Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
## 要約表（規制及び規制緩和の性質についての日米英国際比較）

この比較表は経済研究所の事務局が共同研究者の提出した産業別論文に基づいてとりまとめたものである。内容について不十分な点や誤解があればそれらは事務局に帰属する。引用する際には元の産業別論文を用いていただきたい。

項目	日 本	英国
A. 小史	1951年に制定され、1953年に改正された道路運送法は、新規参入の免許と料金設定について運輸省にその権限を与えた。旅客輸送に比べてトラック輸送の経済的規制はより緩やかな傾向にあった。運賃規制に関しては、運輸省は一定の価格帯を認可し、業者にはその範囲内での運賃設定を許可した。新規参入については、法律により需給バランスを崩さないことが求められたが、新規参入業者はそれを証明して参入することができた。規制の最大の問題点は規制当局に充分な情報がないなかでの免許交付の条件としての需給バランス条項であった。1990年に貨物自動車運送事業法が施行された。これにより参入と料金規制が緩和された。免許制は許可制となった。運賃と料金規制は認可制から届出制となった。ただ過剰供給下での参入やコストとかけ離れた料金に対応するセーフガード条項は残っていた。この法律により、業者がもっと柔軟な営業ができるようにするために区域事業と路線事業の区別が廃止された。しかしこれにより以前の路線事業に似た特別積合せ事業という新たなカテゴリーがもたらされた。	1947年運送法は長距離運送業者を国営化し、民間業者は半径25マイル以内に限られた。民間業者の免許の制限は後に緩和されたが、免許制は厳格に運営され、能力以上の申請は却下されて運行台数も制限された。国営化された業者はすべての有料車両のなかで5%のシェアを占め、依然として最大であった。1968年交通法は免許制を量的規制から質的規制へ変えた。かくして参入障壁は緩和された。National Freight Company (NFC) はすべての国営道路輸送事業が合併して創られた。この法は免許（質による免許）制を創出し、車両数量制限を撤廃した。事業免許を得るためには、申請者が車両を維持するのに充分な財政状態と資源を示すだけでよかった。国営のNFCは1982年にその財政基盤を再構築したのち民営化された。民営化は従業員を買い上げる形で進められた。1994年に免許制は大幅に緩和され、一定期間の免許に変わって継続免許が導入された。
B. 総括的評価	日本のトラック産業の規制の変革に特徴的なことは、それが新しい立法によってもたらされ、いかなる「外圧」もなしに達成され、さらには	欧州委員会は、国際輸送と沿岸交易の規制改革をうまく促進し、EUの輸送部門のダイナミズムを創造した結果として、国内規制にも間接的
項目	日 本	英国
この産業には多数の小規模なしかもほとんどが民間の業者が存在しているということである。規制の変更以前でさえ経済的規制はそれほど厳しいものではなかったし、その変更もすでに現存している事柄を受け入れたにすぎない。規制の変革は実質的であったが完全ではなく、競争を促進する効果は今までのところ定かではない。	な影響をもたらした。1985年以前は、ほとんどの国内市場は輸送能力も料金設定も各国政府によって厳しく規制されていたが、その後より自由化アプローチをとるようになった。また1980年代半ばから徐々に交通政策の域内ハーモナイゼイションが進められた。
C.項目別評価a.参入・退出	1990年の規制変革以後区域トラックの増加は加速した。しかしながら、特別積み合わせ運送業者は減少した。これは規制緩和により再参入が容易になったからかもしれない。特別積み合わせ運送業者の企業規模は拡大している。	Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV)免許の総数は12万5千で、総車両数は40万4千台である。免許数は最近減少している。
b.価格・料金	規制変革以前、1980-90年に運輸省の料金表は25%上昇した。交渉により決定した実際の料金は料金表よりもしばしば低かった。平均料金は、1990年まで公表された料金よりも上昇率は低かったが、1991年に急激に上昇した。	規制緩和で料金構造は捨て去られ、欧州では料金は通常買手と売手の交渉で決定される。長期契約は2年間というのが普通である。概して料金は下方圧力がかかっている。将来の環境上の立法や道路混雑の増大は料金に影響を与えるだろう。
項目	日 本	英国
c.雇用・賃金・企業倒産	過去において労働者数は産業の発展に伴って増加した。1990年にピークを迎えたのち、1991年にはわずかながら減少している。
d.企業収益	特別積み合わせトラックの単位当たりコストは区域トラックの2倍以上である。前者はより資本集約的であるようだ。規制の変更以後単位当たりコストは毎年増加している。コスト削減に関する規制改革の効果は定かではない。	より大規模な企業のほうが収益性が高い。
g.消費者余剰・生産者余剰・社会的厚生	時系列データを用いた需要方程式によれば、価格弾力性は-0.18と推計されかなり小さい。この数字を用いると、料金が10%下落したときに仮定上の荷主（消費者）余剰は1兆2千億円と計算される。これは他の研究結果よりも小さい。
h.市場構造	商業用トラックに対する需要は着実に増加しているが、貨物輸送全体では増加が遅い。この傾向は、鉄道からトラックへ、個人業者から商業用トラックへとシフトしていること、ジャストインタイム等の高度な	上位100社の内、5社で総売上高の48%を占めている。吸収合併を通じて集中化が進む傾向にあり、一社当たりの平均トラック数も急速に増加しているが、平均規模は依然として小さい。50台以上保有している業
項目	日 本	英国
サービスの導入に因っている。	者はたった1%であるが、そこが英国全体の運行量の37%を占めている。平均距離は1979-94年で延びている。国際道路貨物輸送は1982年から倍増している。
j.外部不経済(安全性の問題など)	環境汚染に関する1994年の王立委員会の報告は、燃料の大幅増税や鉄道輸送の大幅増加を勧告している。道路輸送の環境コストは100-180億ポンドと推定される。社会基盤の使用や環境汚染のために効果的にHGVの料金を下げることは道路輸送寄りにかなり競争を歪め、輸送距離の伸長を助長する。ジャストインタイムのような新たなサービスは環境に悪影響を与える。
n.新商品・サービスの革新	日本のトラック規制の歴史上一つの特徴的な出来事は宅配便の急速な普及であった。このサービスは1976年に開始されたが、この時運輸省はこの新サービスを歓迎せず、許可を遅らせていた。その後このサービスは1981年から1993年に年率22.7%という急成長を示し、郵便小包サービスを追い抜いた。ネットワーク経済性のため、上位2社が70%のシェアを占める。消費者はこの新サービスによって大きな恩恵を受けた。しかしながら、サービスの進展は旧規制体制下で企業家精神が発揮されて成	規制のない市場でのサービスは、貯蔵・在庫管理・輸送の3部門に分かれる。また、ジャストインタイムサービスが現れた。単一欧州市場の創出は、企業生産の集中化とより少数の場所での在庫保有をもたらし、輸送への大きな需要を引き起こす。
項目	日 本	英国
し遂げられたのであって、規制改革によって特に恩恵を受けたのではないことは特筆すべきである。
