Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
deal with product waste, although required costs for recycling, etc. (usage charges for recycling facilities, usage charges for collection facilities, transportation charges, etc.) are shared, in cases where the proportion of the required costs for recycling, etc. of the product concerned compared to the selling prices are small, the joint operation has an indirect effect on competition in the product market itself, and is therefore considered unlikely to become problems under the Antimonopoly Act. In particular, with regard to joint operations as mentioned in (2) and (3) above, as their effect on competition in the product market itself is usually only small, they are not considered to be problems under the Antimonopoly Act.

(Note) Although there are cases where entrepreneurs collect required fees for recycling, etc. as a recycling charge from demanders as additional price to the product itself, from the perspective that demanders decide their purchasing product based on the total amount of the product price itself and its recycling charge, in such cases, considerations concerning the impact of joint operations to the product market are the same as description above.

## (2) Cases That Become Problems under the Antimonopoly Act

### A. Wide-ranging Recycling Systems

In cases where entrepreneurs develop a recycling system as a joint operation, when the recycling system has covered broad scope, for example, the inclusion of the collection and transportation of waste and the process for recycling (e.g. including all cases covered under (1) and (3) above), cases emerge where the proportion of the required costs for recycling, etc. of the product concerned through joint operations compared to the selling prices are large. In such cases and when the total share of the participating entrepreneurs in the product market increased significantly, according to the status of competition in the product market, although there exists vigorous competition in the product market, such cases could effect on competition in the product market, for example, that the selling price of products of the participating entrepreneurs become a standardized figure through the joint operation, and it would therefore have implications under the Antimonopoly Act (Section 3 of the Antimonopoly Act (Unjust restriction on trade)).

### B. Exclusive Recycling Systems

In the event that entrepreneurs jointly develop a recycling system because it is
difficult to independently develop a recycling system in doing business in the product market, for no rational reason, for example, by denying or restricting the use of that recycling system to entrepreneurs newly entering the market or specified existing entrepreneurs (see Note), obstructing new entry of other entrepreneurs into the product market, or causing difficulties in the business activities of the existing entrepreneurs, in the case that such actions substantially restrict competition in the product market, they shall fall under the provisions prohibiting private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade (Section 3 of the Antimonopoly Act).

In addition, even in cases that the above actions do not substantially restrict competition in the product market, such actions, there has possibility of resulted difficulties in the normal business activities of entrepreneurs, which are denied or restricted participation in the recycling system, they shall fall under the provisions prohibiting unfair trade practices (General Designation 1 (Concerted Refusal to Deal)).

Accordingly, in cases where entrepreneurs develop recycling systems jointly, it is preferable that in general such systems are opened to entrepreneurs so that they can participate in them under rational conditions.

(Note) For example, in cases where entrepreneurs develop a recycling system through the construction of processing facilities for waste recycling by established a joint investment company, at such a time the other entrepreneurs request to use the recycling system, there shall be no problem in the setting of a difference in usage charge that is rational and in accordance with the investment.

C. Even if the required costs for recycling, etc. undertaken as joint operations become the same for participating entrepreneurs, in cases where those costs are added to the existing price of products that are sold by those entrepreneurs, each entrepreneur should ensure that it makes its own, independent judgment concerning how much to add to the price for recycling cost. Accordingly, even in cases where the joint development itself of a recycling system does not cause problems under the Antimonopoly Act, the joint decision by entrepreneurs on the amount added to the price is nothing less than a decision among entrepreneurs on a
part of the price that is an important means for competition, and could have an effect on competition in the product market, posing problems under the Antimonopoly Act (Section 3 of the Antimonopoly Act (Unjust restriction on trade)).

(Note) In cases where entrepreneurs collect recycling charges corresponding to required costs for recycling, etc. from consumers separately from the price products itself, in the same manner as described above, actions, in which entrepreneurs jointly decide a specific recycling charge fee, shall also become problems under the Antimonopoly Act.

### 2. Recycling Market

(1) Because the construction of recycling systems creates the recycling market (see Note) and new opportunities for trade in the recycling market could be expected to expand, there are at times some concerns about the restriction of competition in the recycling market, but it is therefore unlikely to become an problem under the Antimonopoly Act. However, in cases where many entrepreneurs develop a recycling system jointly, causing difficulties in the business activities for the existing recycling entrepreneurs (contractors for collection and transportation of waste, contractors for recycling, etc.), or making difficulties for other entrepreneurs to enter the recycling market, then leading to substantial restrictions on competition in the recycling market, this shall fall under the provisions prohibiting private monopolization or unjust restriction on trade (Section 3 of the Antimonopoly Act).

