Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
The inability of NTT to provide international service is very strange from the world standard. But there used to be demarcation of market between NTT and KDD. This tradition cannot, it seems, be broken easily not from any economic reason but from MPT regulatory philosophy. When we look at the number of Type I carriers it amounts to 80 which is enough to astonish careless foreign watchers that competition has been enhancing. The reality is that regulation is applied onto each category and competition has been strictly controlled except for the case of mobile telephone area since April 1994.

#### I I. NTT vs. MPT: institutional stalemate

In this section I am going to analyze the structural difficulty of decision making from the view point of regulatory scheme and the induced or contrived competition by the government. Japanese choice of industry structure after privatization in 1985 may better be understood by looking back the origin of telecommunications service provision system established in 1957. After the world war II, Japanese government faced the problem of rebuilding infrastructure which was destroyed by the war and required to be renovated for economic development. There existed conflicting opinions on the organizational structure of telecommunications provider but Japan ultimately chose public corporation type of common carrier for telecom services. That public corporation was called “Kosha” which was under the supervision of the Diet but independent of regulatory intervening of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.

The idea of Kosha was to give solidarity of policy making in the investment of telecommunications facilities. Denden Kosha (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation) endeavored for fulfilling backlog demand of telephone subscribers and its objective was accomplished around 1977 or 1978. During this development NTT was integrated public monopoly which was structured as bureaucratic institution in providing telecommunications services. In addition to that, top management consisted of carrier bureaucrats who moved from the Ministry of Communication which existed until 1949. It is generally observed that bureaucrats do not initiate business until they watch piling up of demands. This determined the corporate culture of NTT and NTT was liable to complaints and criticism for its inflexible and slow response to the demand especially from business world.

Amid the wave of deregulation in the U.S. and privatization in the U.K., Japanese government decided to privatize NTT and in 1985 the Telecommunications Business Law and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation Law were enacted. During this phase of transition from Kosha (public corporation) to privatized entity we must look into Japanese business government relationship and bureaucratic system which should be compared to the U.S. and the U.K..

Firstly, Japanese regulatory system might be termed centralized in the sense that jurisdictions are not, in principle, overlapping each other. This is in contrast to the U.S. where several agencies are always competing and evading: for example, in case of telecommunications,
As a result we had two bureaucracies which claim legitimacy each other. In this situation every decision concerned with the introduction of competition took longer time than was experienced in the U.S. and U.K.

In the U.K. new regulatory agency OFTEL took another kind of approach towards British Telecom (BT). OFTEL adopted price cap regulation which was going to give incentives to the regulated firm and allowed a free rate rebalancing by BT itself. Only one new competitor Mercury was admitted and BT did not face financial difficulty as NTT had because it could realize rebalancing in a few years although BT claimed the existence of access deficit. The ultimate policy goal was always revealed clearly by the Director General and the negotiation between OFTEL and BT did not include fatal conflicts as was in Japan. Sometimes OFTEL was criticized for its excessive protection of BT. This is contrasting to Japan where MPT protected new comers by handcuffing NTT.

We can draw a general picture of regulatory environment amongst Japan, the U.S. and the U.K. Next table summaries our discussion above. With regard to the business government relationship we can only draw vague line: good or bad.

BG relationship = Business Government relationship

“Bad” means that there usually exists conflict or divergence of opinions between regulator and regulated and it takes long time to reach any conclusion. Japan might be placed centralized bad business government relationship. On the other hand the U.K. might be labeled as centralized good business government relationship. In the U.S., new AT&T succeeded to obtain support from the DOJ, the FCC and even from Judge Greene. On the contrary RBOC's faced difficulties with public utility commissions and Judge Greene.

By comparing these cases we can tentatively conclude that when there existed “bad” business government relationship, conflicts and strains between regulator and the regulated firms brought about time delay to meet the change of environment. Especially when we notice the incredibly rapid change of telecommunications technologies, slow decision making in regulatory scheme was the greatest obstacle for industrial development. This is typically the case with Japan where the introduction of arrangement for new business was slow and NTT’s business was narrowly restricted to the domestic market. At the same time new competitors gained so much by cream
content of its program was narrowly defined. Japanese CATV providers could not supply entertainment program as freely as the U.S. providers. Fourth, CATV providers have not had right of way in the access to customers which have been the greatest obstacle to expand their services. In short the rapid development of Japanese CATV industry has been hampered by the regulatory constraint upon CATV.

