Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
In this case, relating to taxi fares, the trade association decided on certain fare increases and on the contents of an application to be submitted to obtain government approval of the proposed fare increases, and coerced constituent firms to submit the application. The trade association then expelled firms that did not abide by the decision of the application. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (iv) (Sec. 8 (iv) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

### 1 -(2)-2. (Buying up discount-priced goods)

Buying up discount-priced goods, or forcing constituent firms do so, to ensure the implementation of conduct that restricts prices.

## [Specific cases]

The Case against X Trade Association of Repair Tire Distributors (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 10 of 1970)

In this case, the association decided to raise the selling price of general summer tires sold by constituent firms, and, to ensure that this decision was effectively implemented, established a system to buy up discount-priced tires. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec 8 (1) (i) (Sec. 8 (i) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

The Case against Y Trade Association of Milk Manufacturers (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 2 of 1982)

In this case, the association set minimum retail prices for hulk milk distributors who had transactions with constituent firms, and decided that constituent firms shall make the distributors strictly maintain those prices. If the distributors refused to comply with this demand and sold milk below the minimum prices set by the trade association, the constituent firms went to the distributors' stores and bought up all their milk. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (i) (Sec. 8 (i) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

### 1 -(2)-3. (Information activities for monitoring conduct that restricts prices)

Collecting or offering information, or promoting the exchange of information among constituent firms concerning the business operations, including transaction prices and partners, of constituent firms, in order to monitor constituent firms to ensure that they are implementing conduct that restrict prices.

## [Specific cases]

The Case against X Trade Association of Manufacturers of Purification Tank Blowers, etc. (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 17 of 1990)

In this case, the association decided to set minimum selling prices for blowers manufactured by the constituent firms for use on small purification tanks. To ensure the effective implementation of the decision, the association forced constituent firms to submit a list of purification tank manufacturers and agents with whom the firms transacted business to the association, distributed the consolidated lists to all constituent firms, and, for the purpose of raising prices, kept all constituent firms informed concerning such matters as the status of negotiations being undertaken.
with their major trade partners. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8(1)(i) (Sec. 8(i) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

The Case against Y Trade Association of Manufacturers of Asphalt Composite Material (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 1 of 1987)

In this case, the association decided to set minimum selling prices for asphalt composite materials manufactured by constituent firms and sold to spot operators. To ensure the effective implementation of this decision, the trade association made the constituent firms engage in various conduct, such as indicating their desire to receive orders from spot traders for composite asphalt materials by registering with the trade association, and reporting the status of the contracts they had won. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (i) (Sec. 8 (i) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

## (3) "Prices" as used in conduct that restricts prices

The term "prices," as used in the phrase "conduct that restricts prices," denotes any compensation received in exchange for goods or services, regardless of the specific name or form of that compensation such as fees, commissions and interest. It also includes monetary benefits, such as rebates and discounts, that are related to prices.

## [Specific cases]

The Case against X and Other Trade Association of Automobile Repairers (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 15 of 1982)

In this case, the association decided to raise the procedural agency fees associated with the continuing automotive inspection services offered by constituent firms. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (i) (Sec. 8 (i) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

The Case against Y Trade Association of Home Electric Appliance Manufacturers and Distributors and the Z Federation of Home Electric Appliance Retailers (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 5 of 1957)

In this case, the Y Association, based on discussions with the Z Federation, set the maximum profit margins of the distributors, the maximum percentage rates of rebates given to the distributors by the manufacturers, and other business factors in order to maintain the retail prices of home electric appliances. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (iv) (Sec. 8 (iv) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

### 2. Conduct that Restricts Quantities

A trade association will be found to violate Sec. 8 (i) if it engages in quantity-related conduct as described below, that substantially restrains competition in a market. Even if such conduct does not lead to the substantial restraint of competition in a market, it will nonetheless in principle be found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (iv).

