Table 4. Determinants of the deviation from the statutory share: Primary inheritances

Sample for analysis	All available observations	Observations for which the sum of reported shares equals 100%
Estimation method	Tobit	OLS	Tobit	OLS
(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	(H)
Marg. Eff.	Marg. Eff.	Coef.	Coef.	Marg. Eff.	Marg. Eff.	Coef.	Coef.
Dynastic motive
Sibling structure
Dummy for those with sibling(s)	0.608 **	0.528	0.882 **	0.813 *	0.716 *	0.536	1.064 *	0.928
(0.26)	(0.325)	(0.371)	(0.447)	(0.406)	(0.46)	(0.6)	(0.647)
Dummy for those with sibling(s)×Dummy for those with sibling(s) of the opposite sex	0.280 *	0.243	0.393 **	0.408 **	0.242	0.336	0.372 *	0.546 **
(0.15)	(0.172)	(0.176)	(0.204)	(0.192)	(0.212)	(0.224)	(0.253)
Dummy for those with sibling(s)×Dummy for first son	-0.130	0.054	-0.270	-0.131	0.124	0.227	-0.073	-0.090
(0.283)	(0.335)	(0.344)	(0.402)	(0.376)	(0.435)	(0.468)	(0.544)
Ratio of real assets in total inheritance amount respondent received	0.013 ***	0.012 ***	0.012 ***	0.011 ***	0.013 ***	0.012 ***	0.011 ***	0.010 ***
(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Equal treatment of children
Dummy for those who are better educated	-0.301	-0.513 ***	-0.347	-0.586 ***	-0.475	-0.748 ***	-0.464	-0.734 **
(0.204)	(0.184)	(0.237)	(0.212)	(0.299)	(0.259)	(0.354)	(0.308)
Dummy for receiving financial assistance from parent(s)	-0.409 **	-0.443 **	-0.661 ***	-0.684 ***	-0.517 **	-0.563 **	-0.806 ***	-0.840 ***
(0.175)	(0.217)	(0.203)	(0.253)	(0.238)	(0.259)	(0.281)	(0.311)
Altruism toward family members
Dummy for those who are economically advantaged	-0.063	-0.122	-0.037	-0.140	0.030	-0.079	0.007	-0.178
(0.199)	(0.178)	(0.221)	(0.202)	(0.274)	(0.233)	(0.306)	(0.278)
Dummy for past occupational status of the surviving parent (Reference group: Full-time homemaker)
Self-employed	0.543 **	0.867 ***	0.594 *	0.886 **	0.768 **	1.047 **	0.859 **	1.043 **
(0.274)	(0.322)	(0.31)	(0.356)	(0.376)	(0.42)	(0.426)	(0.464)
Salaried worker	0.428 **	0.725 ***	0.472 **	0.751 ***	0.488 *	0.793 ***	0.524 *	0.723 **
(0.2)	(0.221)	(0.209)	(0.237)	(0.272)	(0.271)	(0.28)	(0.288)
Dummy for the age of the surviving parent at the time of the primary inheritance (Reference group: 60 or younger)
Between 60 and 74	-	0.842 ***	-	0.660 ***	-	1.104 ***	-	0.859 **
-	(0.26)	-	(0.247)	-	(0.347)	-	(0.336)
75 years of age or above	-	0.949 ***	-	0.832 ***	-	1.141 ***	-	0.901 **
-	(0.3)	-	(0.303)	-	(0.41)	-	(0.424)
Strategic motives
Dummy for those who live(d) with the deceased parent or the surviving parent
Co-residence with the deceased parent	0.044	0.008	0.107	0.064	0.191	0.169	0.353	0.290
(0.297)	(0.312)	(0.344)	(0.358)	(0.403)	(0.405)	(0.467)	(0.471)
Co-residence with the surviving parent	0.623 **	0.602 *	0.724 **	0.679 *	0.707 *	0.765 *	0.861 *	0.880 *
(0.298)	(0.315)	(0.328)	(0.35)	(0.389)	(0.405)	(0.448)	(0.468)
Dummy for providing financial assistance to parent(s)	-0.090	-0.081	-0.080	-0.033	0.011	-0.103	-0.054	-0.101
(0.312)	(0.371)	(0.361)	(0.439)	(0.445)	(0.502)	(0.532)	(0.623)
Other motives
Dummy for those who had a better relationship with their parent(s) than their siblings	0.173	0.064	0.243	0.118	0.115	0.079	0.125	0.153
(0.253)	(0.239)	(0.267)	(0.249)	(0.294)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.326)
Dummy for those who had to pay inheritance tax	0.215	0.146	0.142	0.111	0.322	0.191	0.287	0.204
(0.239)	(0.289)	(0.291)	(0.355)	(0.378)	(0.422)	(0.465)	(0.533)
Very affluent parents	0.657	0.896	0.669	0.945	0.802	1.321	0.852	1.356
(0.751)	(1.026)	(0.791)	(1.009)	(0.889)	(1.333)	(0.959)	(1.283)
Adjusted R-squared/Pseudo R-squared	0.069	0.083	0.177	0.198	0.069	0.091	0.172	0.198
F-value	4.24 ***	3.46 ***	4.57 ***	3.78 ***	2.94 ***	2.77 ***	3.05 ***	2.86 ***
Log pseudo likelihood	-553.2	-440.3	-	-	-369.0	-302.4	-	-
Number of observations	304	244	304	244	192	160	192	160

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. $ ^{***} $ , $ ^{**} $ , $ ^{*} $ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Marginal effects are calculated as $ \beta_{1} \times \Phi(X\beta/\sigma) $ at the mean of covariates.