Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
Assuming this simplified model, the slope of the AS curve is determined primarily by (i) the reciprocal of Okun's coefficient (formula 1 or 1') with the unemployment rate reacting to GNP, (ii) the Phillips curve (formula 2) with wages reacting to the unemployment rate, and (iii) the wage·price spiral (formula 2 and 3) with prices reacting to wages. The larger these three factors, the steeper the slope of the pure AS curve.

Table III·3 shows the slope of the AS curves and these three factors for the third year. As seen, there are three groups: (i) the United Kingdom and Canada, where the AS curves are very flat, (ii) the Republic of Korea, Japan, France, Australia, and Italy, where there is a medium incline, and (iii) West Germany and the United States, where the curve is very steep. The factors determining these slopes differ from country to country. For example, in the two countries with very steep inclines (West Germany and the United States), the steepness is primarily because of the strength of the wage-price spiral in the United States and because of the small value of the Okun's coefficient for West Germany. In contrast, the Republic of Korea and Japan have very steep Phillips curves but large Okun's coefficients, which somewhat offset the steep Phillips curves, resulting in the medium steepness of the AS curve.

Regarding the temporal progression for the pure AS curve, it grows steeper over time in all of the countries studied. Among the slope determinants, the wage-price spiral becomes very strong from time to time (see Table III·4).

(3) The Model-derived AS Curve Compared with the Pure AS Curve

When the AS curve is derived from the full model simulation, it is expected that the increase in capital stock will be accompanied by an increase in productive capacity under expansionary fiscal shock that, in turn, shifts the pure AS rightward, such that the model-derived AS is flatter than the pure AS. However, this does not happen with the EPA model because the present version of the EPA model does not contain the production function (except for the United States and West Germany). Instead, because the labor demand function includes capital stock as complementary to labor, the rise in capital stock with rising employment pushes the pure AS leftward to result in a steeper model-derived AS curve than the pure AS curve in many countries.

In the third year, the model-derived AS curve is flatter than the pure AS curve in West Germany because of the impact of the increased productive capacity arising from the increase in capital stock; but the AS curve becomes steeper in the other countries because of the rise in wages arising from the increase in capital stock (see Table III·5).
Table III·3 Slope of the Pure AS Curve and its Determinants (3rd year)

Slope of $ ^{1)} $ the Pure AS	Main Determinants	Reference
Recipro-cal of Okun's coefficient	Slope of $ ^{2)} $ Phillips curve	Wage- $ ^{3)} $ Price spiral	Productivity elasticity of wage	Productivity elasticity of price
U. K.	0.05	$ \Delta $ 0.25	$ \Delta $ 2.01	2.93	-	$ \Delta $ 0.33
$ ^{4)} $
Canada	0.08	$ \Delta $ 0.36	$ \Delta $ 3.15	2.60	-	$ \Delta $ 0.40
(0.41)
Korea	0.21	$ \Delta $ 0.09	$ \Delta $ 23.74	3.57	0.31	$ \Delta $ 0.44
(0.51)
Japan	0.25	$ \Delta $ 0.02	$ \Delta $ 9.91	1.26	0.22	$ \Delta $ 0.23
(0.60)
France	0.38	$ \Delta $ 0.27	$ \Delta $ 1.51	2.90	0.16	$ \Delta $ 0.45
(0.43)
Italy	0.48	$ \Delta $ 0.08	$ \Delta $ 3.55	3.18	0.22	$ \Delta $ 0.11
(0.47)
Australia	0.50	$ \Delta $ 0.50	$ \Delta $ 2.36	1.03	-	$ \Delta $ 0.22
(0.19)
U. S.	1.13	$ \Delta $ 0.33	$ \Delta $ 1.06	6.41	-	$ \Delta $ 0.23
(0.65)
West Germany	1.14	$ \Delta $ 0.52	$ \Delta $ 3.07	3.38	0.20	$ \Delta $ 0.39
(0.53)

(Notes) 1. The slope of the AS is measured by percentage change in GNP deflator divided by percentage change in GNP.

2. The slope of Phillips curve is measured by percentage change in wages divided by difference in unemployment rate.

3. Wage and price spiral means the resultant price increase after interactions between wage and price when 1% shock is given to the wage function.

