Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
Yusuf, Shahid, “China’s Macroeconomic Performance and Management During Transition,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.8, No.2, Spring 1994.
and China to participate in such a network.

## 3 -1-2 Particular Factors Underlying Eastern European and Asian Transitions

(1) Income Level and History of Democracy Determines Individual Approaches

Backgrounds to transition and approaches to transition naturally vary between transitional economies. The direct trigger for Eastern European reform, in both political and economic terms, was the collapse of Russian hegemony, whereas in China, Vietnam, and other Asian countries, there was a reaction to the rapid economic development of the surrounding market-based ASEAN countries. In general, in socialist countries whose income level is relatively high (for example, using the World Bank standard, countries classed as 'middle-income economies'), political reform has been more significant for the people than in the 'low-income economies,' where economic issues have been more acute. Another reason for different approaches is the historical experience of each country. Eastern European countries have a long history of democracy and, having lost their democratic rights after the War, the peoples of Eastern Europe were naturally eager to recover a degree of political freedom.

(2) What were the Most Serious Economic Bottlenecks?

Among the numerous economic difficulties in socialist economies, the following three were the most significant reasons for the transition to a market economy.

(i) Huge twin deficits (budget deficit and trade deficit) not being financed by the USSR or COMECON

(ii) Deadlock on the domestic supply side

(iii) Foreign policy intervention attached to the new supply of funds from the IMF or the World Bank.

## 3 -2 Price Liberalization as the Most Fundamental Transition Factor

## 3 -2-1 Price Liberalization as the Essential Pre-condition for the Establishment of a Market Economy

Price liberalization in the initial stages of transition to a market economy inevitably tends to create hyper-inflation due to excessive demand. Dr. Sachs has described the mechanism by which hyper inflation arises: under zero-inflation in a centrally-planned economy, excess but hidden demand builds up with the increase of real income. Once prices are liberalized, this pent-up demand is released, which forces up price levels from the demand side. Then, if the market function is to be established, hyper-inflation must be controlled. Price levels should be signals for both buyers and sellers in the market. Hyper-inflation therefore deprives the economy of the most important function of the market mechanism: efficient allocation of resources.

So, price liberalization has two contradictory effects: hyper-inflation, and the establishment of market function. The point is how gradually inflationary forces should be released and by what means they should be brought under control. We will consider this in part 4 of this section.
3-2-2 Price Liberalization as an Integral Part of the Process of Macroeconomic Stabilization

Traditionally, two approaches to stabilization and reform have been put forward: shock therapy (including the immediate and universal liberalization of prices) and the gradual approach. There are many arguments for the superiority of the shock-approach over the gradualist approach. The consensus among economists is, as Dornbush and Fisher stress in their macroeconomics textbook, that shock therapy is the only way to ensure that stabilization programs win the necessary domestic and international credibility. After the initial shock, which includes extremely painful costs to the people, there is more chance of recovery based upon the market mechanism, which in turn creates production recovery and economic development in general.

The traditional arguments regarding the two alternative approaches can be summarized as follows

(i) Two targets are separated: stability and reform.

(ii) To achieve the first goal (stability), shock therapy is the only approach.

(iii) To achieve the second goal (reform), two approaches are feasible: shock or gradual.

But this dualistic framework tends to overlook the overarching importance of price liberalization at all stages of the stabilization and reform process. The validity of the traditional framework is reconsidered and challenged in the following sections of this chapter.

## 3 -3 The Aims, Measures, and Speed of the ‘Structural Adjustment Programs’

## 3 -3-1 Main Aims

During the 1980s, the World Bank played a visible role by helping countries to design structural adjustment policies, and by lending money to help them reduce the costs of restructuring. At the same time, the IMF supervised the introduction of accompanying macroeconomic measures, including budget deficit cuts and exchange rate devaluation. The policy packages implemented jointly by the World Bank and the IMF generated considerable controversy, both as to their effectiveness and as to the sufficiency of the money the two institutions were willing to lend to support such policy measures. Several criticisms have been made concerning the role of the World Bank in the process of this structural adjustment. Among them are: insufficiency of the amount of resources devoted to adjustment loans; overoptimism of the World Bank regarding the response of the private sector to price incentives; and lack of attention to equality issues such as distribution of income and assets.

