Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
Along the Pacific coast from Hachinohe City in Aomori to Ibaraki prefecture, all the ports, including an international hub port and 10 important ports, suffered devastating damages to their port facilities (for example, their breakwaters, berthing facilities and cargo machines). Moreover, oceanside port facilities such as ship courses and anchorages were buried or blocked by sediments. Also, containers, shipped automobiles, and debris were carried away by the currents. Consequently, all port functions were halted in the afflicted areas, and necessities for livelihood and industry in the Tohoku region as a whole could not be brought in until the ports were temporarily restored.

In addition, 156 facilities, including lighthouses to navigate ships safely, collapsed or became flooded (as of August 11).

## 39 : Damage from the Great East Earthquake to Ports

Sendai Shiogama Port

Source: MLIT.

Soma Port

## Column - Damage and Import Mitigation Effects of Bay Entrance Breakwater at Kamaishi Port

At Kamaishi Port, Iwate, bay entrance breakwaters that are the deepest in the world (63m) were completed in March 2009 after 31 years of construction. A center opening area of 300m is secured for bigger ships, at both sides of which are two breakwaters, North Breakwater (990m) and South Breakwater (670m), which are constructed on a slant. It is expected to make tidal waves equivalent to the Meiji-Sanriku Tsunami lower than the top height of the breakwaters within the bay (roughly 4m), which would prevent inundation in the town.

However, the massive tsunami caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake had unexpected power and largely destroyed the breakwaters. As a result, the tsunami went over the breakwaters within the bay and inundated an area wider than what was estimated by the prepared hazard map. It is necessary to research factors of tsunami damages, and to make better use of such knowledge for disaster control. In such research processes, it was found that those breakwaters, in comparison to cases where there were no tsunami breakwaters, did actually help mitigate the damage.

Source: MLIT
Wave gauges set 20km away from Kamaishi Port recorded a maximum tsunami height of 6.7m. Comparing cases where there are breakwaters to case where there are no breakwater using numerical calculations based on the recorded results, it became clear that, with the breakwaters, the heights of tsunami waves decreased about 40% from 13.7m to 8.1m at the observatory within Kamaishi Port, and inundation along Otogawa in the Suga district in Kamaishi Port decreased about 50% from 20.2m to 10.0m. The calculation results mostly agreed with the research regarding tsunami traces and inundation areas. Moreover, according to the computation, the time when the start of inundation delayed 6 minutes. It seems that those breakwaters made elevation of water surface delayed.

Four airports -- Sendai, Hanamaki, Fukushima and Ibaraki -- suffered damages. Although ceilings of terminal buildings fell down at Hanamaki and Ibaraki Airports and all the glass windows of Fukushima Airport's control tower were shattered, those three airports resumed operations on the day of the disaster.

On the other hand, Sendai airport suffered extraordinary damages due to inundation by the massive tsunami. Not only were more than 2,000 cars swept down runways, taxiways, and tarmacs, but sediments and debris were also scattered throughout the airport premises. Machineries and power-generation facilities in the control tower and terminal buildings were also inundated. About 1,400 passengers, staff, and local residents who evacuated to the airport were temporally isolated; it took about 2 days to rescue them.

Sendai Airport Access Railway, the main access to the airport, was also greatly damaged by flooded airport tunnels and inundated operation management facilities. Consequently, though the Airport resumed its operation for private airplanes on April 13, alternative bus transportation has been continuing between Mitzakono and Sendai Airports.
40: Damage on Sendai Airport

Source: MLIT (left); Miyagi Prefecture (right)

The bus system is an important backbone of public transportation. Bus operators in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima suffered damages; 219 vehicles were lost, damaged, or flooded, and employees and company buildings were afflicted. Consequently, many local and express buses stopped their operations. Even in April 28, about 1.5 months after the Earthquake, 26 percent of local buses in the coastal areas of Iwate and Fukushima were not operating and 19 percent stopped their operations in the coastal areas in Fukushima. Furthermore, operators outside of the affected areas had to reduce the number of operating buses due to fuel shortage immediately after the earthquake.

