Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
(参考)

参考表1～9は，サンプル数の少なさ，不明の多さ等の理由から，参考資料として示す。

参考表 1 業種・規模（年間完成工事高）別 住宅に係るリフォーム・リニューアル工事受注件数・受注高（全数推定）

※サンプル数が少ないため、内訳の推定誤差は大きい。

(单位: 者, 件, 億円)

調査対象の区分	調査対象者数	受注件数	受注高
業種	規模(住宅に係る建築工事・建築設備工事の年間完成工事高)
合計	80,606	2,027,077	19,868
一般土木建築工事業	計	3,482	26,694	858
3億円未満	3,056	9,983	147
3億円以上100億円未満	400	3,867	19
100億円以上	26	12,844	691
土木工事業	計	4,024	7,067	85
5,000万円未満	3,661	5,797	59
5,000万円以上	363	1,271	26
建築工事業	計	47,049	1,187,716	13,205
1億円未満	36,657	301,715	2,856
1億円以上2億円未満	5,179	107,224	1,301
2億円以上5億円未満	3,243	99,638	1,298
5億円以上10億円未満	1,096	185,560	1,166
10億円以上	874	493,578	6,583
職別工事業	計	14,047	542,363	3,371
1億円未満	13,253	221,831	1,093
1億円以上	794	320,532	2,277
管工事業	計	5,638	246,229	2,081
1億円未満	5,148	230,234	1,994
1億円以上	490	15,995	87
電気,機械器具設置工事業	計	6,366	17,008	268
2億円未満	6,229	7,551	76
2億円以上	137	9,457	192

※ 復元集計のため，丸め誤差（調査票記載単位千円から億円への標記単位換算）により「合計」は必ずしも一致しない。

※ 調査対象者数とは，各区分において，住宅に係る建築工事・建築設備工事の実績のあるすべての調査対象者数で，建設工事施工統計調査から推定したもの。
## 参考表 2 業種・規模（年間完成工事高）別 非住宅建築物に係るリフォーム・リニューアル工事受注件数・受注高（全数推定）

※サンプル数が少ないため、内訳の推計誤差は大きい。

(单位: 者, 件, 億円)

調査対象の区分	調査対象者数	受注件数	受注高
業種	規模(非住宅建築物に係る建築工事・建築設備工事の年間完成工事高)
合計	57,016	669,707	31,244
一般土木建築工事業	計	3,598	64,352	6,674
5億円未満	2,928	13,177	1,097
5億円以上1,500億円未満	667	35,104	3,259
1,500億円以上	3	16,071	2,318
土木工事業	計	4,260	10,882	387
5,000万円未満	3,616	2,965	105
5,000万円以上	644	7,917	282
建築工事業	計	23,501	175,113	12,689
3,000万円未満	12,590	35,396	656
3,000万円以上1億円未満	5,783	24,114	1,484
1億円以上3億円未満	3,034	24,965	1,351
3億円以上500億円未満	2,088	67,349	4,772
500億円以上	6	23,288	4,425
職別工事業	計	9,095	152,650	2,953
2億円未満	8,710	106,586	1,400
2億円以上	385	46,064	1,553
管工事業	計	6,063	161,252	4,687
3億円未満	5,642	68,837	1,069
3億円以上	421	92,415	3,618
電気,機械器具設置工事業	計	10,499	105,458	3,854
3億円未満	9,958	82,292	2,253
3億円以上	541	23,166	1,601

※ 復元集計のため、丸め誤差（調査票記載単位千円から億円への標記単位換算）により「合計」は必ずしも一致しない。

※ 調査対象者数とは、各区分において、非住宅建築物に係る建築工事・建築設備工事の実績のあるすべての調査対象者数で、建設工事施工統計調査から推定したもの。
参考表 3 施工地域別 建築物リフォーム・リニューアル工事受注高（全数推定） ※サンプル数が少ないため，内訳の推計誤差は大きい。

(单位：億円)