4. Figures in parentheses indicate the resultant price increase relative to the resultant wage increase when 1 % shock is given to the wage function.
Table III·4 Slope of the Pure AS Curve and its Determinants (Temporal Change)

1) Slope of Pure AS	Reciprocal of Okun's Coefficient	2) Slope of Phillips curve	3) Wage-Price spiral
1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year
U.K.	$ \Delta 0.04 $	0.12 (-)	$ \Delta 0.28 $	$ \Delta 0.25 $ 4)	$ \Delta 0.99 $	$ \Delta 2.60 $ 4)	0.91	5.86 4)
(0.89)	(2.6)	(6.4)
Canada	$ \Delta 0.05 $	0.19 (-)	$ \Delta 0.31 $	$ \Delta 0.35 $ (1.13)	$ \Delta 0.84 $	$ \Delta 4.78 $ (5.7)	0.65	5.38 (8.3)
Korea	0.01	0.34 4)	$ \Delta 0.06 $	$ \Delta 0.08 $	$ \Delta 8.77 $	$ \Delta 57.17 $	0.97	7.33
(34.0)	(1.34)	(6.5)	(7.6)
Japan	0.05	0.32 (6.4)	$ \Delta 0.02 $	$ \Delta 0.02 $ (1.0)	$ \Delta 2.71 $	$ \Delta 17.35 $ (6.4)	1.11	1.22 (1.1)
France	0.21	0.59 (2.8)	$ \Delta 0.27 $	$ \Delta 0.26 $ (0.96)	$ \Delta 0.57 $	$ \Delta 2.35 $ (4.1)	0.61	6.35 (10.4)
Australia	0.36	0.54 (1.5)	$ \Delta 0.37 $	$ \Delta 0.47 $ (1.27)	$ \Delta 0.60 $	$ \Delta 3.79 $ (6.3)	0.18	2.19 (12.2)
Italy	0.44	0.52 (1.2)	$ \Delta 0.01 $	$ \Delta 0.17 $ (17.0)	$ \Delta 1.01 $	$ \Delta 6.13 $ (6.1)	0.90	6.69 (7.4)
U.S.	0.19	2.09 (11.0)	$ \Delta 0.40 $	$ \Delta 0.33 $ (0.83)	$ \Delta 0.44 $	$ \Delta 1.71 $ (3.8)	1.48	17.17 (11.6)
West Germany	0.10	5.47 (54.7)	$ \Delta 0.14 $	$ \Delta 0.81 $ (5.79)	$ \Delta 0.76 $	$ \Delta 3.91 $ (5.1)	0.59	8.21 (13.9)

(Notes) 1.2.3. See notes of Table III·3.

4. Figures in parentheses indicate 6th year value divided by 1st year Value
Table III·5 Comparison between the Pure AS Curve and the Model·derived AS Curve (3rd year)

Slope of $ ^{1)} $ the pure AS	Slope of $ ^{1)} $ the model-derived AS	Capital stock elasticity of labour demand	Rate of change in capital stock	Slope of $ ^{2)} $ Phillips curve
U. K.	0.05	0.05	-	-	-
$ ^{3)} $ $ (1.0) $
Canada	0.08	0.31	0.65	0.61	$ \Delta $ 3.15
$ (3.9) $
Korea	0.21	0.21	-	-	-
$ (1.0) $
Japan	0.25	0.43	-	-	-
$ (1.7) $
France	0.38	0.46	0.45	0.27	$ \Delta $ 1.51
$ (1.2) $
Italy	0.48	0.55	0.25	0.65	$ \Delta $ 3.55
$ (1.1) $
Australia	0.50	0.72	0.40	0.73	$ \Delta $ 2.36
$ (1.4) $
U. S.	1.13	1.53	0.42	0.41	A 1.06
$ (1.4) $
West Germany	1.14	1.06	$ \Delta $ 0.06	0.20	$ \Delta $ 3.07
$ (0.9) $

(Notes) 1.2. See notes of Table III·3.

3. Figures in parentheses are the slope of the model-derived AS divided by that of the pure AS.
With regard to the temporal progression for the model-derived AS curve slope, it grows steeper over time just as the pure AS curve does. Since the rate of increase in capital stock accelerates, the change in the slope is more pronounced than for the pure AS curve.