(Note) The recycling market shall be the market related to trade in the transportation services of the collection of waste, the recycling services of waste, etc.

(2) In addition, in the case that entrepreneurs jointly develop a recycling system which has covered broad scope, there are cases where there is no other recycling system in the recycling market. In such cases, having examined whether it is necessary for entrepreneurs to jointly develop a recycling system and if there are alternative means, the points must be considered (i) if participation in the recycling system is free and (ii) if there are any unfair restrictions on the independent development of a recycling system by the participating entrepreneurs, thereby judging if any problems arise under the Antimonopoly Act.
(3) In the case that the development of a recycling system is undertaken by a trade association, for example, substantial restraint of competition in a particular product or recycling market occurs, this shall become problems in terms of Section 8-1 of the Antimonopoly Act, and in the case that a joint investment company is established by multiple entrepreneurs for the development of a recycling system, if substantial restraint of competition in particular products or recycling markets occurs, this may become problem in terms of Section 10 (1) of the Act.

## Section II Joint Activities Pertaining to Recycling, etc

In the event that entrepreneurs jointly develop or a trade association develops a recycling system, for the purpose of its efficient operation, etc., there are cases where various arrangements are made concerning the development of such a system. In addition, even in cases where a recycling system is not jointly developed, there are cases where similar arrangements are made by entrepreneurs or a trade association in order to heighten the effectiveness of recycling, etc.

The concepts concerning joint activities pertaining to recycling, etc. under the Antimonopoly Act are organized as follows:

### 1. Decision on a Target for Recycling Ratio, etc

In the event that each member entrepreneur in a trade association collects waste and recycled, etc., it, there are cases where the recycling ratio of each member entrepreneur should achieve is decided within the trade association, and the recycling ratio achieved by each member entrepreneur is publicized in an attempt to increase it.

According to law or ordinance, the setting of an obligatory recycling ratio, with which individual entrepreneurs have to comply, under the guidance of a trade association will not become problem under the Antimonopoly Act to the extent that certain legal conditions are fulfilled. In addition, even in cases that have no basis in law or ordinance, actions whereby criteria, rules, etc. are set independently by trade associations concerning the achievement of recycling ratios, making them known to member entrepreneurs and promoting their dissemination, or making arrangements concerning their use and compliance, or conducting activities such as giving
instructions, making requests, etc. (independent regulations), shall in principle not be considered to be problems under the Antimonopoly Act, to the extent that there is no unfair discrimination among members and that compliance with these is not enforced (See Trade Associations Guidelines 7-6 (Setting Criteria Based on Social or Public Aims)).

In addition, from the perspective of promoting the achievement of the recycling ratio, the announcement of the achievement of ratios by member entrepreneurs shall in principle not be considered to be problems under the Antimonopoly Act, to the extent that there is no unjust market exclusion (see Note) on the products of members that do not achieve their recycling ratio.

(Note) For example, the setting targets of recycling ratios that could not be achieved by specific members in order to exclude them from the product market of the members that are being sold inexpensively would become problems under the Antimonopoly Act.

2. Integration of Specifications for Components that are Easy to Recycle and Component Standardization

There are cases where, in order to efficiently reuse and process waste, manufacturers jointly aim or a trade association aims to integrate product component specifications and standardize components.

The integration, etc. of component specifications in order to promote efficient recycling, etc., reduces the required costs for recycling, etc. and are considered not to unjustly obstruct benefits for the consumers in general. Hence, even if manufacturers jointly make or a trade association makes arrangements concerning the use of components with integrated specifications or components that had been standardized, to the extent that there is no unjust discrimination among specific manufacturers or component manufacturers and that compliance with these is not enforced, the impact on competition in the product market is small (See Trade Associations Guidelines 7-5 (Setting Criteria Regarding Standardization of Specifications) and in principle are not considered to be problems under the Antimonopoly Act.

3. Joint Research and Development of Products That Are Easy to Recycle
There are cases where, in order to develop products that are easy to recycle and improve the recycling ratio, multiple manufacturers are engaged in joint research and development (R&D) project.