Quite recently we have had deregulatory development mainly due to the recognition of our delay and political pressures from the U.S.. In late 1994, the MPT deregulated CATV industry to some extent. The narrowly defined franchise area was relaxed to enable large scale operation of CATV service across old boundaries. Foreign capital restraint was relaxed to the extent that foreign companies can contribute up to one third of the total capital to enhance alliance with Japanese partners. As was discussed, however, in section III, these deregulatory measures came too late to realize local telephone competition and Japanese information industry will be handicapped severely in the coming years.

### V I. Consequence of deregulation and Privatization

### 1. Productivity

Privatization of NTT meant the organizational restructuring of Denden Kosha management and it was expected that it might give positive effect upon the productivity of NTT. In order to measure productivity change total factor productivity (hereafter TFP) is a typical index. Professor Oniki et al. estimated TFP of NTT from 1961 to 1991 using NTT financial data. It is shown by Figure 6. Looking at the TFP it is clear that there existed upward change of TFP at the time of privatization in 1985. The authors also made the decomposition of factors which explains TFP movement and concluded that privatization is the most important factor.

### 2. Employment

The old NTT was accused of its excess employment and privatization was a trigger to reduce employment. Table-7 gives us the change of employment since 1985. When NTT was privatized the number of employees amounted to 300,000 but it decreased rapidly since then. In 1993 almost 30% of reduction was realized and it is planned that total employment will be less than 200,000 in the near future.

### V II. Estimation of Demand Function and Social Surplus

Under the present regime of regulation upon long distance market competition, we have witnessed a drastic decline of telephone rates in the past 10 years (See Figure-7). It is useful to know empirically how much efficiency gains have been realized by these rates reductions. Telecommunications demand functions were estimated in order to know the magnitude of increased consumers' surplus brought by recent series of reduction of telephone charges.
### 1. Data (Table-8)

In the estimation total number of calls is used as telecommunications demand instead of duration because of limited data availability. Real GDP is used as demand factor while relative average telephone charge is used as price factor $ ^{2} $ . The relative average telephone charge is deflated by domestic demand deflator. Data period is from FY 1975 to FY 1993.

### 2. Stationarity of Demand

Log data are used for estimation. If data are non-stationary, estimated coefficients are biased (See Granger and Newbold (1974)). Therefore a unit-root test should be applied before estimation in order to check if a certain variable is stationary or not. Here the Dickey-Fuller test is applied to the total number of calls. Then P-value is 0.94 in the Estimation 1 and 0.96 in the Estimation 2 $ ^{3} $ , and it is proved that the null hypothesis that the total number of calls is non-stationary cannot be rejected. Therefore in order to keep data stationary the first difference of each data is used for estimation.

### 3. Estimation Results $ ^{4} $ (Figure-7)

(1) Estimation 1

$$ \begin{aligned}&NCLD=1.315*YLD-0.4499*AAPCTLD-0.1434*DUM88-0.05904*DUN88\\ &\\ &(4.893)\quad(-2.550)\quad(-3.132)\quad(-2.412)\\ \end{aligned} $$

Adjusted R-squared = 0.5569
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.305
(2) Estimation 2
NCLD= 1.287 * YLD * 0.3830 * AAPCTLD - 0.1571 * DUM88 - 0.6711 * NCCNTTD
(4.472) (-2.070) (-3.266) (-1.794)
Adjusted R-squared = 0.4885
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.040

Current sample: FY 1976 to FY 1993

Number of observations: 18

where NCLD : The First Difference of Total Number of Calls (Log)

YLD : The First Difference of GDP (Log)

AAPCTLD : The First Difference of Relative Average Telephone charge per second (Log)

DUM88 : A Dummy Variable for Change of Research Method (= 1 in FY 1988) $ ^{5} $

DUN88 : A Dummy Variable for Entry of NCCs (= 1 after FY 1988) $ ^{6} $

NCCNTTD : The First Difference of the Ratio of NCC users to NTT users $ ^{7} $

All estimated coefficients are not 0 at 5% significance level at the Estimation 1 while they are not 0 at 10% significance level at the Estimation 2. Besides, their Durbin-Watson ratios do not show that their residuals are auto-correlated. Therefore the estimations are valid.

