the FCC, the DOJ, state public utility commissions and the court are representing different opinions. $ ^{1} $ Contrary to this decentralized system in the US, there usually exists one ministry in charge of a certain industry(industries) in Japan. This type of centralization is sometimes challenged by other ministry. MITI used to be a candidate for challenger because it regulates computer industry. If the challenge is effective, the degree of power centralization might be weakened but up to now MPT has not faced serious assault. As a result Japanese telecommunications regulation has been centralized in the hand of MPT.

Secondly, the business government relationship cannot simply be molded into a theory of capture. In the U.S., federal regulatory agencies are accused of corruption from time to time by a party of economists. In other words, there might not exist true conflict between regulators and regulated firms according to the capture theory. But in Japan or the U.K., bureaucrats in Kasumigaseki or in White Hall are not deemed corrupted (of course with a few exceptions). Each ministry should have a certain philosophy which in some cases invites true confrontation.

The difference between centralized and decentralized regulatory system seems clear when we compare Japan and the U.S. but the comparison between Japan and the U.K. raises another problem. These two countries have centralized bureaucracy in common although in case of the U.K. OFTEL was newly created for regulating telecommunications industry. But there exists a difference between them: In the U.K., the navigation of regulatory policy is in the hands of top executives who are appointed by the government (we can recall the tradition of “Harvey Road Presupposition”) whereas in Japan we have tightly integrated, hierarchical structure of bureaucrats in each ministry. In other words, political appointees in the U.K. are powerful to represent the opinion of regulatory agency and the business government relationship is established between secretary general and the regulated company. In Japan there usually does not exist political appointees and the business government relationship is determined by the negotiation between ministerial directors and the regulated company.

When we look at the business government relationship in Japan and the U.K., we can notice a difference in the past ten years. In Japan MPT was given a true jurisdiction of telecommunications industry for the first time. NTT public corporation was privatized but it naturally inherited bureaucracy fostered during the days of Kosha. New NTT expected deregulatory policy to be implemented but the fact is that MPT was ambitious to apply industrial policy towards telecommunications industry. MPT invited new comers into the industry and protected them from the market dominance of NTT. In so doing NTT has become to be strictly regulated by MPT. There arose a straight conflict between MPT and NTT. NTT used to be an integrated bureaucracy which accumulated deepest knowledge about telecommunications and still is the most knowledgeable service provider. MPT came later and it must rely upon NTT as for the management of telecommunications sector. But MPT took the approach of omnipotent regulator from the outset.