Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
Part II

III. Multiplier Analysis of the Insulation and Transmission Mechanisms

(A) Effects of Contractionary Monetary Policy

(i) Multipliers for sustained reduction in the U.S.

high-powered money

To what extent do floating exchange rates insulate other countries from a monetary shock in the United States?

General observations

A 1 percent sustained reduction in the high-powered money stock in the U.S. causes declines in U.S. GNP by about 0.4 percent for the first two years consecutively under both fixed and floating exchange rates. While the own impact on aggregate demand remains largely unchanged in US, its cross-impact on real GNP in other countries is quite different between fixed and floating exchange rates. Under fixed rates, all of the European economies, namely, United Kingdom (UK), France (FR), West Germany (GE) and Italy (IT), and also Japan (JA) are affected adversely to more or less the same extent of around -0.05 percent and -0.10 percent for the first and the second year, respectively (Table 5).
Table 5 Effects of Sustained Reduction in the US High-Powered Money Stock by 1 Percent

Year	Real GNP	Domestic Prices	Short Term Interest Rates*	Current Account**	Official Settlement**	Spot Exchange Rates
Fix	Flex	Fix	Flex	Fix	Flex	Fix	Flex	Fix	Flex	Fix	Flex
US 1	-0.38	-0.40	-0.09	-0.14	0.62	0.58	0.55	0.53	1.04	-0.44	0	-0.86
2	-0.43	-0.43	-0.23	-0.32	0.28	0.23	0.85	0.72	0.98	-0.50	0	-1.16
3	-0.29	-0.29	-0.27	-0.40	0.29	0.22	0.27	0.06	0.69	-0.82	0	-1.24
6	0.15	0.18	-0.27	-0.39	0.41	0.37	-1.03	-0.51	0.22	-1.76	0	-0.96
UK 1	-0.06	-0.05	-0.01	-0.03	0.28	0.26	77	96	-42	-15	0	0.34
2	-0.12	0.04	-0.07	-0.02	0.18	0.15	45	25	-91	-27	0	0.86
3	-0.17	0.04	-0.14	0.06	0.18	0.13	54	40	-104	-21	0	1.07
6	-0.12	0.23	-0.32	0.31	0.22	0.16	200	220	-262	-12	0	1.60
FR 1	-0.03	-0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.04	-0.28	-0.46	-0.45	-0.28	0	0.44
2	-0.09	-0.05	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.04	-1.11	-1.27	-0.79	-0.29	0	0.73
3	-0.12	-0.02	-0.05	0.07	0.02	0.12	-1.47	-1.19	-1.40	-0.36	0	1.18
6	-0.08	0.05	-0.04	0.11	0.06	0.01	-1.28	2.22	-1.69	0.77	0	0.76
GE 1	-0.02	0.04	-0.00	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.02	-0.11	-1.14	-0.67	0	1.00
2	-0.09	0.05	-0.01	0.09	0.11	0.05	0.10	0.26	-1.04	-0.34	0	1.86
3	-0.14	0.07	-0.03	0.14	0.14	0.05	0.30	0.76	-0.89	0.07	0	1.92
6	-0.06	0.24	-0.07	0.18	0.16	0.04	0.33	0.48	-0.31	0.05	0	1.57
IT 1	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	0.04	0.11	0.23	-4	16	-83	-8	0	0.61
2	-0.11	-0.08	-0.06	0.00	0.04	0.06	-24	32	-175	-13	0	0.73
3	-0.13	-0.10	-0.10	-0.03	0.04	0.05	-23	27	-213	-0	0	0.85
6	-0.03	0.08	-0.11	0.03	0.08	0.07	-28	67	-331	40	0	0.86
CA 1	-0.21	-0.09	-0.03	0.14	0.41	0.43	62	-32	-***	-206	0	0.85
2	-0.52	-0.42	-0.12	0.05	0.15	0.19	315	269	-	19	0	0.49
3	-0.45	-0.42	-0.19	-0.02	0.17	0.14	574	595	-	-68	0	0.60
6	-0.14	-0.06	-0.28	-0.09	0.40	0.37	299	319	-	7	0	0.49
JA 1	-0.05	0.04	-0.02	0.20	0.09	0.09	-101	-573	-946	-167	0	1.71
2	-0.12	-0.02	-0.05	0.31	0.07	0.04	-181	-193	-421	47	0	1.53
3	-0.16	-0.09	-0.08	0.28	0.09	0.01	-226	-239	-727	160	0	1.18
6	-0.18	-0.15	-0.05	-0.04	0.16	0.00	213	-422	-699	176	0	0.08
AL 1	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.14	0.12	4	22	-120	-80	0	0.25
2	-0.09	-0.10	-0.03	-0.09	0.17	0.14	-6	-5	-77	-54	0	0.18
3	-0.11	-0.10	-0.06	-0.13	0.19	0.15	-2	-6	-80	-49	0	0.26
6	-0.10	-0.06	-0.19	-0.20	0.21	0.18	51	61	-58	-17	0	0.25
KR 1	-0.12	-0.17	-0.02	-0.14	-0.00	-0.00	-17	-28	-13	-23	0	0
2	-0.45	-0.52	-0.13	-0.33	-0.00	-0.01	-42	-66	-31	-45	0	0
3	-0.51	-0.56	-0.28	-0.53	-0.01	-0.01	7	-6	-19	-29	0	0
6	-0.21	-0.20	-0.25	-0.35	-0.01	-0.01	111	118	25	30	0	0