D. 教訓・政策インプリケーション・将来見通し	規制改革の主要な目的は競争の導入や促進ではなかったようだ。運輸省は競争がこれまで充分にあったか或いは競争はあまり重要ではないと考えているようである。故に主目的は、市場の現実を追認しただけであったと判断できる。規制改革の全体的な評価は、充分なデータがまだ無いのでこれまでのところ定かではない。しかし、特に特別積み合わせ貨物事業者の規模の拡大のように、いくつかの構造的な改革は進行中である。	市場は全体として欧州全体と同様最良である。持続的な成長が道路輪送における大企業にとって期待されている。2001年までには上位6社の欧州で道路輸送に基盤を置く企業が市場の23%を占めていると考えられ、これは現状よりもわずかに大きい。
英国における質の高い市場への移行は二つの影響があった。一つは、独立業者から第三業者への移行であり、二つ目は、運輸会社のうちの一部が成熟して専任の運輸会社へ移行したことである。
一般的に運輸、特に道路運送は所有権と道路基盤のコスト負担に関連して将来の見通しがはっきりしない。運輸会社は低い限界費用で営業しており、フランスやドイツのように一部の高速道路で運行料が徴収されることと比較すれば、このことが市場の歪みを招く可能性がある。
ITEMS	JAPAN	UK
C. ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED ITEMS a. ENTRY AND EXIT	After the regulatory reform of 1990, the growth of the number of area carriers accelerated. However, the number of special consolidated carriers declined, possibly because the deregulation made re-entry easier. Firm size of special consolidated carriers expanded.	The total number of Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) licenses was 125 thousand, and a total number of vehicles 404 thousand. The number of licenses have decreased recently.
b. PRICE AND FARE	Before the regulatory reform, though the MoT's fare table showed 25% rise from 1980 through 1990. The actual fare determined through negotiations have been often under the fare table. The average fare had risen less than the published fares until 1990, then rose sharply in 1991.	With deregulation, tariff structure have been abandoned and buyer-supplier negotiations have been standard practice throughout Europe. Longer-term contractual arrangements are prevailing with typically 2 year contract. Overall, the pressure on price is downward. The prospective environmental legislation and increasing road congestion will affect prices.
c. EMPLOYMENT, WAGE, BANKRUPTCY	In the past the number of employees grew as the industry expanded. After it reached the 1990 peak, then slightly declined in 1991.
d. CORPORATE PROFIT	Unit cost of special consolidated trucks is more than double that of area trucks. The former seem to be more capital intensive. After the regulatory change unit cost has increased year by year, thus the effect of the regulatory change on cost reduction has not been clear.	The larger companies have performed better than smaller ones.
g. CONSUMERS' AND PRODUCERS' SURPLUS AND SOCIAL WELFARE	According to a demand equation using time-series data, the price elasticity was estimated as -0.18, fairly small. Using the figure, hypothetical shippers' (consumer) surplus when the fare were to decline by 10% is calculated as 1.2 trillion yen, which is smaller than other study results.
h. MARKET STRUCTURE	Demand for commercial trucks has been growing steadily while freight transportation in total has been growing slowly. This trend was due to shift from railways to trucking, from private trucks to commercial ones, and because of introduction of "just-in-time" or similar logistic system.	In the top 100 operators, the top 5 account for 48% of total turnover. The trend is toward increasing concentration of ownership through acquisition, and the average number of trucks per company has increased sharply, though the average size remains small and fragmented. Only 1% of haulers operated more than 50 vehicles but they ran 37% of all UK commercial vehicles. The average length of haul has risen bet. 1979-94. The international transport of freight by road doubled since 1982.
