Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
was ignored in formula 2 (income being used as an explanatory variable for direct investment), (ii) flat in Canada, Japan, the United States, and West Germany, and (iii) steep in the United Kingdom and Italy. These differences in slope generally correspond to the differences in income elasticity of imports and the interest elasticity of the capital account (see Table IV·1).

The temporal progression of the BP curve shows the slope becoming flatter over time for the United Kingdom but steeper for the other countries. All of the countries except Italy show conspicuous changes. These changes accounted for by the following factors (i) income and interest elasticities of imports grow larger because of the lagged impact of income and interest rate on imports (though this factor works in an opposite direction in the United Kingdom) and (ii) the interest elasticity of capital account changes consistently with the change in the BP curve's slope in all but the United States and France (with the warning that this factor has to be handled with care for the above reasons - see Table IV·2).

## (3) The Model-derived BP Curve Compared with the Pure BP Curve

In principle, all of the variables except those in the final expenditure block and interest rate should cause the pure BP to shift and should affect the slope of the model-derived BP curve. However, because wealth and prices were considered as influencing the shifts of the IS and LM curves in the analyses in part II, and because taking the changes in wealth and price variables into consideration in a model dealing purely with the balance of payments block yields a BP curve that is very close to the model-derived BP curve, it is possible to explain the shift from the pure BP to the model-derived BP in terms of the changes in wealth and prices.

In doing this, the simplified balance of payments block is expanded as shown.

$$ \left(\text{－}\right)\left(\text{－}\right)\left(\text{－}\right) $$

1. Current account balance: BPC = BPC(GNP, i, P)

$$ \left(+)\left(-\right)\right. $$

2. Capital account balance: BPK = BPK(i,w)

where P is prices and w is wealth.

$$ \left(\text{－}\right)\left(\text{－}\right)\left(\text{－}\right)\qquad\left(+\right)\left(\text{－}\right) $$

When BPC (GNP, i, P) + BPK (i, w) = 0 is differentiated for GNP, we get:

$$ \left(\frac{\partial\mathrm{BPC}}{\partial\mathrm{GNP}}+\frac{\partial\mathrm{BPC}}{\partial\mathrm{i}}-\frac{\mathrm{di}}{\mathrm{dGNP}}+\frac{\partial\mathrm{BPC}}{\partial\mathrm{P}}-\frac{\mathrm{dp}}{\mathrm{dGNP}}\right)+\left(\frac{\partial\mathrm{BPK}}{\partial\mathrm{i}}-\frac{\mathrm{di}}{\mathrm{dGNP}}+\frac{\partial\mathrm{BPK}}{\partial\mathrm{w}}-\frac{\mathrm{dw}}{\mathrm{dGNP}}\right)=0 $$
Table IV·2 The Slope of the Pure BP Curve and its Determinants (Temporal Change)

Slope of the Pure BP	1)	Determinants
Income elasticity of imports of goods	Interest rate semi-elasticity of investment income payment	Interest rate 2) semi-elasticity of capital account

1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year
Australia	$ \Delta $ 0.23	0.97	1.35	1.61	0.0	0.15	16.08	1.01
France	$ \Delta $ 0.01	0.49	0.78	1.71	0.09	0.27	2.06	3.94
Canada	0.06	0.31	0.81	1.25	-	-	9.74	2.93
Japan	0.13	0.74	0.84	1.07	0.22	0.69	11.49	3.74
U.S.	0.16	0.90	0.90	1.28	0.76	0.76	9.15	13.04
West Germany	0.19	3.04	0.79	0.96	0.33	0.51	4.22	2.91
Italy	0.63	1.17	1.76	1.76	0.20	0.91	14.59	9.13
U.K.	0.88	0.13	1.81	1.96	0.25	0.86	2.48	9.07

(Note) 1, 2. See notes of Table IV·1
From this, it is possible to derive the slope of the BP curve as

$$ \frac{\mathrm{di}}{\mathrm{dGNP}}=\frac{-\frac{\partial\mathrm{BPC}}{\partial\mathrm{GNP}}-\frac{\partial\mathrm{BPC}}{\partial\mathrm{P}}\cdot\frac{\mathrm{dP}}{\mathrm{dGNP}}-\frac{\partial\mathrm{BPK}}{\partial\mathrm{w}}\cdot\frac{\mathrm{dw}}{\mathrm{dGNP}}}{\frac{\partial\mathrm{BPC}}{\partial\mathrm{i}}+\frac{\partial\mathrm{BPK}}{\partial\mathrm{i}}} $$

