Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
## （4） 内水面漁業・養殖業分類及び3湖沼漁業分類の定義

ア 内水面漁業魚種分類

魚種分類	該当する魚種名等
魚類	さけ・ます類	さけ類	しろざけ（「ときしらず」、「あきざけ」と称する地方もある。）、ぎんざけ、ますのすけ等
からふとます	からふとます（「せっぱります」と称する地方もある。）
さくらます	さくらます（「ます」、「ほんます」、「まます」と称する地方もある。）
その他のさけ・ます類	ひめます（べにざけの陸封性）、にじます、ブラウントラウト、やまめ（さくらますの陸封性、「やまべ」と称する地方もある。）、いわな、おしょろこま、かわます、ごぎ、えぞいわな、びわます（あまご）、いわめ、いとう等
わかさぎ	わかさぎ
あゆ	あゆ
しらうお	しらうお
こい	こい
ふな	ふな（きんぶな、ぎんぶな、げんごろぶな、かわちぶな等）
うぐい・おいかわ	うぐい、まるた、おいかわ（「やまべ」、「はや」、「はえ」と称する地方もある。）
うなぎ	うなぎ
はぜ類	まはぜ、ひめはぜ、うろはぜ、ちちぶはぜ、じゃこはぜ、あしじろはぜ、ごくらくはぜ、どんこ、かわあなご、いさぎ、しろうお、よしのぼり、びりんご、ちちぶ、うきごり等
その他の魚類	上記以外の魚類（どじょう、ふくどじょう、あじめどじょう、しまどじょう、ぼら、めなだ、かじか、なまず、もろこ、にごい、ししゃも、らいぎょ、そうぎょ等）
貝類	しじみ	やまとしじみ、ましじみ、せたしじみ等
その他の貝類	しじみ以外の貝類
その動植物の物水類	えび類	すじえび、てながえび、ぬかえび等（ざりがにを除く。）
その他の水産動植物類	上記以外の水産動植物類（さざあみ、やつめうなぎ、かに、藻類等）
イ 内水面養殖業魚種分類

魚 種	該 当 す る 魚 種 名 等
魚類	ます類	にじます	にじます、ブラウントラウト、ドナルドソン
その他のます類	やまめ、あまご、いわな等
あゆ	あゆ
こい	こい
うなぎ	うなぎ
## ウ 3 湖沼漁業魚種分類

(7) 琵琶湖

魚種分類	該当する魚種名等
魚類	わかさぎ	わかさぎ
ます	びわます
こあゆ	こあゆ（ひうお（こあゆの稚魚）を含む。）
こい	こい
ふな	にごろぶな	にごろぶな
その他	にごろぶな以外のふな
うぐい・おいかわ	うぐい・おいかわ
うなぎ	うなぎ
はぜ類	いさざ	いさざ（はぜ類）
その他	いさざ以外のはぜ類
もろこ類	ほんもろこ	もろこ（ほんもろこ）
その他	もろこ（ほんもろこ）以外のもろこ類（すごもろこ、でめもろこ等を含む。）
はす	はす
その他の魚類	前記以外のいずれにも分類されない魚類
貝類	しじみ	せたしじみ
その他の貝類	前記以外のいずれにも分類されない貝類
その他の水産	えび類	すじえび、てながえび
その他の水産動物類	前記のいずれにも分類されない水産動物類

(イ) 霞ヶ浦及び北浦

魚種分類	該当する魚種名等
魚類	わかさぎ	わかさぎ
しらうお	しらうお
こい	こい
ふな	ふな
うなぎ	うなぎ
はぜ類	まはぜ、ひめはぜ
ぼら類	ぼら、めなだ
その他の魚類	前記のいずれにも分類されない魚類(たなご類、さより、どじょう類、すずき、ひがい、れんぎょ、そうぎょ、らいぎょ、ブラックバス等)
貝類	しじみ	やまとしじみ
その他の貝類	前記のいずれにも分類されない貝類(からすがい(たんがい)、いけちょうがい)
その他の物類	えび類	すじえび、てながえび
その他の水産動物類	前記のいずれにも分類されない水産動物類
## (5) 漁業・養殖業水域別生産統計の世界水域区分図

図中の○付数字は、国際連合食糧農業機関（FAO）の水域区分番号である。
Outline of the 2014 NPA Report on Public Employee Personnel Management

1. Measures regarding the amendment to the National Public Service Act, etc.

(1) The amendment to the National Public Service Act, etc.