41: Damage on the Access Railway to Sendai Airport

Source: Miyagi Prefecture

## iv) Damage on Life supporting Infrastructure

The sewage system is one of the country’s essential utilities. Due to the tsunami and other aftershocks centered in the coastal areas of the Tohoku region, 48 sewage treatment facilities stopped operations and 63 facilities were damaged. With regards to 9 sewage facilities around the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, it has not been possible to determine their conditions. Damages to sewage pipes extended as long as 550 kilometers across eleven prefectures $ ^{1} $ , which was much longer than 162 kilometers of damage from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.

Forests in some public parks along the coast prevented debris drifting into inland areas and the high ground of some public

42: Damage on Sewer Facilities

Left: Southern Miyagi waste water treatment plant

Right: Hove utility hole

Sources: Miyagi Prefecture (left), Fukushima Prefecture (right)

parks became the place for emergency evacuation. Due to the tsunami, forests developed as public parks along the coast lost many trees. Accordingly, it has been necessary to discuss on how to develop forest belts for mitigating tsunami damages and how to effectively arrange evacuation sites and routes that people can use in emergencies.
## I nfluence of the Earthquake in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area

Even though Tokyo is 300 kilometers away from the epicenter of the Great East Japan Earthquake, it experienced strong shaking of intensity 5 upper and was affected very much.

The earthquake, which occurred in the afternoon of a weekday, stopped public transportation across wide areas due to rail checking and recovery operations. Many commuters, especially in Tokyo’s central districts, consequently became unable to return to their homes.

It is expected that a great number of people will not be able to go home if a big inland earthquake were ever to occur in Tokyo. If everyone were to try to go home by foot at the same time in the case of such an emergency, sidewalks and streets will be like jam-packed trains. It may become dangerous, should a group of people fall down at the same time. People should stay where they are and remain calm until they have gathered accurate information.

Therefore, during this disaster, the Government of Japan urged people not to try to go home if it was too difficult. Public facilities were opened up to accommodate people who were not able to make it home, and blankets and other necessities were distributed. Some private buildings, which were prepared for the management of people who could not go home, allowed not only their employees to stay, but also their customers.

However, not every office and commercial building could manage the situation well. Due to the suspension of railways, commuters and

43: Temporary Stay of Commuters Unable to Return Home

Source: Chiyoda Ward, Tokyo

shoppers flooded the streets and areas around stations, trying to go home by foot, by bus, or by any other possible means.

Furthermore, people were trapped in at least 210 elevators in 15 prefectures, including the Tohoku region and Tokyo. They were not rescued until noon on the day after the earthquake (March 12).

Those situations shed some light on the challenges of how to prepare for earthquakes in metropolitan areas, an important issue in case of an earthquake in the Tokyo metropolitan area.

Undersupply of electricity due to the TEPCO (Tokyo Electricity Power Companies) nuclear plant accidents greatly affected economy and society in areas to which TEPCO provides electricity, including the Tokyo metropolitan area.

To avoid large-scale blackouts due to the undersupply of electricity, TEPCO urged residents to save electricity and started planned blackouts by district on March 14 for electricity-demand control. Because of the short notice in the beginning about the planned blackouts and because most railways suspended or reduced their operations in the Tokyo metropolitan area, many commuters were badly affected. In order to remedy the situation, railway companies, TEPCO, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry kept in close cooperation with each other to rearrange train timetables and operations of electrical substations. As a result, many lines improved in terms of schedules and operating areas.
## Serious Influence on Economic Activities

Though it is hard to accurately figure out economic damages caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake, the Cabinet Office estimated that stock worth of 16.9 trillion yen including buildings, lifeline utility facilities and social infrastructures, was damaged $ ^{1} $ . This figure is much greater than the estimated value of 10 trillion yen for direct damages in the affected areas of the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.