## 3 -3-2 Main Measures

On the microeconomic side, structural adjustment programs include the following kinds of measures:

(i) policies that improve efficiency in the use of resources by the public sector, including the rationalization of public investment, the restructuring of state-owned enterprises, and the privatization of some of those enterprises

(ii) trade liberalization and other measures to improve the structure of economic incentives, and efforts to promote the working of the price mechanism, especially in agriculture and
increased through such measures as privatization of inefficient state-owned companies, establishment of private companies, and an increase in productivity. However, still another risk exists in this supply promotion strategy—it may expand budget deficits and money supply, providing yet another potential cause of further inflation.

## 3 -4-3 Japan’s Experience during Its Postwar Recovery

In post-War Japan the ‘priority-production formula’ called for the priority supply of steel to the coal mining industry, followed by the priority supply of the increased coal output to the steel industry. The idea was to expand coal and steel production first and then to supply this coal and steel to other industries according to a set order of priorities, so that the resurgence of production would eventually spread throughout all segments of Japanese industry. In other words this was a plan for resuming full production by giving top priority to certain key industries. This priority-production program was financed by the Reconstruction Finance Bank, which led to expansion of the money supply, because the Bank’s bonds were financed by the Bank of Japan. The increase in the money supply, together with expanded budget deficits, created a further round of inflation. Eventually, the Dodge Line (from the work of Joseph Dodge, economic adviser to Japan in 1949) was implemented. This was a set of drastic anti-inflation measures, such as:

(i) balanced budget (elimination of deficits)

(ii) halting the Reconstruction Finance Bank loans

(iii) single exchange rate of $1 = 360$ (at which the Yen was considered overvalued at that time)

These measures created a sharp economic slump, and there was much heated debate within Japan about this rapid stabilization. Some supported the tight demand policy implemented following the Dodge Line; others objected because the program induced steep deflation. Japan in fact remained in a deflationary slump until the outbreak in 1950 of the Korean War, which generated huge additional demand for Japanese goods and services, lifting the economy out of the recession and onto the path of rapid recovery. Evaluation of the Dodge Line is debatable. Some appreciate these tight demand policies contributed to combat high inflation, others emphasise that Dodge provided Japanese economic sectors particularly enterprises so-called 'hard budget constraint' by stopping subsidies.

## 3 -4-4 How to Minimize the Costs of Deflation?

As mentioned above, the gradual or phased approach to price liberalization necessitates caution with regard to the potential byproduct of inflationary money supply growth. The answer must be a second stabilization stage in which another tight demand policy is endured. Policy makers need to consider how to minimize the costs of such deflationary action. As Chart 1-I-7 shows, as long as supply capacity can be expanded, a rigid demand policy need not drastically reduce output levels.

## 3 -5 Issues in Supply Reform

3-5-1 Two Traps Attached to Gradual Price Reform

(1) Price Liberalization of Output Goods but not of Input Goods
market and banking sector. Financial institutional reform cannot be done in a few years. Legal system does not automatically bring about functional financial mechanism. Interest rate structure, reserve ratio and other economic factors must be considered by gradual way.

3-6 Conclusions-Interdependence of Macroeconomic Stabilization and Enterprise Reform, and the Need for Pragmatism

In the reform process, as reliance upon market allocation increases, the government must replace many of its direct economic interventions with indirect measures, mainly fiscal policy and monetary policy. An appropriate fiscal policy will achieve a reasonable degree of macroeconomic balance, generating sufficient tax revenue to finance regular expenditure. An appropriate monetary policy will allow an increase in the money supply consistent with macroeconomic stability.

