Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
表 7.1 月次モデルによる平均絶対誤差率(AAPE) $ ^{*} $

シミュレーション期間：1975.1～1981.12

子测期間(月)	3	6	9	12	15	18	21	24	27	30	33	36
变数
BPXG	7.20	8.35	8.82	8.95	9.81	12.93	16.27	11.37	17.24	17.12	17.94	18.68
BPMG	5.46	8.27	9.74	9.74	10.08	9.75	9.97	10.93	11.79	12.26	12.52	12.57
KLNPL	5.07	4.29	3.99	6.23	8.23	8.67	8.60	8.41	7.89	7.36	6.61	6.06
KSNN	5.31	7.46	9.10	9.42	10.20	10.58	11.31	12.18	13.15	13.48	13.60	13.19
KSBC	12.64	18.31	22.73	24.23	25.13	25.82	27.41	29.07	30.87	30.73	30.71	30.60
RBRA	7.34	7.24	7.35	7.14	6.94	6.70	6.64	6.55	6.68	6.80	6.98	6.15
FXS	5.26	8.60	10.03	10.41	10.56	10.98	11.76	12.24	13.40	13.99	14.30	14.28

*為替レートは最適固定バンドで決定。 $ BANDX=0.02 $ $ BANDR=0.04 $ 。

表 7.2 四半期モデルによる平均絶対誤差率(AAPE) $ ^{*} $

シミュレーション期間：1975.I～1981.IV

予測期間(四半期)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
変数	7.88	9.96	10.76	11.09	11.74	13.78	16.34	17.47	18.50	18.83	19.88	20.50
BPMG	4.75	8.50	10.99	12.03	12.03	12.18	12.11	11.73	11.00	10.12	11.07	11.43
KLNPL	5.88	5.09	4.29	5.19	7.97	9.24	9.46	9.72	9.78	9.88	9.67	9.84
KSNN	6.17	9.62	12.44	13.33	14.56	15.07	15.40	15.37	14.82	14.00	14.00	14.01
KSBC	17.84	30.79	39.35	44.22	47.32	48.04	49.72	48.59	46.47	44.68	43.51	45.14
RBRA	5.77	6.09	6.25	6.09	6.08	5.79	5.47	5.86	6.34	6.64	6.87	6.96
FXS	5.34	9.65	11.75	12.92	12.94	13.13	13.15	12.93	12.31	11.80	12.20	12.54

*為替レートは最適固定バンドで決定。 $ BANDX=0.04\ BANDR=0.09 $ 。

表 7.3 月次モデルによる平均絶対誤差率(AAPE) $ ^{*} $

シミュレーション期間：1975.1～1981.12

子测期間(月)	3	6	9	12	15	18	21	24	27	30	33	36
突变数
BPXG	7.05	7.89	8.24	8.65	9.75	12.44	14.77	15.74	15.67	16.02	16.75	17.41
BPMG	5.09	7.69	8.70	9.24	8.90	8.77	9.62	10.05	10.97	11.40	12.01	11.60
RLNPL	5.09	4.33	3.93	5.94	7.84	8.12	8.39	8.51	8.30	8.11	7.65	7.33
KSNN	5.10	6.58	7.48	8.45	8.76	9.31	9.97	10.95	11.91	12.22	12.78	12.24
KSBC	11.47	15.54	18.38	20.40	21.47	23.60	26.83	29.11	31.26	31.65	32.53	31.51
RBRA	7.31	7.22	7.33	7.13	7.04	6.78	6.75	6.53	6.57	6.67	6.89	6.81
FXS	4.36	7.28	8.51	9.38	9.14	9.10	9.87	10.27	11.36	11.87	12.36	11.93

*為替レートは最適固定バンド(M2)で決定。

の拡大が目立つが,非銀行民間部門短資移動の誤差は目立つほどには累増しない。最適可変バンドによる為替レート決定方式の場合については,表7.3と表7.4に示されている。この場合には,全期間にわってバンドを固定する場合よりも,ほとんどの変数で,特に長期になるほど,誤差率が小さくなっている。