施工地域	住宅に係る工事	非住宅建築物に係る工事
計	19,865	31,244
1.北海道	509	1,226
内,札幌市	223	732
2.青森県	215	156
3.岩手県	283	424
4.宮城県	268	556
内,仙台市	99	351
5.秋田県	238	313
6.山形県	245	145
7.福島県	58	409
8.茨城県	260	970
9.栃木県	111	731
10.群馬県	161	246
11.埼玉県	687	1,047
内,さいたま市	229	212
12.千葉県	1,303	663
13.東京都	3,229	5,941
内,東京特別区	2,474	5,405
14.神奈川県	2,145	2,008
内,横浜市	677	1,029
内,川崎市	518	247
15.新潟県	574	838
16.富山県	575	318
17.石川県	100	412
18.福井県	70	230
19.山梨県	24	147
20.長野県	482	383
21.岐阜県	318	430
22.静岡県	472	790
23.愛知県	1,105	1,095
内,名古屋市	351	383
24.三重県	53	339
25.滋賀県	71	273
26.京都府	376	588
内,京都市	242	218
27.大阪府	1,057	2,174
内,大阪市	372	1,377
28.兵庫県	1,054	811
内,神戸市	641	354
29.奈良県	180	381
30.和歌山県	131	56
31.鳥取県	104	226
32.島根県	297	522
33.岡山県	223	668
34.広島県	346	671
内,広島市	79	400
35.山口県	385	289
36.徳島県	104	82
37.香川県	447	256
38.愛媛県	224	350
39.高知県	60	592
40.福岡県	409	1,496
内,福岡市	263	736
41.佐賀県	94	148
42.長崎県	193	281
43.熊本県	114	1,063
44.大分県	206	47
45.宮崎県	48	151
46.鹿児島県	149	163
47.沖縄県	107	138

※ 復元集計のため，丸め誤差（調査票記載単位千円から億円への標記単位換算）により「合計」は必ずしも一致しない。

※ 人口 100 万人以上の都市のみ，内数を掲載している。
参考表 4 建築の時期別構造別 建築物リフォーム・リニューアル工事受注高（全数推定）

(单位：億円)

建築年	合計	木造	非木造	不明
合計	51,111	9,460	39,987	1,665
住宅	19,868	8,586	10,796	486
1950年以前	87	79	9	0
1951～1960年	42	35	7	0
1961～1970年	224	151	73	0
1971～1980年	2,094	423	1,670	0
1981～1990年	2,036	450	1,585	1
1991～2000年	1,024	296	725	3
2001年以降	1,056	298	757	0
不明	13,305	6,853	5,970	482
非住宅建築物	31,244	874	29,191	1,179
1950年以前	112	7	105	0
1951～1960年	181	0	181	0
1961～1970年	1,465	44	1,421	0
1971～1980年	1,818	85	1,733	0
1981～1990年	2,277	37	2,227	13
1991～2000年	2,876	9	2,657	211
2001年以降	2,031	32	1,989	10
不明	20,484	661	18,878	945

※ 復元集計のため，丸め誤差（調査票記載単位千円から億円への標記単位換算）により「合計」は必ずしも一致しない。
参考表 5 用途別 主たる工事目的とした建築物リフォーム・リニューアル工事受注件数（全数推定）

(单位：件)

工事目的用途	計	劣化や壊れた部位の更新・修繕	省エネルギー対策	高齢者・身体障害者対応	防災・防犯・安全性向上	用途変更	耐震性向上	屋上緑化、壁面緑化	アスペスト対策	その他	不明
住 宅	1,931,034	1,516,441	100,141	59,506	26,057	11,497	12,953	193	204	183,851	20,190
一戸建住宅	1,388,174	1,038,446	93,481	53,724	19,631	7,374	10,816	151,125	13,577
一戸建店舗等併用住宅	52,166	43,988	570	774	1,644	1,202	3,988
長屋建住宅	7,971	7,502	82	193	193
専有部分	461,402	414,996	5,693	5,007	4,507	1,390	1,944	193	23,940	3,732
共用部分	21,321	11,508	397	193	1,532	204	4,605	2,882
専有部分・共用部分両方
不明
不明
非 住 宅	648,179	444,454	30,928	6,426	18,306	15,194	23,517	385	223	97,178	11,567
事務所	132,145	92,854	4,368	558	3,838	2,002	5,153	141	20,963	2,266
店舗	107,463	66,104	7,188	507	1,566	4,173	701	25,131	2,093
生産施設(工場、作業場)	128,920	87,340	7,647	3,651	4,218	2,895	126	21,390	1,655
倉庫・流通施設	26,225	18,762	1,662	548	799	183	3,722	549
学校の校舎	70,755	45,640	2,231	840	2,442	760	10,852	179	7,341	470
医療施設	38,888	25,691	1,662	1,452	1,976	1,343	745	4,854	1,166
宿泊施設	23,566	19,604	498	818	244	462	1,322	618
老人福祉施設	16,079	11,161	1,331	1,580	185	584	138	44	968	88
その他の非住宅	99,258	74,628	4,031	1,490	3,281	998	2,387	74	44	11,077	1,248
不明	4,879	2,670	311	74	409	1,414