### 3. The Impact of Fiscal Policy and the AD·AS Curves

## (1) The Size of the AD Shift and its Determinants

The extent of the AD shift is determined by the sum of the IS initial shift resulting from fiscal shock, transaction crowding out and portfolio crowding out (or in). Table III·6 shows the size of the AD shift and these factors for the third year. As seen, the extent of the AD shift is largely determined by the IS initial shift. Looking at the impact of crowding out (or in), (i) in Italy, the Republic of Korea, and France the AD curve shifts leftward because of transaction crowding out, (ii) in West Germany and Japan it shifts leftward because of transaction crowding out and portfolio crowding out, (iii) in Australia and Canada it shifts rightward because of portfolio crowding in, and (iv) in the United States and the United Kingdom there is only a negligible shift due to crowding out.

Looking at the temporal progression for AD shifts, the extent of the shift increases in all the countries except West Germany, particularly strongly in Australia and Italy. Only in West Germany does the extent of the AD shift diminish sharply. The main determinants of the over-time shift of the AD curve are (i) progressively stronger portfolio crowding in as in the case of Australia, the United States, and Canada and (ii) the IS initial shift as in the case of the other six countries (see Table III·7).

## (2) Inflation Crowding Out and the AD·AS Slopes

Table III·8 shows the relationship between the size of inflation crowding out and the AD and AS slopes. While this shows the impact on both GNP and prices, it is clear that the impact on GNP is generally determined by the AD slope and that on prices by the AS slope. For example, there is a greater impact on GNP in the United States and Australia, where the AD is very flat. Likewise, the impact on the GNP deflator is especially large in the United States, where the AS is extremely steep, and small in the United Kingdom, where the AS is very flat.

The temporal progression for inflation crowding out shows that, since the AS becomes steeper and the AD becomes in most cases flatter, the impact on GNP and prices grows over time (see Table III·9).
Table III·6 Size of Shift in the AD Curve and its Determinants (3rd year)

Shift in the AD	Initial shift	Shift caused by transaction crowding-out	Shift caused by Portfolio Crowding-out (in)
Italy	2.05	2.46	$ \Delta $ 0.41	0.00
Australia	1.87	1.49	$ \Delta $ 0.06	0.44
U.S.	1.78	1.75	$ \Delta $ 0.47	0.49
Korea	1.77	1.97	$ \Delta $ 0.20	-
Canada	1.56	1.38	$ \Delta $ 0.00	0.18
France	1.46	1.60	$ \Delta $ 0.11	$ \Delta $ 0.03
U.K.	1.29	1.32	$ \Delta $ 0.02	$ \Delta $ 0.01
Japan	1.20	1.48	$ \Delta $ 0.21	$ \Delta $ 0.07
West Germany	0.47	0.79	$ \Delta $ 0.12	$ \Delta $ 0.21

(Note) 1. All figures are represented by percentage change in GNP
Table III·7 Size of Shift in the AD Curve and its Determinants(Temporal Change)

Shift in the AD	Initial Shift	Shift caused by transaction crowd - ing-out	Shift caused by portfolio crowding - out
1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year
Italy	1.33	2.04 (0.71)	1.41	2.72 (1.31)	$ \Delta $ 0.07	$ \Delta $ 0.68 ( $ \Delta $ 0.61)	0.00	$ \Delta $ 0.00 ( $ \Delta $ 0.00)
Australia	1.26	2.12 (0.86)	1.26	1.19 ( $ \Delta $ 0.07)	$ \Delta $ 0.03	$ \Delta $ 0.01 (0.02)	0.03	0.94 (0.91)
U.S.	1.58	1.89 (0.31)	1.87	1.61 ( $ \Delta $ 0.26)	$ \Delta $ 0.34	$ \Delta $ 0.40 ( $ \Delta $ 0.06)	0.06	0.69 (0.63)
Korea	1.19	1.65 (0.46)	1.24	1.69 (0.45)	$ \Delta $ 0.05	$ \Delta $ 0.05 (0.00)	-	-
Canada	1.59	1.67 (0.08)	1.58	1.24 ( $ \Delta $ 0.34)	0.00	0.00 (0.00)	0.00	0.43 (0.43)
France	1.39	1.44 (0.05)	1.40	1.59 (0.19)	$ \Delta $ 0.01	$ \Delta $ 0.12 ( $ \Delta $ 0.11)	$ \Delta $ 0.00	$ \Delta $ 0.03 ( $ \Delta $ 0.03)
U.K.	1.04	1.53 (0.49)	1.05	1.57 (0.52)	$ \Delta $ 0.02	$ \Delta $ 0.02 (0.00)	0.00	$ \Delta $ 0.02 ( $ \Delta $ 0.02)
Japan	0.97	1.51 (0.54)	1.09	1.46 (0.37)	$ \Delta $ 0.07	$ \Delta $ 0.11 ( $ \Delta $ 0.04)	$ \Delta $ 0.05	0.16 (0.21)
West Germany	0.97	0.53 ( $ \Delta $ 0.44)	1.31	0.63 ( $ \Delta $ 0.68)	$ \Delta $ 0.22	$ \Delta $ 0.04 (0.18)	$ \Delta $ 0.12	$ \Delta $ 0.06 (0.06)

