Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
# 環境衛生金融公庫

## 昭 和 48 年 度 暫 定 予 算 事 業 計 画

1. 昭和48年4月1日から4月11日までの期間における貸付金は総額4,300,000千円を予定している。

2. 上記の原資としては、貸付回収金等 4,300,000 千円を予定している。

## 昭 和 48 年 度 暫 定 予 算 資 金 計 画

支	出	収	入
区	分	金	額(千円)	区	分	金	額(千円)
貸	付	金	4,300,000	前期期末現金預付金	3,939,239
事業損益	損益	金	272,744	貸付回収金	1,902,745
事務費	費	7,170	事業益金	461,427
業務委託費	費	265,574	運用収入	30
翌日へ現金預付金線越	註	1,733,012	雑収	2,315
合計	計	6,305,756	合計	6,305,756
昭和48年度2100沖縄振興開発金融公庫甲号 收入支出暫定予算予定計算書
区分	昭和48年度暫定予算予定額(千円)
1 収入2 支出	60,6145,946
[收入支出暫定予算予定額内訳]
収入款・項・目別区分並びに各目の見積の事由及び計算の基礎
款・項・目	昭和48年度暫定予算予定額(千円)	見積の事由及び計算の基礎
0100-00 事業益金0101-00 事業益金0101-01 貨付金利息0200-00 雑収入0201-00 運用収入0201-01 運用収入	60,074	貨付金残高を基礎として利息の収入見込額を算出有価証券の運用による利息収入等の収入見込額を計上
支 出
事 项 别 内 訳
項	事 项	昭和48年度暫定予算予 定 額(千円)	説	明
01 事 業 損 金	事務運営に必要な経費	5,946	事務運営に必要な事務費等
収 入 支 出 暫 定 予算予 定 額科目 別 表
科 目	昭和48年度暫定予算予 定 額(千円)	科 目	昭和48年度暫定予算予 定 額(千円)
収 入	収 入 合 計	60,614
0100-00 事 業 益 金	支 出
0101-00 事 業 益 金	01 事 業 損 金	5,946
0101-01 貨 付 金 利 息	60,074	11-05 退 職 手 当	265
0200-00 雑 収 入	12-07 旅 費	1,778
0201-00 運 用 収 入	13-08 業 務 諸 費	3,854
0201-01 運 用 収 入	540	19-09 交 際 費	49
## 沖縄振興開発金融公庫

## 昭 和 48 年 度 暫 定 予 算 事 業 計 画

昭和48年4月1日から4月11日までの期間における事業計画は、次のとおりである。

（1）貸付契約は、産業開発資金貸付 597,000 千円、中小企業等資金貸付 520,000 千円、住宅資金貸付 480,000 千円、農林漁業資金貸付 270,000 千円、医療・環境衛生資金貸付 63,000 千円、総額 1,930,000 千円を予定している。

（２）資金の貸付けは、昭和４７年度の貸付契約金額のうち１,６７０,０００千円及び沖縄振興開発金融公庫が承継した琉球開発金融公社等の貸付契約に係る貸付け３８１,０００千円、計２,０５１,０００千円を予定している。

（３）上記の原資としては、貸付回収金等２,０５１,０００千円を予定している。

## 昭 和 48 年 度 暫 定 予 算 資 金 計 画

支	出	収	入
区	分	金	額(千円)	区	分	金	額(千円)
貸	付	金	2,051,000	前期期末現金預付金	10,357,937
事業損益	貸付回収金	155,963
事務費	5,946	事業益金	60,074
翌日へ現金預付金繰越	8,517,568	雑収收入	540
合計	10,574,514	合計	10,574,514
昭和48年度3010日本開発銀行
甲号 收入支出暫定予算予定計算書
区分	昭和48年度暫定予算予定額(千円)
1 収入	3,558,819
2 支出	478,683
[收入支出暫定予算予定額内訳]
収入
款・項・目	昭和48年度暫定予算予定額(千円)	見積の事由及び計算の基礎
0100-00 事業益金
0101-00 事業益金	3,551,558
0101-01 貸付金利息	3,538,615	貸付金残高を基礎として利息の収入見込額を算出
0101-02 保証料	12,943	保証債務残高を基礎として保証料の収入見込額を算出
0200-00 雑収入	7,261
0202-00 運用収入
0202-01 運用収入	5,057	有価証券の運用による利息収入等の収入見込額を計上
0203-00 雑収入	2,204
84 日本開発銀行