推定バンドによる為替レート決定の場合については,それぞれ表7.5と表7.6に示されている。この場合も,一般に予測期間が拡大されるにつれて誤差が累増される。また,銀行部門の短
表 7.4 四半期モデルによる平均絶対誤差率(AAPE) $ ^{*} $

シミュレーション期間：1975.I～1981.IV

子测期间(四半期)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
变数
BPXG	7.51	8.66	9.31	9.58	10.48	12.05	13.54	14.06	14.55	15.70	15.87	16.58
BPMG	3.50	6.53	8.36	9.62	10.00	10.10	9.69	9.29	8.78	9.13	8.70	9.49
KLNPL	6.02	5.14	4.28	4.91	7.64	8.70	9.01	9.47	9.70	9.87	9.82	9.18
KSNN	5.68	7.26	9.76	10.76	11.96	13.07	13.15	12.88	11.74	11.59	11.19	10.92
KSBC	14.14	23.76	30.39	33.92	38.28	40.51	39.39	37.31	33.15	30.85	28.11	29.63
RBRA	5.69	5.95	6.05	6.00	6.05	5.86	5.77	6.09	6.54	7.04	7.35	7.25
FXS	3.71	6.81	8.46	9.61	10.42	10.67	10.16	10.09	10.01	10.30	9.84	10.58

$ ^{*} $ 為替レートは最適可変バンド（Q2）で決定。

表 7.5 月次モデルによる平均絶対誤差率 $ ^{®} $

シミュレーション期間：1975.1～1981.12

予測期間(月)	3	6	9	12	15	18	21	24	27	30	33	36
空数
BPXG	7.78	9.32	9.49	9.26	10.62	15.14	19.24	19.55	18.18	16.78	17.71	19.61
BPMG	6.49	9.61	10.57	10.23	9.84	11.56	13.00	15.36	16.58	17.44	17.56	16.31
KLNPL	5.02	4.18	3.85	6.33	8.06	8.30	8.16	7.82	7.70	7.14	7.22	7.01
KSNN	6.61	9.52	10.33	10.04	9.90	11.27	12.65	15.54	16.85	17.64	17.45	16.21
KSBC	15.92	22.51	25.38	24.68	24.55	27.32	31.43	35.14	36.59	37.27	35.82	34.41
RBRA	7.37	7.25	7.34	7.10	6.90	6.55	6.54	6.51	6.52	6.56	6.65	6.41
FXS	6.98	10.49	11.04	10.67	10.93	13.34	15.80	19.38	22.15	23.90	23.21	21.11

*為替レートは最適固定バンドで決定。BANDX=0.05 BANDR=0.06。

表 7.6 四半期モデルによる平均絶対誤差率(AAPE) $ ^{*} $

シミュレーション期間：1975.I～1981.IV

子测期间(四半期)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
变数
BPXG	8.75	11.44	12.53	12.91	13.59	17.28	20.24	21.76	22.94	23.45	25.56	27.13
BPMG	6.60	11.10	13.64	15.75	15.97	16.15	15.23	15.89	16.14	15.76	17.23	18.37
KLNPL	5.84	5.01	4.22	5.45	8.22	9.72	9.97	10.14	9.89	9.94	9.89	10.14
KLNN	8.30	12.89	15.75	16.99	18.50	19.10	18.65	19.85	20.41	19.24	20.42	21.96
KSBC	24.63	42.64	53.10	58.83	59.69	64.83	64.99	70.09	68.19	64.57	68.17	73.30
RBRA	5.81	6.28	6.30	6.23	6.04	5.37	4.97	5.22	5.33	5.37	5.90	6.15
FXS	7.14	12.04	13.99	16.27	16.32	16.57	15.92	16.42	16.63	16.50	18.55	20.59

*為替レートは推定バンド(M2)で決定。BANDX=0.08 BANDR=0.10。

資移動の誤差はやはり大きい。

定義しよう。

次に,月次と四半期のモデルに基づく予測誤差を比較するために,相対誤差率を次のように相対誤差率（RPRAAPE）

$$ =\left(\frac{ 月次 \mathcal{O}AAPE}{ 四半期 \mathcal{O}AAPE}-1\right)\times100 $$
表 7.7 は最適固定バンドによる為替レート決定の場合の相対誤差率を示している。全体としてみれば理論的分析が示唆したように四半期による予測誤差のほうが相対的に大きい。もちろん例外もかなり多くの場合についてみられる。しかし,為替レート決定において重要な役割を果たす民間部門の短資移動（KSNNとKSBC）については,すくなくとも8四半期までの予測で月次の方がパフォーマンスがよい。また,実際の予測期間としての特に関心のもたれる4ないし5四半期期間のところをみると,すべての変数の予測において月次モデルに基づく方が良い結果となっており,とりわけ短期資本移動については月次の方が圧倒的に良い。