※ 件数：当該工事目的が，選択肢の工事目的（「不明」を含む10工事。）に照らして，「主たるもの」と回答した件数である。なお，0件の項目は，便宜上空欄としている。
参考表6 建築年別 主たる工事部位とした建築物リフォーム・リニューアル工事受注件数（全数推定）

(单位: 件)

工事部位
建築年別	計	建
基礎軀体	屋根屋上	外壁	內装	建具	その他
建築	防災関連
設備	空気調和
換気設備	給水給湯
排水衛生
器具設備	廃棄物
処理設備	電気設備	昇降機
設備	太陽光
発電設備	中央監視
設備	その他
設備	外構	その他	不明
住 宅	1,493,507	38,144	188,068	238,730	312,481	79,181	91,304	3,219	25,770	340,537	4,183	20,873	1,278	27,381	41,961	52,775	20,497	7,127
2001年以降	114,372	3,443	9,875	25,928	20,480	10,429	10,084	637	2,309	8,817	1,752	318	6,563	2,314	8,156	3,270
1991～2000年	126,294	1,896	13,490	37,205	25,364	4,600	7,502	637	2,274	21,660	2,885	1,219	1,773	3,155	2,334	300
1981～1990年	103,285	3,241	11,433	18,543	28,122	5,498	2,832	5,258	20,828	168	1,940	300	600	1,013	1,563	1,345	600
1971～1980年	52,132	2,164	4,241	9,045	14,331	2,368	2,851	1,767	10,439	1,037	168	174	945	336	1,422	845
1961～1970年	12,242	300	2,513	600	3,436	1,336	1,163	150	1,782	318	324	168	150
1951～1960年	1,817	250	168	454	946
1950年以前	4,238	491	741	318	713	545	545	341	545
不明	1,079,127	26,358	145,774	146,922	219,580	54,406	66,327	1,605	14,013	275,521	3,696	12,937	491	18,825	35,916	39,397	11,977	5,382
非 住 宅	536,160	20,384	51,483	40,096	109,912	29,805	20,901	13,348	83,671	65,985	3,777	55,760	2,142	2,839	3,470	12,911	7,461	9,583	2,631
2001年以降	29,724	2,276	2,052	2,087	8,247	2,018	1,644	1,384	3,351	2,268	101	2,200	276	95	606	492	561	66
1991～2000年	31,542	1,139	1,778	3,754	5,973	1,428	1,119	2,995	4,653	2,638	55	4,303	198	643	432	287	148
1981～1990年	26,778	1,118	2,070	1,792	4,589	1,017	702	1,215	4,400	4,953	375	3,401	201	335	341	268
1971～1980年	14,416	1,748	1,966	1,117	2,676	1,088	821	724	1,422	976	55	1,199	55	249	249	71
1961～1970年	12,318	1,000	1,880	711	2,928	134	637	87	1,044	1,033	1,760	951	66	87
1951～1960年	685	145	26	164	195	109	47
1950年以前	870	280	207	149	167	66
不明	419,827	12,958	41,431	30,429	85,186	24,120	15,978	6,943	68,605	54,009	3,192	42,683	791	2,228	2,677	11,217	6,345	8,469	2,565

※ 件数：当該工事部位が，選択肢の工事部位（「不明」を含む18項目。）に照らして，「主たるもの」と回答した件数である。0件の項目は，便宜上空欄としている。
参考表 7 主たる工事目的に対する該当ある工事部位の割合（単純集計）

(单位：%)