ITEMS	JAPAN	UK
j. EXTERNAL DISECONOMIES (SAFETY PROBLEMS, ETC.)	The Report of the Royal Commission on Environment Pollution in 1994 recommended steep fuel tax increase and a big growth of rail freight. The environment costs of road transport was estimated bet. L10-L18 billion. The underpricing of the HGVs for the use of infrastructure and environmental pollution effectively distorts competition in favor of road freight and encourages the progressive growth in the distance of transport. New services such as just-in-time have adverse environment effect.
n. INNOVATION OF NEW PRODUCTS/ SERVICES	One characteristic event in Japan's trucking regulation history was rapid expansion of a door-to-door delivery. The service started in 1976, when the MoT did not welcome the new service and delayed approvals. Still, the service grew rapidly by 22.7% annual increase from 1981 through 1993, surpassing the postal parcel service. Due to network economies, top two companies occupy 70% share. Consumers have been greatly benefited by this new service. It should be noted, however, that the service growth was carried out by entrepreneurship under the former regulation scheme, and was not particularly benefited by the regulatory reform.	In the deregulated market, third-party services, offering storage, stock control and transport. Also, just-in-time logistics emerged. The creation of the Single European Market stimulated the concentration of companies' production and inventory holdings at a smaller number of locations, leading to larger need for transportation.
D. LESSONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE PER-SPECTIVES	The main aim of the regulatory reform does not seem to introduce or promote competition. The MoT seems to have thought either that there had been enough competition, or that competition was not very important. So the main purpose can be judged as just to confirm the market reality. The overall effects of the regulatory change is not clear so far, as not enough data are available yet, though some structural changes are going on, particularly the expansion of special consolidated carriers' firm size.	The market is best seen as a Europe as a whole. Continued growth is the prospect for the largest companies in road transport. It is predicted that by 2001, the top 6 European road-based companies will have captured 23% of the market, slightly higher than the current situation. The move to a quality market in the UK has had two effects: 1) movement from own account carriers into third party distribution; and 2) the more matured parts of the haulage sectors have moved into a dedicated fleet. Transport in general and road transport in particular now seem to have an uncertain future, in relation to ownership and cost burden if road infrastructure. The freight company operators are operating at low marginal costs, and compared to where tolls charged on some motorway routes in France and Germany, this can lead to distortion in the market.
4. United Kingdom