表 7.7 相对誤差率(RPRAAPE) $ ^{*} $

子测期間(四半期)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
变数
BPXG	6.3	-7.9	-10.9	-14.4	-2.1	15.5	18.8	10.6	-7.3	-14.8	-15.5	-19.0
BPMG	51.8	6.6	-4.7	-15.8	-22.8	-15.0	-10.5	2.5	1.4	15.2	13.1	7.9
KLNPL	-21.0	-13.4	-21.8	-4.3	-8.3	-13.5	-24.4	-38.2	-44.8	-60.0	-58.8	-44.6
KSNN	19.9	-10.6	-21.1	-30.7	-39.1	-36.5	-32.8	-21.1	-26.0	-22.2	-24.4	-29.9
KSBC	-1.0	-35.2	-39.9	-43.6	-53.4	-47.6	-44.1	-37.7	-44.7	-43.1	-47.3	-53.1
RBRA	7.2	2.4	2.3	-0.7	-4.6	5.8	13.6	26.2	20.6	8.5	3.9	5.3
FXS	30.5	2.4	-5.8	-11.8	-12	-5.5	3.8	32.4	31.5	29.0	17.8	3.3

*為替レートは最適固定バンド(M2)で決定（表7.1,表7.2参照）。

表 7.8 相对誤差率(RPRAAPE) $ ^{*} $

子测期间(四半期)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
变数
BPXG	-6.1	-8.9	-11.5	-9.7	-7.0	3.2	9.1	11.9	7.7	2.0	5.5	5.0
BPMG	45.4	17.8	4.1	-4.0	-11.0	-13.2	--0.7	8.2	24.9	24.9	38.0	22.2
KLNPL	-15.4	-15.8	-8.2	21.0	2.6	-6.7	-6.9	-10.1	-14.4	-17.8	-22.1	-20.2
KSNN	-10.2	-9.4	-23.4	-21.5	-26.8	-28.8	-24.2	-15.0	1.4	5.4	14.2	12.1
KSBC	-18.9	-34.6	-39.5	-39.9	-43.9	-41.7	-31.9	-22.0	-5.7	2.6	15.7	6.3
RBRA	28.5	21.3	21.2	18.8	16.4	15.7	17.0	7.2	0.5	-5.3	-6.3	-6.1
FXS	17.5	6.9	0.6	-2.4	-12.0	-14.7	-2.9	1.8	13.5	15.2	25.6	12.8

*為替レートは最適固定バンド(M2)で決定（表7.3,表7.4参照）。

表 7.9 相对誤差率(RPRAAPE) $ ^{*} $

予測期間
(四半期)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
変数
BPXG	-11.1	-18.5	-24.3	-28.3	-21.9	-12.4	-4.9	-10.2	-20.7	-28.4	-30.7	-27.7
BPMG	-1.7	-13.4	-21.9	-35.0	-38.4	-28.4	-14.6	-3.3	2.7	10.7	1.9	-11.2
KLNPL	-14.0	-16.6	-8.8	16.1	-1.9	-14.6	-18.2	-22.9	-22.1	-28.2	-27.0	-30.3
KSNN	-20.4	-26.1	-34.4	-40.9	-46.5	-41.0	-32.2	-21.7	-17.4	-8.3	-14.5	-25.9
KSBC	-35.4	-47.2	-52.2	-58.0	-58.9	-57.9	-51.6	-49.9	-46.3	-42.3	-47.5	-53.3
RBRA	26.9	15.4	16.5	14.0	14.2	22.0	31.6	24.7	22.3	22.2	12.7	5.5
FXS	-2.2	-12.9	-21.1	-34.4	-33.0	-19.5	-0.8	18.0	33.2	44.8	25.1	2.6

