Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
Resource constraint:

$$ y_{t}=c_{t}+i_{t}+g_{t}^{c}+g_{t}^{i}+\frac{1}{\mu_{z^{+},t}\mu_{\Psi,t}}a(u_{t})k_{t-1} $$

Budget constraint of government:

$$ \begin{aligned}&g_{t}^{c}+g_{t}^{i}+\frac{1}{\mu_{z^{+},t}}\frac{R_{t-1}}{\Pi_{t}}b_{t-1}\\&=\tau_{t}^{c}c_{t}+\tau_{t}^{h}w_{t}H_{t}+\tau_{t}^{k}\left(p_{t}^{k}u_{t}-a(u_{t})\right)\frac{k_{t-1}}{\mu_{z^{+},t}\mu_{\Psi,t}}+\tau_{t}^{k}(v_{t}+v_{t}^{k})+b_{t}+\tau_{t}\\ \end{aligned} $$

Aggregated profit (intermediate goods firms):

$$ v_{t}=(1-m c_{t})y_{t}-m c_{t}\Theta $$

Aggregated profit (capital producing firms):

$$ v_{t}^{k}=\alpha_{g}\frac{\tilde{k}_{t-1}}{u_{t}k_{t-1}}r_{t}^{k}-\Theta^{k} $$

#### A.2.6 Auxiliary Variables

Wage inflation:

$$ \frac{w_{t}}{w_{t-1}}=\frac{\Pi_{t}^{w}}{\mu_{z^{+},t}\Pi_{t}} $$

Growth rate of technological progress:

$$ \mu_{z^{+},t}=\mu_{\Psi,t}^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}\mu_{z,t} $$

#### A.2.7 Structural Shocks

Neutral technological progress shock:

$$ \ln\mu_{z,t}-\ln\mu_{z}=\rho_{\mu_{z}}\left(\ln\mu_{z,t-1}-\ln\mu_{z}\right)+\epsilon_{t}^{\mu_{z}} $$

Investment specific technological progress shock:

$$ \ln\mu_{\Psi,t}-\ln\mu_{\Psi}=\rho_{\mu_{\Psi}}\left(\ln\mu_{\Psi,t-1}-\ln\mu_{\Psi}\right)+\epsilon_{t}^{\mu_{\Psi}} $$

Trend inflation shock:

$$ \ln\bar{\Pi}_{t}-\ln\bar{\Pi}=\rho_{\bar{\Pi}}\left(\ln\bar{\Pi}_{t-1}-\ln\bar{\Pi}\right)+\epsilon_{t}^{\bar{\Pi}} $$

Neutral technology shock:

$$ \ln\epsilon_{t}=\rho_{\epsilon}\ln\epsilon_{t-1}+\epsilon_{t}^{\epsilon} $$

Preference shock:

$$ \ln\zeta_{t}^{c}=\rho_{\zeta_{c}}\ln\zeta_{t-1}^{c}+\epsilon_{t}^{\zeta_{c}} $$

Labor supply shock:

$$ \ln\zeta_{t}^{h}=\rho_{\zeta_{h}}\ln\zeta_{t-1}^{h}+\epsilon_{t}^{\zeta_{h}} $$
Private investment specific technology shock:

$$ \ln\zeta_{t}^{i}=\rho_{\zeta_{i}}\ln\zeta_{t-1}^{i}+\epsilon_{t}^{\zeta_{i}} $$

Government investment specific technology shock:

$$ \ln\zeta_{t}^{g,i}=\rho_{\zeta_{g,i}}\ln\zeta_{t-1}^{g,i}+\epsilon_{t}^{\zeta_{g,i}} $$

Consumption tax shock:

$$ \tau_{t}^{c}-\tau^{c}=\rho_{\tau_{c}}(\tau_{t-1}^{c}-\tau^{c})+\epsilon_{t}^{\tau_{c}} $$

Corporate income tax shock:

$$ \tau_{t}^{k}-\tau^{k}=\rho_{\tau_{k}}(\tau_{t-1}^{k}-\tau^{k})+\epsilon_{t}^{\tau_{k}} $$

Labor income tax shock:

$$ \tau_{t}^{h}-\tau^{h}=\rho_{\tau_{h}}(\tau_{t-1}^{h}-\tau^{h})+\epsilon_{t}^{\tau_{h}} $$

Lump-sum transfer shock:

$$ \tau_{t}-\tau=\rho_{\tau}(\tau_{t-1}-\tau)+\epsilon_{t}^{\tau} $$

### A.3 Steady States

This subsection explains how we compute steady states of endogenous variables. Following CTW, we impose the following assumptions in the derivation of steady states: First, we assume u = 1, thus the capital utilization rate is 100% in steady state. Second, we assume that excess profits of firms are zero in steady state, i.e. $ v = v^{k} = 0 $ .