Then income elasticity of demand is 1.31 in the Estimation 1 while it is 1.29 in the Estimation 2. On the other hand price elasticity of demand is 0.45 in the Estimation 1 while it is 0.38 in the Estimation 2. These income elasticities are much higher than that in a foreign country. For example they were estimated to vary between 0.469 for off-peak long-haul to 0.640 for short-haul peak in Ontario and Quebec by Bell Canada (1984) (referred in Taylor (1994)) $ ^{8} $ . Our estimated
price elasticities are a little bit higher than that in a foreign country. By Bell Canada they were estimated to lie in a range of -0.282 for peak short-haul to -0.390 for off-peak long-haul.

According to the estimation results the impact of entry of NCCs on decline of NTT demand was 5.9% per year after FY 1988 and accumulated up to 29.8% until FY 1993 in the Estimation 1 while 1% point increase of the number of NCC users relative to NTT users reduced NTT demand by 0.67% and accumulated up to 24.1% in the Estimation 2.

### 4. Consumers' Surplus

Thus increased consumers’ surplus brought by recent series of reduction of telephone charges can be calculated as Table-9 although it also includes increased producers’ surplus. It was 231 and 245 billion yen in FY 1992 and 1993 respectively in the Estimation 1 and accumulated up to 1,955 billion yen after FY 1980 when the recent series of reduction had started. This figure is almost the same as the revenue of telephone service of NTT in FY 1993, that is, 2,281 billion yen. Roughly speaking, half of the revenue of telephone service of NTT has been replaced by the increased consumers’ surplus during the past 14 years. This result does not change very much in the Estimation 2.
## References

1. Bell Canada (1984): “Econometric Models of Demand for Selected Intra-Bell Long-Distance and Local Services, Attachment 1 of Response to Interrogatory Bell (CNCP) 20 February 84-509 IC (Supplemental, July 1984), CRTC, Ottawa, Ontario

2. Gerald W. Brock, Telecommunication Policy for the Information Age (Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, 1994)

3. Granger, C.W.J. and P. Newbold (1974): “Spurious Regressions in Econometrics”, Journal of Econometrics 2, 111-120

4. Hajime Oniki, “Has NTT Productivity Risen?” in M. Okuno, K. Suzumura and T. Nambu eds, Telecommunications in Japan (Nihonkeizai Shinbunsha, 1993) (in Japan)

5. Shiba, Tsunemasa and Teruo Nakatsuma (1993): “Econometric Analysis of Telecommunications Demand (in Japanese)”, IPTP Review No.4, Institute for Posts and Telecommunications Policy

6. Sumitomo-Life Research Institute, Inc. (1993): “Research for another Economic Deregulation”, Report for Economic Planning Agency in FY 1992

7. Taylor, Lester D. (1994): “Telecommunications Demand in Theory and Practice”, Chapter 6, Kluwer Academic Publishers
Table-1 Number of telecommunications carriers

1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1993.7	1995.1
Type I Carriers	37	45	62	68	70	80	84	84
NTT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
KDD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
NTT* DoCoMo	--	--	--	--	--	1	9	9
NCCs	35	43	60	66	68	77	73	73
inter-city	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
regional	4	4	7	7	7	8	8	11
international	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
satellite	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	2
mobile	23	31	46	52	53	61	57	57
others	1	1	--	--	--	--	--	--
Type II Carriers	530	693	841	943	1,036	1,179	1,291	1,291
Special Type II	18	25	28	31	36	36	38	38
General Type II	512	668	813	912	1000	1143	1253	1253
Total	567	738	903	1011	1106	1259	1375	1375

$ ^{*} $ Established in July 1992 and diversified into 9 regional companies in July 1993.