*為替レートは最適固定バンド(M2)で決定（表7.5,表7.6参照）。
表 7.8 は最適可変バンドに基づいて為替レートを決定する場合,表 7.9 は推定バンドで為替レートを決定する場合の相対誤差率を示している。これらの場合も全般的に月次モデルに基づく誤差の方が小さいこと,短資移動については圧倒的に月次モデルに基づく誤差の方が小さいこと,4 ないし 5 四半期間の予測では長期資本移動などに若干の例外がみられるものの,やはり月次モデルに基づく予測の方が相対的に良好な結果となっている。

### 7.2 平方平均二乗相対誤差率でみた予測誤差

全内生変数の推定期間 1975 年～1981 年の全期間にわたる平方平均二乗誤差率 (RMSPE) を月次モデルと四半期モデルについて求め, それを用いた予測効果の尺度を次式によって定義しよう。すなわち, 月次モデルと四半期モデルの予測の相対誤差率として,

$$ RPRRMSPE=(\frac{RMSPE_{M}}{RMSPE_{Q}}-1)\times100 $$

を考え,これを平方平均二乗相対誤差率と定義する。ここに, $ RMSPE_{M} $ は月次モデルの平方平均二乗誤差率であり, $ RMSPE_{Q} $ は四半期モデルの平方平均二乗誤差率である。

表 7.10 は,各内生変数の平方平均相対誤差率を示している。表 7.7～表 7.9 と同様に,負値を

表 7.10 平方平均二乘相对误差率(RPRRMSPE)

次数	最適固定	最適可変	推 定
BPXG	0.3	7.7	-13.6
BPMG	-5.2	-4.5	-30.3
BPT	45.2	-3.8	20.1
BPC	-53.2	99.8	-69.6
KLNPL	-27.0	-31.5	-52.6
KSNN	-23.4	-20.4	-36.4
KSBC	-41.4	-18.1	-61.0
RBRA	29.2	29.6	27.4
RSEC	-7.7	-6.6	-11.2
FP	-69.5	-72.1	-70.8
GFX	-19.0	-44.4	-47.3
FXS	-11.2	-21.4	-26.7

とれば月次モデルの予測誤差の方が四半期モデルのそれより小さいことを示す。すべてのバンドの与え方に対して四半期モデルの誤差の方が小さいのは短期利子率だけであり、その他の内生変数に対しては圧倒的に月次モデルの方がパフォーマンスがよいことを示している。特に長短の資本移動や外貨保有高、直物為替レートや先物プレミアム等では、月次モデルの相対的優位性が顕著に現れている。バンドの設定による違いでは、推定バンドのときに月次モデルの優位性が一番明確に示されている。

## 第8節 乗 数 分 析

時間集計が推定値や予測誤差に与える効果については上にみてきたが,この他にも,乗数分析を通じて調べられるモデルの動学的特性にどのような影響をもつかを調べることも重要な課題である。EPA世界経済モデルのような大型非線型モデルでは,その動学的特性や政策効果を解析的に調べることは事実上不可能なので,それは動学的シミュレーションによる乗数分析に基づいてなされる。その場合に,四半期モデルに基づく乗数が特定の方向のバイアスをもつならば乗数分析に基づいて得られる動学的特性や政策効果の解釈には特別な注意が必要となるであろう。

この節では,本研究で用いられている小型のモデルを用いて,同一の外生的攪乱に対して月次のモデルと四半期のモデルから得られる乗数に異なった影響がみられるか否かを調べる。その場合に,始点を違えたときの効果(いわゆる初期値テスト)や攪乱の与え方をプラスとマイナスに違えたときの効果（いわゆる非対称性テ
The Guidelines for Exclusionary Private Monopolization under the Antimonopoly Act