#### A.3.1 Endogenous Variables that Have Explicit Solutions

From equations (A.60)-(A.64), we can derive the following equations:

$$ \begin{aligned}&\Pi=\Pi^{opt}=\Pi_{\kappa}=\bar{\Pi}\\&mc=\frac{1}{\lambda}\\ \end{aligned} $$

Using (A.69) and (A.70), we have the steady state value of the real interest rate:

$$ \frac{R}{\bar{\Pi}}=\frac{\mu_{z^{+}}}{\beta} $$

Since the shadow price of capital, q, becomes 1 in steady state from (A.72), we can derive the real rental price of capital in steady state from (A.73).

$$ p^{k}=\frac{1}{1-\tau^{k}}\left[\frac{\mu_{z^{+}}\mu_{\Psi}}{\beta}-(1-\delta)\right] $$

#### A.3.2 Numerical Calculation

Since we cannot derive explicit solutions on the rest of the endogenous variables, we employ the following numerical calculation method.
Let $ X^{(j)} $ denote the value of X at the j-th iteration. Given $ \left(r^{k}\right)^{(j)} $ , $ \left(g^{c}\right)^{(j)} $ , $ \left(g^{i}\right)^{(j)} $ and $ H^{(j)} $ , we can derive the following solutions: From (A.58) and (A.108),

$$ w^{(j)}\leftarrow\left[\frac{\alpha^{\alpha}\big(1-\alpha\big)^{1-\alpha}}{\lambda\left[\big(r^{k}\big)^{(j)}\right]^{\alpha}}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} $$

From (A.59),

$$ \left(\frac{\tilde{k}}{H}\right)^{(j)}\leftarrow\mu_{z^{+}}\mu_{\Psi}\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}\frac{w^{(j)}}{\left(r^{k}\right)^{(j)}} $$

From (A.84),

$$ \left(k^{g}\right)^{\left(j\right)}\leftarrow\frac{\left(g^{i}\right)^{\left(j\right)}}{1-\frac{1-\delta_{g}}{\mu_{z}+\mu_{\Psi}}} $$

From (A.65) and (A.71),

$$ i^{(j)}\leftarrow\left(1-\frac{1-\delta}{\mu_{z^{+}}\mu_{\Psi}}\right)\left[\left(\frac{\tilde{k}}{H}\right)^{(j)}H^{(j)}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_{g}}} $$

From (A.91) and (A.108), the zero excess profit assumption requires $ \Theta = (\lambda - 1)y $ . Substituting this into (A.88), we have

$$ y^{(j)}\leftarrow\frac{1}{\lambda}\left[\left(\frac{\tilde{k}}{H}\right)^{(j)}\right]^{\alpha}H^{(j)}. $$

Then, from (A.89),

$$ c^{(j)}\leftarrow y^{(j)}-\left\lceil i^{(j)}+(g^{c})^{(j)}+\left(g^{i}\right)^{(j)}\right\rceil $$

From (A.67),

$$ \tilde{c}^{(j)}\leftarrow c^{(j)}+\nu_{g}\left(g^{c}\right)^{(j)} $$

From (A.81)

$$ z_{\chi}^{(j)}\leftarrow\left(\frac{1}{\mu_{z^{+}}}\right)^{\frac{1-v}{v}}\left(1-\frac{\theta}{\mu_{z^{+}}}\right)\tilde{c}^{(j)} $$

From (A.82),

$$ L^{(j)}\leftarrow\left[\frac{1-\tau^{h}}{1+\tau^{c}}\frac{w^{(j)}}{z_{\chi}^{(j)}}\right]^{1/\sigma_{h}} $$