• The prime minister newly conducts integrated personnel management of senior officials, fostering courses for senior official candidates, and an operation regarding organizations and the number of staff members. The Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs was established and deals with these new duties as well as existing ones.

• The NPA continues to play the role of securing fairness in the personnel administration of public employees, and of implementing a compensatory measure for restrictions placed on basic labor rights.

• It is crucial for the NPA and the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs to exercise their own functions fully and operate the systems under their responsibility adequately from now on.

(2) Course of the NPA’s operation for the amendment

• Express opinions on integrated personnel management of senior officials in order to secure fairness, etc.

• Adequately carry out duties concerning appointment, recruitment examinations and training, of which the NPA continues to be in charge, consistently taking account of securing fairness in the personnel administration.

• Adequately implement a compensatory measure for restrictions placed on basic labor rights by submitting, as the NPA’s opinion, a draft proposal of the fixed numbers of staff in each grade of the salary schedules, based on the opinions of employees and employers collected by the NPA.

2. Measures taken to promote personnel management based on ability and performance

• Conduct necessary support to improve the operation of the personnel evaluation system, and assist the Cabinet Office and each ministry with human resource development by conducting training for evaluators, etc.

• Request the Cabinet Office and each ministry to adequately utilize the evaluation results for appointment, dismissal and remuneration.
3. Expansion of the initial appointment and promotion of women and promotion of the work-life balance support system

(1) Measures taken for expansion of initial appointment of women

Strengthen activities to attract women and review contents, etc. of the examination for comprehensive service to encourage a greater number of excellent women to take the examination.

(2) Measures taken for expanding training for promotion of female employees, etc.

Improve training for promotion of female employees, including expanding training for female employees in regional offices.

(3) Considering measures regarding the work-life balance support system for childcare and nursing care

• Consider childcare hours, etc. through examining concrete needs of employees and efforts made by private enterprises for work-life balance support, etc.

• Regarding nursing care, provide necessary information and grasp the concrete needs of employees by holding seminars, etc.

• Regarding teleworking including working at home, etc., consider the management of employees’ working hours.

(4) Encouraging male employees to utilize the work-life balance support system, including childcare leave

Request the Cabinet Office and each ministry to encourage male employees to utilize the work-life balance support system, including childcare leave as well as hold seminars to raise awareness.

### 4. Improvement of the working environment

(1) Revision of the practice of working long hours

Consider more effective measures to reduce overtime work through conducting surveys on efforts made by private enterprises and employees' awareness of overtime work, etc.

(2) Promotion of preventive measures against harassment
• Further measures are needed: to thoroughly conduct training for preventing sexual harassment; to promote participation in such training; and to develop systems for consultation on complaints, etc.

• Promote awareness raising, including preparing and distributing handbooks, etc. using measures for preventing power harassment in private enterprises as reference.

## (3) Promotion of mental healthcare

• Promote the utilization of “Going to Work on a Trial Basis,” etc. to promote smooth returns to work.

• Prepare and distribute E-learning materials, as well as promote improvement of the working environment in order to prevent mental disorders.

## (4) Improvement of the working environment for part-time employees

Take necessary measures for granting part-time employees flexible annual leave in summer after a certain period of continuous service.

### 5. Preparation for recruitment examinations in 2015, etc

Promote preparations for utilization of external English tests in the examination for comprehensive service and smooth postponement of the examination dates.