該当ある工事部位
主たる工事目的	計	建築	設備	外構	その他	不明
基礎躯体	屋根屋上	外壁	内装	建具	その他
建築	防災関連
設備	空気調和
換気設備	給水給湯
排水衛生
器具設備	廃棄物
处理設備	電気設備	昇降機
設備	太陽光
発電設備	中央監視
設備	その他
設備
住宅	劣化や壊れた部位の更新・修繕	100.0	2.4	14.0	17.2	19.7	10.4	6.8	0.4	3.0	15.0	0.3	5.4	0.1	0.1	1.3	2.6	1.1	0.2
省エネルギー対策	100.0	2.6	6.0	7.3	10.7	13.0	3.8	0.9	4.7	16.7	0.2	10.5	19.2	1.3	1.1	1.7	0.4
高齢者・身体障害者対応	100.0	5.2	4.6	7.1	25.3	13.8	6.3	0.8	4.6	18.4	0.4	8.4	0.6	0.2	1.7	1.9	0.6
防災・防犯・安全性向上	100.0	6.6	5.3	7.9	10.5	18.4	11.2	7.2	4.6	4.6	6.6	0.7	0.7	2.0	9.9	3.9
用途変更	100.0	4.1	2.1	6.2	27.8	21.6	6.2	4.1	14.4	12.4	1.0
耐震性向上	100.0	16.8	8.1	13.3	14.5	8.7	2.9	2.9	7.5	9.8	1.2	7.5	0.6	0.6	1.2	4.6
屋上緑化、壁面緑化	100.0	50.0	50.0
アスベスト対策	100.0	100.0
その他	100.0	4.5	6.8	10.5	18.3	10.8	8.7	0.6	4.9	12.8	0.9	7.1	0.6	3.7	5.3	4.1	0.4
不明	100.0	6.3	10.9	8.6	17.2	11.7	5.5	10.9	6.3	0.8	5.5	3.9	12.5
非住宅	劣化や壊れた部位の更新・修繕	100.0	2.3	10.6	9.6	17.1	8.7	4.9	2.3	15.8	13.4	0.8	8.3	0.4	0.0	0.5	2.0	1.7	1.2	0.1
省エネルギー対策	100.0	1.1	7.6	2.4	4.7	2.6	1.3	0.8	33.7	8.4	0.5	27.1	3.9	0.3	3.4	0.8	1.1	0.3
高齢者・身体障害者対応	100.0	6.1	3.9	5.2	17.5	11.4	5.7	4.4	9.2	15.7	10.5	3.1	1.3	3.9	2.2
防災・防犯・安全性向上	100.0	3.2	3.2	3.5	14.5	9.4	8.4	20.0	5.2	6.5	0.6	10.6	0.6	0.3	1.0	5.2	5.8	1.6	0.3
用途変更	100.0	2.8	2.8	6.0	22.4	11.2	4.1	4.3	10.8	13.6	0.6	15.3	0.7	0.2	0.4	2.6	1.7	0.6
耐震性向上	100.0	16.9	6.7	14.3	15.9	8.2	5.5	3.7	5.6	8.5	0.2	10.3	1.0	0.6	1.1	1.3	0.3
屋上緑化、壁面緑化	100.0	16.7	16.7	16.7	16.7	33.3
アスベスト対策	100.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0
その他	100.0	3.5	3.7	4.2	25.4	8.6	5.8	3.5	12.1	10.2	0.3	12.5	0.4	0.4	0.2	3.4	1.2	3.4	1.1
不明	100.0	1.2	0.6	17.4	5.8	5.2	1.2	22.7	16.3	5.2	0.6	6.4	1.2	1.7	14.5

※ 該当ある工事部位：当該工事部位が，選択肢の工事部位（「不明」を含む18項目。）に照らして「主たるもの」又は「該当あるもの」とした件数である。

※ 主たる工事目的：当該工事目的が，選択肢の工事目的（「不明」を含む10項目。）に照らして，「主たるもの」と回答した件数である。

※ 0件の項目は，便宜上空欄としている。
参考表8 主たる工事部位に対する該当ある工事部位の割合（単純集計）

(单位：%)