# DEREGULATION AND PRIVATIZATION IN THE UK FREIGHT, AND BUS AND COACH INDUSTRIES

Helen LAWTON-SMITH

Regulatory Policy Research Centre

Hertford College, Oxford
### 1. INTRODUCTION

This paper is in two sections. The first deals with privatisation and deregulation in freight markets (trucking), and the second with coach and bus markets. The argument which the paper develops is that privatisation and deregulation in the freight industry in the UK has generally achieved its objectives of promoting competition, but that bus deregulation and privatisation has had a number of adverse effects. In particular these include a fall in passenger trips, low profitability in large parts of the industry, and wide-spread anti-competitive behaviour. On the other hand, the opening up of the market in the long-distance coach sector has been of benefit to consumers. An increasingly important area of regulation at national and international levels, and which has important implications for the operation of both industries, is that designed to combat environmental pollution.

The key differences between the two industries can be summarised as follows

i. freight transport is much more subject to European Union (EU) regulation than the coach and bus industry. This is because the latter is primarily a domestic market and therefore has a different regulatory environment. In the freight industry, the effects of UK regulatory changes and that of the EU are inter-linked;

ii. freight, unlike passenger vehicles, has not had a system of route licensing. Route licensing was a critical component in shaping the structure of the road passenger market, hence regulatory change operates within a different pre-existing market configuration;

iii. unlike in the bus and coach industry where there were few opportunities to compete before deregulation, it had always been possible for firms to enter the freight market; and

iv. there is no evidence of restrictive practices and predatory pricing in the freight industry as in the coach and bus sector, which in the case of the latter has arisen as a direct consequence of changing regulation.

### 2. FREIGHT

#### 2.1. Introduction

Deregulation of the freight industry, which began in the late 1960's has been a British success story in that it has pushed forward an open market system into Europe. The freight industry was one of the first UK public sector industries to be privatised, and was brought about by an employee buy-out of the National Freight Corporation (NFC) in 1982. However, deregulation and privatisation of freight transport markets has been only one of four factors which have been particularly important in influencing the structure of the European freight transport markets in general and the UK in particular (Cooper 1995, 2). The other three are (i) the changing needs of users of freight transport, especially retailers and manufacturers; (ii) information technology; and (iii) environmental considerations. This paper will focus on deregulation and privatisation in the
UK and reference to other factors will be made where appropriate.

The first part briefly describes the steps towards privatisation and deregulation in the UK. This is followed by an outline of the structure of the UK market, then by a discussion of the EU context, and finally some conclusions are drawn.

#### 2.2. Privatisation and deregulation in the UK

Road freight transport activities were first nationalised under the Transport Act 1947. During world war II, the state had controlled road transport though the Road Haulage Organisation. The period from 1948 to 1970 was dominated by a policy of integration, with the need for public sector road freight transport subordinated to those of the railways (Bradley and Nejad 1989, 36).

##### 2.2.1. The 1947 Transport Act

The Act set up the British Road Transport Commission (BTC) which was to co-ordinate the development of a nationally integrated transport network. This intention was pursued until 1979, but at the expense of productive efficiency in road transport (Bradley and Nejad 1989, 36).