44: Changes in Economic Indexes before and after the Great East Japan Earthquake

Trend of Real GDP Growth Rate

Source: MLIT based on the "Quarterly Estimates of GDP 2011, Jan. to Mar. 2011 (the second preliminary)" of the Cabinet Office

Trend of Industrial Output Index

Note: The mean value in 2005 is 100.0

Source: MLIT based on the “Indices of Industrial Production” of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

Trend of Import/Export

Source: MLIT based on the "Trade Statistics of Japan" of the Ministry of Finance

Source: MLIT based on the "Current Survey of Commerce" of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

Trend of Domestic New Car Sales

Source: MLIT based on materials of the Japan Automobile Dealers Association

Trend of Housing Construction Starts (Raw Figure)

Source: MLIT
This earthquake brought not only direct damages but also indirect economic damages, such as the decline of output by corporations due to factory damages and breached supply chains. Moreover, it looms on various economic activities in both domestic and international fields, through electricity undersupply and planned blackouts due to the nuclear plant accidents. Additionally, there were agricultural and fishery damages and even reputational damage caused by the radioactive diffusion.

The earthquake caused not only direct damages to ports and airports and but also reputational damages due to the nuclear accidents. Consequently, international transportation has been severely damaged.

Eleven ports (international hub port and important ports) along the Pacific coast in the Tohoku region, which had handled seven percent of all cargos nationwide and three percent of the country's total trade amount, were essential infrastructures in supporting the livelihoods and industries of the region. Those ports were afflicted and have had difficulties in continuing to play such important roles. Furthermore, the damages on supply chains amongst corporations badly affected economic activities in areas even outside of those afflicted. Damages are not limited to infrastructure of any one region; they are widespread.

Because of these situations, operations were suspended for regular routes of international container vessels and domestic feeder routes connecting Tohoku with the Keihin port, artery routes for Tohoku and northern Kanto. Reputational damages caused some companies (mostly foreign ship lines) to stop making a port call at Keihin port. On another front, some ship lines were forced to change their routes to Korea's Busan Port via Akita and Niigata ports along the Japan Sea coast.

Consequently, the affected ports, including Keihin port (which had just been designated as a strategic port for international container transportation in August 2010) face a serious situation; international container vessels from/to East Japan areas have to now make the switch in Pusan and other ports. If the restoration of affected ports is delayed, severe damages will spread to all Japanese industries and affect the country’s economy as a whole.

With regards to international airlines, some foreign airline companies tried cancelling or changing flight routes centering on Narita and Haneda routes.

Considering that Kobe port, one of the top ports worldwide before the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, lowered its international status due to the earthquake and had difficulties in its restoration $ ^{1} $ , there is a concern regarding negative impacts on our economy of changes in international transportation of goods and passengers, which are caused by the huge earthquake and accompanied reputational damages.

45: Regular Lines Calling at Ports in Tohoku and Northern Kanto before and after the Great East Japan Earthquake (Regular Foreign Cargo Line)

Notes: The values are the total for the affected prefectures (Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, and Ibaraki). Source: MLIT
46: Number of Entries and Departures at Narita and Haneda Airports Before and After the Great East Japan Earthquake Narita Airport Haneda Airport

Note: Data of Narita Airport show year-to-year proportions of the number of people who entered and departed Japan between March 11th and April 18th 2011. Data for Haneda Airport is the percentage of entry/departure from March 11 $ ^{th} $ to April 18 $ ^{th} $ , 2011 compared to the one from March 1 $ ^{st} $ to March 10 $ ^{th} $ , 2011. The mean number of entry/departure per day is compared. Source: MLIT

For tourism, there was a wave of cancellations by foreign visitors and Japanese visitors. The number of foreign visitors in March and April, 2011 decreased on a year-to-year basis by 360,000 (-50 percent) and 490,000 (-63 percent), respectively. These were the largest decreases in the past 50 years. $ ^{1} $

The Japan Tourism Agency affirmed that cancellation rates of hotel bookings from March to April were 61% in Tohoku region, 48% in Kanto region, and 36% nationwide. The disaster affected the tourism industry badly through bankruptcy, the closure or suspension of affected hotels and inns.