Using (A.111)-(A.119), we can derive $ \left(r^{k}\right)^{(j+1)} $ , $ \left(g^{c}\right)^{(j+1)} $ , $ \left(g^{i}\right)^{(j+1)} $ and $ H^{(j+1)} $ according
Endogenous variable	Name	Observability
1	Πt	Inflation	○
2	Πw	Wage inflation	○
3	Πopt	Optimal inflation	-
4	wopt	Optimal wage inflation	-
5	Πκ,t	Inflation indexation	-
6	Πw,t	Wage inflation indexation	-
7	Kt	Numerator of NKPC (price)	-
8	Ft	Denominator of NKPC (price)	-
9	Kw	Numerator of NKPC (wage)	-
10	Ft	Denominator of NKPC (wage)	-
11	wt	Real wage	-
12	qt	Tobin's Q (shadow price of capital)	-
13	Rt	Nominal interest rate	○
14	rk	Real rental price of capital (intermediate goods firms)	-
15	pt	Real rental price of capital (capital producing firms)	-
16	mct	Real marginal cost	-
17	yt	Output	○
18	ct	Consumption	○
19	c	Bundled consumption	-
20	it	Private investment	○
21	gt	Government consumption	○
22	gt	Government investment	○
23	kt	Private capital	-
24	kt	Public capital	-
25	kt	Capital	-
26	ut	Capital utilization rate	-
27	Ht	Employment	-
28	φc	Marginal utility on consumption	-
29	χh	Endogenous preference shifter 1	-
30	zχ,t	Endogenous preference shifter 2	-
31	Lt	Desirable labor supply	-
32	Ut	Unemployment rate	○
33	Λt,t+1	Stochastic discount factor	-
34	bt	Real bond holdings	○
35	vt	Real profit (intermediate goods firms)	-
36	vt	Real profit (capital producing firms)	-
37	Πt	Trend inflation	-
38	μz,t	Labor augmented technological progress	-
39	μψ,t	Investment specific technological progress	-
40	μz+,t	Neutral technological progress	-
41	εt	AR(1) neutral technology shock	-
42	ζt	AR(1) preference shock	-
43	ζt	AR(1) labor supply shock	-
44	ζt	AR(1) investment specific technology shock	-
45	ζg,i	AR(1) government investment specific technology shock	-
46	τc	AR(1) consumption tax shock	○
47	τk	AR(1) corporate income tax shock	○
48	τh	AR(1) labor income tax shock	○
49	τt	AR(1) lump-sum tax shock	○

Table 1 Endogenous Variables
1	$ \epsilon_{t}^{\mu_{z}} $	Labor augmented technological progress shock
2	$ \epsilon_{t}^{\mu_{\Psi}} $	Investment specific technological progress shock
3	$ \epsilon_{t}^{\Pi} $	Trend inflation shock
4	$ \epsilon_{t}^{\epsilon} $	Neutral technology shock
5	$ \epsilon_{t}^{\zeta_{c}} $	Preference shock
6	$ \epsilon_{t}^{\zeta_{h}} $	Labor supply shock
7	$ \epsilon_{t}^{\zeta_{i}} $	Investment specific technology shock
8	$ \epsilon_{t}^{\zeta_{g,i}} $	Government investment specific technology shock
9	$ \epsilon_{t}^{\tau_{c}} $	Consumption tax shock
10	$ \epsilon_{t}^{\tau_{k}} $	Corporate income tax shock
11	$ \epsilon_{t}^{\tau_{h}} $	Labor income tax shock
12	$ \epsilon_{t}^{\tau} $	Lump-sum tax shock
13	$ \epsilon_{t}^{g_{c}} $	Government consumption shock
14	$ \epsilon_{t}^{g_{i}} $	Government investment shock
15	$ \epsilon_{t}^{R} $	Monetary policy shock

Table 2 Structural Shocks

Variable	Definition	Unit	Source
$ Y_{t}^{data} $	Real GDP (excluding net export)	a billion yen	SNA
$ C_{t}^{data} $	Real private consumption	a billion yen	SNA
$ I_{t}^{data} $	Real private investment	a billion yen	SNA
$ G_{t}^{c,data} $	Real government consumption	a billion yen	SNA
$ G_{t}^{i,data} $	Real government investment	a billion yen	SNA
$ B_{t}^{data} $	Real government bond	a billion yen	Bank of Japan
$ W_{t}^{data} $	Compensation of Employees / Employees	a billion yen/a thousand	SNA and Statistic Bureau, MIC
$ U_{t}^{data} $	Unemployment	%	Statistic Bureau, MIC
$ R_{t}^{data} $	Overnight call rate	%	Bank of Japan
$ P_{t}^{data} $	GDP deflator	2005 year=100	SNA
$ P_{t}^{i,data} $	Investment deflator	2005 year=100	SNA
$ \tau_{t}^{c,data} $	Consumption tax rate	%	-
$ \tau_{t}^{k,data} $	Corporate income tax rate	%	-
$ \tau_{t}^{l,data} $	Labor income tax rate	%	-
$ N_{t}^{data} $	Labor force	a thousand	Statistic Bureau, MIC

Table 3 Data

Parameter	Value	Definition	Source
$ \beta $	0.995	Subjective discount factor	CTW (2013)
$ \lambda $	1.20	Gross price mark-up rate	CTW (2013)
$ \lambda_{w} $	1.20	Gross wage mark-up rate	CTW (2013)
$ v $	0.020	Endogenous preference shifter parameter	GSW (2011)
$ S^{\prime\prime} $	2.580	Private investment adjustment cost parameter	CTW (2013)
$ \delta $	0.023	Private capital depreciation rate	Sample mean
$ \delta_{g} $	0.008	Public capital depreciation rate	Sample mean
$ \frac{g_{c}}{g_{i}} $	0.143	Government consumption to GDP ratio	Sample mean
$ \frac{g_{i}}{y} $	0.051	Government investment to GDP ratio	Sample mean
$ \frac{b}{y} $	1.934	Debt to GDP ratio	Sample mean
$ \tau_{c} $	0.070	Consumption tax rate	Sample mean
$ \tau_{k} $	0.487	Corporate income tax rate	Sample mean
$ \tau_{h} $	0.256	Labor income tax rate	Sample mean