(Notes) * percentage points

** Units for balance of payments items in tables of multipliers as follows:

US:billion US$; FR:billion FR.F.; GE:billion DM; IT:billion lire; UK:million £

CA:million CA$; JA:million US$; AL:million AL$; KR:million US$

***In Canadian model, official settlement is always zero under fixed exchange rate regime. (Short-term capital account balance is defined as residuals of overall balance.)

(Source) The EPA World Econometric Model, February 1984.
The transmission mechanism is rather straightforward under fixed exchange rates, First, the U.S. tight monetary policy is deflationary on her domestic demand and reduces her import demand for foreign goods by 0.27 percent and 0.73 percent for the first and the second year, respectively. As a result, most other countries suffer from declines in their exports of goods. The trade balance worsens for most countries in contrast to the improvement of the U.S. However, the trade balance improves for the UK for the first 2.5 years and for Canada (CA) for six years. In particular, the former reflects high income elasticities of imports of UK as shown in Table 2, which causes larger declines in imports than exports of goods. A second channel for the transmission of the contractionary U.S. monetary policy is a decline in money supply caused by intervention in the foreign exchange market by monetary authorities in other countries to maintain fixed exchange rates. In the EPA model, intervention is assumed not to be sterilized when the standard solution is produced. Higher U.S. interest rates attract a capital inflow into the U.S., making worse the long-term capital account (except FR for all years and CA for the first year), the short-term capital account (except for GE for all years due to reduced international trade credit extended by GE, or both capital accounts. Consequently, all other countries face a deterioration in the overall balance of payments, leading to reductions in their money supplies and higher interest rates.
How do floating exchange rates alter the channels

through which these effects of the reduced high-powered money

stock in the US are transmitted to the rest of the world?

A 1 percent decrease in the US high-powered money stock

results in a depreciation in all other currencies. The

magnitude of the depreciations varies from country to

country. For the first two years, yen and DM depreciate

most, followed by French franc, Pound sterling, Italian lira,

and CA$. Australian (AL) $ depreciates the least. These

differences in the size of depreciations lie in the

sensitiveness of international capital movement to higher US

interest rates. In the case of GE and JA, the parameters on

international interest rate differentials are high in the

demand function for foreign dollar assets and liabilities, as

compared with other countries.

Because of the depreciation of the currencies vis a vis

the US dollar, real exports of goods from other countries

decline much less under floating than under fixed exchange

rates, and even turn to positive for GE in all six years, UK

for the last five years and for JA for the first three years,

reflecting the larger depreciations of their currencies.

In addition, the overall balance of payments of all

other countries deteriorate much less under the floating than

under the fixed regime, helped by improvements not only in
the current account but also in the capital account. It is, however, interesting that not all countries enjoy improvements in the current account but that almost no country fails to improve the capital account.