47: Trends in Foreign Visitors and Departing Japanese Before and After the Great East Japan Earthquake

Source: MLIT from documents of JNTO
### 1. Initial Response and Temporary Restoration

## Establishing Unified All-Out Emergency Management Systems

In regards to approaches for earthquakes originated in and around the Japan Trench and the Kuril Trench, the Japanese government had assumed eight different types of earthquakes, including the “Meiji-Sanriku” type and the “off the coast of Miyagi” type, and had announced damage estimations. However, considering that the number of deaths was estimated at about 2,700 in a worst case scenario (Meiji-Sanriku type), the government was not expecting this vast scale of widespread damage. $ ^{1} $

The outstanding and widespread damages was beyond expectation, and made the initial response (including the grasping the damage) extremely difficult.

The government set up the Emergency Task Force for the first time since the enactment of the Basic Act for Disaster Countermeasure in 1961, in which all the ministers take part with the Prime Minister as the chief.

MLIT also set up the MLIT Emergency Task Force 30 minutes after the earthquake to manage emergency response of all MLIT offices, including the Tohoku Regional Development Bureau and the Tohoku District Transport Bureau $ ^{2} $ .

In the initial response and temporary restoration, MLIT put all efforts towards rescuing the afflicted and towards opening and maintaining emergency transportation routes via roads, airlines, and sea lines to save as many lives as possible. In trying to figure out the damaged conditions and needs of the affected areas – which were changing from moment to moment – MLIT utilized all available measures to manage diverse types of damages and pulled all-out efforts in cooperation with not only related national ministries and local governments (including the afflicted ones), but also related private business associations. $ ^{3} $

MLIT dispatched its 24,779 officials until August 7 in order to support the MLIT On-Site Emergency Task Force and the affected municipalities which lost their administrative functions during this disaster. Sixty-two officials were sent as members of the Technical Emergency Control–FORCE (hereinafter called TEC-Force) on the day of disaster, and 400 were dispatched the next day. More than 500 TEC-Force officials worked together at the peak period. The total number of dispatched TEC-Force officials was 18,053, the largest number since its establishment in 2008. Also MLIT sent 19,512 machineries and equipments for managing disaster to the affected areas.

48: Dispatch of MLIT Officers to the Affected Areas

A Total of Dispatch (as of Aug 7th)	Remarks
MLIT Officers	24,779
Officers who took part in the TEC-FORCE	18,053
Equipment for Disaster Management	19,512	Trucks for lighting, drain pumps, satellite relays, headquarter facilities, waiting support, water sprays, etc.
## Column - Temporary Bulletin Board for the Affected Municipalities

One of the biggest difficulties from the Great East Japan Earthquake was weakened capabilities of municipalities to offer information about the affected areas. The MLIT Tohoku Bureau managed situations in which more affected areas had less effective ways of communication. It offered disaster management vehicles to many municipalities that lost communication measures in order to secure such measures. In addition, it opened a temporary bulletin board on the MLIT homepage so that municipalities could ask for help regarding supplies until full-fledged communication means were restored. Since March 19th, 20 municipalities in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima have made use of it.

## Column - Technical Emergency Control Force of MLIT (TEC-FORCE)

The Technical Emergency Control Force (TEC-FORCE) was established in MLIT (including the National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management, the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan, local bureaus of MLIT, and the Japan Meteorological Agency) in 2008 in order to offer smooth and immediate technical support for investigations of damage situations, prevention of damage enlargement, and early reconstruction, etc. when a massive natural disaster occurs or when there is a possibility of one occurring.

A total of 1,500 people for the 2008 Iwate-Miyagi Earthquake; 1,100 for the 2009 Chugoku-Shikoku Rainstorm; and 200 for the Amami Rainstorm were dispatched.

During the Great East Japan Earthquake, a total number of 18,053 (as of August 7th) people were sent to the affected areas to figure out the emergency situation immediately, secure and restore disconnected communication measures, drain pooled water by drain pump vehicles, and to investigate conditions for recovery.