### 6. Improvement and expansion of training

Develop new training methods and make curriculums, etc. to conduct more effective training.
# The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives: Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households

Junya Hamaaki, Masahiro Hori and Keiko Murata

September 2016

Economic and Social Research Institute

Cabinet Office

Tokyo, Japan

The views expressed in “ESRI Discussion Papers” are those of the authors and not those of the Economic and Social Research Institute, the Cabinet Office, or the Government of Japan. (Contact us: https://form.cao.go.jp/esri/en_opinion-0002.html)
# The Intra-Family Division of Bequests and Bequest Motives: Empirical Evidence from a Survey on Japanese Households $ ^{\dagger} $

Junya Hamaaki, $ ^{a,b} $ Masahiro Hori, $ ^{a} $ and Keiko Murata $ ^{a,c} $

$ ^{a} $ Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Japan

$ ^{b} $ Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University, Japan

$ ^{c} $ Graduate School of Social Sciences, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Japan

September, 2016

## Abstract

The division of bequests among family members differs sharply between Japan and the United States. Whereas in the United States, bequests tend to be divided equally among decedents' children, they tend to be divided unequally in Japan. This paper first tries to answer why this is this case. We start by arguing that certain legal and institutional aspects that lead to equal bequests in the United States are not present in Japan. We then investigate patterns of bequest division in Japan to understand parental bequest motives. In particular, we compare the division of bequests in primary and secondary inheritances to examine parental motives and the role of traditional family values in Japan. While in the case of both “primary” and “secondary” inheritances (referring to inheritances where the first parent has died and inheritances in which the second parent has died, respectively) the patterns of bequest division in Japan look generally consistent with a variety of parental bequest motives proposed in the literature, the role of these motives, especially of the dynastic and strategic motives, is more prominent in primary inheritances, in which the surviving spouse has the opportunity to express his/her intentions. However, Japanese parents, contrary to predictions of the altruism model, appear not to bequeath more to economically disadvantaged children.

JEL classification codes: D13, D31, D64

Keywords: bequests; dynastic motive; altruism; strategic motive; Japan
### 1. Introduction

Bequests feature prominently in theoretical and empirical discussions of household savings, capital accumulation, fiscal and tax policies, and the distribution of income and assets. Gaining a better understanding of bequest motives therefore is of considerable relevance for a wide range of issues in economics and economic policy. For instance, altruism-based bequests provide the foundation for models with infinite-lived agents (see, e.g., Barro [1974]), which are widely used in economic analyses.

Most hypotheses regarding bequest motives imply that one would expect decedents to divide their estate unequally among children. If bequests reflect parental altruism (as in Barro [1974] and Becker [1974]) or intra-family exchange (as in Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers [1985], Cox [1987] and Cox and Rank [1992]), the division of bequests should vary with the characteristics of households as well as those of decedents and their heirs. However, in a number of Western countries, most notably the United States, there is substantial evidence that parental bequests to children are nonetheless typically divided equally (e.g., Menchik [1980, 1988], Wilhelm [1996], McGarry [1999], Behrman and Rosenzweig [2004], Light and McGarry [2004], Norton and Van Houtven [2006] for the United States; Arrondel, Masson, and Pestieau [1997] for France; and Ohlsson [2007] for Sweden). This finding has been regarded as a challenge to existing theories on intergenerational transfers and came to be known as the “equal division puzzle.” One possible explanation is that equal division reflects accidental bequests or parental indifference, but such explanations do not take into account that parents treat their children unequally when making inter vivos transfers (gifts) to their children (e.g., Dunn and Phillips [1997], McGarry [1999] and Hochguertel and Ohlsson [2009]).

Given this puzzle, the equal division of bequests has attracted considerable research attention and thanks to such research, and especially the study by Bernheim and Severinov (2003), a consensus regarding the mechanisms underlying the equal division of bequests in the United States appears to have emerged, highlighting the following:

While parents often prefer to treat their children unequally for a variety of reasons, they do not want this to be known to their children or to third parties.

Intergenerational asset transfers can be divided into two types: transfers observable only to those involved in the transfer, such as life insurance claims, trust assets, and gifts; and transfers that are also observable to others than those involved, such as bequests, especially through probate.