Introduction.....1
1. Purpose of the Guidelines.....1
2. Outline of the Guidelines.....2
Part I. Enforcement Policy of the JFTC.....3
Part II. Exclusionary Conduct.....4
1. Basic View.....4
(1) Nature of Exclusionary Conduct.....4
(2) Types of Exclusionary Conduct.....5
2. Below-cost Pricing.....8
(1) Conduct that may fall under Exclusionary Conduct.....8
(2) Factors for assessment.....11
(3) Reference example.....13
3. Exclusive Dealing.....13
(1) Conduct that may fall under Exclusionary Conduct.....13
(2) Factors for assessment.....14
(3) Exclusive Rebate-giving.....16
(4) Illustrative examples.....18
4. Tying.....20
(1) Conduct that may fall under Exclusionary Conduct.....20
(2) Factors for assessment.....21
(3) Reference examples.....24
5. Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment.....25
(1) Conduct that may fall under Exclusionary Conduct.....25
(2) Factors for assessment.....27
(3) Illustrative examples.....29
Part III Substantial Restraint of Competition in Any Particular Field of Trade.....31
1. A Particular Field of Trade.....31
(1) Basic view.....31
(2) Scope of products.....31
(3) Geographical scope.....33
2. Substantial Restraint of Competition.....34
(1) Basic view.....34
(2) Factors for assessment.....34
The Guidelines for Exclusionary Private Monopolization under the Antimonopoly Act

October 28, 2009

(Revised: December 25, 2020)

Japan Fair Trade Commission

## I ntroduction

### 1. Purpose of the Guidelines

Private monopolization, as defined in the provisions of Article 2 (5) of the Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (Act No.54 of 1947; hereinafter referred to as the "Antimonopoly Act"), is "such business activities, by which any entrepreneur, individually or by combination in conspiracy with other entrepreneurs, or by any other manner, excludes or controls the business activities of other entrepreneurs, thereby causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade." Private monopolization is prohibited under the provisions of Article 3 of the Antimonopoly Act.

The Japan Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "JFTC") can take necessary measures against any private monopolization to eliminate the violation pursuant to the provisions of Article 7 of the Antimonopoly Act. In addition, the JFTC shall order payment of a surcharge pursuant to the provisions of Article 7-9 (1) of the Antimonopoly Act against any private monopolization by controlling the business activities of other entrepreneurs.

Consequent to the establishment of Act No.51 of 2009 for amending the Antimonopoly Act in June 2009, the Act includes the provision that the JFTC shall order payment of a surcharge pursuant to Article 7-9 (2) of the Antimonopoly Act against any private monopolization by excluding the business activities of other entrepreneurs (hereinafter referred to as “Exclusionary Private Monopolization”) (Note 1).

Exclusionary Private Monopolization refers to excluding the business activities of other entrepreneurs (hereinafter referred to as “Exclusionary Conduct”), thereby causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade. There are not so many Exclusionary Private Monopolization cases in Japan, and various types of the alleged conduct fall under such monopolization. Moreover, it could naturally happen in every competition process that as a result of business activities of an entrepreneur, a product—in these
guidelines, a product includes a service such as loan of funds and grant of a license concerning a patent right and grant of a license to use facilities and equipments—of the other entrepreneur is driven out of the market. Therefore, because of the difficulty in distinguishing Exclusionary Conduct from normal business activities leading to exclude the business activities of other entrepreneurs, it has been pointed out that the introduction of a surcharge against Exclusionary Private Monopolization might cause a so-called chilling effect for entrepreneurs and interfere with their fair and free business activities.

In light of these circumstances, the JFTC formulates the “Guidelines for Exclusionary Private Monopolization under the Antimonopoly Act” (hereinafter referred to as the “Guidelines”). The purpose of the Guidelines is to ensure further transparency of law enforcement and to improve predictability for entrepreneurs by clarifying, to the extent possible, the requirements for Exclusionary Private Monopolization.

### 2. Outline of the Guidelines

The Guidelines describe the JFTC’s investigation policies about cases concerning Exclusionary Private Monopolization and what conduct may fall under “Exclusionary Conduct” and “substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade” as the requirements for Exclusionary Private Monopolization. If it would be deemed that an entrepreneur commits Exclusionary Conduct but not be deemed that the conduct substantially restrains competition in a particular field of trade, the conduct would not fall under Exclusionary Private Monopolization.