Compared to formula (i) for the pure BP curve, the denominator remains the same but the numerator changes with the additional inclusion of the second and third terms. (It may be assumed that $ \partial XV/\partial GNP $ and $ \partial XV/\partial i $ are zero.) Because it is expected that $ \partial BPC/\partial P<0 $ , dp/dGNP>0, $ \partial BPK/\partial w<0 $ , and dw/dGNP>0, both the second and third terms are negative and the model-derived BP is expected to be steeper than the pure BP.

The slope of the pure BP in the first year, the slope of the model-derived BP, and the values of the second and third terms of the numerator in formula (ii) are as summarized in Table IV·3. As seen, the model-derived BP is steeper than the pure BP in the seven countries excluding Japan. The main factor determining the differences in slope is the wealth effect on the long-term capital account. The Japanese exception is explained by the price impact on the current account and the wealth impact on the short-term capital account.

The temporal progression shows that, since the rate of increase in prices and wealth accelerates over time, the price impact on the current account and the wealth impact on the capital account get larger correspondingly, resulting in an increasingly steeper slope for the model-derived BP curve except Japan and the United Kingdom(see Table IV·4).

### 2. The Impact of Fiscal Policy and the LM·BP Curves

(1) The Impact on the Overall Balance of Payments and the LM and BP Curves under a Fixed Exchange Rates Regime

The relative steepness of the slope of the LM and BP curves determines whether expansionary fiscal policy results in an overall balance of payments surplus (or currency appreciation) or deficit (or currency depreciation). Comparing the slope of the LM curve with that of the BP curve (both model-derived) for the first year, the BP curve is steeper in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada but the LM curve is steeper in the other countries. Given these differences in the slopes, it is expected that fiscal expansion will push the overall
Table IV·3 Comparison between the Pure BP Curve and the Model·derived BP Curve (1st year)

Slope of the BP 1)	Factors responsible for the change in slope
Current account	Long-term capital account	Short-term capital account
Pure BP	Model-derived BP	Price 2) elasticity of Current account	Income elasticity of Price	Wealth2) elasticity of long-term capital account	Income elasticity of wealth	wealth2) elasticity of short-term capital account	Income elasticity of wealth
Australia	Δ0.22	Δ0.33	0.52	-	-	-	-
France	Δ0.23	0.15	Δ0.07	0.20	Δ0.93	0.42	0.11	0.42
Canada	Δ0.01	0.07	0.44	Δ0.04	Δ0.61	0.23	0.08	1.02
Japan	0.06	0.12	Δ0.12	Δ0.14	Δ0.45	1.51	0.21	1.51
U.S.	0.13	0.19	0.02	0.20	Δ0.83	0.68	Δ0.15	0.68
West
Germany	0.20	0.11	Δ0.04	Δ0.31	0.26	0.02	0.26
Italy	0.19	0.75	0.01	0.44	Δ5.25	0.27	Δ0.43	0.27
U.K.	0.63	0.92	0.10	0.03	Δ0.67	0.41	0.27	0.41
0.89

(Notes) 1. See notes of Table IV·1.

2. Price (wealth) elasticity of current (capital) account is calculated by deviation from baseline in current (capital) account divided by the baseline value of nominal imports when Price (wealth) changes by 1%. The reason employing this formula is shown in note 2 of Table IV·1.
TableIV·4 Comparison between the Pure BP Curve and the Model-derived BP Curve (Temporal Change)