該当ある工事部位	計	建築	設備	外構	その他	不明
主たる工事部位	基礎塚体	屋根屋上	外壁	内装	建具	その他建築	防災関連設備	空気調和換気設備	給水給湯排水衛生器具設備	廃棄物処理設備	電気設備	昇降機設備	太陽光発電設備	中央監視設備	その他設備
住宅	建築	基礎塚体	100.0	7.4	14.4	16.7	15.6	12.5	5.1	2.9	6.2	11.7	0.8	10.1	0.2	0.4	0.8	2.5	0.2
屋根屋上	100.0	42.2	9.3	8.0	10.6	0.6	3.2	5.8	0.2	5.0	0.2	0.4	1.3	3.9	1.7
外壁	100.0	7.1	36.7	11.5	10.3	10.2	0.7	2.9	6.4	0.5	4.5	0.4	0.5	0.7	5.3	2.2	0.1
内装	100.0	3.1	3.5	8.2	26.2	5.2	1.2	7.8	22.8	1.0	15.7	0.2	0.1	2.2	1.4	1.1	0.4
建具	100.0	3.8	4.5	8.0	29.3	11.8	2.8	10.5	11.8	0.3	11.5	0.7	1.4	2.4	1.0
その他建築	100.0	7.8	10.6	12.2	15.1	9.4	4.5	7.3	11.8	0.8	6.9	0.4	0.4	3.7	3.3	5.7
設備	防災関連設備	100.0	2.7	2.7	5.4	13.5	10.8	13.5	10.8	10.8	13.5	0.6	11.2	0.6	10.8	5.4	0.6	0.6
空気調和換気設備	100.0	4.7	6.5	7.6	17.1	15.3	10.0	3.5	15.3	0.6	11.2	0.1	0.9	3.5	2.9	0.6	0.2
給水給湯排水衛生器具設備	100.0	3.1	4.3	6.5	34.7	15.3	6.9	1.2	7.9	0.4	14.9	0.1	0.9	1.6	1.3	0.5	0.2
廃棄物処理設備	100.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	16.0	8.0	12.0	4.0	4.0	32.0	4.0	4.0	2.1	2.1	1.4
電気設備	100.0	4.3	5.7	7.9	18.6	15.0	9.3	4.3	10.7	17.9	0.7	12.5	14.3	2.4	2.4	2.4
昇降機設備	100.0	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	4.8	2.4	26.2	14.3	14.3	3.0	3.0
太陽光発電設備	100.0	2.4	16.7	19.0	2.4	2.4	2.4	4.8	2.4	26.2	14.3	14.3	2.8	2.8	5.6	4.2
中央監視設備	-
その他の設備	100.0	2.2	6.0	7.5	20.9	11.9	7.5	2.2	9.7	17.9	0.7	10.4	2.8	2.8	5.6	4.2
外構(門、塚等)	100.0	4.2	12.7	8.5	8.5	4.2	18.3	4.2	7.0	9.9	9.9	9.9	4.8	14.3	9.5
その他	100.0	4.8	14.3	9.5	9.5	14.3	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	33.3	33.3	33.3
不明	100.0	33.3
非住宅	建築	基礎塚体	100.0	10.2	15.9	15.9	11.3	7.0	4.6	6.8	8.2	0.9	10.9	2.1	0.5	0.2	1.8	2.3	1.4	0.3
屋根屋上	100.0	9.8	26.2	15.3	9.8	8.2	2.2	6.6	6.0	0.5	7.9	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.5	3.0	2.5	0.3
外壁	100.0	6.6	22.6	19.4	12.0	8.6	3.6	6.6	6.8	0.2	7.0	0.6	0.2	0.2	1.2	3.4	0.8	0.2
内装	100.0	2.0	4.0	7.8	20.0	7.6	6.0	13.1	13.6	1.0	18.3	0.6	0.1	0.2	1.9	1.9	1.9
建具	100.0	5.2	8.8	11.6	27.1	8.0	5.2	7.6	8.8	0.8	7.6	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.4	4.4	3.6	2.8
その他建築	100.0	3.8	7.5	11.3	17.0	10.4	1.9	15.1	7.5	0.9	12.3	12.3	12.3	12.3	3.8	5.7	2.8	1.1
設備	防災関連設備	100.0	3.9	2.8	5.0	17.1	7.7	5.0	16.6	10.5	0.6	20.4	0.6	0.4	1.8	5.3	2.0	2.0	1.9
空気調和換気設備	100.0	2.4	3.5	4.2	16.8	4.4	2.7	8.8	20.8	0.9	23.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	2.8	2.4	1.9	1.9
給水給湯排水衛生器具設備	100.0	3.5	4.3	5.0	21.4	10.6	5.6	4.1	17.5	1.7	17.3	1.1	0.4	0.4	2.8	2.4	1.9	1.9
廃棄物処理設備	100.0	15.6	3.1	3.1	6.3	12.5	6.3	3.1	3.1	18.8	12.5	3.1	1.2	1.5	3.9	2.4	1.8	1.8
電気設備	100.0	3.9	4.2	6.2	17.5	6.5	4.2	15.1	16.9	12.2	0.9	15.4	1.8	1.2	5.1	2.6	2.6	2.6
昇降機設備	100.0	10.3	5.1	7.7	15.4	7.7	7.7	5.1	5.1	7.7	2.6	15.4	1.8	1.2	5.1	2.6	2.6	2.6
太陽光発電設備	100.0	3.8	11.5	3.8	7.7	7.7	3.8	7.7	7.7	7.7	2.6	15.4	1.8	1.2	5.1	2.6	2.6	2.6
中央監視設備	100.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	15.0	5.0	5.0	20.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	20.0	5.0	1.8	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
その他の設備	100.0	5.3	2.6	5.3	17.1	7.9	7.9	5.3	7.9	11.8	23.7	12.3	12.3	12.3	12.3	12.3	12.3	12.3
外構(門、塚等)	100.0	2.6	9.0	15.4	11.5	10.3	11.5	9.0	7.7	7.7	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.3
その他	100.0	4.3	19.1	6.4	14.9	14.9	17.0	17.0	2.1	2.1	8.5	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.3
不明	-
不明	-

