Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
Note: The FTC has announced the adoption of a policy to actively accuse to seek criminal penalties on the following cases:

a. Vicious and serious cases which are considered to have wide-spread influence on people's livings, out of those violations which substantially restrain competition in certain areas of trade such as price-fixing cartels, supply restraint cartels, market allocations, bid-rigging, group boycotts, and other violations.

b. Among violation cases involving those firms or industries who are repeat offenders or those who do not abide by the elimination measures, those cases for which the administrative measures of the FTC are not considered to fulfill the purpose of the Act.

("The Fair Trade Commission's Policy on Criminal Accusation and Compulsory Investigation of Criminal Cases Regarding Antimonopoly Violations" published October 7, 2005)

## (4) Indemnification of damages

Regarding a violation described in 1(2) above, firms who conduct unreasonable restraints of trade or unfair trade practices assume absolute liabilities to the injured party after the Cease and Desist Order or the Surcharge Payment Order issued by the FTC has become final and binding (Sec.25, 26).

When a damage suit is filed against a firm in question in accordance with Section 25, the FTC will submit, at the court's request, the FTC's views on the amount of damages caused by the violation (Sec.84).

The FTC will provide related materials when commissioned by a court to do so to ensure that the damage-suit system under Section 25 can effectively function.

## Part II - The Antimonopoly Act and Firms' and Trade Associations' Real Activities in connection with Bids

### 1. Conduct Related to the Selection of Conduct Awardee

## (1) Viewpoint

The Public Accounting Act and the Local Autonomy Act prescribe bid procedures in which, in principle, contract awarding public agency selects the bidder, for a contract awardee, who tenders the most advantageous terms for the agency, and then award the contract according to the terms the bidder offers.

The functions of the bid system will be undermined by firms' concerted conduct or a trade association's conduct of predetermined an expected bid winner, or of predetermined a procedure for selecting an expected bid winner. Moreover, such conduct will result in the restraint of competition in the transaction of goods or services through bid process, and, in principle, constitute violation of the Antimonopoly Act.

Conduct of predetermined an expected bid winner or conduct of predetermined a procedure for selecting an expected bid winner is basically defined as any conduct, regardless of the specific methods or procedures employed, that is engaged in to
specify the awardee in a bid so as to make the contract awarded to him.

As used in this context, predetermination is not limited to the explicit predetermination of an expected bid winner or of a procedure for selecting expected bid winner, but extends to the formation of any tacit understanding or common intent concerning an expected bid winner or a procedure for selecting an expected bid winner.

Conduct of predetermined an expected bid winner or conduct of predetermined a procedure for selecting an expected bid winner, is held in violation regardless of the purpose or the intent of the conduct. Such purposes as to assure the quality of the goods or services supplied, to equalize the opportunities for being awarded contracts, or to take into account the business activities of individual firms, and to respect continuity and established relations with previously contracted work do not justify such conduct.

If a third party recommends a certain firm as an expected bid winner, and if firms concertedly decide, or if a trade association decides, to accept this recommendation, such conduct of firms or a trade association results in predetermined an expected bid winner.

(2) Examples

The following section describes various types of conduct that can be used as reference cases in realizing whether or not such conduct constitutes violation.

• Conduct in principle constituting violation

1-1 (Predetermining an expected bid winner)

Firms' concerted conduct or a trade association's conduct of predetermined an expected bid winner or predetermined a procedure for selecting an expected bid winner.

(Specific cases)

Firm X and other construction firms (FTC Recommendation decision No.16 of 1992)

In this case, involving bids competed by designated firms for general contracting of civil engineering work ordered by Prefecture A, the designated firms had predetermined the expected bid winners from among them under the agreement that they hold meetings, that they predetermine the expected bid winner from among those expressing an interest in winning a forthcoming bid, taking into consideration such factors as the submission of "PR forms" (in which they described the site of the work and work previously done at neighboring sites, etc.) for each ordered work, the date of submission of those documents and the accuracy of those documents, and that they cooperate so that the expected bid winner may be awarded the contract. This was found to be in violation of Section 3.