款 · 項 · 目	昭和48年度暫定予算予 定 額(千円)	見 積 の 事 由 及 び 計 算 の 基 礎
0203-02 労働保険料被保険者負担金0203-01 雑 收 入	1,454750	労働保険料の被保険者負担金の収入見込額を計上
支 出事 項 別 内 訳
項	事 項	昭和48年度暫定予算予 定 額(千円)	説
01 事 業 損 金	事務運営に必要な経費業 務 委 託 費支 払 利 息	212,703588265,392	事務運営に必要な人件費及び事務費業務の一部を委託する金融機関に支払う手数料産業投資特別会計からの借入れ等に伴う支払利息
収入支出暫定予算予定額科目別表
科 目	昭和48年度暫定予算予 定 額(千円)	科 目	昭和48年度暫定予算予 定 額(千円)
収 入	0200-00 雑 収 入	7,261
0100-00 事 業 益 金	0202-00 運 用 収 入
0101-00 事 業 益 金	3,551,558	0202-01 運 用 収 入	5,057
0101-01 貸付金利息	3,538,615	0203-00 雑 収 入	2,204
0101-02 保 証 料	12,943	0203-02 労働保険料被保険者負担金	1,454
科目	昭和48年度暫定予算予 定 額(千円)	科目	昭和48年度暫定予算予 定 額(千円)
0203-01 雑 収 入	750	11-04 超 過 勤 務 手 当	17,447
収 入 合 计	3,558,819	12-07 旅 費	5,450
支 出	13-08 業 務 諸 費	32,879
01 事 業 損 金	478,683	19-09 交 際 費	110
11-01 役 員 給	5,190	15-11 業 務 委 託 費	588
11-02 職 員 基 本 給	141,904	99-12 支 払 利 息	265,392
11-03 職 員 諸 手 当	9,723
# 日 本 開 発 銀 行

## 昭 和 48 年 度 暫 定 予 算 事 業 計 画

1. 日本開発銀行の昭和48年4月1日から4月11日までの期間における貸付の対象は、都市開発、地方開発、国民生活改善等とし、貸付金額は16,500,000千円を予定している。

2. 上記の原資としては、自己資金 16,500,000 千円を予定している。
昭和48年度3020日本輸出入銀行
甲号 收入支出暫定予算予定計算書
区分	昭和48年度暫定予算予定額(千円)
1 収入2 支出	3,354,33720,500
[收入支出暫定予算予定額内訳]
収入
款·項·目別区分並びに各目の見積の事由及び計算の基礎
款·項·目	昭和48年度暫定予算予定額(千円)	見積の事由及び計算の基礎
0100-00 事業益金0101-00 事業益金0101-01 貸付金利息0200-00 雑収入0201-00 運用収入0201-01 運用収入0202-00 雑収入0202-01 雑収入	3,341,33413,00312,379	貸付金残高を基礎として利息の収入見込額を算出
有価証券の運用による利息収入等の収入見込額を計上
受託手数料収入等の収入見込額を計上
支 出
事 项 别 内 訳
項	事 项	昭和48年度暫定予算予 定 額(千円)	説
01 事 業 損 金	事務運営に必要な経費	20,500	事務運営に必要な事務費
収 入 支 出 暫定予算予 定 額科目別表
科 目	昭和48年度暫定予算予 定 額(千円)	科 目	昭和48年度暫定予算予 定 額(千円)
収 入	0202-01 雑 収 入	624
0100-00 事 業 益 金	収 入 合 计	3,354,337
0101-00 事 業 益 金	支 出
0101-01 貨付金利息	3,341,334	01 事 業 損 金	20,500
0200-00 雑 収 入	13,003	12-07 旅 費	2,938
0201-00 運用収入	12-08 業 務 諸 費	17,451
0201-01 運用収入	12,379	19-09 交 賀	111
0202-00 雑 収 入
日 本 輸 出 入 銀 行