When parents choose to transfer their assets unequally among their children, they have incentives to do so stealthily and to treat the observable part equally.

While earlier studies appear to have helped to elucidate the mechanisms giving rise to the puzzle, they also made clear the inconvenient fact that studies on probate records in the United States
may not be helpful for understanding the motives underlying intergenerational asset transfers. (Equally divided estates in probate records are unlikely to contain rich information on the bequest motives.)

Against this background, this study focuses on the intra-family division of estates in Japan, which has different institutions (and incentive structures) and cultural norms from the United States regarding bequests, in order to examine (indirectly) the validity of existing explanations of the “equal division puzzle” and to elucidate the bequest motives to the greatest extent possible. In contrast with Western countries, there are few studies on the division of estates in Japan, with the exception of a few survey-based descriptive analyses by Horioka (1984, 2002, and 2014). Using data from a questionnaire survey designed and implemented by our research group on inheritances, we first show the fact that actual bequests are divided quite unequally among children in Japan. $ ^{1} $ We then investigate patterns of bequest division in Japan to understand parental bequest motives.

We start by reviewing legal and other institutions related to bequests in the two countries and, based on this, argue that some of the circumstances resulting in equal division in the United States are not present in Japan. We further argue that certain cultural and social norms and practices in Japan also mean that one would expect unequal division in Japan. Since the way inheritances are divided among children are bound to reflect the motives for leaving bequests, investigating bequest patterns should provide useful information for understanding parental bequest motives. Moreover, by comparing bequest patterns in primary inheritances – that is, inheritances where the first parent has died but a surviving spouse is present – and secondary inheritances – that is, inheritances where the second parent has also died and hence no parent is present – we attempt to elucidate parental motives and the role of traditional family values in Japan. While both in the case of primary and secondary inheritances bequest patterns in our survey-based micro data look generally consistent with a variety of bequest motives proposed in the literature, the role of those motives, especially that of dynastic (family line) and strategic motives, is more conspicuous in primary inheritances, in which the surviving spouse has the opportunity to express his/her view. However, Japanese parents, contrary to predictions of the altruism model, do not appear to bequeath more to economically disadvantaged children, although children appear to allocate bequests altruistically to ensure that a (disadvantaged) surviving parent is financially supported.
The study makes the following (original) contributions in the literature. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the patterns of actual bequest division, instead of intended division, by households in Japan, where estates are typically divided unequally among children. It is also the first study to use microdata on the bequest share of individual heirs to examine parental bequest motives, while most previous studies use bivariate data to identify whether estates are divided equally or not. Furthermore, it compares the patterns of bequest division of primary and secondary inheritances to identify parental bequest motives separately from other motives reflecting the shared values of other family members, whereas most previous studies in Western countries focus only on secondary inheritances. Finally, the analysis in this study carefully takes account of legal, institutional, and cultural differences between Japan and the United States. Therefore, the empirical findings reported in this study based on microdata from a unique household survey that has a wealth of information on bequest division provide important insights on parental bequest motives that are of relevance for economic researchers and policy makers not only in Japan but also elsewhere.

The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section describes the legal, cultural, and social institutions surrounding inheritances in Japan to provide some background to the contrasting patterns of bequest division between the United States and Japan. Section 3 then introduces our data source, the “Family and Lifestyle Survey,” and discusses the data used for the analysis. Section 4 outlines our empirical strategy to identify bequest motives, while Section 5 reports our estimation results and discusses their implications. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our findings and concludes.

### 2. Institutional differences between Japan and the United States

We start our discussion by examining key legal and cultural institutions and norms in the United States and Japan. Understanding these institutions helps to understand the reasons for the contrasting patterns of bequest division between the two countries.