### 2 -1. (Restricting quantities)

Restricting the quantities of goods or services either supplied or received by constituent firms.
## [Specific cases]

The Case against X Trade Association of Manufacturers of Sanitary Ceramics (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 14 of 1973)

In this case, the association decided to increase the selling price of the constituent firms' sanitary ceramics to a set goal, and to restrict the quantities of monthly shipments through volume allocations derived by multiplying the volume of each firm's shipments in the same month of the previous year by a fixed rate. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (i) (Sec. 8 (i) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

The Case against Y Trade Association of Manufacturers of Methanol Formalin (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 36 of 1971)

In this case, the association decided the total quantity of methanol sold in Japan as well as the amounts sold by each constituent firm. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (i) (Sec. 8 (i) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

Conduct that restricts quantities (2-1) takes many forms and is pursued through a variety of methods such as the following. However, conduct that restricts quantities (2-1) in principle constitutes a violation, regardless of the specific form or method involved.

#### 2 -1-1. (Restricting quantities by restricting the purchase of raw materials, etc.)

Restricting the quantities of goods produced and sold, or the amount services provided by the constituent firms, by restricting purchase volume of raw materials from them, operation of facilities or other means.

## [Specific cases]

The Case against X Trade Association of Petroleum Refiners, etc. (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 7 of 1974)

In this case, the X association decided the quantity of crude oil to be processed by each constituent firm. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (i) (Sec. 8 (i) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

2-1-2. (Adjusting quantities by establishing standards that suggest quantitative limits) Adjusting quantities by establishing standards that suggest specific quantitative limits on individual constituent firms in terms of the goods they produce and sell or the services they provide.

## [Specific cases]

The Case against X Trade Association of Woolen Yarn Spinners (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 43 of 1974)

In this case, to adjust the production quantity of worsted yarn and to stabilize the market, the trade association estimated the worsted yarn demand quarterly at the board meetings held two months before every business quarter. The production goals were then set on the basis of that estimate, and constituent firms were asked to
submit quarterly their production plans to the association. At the board meetings held one month before those business quarters, the production plans were reviewed, and approved if judged to meet the production goal, or rejected for resubmission if judged not to meet therewith. Through this system, the trade association decided the amount of worsted yarn produced quarterly by constituent firms. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (i) (Sec. 8 (i) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

### 3. Conduct that Restricts Customers, Sales Channels, etc

A trade association will be found to be in violation of Sec. 8 (i) if it engages in conduct, such as that described below, that restricts customers, sales channels, and other business factors, and that substantially restrains competition in a market. Even if such conduct does not lead to the substantial restraint of competition in a market, it will nonetheless in principle be found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (iv).

### 3 -1. (Restricting customers)

Restricting customers of the constituent firms by deciding that each constituent firm should not trade with another firm's customers.

[Specific cases]

The Case against X Trade Association of Milk Distributors (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 16 of 1969)

In this case, the association decided that no constituent firm would be permitted to "steal" important customers from other milk distributors by offering them lower prices, and that, in the event of not complying to the decision, the offending firm would return the business with these customers to the original milk distributor; in addition, the trade association forced a non-constituent firm that had taken important customers from its constituent firm to return the business with those customers to that constituent firm. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8(1)(i) (Sec. 8(i) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

The Case against Y Trade Association of Operators of Waste Treatment Plants (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 19 of 1991)

In this case, in order to restrain competition over customers among constituent firms, the trade association decided to have the constituent firms respect each other's existing customers, and to refrain from active attempts to engage in business activities with such customers of other constituent firms. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (iv) (Sec. 8 (iv) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

The Case against Z Trade Association of Distributors of Propane Gas (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 42 of 1971)

In this case, in order to prevent the customers of a constituent firm from shifting to other constituent firms, the trade association established a system whereby a firm that sold propane gas to the customers of another constituent firm was forced to pay compensation and therefore restricted the sales channels of the constituent firms. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (iv) (Sec. 8 (iv) of the existing
Antimonopoly Act).