J-curve and the capital account

For instance, JA faces a worsening of the current account under floating as compared with fixed exchange rates, though net exports of JA in real terms improve under floating rates. This is, of course, ascribed to the J-curve phenomenon, as discussed in Part I of this paper on the EPA model. Then an interesting question arises as to why and how the capital account of JA can improve under floating as compared with under fixed exchange rates. The mechanism is as follows. Higher interest rates in the U.S. tend to suck in international capital from JA, as is so under fixed exchange rates. The only condition to reverse such international capital flows and attract them into JA is to enhance the expected rate of return $ (i_{\mathrm{JA}} - \mathrm{E}(\dot{\mathrm{s}})) $ on JA bonds as compared with US dollar interest rate $ (i_{\mathrm{US}}) $ . The expected change in the exchange rate of the yen per US dollar $ (E(\dot{\mathrm{s}})) $ is determined in the JA model by the following two main factors: (1) the current account imbalance, and (2) the regressive expectation of the exchange rate. In the case under consideration, the former factor works for depreciation of the yen, whereas the latter works against it. The latter factor more than offset the former force, leading to the
expectation of an appreciation of the yen. Consequently, the

expected rate of return on JA bonds surpasses that on US

bonds.

As a whole, all other countries except Australia (AL)

enjoy an expansion in net exports in real terms owing to

depreciations of their currencies. And in addition, the

money supply in these countries does not decline much owing

to the external financing function of floating exchange

rates, helping to maintain the aggregate demand. Thereby,

floating exchange rates are successful in insulating real GNP

of all other countries from a monetary disturbance in the

U.S.

In the case of South Korea (KR), however, M2 declines

even further under the floating regime adopted by advanced

countries. Since KR which is assumed in the EPA model to

adopt the fixed exchange rate regime as KR actually did so

until February 1980, it suffers larger decline in GNP when

the currencies of advanced countries depreciate in relation

to the Korean won which is fixed with the US dollar.

Trade-off between output and inflation under floating rates

So far good news for the insulation mechanism of

floating exchange rates. But such insulation effects are

limited to real GNP alone. The costs of such insulation

effects are great. In most countries, absorption deflators

rise (JA, FR, GE) or decline less (UK and IT for a few
years, and CA for the last 4 years) under the floating than

the fixed regime. In the case of both AL and KR, however,

absorption deflators decline to a greater extent under the

generalized floating regime, reflecting the non-insulation of

their GNP from the U.S. monetary disturbance. This is

because KR adopts the fixed exchange rate regime and the

exchange rate of the Australian dollar depreciates only

slightly since it is determined largely by the PPP method in

relation to the US prices, which decline under the

contractionary US monetary policy.

It is after all the macroeconomic question of the

trade-off between real output and price inflation how the

insulation effects of floating exchange rates should be

evaluated.

## (ii) Effects of Higher Official Discount Rates

It appears that the abovementioned 1 percent reduction

in the US high-powered money stock produces own and cross

impacts rather similar to the case of a 2percentage points

increase in the US official discount rate as shown by Table

6-A. In this table, each country initiating the monetary

disturbance is shown in the row heading and each country to

which such disturbances are transmitted from abroad is shown

in the column heading.
Unlike the own impact on real GNP of a tight monetary

policy in US which remains more or less same under both

exchange rate regimes as noted above, contractionary monetary

policies in GE and JA produce much larger multipliers for

their own economies under floating than under fixed exchange

rates due to appreciations of DM and the yen in relation to

the currencies of the transmitted countries. In the second

year, for example, for GE the own impact on real GNP is 1.53

percent and a 1.00 percent decline under the floating and the

fixed regime, respectively. In the case of Japan, too, the

declines in real GNP amount to 0.39 percent and 0.17 percent,

respectively. This strengthened own impact can be called the

bottling-up effects of floating exchange rates. Not only GE

and JA but also other countries experience such bottling-up

effects, with the exceptions of AL and KR in addition to the

already-mentioned case of the United States.

The bottling-up effects insulate real GNP in other

foreign countries from domestic monetary disturbances. It is

indeed true that with the help of the bottling-up effects

cross effects on other foreign economies will be lessened

since the major effects of home monetary disturbances are

exerted solely on the home economies. However, the home

monetary effects in GE, JA, UK and other countries except

KR are transmitted to foreign countries not in an opposite

direction but in the same directions sometimes (particularly

after the third year) with greater force under floating than

under fixed exchange rates. This is basically because the

deepening of the own deflationary impact through bottling-up
effects tends also to affect adversely foreign countries,

when a transmitting country is large enough to influence the

rest of the world.

The cross country effects of an increase in official

discount rate of GE vary from country to country and from

year to year. For example, when DM appreciates vis a vis all

other currencies reflecting the tight monetary policy, pound

sterling depreciates vis a vis most currencies for all years,

resulting in an expansionary impact on real GDP of UK in the

first year. In the second and third years, however, the UK

economy is also pulled into a recession through the

deflationary international linkage of income effects

reflecting the deepening of the GE recession due to the own

bottling-up effect. The cross effect on real GDP of UK gets

worse in the third year under floating compared with fixed

exchange rates.