The one overriding difficulty in this is that successful macroeconomic reform depends upon effective changes in how enterprises operate at the microeconomic level. On the one hand, stabilization through effective macroeconomic policy is a fundamental prerequisite for the creation of a decentralized and efficient enterprise system. On the other hand, successful enterprise reform is a necessary ingredient for successful macroeconomic stabilization. Prolongation of the life of state-owned enterprises represents an obstacle from both the microeconomic view and, because of its detrimental effect on fiscal and monetary policy, from the macroeconomic view also.

Policy makers must therefore take plural approaches. They must remain attuned to changing economic realities, must judge between shock or gradual approaches as occasion demands, and must implement appropriate price-liberalization, demand-control, and supply-expansion policies, with pragmatism and skill. Above all, they must be flexible enough to change policies whenever an original policy has been seen to be harmful. (Nariai)
Crude Once-and-For-All Approach to Price Liberalization

Centrally-planned Economy : P=P0 (fixed price level)

After Price Liberalization : P=P1

Shock Therapy (Tight Demand Policy) : P=P2

Sharp Increase of Input Prices : P=P3
Y2Y4 Y1Y3

Phased Price Liberalization as Part of a Skillful Stabilization Policy

(1) Centrally-planned Economy : P=P0

(2) After Price Liberalization : P=P1

(3) Gradual Price Liberalization + Mild Demand Control Policy : P=P2

(4) Increase of Supply under Skillful Governmental Policy : P=P3

(5) Tight Demand Policy : P=P4
## REFERENCES

Dornbush, Rudiger and Stanley Fisher, Macroeconomics 5th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990

Flemming, John. EBRD Economic Review, EBRD 1993

The World Bank, World Development Report, 1991

Sachs, Jeffrey and Felipe Larrain, Macroeconomics in the Global Economy, Harvester Wheathear, 1993

Sachs, Jeffrey and David Lipton, Creating a market economy in Eastern Europe, working paper, 1990
## 4 A “Pluralistic Approach” to Transition

## 4 -1 Introduction

“Transition” is a movement from a centrally planned to a market economy. This leads to a question: what kind of market economy will be realized after the completion of the transition process? Although this topic is not treated by the IMF or the World Bank in their articles on market-oriented reforms, in our opinion, this is a crucial issue, since the course of the transition --in other words the contents of the reform program-- inevitably depends on the type of market economy which is desired. $ ^{1} $

Alan Blinder is one of the few Western scholars who deals with this issue in an explicit manner. According to him, neoclassical economics has a weakness in analyzing transitions from one equilibrium to another. To overcome this problem, he proposes to divide the “transition problem” into the following two questions: $ ^{2} $

(1) Where do we want to go?

(2) How do we get from here to there?

In our opinion, the first question is more crucial than the second because, as we mentioned, the path of transition is determined to a certain extent, once the goal is given. From this viewpoint, in this section, we are going to deal with the issue of the goal (“destination”) of transition.

## 4 -2 “Destinations” and Transitional Paths

## 4 -2-1 Patterns of Market Economies

Recent studies $ ^{3} $ give insight into the diversity of market economies. Although each market economy has its own unique features, we can envisage the following three basic models of a market economy (needless to say, this is not an exclusive list):

(1) American model

(2) European model

(3) Japanese model

There are two important factors determining the characteristics of these models: $ ^{4} $

(a) relations between the government and market (or private sector)

(b) relations among main actors or players in the economy :firm vs firm, bank vs firm, firm vs workers, supplier vs consumer etc.

In the American model, the role of government is relatively small. The basic idea is “leave it as far as possible, to the market mechanism”, so as to realize the optimal resource allocation. In the Japanese model, on the other hand, government plays a crucial role in overcoming “market failure” and realizing “dynamic” optimum of resource allocation, which is beyond the capacity of the market mechanism alone. $ ^{5} $ Meanwhile, relations among the main actors of the economy are based on long-term viewpoints, in the Japanese model, in order to maximize the long-term rate of return; initial loss is accepted if sufficient return is expected in the future. The typical cases are “life-time employment system”, “keiretsu”, “main bank system” etc. In the American model, the most appropriate way of collaboration under any given specific situation is chosen in order to maximize the short-term rate of return. Therefore ad hoc relations are very common.