Specifically, first, the Guidelines describe general matters that the JFTC is to consider when determining whether to prioritize investigation of a particular case as Exclusionary Private Monopolization (Part I below). The next part of the Guidelines shows types of chief conduct that tends to be deemed problematic as “Exclusionary Conduct” and the framework for deliberations and factors applied for assessing whether or not it falls under Exclusionary Conduct for each type (Part II below). Finally, the Guidelines describe the factors to be considered for defining a particular field of trade and determining the presence or absence of a substantial restraint of competition in a particular field of trade when assessment is made over whether Exclusionary Conduct has substantially restrained competition in the field of trade (Part III below).

The Guidelines clarify the JFTC’s view under the Antimonopoly Act regarding the conceivable Exclusionary Private Monopolization in the present. Business
activities undermining competition in the market will continue to change because of changes in market conditions, technological innovations, and other factors. Therefore, the JFTC will revise the Guidelines, as necessary, while reviewing the specific law enforcements and watching market conditions.

(Note 1) Any entrepreneur who engages in Private Monopolization affecting consideration of the product’s price by controlling and excluding business activities of other entrepreneurs shall be ordered to pay a surcharge pursuant to the provisions of Article 7-9 (1) of the Antimonopoly Act.

### Part I. Enforcement Policy of the JFTC

The purpose of the Antimonopoly Act is to promote fair and free competition in the market, stimulate the creative initiative of entrepreneurs, and thereby allow general consumers to choose from a wide variety of high-quality and low-cost products.

In most of the past cases concerning Exclusionary Private Monopolization, entrepreneurs who were subject to the JFTC’s investigation had a large share of the markets for the product related to Exclusionary Conduct. Thus, in most cases where an entrepreneur’s conduct can be effective in excluding business activities of the other entrepreneurs and foreclosing the market, the share of the product (Note 2) that the said entrepreneur supplies is to some extent large. Moreover, the larger the share of the product that the said entrepreneur supplies is, the more likely it is that the alleged Exclusionary Conduct becomes highly effective in causing a substantial restraint of competition in a particular field of trade.

In light of these, the JFTC, when deciding whether to investigate a case as Exclusionary Private Monopolization, will prioritize the case where the share of the product that the said entrepreneur supplies exceeds approximately 50% after the commencement of such conduct and where the conduct is deemed to have a serious impact on the lives of the citizenry, comprehensively considering the relevant factors such as market size, scope of business activities of the said entrepreneur, and characteristics of the product. However, even if a case does not meet these criteria, it may be subject to investigation of the case as Exclusionary Private Monopolization depending on the type of conduct, market conditions, positions of the competitors, and other factors.

Needless to say, even where the alleged conduct is found not to fall under Exclusionary Private Monopolization after the JFTC’s investigation, it is still likely
to be regulated as unfair trade practices, as provided for in Article 2 (9) of the Antimonopoly Act or as the conduct that violates the other provisions of the Antimonopoly Act.

(Note 2) “The share of the product” in the case of “Tying” (in 4 of Part II below) refers to the share of the tying product and “the share of the product” in the case of “Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment” (in 5 of Part II below) refers to the share of the product in the upstream market.

If multiple entrepreneurs combined or conspired with each other, the share herein refers to the sum of the shares of products supplied by the respective entrepreneurs involved.

### Part II. Exclusionary Conduct

### 1. Basic View

## (1) Nature of Exclusionary Conduct

Exclusionary Conduct refers to various conducts that would cause difficulty for other entrepreneurs to continue their business activities or for new market entrants to commence their business activities, thereby would be likely to cause a substantial restraint of competition in a particular field of trade. In the case that an entrepreneur supplies a low-cost and high-quality product by its own efforts such as improving efficiency, and if such conduct would make it difficult for competitors to continue their inefficient business activities, it does not fall under Exclusionary Conduct because it is a result of fair and free competition, which the Antimonopoly Act intends to promote.

To constitute Exclusionary Conduct, conduct of an entrepreneur does not have to result in the actual elimination of business activities of other entrepreneurs from the market or complete block of business activities of new market entrants. In other words, any conduct falls under Exclusionary Conduct when it is highly likely to cause difficulties in continuing the business activities of other entrepreneurs or commencing the business activities of new market entrants. Even if such conduct was assessed by the entrepreneur to be indispensable for its business management because of the market conditions etc., it does not mean that the said conduct might not fall under Exclusionary Conduct.