## 昭 和 48 年 度 暫 定 予 算 事 業 計 画

1. 日本輸出入銀行の昭和48年4月1日から4月11日までの期間における業務は、資源等重要物資の輸入、海外投資及び直接借款等のために必要な資金の貸付等であり、貸付の金額は21,900,000千円を予定している。

2. 上記の原資としては、自己資金 21,900,000 千円を予定している。
## 第2編

第2篇

鉱業等に係る土地利用の調整手続等

に関する法律等に基づく事務の処理
## 第1章　鉱業等に係る土地利用調整制度の概要

公害等調整委員会（昭和47年6月30日以前は土地調整委員会。以下本編において同じ。）は、鉱業、採石業又は砂利採取業と一般公益又は農業、林業その他の産業との調整を図るため、鉱区禁止地域の指定、鉱業等に係る行政処分に対する不服の裁定を行い、また、土地利用の複雑・多様化に対応して、土地利用に関する行政庁の適正な処分を確保するため、主務大臣に対する意見の申出等を行っている。

このような土地利用の調整に関する事務については、公益的な観点から一定の土地をどのように利用するのが最も適当であるかという判断に関するものであることから、公正・中立性が必要であること、関係する範囲が極めて広範にわたり専門的知識が必要であること、独立の権能を持ち、行政機関として最終的な決定を行う必要があること等から、総務省の外局として設置されている行政委員会である公害等調整委員会が処理に当たっている。個々の制度の概要は、次のとおりである。

## 第1節 鉱区禁止地域の指定制度

## 1 鉱業と一般公益又は他産業との調整の必要性

鉱物資源の乏しい我が国においては、国内の鉱物資源の開発及び有効利用は国民経済上極めて重要であるが、国土が狭小であることから、有用な鉱物資源の埋蔵される地域にダム、農業用水池、温泉源等が存在したり、その地域が景勝地であることも多い。このような場合、鉱業と一般公益又は農業、林業若しくはその他の産業との調整が必要である。そこで、当該地域を鉱業と一般公益又はその他の産業とのいずれの利用に供するのが適当かという見地から、鉱区禁止地域を指定する手続（鉱区禁止地域の指定制度）が、鉱業等に係る土地利用の調整手続等に関する法律（昭和25年法律第292号）及び鉱業法（昭和25年法律第289号）により設けられている。

## 2 鉱区禁止地域の指定制度

本制度は、公害等調整委員会が、各大臣又は都道府県知事の請求に基づき、鉱業法の所管大臣である経済産業大臣の意見を聴き、公聴会を開いて一般の意見を求め、利害関係人を審問した上で、請求地域において鉱物を掘採することが一般公益又は農業、林業若しくはその他の産業と対比して適当でないと認めるときは、当該地域を鉱区禁止地域として指定し、また、同様の手続によりその指定を解除する制度である（鉱業等に係る土地利用の調整手続等に関する法律第22条〜第24条の2）（図2－1－1）。

また、鉱区禁止地域の指定が既存の鉱業権の効力を否定するものでないことから、公害等調整委員会は、鉱区禁止地域を指定した場合において、当該地域内における指定された鉱物を目的とする鉱業権が既に設定されており、当該鉱物の掘採が著しく公共の福祉に反するようになっていると認めるときは、経済産業局長に対し、当該地域内に存する当該鉱物を目的とする鉱業権の取消し等の処分をすべきことを勧告することができるとされている（鉱業法第15条第2項）。
## 国の債権に係る情報の公表

総務省 (一般会計)

歳入金債権の発生額及び消滅額等の推移

(单位:百万円)