In contrast, however, the cross impact of the GE tight

monetary policy on real GNP of JA is less deflationary for

all years under the floating than the fixed regime. This is

attributable to the exchange rate movements of the yen,

because a depreciation in the first year helps to increase

demand for real output of JA and appreciations in the second

and third years induce personal consumption to rise by

moderating price inflation (Tables 6-B and 6-C).
In contrast, the Italian lira appreciates vis a vis the US dollar for all years in the face of the tight monetary policy in GE and of the resultant appreciation of DM. On the one hand, the tight monetary policy in GE causes deficits in the current account of IT like other affected countries, which works for a depreciation of the Italian lira. On the other, however, such deficits in the current account reduce net financial assets of IT defined as the sum of cumulative current account imbalance and government deficits, which works for an appreciation of the Italian lira, became a decline in the net financial assets of IT results in net inflows of international capital through lower demand by IT for external assets. In addition, a surplus in the current of GE generated by its own tight monetary policy increases net financial assets of GE, which leads to net inflows of capital into IT, because GE allocates part of the increased net financial assets into external claims on IT. Since these net capital inflows dominate the current account deficit, the Italian lira appreciates.

## (B) Effects of sterilization policy under fixed exchange

## rates – a comparison between Germany and Japan

It is often argued that as monetary policy would be

ineffective under fixed exchange rates, so would a policy of

the sterilization. Indeed, the multiplier exercises of the

EPA model suggest that in the case of GE the deflationary

impact on own real GNP of a reduction in the high-powered

money stock tend to peter out in the long-run. However,
Table 6-B Effects on Spot Exchange Rates (FXS) of Sustained Increase in Official Discount Rate by 2 percentage points

(% deviations from the standard solution)

From Year	To	US	UK	FR	GE	IT	CA	JA	AL	KR
Fix	Flex	Fix	Flex	Fix	Flex	Fix	Flex	Fix	Flex	Fix	Flex	Fix	Fix	Fix	Fix	Flex
US	1	-0.66	0.26	0.35	0.72	0.47	0.73	1.26	0.25
2	-1.04	0.68	0.62	1.65	0.68	0.51	1.48	0.11
3	-1.15	0.95	1.01	1.82	0.80	0.53	1.15	0.20
6	-1.21	1.52	0.96	1.94	1.05	0.47	0.76	0.25
UK	1	0.16	-1.20	0.05	0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.03	-0.00
2	0.20	-2.34	0.46	0.30	-0.01	0.00	0.04	-0.00
3	0.12	-2.29	0.74	0.39	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.01
6	0.34	-3.48	0.29	0.58	-0.03	-0.01	0.04	-0.03
FR	1	0.20	-0.02	-1.17	0.00	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.00
2	0.42	-0.06	-2.16	-0.07	-0.10	0.04	-0.07	-0.00
3	0.46	-0.07	-2.14	-0.17	-0.07	0.04	-0.20	-0.03
6	0.19	0.13	-1.30	0.13	0.04	-0.01	-0.13	-0.03
GE	1	1.03	0.17	-0.30	-3.57	-0.10	0.03	0.07	-0.00
2	1.52	0.29	0.22	-5.52	-0.31	0.04	-0.16	-0.03
3	1.10	0.34	1.24	-4.78	-0.06	0.02	-0.21	-0.02
6	1.90	0.96	0.74	-7.65	-0.30	0.01	0.08	-0.04
IT	1	0.12	0.03	0.02	0.02	-1.18	0.00	0.00	0.00
2	0.19	0.03	0.16	0.14	-2.18	0.00	-0.01	-0.00
3	0.14	0.05	0.58	0.37	-2.96	-0.00	0.01	0.00
6	0.25	0.12	0.22	0.31	-3.59	0.01	0.17	0.00
CA	1	0.22	0.12	0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-2.04	0.04	0.00
2	0.24	0.26	0.01	0.01	-0.03	-2.39	0.04	-0.03
3	0.23	0.28	0.19	0.08	-0.00	-2.84	0.07	-0.01
6	0.18	0.68	0.05	0.12	-0.04	-2.89	0.13	-0.03
JA	1	0.49	-0.04	-0.20	-0.05	-0.17	0.03	-2.35	0.00
2	0.63	-0.07	-0.46	-0.24	-0.24	0.06	-2.54	-0.02
3	0.37	0.05	-0.43	-0.26	-0.12	0.00	-1.28	-0.02
6	-0.01	0.79	0.04	-0.20	0.04	-0.01	-0.36	0.03
AL	1	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.04	-0.46
2	-0.03	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.01	-0.01	0.06	-0.09
3	-0.05	0.03	0.10	0.05	0.01	-0.00	0.08	-0.08
6	-0.09	0.03	0.17	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.15	-0.76
KR	1	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00
2	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00
3	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00
6	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00