※ 該当ある工事部位：当該工事部位が，選択肢の工事部位（「不明」を含む18項目。）に照らして「主たるもの」又は「該当あるもの」とした件数である。

※ 主たる工事部位：当該工事部位が，選択肢の工事目的（「不明」を含む18項目。）に照らして，「主たるもの」と回答した件数である。

※ 0件の項目は，便宜上空欄としている。
ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.80

Is Non-Profit Status a Signal of Better Quality?

MICRO-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN'S AT-HOME CARE INDUSTRY

by

Haruko Noguchi and Satoshi Shimizutani

November 2003

Economic and Social Research Institute

Cabinet Office

Tokyo, Japan
# Is Non-Profit Status a Signal of Better Quality? Micro-Level Evidence from Japan’s At-Home Care Industry

By

Haruko Noguchi

(Visiting Fellow, Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office)

and

Satoshi Shimizutani

(Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office) $ ^{1} $

November 2003
## Abstract

After the introduction of public long-term care insurance in 2000, for-profit facilities were allowed to enter the at-home care market in Japan, where nonprofits are dominant. However, according to a popular hypothesis called the “contract failure,” nonprofit centers are preferred over for-profit counterparts due to an asymmetry of information. If this is the case, a change in competition policy in the long-term care market would not work.
This study takes advantage of unique data to examine directly whether a choice in type of management is biased toward nonprofits, as the contract failure hypothesis predicts.
Our empirical findings are as follows. The share of users of for-profit providers occupies about 40 percent of the at-home care. In this sense, the entrance policy of proprietary firms after the introduction of public long-term care insurance has been welcomed.
Regarding the preference between nonprofit and for-profits, households with higher care levels or any acquaintance who is a medical doctor or a professional caregiver are inclined to choose nonprofits, which are associated with the entrance restriction that only nonprofits are incumbent in medical care and institutional care. In addition, nonprofits enjoy their acquired benefits as earlier participants in the market. In this sense, proprietary providers are disadvantageous.
On the contrary, households with more knowledge of suppliers tend to choose for-profits, which implies that this mitigating asymmetry of information might overcome the entrance limitations in other related markets, which makes the at-home market more competitive.
### 1. Introduction

Do consumers prefer nonprofit or for-profit service? This classical and frequently debated issue has held interest for both academics and policy-makers for a long time. After the introduction of public long-term care insurance in the spring of 2000, this became a critically pragmatic issue to be solved immediately in Japan since this historical “experiment” allowed for-profit enterprises to enter the at-home care market for the first time.