Slope of the BP 1)	Factors responsible for the change in slope
Pure BP	Model-derived BP	Current account 2)	Long-term Ca3) ·pital account	Short-termCa 3) ·pital account
1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year
Australia	Δ0.23	0.97 (-)	Δ0.22	1.09 (-)	Δ0.17	Δ0.58 (3.41)	-	-	-	-
France	Δ0.01	0.49 (-)	0.15	1.94 (12.93)	Δ0.01	Δ0.53 (53.0)	Δ0.39	Δ1.42 (3.64)	0.05	0.00 (-)
Canada	0.06	0.31 (5.17)	0.07	0.48 (6.86)	Δ0.02	Δ0.05 (2.50)	Δ0.14	Δ0.15 (1.07)	0.09	Δ0.20 (-)
Japan	0.13	0.74 (5.69)	0.12	0.57 (4.75)	0.02	Δ0.07 (-)	Δ0.68	Δ0.64 (0.94)	0.32	Δ0.33 (-)
U.S.	0.16	0.90 (5.63)	0.19	1.20 (6.32)	0.00	Δ1.18 (-)	Δ0.57	Δ0.04 (0.07)	0.10	Δ0.08 (0.80)
West Germany	0.19	3.04 (16.0)	0.20	3.29 (16.45)	Δ0.00	Δ1.49 (-)	Δ0.08	Δ0.34 (4.25)	0.01	Δ0.04 (-)
Italy	0.63	1.17 (1.86)	0.75	2.00 (2.67)	0.00	Δ0.11 (-)	Δ1.40	Δ13.17 (9.41)	Δ0.11	Δ0.94 (8.55)
U.K	0.89	0.13 (0.15)	0.92	0.09 (0.10)	0.00	Δ0.05 (-)	Δ0.28	Δ0.42 (1.50)	0.11	0.34 (3.09)

(Notes) 1. See notes of Table IV·1.

2. Income elasticity of price multiplied by price elasticity of current account.

3. Income elasticity of wealth multiplied by wealth elasticity of capital account.

4. Figures in parentheses indicate 6th year value divided by 1st year value.
balance of payments into deficit in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada and will push the overall balance of payments into surplus in the other countries under a fixed exchange rate regime. In fact, this is the case; except for France, where the difference in the steepness of the slopes of the two curves is so small as to be insignificant (see Table IV·5).

From the second year on, it is difficult to expect a clear correlation between the degree of slope in the LM and BP curves and the resultant changes in the overall balance of payments under fiscal shock, because the capital movement function is formulated on the basis of the stock approach to portfolio equilibrium as mentioned earlier. However, the above correlation generally holds. The only exceptions are the third and sixth years for Japan, the fifth and sixth years: for the United Kingdom and the second, fourth, and sixth years for Australia. Furthermore, there is a rough correlation that the larger the difference in the steepness of the two curves, the larger the changes in the overall balance of payments (see Table IV·6).

(2) The Impact on the Exchange Rate and the LM and BP Curves under a Flexible Exchange Rates Regime

In the EPA model, the exchange rate is determined as the rate which equilibrates the supply of and the demand for foreign exchange. It should be noted, however, that, because the EPA model assumes the authorities to intervene in the foreign exchange markets ("leaning against the wind"), the excess supply of foreign exchange is the sum of the overall balance of payments and the authorities' intervention. Thus there is no guarantee that the relative slope of the LM and BP curves and the changes in the exchange rate under fiscal shock will correlate. In the case of Australia where the exchange rate is derived from a single structural equation, no such correlation is expected to emerge. There is, however, a general correlation between the relative slope of the LM and BP curves and the impact of fiscal expansion on the exchange rate under a flexible exchange rate regime, except for the first through fourth years in Australia and the fifth and sixth years in the United Kingdom.

In the first year, the currency depreciates for the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada, where the BP curve is steeper, and appreciates for the United States, Japan, West Germany, and France, where the LM curve is steeper (see Table IV·5). In the temporal progression, (i) the currency continues to appreciate for the United States and Japan, where the LM curve is steeper than the BP curve for the entire six years, (ii) the currency appreciates in the first year but subsequently depreciates for West Germany and France, where the LM curve is steeper in the first year but the BP curve is steeper in subsequent years, and (iii) the currency continues to depreciate for Italy and Canada, where the BP curve is consistently
Table IV·5 Relation between the Effect of Fiscal Policy and the Relative Slope of the LM·BP Curves (1st year)