(Source) The EPA World Econometric Model, February 1984.
sterilization intensifies the deflationary impact as measured

by the differences from the case of non-sterilization. This

stronger deflationary impact works through higher interest

rates because the sterilization offsets the high-powered

money stock which would otherwise increase reflecting larger

external reserves under the tight non-sterilizing monetary

policy. As a consequence, the continued high interest rates

in GE due to such a sterilization policy keep the overall

balance of payments in larger surpluses than in the case of

non-sterilization, leading to increasingly larger external

reserves held by GE monetary authorities (See Table 7).

The same simulations run for JA have produced the

similar multipliers. However, the sterilization policy in JA

does not show conceivable differences in its impact on real

GNP, short-term interest rates and external reserves for the

first three years (Table 7). Such relatively weak effects of

the sterilization in JA may be attributable to the relative

insensitivity of the money market interest rate to changes in

the high-powered money stock or the supply of free reserves.

In sum, even under fixed exchange rates monetary

policy is effective owing partly to imperfect substitutes

between home and foreign bonds. Furthermore, the

sterilization policy can intensify the impact of monetary

policy, but at the cost of a continued larger accumulation of

external reserves.
(deviations from the standard solution)

Germany
year	1st	2nd	3rd	6th
Real GNP (percent)	-0.17	-0.55	-0.78	-0.38
Sterilization	-0.15	-0.46	-0.59	-0.18
Non-Sterilization
Changes in external reserves (billions of DM)
Sterilization	2.85	1.53	1.85	2.29
Non-Sterilization	2.42	1.00	1.22	0.92
Short-term interest rates (percentage points)
Sterilization	0.75	0.70	0.65	0.61
Non-Sterilization	0.64	0.51	0.44	0.25

Japan

year	1st	2nd	3rd	6th
Real GNP (percent)	-0.02	-0.06	-0.09	-0.18
Sterilization	-0.02	-0.06	-0.09	-0.15
Non-Sterilization
Changes in external reserves (millions of US dollars)
Sterilization	403	182	224	424
Non-Sterilization	387	160	187	321
Short-term interest rates (percentage points)
Sterilization	0.30	0.36	0.36	0.33
Non-Sterilization	0.29	0.33	0.33	0.27

(Source) The EPA World Econometric Model, February 1984
林は、国土の保全、水源の涵養、木材等の生産等の多面的機能の発揮によって、国民生活及び国民経済に大きな貢献をしている。また、現在の我が国の森林は、これまでの先人の努力等により、戦後造林された人工林を中心に本格的な利用期を迎えており、国内の豊富な森林資源を循環利用することが重要な課題となっている。

さらに、我が国の林業・木材産業は、近年国産材供給量が回復傾向にあるものの、木材需要の7割近くは依然として輸入材により占められており、また、長期にわたる林業産出額や林業所得の減少、森林所有者の経営意欲の低迷、国産材の生産・流通構造の改革の遅れなど、引き続き厳しい状況にある。このため、国内の森林資源が十分に利用されず、また、適切な森林整備が行われない箇所もみられるなど、森林の有する多面的機能の発揮への影響も懸念されている。さらに、東日本大震災による被災地では、津波により被災した海岸防災林の復旧・再生、原子力災害からの復興等は引き続き大きな課題である。

こうした中、農林水産省では、森林の整備及び保全を図りつつ、効率的かつ安定的な林業経営の育成、木材の加工・流通体制の整備、木材の利用拡大等を進めるとともに、国有林野の管理経営や東日本大震災からの復興にも取り組んでいる。