The European model is often placed in the middle between the American and the
countries of Europe might do better by emulating the Japanese model than by emulating the American model. --- part of the reason pertains to the likelihood of making the transition successfully. $ ^{10} $

## 4 -2-3 Alternative Reform Programs

There may be an argument that the leaders of transitional economies do not necessarily keep some specific types of market economies in their minds as goals of transitions. This argument is correct. However, in our opinion, it is advisable for the leaders to envisage the goals of their transitions, since this inevitably influences the specific features of their reform programs.

Suppose there are two transitional economies: one is aiming at an American model and the other is moving toward a Japanese model. The substantial difference in the relationship between government and market of these two models inevitably influences the contents of reform programs.

Let us take the case of financial sector reform. The standard menu of financial sector reform is composed of the establishment of a central banking system, breaking up of "mono bank system", and commercialization and privatization of specialized banks owned by the state. Although the fundamental structure is not influenced by the selection of model, there is one crucial issue that causes differences in the reform program. The issue is whether to maintain a state owned specialized bank to provide preferential (or direct) credit with subsidized interest rates to state-designated activities, such as export promotion, agricultural development, promotion of small and medium sized industries, and R & D of advanced technology.

In the American model, the principle is that commercial banks finance these activities with market interest rates. The World Bank and the IMF tend to be reluctant to accept the idea of specialized bank and direct credit with subsidized interest rate, particularly the latter. In their recommendation to the former USSR, four international institutes (IMF, IBRD, OECD, EBRD) claimed: $ ^{11} $

“Experience in other countries suggests that subsidized state directed lending easily becomes subjects to special interests, is frequently inefficient and can ultimately undercut the soundness of the bank itself.”

Needless to say, various types of direct credit with subsidized interest rates play an important role in a Japanese model. The purpose is to overcome market failures. Therefore the selection of the model causes substantial differences in the banking system of a transitional economy, therefore in the feature of reform program of the financial sector.

## 4 -3 Other Factors to Influence Reform Programs

It should be stressed that, in addition to “destination” (goal), three factors play major roles in determining the features of a reform program. In other words, the path of transition is a function of the following three variables plus “destination”.

## (1) Initial Conditions

Initial conditions of an economy have strong effects on the process of development. $ ^{12} $ Typical examples of initial conditions are shown below:
technocrats have begun to study these cases.

It should be pointed out that a reference case is not necessarily a model of market economy as a goal of the transition. When a country constructs export processing zones, taking into account the success of such an attempt in Taiwan, the country may simply borrow the idea from Taiwan without any intention to construct a market economy which resembles Taiwan.

## (3) Recommendation and Suggestion of International Institutes

It is to be admitted that the reform programs of transitional economies are not feasible without financial support by international institutes such as the IMF and the World Bank. In most cases, financial support is accompanied by “policy dialogue” and “conditionalities”. As a result, most of the reform programs are fundamentally compatible with the recommendations and suggestions of the international institutes. Perhaps the reform program in China is less influenced by these international institutes, as China has relied less on the financial assistance with conditionalities.

## 4 -4 Concluding Remarks

The path of transition or the feature of a reform program is a function of four variables: (a) the pattern of a market economy aimed at as a “destination” (goal), (b) initial conditions of the transitional economy, (c) “reference case”, and (d) recommendation and suggestion of international institutes. These variables lead to diversity of the reform process. While the IMF and the World Bank stress the diversity of initial conditions, they do not deal with the diversity of the patterns of market economies. In our opinion, such a “single model approach” suffers from a lack of flexibility and applicability. Under these circumstances, we wish to propose a “pluralistic approach” paying due attention to all of the abovementioned four variables.

(Shimomura)

Chart 1-1-8

[Single Model Approach]

Initial Position → Market Economy

[Pluralistic Approach] → Market Economy (Model A)

Initial Position $ \rightarrow $ Market Economy (Model C)

→ Market Economy (Model N)
## FOOTNOTES

1/ See Chart 1-I-4.