(Notes) 1. All figures are represented by percentage change in GNP.

2. Figures in parentheses indicate difference between 6th year and 1st year.
Table III·8 Relation between Inflation Crowding·out and the Slope of the AD·AS Curves (3rd year)

Crowding-out 1)	Determinants
GNP	GNP deflator	Slope of 2) the AD (1)	Slope of 2) the AS (2)	(2)	Shift in 3) the AD
U. S.	Δ 1.02	1.16	Δ 1.13	1.53	Δ 1.35	1.78
Australia	Δ 0.65	0.79	Δ 1.21	0.72	Δ 0.60	1.87
France	Δ 0.18	0.61	Δ 3.43	0.46	Δ 0.13	1.46
Japan	Δ 0.10	0.49	Δ 4.92	0.43	Δ 0.09	1.20
Korea	Δ 0.07	0.36	Δ 5.14	0.21	Δ 0.04	1.77
Canada	Δ 0.06	0.46	Δ 8.26	0.31	Δ 0.04	1.56
Italy	Δ 0.04	0.99	Δ 22.59	0.55	Δ 0.02	2.05
U. K.	Δ 0.03	0.14	Δ 4.90	0.05	Δ 0.01	1.29
West Germany	0.12	0.64	5.47	1.06	0.19	0.47

(Notes) 1. Measured by percentage change.

2. Measured by percentage change in GNP deflator divided by percentage change in GNP.

3. Measured by percentage change in GNP.
Table III·9 Relation between Inflation Crowding·out and the Slope of the AD·AS Curves (Temporal Change)

GNP 1)	GNP 1) deflator	Slope of the2) AD	Slope of the2) AS	Shift in the3) AD
1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year	6th year
U. S.	Δ0.15	Δ1.33	0.33	1.69	Δ2.27	Δ1.27	0.23	2.99	1.58	1.89
Australia	Δ0.08	Δ0.74	0.46	1.23	Δ5.07	Δ1.42	0.39	0.89	1.26	2.12
France	Δ0.03	Δ0.44	0.29	0.83	Δ10.58	Δ2.02	0.22	0.82	1.39	1.44
Japan	Δ0.01	Δ0.27	0.15	0.70	Δ15.12	Δ2.62	0.16	0.56	0.97	1.51
Korea	0.00	Δ0.23	0.01	0.49	Δ1.98	Δ2.05	0.01	0.34	1.19	1.65
Canada	0.02	Δ0.22	Δ0.06	0.99	Δ4.17	Δ4.05	Δ0.04	0.68	1.59	1.67
Italy	0.02	Δ0.08	0.59	1.68	29.70	Δ19.02	0.44	0.86	1.33	2.04
U. K.	Δ0.01	Δ0.06	Δ0.04	0.18	Δ9.18	Δ3.88	Δ0.04	0.12	1.04	1.53
West Germany	0.01	Δ0.27	0.09	1.31	6.65	Δ4.87	0.09	5.00	0.97	0.53

(Note) See notes of Table III·8.
(3) The Impact of Fiscal Policy and its Determinants

The impact of fiscal policy on real GNP is determined by the extent of the AD curve shift and inflation crowding out as examined above.

Table III·10 shows the temporal progression for the fiscal multiplier in relation to these two factors. Comparing the first and sixth years, the extent of the AD shift grows larger in eight of the countries (all except West Germany). But, because inflation crowding out also expands, what happens to the fiscal multiplier depends upon which of these factors is the larger. The results show that the United States, France, and Canada have larger inflation crowding out and hence diminishing fiscal multipliers; whereas the other five countries have larger AD curve shifts and hence expanding fiscal multipliers. In West Germany, the AD shift becomes less and inflation crowding out grows, such that the fiscal multiplier gets smaller.