Source: InfoCom Research, Information and Communication in Japan 1993-94

Table-2 Size of telecommunications Carriers

Type 1(NTT)	NTT(KDD)	(DoCoMo)	(NCCs)
Number of Carriers	80	1	1	1	77	inter-city	regional	satellite	mobile	international
Number of Employees	252970	232198	5881	1938	12953	6100	1871	325	3729	928
Capital expenditures(a)	2576	1883	62	134	497	189	54	42	184	28
Sales FY92(b)	6915	5574	235	328	778	411	37	19	243	68
(a)/(b)%	37.25%	33.78%	26.38%	40.85%	63.88%	45.99%	145.95%	221.05%	75.72%	41.18%

Source: InfoCom Research, ibid
Table-3 Tariff of NTT

(yen/3 minutes)

76.1	81.8	83.7	84.7	88.2	89.2	90.3	91.3	92.6	93.10
Local 10	10
until 20 km	30	20
30	50	20
40	60	60
60	90
80	120	80
100	140
120	180	140
160	230	180
240	280	240
320	360	200
500	450	400	360	330	280	180
750	600	520
750-	720	600

Source: NTT

Table-4 Tariff of NCC

(yen/3 minutes)

87.9	88.2	89.2	90.3	91.3	92.4	93.11
until 60	60	50
80	90	80
100	110	100	80
160	140	130
170	200	140
320	200
340	300	200	180	170
340-	280	240	200

Source: NCC reports
Table-5 Profitability of NTT and NCCs

Rate of Return	3 Year
1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	Ave.
NTT	ROE	12.10	10.00	8.30	5.80	2.60	0.80	3.10
ROT	6.00	5.30	4.80	3.60	2.10	0.80	2.20
DDI	ROE	148.20	91.10	58.80	50.00	18.80	11.60	26.80
ROT	14.40	12.50	11.90	11.00	9.60	5.30	8.60
JT	ROE	70.10	35.60	29.60	31.60	23.40	2.50	19.20
ROT	8.80	7.20	8.10	8.80	7.30	3.20	6.40
TWJ	ROE	-435.80
ROT	4.70	2.30	-4.20	-4.20	-6.10	-3.80	-4.70

ROE=Rate of return on equity

ROT=Rate of return on total capital

Source: Annual Reports

Table-6 Output Index, Input Index and TFP NTT(1961 - 1991), 1980=100)

Year	Output Index	Input Index	TFP	Partial Productivity
Labor	Material	Capital
1961	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.17	0.3	1.59
1962	0.11	0.22	0.47	0.17	0.29	1.39
1963	0.12	0.25	0.5	0.19	0.33	1.35
1964	0.14	0.28	0.51	0.21	0.35	1.29
1965	0.16	0.31	0.52	0.23	0.37	1.24
1966	0.19	0.35	0.65	0.27	0.36	1.25
1967	0.23	0.4	0.57	0.3	0.37	1.25
1968	0.26	0.45	0.59	0.34	0.39	1.22
1969	0.31	0.49	0.62	0.38	0.42	1.22
1970	0.34	0.54	0.62	0.4	0.43	1.17
1971	0.38	0.58	0.66	0.44	0.51	1.15
1972	0.44	0.65	0.69	0.49	0.55	1.13
1973	0.52	0.71	0.73	0.56	0.65	1.08
1974	0.57	0.75	0.77	0.6	0.75	0.96
1975	0.65	0.79	0.83	0.68	0.82	0.97
1976	0.69	0.83	0.83	0.7	0.86	0.93
1977	0.87	0.87	1	0.88	1.02	1.1
1978	0.91	0.92	0.99	0.91	1.03	1.05
1979	0.96	0.96	1	0.95	1.04	1.02
1980	1	1	1	1	1	1
1981	1.04	1.02	1.01	1.04	1.02	0.99
1982	1.08	1.05	1.03	1.09	1.04	0.98
1983	1.13	1.07	1.06	1.17	1.06	1
1984	1.34	1.09	1.23	1.4	1.18	1.15
1985	1.43	1.08	1.32	1.55	1.35	1.19
1986	1.47	1.1	1.34	1.62	1.3	1.21
1987	1.56	1.11	1.4	1.75	1.28	1.27
1988	1.58	1.13	1.4	1.87	1.23	1.23
1989	1.59	1.13	1.41	1.96	1.23	1.2
1990	1.67	1.15	1.45	2.12	1.11	1.25
1991	1.68	1.17	1.44	2.2	1.08	1.22
Annual Growth Rate(%)
1961-91	9.91	6.09	3.6	8.9	4.36	0.88
1961-76	14.57	9.7	4.44	10.77	7.98	2.3
1977-82	4.35	3.76	0.57	4.49	0.38	2.07
1983-91	5.06	1.2	3.82	8.11	0.37	2.39