All land transport was controlled by the BTC through four executives. The Road Haulage Executive (RHE) was responsible for road haulage activities and traded as British Road Services (BRS). Nationalisation of such a fragmented industry proved difficult, and it proved possible to nationalise only long distance hauliers. Private hauliers were limited to a radius of 25 miles. At the end of 1951, when the final take-overs were completed, BRS had acquired over 3,700 firms, owned some 41,000 vehicles, based on 1,000 depots, and employed over 75,000 people. BRS's monopoly was consolidated by the BTC's control over the issuing of new licences to competitors.

##### 2.2.2. The 1952 Transport Act

The Transport Act 1952, introduced under the Conservative government elected in 1951, recommended de-nationalisation of most of BTC's licence haulage activities. In the event, less extensive changes were made. Major changes were limited to the lifting of BTC's licence-issuing role and of the 25-mile limit imposed on private hauliers.

##### 2.2.3. The 1956 Transport Act

This Act signalled the end of de-nationalisation. However, BRS remained larger than intended and was larger than any private firm. It controlled 1 per cent of all goods vehicles in its weight classes, and 5 per cent of all hire and reward vehicles. Even so, it was in competition with private hauliers and its performance improved.

##### 2.2.4. The 1962 Transport Act

This Act dismantled the BTC, separated its various transport functions and passed all of its road transport functions to the newly formed Transport Holding Company (THC). This was
instructed to operate as a commercial enterprise. The THC was allowed to grow by acquisition in line with the general growth in road freight activity.

##### 2.2.5. The 1968 Transport Act

It was a Labour government, under the Minister of Transport, Barbara Castle, who brought in the first moves towards deregulation through this Act, which enacted the 1967 White Paper The Transport of Freight. The White Paper recommended the formation of the National Freight Corporation (NFC) to incorporate all road freight activities, including those previously undertaken by the British Railways Board. The NFC “represented a notable departure from previous attempts at integration. Within the NFC traffic was to be allocated purely on the basis of competition” (Bradley and Nejad 1989, 40). However, Bradley and Nejad argue that political commitments to maximising the volume of transport carried by rail impaired NFC’s early commercial efficiency.

The Act created a system of licensing (quality licensing), and removed the restrictions on numbers of vehicles which could carry freight unless vehicles were carrying the company's own goods (own account), in which case the company had to have a permit. Under the new system, anyone operating Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV) is required to hold an operator's licence (O licence). This licence is granted by the Traffic Commissioner to those of good repute. In order to operate, firms have to show that they have sufficient financial standing and resources to maintain vehicles. The system therefore changed from quantity to qualitative regulation, and lowered barriers to entry to the industry.

Since 1984, local authorities have had the right to object to O-licenses if a depot is, or would be, damaging to the local environment. Between 1986 and 1992 Surrey County Council, for example, objected to 202 applications (7 per cent of the total) and 97 per cent of the objections were upheld (Royal Commission on the Environment 1994). The government has recently restructured the system of licensing by introducing continuous licenses instead of fixed term ones as at present. This was enacted through the 1994 “Deregulation Bill”. Other legislation which has affected operation of the market include that to introduce speed limiters which came into force in late 1992.

##### 2.2.6. Privatisation

Large scale privatisation came about in 1982 with the sale of the NFC. It was Britain's largest freight company. Under state control it was an ailing enterprise, and did not make a profit until 1978 (Bradley and Nejad 1989, 43). The 1978 Transport Act reorganised the NFC's capital structure, and its capital debt was reduced by half to $ £100 $ million. Reconstruction under the Act meant that NFC was in a stronger financial condition, able to continue modernisation.

The Conservative Party’s 1979 election manifesto included a pledge to privatise NFC. In 1980 an enabling law was passed in preparation for the sale. The Transport Act 1980 converted the NFC’s capital structure from that of a loan-based public corporation to an equity-based limited company. All equity was invested in the Department of Transport. The NFC’s debts were
extinguished and constraints on director's salaries and areas of business activity were removed. The Act also committed the government to fund most of NFC's pension fund liability (some £40 million).

Privatisation took the form of an employee buy-out, for a sale price of $ £53.5 $ million. Since privatisation, the fortunes of NFC have been transformed, it has remained the largest UK freight company and is now in the process of expanding internationally as a major competitor to companies with a much longer presence in the private sector.