The fiscal multiplier is larger in the sixth year than in the first for the five countries as stated earlier (Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia). They are, however, divided into two groups. One is countries where fiscal multipliers come down after peaking out in the third to fifth years. Italy, the Republic of Korea and Australia belong to this group. By contrast, the other group is countries where the fiscal multipliers increase continuously. Japan and the United Kingdom belong to this group. Yet even in these two countries, there is increased inflation crowding out and the only reason there is no apparent crowding out in the time profile of the fiscal multiplier is that the simplified Keynesian fiscal multiplier is itself growing as mentioned above and hence the extent of the AD shift accelerates over time. The existence of inflation crowding out does not necessarily rule out a continued increase in the fiscal multiplier over time.

Based upon this analysis, we can attribute the differences in price reaction to fiscal shock between Japan and the United States - i.e. the model property that expansionary fiscal shocks result in sharply higher prices in the United States but not in Japan - to that the slope of the AS curve is steeper in the United States because the Okun's coefficient is small and the wage-price spiral is large, whereas the Okun's coefficient is large and the wage-price spiral is small in Japan, giving Japan a rather flat AS curve.
Table III·10 Differences in the Fiscal Multipliers among countries and its Determinants

1)	1)	Inflation Crowding-out
Fiscal multiplier	Shift in the AD	6th year
1st year	Peak	6th year	1st year	6th year	1st year
U.S.	1.43	(monotonic) decrease	0.57 (Δ 0.86)3)	1.58	1.89 (0.31)3)	0.15	1.33 (1.18)3)
West Germany	0.98	(monotonic) decrease	0.26 (Δ 0.72)	0.97	0.53 (Δ 0.44)	Δ 0.01	0.27 (0.28)
Canada	1.61	(monotonic) decrease	1.45 (Δ 0.16)	1.59	1.67 (0.08)	Δ 0.02	0.22 (0.24)
France	1.37	(2)2)	1.01 (Δ 0.36)	1.39	(2)2)	1.44 (0.05)	0.03	(2)2)	0.44 (0.41)
Italy	1.35	(4)	1.96 (0.61)	1.33	(4)	2.04 (0.71)	Δ 0.02	(4)	0.08 (0.10)
Korea	1.19	(3)	1.42 (0.23)	1.19	(3)	1.65 (0.46)	Δ 0.00	(3)	0.23 (0.23)
Australia	1.18	(5)	1.39 (0.21)	1.26	(5)	2.12 (0.86)	0.08	(5)	0.74 (0.66)
Japan	0.96	(monotonic) increase	1.24 (0.28)	0.97	1.51 (0.54)	0.01	0.27 (0.26)
U.K.	1.04	(monotonic) increase	1.47 (0.43)	1.04	1.53 (0.49)	0.01	0.06 (0.05)

(Notes) 1. All figures are represented by percentage change in GNP.

2. Figures in parentheses indicate the year in which fiscal multiplier is largest.

3. Figures in parentheses indicate the difference between 6th year and 1st year.
### I V. The BP Curve and the Impact of Fiscal Policy

### 1. The Slope of the BP Curve and its Determinants

## (1) Analytical Framework

Next, we derive the BP curve from the fiscal policy simulation. The framework for this exercise is shown in Figure IV·1. The $ IS_{0} $ and $ LM_{0} $ are the initial IS and LM curves, A is the solution for the standard case, $ IS_{3} $ and $ LM_{2} $ are the IS and LM curves after they have shifted as a result of fiscal policy, and B is the solution for the full model simulation after an increase in government expenditures. Figure IV·1 shows the BP curve assuming that the overall balance of payments is in surplus at point A and in deficit at point B. This has been derived as follows.

To start with, the variables in the final expenditures block are exogenized at A and B. Then the points at which the overall balance of payments is in equilibrium (A' and B') are simulated assuming that the money supply is an instrument variable (i.e., assuming that the LM curve shifts from $ LM_{0} $ to $ LM_{0} $ at point A and from $ LM_{2} $ to $ LM_{2} $ at point B). A' and B' thus derived are the model-derived BP curve.

The pure BP curve can be obtained by using only the balance of payments block and deriving the points at which the overall balance of payments is at equilibrium when the values for A and B are assigned to the variables in the final expenditures block, actual values are assigned to the other variables, and the interest rate is assumed as an instrument variable.