### 2.1 Wills and will substitutes

Both in Japan and the United States, inheritance laws, as a general rule, stipulate that children shall receive equal shares of a parent’s bequest. If parents want to divide their bequest unequally among their children, the most straightforward way to do so is to prepare a will. This, however, means that their children (as well as third parties) will know about the unequal treatment. In practice, roughly 30 to 50 percent of decedents in the United States die testate, but their wills usually do not allocate bequests disproportionately among children and are simply prepared to
reduce the burden of cumbersome probate. $ ^{2} $ Instead of giving instructions for an unequal division of the bequest among children, wills are typically drawn up to prepare for two contingent states, namely, whether the decedent’s spouse is still alive at the time of bequest or not.

If parents want to divide their bequest unequally among their children without their children being aware of this, a common practice in the United States is to transfer assets through will substitutes and/or inter vivos gifts. Will substitutes are means that allow a parent to transfer assets at his/her death to heirs outside of the probate process, in which documents become part of the public record and can be accessed not only by heirs, but also by the general public. Examples of will substitutes include irrevocable living trusts and life insurance, where a deceased person designates a beneficiary to whom payments are made after his/her death. Since parents in the United States typically want to keep any unequal treatment of children secret, will substitutes as well as inter vivos gifts are widely used.

In contrast, in Japan, people usually neither leave a will $ ^{3} $ nor use will substitutes or gifts as means of unequal intergenerational asset transfers to heirs (children). As explained in detail later, the tradition in Japan is to regard the assets left by a decedent not as his/her personal property but as family property. Therefore, although civil law in Japan has stipulations regarding the statutory division of bequests, the most common procedure is to divide inherited assets in a negotiation among surviving family members. In the negotiation process, the inherited assets can be distributed freely as long as the heirs can come to an agreement, regardless of whether a will was left or not. $ ^{4} $ While in the United States non-statutory distributions would be regarded as taxable gifts, in Japan such distributions are treated as part of the inheritance and heirs can allocate the inherited assets among themselves costlessly as they like (evenly or unevenly). Moreover, since a cumbersome probate process does not exist in Japan, there is no need to avoid it through the use of a will or will substitutes.

### 2.2 Inheritance, estate, and gift tax laws

One of the most important determinants of differences between the United States and Japan is differences in the tax system. That being said, in both countries, it is (in principle) not possible to avoid asset transfer taxes through manipulation of the way bequests are divided among children. $ ^{5} $
Therefore, the contrasting patterns in bequest division do not result from differences in the degree of tax (dis)advantages of the unequal treatment of children. Instead, what appears to make a difference is the cost of making gifts (relative to bequests).

In Japan, the tax burden is much higher for intervivos gifts than for bequests. Recipients of gifts are subject to gift tax if they receive gifts exceeding ¥1.1 million (ca. 10,000) in any given year. On the other hand, until 2014, Japanese inheritance tax law set a very high exemption level of ¥50 million plus ¥10 million $ \times $ the numbers of statutory heirs, $ ^{6} $ meaning that only about 4 percent of inheritances were subject to inheritance tax. Moreover, in Japan, the progressivity of gift taxes is far greater than that of inheritance taxes. It is likely due to these aspects of the tax system that in Japan bequests make up a larger share of intergenerational asset transfers than in the United States.

On the other hand, in the United States, it is possible to significantly reduce the total amount of transfer taxes (i.e., inheritance/estate taxes plus gift taxes) by making gifts, since federal law provides various tax breaks for gifts. Specifically, until the 1976 tax reform, gift and estate taxes were treated separately, and gifts were taxed more modestly than bequests. It was therefore possible to reduce transfer tax payments by transferring wealth in the form of gifts. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 equalized the tax rates on gifts and estates and established a new transfer credit system that applies to gift and estate taxes in order to prevent individuals, especially the wealthy, from avoiding (or reducing) estate taxes by making gifts. $ ^{7} $ However, even though gift and estate taxes were integrated, U.S. tax law still allows each individual to make tax-free transfers up to 14,000 per recipient per year. $ ^{8} $ This means that a married couple can make inter-vivos gifts of up to 28,000 (per recipient per year) without incurring any taxes, so that the amount exempted from tax is more than twice as large as in Japan. These considerations suggest that the