Although the research results of joint R&D projects of products that are easy to recycle naturally have direct impact on the product market, the project intends to address so-called external factors such as environmental measures, the necessity for joint undertaking is considered to be high. Accordingly, the joint R&D project, depends on the number of participants, market share, access to results achieved, etc., it is unlikely to become an problem under the Antimonopoly Act, in cases where it is not so easy to carry it out alone taking into account cost, risk etc. related to research (see Note).

(Note) The “Guidelines Concerning Joint Research and Development under the Antimonopoly Act” state that, “a joint R&D project intended to address so-called external factors, such as developing an environmental or safety measure, may not in itself immediately exclude the possibility for such a project to become an problem under the Antimonopoly Act. However, taking into account cost, risk, etc. related to research, it may not be so easy to carry it out alone. In such a case, it is unlikely to become an problem under the Antimonopoly Act.”

### 4. Standardization of Formats of Waste Management Forms (Manifests) and Enforcing their Use

Pursuant to such laws as the Waste Disposal and Public Cleansing Law, in some cases entrepreneurs are required to use a waste management form this is called a manifest in order to prevent the illegal disposal of waste. The formats of these manifests are standardized within trade associations, and the members of the association are obliged to use that manifest. In cases where the use of a manifest is a legal requirement and in addition to that, there are legal provisions concerning the items that must be recorded in the manifest, although it is matter of course, however, even in cases where there are no such provisions, considering the character of the manifest, which is used for the management of appropriate activities for the recycling, etc. of waste, even if the manifest is in a standardized format and its use is enforced among the members of the association, there should be no impact on competition in the product and recycling markets, and therefore are not considered to be any problems under the Antimonopoly
### 5. Joint Activities Concerning Recycling Expenses

In the event that the implementation of recycling shall be a requirement by laws or ordinances, or strongly required from social purposes, since appropriate additional costs are required on a continual basis of activities for recycling, etc., it can be expected that the promotion of recycling, etc. will be difficult if the burden of the required costs for collection and transportation of waste or processing for their recycling, etc. (hereinafter referred to as "recycling costs") are not placed on the demanders such as consumers (hereinafter referred to as "demanders"), there are cases where entrepreneurs jointly employ or a trade association employs various measures for recycling costs. The principles under the Antimonopoly Act are as follows:

(1) Setting Independent Criteria Regarding Collection Methods

A. There are cases where, as part of activities for recycling, etc., entrepreneurs collect waste at the time of the sale of their products to demanders, and in these cases the collection method of recycling cost is either to include the equivalent recycling cost into the price of the product itself and collect them from the demander, or to collect a recycling charge separate from the price of product.

In such cases, in order to gain the understanding of demanders, if entrepreneurs jointly set or a trade association sets independent criteria with the aim of collecting a recycling charge separate from the price of product itself, to the extent that compliance with them is not enforced, they are not considered to be problems under the Antimonopoly Act (See Example 5 and Example 6).

B. However, if entrepreneurs jointly set or a trade association sets a specific recycling charge fee results in the product sale and the collection of waste transaction being treated as one, there could be a significant impact on competition in the product market, and also reduce incentive on the part of entrepreneurs to reduce required costs for recycling, etc., which would obstruct the promotion itself of efficient recycling, etc., having a significant impact on competition in the recycling market, and therefore would become problems under the Antimonopoly Act (Section 3 or Section 8(1)(i) of the Antimonopoly Act).
## (2) Setting Independent Criteria at the Time of Collection

In the case that entrepreneurs undertake new activities for recycling, etc., the methods for collection of recycling costs are pointed to demander to pay at the time of waste collection, or collect it at the time of sale by incorporating the cost into the selling price of the product in advance. Even if entrepreneurs jointly set or a trade association sets independent standards to facilitate recycling, etc. and make the collection of costs easy to understand by consumers, by either collecting recycling costs at the time of waste collection or collecting them at the time of sale, to the extent that compliance with these is not enforced, they are not considered to be problems under the Antimonopoly Act.

## (3) Setting Independent Criteria Regarding the Indication Methods

Since appropriate additional costs are required on a continual basis for activities for recycling, etc., gaining the understanding of demanders, even if entrepreneurs jointly set or a trade association sets independent criteria for indicating recycling costs, for example, providing a form for the indication, to the extent that compliance with these is not enforced, they are not considered to be problems under the Antimonopoly Act. However the decision of a specific sum for recycling costs by entrepreneurs acting jointly or by a trade association could increase the selling prices of products and therefore would become problems under the Antimonopoly Act (Section 3 or Section 8(1)(i) of the Antimonopoly Act) (see Example 2).