The government expected that the entry of for-profits always contributed toward making the market more competitive. However, we should keep in mind that this is not self-evident. If consumers have biased preferences toward nonprofit services, participants of for-profits have little effect on market competitiveness. This is clearly described by the “contract failure” hypothesis (Hansmann (1980)). If consumers cannot observe the quality of services in advance, they might tend to choose nonprofit services, since the “non-distributional constraints” nonprofits must obey prevent those from appealing to the opportunistic behavior; that is, making profits by lowering the quality of services. If consumers recognize this reality, they tend to choose nonprofits. The traditional solution to address the asymmetry of information is to allow only nonprofit enterprises to operate in the market.

Although more than three years have passed since the introduction of the new entry policy, there has been little research on consumer choice of nonprofits and for-profits in spite of this innovative institutional change. The Japanese at-home long-term care market is unusually suitable for testing the “contract failure” hypothesis because the output prices are regulated to be same for all types of providers by the government. The contents of services are also
heavily regulated and standardized across providers. Care users are able to select care services from any provider freely and equally, which exempts us from considering pricing behavior of those different types of providers.

This study takes advantage of a unique micro-level data set to test consumer preferences on the types of providers. Several previous studies, such as Shimizutani and Suzuki (2002) and Suzuki (2002), directly examined quality differences based on suppliers' data. However, to our best knowledge, there has been no data to examine the hypothesis based on demand-side data $ ^{2} $ . Originally, micro-data from users should be utilized to examine the hypothesis because asymmetry of information motivates care users' preferences toward nonprofits, regardless of the fact that the quality of service provided by nonprofits might be higher or lower than that of for-profits.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 overviews previous studies, mainly conducted in the United States. Section 3 describes the data set used in this study. Section 4 presents the empirical specifications employed in this study and discusses the results. Section 5 draws policy implications from our empirical findings and concludes.

### 2. Review of Previous Studies

Contrary to the little research that has been done in Japan, there are plenty of studies on consumer behavior of nonprofits and for-profits. The representative is the “contract failure” approach proposed by Hansmann (1980), from which most of the following studies originated.
Hansmann’s discussion starts with the two key concepts: asymmetry of information, and non-distributional constraints. As emphasized by Akerlof (1970), quality uncertainty based on asymmetry of information between sellers and buyers is inevitable. Due to this asymmetry, consumers are not able to observe the quality of services in advance. This is especially crucial in the service sector.

If this is the case, which type of providers do consumers choose to purchase services?

Suppose there are two types of providers: for-profits and nonprofits. The nonprofit sector is prohibited from distributing net earnings. On the contrary, for-profits must make profits to distribute them to stockholders, which sometimes invites opportunistic behavior to decrease costs by lowering the quality of services. This mechanism motivates consumers to choose to purchase services from nonprofits rather than from for-profits.

Apart from the contract failure hypothesis, a similar situation can occur under different behavioral characteristics of different types of providers. For-profits are assumed to maximize their profits, while nonprofit managers benefit from both profits and quality of services.

Newhouse (1970) discusses that managers in the not-for-profit sector have fewer incentives to lower the quality provided, since their performance is judged by quality, or because they desire to show professional excellence or technical virtuosity by stressing quality.

There is a large literature on nonprofit wage premiums and quality differentials between nonprofits and for-profits (see Noguchi and Shimizutani (2002) for previous studies on those gaps between for-profits and nonprofits in the United States and Japan). While some studies proceed by modeling the contract failure hypothesis (Easley and O'Hara (1983, 1988), Chillemi and Gui (1991), Hirth (1999)), there is relatively little empirical literature that
directly examines consumer choice among different types of providers.

The original message of the contract failure hypothesis is that a consumer chooses nonprofit services because they believe that nonprofit suppliers provide higher quality services, which is not necessarily related to the reality of whether or not they actually do provide a higher quality of services. In other words, asymmetry of information motivates consumers to choose nonprofits and the disadvantage of for-profits disappears once quality of services is observed ex post, such as in repeated contracts.