平成23年度	平成24年度	平成25年度
管理对象債權額	消滅額	管理对象債權額	消滅額	管理对象債權額	消滅額
前年度以前巻生未消滅債權分	本年度巻生分	前年度以前巻生分	本年度巻生分	前年度以前巻生未消滅債權分	本年度巻生分	前年度以前巻生分	本年度巻生分	前年度以前巻生未消滅債權分	本年度巻生分	本年度巻生分
万ち不納欠損額	万ち不納欠損額	万ち不納欠損額	万ち不納欠損額	本年度巻生分	万ち不納欠損額	万ち不納欠損額
合 計	81,491	1,000	80,491	80,575	158	30	80,417	0	136,449	1,765	134,683	135,520	878	30	134,641	0	92,660	1,095	91,564	91,732	230	91,501
備 考	主な管理对象債權額電波利用料債權:74,571百万円返納金債權:4,422百万円	主な消滅額電波利用料債權:74,517百万円返納金債權:3,794百万円	主な管理对象債權額電波利用料債權:76,441百万円返納金債權:2,991百万円	主な消滅額電波利用料債權:76,394百万円返納金債權:2,453百万円	主な管理对象債權額電波利用料債權:80,630百万円返納金債權:3,231百万円	主な消滅額電波利用料債權:80,586百万円返納金債權:2,717百万円

※消滅額の項中「うち不納欠損額」は、歳入徴収官事務規程（昭和二十七年大蔵省令第百四十一号）第二十七条第一項各号に該当する金額の合計額であり、消滅額の内数。

歳入金債権の年度末現在額の推移

平成23年度末現在額	平成24年度末現在額	平成25年度末現在額
ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.88

# POTENTIAL GROWTH OF THE JAPANESE AND U.S.

# ECONOMIES IN THE INFORMATION AGE

by

Dale W. Jorgenson

and

Kazuyuki Motohashi

March 2004

Economic and Social Research Institute

Cabinet Office

Tokyo, Japan
# POTENTIAL GROWTH OF THE JAPANESE AND U.S.

# ECONOMIES IN THE INFORMATION AGE $ ^{*} $

by

Dale W. Jorgenson

Samuel W. Morris University Professor

Harvard University

and

Kazuyuki Motohashi

Associate Professor, University of Tokyo and

Senior Fellow, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry

March2004
# POTENTIAL GROWTH OF THE JAPANESE AND U.S. ECONOMIES IN THE INFORMATION AGE

by

Dale W. Jorgenson

a n d

Kazuyuki Motohashi

Japan's deployment of information technology (IT) is said to have lagged behind the U.S. throughout the "lost decade," as the 1990s are often described. However, if we harmonize the national accounts for the two countries, the contribution of IT to economic growth turns out to be nearly identical. The gap between growth rates is partly explained by the failure of Japanese economy to maintain aggregate demand growth, resulting in a decline in Non-IT investment and a fall in employment. The future growth of the Japanese economy depends on offsetting the ongoing decline in the working age population by rising participation rates and more rapid innovation.

#### How did Japan's economy differ from the U.S.?

Japan's average rate of economic growth fell precipitously from 4.4% in the 80s to 2.3% in the 90s. Looking at more recent trends, the growth rate for the first six months of this year shows signs of revival and the unemployment rate is falling. In marked contrast to Japan, the U.S. economy prospered in the latter half of the 1990s, when accelerated economic growth, supported by rising productivity from investment in IT, produced a "new economy." Beginning in 2001 the U.S. growth rate collapsed, triggering a sharp global recession in the IT industry. However, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, productivity growth actually improved.

The speed of IT innovation is often expressed by Moore's Law, which states that the density of transistors in a semiconductor chip doubles every 18-24 months. Drawn on by this overwhelming rate of technical change, the cost and performance advantages offered by computers and telecommunication equipment have continued to grow. According to the International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS), the rate of increase in the density of transistors on semiconductor devices before 1995 was set to sustain a three-year product cycle. After 1995 the industry shifted to a two-year product cycle, increasing the rate of innovation by 50 percent! Also, midway through the
1990s the Internet suddenly became widely available.