Firm Y and other suppliers of adhesive seals for payment notices (FTC Recommendation decision No.9 of 1993)

In this case, involving bids for special seals for payment notices ordered by Ministry B, the designated firms and another firm had decided that they would predetermine the expected bid winner for each bid by collusion, and that the designated firms would hold discussions to select the expected bid winner and would cooperate so that the expected bid winner may be awarded the contract. And then, based on this decision, they had predetermined the expected bid winners. This was found to be in violation of Section 3.
records of similar types of work done, description of its technical and engineering staff, and an implementation plan for the work to be awarded, responding to the institutional request of such agencies, prior to the agency's designation of firms, without consultation and adjustment with other firms or a trade association.

## 1 -6 (Declining to participate in a bid on one's own judgement)

A designated firm's conduct of declining to participate in a bid, based on the business management decision of the firm itself, without consultation or adjustment with, or without requests from other firms or a trade association.

### 2. Conduct Related to Bid Prices

## (1) Viewpoint

Prices must be determined through fair and free competition among firms. It is highly probable that firms' concerted activities or trade association's activities related to prices raise problems under the Antimonopoly Act.

With regard to bids generally, the Public Accounting Act and the Local Autonomy Act prescribe strict conformity to the principle of price competition. These laws stipulated, in principle, that the contract must be awarded to the participating firm that submits the lowest bid (or the highest bid, depending on the aim of the contract) so long as this does not exceed the estimated price of agency, and that the winning bid price is to be applied as the contract price.

The functions of the bid system are undermined by firms' concerted conduct or a trade association's conduct of predetermined a minimum bid price (or a maximum bid price, depending on the aim of the contract), an expected winning bid price or standards for the determination of these prices (hereinafter the "minimum bid price" includes a minimum bid price, an expected winning bid price and such standards). Moreover, this conduct results in the restraint of competition in the transaction of goods or services through bid process, and, in principle, constitutes violation of the Antimonopoly Act.

As used in this context, predetermination is not limited to explicit predetermination of a minimum bid prices but extends to the formation of any tacit understandings or common intent concerning a minimum bid price.

Conduct of predetermined a minimum bid price is held in violation regardless of the purpose or the intent of the conduct. Such purposes as to maintain appropriate price levels, to assure the quality of the goods or services supplied, or to prevent contracting at unreasonably low prices do not justify such conduct.

## (2) Example

• Conduct in principle constituting violation

2-1 (Predetermining a minimum bid price)

Firms' concerted conduct or a trade association's conduct of predetermined minimum bid price.

## (Specific cases)

Firm X and other manufacturers of water meters (FTC Recommendation decision No.33)
contents of the information concerning the prices of goods or services to be submitted to contract awarding public agency, while knowing that this information is to be used as a base in the computation of the estimated price of the agency, would raise problems under the Antimonopoly Act, regarded as leading to restraint on price.

## (Specific cases of violation)

Firm X and other manufacturers and distributors of metal covers for public-sewer manholes (FTC Hearing decision No.2 of 1991)

In this case, the firms had been aware that roughly 90 percent of the estimated prices, of city-type metal covers (metal covers as specified by City A), which City A obtained from selected firms for computation of sewage construction costs, was used by City A as the design unit-price when placing an order, and that the sales price by the firms for the sewage constructors could be derived by deducting the profit margins of the constructors and trading companies from that design unit-price. Based on this knowledge, the firms had predetermined the minimum estimates to be submitted to City A and predetermined the sales prices by taking into account the profit margins of the sewage constructors and trading companies. This was found to be in violation of Section 3.

• Conduct in principle not constituting violation

2-3 (Study concerning computation criteria)

Firms' concerted conduct or a trade association's conduct of studying computation criteria which have been made public by contract awarding public agency (Excluding such conduct which gives common standards of the computed prices of contracts among firms.).

2-4 (Formulation of general rule of computation)

Conduct, by a trade association of small- and medium-scale firms, of formulating methods of computation that list standard expense items, or of indicating the standard materials and labor required, for the purpose of improving the computational capabilities of members, for bids in general (Excluding such conduct which gives common standards of the computed prices of contracts among firms.).

### 3. Conduct Related to Contractual Quantity

## (1) Viewpoint

In certain bid systems, due to the characteristic and aim of contract, participants may be asked to submit such offers as quantities in addition to prices. In such cases, the bid process is used to determine the awardees, the contract prices and also such terms as contractual quantities in accordance with the contents of the offers. Firms' concerted conduct or a trade association's conduct of predetermined such terms as quantities or shares of a contract results in the restraint of competition in the transaction of goods or services through bid process, and, in principle, constitutes violation.