Source: Oniki et al, “Has NTT Productivity Risen by Privatization?” in M. Okuno, K. Suzumura and T. Nambu eds, Telecommunications in Japan (Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1993)
Table-7 The Number of employees of NTT

The Numbers of Employees	303,951	297,596	291,142	276,650	266,017	257,627	249,942	232,198	215,629
Rate of change	-2.09%	-2.17%	-4.98%	-3.84%	-3.15%	-2.98%	-7.10%	-7.14%

Source: NTT annual Report

Table-8 Total Number of Calls and Average Telephone Charge

FY	Total Number of Calls (Million of Calls)	Average Telephone Charge (Yen/second)	Real GDP (Billion yen)
1975	33700	0.183317	215849
1976	33800	0.216052	224508.8
1977	33600	0.261881	235080.4
1978	35600	0.261881	246851.1
1979	37700	0.261881	260415.4
1980	39000	0.257745	269024.2
1981	42800	0.247367	277867.4
1982	46000	0.245073	287041.1
1983	50900	0.240669	295370.8
1984	57000	0.230682	308501
1985	63200	0.227842	322752.9
1986	71823	0.223611	332003.6
1987	75876	0.221171	347535.2
1988	67798	0.214704	368350.6
1989	71839	0.207433	384141.3
1990	72613	0.192877	404561
1991	73271	0.174501	419103.8
1992	72756	0.160926	420493.4
1993	74238	0.14564	419490.4
Table-9 Relative Average Telephone Charge and Consumers' Surplus

FY	Relative Average Telephone Charge (Deflator=1 in 1985) (yen/second)	Increased Consumers' Surplus (FY 1993 Demand Curve) (Billion yen)	(Billion yen)
1975	0.268793	Dun88	NCCNTTD
1976	0.293151	-193	-193
1977	0.336176	-301	-300
1978	0.324512	81	81
1979	0.307733	123	123
1980	0.282615	199	199
1981	0.263717	161	161
1982	0.256353	65	65
1983	0.248882	68	68
1984	0.233484	148	149
1985	0.227161	63	63
1986	0.223835	34	34
1987	0.221171	27	27
1988	0.214704	68	68
1989	0.202374	137	137
1990	0.183343	232	232
1991	0.163085	276	277
1992	0.147774	231	232
1993	0.133126	245	246
Accumulated after FY 1980	1955	1960

$ ^{*} $ Revenue of Telephone Service(ATOMICS): 2281 billion yen
Figure-1 Trends of Profitability

(hundred million yen)

1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Business	6.843	7.227	8.206	7.047	6.654	5.789	5.282	3.710	(41.5)
Profit	(100)	(105.6)	(119.9)	(103.0)	(97.2)	(84.6)	(77.2)	(54.2)
Current	3.161	3.579	4.967	4.259	4.847	4.143	3.528	2.290	(47.1)
Profit	(100)	(113.2)	(157.1)	(134.7)	(153.3)	(131.1)	(111.6)	(72.4)

Source: NTT Annual Report

FY	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
DDI	59.18	348.45	722.22	1096.93	1468.52	1830.93
JT	50.68	234.19	545.99	941.86	1452.75	1734.52
TWJ	22.97	110.25	210.27	259.45	294.69	342.64
TTNet	2.68	3.73	4.24	6.61	11.73