We have analyzed the responses of the Japanese and U.S. economies to the technology acceleration in 1995. The vibrant ascent of productivity growth in the U.S. resulted in a vigorous surge in IT investment during the last half of the 90s. Comparing the average annual rate of growth of U.S. labor productivity in the years 1989-1995 with 1995-2000, we see an increase of 0.75% per year. This can be broken down into three components -- an increase in capital input per hour worked or capital deepening, a rise in the growth of total factor productivity or output per unit of input, and an increase in labor quality, labor input per hour worked, due to a shift toward a better educated and more experienced labor force.

Capital input from IT in the U.S., including computer hardware, software, and telecommunication equipment, contributed 0.44% to the jump in capital deepening. If this is added to the 0.19% rise in TFP growth in the IT-producing industries, the resulting contribution of IT is 0.63%, so that 84 percent of the acceleration in the growth in U.S. labor productivity in the second half of the 1990s is explained by IT.

What about Japan? The speed of technical innovation expressed by Moore's Law can be seen in Japan as well as the U.S. It would be natural to expect that Japan, like the U.S., also experienced the phenomenon of the new economy. But, according to a new report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Pilat, 2003), Japan was slower in the deployment of IT than the U.S. As a consequence, Japanese growth was held back.

The OECD report uses the official national accounts without harmonizing the methodology. In order to compare the impact of IT on economic growth between Japan and the U.S., we have first developed comparable databases for both countries. Although the national accounts of the two countries conform to the United Nations System of National Accounts of 1993, several important differences exist in the application of the UN system. The most important of these is the measurement of IT investment.

## Japan undervalues IT investment

First, the definition of “software” in Japan differs from the U.S. Only custom-made
software is treated as capital investment when Japan's GDP is calculated. By contrast, U.S. investment includes not only custom-made software, but also pre-packaged software, like Windows or Office, as well as software developed in-house for specific applications, such as airline reservations systems. Capital investment in IT, based on Japan's official statistics, is substantially underestimated. Since investment in software was some ¥4 trillion in 2000, this is not a trivial matter. We calculate that Japanese GDP was underestimated by close to one percent.

Second, there are important differences in the price deflators for IT equipment. As the pace of innovation accelerates, model changes in hardware and software become more and more frequent. As a consequence, the price index for IT must be calculated from sophisticated statistical models of the prices of successive upgrades of both hardware and software. Even though the U.S. and Japan use the same methodology in measuring IT prices, the resulting indexes are heavily influenced by the particular model of IT prices employed.

If we compare the official U.S. and Japanese computer-related price indexes, the rate of price decline from 1995 to 2000 was twice as fast in the U.S. Different methods for compiling price statistics exert a powerful influence on the Japanese growth rate. Since the rate of decline in IT prices is smaller in Japan, the growth rate of IT investment is lower and the contribution by this investment to Japanese growth is underestimated. If Japan's growth rate for the last half of the 90s is calculated by U.S. methods, the annual rate of growth rises to 2.13 percent per year. More than half of this can be explained by rising productivity in the IT-producing industries and a surge in IT investment.

We have corrected discrepancies between the price statistics for the two countries and used the harmonized prices to analyze the sources of economic growth. The contribution of IT capital to economic growth in the latter half of the 90s was similar – 0.78 percent per year for Japan versus 0.97 percent for the U.S. The growth in total factor productivity in IT-producing industries during the second half of the 90s was actually higher in Japan than in the U.S. – 0.61 percent versus 0.44 percent. The total contribution of IT was 1.39 percent per year in Japan and 1.41 percent in the U.S. Despite the enormous difference between the growth rates of the Japanese and U.S. economies after 1995, the contribution of IT was almost identical!