Table 4 Calibrated Parameters
Parameter	Prior	Posterior
Mean	SD	Shape	Mean	SD	90% credible interval	CI
ξp	0.500	0.025	beta	0.560	0.023	[0.522, 0.598]	1.00
ξw	0.500	0.025	beta	0.489	0.025	[0.449, 0.531]	1.00
κ	0.600	0.100	beta	0.820	0.041	[0.748, 0.882]	1.00
κw	0.600	0.100	beta	0.958	0.012	[0.938, 0.975]	1.00
αg	0.200	0.100	beta	0.155	0.060	[0.061, 0.259]	1.00
α	0.400	0.100	beta	0.386	0.025	[0.345, 0.428]	1.00
νg	0.000	0.100	normal	-0.023	0.100	[-0.185, 0.143]	1.00
θ	0.200	0.100	beta	0.732	0.028	[0.685, 0.776]	1.01
σH	3.000	0.100	gamma	3.151	0.097	[2.991, 3.310]	1.00
σa	0.200	0.075	gamma	0.789	0.141	[0.572, 1.038]	1.00
ρg,c	0.950	0.010	beta	0.970	0.007	[0.958, 0.980]	1.00
ρg,i	0.950	0.010	beta	0.958	0.008	[0.944, 0.970]	1.00
φg,c	0.500	0.100	gamma	0.289	0.063	[0.195, 0.400]	1.01
φg,i	0.500	0.100	gamma	0.496	0.080	[0.371, 0.632]	1.02
ρR	0.500	0.050	beta	0.507	0.046	[0.432, 0.582]	1.00
φΠ,0	0.500	0.050	gamma	0.532	0.049	[0.456, 0.614]	1.00
φy	0.125	0.050	gamma	0.035	0.012	[0.018, 0.057]	1.01
Π	1.0025	0.005	normal	0.998	0.004	[0.992, 1.005]	1.01
μz+	1.0025	0.001	normal	1.002	0.001	[1.000, 1.003]	1.00
μΨ	1.0000	0.001	normal	0.999	0.001	[0.997, 1.000]	1.00
ρμz	0.500	0.050	beta	0.390	0.041	[0.323, 0.459]	1.00
ρμΨ	0.500	0.050	beta	0.496	0.049	[0.415, 0.578]	1.00
ρΠ	0.500	0.050	beta	0.427	0.041	[0.359, 0.496]	1.01
ρε	0.950	0.005	beta	0.958	0.004	[0.950, 0.965]	1.00
ρζc	0.950	0.005	beta	0.955	0.005	[0.947, 0.963]	1.01
ρζH	0.950	0.010	beta	0.944	0.009	[0.928, 0.958]	1.00
ρζi	0.800	0.010	beta	0.804	0.010	[0.787, 0.819]	1.00
ρζg,i	0.800	0.075	beta	0.801	0.075	[0.670, 0.913]	1.00
ρτc	0.500	0.075	beta	0.517	0.074	[0.396, 0.637]	1.01
ρτk	0.500	0.075	beta	0.807	0.032	[0.753, 0.857]	1.00
ρτh	0.500	0.075	beta	0.615	0.067	[0.501, 0.722]	1.00
ρτ	0.500	0.075	beta	0.824	0.028	[0.777, 0.868]	1.00
σμz	0.150	0.500	inv-gamma	0.0036	0.0005	[0.0028, 0.00438]	1.01
σμΨ	0.150	0.500	inv-gamma	0.0029	0.0004	[0.0024, 0.00357]	1.04
σΠ	0.150	0.500	inv-gamma	0.0084	0.0017	[0.0060, 0.01146]	1.02
σε	0.150	0.500	inv-gamma	0.0030	0.0004	[0.0024, 0.00368]	1.03
σζc	0.150	0.500	inv-gamma	0.0083	0.0015	[0.0062, 0.01105]	1.00
σζH	0.150	0.500	inv-gamma	0.0127	0.0023	[0.0093, 0.01691]	1.00
σζi	0.150	0.100	inv-gamma	0.0162	0.0023	[0.0127, 0.02030]	1.00
σζg,i	0.150	0.100	inv-gamma	0.3285	0.2953	[0.0926, 0.85982]	1.08
στc	0.150	0.500	inv-gamma	0.0026	0.0003	[0.0021, 0.00315]	1.00
στk	0.150	0.500	inv-gamma	0.0032	0.0004	[0.0025, 0.00391]	1.01
στh	0.150	0.500	inv-gamma	0.0027	0.0003	[0.0022, 0.00325]	1.02
στ	0.150	0.500	inv-gamma	0.0109	0.0023	[0.0077, 0.01523]	1.01
σR	0.150	0.500	inv-gamma	0.0036	0.0005	[0.0029, 0.00448]	1.01
σg,c	0.150	0.500	inv-gamma	0.0049	0.0006	[0.0040, 0.00601]	1.00
σg,i	0.150	0.500	inv-gamma	0.0030	0.0004	[0.0024, 0.00370]	1.01

Table 5 Prior and Posterior distributions
Figure 1. Unemployment Rate

Note: The sample mean of unemployment is 3.53%.