平成27(2015)年、政府は、6月に「「日本再興戦略」改訂2015」と「まち・ひと・しごと創生基本方針2015」を閣議決定するとともに、12月には、「まち・ひと・しごと創生総合戦略(2015改訂版)」を閣議決定した。これらの戦略や基本方針においては、林業の成長産業化を推進することとし、森林資源のフル活用に向けて、バランスの取れた木材需要を創出し、需要に応じた安定供給体制を確立することに加え、林業の生産性の向上を図るとともに、林業の担い手の育成・確保を進めるなどとしている。

本年度報告する「第1部森林及び林業の動向」は、このような動きを踏まえ、この一年間における森林・林業の動向や主要施策の取組状況を中心に、森林・林業に対する国民の皆様の関心と理解を深めていただくことをねらいとして作成した。

冒頭のトピックスでは、平成27(2015)年度の動きとして、木材自給率の回復、東京オリンピック・パラリンピック競技大会における木材利用、ミラノ国際博覧会での木材の魅力の発信、気候変動枠組条約第21回締約国会議の「パリ協定」における森林の重要性、国有林の保護林制度が創設から100年を迎えたこと等を紹介した。

本編では、第Ⅰ章の特集においては「国産材の安定供給体制の構築に向けて」をテーマに、森林資源の充実と国産材需給の現況を分析し、国産材の安定供給体制の構築の意義と考え方を記述するとともに、安定供給体制の構築に向けた取組の現状と今後の課題を整理した。第Ⅱ章以降の各章では、森林の整備・保全、林業と山村、木材産業と木材利用、国有林野の管理経営、東日本大震災からの復興について主な動向を記述した。
# 平成27年度 食育推進施策

第190回国会(常会)提出
この文書は、食育基本法（平成17年法律第63号）第15条の規定に基づき、食育の推進に関して講じた施策について報告を行うものである。
平 成 28 年 度 政 府 関 係 機 関 予 算

(平成28年度政府関係機関予算参照書添付)

第 190 回 国 会 (常 会) 提 出
## 総目録

## 平成28年度政府関係機関予算

予算総則

甲号 收入 支出 予算

(添付)

平成28年度政府関係機関予算参照書

平成28年度政府関係機関収入支出予定計算書

(参考)

コード番号について

予算書情報について 123
# 平成28年度政府関係機関予算目録

予 算 総 則

1

甲号收入支出予算 5

沖縄振興開発金融公庫 5

株式会社日本政策金融公庁

5

株式会社国際協力銀行

8

独立行政法人国際協力機構有償資金協力部門

8
(添 付)

## 平成 28 年度政府関係機関予算参照書目録

平成28年度政府関係機関収入支出予定計算書	(参 考)
沖縄振興開発金融公庫	9	コード番号について 121
甲号収入支出予定計算書	9	予算書情報について 123
株式会社日本政策金融公庫	25
甲号収入支出予定計算書	25
国民一般向け業務	25
農林水産業者向け業務	29
中小企業者向け業務	32
信用保険等業務	36
危機対応円滑化業務	39
特定事業等促進円滑化業務	43
株式会社国際協力銀行	97
甲号収入支出予定計算書	97
独立行政法人国際協力機構有償資金協力部門	111
甲号収入支出予定計算書	111
平 成 28 年 度 政 府 関 係 機 関 予 算
# 平 成 28 年 度 政 府 関 係 機 関 予 算

# 予算総則

( 收入支出预算 )

第１条 次に掲げる各政府関係機関の平成２８年度収入支出予算は、「甲号収入支出予算」に掲げるとおりとする。

沖縄振興開発金融公庫

株式会社日本政策金融公庫

株式会社国際協力銀行

独立行政法人国際協力機構有償資金協力部門

2 前項に規定する独立行政法人国際協力機構有償資金協力部門とは、「独立行政法人国際協力機構法」第13条第1項第2号に規定する業務並びに同項第8号及び第9号並びに同条第3項に規定する業務のうち有償資金協力に係るものに関する部門をいう。

(借入金等の限度額)

第2条 次の表の左欄に掲げる公庫の「沖縄振興開発金融公庫の予算及び決算に関する法律」第5条第2項第1号及び第2号の規定による借入金又は債券の限度額、株式会社の「株式会社日本政策金融公庫法」第31条第2項第1号及び第2号の規定による借入金又は社債の限度額並びに株式会社の「エネルギー環境適合製品の開発及び製造を行う事業の促進に関する法律」第17条及び「産業競争力強化法」第39条第2項の規定による借入金の限度額は、それぞれ右欄に掲げるとおりとする。