The Case against U Trade Association of Platemakers of Engraving Rubber for Printing Applications (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 8 of 1968)

In this case, the association forced the constituent firms to register their trade partners. When a constituent firm was to register its trading partner but that had already been registered by another constituent firm, the association made adjustments based on the principle that the firm with the earlier registration had priority. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (iv) (Sec. 8 (iv) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

### 3 -2. (Allocating markets)

Restricting the scope of sales territories, the variety of products or services, or other business factors of individual constituent firms.

[Illustrative Examples]

(1) A trade association of distributors restricts the respective sales territories of the constituent firms, thereby dividing market based on geographical divisions.

(2) A trade association of manufacturers restricts the variety of products manufactured by the constituent firms, thereby making market allocations based on product variety.

3-3. (Allocating contracts, predetermined the bidder expected to win a contract, etc.) Allocating contracts among the constituent firms or predetermined which firm is expected to win a bid, or a procedure for selecting the winner over bids.

[Specific cases]

The Case against X Trade Association of Land Reclamation Construction Companies (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 5 of 1989)

In this case, concerning marine transportation contracts received from a joint enterprise engaged in the construction work for retaining the bank walls for airport island, the trade association set the amount of pit sand to be transported for this project according to the construction area of each constituent firm, thereby deciding the amount of work each constituent firm would undertake. In addition, the trade association decided the unit prices of transportation. These were found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (i) (Sec. 8 (i) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

The Case against Y Trade Association of Construction Companies (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 28 of 1994)

In this case, on competitive biddings among designated firms for general contracting of construction work, building work and pavement construction work ordered by City 'A', the association decided that if only one firm desired to win the bid, that firm was designated as the "bidder expected to win;" and if more than one firms desired to win the bid, the bidder expected to win was predetermined through such means as meetings conducted among the bidding firms. The association also caused constituent
firms to adjust their bid prices so that the bidder expected to win would win the bid at the adjusted price. Thus the association decided that the bidder expected to win would be predetermined among the constituent firms and caused the constituent firms to cooperate so that the bidder expected to win would be awarded the contract. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (i) (Sec. 8 (i) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

Bid-rigging is one of the methods of allocating contracts, predetermined the bidder expected to win a contract, and so forth (3-3). For more information concerning the relationship between the activities of firms and trade associations with regard to bids and the Antimonopoly Act, “Guidelines concerning the Activities of Firms and Trade Association with regard to Public Bids (published July 5, 1994)” shall be referred.

### 4. Conduct that restricts Facilities and Technology

A trade association will be found to violate Sec. 8 (i) if it engages in such conduct as described below, relating to facilities and technology, that substantially restrains competition in a market. Even if such conduct does not lead to the substantial restraint of competition in a market, it will nonetheless in principle be found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (iv).

#### 4 -1. (Restricting the construction or expansion of facilities, etc.)

Restricting the introduction, expansion, or demolition of facilities that are or will be used to supply or receive goods or services planned by constituent firms, or restricting the operation of said facilities.

[Specific cases]

The Case against X Trade Association of Bus Companies (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 9 of 1989)

In this case, concerning applications for approval to change operating plans to increase the number of charter buses, the trade association determined the limit of the number of additional vehicles with which the application could be submitted by each constituent firm complying with the decision. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (iv) (Sec. 8 (iv) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

The Case against Y Trade Association of Manufacturers of Polyolefine Film (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 2 of 1975)

In this case, after the expiration of adjustment provisions, based on law, that restricted the operation of manufacturing facilities and prohibited the construction of new facilities, the trade association decided, as a means of dealing with market conditions, not to allow constituent firms to build new facilities without the association's approval. Furthermore, the trade association decided that in the case of renovation the production capacity of the renovated facilities should not exceed limits set by the trade association. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (iv) (Sec. 8 (iv) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).
The Case against Z Federation of Trade Association of Paper Manufacturers (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 1 of 1973)

In this case, the federation decided that constituent firms would, at regular intervals, stop operation of their paper-coating machines for a certain period set by the federation, and furthermore decided to increase the selling price of coated paper. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (i) (Sec. 8 (i) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

### 4 -2. (Restricting the development or use of technology)

Unjustly restricting the development or use of technology by the constituent firms.