Slope of the 1) model-derived	Effects on the balance of 2) Payments under fixed exchange-rate	Effect 3) on the exchange rate under flexible exchange rate
BP	LM	Overall balance	Current account balance	Capital account balance
Australia	Δ 0.22	0.63 (Δ 0.86) 5)	($)	Δ 1.1	5.6	1.29
France	0.15	0.17 (Δ 0.02)	4.4 (3.36) 4)	Δ 5.0	5.0	Δ 0.02
Canada	0.07	0.03 (0.04)	Δ 0.0 (Δ 0.01)	Δ 1.1	0.3	0.21
Japan	0.12	0.61 (Δ 0.49)	($)	Δ 1.4	9.8	Δ 1.42
U.S.	0.19	0.40 (Δ 0.22)	8.5 (0.84)	Δ 5.2	12.7	Δ 0.85
West Germany	0.20	0.27 (Δ 0.07)	7.5 (0.30)	Δ 7.9	8.7	Δ 0.69
Italy	0.75	0.44 (0.31)	0.8 (0.06)	Δ 2.1	Δ 2.1	0.81
U.K.	0.92	0.14 (0.77)	(Lire) Δ 4.2 (Δ 1.51) (£) Δ 1.0 (Δ 0.50)	Δ 1.0	0.1	0.85

(Notes) 1. The slope of the LM·BP curves is measured by deviation from baseline in interest rate divided by percentage deviation from baseline in GNP.

2. Unit : billion except Italy where it is trillion

3. Unit : %

4. Figures in parentheses indicate ratio to nominal GNP.

5. Figures in parentheses indicate difference between slope of the BP curve and slope of the LM curve.
Table IV·6 Relation between the Effect of Fiscal Policy and the Relative Slope of LM·BP Curves (Temporal Change)

Slope of the model·derived BP (1)	Slope of the model·derived LM (2)	(1) - (2)	Effects on 2) the overall balance under fixed exchange rate	Effects on 3) the exchange rate under flexible exchange rate
1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year
Australia	Δ 0.22	1.09	0.63	1.06	Δ 0.86	0.03	($) 4.4 (3.36)4)	0.5 (0.31)4)	1.29	3.12
France	0.15	1.94	0.17	0.31	Δ 0.02	1.63	(FF) Δ 0.0 (Δ 0.01)	Δ 25.0 (Δ 0.67)	Δ 0.02	5.27
Canada	0.07	0.48	0.03	0.10	0.04	0.39	(CA.) Δ 0.8 (Δ 0.30)	Δ 3.8 (Δ 0.84)	0.21	5.58
Japan	0.12	0.57	0.61	1.03	Δ 0.49	Δ 0.46	($) 8.5 (0.84)	Δ 2.3 (Δ 0.19)	Δ 1.42	Δ 0.69
U. S.	0.19	1.20	0.40	3.68	Δ 0.22	Δ 2.48	($) 7.5 (0.30)	50.0 (1.30)	Δ 0.85	Δ 8.80
West Germany	0.20	3.29	0.27	1.35	Δ 0.07	1.94	(DM) 0.8 (0.06)	Δ 5.7 (Δ 0.31)	Δ 0.69	1.39
Italy	0.75	2.00	0.44	0.81	0.31	1.18	(Lire) Δ 4.2 (Δ 1.51)	Δ 28.9 (Δ 4.68)	0.81	4.69
U. K.	0.92	0.09	0.14	0.42	0.77	Δ 0.33	(£) Δ 1.0 (Δ 0.50)	Δ 0.1 (Δ 0.05)	0.85	2.04

(Notes) 1, 2, 3, 4. See notes of Table IV-5.
steeper. At the same time, there is a general correlation between the relative steepness of the LM and BP curves and the percentage changes in the exchange rate over time (see Table IV·6).
### V. Conclusions

### 1. Main Conclusions

How well has our analysis answered the issues we posed at the beginning? The first question was what mechanism accounts for the large differences in the temporal progressions for fiscal multipliers between the United States and Japan. On this point, as pointed out by J. Helliwell [5] and others at the Fourth EPA International Symposium, it is especially important to understand why the Japanese fiscal multiplier does not decline over time.