Figure 2 (a) Unemployment
Figure 2 (b) Effects of Wasteful Fiscal Expansions

Figure 2 (c) Effects of Non-wasteful Fiscal Expansions
Figure 3. Distortionary Tax Rates

Figure 3 displays three distortionary taxes data calculated via Mendoza et al. (1994)'s method. Consumption tax rate data corresponds to the left axis. Corporate and labor income tax rates correspond to the right axis.
Figure 4-1 (a): IRFs for Government Investment Shock

Figure 4-1 (b): IRFs for Government Consumption Shock

Note:

Figure 4-1 (a) shows IRFs for 1% government investment increase. All responses are percent deviations from steady states. The blue lines are IRFs when $ \alpha_{g}=0.155 $ (posterior mean). The red lines are IRFs when $ \alpha_{g}=0 $ .

Figure 4-1 (b) shows IRFs for 1% government consumption increase. All responses are percent deviations from steady states. The blue lines are IRFs when $ \nu_{g} = -0.023 $ (posterior mean). The red lines are IRFs when $ \nu_{g} = 0 $ .
Figure 4-1 (c): IRFs for Monetary Policy Shock

Figure 4-1 (d): IRFs for Neutral Technology Shock

Note:

Figures 4-1 (c) and (d) show IRFs for 1% shocks and calculated by using posterior means of parameters. All responses are percent deviations from steady states.
Figure 4-2 (a). Historical Decomposition: Output

Figure 4-2 (b). Historical Decomposition: Inflation
Figure 4-2 (c). Historical Decomposition: Unemployment

Figure 4-2 (d). Historical Decomposition (Government Spending Shock): Unemployment
Figure 4-3 (a): Inflation and Nominal Interest Rate

Figure 4-3 (b): Inflation vs. Nominal Interest Rate
## [Issues threatening the safety and security of buildings]

Buildings like houses and condominiums form the most fundamental basis of citizen’s lives and serve to protect lives and assets against natural disasters.

Trends in New Housing Starts

Source: Compiled from MLIT, Juutaku Chakkou Toukei (Statistics on Housing Starts)

## (Quakeproofing of residences)

In order to protect residences from destruction by earthquakes, it is important to take immediate measures to make them earthquake resistant.

## (The issue of fabricated structural calculation data sheets)

Uneasiness stemming from the issue of fabricated structural calculation data sheets about the earthquake resistance of buildings is spreading and faith in the building verification and inspection system is wavering considerably.

## (1) Investigation into whether or not structural calculation data sheets have been fabricated, the earthquake resistance of buildings, etc

Toward the wiping away of public uneasiness regarding the earthquake resistance of buildings, it is necessary to push forward immediately with investigations into whether or not structural calculation data sheets have been fabricated, investigations on the earthquake resistance of buildings, and so on, summarizing and promptly publicizing the results to the extent possible.

## (2) Consideration of an overhaul of the building verification and examination system and measures to prevent recurrence

Based on the lessons of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, an amendment to the building code in 1998 granted private institutes the right to carry out building verification and inspection. This resulted in improvements like an increase in the percentage of completion inspections carried out (FY1998: about 38% → FY2004: about 73%) and a dramatic reduction in the number of illegal buildings (FY1998: 12,283 buildings → FY2004: 7,782 buildings), hence it seems that the opening of the building verification and inspection market to the private sector was in itself a rational administrative choice.

At the same time, the discovery of the recent fabrication problem has brought to light the fact that inadequate review was performed not only by the designated verification and inspection institutes, but also by specified administrative government agencies. The discovery also confirms that there are flaws in the review process for certain designated verification and inspection institutes and specified administrative government agencies. In light of this it must be said that, rather than having been brought about by the opening of the market to the private sector, this issue resides within the building verification and inspection system itself.
## 5 影響を受ける可能性のある本人への連絡等

事案の内容等に応じて、二次被害の防止、類似事案の発生回避等の観点から、事実関係等について、速やかに、本人へ連絡し、又は本人が容易に知り得る状態に置く。

## 6 事実関係、再発防止策等の公表

事案の内容等に応じて、二次被害の防止、類似事案の発生回避等の観点から、事実関係及び再発防止策等について、速やかに公表する。

## 7 特定個人情報保護委員会への報告

独立行政法人等及び地方公共団体等は、番号法違反の事案又は番号法違反のおそれのある事案を把握した場合には、事実関係及び再発防止策等について、速やかに特定個人情報保護委員会に報告する。

