suppliers. Such dependency for fundamental parts on the other countries represents the vulnerability of inter-industrial relations in Korea.

The Korean HEEI is now encountering difficulties in its product quality. In Table 6, one can see a steep decline in the HEEI export from Korea to Japan in 1990 after a stable growth since 1985. In the Japanese market, there was a boom of the NIEs products in 1988 and 1989, and the Korean HEEI products flowed massively into the Japanese market with appealing low prices. However, the boom was soon over because of the outbreaks of machine troubles and the claims by the customers caused by low product quality and poor after-sale services.

Although we saw the Korean HEEI manufactured products have surpassed the Japanese ones in terms of export competitiveness, it should not be missed that this competitiveness index is computed on the export-import rates not to the Japanese market but to the total world market. For the Korean HEEI, the largest market is the U.S.A. In the U.S. market, with a variety of income levels of customers and the Korean products, the characteristics of which were simple-function and low-price level, got a favorable reception from the customers. Nowadays, however, even in the U.S. market, the ASEAN products are penetrating into the market for the Korean products because the ASEAN countries begin to produce lower-cost and better-quality products than the Korean HEEI as a part of the Japanese HEEI's global production network. The quality improvement therefore is a problem that Korean HEEI has to overcome.

By the latter half of the 1980's, the Korean HEEI reached the stage of export expansion under the government's market protection and the export promotion by foreign direct investment of multi-national enterprises. However, since the learning effect and the industrial efficiency improvement, which are key factors of successful Flying-Wild-Geese development, did not spread to the lowest level of the whole HEEI, it faced various difficulties once it tried to be independent from the Japanese global production network and achieve industrial development by themselves.

This could also happen to Thailand where the Japanese enterprises are energetically making investment and trying to establish their production network. The massive flow of the Japanese investment to Thailand after the Plaza Accord in 1985 made Thailand's export in the HEEI grow at much higher pace than that in Korea. Through such a short process, can the technology learning effects and management know-hows be diffused into local enterprises of the HEEI? It is reported that labor costs in Bangkok have already increased to such an extent that some foreign affiliated computer enterprises decided to withdraw from Thailand $ ^{6} $ . How can they gain from the learning process through foreign investment, import substitution and export expansion and gain an efficiency through the export competition against foreign products? At the time when Japanese investment changes the target away from Thailand to China and the other Asian countries with lower labor costs, we were able to find out Thailand HEEI's real ability.

The development of the HEEI in the East Asian economies was thus realized in the Flying-Wild-Geese development pattern headed by advanced countries, mainly Japan, and late-starting countries have tended to depend for a supply of parts on Japan and had a vulnerability in their industrial competitiveness.

Then, is it unavoidable for the HEEI of the developing countries to make an “Outward”