As used in this context, predetermined is not limited to explicit predetermined of quantities or shares of a contract, but extends to the formation for any tacit understanding or common intent concerning quantities or shares of a contract.

Firms' concerted conduct or a trade association's conduct of predetermined quantities or shares of a contract is held in violation regardless of the purpose or the
intent of the conduct.

## (2) Examples

• Conduct in principle constituting violation

3-1 (Predetermining quantities or shares of contract)

Firms' concerted conduct or a trade association's conduct of predetermined quantities or shares of a contract through a bid process.

(Special case of violation)

Firm X and other distributors of silk fabrics (FTC Consent decision No.14 of 1950)

In this case, involving bids competed by firms for the domestic sale of inventories of silk fabrics held for export by Public Corporation A, the firm had decided that 10 out of the 25 firms participating in the bid would win the bid for the minimum bid quantity equivalent to one-tenth of the entire quantity. At the same time, the firms had predetermined the bid prices. This was found to be in violation of Section 3.

• Conduct in principle not constituting violation

3-2 (Publishing rough aggregate of past public procurements)

For the purpose of grasping the general trends in related public procurements, a trade association's conduct of requesting its members to voluntarily submit rough aggregate of past public procurements awarded without individual procurement specified, or collecting information which has been made public by contract awarding public agency concerning past public procurements or forthcoming public procurements scheduled, and conduct of publishing rough aggregate of past public procurements or general outlook for forthcoming public procurements in question without those of individual firm specified.

### 4. Collecting and Offering Information and Management Guidance

(1) Viewpoint

A trade association's conduct of collecting and offering information and materials concerning the bid system in general or propagating general knowledge relevant to the relation between the Antimonopoly Act and the firms' or trade associations' activities in connection with bids in accordance with these Guidelines does not constitute violation in principle.

As opposed to this, conduct, by a trade association which includes firms intending to participate in a bid, of collecting and offering information concerning the bid or promoting the exchange of such information among such firms would raise problems under the Antimonopoly Act, in a case that such conduct leads to the one which restrains or impedes competition or is used as a method or a procedure for the conduct which restrains or impedes competition.

Needless to say, conduct of collecting information, as far as undertaken independently and not concertedly by individual firms, does not raise problems under the Antimonopoly Act. As opposed to this, conduct of mutually exchanging information concerning a bid by firms intending to participate in the bid would raise problems under the Antimonopoly Act.
(Exchange of information concerning bid prices)

➢ Conduct of exchanging information concerning bid prices among firms intending to participate in a bid. Or, conduct of collecting and offering such information by a trade association which includes such firms, or conduct of promoting the exchange of such information among such firms by it.

(Previously cited under 2-1-1)

• Conduct suspected to be in violation

4-1 (Reporting the fact of designation and planned participation in bids)

Firms' concerted conduct of a trade association's conduct of requiring individual firms to report the fact of their designation for participation or their intent to participate in a forthcoming bid.

(Previously cited under 1-2)

4-2 (Exchange of information concerning combination of partners in a joint venture)

▶ Conduct of exchanging information concerning combination of partners in a joint venture between a firm intending to participate in a bid as a partner in a joint venture and a firm intending to participate in a bid individually or as a partner in other joint venture, or, of promoting the exchange of such information by a trade association (Excluding such conduct which comes under 4-9).

4-3 (Exchange of information concerning price levels of goods or services subject to a bid)

➢ Conduct of exchanging information among firms intending to participate in a bid concerning the price levels or trends in prices of goods or services subject to a bid, or conduct of collecting and offering such information by a trade association which includes such firms or conduct of promoting the exchange of such information among such firms by it, in such a case that contract awarding public agency requests firms or a trade association to submit information to be used in the computation of the estimated price for the bid of the agency.

(Previously cited under 2-2)

• Conduct in principle not constituting violation

4-4 (Collecting and offering general information concerning bids)

A trade association's conduct of collecting and offering general information concerning bids (information regarding the records of past and future contracts to be awarded by contract awarding public agencies, information concerning the qualifications for participation in bids or designation criteria, or information concerning the objective data of trends in labor wages and prices of materials including raw materials) made public by governments, public agencies or private research organizations.