As analyzed in parts II and III, on the one hand crowding out occurs in Japan but on the other its fiscal multiplier gets larger as time passes on. In effect, the fiscal multiplier endogenizing interest rate, wealth, and prices is less than the fiscal multiplier exogenizing these factors (i.e., the initial shift or the simplified Keynesian fiscal multiplier). And the extent of crowding out becomes larger over time. However, because the simplified fiscal multiplier itself gets larger over time, this effect works to negate crowding out, resulting in the ever-growing (general equilibrium) fiscal multiplier over time. By contrast, crowding out occurs to a greater extent in the United States and the simplified fiscal multiplier gets contracted such that the (general equilibrium) fiscal multiplier declines over time.

In short, the differences in simplified fiscal multiplier between the U.S. and Japan are primarily accounted for by the differences in marginal propensities to invest and the differences in the scale of crowding out between the two economies are primarily due to differences in the scale of inflation crowding out, which is much larger for the U.S. As a consequence, in discussing the temporal progression for the (general equilibrium) fiscal multiplier, it is necessary to look not just at the time profile for crowding out but also at that for the simplified fiscal multipliers.

The second question was why the impact of fiscal expansion on prices is different in Japan and the United States. Basically, this is due to the differences in the slopes of the AS curves. The AS curve is steep in the United States because the Okun's coefficient is rather small and the wage-price spiral is strong, although the Phillips curve is flat. By contrast, the AS curve is flat in Japan because, even though the Phillips curve is steep, the Okun's coefficient is large and the wage-price spiral is weak.

Admittedly the EPA model’s supply block is inadequate due to the lack of production function, but it is clear from our model simulations that the AS curve slope cannot be discussed solely in terms of the Phillips curve and that the Okun’s coefficient and the wage·price spiral are also significant.

The third question was to what extent the change in the exchange rate under
fiscal expansion can be explained by employing the BP curve together with the LM curve. Because the EPA model formulates the capital movement function on the basis of the stock approach, it is difficult to describe the locus of equilibrium for the balance of payments flow on the GNP and interest rate planes. Thus there is no guarantee that the difference in the slopes of the LM and BP curves will correlate to the change in the exchange rate. In fact, however, a few exceptions notwithstanding, there is a general correlation between these two.

One reason that the formulation of the capital movement function on the basis of the stock approach does not grossly contradict the results of the fiscal shock obtained from the Mundell·Fleming framework is that the EPA model employs a partial adjustment mechanism for the long·term capital movement in most countries. As a result, the capital account can be considered not as a function of difference in interest rate but as the function of interest levels.

### 2. Remaining Issues

There are a few important issues remaining. Some issues are associated with the problems which encounter national models in the EPA model as indicated by the foregoing analysis. For example: (i) the problems in the financial block as underscored by the findings that Canada's LM curve is absolutely flat and that the interest elasticities of money demand for France and West Germany are extremely large and (ii) the fact that the slope of the AD curve is positive for West Germany and Italy.

The next problem is the need to expand the supply block. As noted, the EPA model's supply block is inadequate. As seen in part III, there are a number of simulation results which seem inconsistent with perceived reality (e.g., the AS curve is very flat for the United Kingdom and very steep for West Germany).

And yet another issue is the need to discuss the BP curve in more depth. While our effort to derive the BP curve from the EPA model has proved more successful than might have been expected for an initial effort, there is still a good chance that errors remain. More discussion and study are needed, and we would appreciate constructive comments and discussion at this Sixth EPA International Symposium.
## Notes

1. The reason why the income and interest elasticities for the aggregate demand turn to decline is as follows. If the functions are formulated in logarithmic form, the elasticities converge once the long-run effects of income and interest rate work completely, but in the case of linear functions, the elasticity varies in line with the change in the ratio of explanatory variable to dependent variable even in the long run. In the EPA model, at least one of the GNP components for each country is formulated as a linear function, and the change in this ratio accounts for the turn to declining elasticities in most countries. The reason that income elasticity for the United Kingdom and Italy continues to increase is that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in consumption function is fairly large in both countries.

2. There are a number of reasons why the time profile for the interest semi-elasticity of money demand differs from country to country. The steady increase in West Germany is because the money demand function includes the lagged dependent variable with a large coefficient. As to the other countries, where the money demand function is formulated in linear form, the change in interest semi-elasticity corresponds to the change in the reciprocal of dependent variable (money stock); and where the formulation is logarithmic, the elasticity changes in correspondence with the reciprocal of interest rate.