2/ BLINDER, [1992]

3/ ALBERT, [1991] BLINDER, [1992] KOJIMA, [1994] OHNO, [1993] etc.

4/ BLINDER, [1992] AOKI, [1992] KOSAI, [1992]

5/ MURAKAMI, [1992]

6/ ALBERT, [1991]

7/ See Chart 1-I-4.

8/ MAHATHIR, [1983]

9/ Keidanren, [1993]

10/ BLINDER, [1992]

11/IMF, IBRD, OECD, EBRD, [1990]

12/ ISHIKAWA, [1990]

13/ World Bank, [1992b]
## REFERENCES

ALBERT, Michel, SHIHON - SHUGI TAI SHIHON - SHUGI (CAPITALISME CONTRE CAPITALISME), Takeuchi Shoten Shinsha, 1991.

AOKI, Masahiko, “Soshiki Kiko No Chigai Ni Chakumomu” (On the Difference of Organizational Structure), NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, December 29, 1992.

BLINDER, Alan, SHOULD THE FORMER SOCIALIST ECONOMIES LOOK EAST OR WEST FOR A MODEL ?, CEPS Working Paper NO.8, 1992.

ISHIKAWA, Shigeru, KAIHATSU KEIZAIGAKU NO KIHON MONDAI (BASIC ISSUES OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS), Iwanami Shoten, 1990.

Keidanren, DAI IKKAI NIHON VIETNAM GODO KEIZAI KAIGI HOKOKUSHO (REPORT ON THE FIRST VIETNAM-JAPAN JOINT ECONOMIC CONFERENCE), 1993.

KOSAI, Yutaka, “Ishu Shihon-shugi Kan No Kyoso Wo” (Competition among Different Types of Capitalism is Preferable), NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, December 21, 1992.

KOJIMA, Shoichi, CONVERGENCE AND CONFLICT IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, Paper Submitted to the Eleventh ERI International Symposium, March 1994.

MAHATHIR, Bin Mohamad, “On the ‘Look East’ Policy”, in Mahathir, Bin, Mohamad, MALAY DILEMMA (THE MALAY DILEMMA), Keiso Shobo, 1983.

MURAKAMI, Yasusuke, HAN-KOTEN NO SEIJI KEIZAIGAKU (POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTI-NEOCLASSICAL PARADIGM), Chuo Koron-Sha, 1992.

OHNO, Kenichi, “Shijo-Keizai Donyu No Kihon Mondai” (Basic Issues of the Introduction of Market Mechanism), SHAKAI KAGAKU KENKYU, Vol. 45, No.2, 1993.
入力方向

青果物卸壳市場調查 月別調查票

この調査は、農林水産省が統計法第19条第1項の規定に基づき一般統計調査として実施するものです。

また、この調査票は統計を作成するためのみに使用するもので、課税など統計以外の目的に使用しませんので、ありのままを記入してください。

記入見本 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9

政府統計

統計法に基づく国の

統計調査です。調査

票情報の秘密の保護

に万全を期します。

品目・品種名称	品目・品種名称	産地コード	転送元市場コード	数 量(kg)

注：1 網掛け項目については、農林水産省職員が記入しますので、記入しないでください。

2 「税区分」については、消費税込みの場合は「0」、消費税抜きの場合は「1」を記入してください。

3 「品目・品種名称」「品目・品種コード」「産地コード」「転送元市場コード」については、別紙「名称・コード一覧表」をご参照ください。

4 公表品目・品種で記入可能な場合は、公表品目・品種で記入しても構いません。

5 この調査票は、直接機械で読み取るので、汚したりしないでください。また、数字の記入に当たっては記入見本を参考にして黒い鉛筆を使用し、間違えた場合は消しゴムできれいに消してください。
## Ⅲ 耕地の利用状況