Source: Infocom Research, ibid
Figure-3 Market share on inter-perfectural*basis

Source: InfoCom Research, ibid

Figure-4 Market share in the Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka triangle

Source: InfoCom Research, ibid
Figure-5 Comparison of Rate Rebalancing (Japan, US, UK)

Figure-6 Output Index, Inputindex and TFP
Figure-7
# 経済分析

第92号 昭和58年7月

☆完全雇用余剩の再検討

☆汚染税と汚染基準の理論的考察

経済企画庁経済研究所編集
# 経 济 分 析

第 92 号

昭和58年7月

## 目 次

## <分析1>

## 完全雇用余剩の再検討

I はじめに.....1

II 完全雇用余剰概念とその問題点.....2

(1) 完全雇用余剰概念について.....2

(2) 完全雇用余剰の問題点.....4

III 完全雇用GNPと分配所得の推計.....7

(1) 完全雇用GNPの推計.....8

(2) 分配所得の推計.....12

IV 完全雇用余剰の計測.....16

(1) 一般政府の完全雇用余剰.....16

(2) ウェイト付きの完全雇用余剰.....23

(3) 経済全体の貯蓄投資差額.....29

(4) 一般会計完全雇用余剰.....35

V 結びにかえて.....38
## 汚染税と汚染基準の理論的考察

I はじめに……45

II 部分均衡モデルにおける汚染税と汚染基準……46

(1) 部分均衡モデル……46

(2) 最適汚染税……48

(3) 汚染税と汚染基準……49

(4) 最適な汚染基準の理論：汚染税ゼロのケース……51

(5) 最適汚染基準の一般理論：汚染税が所与の値をとるケース……53

III 一般均衡モデルにおける汚染税と汚染基準……56

(1) 一般均衡モデル……56

(2) ファースト・ベストと最適汚染税……57

(3) 制約つきの最適基準問題とその解……58

(4) 汚染税と汚染基準に関するシミュレーション結果……62

IV むすびに代えて……65

付 A 部分均衡分析の図解……66

付 B 短期一般均衡分析……70
# 完全雇用余剩の再検討 $ ^{*} $

油井雄二

## Ⅰ はじめに

昭和50年度以降，わが国は大幅な財政赤字を抱えるにいたった。その原因の一つとして，低成長経済への移行に伴って歳入不足が顕在化しているにもかかわらず，歳出構造が高度成長期の体質を温存したまま受け継がれ，時代に即応した改革がなされていないという指摘がしばしばなされてきた。このような指摘の背景には，現在の財政赤字が経済活動水準の停滞に起因する循環的な赤字というよりも，財政構造自体から発する構造的ないし制度的赤字であるという現状認識がある。財政赤字が構造的であるか否かを判断する指標として，完全雇用余剩という概念がしばしば用いられてきた $ ^{①} $ 。わが国における完全雇用余剩の推計もまた構造的赤字の指標としての利用に限定されてきた。

しかし，完全雇用余剰概念自体の歴史は古く，とくに1960年代前半のいわゆるNew Economicsが全盛の頃，現実の政策立案の場において，完全雇用余剰が裁量的財政政策の効果を要約した尺度（summary measure）として利用されたことは周知であろう。いずれの利用の仕方にしろ，完全雇用余剰概念が定着するにつれ，概念自体にもその測定にも多くの問題点が存在することも指摘されてきた。その結果，少くとも現在では，完全雇用余剰は財政政策の効果を示す厳密な尺度とはなりえなくとも，その動向

* 本稿を作成するに当たり，経済研究所の福地崇生所長，吉富勝総括主任研究官，石弘光前システム分析調査室長，本間正明現室長はじめ多くの方々より有益なコメントを得た。ここに記して感謝をラフに示す指標としては有用であるという評価が定着しつつある $ ^{(2)} $ 。