Table 1: Goods vehicles operator licences in issue and total number of heavy goods vehicles specified over 3.5 tonnes as at March 1994

Traffic Area	Restricted	Type of Licence	Total number of licences in issue	Total number of vehicles specified
Standard	Standard International
North Eastern	9126 (9543)	8328 (8662)	2266 (2327)	19720 (20532)	64165 (63840)
North Western	10165 (10399)	8671 (9000)	2326 (2362)	21162 (21761)	67376 (67698)
West Midland	6936 (7281)	5585 (5913)	1317 (1364)	13838 (14558)	43158 (43244)
Eastern	9314 (9792)	8162 (8567)	3078 (3210)	20554 (21569)	67802 (67873)
South Wales	3330 (3476)	2550 (2666)	503 (526)	6383 (6668)	17380 (17172)
Western	8199 (8493)	6932 (7286)	2222 (2253)	17353 (18032)	53942 (54701)
South Eastern and Metropolitan	7620 (8247)	5617 (6165)	2359 (2559)	15596 (16971)	52926 (54255)
Scottish	5119 (5271)	4626 (4724)	942 (925)	10687 (10920)	37462 (37660)
TOTAL	59809 (62502)	50471 (52983)	15013 (15526)	125293 (131011)	404211 (406443)

Source: UK Department of Transport 1994c

#### 2.3. The UK industry

##### 2.3.1. Numbers of firms and licenses

The number of firms in the UK was estimated by a survey in 1993 by MAI as 72,400. The total number of licenses in issue and the number of first time applications have decreased markedly in the recent period. As at March 31 1994 the total number of licenses was 125,293 (131,011 1992/3), with a total number of vehicles specified 404,211 (406,443 1992/3) (Table 1). At the end of 1994, there were 423,000 vehicles over 3.5 tonnes gross vehicle weight in Great Britain., and account for 95 per cent of all freight moved by road. Table 2 shows the population of HGVs 1979 to 1994. First time applications received up to the year end March 31 1994 were 12,101 (12,946
Table 2: Population of heavy goods vehicles 1979-1994

Rigids	Artics	Artics	All Vehicles
Artics	Over 33 Tonnes $ ^{1} $

1979	382	102	-	485
1980	375	100	-	475
1981	357	95	-	451
1982	347	88	-	436
1983	348	89	11	436
1984	347	91	21	437
1985	341	90	28	432
1986	341	93	35	435
1987	346	98	43	444
1988	357	105	52	462
1989	368	110	62	478
1990	353	106	64	460
1991	330	100	63	430
1992	316	99	65	415
1993	311	102	69	412
1994	314	109	76	423

32.5 have a maximum gross weight of 38 tonnes.

Source: Transport of Goods by Road Great Britain 1994

The licensing system has been criticised for its laxity. It has been estimated that in 1994 there were some 6-12,000 illegal operators. Illegal working by HGV operators and drivers increases the dangers associated with such large vehicles and leads to unfair competition against legal operators and against other modes (Royal Commission of the Environment 1994, 174).

##### 2.3.2. Concentration of ownership in transport

Figures published in May 1995 (Lloyds Bowater/Coopers & Lybrand 1995) showed that the total turnover of the UK's top 100 operators is in excess of $ £12.7 $ billion, of which the top 5 account for 48 per cent and the top 20 for 78 per cent. Appendix 1 shows the Top 100 companies ranked by turnover, and shows pre-tax profit and employees. This shows that NFC is by far the largest company by turnover.

The average pre-tax profit was 4.3 per cent which compares with 3.5 per cent in the 1994 survey, and 3.4 per cent in the 1992 survey. A study of financial and operational trends in the UK road haulage industry 1983 to 1992 undertaken by the University of Westminster Transport Studies Group (1993) found that the competitive nature of the road haulage industry resulted in profit margins between 3 per cent and 6 per cent being achieved during the period studied. Return on total assets (ROTA) fell from a peak of 8 per cent in 1988 to a low of 2.5 per cent in 1991. During