また、特定個人情報に関する重大事案（①情報提供ネットワークシステム又は個人番号を取り扱う情報システムで使用するネットワークから外部に情報漏えい等があった場合（不正アクセス又は不正プログラムによるものを含む。）、②事案における特定個人情報の本人の数が101人以上である場合、③不特定多数の人が閲覧できる状態になった場合、④職員等が不正の目的で持ち出したり利用したりした場合、⑤その他各機関において重大事案と判断される場合）又はそのおそれのある事案が発覚した時点で、直ちにその旨を特定個人情報保護委員会に報告する。
## 付 錄

## I II 属性別クロス集計表

（注）人口規模，予算規模，1人当り予算額，人口増加率，財政力指数および実質収支比率によるクロス集計は，政令都市を除く市・町628団体について，1次就業比率および首長の政党色によるクロス集計は政令都市を除く市547団体について行っている。

付 - III - 1

問 1	1 中長期計画はない。	2 中長期計画によりおおよそのガイドラインが示され,計数的なものは予算編成時に決定される。	3 中長期計画に基づき各年度ごとの実施計画が計数的に示され政策的経費はほぼそれに基づいて決定される。	4 その他無回答	計
総計	団体108	%15.5	団体368	%71.4	団体178	%25.5	団体44	%6.3	団体698	%100.0
都道府県政令都市特別区政令都市を除く市町政令都市を除く市町	600

付 - III - 2

問 4	1 持っていない。	2 歳入や歳出に関するおよその積み上げによって見通しをつくる。	3 前年度予算規模と税収の伸び率等によって見通しをつくる。	4 その他・無回答	計
総計	団体%	団体%	団体%	団体%	団体%	団体%	団体%	団体%
都道府県	30	4.3	268	38.4	354	50.7	46	6.6	698	100.0
政令都市区	3	7.1	15	35.7	22	52.4	2	4.8	42	100.0
特別区	0	0.0	4	50.0	4	50.0	0	0.0	8	100.0
政令都市区	1	5.0	9	45.0	10	50.0	0	0.0	20	100.0
町	24	4.4	203	37.1	278	50.8	42	7.7	547	100.0
政令都市区	2	2.5	37	45.7	40	49.4	2	2.5	81	100.0
町	26	4.1	240	38.2	318	50.6	44	7.0	628	100.0
人口規模	30万人以上	2	5.9	10	29.4	18	52.9	4	11.7	34
10～80万人	5	4.6	39	36.1	50	46.3	14	13.0	108
5～10万人	9	5.0	67	37.0	93	51.4	12	6.6	181
3～5万人	7	3.1	85	38.1	118	52.9	13	5.8	223
3万人未満	3	3.7	39	47.6	39	47.6	1	1.2	82
予算規模	200億円以上	3	4.5	21	31.8	35	53.0	7	10.6	66
100～200億円	6	7.6	28	35.4	34	43.0	11	14.0	79
50～100億円	7	3.7	78	40.8	91	47.6	15	7.9	191
30～50億円	7	3.3	80	37.4	117	54.7	10	4.7	214
30億円未満	3	3.8	33	42.3	41	52.6	1	1.3	78
財政力指数	1以上	1	2.6	15	39.5	19	50.0	3	7.9	38
0.75～1.00	6	5.5	30	27.5	60	55.0	13	11.9	109
0.5～0.75	7	3.3	90	42.5	102	48.1	12	5.7	212
0.25～0.5	10	4.5	88	39.8	111	50.2	11	5.0	221
0.25未満	2	4.2	17	35.4	26	54.2	3	6.3	48
付 - III - 3

問 5	1 財政環境	2 国あるいは都道府県の指示指導事項	3 中長期計画との関連	4 各経費ごとの要求要領
総計	団体%586	84.0	団体%418	59.9	団体%428	61.3	団体%588	84.2
都道府県政令都市特別政令都市を除く市町	39	92.9	25	59.5	25	59.5	42	100.0
8	100.0	3	37.5	6	75.0	7	87.5
18	90.0	6	30.0	12	60.0	18	90.0
460	84.1	326	59.6	337	61.6	459	83.9
61	75.3	58	71.6	48	59.3	62	76.5
政令都市を除く市町	521	83.0	384	61.1	385	61.3	521	83.0
人口規模	30万人以上	29	85.3	14	41.2	22	64.7	31	91.2
10～30万人	97	89.8	66	61.1	70	64.8	92	85.2
5～10万人	151	83.4	105	58.0	107	59.1	151	83.4
3～5万人	175	78.5	138	61.9	141	63.2	183	82.1
3万人未満	69	84.1	61	74.4	45	54.9	64	78.0
財政力指数	1以上	28	73.7	17	44.7	22	57.9	33	86.8
0.75～1.00	93	85.3	59	54.1	69	59.6	90	82.6
0.5～0.75	177	83.5	132	62.3	134	63.2	179	84.4
0.25～0.5	182	82.4	140	63.3	131	59.3	180	81.4
0.25未満	41	85.4	36	75.0	33	68.8	39	81.3