言うまでもなく，完全雇用余剰を実際に推計するに際しては，多くの大胆な仮定，単純化が必要とされる。したがって，推定された完全雇用余剰の大きさはそれらの前提に大きく依存することになる。本稿は，わが国を対象に完全雇用余剰を推計するが，推計に関して新たな方法論の展開を意図するものではない。むしろ本稿の第1の目的は，伝統的な推計方法に依拠しつつ完全雇用余剰概念の問題点とその相対性を再検討することにある。近年，わが国でも完全雇用余剰がしばしば利用されるに至った点を考慮すれば，本稿で完全雇用余剰の現実適用面における問題点を整理しておくことは，この概念の理解と応用にとって有益なものとなろう。

さらに，次節で詳細にみるように、伝統的な完全雇用余剰概念の問題点の1つとして，予算項目毎の総需要に与える効果の差異を無視していることがあげられる。この欠点を除去するために「ウェイト付きの完全雇用余剰」という概念が提案されているが，本稿の第2の目的はこの問題を検討することにある。

インフレなき完全雇用を達成するためには，完全雇用余剰が国民経済全体の貯蓄投資バランスからみて適切な大きさになっていること（full-employment adequacy）が必要である。したがって，完全雇用余剰の大きさと民間および海外部門の完全雇用時の貯蓄投資差額の大き

する。もちろん残る誤りは筆者の責任である。

(1) 代表的な例として野口悠紀雄[29], 経済企画庁[39], [40], [41]。

(2) たとえばOkun-Teeters [12] を見よ。
さとの相対的関係が問題にされなければならない。本稿の第3の目的は，この両者の相対的関係がどのように推移してきたかを検討することにある。

以上の問題は，国民経済計算上の一般政府の完全雇用余剰を用いて検討される。しかし，他の完全雇用余剰も考えられないことはない。たとえば国の一般会計を対象にした完全雇用余剰がこれにあたる。そこで本稿では，最後に国の一般会計を対象に完全雇用余剰を推計し，より長期間の完全雇用余剰の推移を検討してみた。

本稿は次のような構成をとる。第Ⅱ節において完全雇用余剰概念とその理論的問題点について，これまでの議論を要約する。次いで第Ⅲ節において，完全雇用GNP等の推計を行い，完全雇用余剰推計の準備作業を行う。とくに第Ⅳ節での検討のために，完全雇用失業率について3つのケースを仮定することにより，完全雇用GNP等についても3系列の数値を作成する。第Ⅳ節において，国民経済計算上の一般政府と国の一般会計の完全雇用余剰が推計される。また，前述のウェイト付けの問題とfull-employment adequacyについて検討を行う。最後に結果を要約し，残された課題を述べることになる。

## I I 完全雇用余剰概念とその問題点

完全雇用余剰概念については，これまで多くの文献で詳細に検討されているので，ここでは，簡単に従来からの議論を整理することにする $ ^{(3)} $ 。

## (1) 完全雇用余剩概念について

完全雇用余剰とは，所与の財政制度とくに租税制度のもとで，経済活動水準が完全雇用時のそれへ移行したときに発生すると予測される予算の余剰を言う。具体的には，完全雇用へ移行したときの税収の変化が重視され，失業保険給付など，景気循環に伴って変化するものを除けば，歳出額は裁量政策によって決定されているものと見做して，調整されないことが多い。

この概念は，アメリカで発展したものであり，その萌芽は1930年代まで遡上るとされている。より明確な形では，1947年の経済発展委員会(Committee for Economic Development: CED)の提言〔1〕において示された「高雇用水準において，予算が若干の黒字を生み出すように税率を決定する」という考え方の中に求めることができる。CEDのこの考え方は完全雇用余剰を政策運営上のガイド・ラインとして利用しようとするものであり，ケインズ的な経済安定化政策と伝統的な均衡予算主義を折衷したものであると考えられる。すなわち，完全雇用時において予算を均衡させることで，均衡予算主義の背後にある財政膨張への歯止めを与えるとともに，不況期においては赤字財政を容認させようとする両面的な意図をもつものである $ ^{(4)} $ 。

他方，完全雇用余剰は政策運営上のガイド・ラインとして利用するだけでなく，財政政策が有効需要に与える効果の尺度として，すなわちsummary measureとしても利用されてきた $ ^{(5)} $ 。完全雇用余剰を財政政策のsummary