It is not essential that for falling under Exclusionary Conduct, the entrepreneur had the exclusionary intent. However, the exclusionary intent as a subjective element can be an important fact leading the presumption that the alleged
conduct is Exclusionary Conduct. Moreover, when the entrepreneur has engaged in multiple acts with the exclusionary intent, these acts may be collectively recognized as a series of integrated acts aimed at realizing the exclusionary intent.

In addition, “excluding business activities of other entrepreneurs” include not only direct but also indirect conduct via its trading partner against the said other entrepreneurs. Moreover, such conduct also includes the conduct committed by multiple entrepreneurs in combination or in conspiracy with each other.

## (2) Types of Exclusionary Conduct

The first example of typical Exclusionary Conduct is a type of conduct similar to the unfair trade practices listed in Article 2 (9) of the Antimonopoly Act. Therefore, a part of unfair trade practices may fall under Exclusionary Conduct. On the other hand, in past cases of Exclusionary Private Monopolization, Exclusionary Conduct has not necessarily been limited to those similar to unfair trade practices, and types of conduct other than these have been also regarded as Exclusionary Conduct.

Thus, there is a wide variety of conduct deemed as Exclusionary Conduct, so it is difficult to characterize all of them. However, factors to be considered for assessing whether the alleged conduct falls under Exclusionary Conduct differ according to the type of the conduct. Therefore, to the extent possible, breaking down Exclusionary Conduct into types and listing factors for assessment for each type of conduct are beneficial from the viewpoint of ensuring transparency of law enforcement and improving predictability of entrepreneurs.

The Guidelines describe four typical Exclusionary Conducts—“Below-cost Pricing,” “Exclusive Dealing,” “Tying,” and “Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment” in reference to past cases—and for each type of conduct, consideration factors for assessing whether the alleged conduct falls under Exclusionary Conduct. Of course, Exclusionary Conduct that constitutes Exclusionary Private Monopolization is not limited to the acts that fall under these four typical Exclusionary Conducts. For example, setting a price exclusively either in the sales territory where an entrepreneur competes with others or for customers, for whom an entrepreneur competes with others (Note 3), or interfering with business activities of other entrepreneurs (Note 4) may be regarded as Exclusionary Conduct in some cases. Further, multiple acts may be collectively regarded as a series of integrated Exclusionary Conduct (Note 5).
The illustrative examples given in 2 to 5 of Part II below show conducts deemed as Exclusionary Private Monopolizations in past decisions and judgments for the purpose of helping in understand concretely what conduct falls under Exclusionary Conduct. The reference examples are also given to help understand concretely what conduct falls under Exclusionary Conduct by showing conduct deemed as unfair trade practices in past decisions, judgments, and others. Needless to say, assessment over whether specific conduct, including conduct not referred to in the Guidelines, falls under Exclusionary Conduct is to be made in the context of individual cases pursuant to the provisions of the Antimonopoly Act (Notes 6 and 7).

(Note 3) The following is an illustrative example of setting a price exclusively either in sales territory where an entrepreneur competes with others or for customers, for whom an entrepreneur competes with others:

Company X, a music broadcasting business entrepreneur in Japan, in an attempt to deprive a competitor, Company Y, of a large number of its customers in a short period and to make it difficult for Company Y to manage its music broadcasting business, carried out campaigns only for Company Y's customers, which significantly prolonged free subscription period and significantly lowered minimum subscription fee for the products that competed with Company Y's products. Such conduct was found to exclude the business activities of the said competitor in the music broadcasting business (JFTC recommendation decision, October 13, 2004).

(Note 4) The following are illustrative examples of conducts of interfering with business activities of other entrepreneurs:

1) Company X—a food cans manufacturer—which held approximately 56% (Company X and Companies A, B, C, and D, whose business activities were dominated by Company X, collectively held approximately 74%) of the market share of all such products supplied in Japan—discontinued its supply of food cans that the canned food manufacturer Company Y could not manufacture on its own, with the intent to make Company Y give up its attempt to independently manufacture food cans to reduce the cost of manufacturing its canned food. Such conduct was found to exclude the business activities of food can manufacturers’ producing food cans on their own (JFTC