公庫又は株式会社	限度	額
沖縄振興開発金融公庫	政府からの借入金の総額	78,100,000千円
政府以外の者からの借入金の総額	2,200,000
沖縄振興開発金融公庫債券の額面総額	25,000,000
沖縄振興開発金融公庫住宅宅地債券の額面総額	578,500
株式会社日本政策金融公庫	国民一般向け業務借入金の総額	1,955,000,000
社債の額面総額	245,000,000
農林水産業者向け業務借入金の総額	249,000,000
社債の額面総額	20,000,000
2 予算総則

公庫又は株式会社	限度	額
中小企業者向け業務借入金の総額社債の額面総額危機対応円滑化業務借入金の総額社債の額面総額特定事業等促進円滑化業務借入金の総額	1,094,000,000千円213,700,000547,000,000200,000,000100,000,000
2 財務大臣は、予見し難い経済事情の変動その他やむを得ない事由により前項に掲げる公庫又は株式会社において事業資金又は借入金、債券及び社債により調達する資金の増額を必要とする特別の事由があるときは、法令の規定に従い同項の借入金、債券及び社債のそれぞれの限度額の100分の50に相当する金額の範囲内において、当該限度額を増額することができる。
3 第1項に規定する沖縄振興開発金融公庫債券、沖縄振興開発金融公庫住宅宅地債券及び社債の発行価格が額面金額を下回るときは、それぞれの発行価格差減額をうめるため必要な金額を同項のそれぞれの限度額(前項の規定により限度額が増額された場合を含む。)に加算した金額を限度額とする。(保険契約等の限度額)
第3条 株式会社日本政策金融公庫の次の表の左欄に掲げる法律の規定による金額の限度は、平成28年度においてそれぞれ右欄に掲げるとおりとする。
根拠規定	限度	額
「株式会社日本政策金融公庫法」第31条	受益権及び貸付債権等の譲渡により調達する資金の総額中小企業者向け業務貸付金の総額「株式会社日本政策金融公庫法」別表第2第2号及び第5号に掲げる業務として行う取引において支払うことを約する金銭の額の総額農林水産業者向け業務中小企業者向け業務保証金額の総額	6,500,000千円24,000,0001,850,00030,000,00066,000,000
予算総則 3

根 拠 規 定	限 度	額
「破綻金融機関等の融資先である中堅事業者に係る信用保険の特例に関する臨時措置法」第6条	保険価額の総額補填の額の総額保険価額の総額	23,660,000,000千円1,064,475,00086,000,000
(収入支出予算の弾力条項)
第4条 次の表の左欄に掲げる各政府関係機関において、中欄に掲げる事由により収入金額が予算額に比して増加(第1号にあっては同号に掲げる増額)するときは、財務大臣の承認を受けて、その増加する金額を限度として(第1号にあっては予算額を超えて)それぞれの右欄に掲げる経費を増額することができる。
政府関係機関	要	件	経費
1 沖縄振興開発金融公庫又は株式会社日本政策金融公庫(信用保険等業務を除く。)	第2条第2項及び第3項の規定による借入金の借入れ及び債券又は社債の発行の増額	借入金及び債券又は社債の利子その他の事業量の増加に伴い直接必要な経費
2 株式会社国際協力銀行又は独立行政法人国際協力機構有償資金協力部門	貸付業務に係る事業量の増加	貸付業務の増加に直接必要な経費
2 株式会社日本政策金融公庫信用保険等業務において、「中小企業信用保険法」、「株式会社日本政策金融公庫法」及び「破綻金融機関等の融資先である中堅事業者に係る信用保険の特例に関する臨時措置法」に基づく保険金の支出が増加し、保険金の予算に不足を生ずるときは、信用保険等業務に整理された勘定に属する資本金及び準備金の額の合計額に相当する金額を限度として財務大臣が定める金額を増額することができる。(流用の制限)
第5条 株式会社日本政策金融公庫、株式会社国際協力銀行又は独立行政法人国際協力機構有償資金協力部門がその経費の金額を相互に流用し、又はその経費と他の経費との間にその金額を相互に流用する場合において、「株式会社日本政策金融公庫法」第38条第1項、「株式会社国際協力銀行法」又は「独立行政法人国際協力機構法」第26条第1項の規定により財務大臣の承認を受けなければならない経費は、次に掲げるとおりとする。(1) 役職員に対して支給する給与に要する経費(2) 交際費に要する経費