3. The misunderstanding is widespread that it is possible to assume that the scale of the IS initial shift is controlled the same in all countries because the increase in real government expenditures is 1% of real GNP for all countries, and we also made this same mistake in the EPA analyses $ [1] $ .

4. In the EPA model, the private financial net worth is defined as the sum of the cumulative government deficit and the cumulative current account surplus. While considering the government deficit (government bond issues) as private wealth would mean that the Ricardian equivalence does not hold, it should be noted that the Ricardian equivalence has not necessarily been empirically proved. (See, for example, L. Leiderman and M. Blejer [6], and D. Morris [7].)

5. Unlike the Mundell·Fleming model, which assumes a static exchange rate expectation, the EPA model explicitly incorporates the expected exchange rates. And this expected exchange rate is endogenized in deriving the BP curve. However, since the interest rate differential is the main explanatory variable of the expected exchange rate, we treat the changes in capital movement resulting from changes in the expected exchange rate as the changes in capital movement caused by changes in the interest rates for simplicity.
[1] EPA “The Structure and Dynamic Properties of the EPA World Economic Model·February 1984 Verison - ”

Keizai Bunseki Vol. 97 Mar. 1985 (In Japanese)

[2] EPA “EPA World Economic Model·July 1987 Version - ”

EPA World Economic Model Discussion Paper Na 18 Sept. 1987

[3] Friedman, B. M., “Crowding Out or Crowding In? Economic Consequences of Financing Government Deficits”

Brooking Paper of Economic Activity Mar. 1973

[4] Hickman, B. G., “Estimating Core Elasticities of An Econometric Model” Paper presented at Regional Seminar on an Interlinked Country Model System (Bangkok) Nov. 1987

[5] Helliwell, J. F., "The Effects of Fiscal Policy on International Imbalances: Japan and the United States"

Paper presented at the 4th EPA International Symposium (Tokyo)

Mar. 1988

[6] Leiderman, L. and M.J. Blejer “Modeling and Testing Ricardian Equivalence - A Survey -”

IMF Staff Paper on Economic Activity Vol. 35 Na 1 Mar. 1988

[7] Morris, D. “Government Debt in International Financial Markets” Pinter Publishers (London) 1988

[8] Cockerline, J., J. F. Helliwell and R. Lafrance “Multicountry Modelling of Financial Markets” NBER Working Paper Na 2736 Oct. 1988
障 発 1 2 2 4 第 3 号

平成21年12月24日

# 都道府県知事 各指定都市市長 殿 中核市市長

# 厚生労働省社会・援護局障害保健福祉部長

身体障害者手帳に係る交付手続き及び医師の指定に関する取扱いについて

標記については、身体障害者福祉法（昭和24年法律第283号。以下「法」という。）及び関係法令等に基づき実施されているところであるが、この実施に当たっての取扱いを下記のとおり定め、平成22年4月1日より適用することとしたので、ご了知の上、その取扱いにつき遺憾なきょう願いたい。

なお、本通知は、地方自治法（昭和22年法律第67号）第245条の4第1項の規定に基づく技術的助言（ガイドライン）として位置づけられるものである。

また、「身体障害者福祉法施行細則準則について」（平成5年3月31日社援更第112号厚生省社会・援護局長通知）及び「身体障害者福祉法第15条第2項の規定による医師の指定基準について」（平成12年3月31日障第275号厚生省大臣官房障害保健福祉部長通知）は、平成22年3月31日をもって廃止する。

## 記

## 第一 身体障害者手帳の交付手続き

## 1 交付申請

（1）身体障害者手帳の交付を受けようとする者は、障害の種別ごとに法第15条第1項に規定する医師の診断書及び同条第3項に規定する意見書（以下「診断書・意見書」という。）を添えて、その居住地（居住地を有しないときは、その現在地。）の都道府県知事（地方自治法第252条の19第1項に規定する指定都市及び同法第252条の22第1項に規定する中核市にあっては、その長とする。以下同じ。）に対して申請する。

（２）診断書・意見書は、様式第１のとおりとする。