## 4 -5 (Publishing rough aggregate of past public procurements)

For the purpose of grasping the general trends in related public procurements, a trade association's conduct of requesting its members to voluntarily submit rough aggregate of past public procurements awarded without individual procurement specified, or collecting information which has been made public by contract awarding public agency concerning past public procurements or forthcoming public procurements scheduled, and conduct of publishing rough aggregate of past public procurements or general outlook for forthcoming public procurements in question
(Previously cited under 2-4)

4-12 (Formulating and offering guidelines for the operation of permanent joint ventures)

➢ Conduct, by a trade association of small- and medium-scale firms, of formulating and offering to members general guidelines concerning the operation of permanent joint ventures (methods for the distribution of necessary expenses for the implementation of the work allotted to each member, and methods for the sharing of common cost).

4-13 (Study concerning computation criteria)

Firms' concerted conduct or a trade association's conduct of studying computation criteria which have been made public by contract awarding public agency (Excluding such conduct which gives common standards of the computed prices of contracts among firms.).

(Previously cited under 2-3)

4-14 (Activities for the propagation of general knowledge relevant to the Antimonopoly Act)

Firms' concerted conduct or a trade association's conduct of propagating general knowledge relevant to the relation between the Antimonopoly Act and the firms' or trade associations' activities in connection with bids in accordance with these guidelines.

4-15 (Activities for the enlightenment of firms on the necessity of the fulfillment of contractual obligations)

Firms' concerted conduct or a trade association's conduct of general enlightenment on the necessity of the fulfillment of contractual obligations, the necessity of proper conduct of subcontract transactions, and, of safe operation, undertaken through bids, or, for this purpose, conduct of studying technical trends and content of the bid system, or, of related laws and regulations, and propagating general knowledge thereof (Excluding such conduct which may lead to the exchange of information, issuance of guidance or requests concerning a specific bid.).

4-16 (Expression of opinions or requests to the national and local governments)

Firms' concerted conduct or a trade association's conduct of expressing opinions or requests to the national and local governments concerning the content or management of the bid system in general.

4-17 (Giving technical information to contract awarding public agency)

Firms' conduct of giving general information on technology to contract awarding public agency, not related to specific bids.
## 0 前提

協調政策ケースでは、アメリカの財政赤字の縮小政策及び金融緩和政策に合わせて、各国が協調して金融緩和等の経済拡大政策が採られる。日本でもイ）85年1～3月期以降公定歩合を1.5%引下げ、口）公共投資を85年に5,000億円（実質1975年価格）追加し、更に86年に5,000億円（実質）追加し、合計1兆円（実質）の公共投資を追加するものと想定している。（これは名目でもほぼ同額である。）

## 1 概 観

このような協調政策ケースの我が国経済への影響は、次のように要約できるであろう。

1）我が国の経済政策（財政金融の両面からの拡大政策）が、我が国の為替レート（円／ドル）に及ぼす効果は乗数によればともに円安の方向であるが、協調政策ケースでは、海外諸国の政策効果を強く受けて、為替レート（円／ドル）は逆に円高となる。

2）公共投資追加と為替レートが円高となることから、純輸出は単純外挿ケースと比べ減少する。従って、協調政策ケースでは、日本は内需依存型の経済成長をとる。

3）実質GNPの伸率でみた経済成長率は、単純外挿ケースよりは高くなるが、我が国が単独で財政・金融政策を発動したときよりは低くなる。従って、協調政策ケースでの我が国の財政・金融面からの景気刺激政策は、ある意味では、海外からのデフレ効果を相殺するために必要な政策であると言えよう。更に言えば、日本の採る財政・金融政策は、アメリカ経済と世界経済を正常な姿に戻すためのコストである。