### 6. Development of a Deposit System

(1) As one kind of recycling system, there are cases where, in order to improve collection ratios for waste such as empty bottles, an association of distributors introduces a deposit system (meaning a system that entails collecting a specific amount of deposit at the time of sale of the product, and returning the same amount once the waste is collected; hereafter the same) (see Examples 7 and 8).

In the event that the deposit system is being smoothly implemented and it has become a norm for demanders to return waste to distributors, etc., since the amount of money returned is the same as that which was paid as a deposit, the deposit amount has little impact on the choice of product purchased by consumers, and does not entail a direct means of competition among entrepreneurs.
Accordingly, in order to enhance the collection ratio for empty cans, bottles, batteries, etc., when entrepreneurs jointly develop or trade association develops a deposit system, if the amount of deposit collected at the time of sale of the product and the amount returned at the time of collection of waste are the same and is the same for all entrepreneurs, it is usually the case that it is not considered to be an problem under the Antimonopoly Act.

(2) However, although there are cases where entrepreneurs jointly set or a trade association sets the deposit amount higher than the amount of money that is returned in order to incorporate the required costs for waste collection into the deposit amount, and arrange to make the deposit and returned amount of money the same, the problem of degree to which demanders should bear the required costs for waste collection should be left to the independent decision of entrepreneurs, and such arrangements could lead to increases the selling prices of products and is therefore an problem under the Antimonopoly Act (Section 3 or Section 8(1)(i) of the Antimonopoly Act).

## Example 1 Development of a Recycling System by Manufacturers

### 1. Overview

Five companies, including company A are large household appliance manufacturers. The Law for the Recycling of Specified Kinds of Home Appliances (hereinafter referred to as the "Home Appliance Recycling Law") obliges household appliance manufacturers to take back products that have been disposed of, to implement their re-merchandizing, etc., and to publicize the charges for their re-merchandizing, etc. for four specified home appliances (air conditioners, televisions, refrigerators and washing machines). It is necessary for the appliance manufacturers to develop a system for the taking back and re-merchandizing of the four specified appliances that have been disposed of. However, each individual manufacturer would have difficulty in developing a system independently due to the cost burden involved.

For this reason, the five companies, including company A, are considering the development of a recycling system as detailed below.

(i) To establish processing facilities nationwide to deal with re-merchandizing.

(ii) To establish sites nationwide to which home appliance retailers can forwarddisposed appliances that have been taken back from their users to specific locations (hereinafter referred to as “designated collection sites”), and to commit a transportation company to transport the disposed appliances from the designated collection sites to the re-merchandizing facility.

(iii) To establish a jointly financed company to manage and operate the recycling system.

In addition to the five companies including company A, two other large household appliance manufacturers are acting jointly in looking into the development of a similar recycling system. Small and medium household appliance manufacturers are looking into using the systems developed by the large household appliance manufacturers.
2. Views under the Antimonopoly Act

(1) This example is one in which the costs required for recycling, etc. undertaken as a joint operation are charged as cost for re-merchandizing, etc. separate to the selling price of the product. The participants in the said recycling system are large household appliance manufacturers and joint operations are being applied to the establishment of designated collection sites, the transportation from the collection sites to the re-merchandizing facilities and re-merchandizing itself. It is considered that the costs required for recycling, etc. undertaken as a joint operation are generally small in comparison to the selling price of the products and in the usual case have little influence on competition in the product market of the four specified home appliances. However, in the case that the five companies, including company A, deny use of the said recycling system by small and medium household appliance manufacturers without rational reason, thereby causing difficulties in the business activities for the small and medium manufacturers, this would present a problem under the Antimonopoly Act (General Designation 1 (Concerted Refusal to Deal)).

(2) In addition, in this example, due to the fact that multiple recycling systems exist, it cannot be concluded that this would restrain competition in the recycling market. However, if users of the recycling system in this example are unjustly restricted from developing a separate system, or if use of other recycling systems is unjustly restricted, there is the possibility of presenting a problem under the Antimonopoly Act ((General Designation 11 (Dealing on Exclusive Terms) or General Designation 13 (Dealing on Restrictive Terms))).