What explains the difference in growth rates between the two countries? Labor input
made almost no contribution to growth in Japan throughout the 90s. Production was becoming more efficient, but demand was not rising fast enough to absorb the available supply. By contrast the growth of labor input in the U.S. far outstripped the growth of the labor force, resulting in a decline in the rate of unemployment and a rise in labor force participation rates. Another indication of slack demand in Japan is the anemic growth of Non-IT capital input, relative to the U.S.

The decline in per capita hours worked throughout the 90s distinguishes Japan from other industrialized countries. This decline has been analyzed in detail by Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and can be attributed to the widespread adoption of a five-day workweek and an increase in the number of national holidays. The working age population peaked in 1995 at 87.17 millions and hours worked per capita has continued to decline. Future demographic trends in Japan suggest that the decline in hours worked will accelerate sharply, even with no further decline in the workweek and stable employment rates.

Advances in efficiency by downsizing, as seen in the restructuring of private firms, is not the only way to cope with more rapid improvements in technology. Development of new products to stimulate demand is crucial as productivity rises, as Yoshikawa (2003) has emphasized. Effective this year, Japan has expanded tax incentives for research and development. Japan's failure to implement this policy measure during the 1990s is an important reason for slack economic growth throughout the decade.

### Growth of Potential Output in Japan and the U.S

In all considerations of Japan’s future growth rate, the availability of sufficient labor is of paramount importance. Projections by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research show that Japan’s working age population will decline at an annual rate of 0.63 percent during the decade 2002-2012. By contrast, the Bureau of the Census projects growth of the U.S. working age population at around 1.00 percent per year for the same period. The difference of 1.63 percent per year produces an enormous difference in potential economic growth in the two countries.

A second difference between the U.S. and Japan is the unemployment rate. The OECD reports standardized rates for the two countries of 5.4 percent for Japan and 6.2 percent for the U.S. in the second quarter of 2003. The OECD estimates natural rates of
unemployment for the two countries at 3.9 percent and 5.2 percent, respectively. These are the rates at which inflation will not accelerate. This implies that the U.S. could allow the unemployment rate to fall by one percent over the next decade with no rise in the inflation rate and the Japan could allow the unemployment rate to fall by 1.5 percent over the same period.

Since Japanese productivity growth has become highly dependent on investment in IT, an important issue is whether this is sustainable. The development of semiconductor technologies is becoming progressively more difficult and the pace of innovation could fall back to the two-year product cycle seen before 1995. The telecommunications industry is suffering from severe over-capacity worldwide, even though the demand for bandwidth is rising exponentially. The development of content for the communications industry may become a bottleneck. If the pace of IT innovation decelerates, its contribution to the long-term growth rate would become weaker and productivity growth would decline.

Table 1 gives growth projections for the U.S., using the methodology developed by Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2003). The key assumptions are, first, that hours worked grows at the same rate as the working age population for the next decade, plus 0.1 percent per year to allow for elimination of slack in the labor market. The second key assumption is that reproducible capital stock – plant, equipment and software, and inventories – rises at the same rate as output. Land remains fixed in supply. These assumptions characterize growth in the U.S. over periods longer than a typical business cycle.

We present three alternative growth scenarios for the U.S. – a base case, an optimistic case, and a pessimistic case. These three scenarios use a common set of assumptions for the growth of hours, the growth of labor quality, the share of capital in the national income, the share of IT output in the GDP, and the proportion of capital stock that is reproducible. The scenarios differ in assumptions about total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the IT-producing industries and the Non-IT industries. They also differ in assumptions about the growth of capital quality, defined as capital input per unit of capital stock. This reflects shifts in the composition of capital toward less durable assets like IT hardware and software.

For the U.S. the base case projection of potential output uses 1989-2000 averages of
growth rates in IT and Non-IT total factor productivity and capital quality. This reflects the experience of the last half of the 1990s, dominated by the acceleration in TFP growth in the IT-producing industries, as well as the first half of the 1990s, before the acceleration took place. This is implied by the International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors, which projects a continuation of a two-year product cycle through 2007 and resumption of the three-year cycle after that.