For more information concerning contracts for joint research and development and their implementation are regarded under the Antimonopoly Act, please refer to “Guidelines concerning Joint Research and Development under the Antimonopoly Act (published April 20, 1993)”.

### 5. Conduct that Restricts the Entry of Firms, etc

A trade association will be found to violate Sec. 8 (i) if it engages in conduct such as described below, that restricts the entry of firms into a market and thereby substantially restrains competition in the market. Even if such conduct does not lead to the substantial restraint of competition in a market, it will nonetheless in principle be found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (iii), (iv), or (v).

### 5 -1. (Restricting entry, etc)

For example, engaging in conduct such as described in 5-1-1 through 5-1-3 below, to make it notably difficult for firms to enter a market, or that forces firms out of a market.

### 5 -1-1. (Restricting the supply of goods or services)

Causing or pressuring constituent firms or their trading partners to restrict the supply of goods or services to specific firms.

## [Specific cases]

The Case against X Trade Association of Ready-mixed Concrete Manufacturers (FTC Hearing Decision No. 2 of 1981)

In this case, the association prevented non-constituent ready-mixed concrete manufacturers from building new production facilities within the its business sphere by demanding that cement manufacturers refrain from supplying cement to any non-constituent ready-mixed concrete manufacturer who planned to construct new facilities. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (iii) (Sec. 8 (iii) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

### 5 -1-2. (Restricting the handling of goods or services)

Causing or pressuring constituent firms or their trade partners to restrict the receipt or handling of goods or services from specific firms.
[Illustrative Examples]

{1} To eliminate imported goods, a trade association of distributors prohibits constituent firms from dealing with any firm that supplies imported goods.

{2} To prevent competitors of the constituent firms from entering a market, a trade association of manufacturers pressures the distributors who trade with the constituent firms not to handle the goods supplied by newcomers.

### 5 -1-3. (Unjustly restricting entry or unjustly expelling)

Unjustly restricting entry into an association or unjustly expelling a firm from an association where it is difficult to conduct business without joining the association (see Note below).

(1) Conduct strongly suspected of constituting unjust restricting of entry into an association

Conduct such as described below is strongly suspected to constitute "unjustly restricting entry into an association" as described in 5-1-3 above. Therefore, where it is difficult to conduct business without joining the association (see Note below), such conduct is strongly suspected to constitute a violation.

#### 5 -1-3- $ \{1\} $ . (Collecting exorbitant entry fees, etc.)

Collecting entry fees or imposing other economic burdens that are exorbitant in light of common practice.

## [Specific case of violations]

The Case against X Association of Doctors (FTC Recommendation Decision No. 7 of 1980)

In this case, a doctor who wished to open an independent practice without joining the trade association found it difficult to do so because of lack of access to necessary services that association members enjoyed; these included: being recommended to serve as school doctors, receiving assistance in applying for certification as a designated doctor based on the Eugenic Protection Act, and receiving assistance in communicating with appropriate governmental agencies. Also, non-members found it difficult to obtain the cooperation of other doctors regarding the examination and treatment of patients. Under these conditions, the association decided to raise the membership fee to the doctors who were starting up new practices more than twice of the usual fee, with the intention of restricting the establishment of new hospitals and clinics within its business sphere and of strengthening those restrictions. This was found to constitute a violation of Sec. 8 (1) (iii) and (iv) (Sec. 8 (iii) and (iv) of the existing Antimonopoly Act).

#### 5 -1-3- $ \{2\} $ . (Restricting the number of stores, etc.)

Establishing qualification requirements as membership that restrict the number of stores in a given geographical area or prevent a new store within a prescribed distance from existing members' stores.