## (2) The Slope of the Pure BP Curve and its Determinants

The balance of payments block in the EPA model may be described in the following simplified form $ [5] $ .

$$ \begin{aligned}(+)&(+)\\\mathbf{BPC}=\overline{\mathbf{XV}}\cdot\mathbf{MV}(\mathbf{GNP},i)\end{aligned} $$

1. Current account balance BPC = $ \overline{XV} $ - MV(GNP,i)

### 2. Capital account balance BPK = BPK(i)

where XV is nominal exports, MV nominal imports, and i the interest rate (- indicating an exogenous variable).
Figure IV·1 Methodology to derive BP curve

(Notes) 1. GNP is measured by percentage change and interest rate is measured by difference.

2. As to the meaning of subscript, see IV·1·(1) in the paper.
Because the BP curve tracks the equilibrium locus of the combination of GNP and the interest rate where the overall balance of payments is in equilibrium, the following formula can be derived from formulae 1 and 2.

$$ \begin{aligned}&\overline{XV}-\mathrm{MV}(\mathrm{GNP},\mathrm{i})+\mathrm{BPK}(\mathrm{i})=0\\&\quad From this,\\&\quad-\frac{\partial\mathrm{MV}}{\partial\mathrm{GNP}}\mathsf{d}\mathrm{GNP}-\frac{\partial\mathrm{MV}}{\partial\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{di}+\frac{\partial\mathrm{BPK}}{\partial\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{di}=0\end{aligned} $$

Thus the slope of the BP curve is:

$$ \frac{\mathrm{di}}{\mathrm{dGNP}}=\frac{\frac{\partial\mathrm{MV}}{\partial\mathrm{GNP}}}{-\frac{\partial\mathrm{MV}}{\partial\mathrm{i}}+\frac{\partial\mathrm{BPK}}{\partial\mathrm{i}}} $$

From formula (i), it can be seen that the greater the income and interest elasticities of imports and the smaller the interest elasticity of capital account, the steeper the BP curve. The interest elasticity of imports is associated with investment income.

One caution is in order on the treatment of the relationship between international capital flows and interest rates. Since the stock approach is theoretically appropriate for determining international capital movements, the EPA model treats the level of interest rates as a determinant of portfolio stock equilibrium. Therefore, capital flow should be a function of changes in interest rates. In this case, it is impossible to specify the slope of the BP curve simply as shown in formula (i). In the EPA model, however, portfolio stock equilibrium is not obtained instantaneously, and there are adjustment lags for portfolio investment to interest rate changes. This empirical formulation of the international capital movements function gives us the possibility of discussing the BP curve slope along the line of formula (i). Table IV·1 indicates the slope of the BP curve for the first year. The reason why the results for the first year are examined · this being different from the analyses in parts II and III where the results for the third year were examined · is that the direction of change in interest rate levels is sure to be consistent with the direction of change in interest rate deviations in the first year. In the first year, the BP curve slope is (i) negative in Australia and France because of the income effect on the capital account, which
Table IV·1 Slope of the Pure BP Curve and its Determinants (1st year)

Slope of $ ^{1)} $ the Pure BP	Determinants	Reference
Income elasticity of imports of goods	Interest rate semi-elasticity of investment in income payment	Interest rate semi-elasticity of capital account	Interest rate semi-elasticity of long-term capital account	Interest rate semi-elasticity of short-term capital account
Australia	$ \Delta $ 0.23	1.35	0.0	16.08	16.08	-
France	$ \Delta $ 0.01	0.78	0.09	2.06	0.50	1.56
Canada	0.06	0.81	-	9.74	9.14	0.60
Japan	0.13	0.84	0.22	11.49	2.51	8.98
U.S.	0.16	0.90	0.76	9.15	6.69	2.46
West Germany	0.19	0.79	0.33	4.22	2.05	2.17
Italy	0.63	1.76	0.20	14.59	6.87	7.72
U.K.	0.88	1.81	0.25	2.48	1.34	1.14

(Notes) 1. The slope of the Pure BP is measured by deviation from baseline in interest rate divided by percentage deviation from baseline in GNP.

2. In the case of capital account, interest rate semi-elasticity is calculated by deviation from baseline in capital account divided by the baseline value of nominal imports when interest rate changes by 1% point.

Though this is, in reality, different from the definition of semi-elasticity, it is convenient for us to compare this value among countries.

3. $ \Delta $ indicates minus (this is the same in subsequent tables).