付 - III - 4

問 6	1 一律に提示する。	2 上限は示すが,一律ではない。	3 提示しない。	無 回 答	計
総計	団体%86	団体%12.3	団体%230	団体%33.0	団体%380	団体%54.4	団体%2	団体%0.3	団体%698	%100.0
都道府県政令都特別政令都市を除く市町政令都市を除く市町	13 31.03 37.52 10.063 11.55 6.268 10.8	16 38.13 37.56 182 23 205	13 31.02 25.060 54.853 65.456.2	0 0.00 0 0.00
(複数回答のため合計は100%超える)

5 予算編成の日程	6 当該年度の重点施策	7 要求限度	8 標準単価	9 その他	対象数
団体	%	団体	%	団体	%	団体	%	団体	%	団体
569	81.5	481	68.9	230	33.0	538	77.1	57	8.2	698
28	66.7	22	52.4	29	69.1	39	92.9	5	11.9	42
5	62.5	2	25.0	5	62.5	5	62.5	0	0.0	8
14	70.0	15	75.0	7	35.0	19	95.0	2	10.0	20
446	81.5	372	68.0	173	31.6	420	76.8	47	8.6	547
76	93.8	70	86.4	16	19.8	55	67.9	3	3.7	81
522	83.1	442	70.4	189	30.1	475	75.6	50	8.0	628
27	79.4	22	64.7	14	41.2	20	88.2	6	17.6	34
88	81.5	74	68.5	46	42.6	91	84.3	14	13.0	108
139	76.8	122	67.4	50	27.6	139	76.8	17	9.4	181
194	87.0	158	70.9	63	28.3	162	72.6	10	4.5	223
74	90.2	66	80.5	16	19.5	53	64.6	3	3.7	82
34	89.5	24	63.2	15	39.5	30	78.9	3	7.9	38
90	82.6	71	65.1	36	33.0	90	82.6	11	10.1	109
176	83.0	149	70.3	70	33.0	166	78.3	20	9.4	212
181	81.9	164	74.2	58	26.2	160	72.4	14	6.3	221
41	85.4	34	70.8	10	20.8	29	60.4	2	4.2	48

付 - III - 5

(2項目回数のため合計は100%を超える)

問 7	1 經常的 經費と臨 時的經費	2 規定經 費と新規 經費	3 目的別 分類によ る經費	4 性質別 分類によ る經費	5 所管別 經費	6 事業別 經費	7 1～6 のような 区分を設 けず,個 別施策ご とに考え る	対象数
問 8	1 規模・内容と も変化がある	2 内容にお いて変化が ある	3 ほとんど 変化がない	無 回 答	計
総計	団体 213	% 30.5	団体 161	% 23.1	団体 322	% 46.1	団体 2	% 0.3	団体 698	% 100.0
都道府県 政令都市特別区 政令都市を除く市町 政令都市を除く市町	14 33.3 6 75.0 6 30.0 160 29.3 27 33.3 187 29.8 13 38.2 36 33.3 55 30.4 59 26.5 24 29.3 26 32.9 57 29.8 52 24.3 26 33.3 12 31.6 34 31.2 67 31.6 61 27.6 13 27.1
人口規模	30万人以上 10～30万人 5～10万人 3～5万人 3万人未満	13 38.2 36 33.3 55 30.4 59 26.5 24 29.3 26 32.9 57 29.8 52 24.3 26 33.3 12 31.6 34 31.2 67 31.6 61 27.6 13 27.1
予算規模	200億円以上 100～200億円 50～100億円 30～50億円 30億円未満	26 39.4 26 32.9 57 29.8 52 24.3 26 33.3 12 31.6 34 31.2 67 31.6 61 27.6 13 27.1
財政力指数	1以上 0.75～1.00 0.5～0.75 0.25～0.5 0.25未満	12 31.6 34 31.2 67 31.6 61 27.6 13 27.1
付 - III - 7

問 9	1 首長の意向	2 各施策担当部門の意向	3 議員の意向	4 その他無回答	計
付 - III - 9

問 11	1 予算委員会で一括審議する	2 常任委員会で個別審議する	3 1 と 2 の併用	4 その他・無回答	計
総計	団体215	%30.8	団体378	%54.2	団体73	%10.5	団体32	%4.6	団体698	%100.0
都道府県政令都市特別区政令都市を除く市町政令都市を除く市町	5420100.01731316.118629.6	11.950.0100.017331.616.118629.6	2825.00.029553.9534855.4	66.725.00.029553.9534855.4	819.112.50.05910.85.26410.2	112.50.02012.4304.8	2.412.50.00.0203.712.4304.8	42820100.0100.0547100.081100.0628100.034100.0108100.0181100.0223100.082100.066100.079100.0191100.0214100.078100.010.038100.0109100.0212100.0221100.048100.010.010
付 - III - 10