The optimistic case for the U.S. uses 1995-2000 averages of growth in productivity and capital quality for the decade 2002-2012. This is in line with productivity growth in the U.S. since the recession of 2001. Even if this were to continue, U.S. growth would still fall far short of the historical rate of 4.05 percent per year during the period 1995-2000, when growth of hours worked at 1.99 percent was almost double the rate of labor force growth. For the U.S. the pessimistic case involves a reversion to trends in productivity before 1995. This implies a substantial slowdown in capital quality growth, reducing the impact of IT investment.

The base case projection of U.S. productivity growth is 1.64 percent per year by contrast with 2.06 percent per year from 1995-2000. The drop in projected growth of hours worked from 1.99 percent per year to 1.10 percent pulls the base case projection of U.S. GDP growth down to 2.74 percent per year, well below growth of 4.05 percent during 1995-2000. The optimistic case is for productivity growth of 2.38 percent per year, above the growth rate for 1995-2000. This is the consequence of the increase in capital deepening associated with slower growth of hours worked. Output growth would be 3.48 percent per year in the optimistic case. Finally, productivity growth in the pessimistic case would be only 1.02 percent per year, well below the level before 1995. The corresponding growth rate of GDP would be only 2.12 percent per year.

Table 2 presents our projections of Japanese economic growth for the decade 2002-2012. We use the same methodology as for the U.S. However, hours are projected to decline at the same rate as the working age population – 0.63 percent per year, partly offset by a rise of 0.15 percent to allow for a decline in unemployment. Our base case for Japan uses 1989-2000 averages for IT and Non-IT productivity growth and the growth of capital quality. This was a period of very rapid productivity growth outside of the IT-producing industries and reflects Japan's continuing success in closing the productivity gap with other industrialized countries. However, Jorgenson (2003) shows that Japanese productivity was the lowest among the G7 nations in 2000, so that a
sizable gap remains.

Our optimistic case for Japan is based on the productivity averages of 1995-2000 for the IT-producing industries, just as for the U.S. These averages are combined with growth of Non-IT productivity and capital quality at the more rapid rates of 1989-1995. Finally, our pessimistic case is based on 1989-1995 averages for IT producing industries – the beginning of the so-called “lost decade.” These are combined with Non-IT productivity and capital quality growth at the slower rates of 1995-2000.

Our base projection of Japanese labor productivity is 2.86 percent per year, well above the U.S. This is not surprising, since Japanese labor productivity has grown faster than the U.S., even during the great American growth resurgence of the late 90s. The decline of hours worked in Japan will provide opportunities for capital deepening. In addition, growth of TFP in IT-production and the Non-IT sector will remain considerably higher in Japan than in the U.S. Finally, labor quality growth in Japan will continue at levels well above the U.S. These three components, together with elimination of the unemployment gap, will enable Japanese productivity growth to maintain the levels of the 1990s. Our optimistic projection of Japanese labor productivity growth is 3.12 percent per year, well above the U.S. projection of 2.38 percent per year. Finally, our pessimistic projection for Japan is 2.60 percent per year, far in excess of the projected U.S. growth rate of 1.02 percent.

We conclude that Japanese productivity growth will continue to close the gap with the U.S.; however, Japanese economic growth is likely to lag behind the U.S. This is implied by the projected decline in the working age population in Japan, even with a reduction in the unemployment rate and continued improvements in labor quality. Our optimistic projection for Japan is 2.63 percent per year for the period 2002-2012, substantially below the projection for the U.S. of 3.48 percent. Our pessimistic projection for Japan for the same period is 2.12 percent, the same as the U.S. projection. Finally, our base case projection of Japanese GDP growth is 2.38 percent per year, well below the projected U.S. growth of 2.74 percent!

The departure from the labor force of the mid-50s baby boomers is one of the primary sources of the projected fall in Japan's labor force over the next decade. In the longer run the declining birthrate is the big issue. Thus, in slowing the contraction of the labor supply, it is necessary to address the conflict between women's participation in the labor