WBCSD and the WRI with the ISO on joint promotion of the WRI/WBCSD GHG Protocol standards and the ISO 14064 standard for GHG accounting and reporting (WBCSD, 2007).

### 5.3 A compliance system for sectoral approaches

One possible way to enhance the effectiveness of sectoral approaches would be to have an embedded compliance system. This section first illustrates how the compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol works, and then turns to that of the EU ETS. A significantly weaker arrangement for compliance with the agreement on non-ETS sectors is also introduced.

#### 5.3.1 Compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol

The issue of compliance is central to international agreements, and has proved a challenge in particular for international environmental law. The Kyoto Protocol contains a compliance mechanism (Art. 18) to ensure that parties meet their commitments. Specific procedures and mechanisms were introduced in the first meeting after the entry into force of the Protocol. $ ^{48} $ Under this framework the Compliance Committee has been operational since March 2006. Its backbone is composed of two branches, the ‘facilitative branch’ and the ‘enforcement branch’. This structure is the first of its kind, and allows for both preventive and reactive actions. The facilitative branch provides technical and financial advice to parties facing difficulties in meeting their commitments. The enforcement branch is responsible for ensuring that the parties comply with their commitments. The compliance tools range from i) ‘declarations of non-compliance’, aimed at applying moral pressure through a reputation effect; ii) the request to the party concerned to present a plan analysing the causes on non-compliance and indicating the corrective measures; and finally iii) the possibility to suspend eligibility for participation in the flexible mechanisms. The latter sanction depends heavily on the good functioning and the attractiveness of the market mechanisms, whereby exclusion might mean substantial disadvantages.

A case of non-compliance with emission targets cannot come before the enforcement branch until after the end of the commitment period in 2012. Up to now, the compliance cases that have been eligible to be brought before the enforcement branch have been limited to matters of procedure or implementation (e.g. registry and reporting issues). To date there have been four cases – against Greece, Canada, Croatia and Bulgaria. Greece and Bulgaria’s cases focus on the national system, including arrangements for estimating emissions and sinks covered by the Protocol and for reporting and archiving this information. Canada’s case relates to the national registry. Croatia’s case is concerned with the assigned amount and the commitment period. In conclusion, Greece and Canada were found in non-compliance on the final decision and on the preliminary decision respectively, but as they remedied the situation, the cases were subsequently closed. Croatia expressed disappointment with the final decision of non-compliance. Bulgaria’s case has been opened but the country has not yet been found in non-compliance. $ ^{49} $

A major drawback to the mechanism, however, is that the enforcement branch cannot operate in a binding fashion. Any procedures and mechanisms entailing binding consequences (Art. 18, Kyoto Protocol) will require the adoption of an amendment. Agreement on such an amendment has not been reached so far and has met with strong opposition. As a result, the compliance mechanism is presently weakened by the fact that it is not binding. While the compliance procedure allows consideration of sanctions, the ‘facilitation’ aspect will significantly override the ‘enforcement’ aspect (Maljean-Dubois, 2007) unless an amendment is adopted.