問 12	1. 0	2. 1~3回	3. 4~7回	4. 8~10回	計
総計	団体612	%87.7	団体75	%10.7	団体10	%1.4	団体1	%0.1	団体698	%100.0
都道府県政令都市特別政令都市を除く市町政令都市を除く市町	39	92.9	3	7.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	42	100.0
4	50.0	2	25.0	2	25.0	0	0.0	8	100.0
20	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	20	100.0
476	87.0	63	11.5	7	1.3	1	0.1	547	100.0
73	90.1	7	8.6	1	1.2	0	0.0	81	100.0
549	87.4	70	11.1	8	1.3	1	0.2	628	100.0
人口規模	30万人以上	25	85.3	2	5.9	3	8.8	0	0.0	34	100.0
10~30万人	95	88.0	12	11.1	1	0.9	0	0.0	108	100.0
5~10万人	153	84.5	27	14.9	1	0.6	0	0.0	181	100.0
3~5万人	199	89.2	20	9.0	3	1.3	1	0.4	223	100.0
3万人未満	73	89.0	9	11.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	82	100.0
財政力指数	1以上	35	92.1	2	5.3	1	2.6	0	0.0	38	100.0
0.75~1.00	93	85.3	13	11.9	3	2.8	0	0.0	109	100.0
0.5~0.75	186	87.7	23	10.8	3	1.4	0	0.0	212	100.0
0.25~0.5	197	89.1	24	10.9	0	0.0	0	0.0	221	100.0
0.25未満	38	79.2	8	16.7	1	2.1	1	2.1	48	100.0
首長の政党色	自民保守系無所属純無所属革新系無所属社	46	95.8	1	2.1	1	2.1	0	0.0	48	100.0
314	88.2	40	11.2	1	0.3	1	0.3	356	100.0
37	86.0	6	14.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	43	100.0
72	79.1	14	15.4	5	5.5	0	0.0	91	100.0
7	77.8	2	22.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	9	100.0
付 - III - 12(1)

付 - III - 11(1)

問13 補正時期(第1回補正)	1 月	2 月	3 月	4 月	5 月	6 月
総計	団体%1	団体%0	団体%0	団体%3	団体%0.4	団体%10	団体%1.4	団体%51	団体%7.3	団体%465	団体%66.6
都道府県政令都市特別区政令都市を除く市町	0 0.00 0.0

付 - III - 11(2)

問13 補正時期(第1回補正)	1 給与改訂	2 補助金の確定	3 起債額の確定	4 交付金の決定	5 税収見込みの変更	6 その他
総計	計	団体%27	3.9	団体%338	48.8	団体%143	20.6	団体%60	8.7	団体%76	11.0	団体%372	53.7
都道府県	1	2.4	21	50.0	6	14.3	5	11.9	30
政令都市	0	0.0	3	37.5	1	12.5	0	0.0	6
特別区	8	40.0	5	25.0	7	35.0	3	15.0	12
政令都市を除く市町	15	2.8	272	50.2	110	20.3	55	10.2	280
3	3.7	37	45.7	19	23.5	13	16.1	44
政令都市を除く市町	18	2.9	309	49.6	129	20.7	68	10.9	324

問13 補正時期(第2回補正)	1 月	2 月	3 月	4 月	5 月	6 月
総計	団体%1	団体%1	団体%1	団体%7	団体%1.0	団体%0	団体%0	団体%0	団体%30	団体%4.3
都道府県政令都市特別区政令都市を除く市町	0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0

問13 補正時期(第2回補正)	1 給与改訂	2 補助金の確定	3 起債額の確定	4 交付金の決定	5 税収見込みの変更	6 その他
総計	計	団体%123	17.7	団体%373	53.7	団体%208	29.9	団体%168	24.2	団体%201	28.9	団体%270	38.9
都道府県	14	33.3	26	61.9	9	21.4	10	23.8	10	23.8	23	54.8
政令都市	1	12.5	3	37.5	5	62.5	1	12.5	1	12.5	5	62.5
特別区	11	55.0	6	30.0	8	40.0	9	45.0	6	30.0	12	60.0
政令都市を除く市町	83	15.2	306	56.2	161	29.5	131	24.0	154	28.3	202	37.1
14	17.5	32	40.0	25	31.3	17	21.3	30	37.5	28	35.0
政令都市を除く市町	97	15.5	338	54.1	186	29.8	148	23.7	184	29.4	230	36.3