージンスクイーズ規制について，平成22年以降大きな動きがみられる。すなわち，平成22年1月に排除型私的独占に対して課徴金を導入する改正法（7条の24項，20条の3，20条の4）が施行されエンフォースメントが強化された。平成22年10月には排除型私的独占ガイドラインが公表され，その中で取引拒絶類型の中にマージンスクイーズが明記されている。さらに，平成22年12月，マージンスクイーズ該当性が論点となったNTT東日本事件について最高裁判所判決が出され，そこではNTT東日本の行為を「単独かつ一方的な取引拒絶ないし廉売」と位置付けつつ，排除行為該当性の考慮要素が示されている。

さらに，マージンスクイーズ規制は，電気通信というネットワーク効果が働く産業に先例が多いが，他のネットワーク効果が働く産業では規制事例があるのかないのか，他の産業においてもこの考え方は応用できないかも関心が持たれている。

このように，近年，国内外において，殊にネットワーク産業におけるマージンスクイーズ規制に関して大きな動きがみられることを踏まえ，本研究では，米国及びEUにおけるマージンスクイーズ規制を分析検討し $ ^{5} $ ，さらにそれを我が国におけるマージンスクイーズ規制と比較して分析する。それとともに，これらの規制が経済理論からどのように裏付けられるのかを検討分析する。さらにこの規制を発動する場合には，排除措置命令の設計も問題になる。すなわち，川上市場の料金を引き下げることと川下市場の料金を引き上げることが考えられるが，後者は消費者利益を害する可能性もあるが許容されるのか，さらに構造的措置（事業譲渡等）も考えられるのかを検討する。本報告書は，以上の観点から総合的に検証し，これによって，今後の独占禁止法の運用及び競争政策への示唆を得る。

## 2 報告書の構成

本報告書は，以下の構成によっている。

「第1部」は「総論」であり，「研究の目的及び問題意識」及び「報告書の構成」を述べている。

「第2部」においては「マージンスクイーズに係る各国の規制」を比較検討する。

本研究で比較法研究の対象となるのは EU，米国及び日本である。EU では，Deutsche Telekom 事件判決，TeliaSonera 事件判決，Telefónica 事件判決を取り上げている。日本では，NTT 東日本事件判決を検討する。それぞれマージンスクイーズ規制の概要とその特徴を，判決又は決定から分析検討している。そして，最後に，日米欧のマージンスクイーズ規制を比較・分析している。
「第3部」においては，以上の検討を踏まえて，今後の独占禁止法の運用及び競争政策への示唆を得る。

1 では，Carlton などの研究を踏まえて，マージンスクイーズの経済学的検証及びそこから得られる示唆を述べる。

2 では，EU 及び米国のマージンスクイーズ規制からの示唆として，4つの観点から更に検討している。第1は，マージンスクイーズの要件・基準について，第2は事業法と競争法の関係について，第3は排除措置命令の設計について，第4は電気通信産業から他のネットワーク産業全般への示唆についてである。
## 第2部 マージンスクイーズに係る各国の規制

## 1 EU におけるマージンスクイーズ規制

## ア 概要

まずこの問題が最も頻繁に取り上げられる，欧州の電気通信分野における支配的地位濫用事件の状況をみることにする。マージンスクイーズ規制に加えて取引拒絶，不当廉売を取り上げるのは，マージンスクイーズ規制は，単独の取引拒絶規制，不当廉売規制と近い部分が多く，市場支配的地位の濫用規制の全体像を把握することは意味があると考えられるからである。マージンスクイーズ規制が多い電気通信分野，取り分けプロードバンド接続分野を中心にみることとするが，他の分野の事件についても参考となると思われるものは取り上げることとした⁶。

## イ 欧州委員会又は欧州司法裁判所が取り扱ったマージンスクイーズ事件等

## （ア）電気通信分野の事件

## ① Deutsche Telekom 事件

2003 年 5 月，欧州委員会は，Deutsche Telekomに対して，ドイツの電気通信市場におけるマージンスクイーズにより支配的地位を濫用したとして1260万ユーロの制裁金を課した。同社は，同社の顧客が支払う固定電話の料金よりも高い卸料金（加入者回線への接続料金）を競争者に課していた。この行為は，新規参入者の参入を阻止し，電気通信サービスの供給者の選択肢及び顧客に対する価格競争を減殺するとされた。欧州第一審裁判所もこれを支持したために同社は上訴したが，2010年10月に出された欧州司法裁判所は，1260万ユーロの制裁金を課す原決定を支持した。当該事件の詳細については，後記参照。

## ② Wanadoo 事件

2003 年 7 月，欧州委員会は，France Télécomのインターネット部門の子会社であるWanadooに対して，フランスの小売りブロードバンド市場において費用を下回る価格（効率的な競争者を排除し得る略奪的価格）を設定したとして1050万ユーロの制裁金を課し $ ^{9} $ ，2009年4月，欧州司法裁判所は同社の上訴を棄却した $ ^{10} $ 。本判決は，略奪的価格設定を認定するためには，(1)当該事業者が損失を埋め合わせる（recoup）ことができることの証明は不要であること，(2)支配的事業者は，
競争者の設定する価格に対抗するために低い価格を設定する権利 $ ^{11} $ を持たないことを認めた。

## ③ TeliaSonera 事件判决

欧州委員会が関わった事件ではないが，欧州司法裁判所がマージンスクイーズ規制の要件について判示した事例がある。スウェーデンの競争法庁はTeliaSoneraの価格戦略は支配的地位の濫用に当たりTFEU $ ^{12} $ 102条に違反するとして，ストックホルム地方裁判所にTeliaSoneraを提訴した。2009年2月，ストックホルム地方裁判所は，マージンスクイーズの判断基準に関して，欧州司法裁判所の先決裁定を求めるため，TFEU267条に基づき，事案を欧州司法裁判所に移送し，2011年2月，欧州司法裁判所は先決裁定を出した。当該事件の詳細については，後記参照。

## ④ Telefónica 事件（電気通信）

2007 年 7 月，欧州委員会は，スペインの既存電気通信事業者Telefónicaに対して，5 年間，自らが競争者に課す卸料金と自らが顧客に販売する小売料金の間に不当な価格差を設定してマージンスクイーズを行ったとして，支配的地位の濫用により1億5180万ユーロの制裁金を課した $ ^{13} $ 。同社のネットワークに依存する競争者は，同社の小売価格と競争をすれば損失を被らざるを得ないことから，この行為は競争者を弱体化させた。本件では，消費者はブロードバンドサービスについて欧州において最も高額の価格を支払い，スペインにおけるブロードバンドの浸透を遅延させたことが競争法上問題であるとされた。

Telefónicaとスペイン政府は，それぞれ本件決定に対して控訴したが，欧州一般裁判所は，2012年3月29日に判決を出し欧州委員会の決定を支持した $ ^{14} $ 。当該事件の詳細については，後記参照。

## ⑤ Slovak Telekom 事件

2009 年 4 月，欧州委員会は，スロバキアのブロードバンドアクセス市場及びその他の電気通信市場において支配的地位を濫用したとして，スロバキアの既存電気通信事業者である Slovak Telekom に対する調査を開始した。2010 年 12 月，欧州委員会は，この調査の範囲を親会社である Deutsche Telekom に拡大することを決定した。欧州委員会は，2012 年 5 月 8 日，Slovak Telekom 及び Deutsche Telekom に対して，単独の取引拒絶及びマージンスクイーズに該当するおそれを理由として異議告知書を出した。