協調政策ケースで日本の採る政策は、イ）85年1～3月期以降公定歩合を1.5％引下げる。口）公共投資を85年に5,000億

表II - 2 - 4 協調政策ケースと単純外挿ケース

の比較：日本 （前年比伸率等）

単純外挿ケース	協調政策ケース
1985	1986	1985	1986
民間消費支出	4.1	3.8	4.2	4.2
民間住宅投資	5.3	4.9	5.4	5.5
民間設備投資	5.4	4.1	5.8	4.5
輸輸	8.6	4.1	7.5	3.3
財輸	9.2	4.2	8.7	4.1
輸輸	10.6	5.8	10.0	5.7
財輸	10.1	5.3	10.8	6.7
実質国民総生産	4.2	3.5	4.4	3.7
名日国民総生産	5.2	4.3	5.4	4.2
在庫デフソータ	△0.7	△0.6	△0.9	△2.5
民間消費支出デフソータ	2.5	2.1	2.4	1.4
一人当たり雇用者所得	4.3	3.3	4.3	2.8
失業率(%)	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7
政府バランス対GNP比(%)	△3.4	△3.1	△3.6	△3.3
通貨供給量(M2)	4.3	3.8	9.8	7.4
短期金利(%)	6.5	6.6	5.1	4.9
長期金利(%)	6.9	6.9	6.5	5.9
経常収支(億ドル)	390	480	390	520
直物為替シート(年平均価円/ドル)	230	226	224	208

表II - 2 - 5 展望期間中のGNP成長率の内

· 外需別寄与度 （单位：%）

項目	年	単純外挿ケース	協調政策ケース
1984	1985	1986	1985	1986
内	需	4.0	3.7	3.3	4.1	3.8
民	間	3.8	3.5	3.0	3.7	3.3
政	府	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5
外	需	2.5	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.1
合	計	6.5	4.2	3.4	4.4	3.7

円（実質値）追加し、更に86年に5,000億円（実質値）追加し、合計1兆円（実質値）の公共投資の追加を行うというものである。

以上の政策の効果により、乗数によれば実質
表II - 2 - 6 海外諸国の協調政策の我が国経済に及ぼす効果

（单位：百億円）

85 年	86 年
民間消費支出	4	49
民間住宅投資	4	5
民間設備投資	11	26
民間在庫投資	13	29
輸出	41	120
輸入	29	143
實質国民総生產	36	78

表II - 2 - 7 国内政策効果と協調政策ケースの総合効果 （単位：百億円）

项目	年	出资投资出资金额
民间投资	<ecel>

國內政策効果	協調総合効果
85年	86年	85年	86年
△3	△6	1	43
5	3	1	8
25	55	14	29
26	33	13	4
△12	25	△53	△95
12	23	△17	△20
79	187	43	109

GNPは85年に4.6％成長、86年に3.9％成長を遂げると試算できるが、強調政策ケースでは実質GNPの成長率は85、86年それぞれ4.4%、3.7％となっている。これは、海外の経済政策によって、日本経済がデフレ効果を受けることを示している。

表II - 2 - 6は、このデフレ効果がどの程度のものかを示している。デフレ効果は為替レートが円高になり、財貨輸出が減少することと、海外の金利が低下することによってサービス等の輸出が大きく減少するところから始まる。そして、この輸出の減少が民間設備投資、在庫投資を抑制する。民間消費支出、民間住宅投資は86年に僅かながら増加しているが、これは円高による物価安定効果によるものである。輸入が輸出と同様に減少しているが、これは円高によって貨輸入は増加するものの、サービス等の輸入が金利の低下のため減少するためである。

以上の海外諸国の強調政策の効果と、我が国の政策効果の合計が協調政策ケースにおける総合効果である。

経済の主要な変数について、協調政策ケースを単純外挿ケースと比較しつつ見てみると、前述のように実質GNPの成長率は、85年4.4%、86年3.7%と単純外挿ケースの成長率を上回っている。項目別にみると、消費は主として円高による物価安定効果によって86年には伸率を高める。民間住宅投資も、物価の安定と金利の低下効果により、86年には伸率を高める。民間設備投資と民間在庫投資は内・外の政策効果が逆向きに作用するため、協調政策ケースと単純外挿ケースで目立った違いは生じない。輸出は前述のように円高による財貨輸出の鈍化と、金利低下によるサービス等の輸出の減少により、85、86年と伸率が鈍化していく。輸入は内需拡大と円高により貨輸入が増大するものの、内・外

表II - 2 - 8 内・外の協調政策による輸出入への効果

（单位：百億円）

国内政策による効果	海外からの政策効果	総 合 効果	果年
85 年	86 年	85 年	86 年	85 年	86 年	85 年	86 年
財 貨 輸 出	△11	24	△8	△47	△19	△23
サ ビ ス 等 輸 出	△1	1	△33	△73	△34	△72
輸 出	△12	25	△41	△120	△53	△95
財 貨 輸 出	11	19	5	36	16	55
サ ビ ス 等 輸 出	1	4	△34	△79	△33	△75
輸 出	12	23	△21	△43	△17	△20