Mission of TEC-FORCE

## Technical support for emergency response of affected local governments

### 1. To figure out damages immediately

Support for figuring out damages on rivers, roads, ports, airports, town areas, housings, land erosion, sea coast, etc.

### 2. To prevent damage and its widening

Support for emergency response to prevent inundation and overflowing from rivers, seashore, or port facilities, and sediment disaster.

Support for risk level evaluation of affected buildings and housing sites.

3. To restore afflicted areas as early as possible

Technical advices for early restration of rivers, roads, ports, airports, town areas, sediment control, sea coast, etc.

Support for co-ordination of emergency supply delivery.

Source: MLIT

Source: MLIT

Left: Damage investigation

Center: Satellite communication vehicle dispatched to Ishinomaki City

Right: Meeting with affected municipalities and Self-Defense Forces
## Unprecedented Rescue and Search

Because tsunami warnings and cautions to the areas including the Japan Sea side were announced, the Japan Coast Guard (hereinafter called JCG) dispatched all the vessels and airplanes in every district (349 patrol boats and 46 airplanes on the peak day of March 12). After those warnings were lifted, the JCG dispatched the patrol boats and planes to the Pacific coast across the Tohoku region, which suffered massive damages.

The JCG rescued and searched

49: Activity of the Japan Coast Guard

Maximum Dispatched	Total Number Dispatched (as of August 11)
Special Salvage Unit, etc.	35 persons (March 13)	2,200 persons
Patrol Boat	349 boats (March 12)	7,044 boats
Airplane	46 planes (March 12)	2,404 planes

Source: Japan Coast Guard

afflicted people where a great deal of debris was diffused and floating in the sea along the coast due to the huge tsunami. JCG rescued 360 people by their patrol boats and airplanes. People were saved, included those left behind in drifting ships, those isolated or floating in inundated land areas, and those injured and sick. The JCG also investigated whether the drifting ships had survivors on board and confirmed there were no people on the all of 504 ships. Furthermore, it found 321 drifting dead bodies (up until August 11).

50: Activity of the Special Salvage Unit of the Japan Coast Guard

Source: Japan Coast Guard

## Emergency Drain and Prevention of Secondary Disaster

The tsunami caused by this massive earthquake inundated a large area along the coast, and 112 million cubic centimeters of water (approximately 310,000 pools of 25 meter long) filled the area as of March 13. The flooded water greatly impeded the emergency rescue of missing people and the restoration of damaged facilities. Therefore, MLIT gathered drainage pump vehicles from all Regional Bureaus across Japan and carried out drainage of the places where natural drainage was difficult due to wide area coverage and depth of inundation. A total of 4,000 vehicles conducted drainage intensively and effectively in 66 points of 16 municipalities within Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures. MLIT completed the drainage operation at the end of June.

51: Drainage Activity in the Area Pooled by Tsunami

Source: MLIT
56: Recovery of Transportation Infrastructures

* 4/23 Renewed total distance of existing Shinkansen lines (1012km). Because excluded section was changed from "controlled" to "caution" and "evacuation" area for the nuclear power plant accidents.

*4/23 Renewed total distance of directly-controlled national roads (1119km). Because excluded section was changed from "controlled" to "caution" area for the nuclear power plant accidents.

Source: MLIT

## 57 : Early Recovery of Expressways and the Shinkansen

###### 2011.3.11 2011.4.1

Recovery of all sections

$ ^{*} $ Excluded controlled sections due to nuclear power station accidents

$ ^{*} $ Emergency vehicles could drive the next day on the Tohoku Expressway (Urawa IC to Ikarigaseki IC), Joban Expressway (Sango JCT to Iwaki Chuo IC), etc.

*Reference: In the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, it took 622 days for the full recovery of expressways due to the partial collapse of the Kobe line of the Hanshin Expressway passing near the epicenter.

* Reference: In the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, it took 81 days for the full recovery of Shinkansen operations because of the collapse of and damage to over 700 bridges.

Source: MLIT.