Among those studies, Holtmann and Ullmann (1993) use a simple method to describe the choice problem and perform empirical tests using the U.S. National Nursing Home Survey. In what follows, we describe the choice problem following their framework.

We assume that a consumer purchases services from nonprofits $ \left(Q_{n}\right) $ and for-profits $ \left(Q_{p}\right) $ . Since a consumer cannot judge the quality of services in advance, the quality is generally uncertain. For simplicity, we assume that the quality of nonprofit services is certain and this is not the case with for-profits. Thus, we define the actual unit of for-profit services as $ Q_{p}^{*}=zQ_{p} $ where z is a random variable with $ E(z)=z $ .

A consumer maximizes his utility $ EU(Q_{n}, Q^{*}_{p}) $ under the budget constraints $ p_{n}Q_{n} + p_{p}Q_{p} = Y $ and $ Q_{n} \geq 0 $ and $ Q_{p} \geq 0 $ . The utility function is assumed to be increasing and concave in $ Q_{n} $ , $ Q_{p} $ , z.

We set up the Lagrangian as follows with $ \lambda $ as the Lagrange multiplier

$$ L=E U(\mathrm{Q_{n},Q^{*}_{p}})+\lambda\quad(\mathrm{Y-p_{n}Q_{n}-p_{p}Q_{p}});\mathrm{Q_{n}}\geq0\mathrm{a n d}\mathrm{Q_{p}}\geq0. $$
The first order conditions are

$$ \partial L/\partial\mathbf{Q}_{\mathrm{n}}=\mathbf{E}(\partial\mathbf{U}/\partial\mathbf{Q}_{\mathrm{n}})-\lambda\mathbf{p}_{\mathrm{n}}\leq0 $$

$$ \left(\partial L/\partial Q_{n}\right)\quad Q_{n}=0 $$

$$ \partial L/\partial\mathrm{Q}_{\mathrm{p}}=\mathrm{E}[(\partial\mathrm{U}/\partial\mathrm{Q}_{\mathrm{p}}^{*})\mathrm{z}]-\lambda\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{p}}\leq0 $$

$$ (\partial L/\partial Q_{\mathrm{p}})\quad Q_{\mathrm{p}}{=}0 $$

$$ \partial L/\partial\lambda=\mathrm{Y}-\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{Q}_{\mathrm{n}}-\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{p}}\mathrm{Q}_{\mathrm{p}}=0 $$

Therefore,

$$ \begin{aligned}&If Q_{p}=0and Q_{n}>0,E(\partial U/\partial Q_{n})/p_{n}>E[(\partial U/\partial Q_{p}^{*}){z}]/p_{p}\\&If Q_{p}>0and Q_{n}>0,E(\partial U/\partial Q_{n})/p_{n}=E[(\partial U/\partial Q_{p}^{*})z]/p_{p}\\&If Q_{p}>0and Q_{n}=0,E(\partial U/\partial Q_{n})/p_{n}
and nonprofits, the left hand side is always greater than the right if the amount of purchase is same.

Those conditions show that if for-profit care facilities survive in the market, it should be the case that (1) the average quality is greater for for-profits than for nonprofits, and/or (2) uncertainty of quality disappears if the average quality is the same between the two types of management.

Thus, we must address two issues. The first one is which type of provider offers higher quality of services in reality. Previous studies in Japan indicate that this is inclusive (Shimizutani and Suzuki (2002)). Although our survey (explained in the next section) does not contain any information from suppliers on the quality of services, we do have results on their subjective evaluation on the care they receive.

Figure 1 describes the results on the quality of services from our survey described in the next section. The quality of for-profit services is not clearly worse than that of nonprofit centers, though the share of those who responded “uncertain” is much higher for for-profits. Figure 2 summarizes the results on reasons why the provider was chosen. The share of those who chose the provider by public reputation of higher quality is greater for for-profit users than for its counterparts. The share of those who chose nonprofits due to anxiety of using proprietary centers is very small, which implies that there is little prejudgment for opportunistic behavior in for-profits. Those results indicate that quality of services is not evidently better in either type of management.

We then come to the second issue: which type of provider is preferred by consumers. To