## 1 夏期における田本地の利用状況

（1）平成26年夏期（おおむね水稻の栽培期間）における田本地の利用状況をみると、水稻作付田は163万9,000ha（青刈り面積を含む。）、水稻以外の作物のみの作付田は41万6,300haで、それぞれ前年並みとなった。

また、夏期全期不作付地は26万5,000haで、前年に比べて2,700ha（1％）増加した。

この結果、田本地に占める水稻作付田の割合は70.6%、水稻以外の作物のみの作付田の割合は17.9%、夏期全期不作付地の割合は11.4%となった（表16）。

表16 平成26年夏期における田本地の利用状況

区 分	面 積	前年との比較	構成比
対 差	対 比
田 本 地	ha	ha	%	%
2,320,000	△	6,000	100	100.0
水 稲 作 付 田	1,639,000	△	7,000	100	70.6
水稲以外の作物のみの作付田	416,300	△	400	100	17.9
夏期全期不作付地	265,000	2,700	101	11.4

(2) 夏期における田本地の利用状況の動向をみると、昭和45年に米の生産調整が実施されて以降、米の生産調整面積の変動による増減はあるものの、水稲作付田は減少傾向で推移し、夏期全期不作付地については増加傾向で推移している（図12）。

図12 夏期における田本地の利用状況の推移
## 2 農作物作付（栽培）延べ面積及び耕地利用率（平成26年）

(1) 田の農作物作付（栽培）延べ面積は227万3,000haで、前年とほぼ同数であった（表17）。田の耕地利用率は92.5%で、前年並みとなった（表17）。

(2) 畑の農作物作付（栽培）延べ面積は187万4,000haで、前年に比べて1万3,000ha（1%）減少した（表17）。

これは、飼肥料作物、果樹、野菜等の作付（栽培）面積が減少したためである。

畑の耕地利用率は91.0％で、前年並みとなった（表17）。

(3) この結果、田畑計の耕地利用率は91.8%で、前年並みとなった（表17）。

表17 平成26年農作物作付（栽培）延べ面積及び耕地利用率

区 分	田 烟 計	田	烟
作付(栽培)延べ面積	前年との比較	耕地利用率	作付(栽培)延べ面積	前年との比較	作付(栽培)延べ面積	前年との比較
対差	対比	対差	対比	対差	対比
作付(栽培)延べ面積	ha	ha	%	ha	ha	ha	ha	ha	ha	ha	%
4,146,000	△	21,000	99	91.8	2,273,000	△	7,000	100	1,874,000	△ 13,000 99
水陸稲(子実用)	1,575,000	△	24,000	98	34.9	1,573,000	△	24,000	98	1,540	△ 320 83
麦類(子実用)	272,900	3,300	101	6.0	168,800	2,100	101	104,100
かんしょ	38,000	△	600	98	0.8	2,810	△	100	97	35,200	△ 400 99
雑穀(乾燥子実用)	61,400	△	1,500	98	1.4	38,300	△	1,800	96	23,000
豆類(乾燥子実用)	181,000	2,500	101	4.0	116,300	1,500	101	64,700
野菜	530,400	△	2,700	99	11.7	142,000	△	200	100	388,400	△ 2,500 99
果樹	233,800	△	3,200	99	5.2	-	-	nc	233,800	△ 3,200 99
工芸農作物	151,200	△	1,500	99	3.3	6,360	△	270	96	144,900	△ 1,200 99
飼肥料作物	1,019,000	7,000	101	22.6	198,500	15,400	108	820,800	△ 7,800 99
その他作物	83,600	△	700	99	1.9	26,200	△	400	98	57,400	△ 300 99
耕地面積	4,518,000	△	19,000	100	nc	2,458,000	△	7,000	100	2,060,000	△ 12,000 99
耕地利用率	91.8%	0.0%	10%	nc	nc	92.5%	0.0%	10%	nc	91.0%	△0.1% 1%

耕地利用率（%）= $ \frac{作付（栽培）延宀面積}{耕地面积（7月15日現在）} $ $ \times $ 100

注：耕地利用率とは、耕地面积を「100」とした作付（栽培）延べ面積の割合である。