Cost containments: Sectors are presumed to be eligible for rebates if they meet i) a 5% energy or GHG-intensity threshold and a 15% trade intensity or ii) a 20% energy or GHG-intensity threshold. Each sector is rebated at 100% of the direct and indirect emissions cost on average. Rebates will be phased out from 2025 in principle. If no international agreement is reached before January 2018 to address competitiveness concerns, the president will establish an international reserve allowance programme to adjust the price of energy-intensive imports at the border.

The Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (CEJAPA, S.1733, Kerry-Boxer) $ ^{31} $

The Senate Committee on EPW passed the CEJAPA in November 2009. The final bill draws heavily from ACESA (Waxman–Markey Bill), for example, in setting a cap-and-trade scheme, but differs in several aspects such as the 2020 target. While the ACESA is comprehensive and encompasses clean energy and climate change, this bill mainly focuses on GHG emission reductions. The following summary concentrates on provisions concerning the cap-and-trade scheme, mainly focusing on GHG emissions.

Coverage: The programme covers the same seven GHGs covered in the ACESA. HFCs are subject to a separate cap. Perflurocarbons (PFCs) may be also regulated separately under performance standards. The sources covered include power plants and large stationery sources with annual GHG emissions over 25,000 tonnes. The programme applies to both upstream and downstream emissions. The cap will expand the coverage in several phases over a five-year period. By 2016, almost 85% of national GHG emissions will have been covered under the cap.

Caps: The programme sets two caps: a mandatory cap on emissions from the installations covered and non-binding, economy-wide, emission reduction goals for all sources.

The 2020 emissions cap is more stringent than that under the ACESA, i.e. a 20% cut from 2005 levels in 2020. Other emission caps are the same as those in the ACESA: 3% below 2005 levels, 42% below 2005 levels in 2030 and 83% below 2005 levels in 2050. Economy-wide goals are same as those in the ACESA.

Allocation: Consumer benefits are taken into account in allocation. Auctions will start in March 2011. There will be a market stability reserve for auction. The minimum reserve price for 2012 will be $28 per tonne in 2005 dollars and increase by 5% from 2013 through 2017 and by 7% thereafter plus the inflation rate on top of the previous year’s reserve price.

Timing: The compliance period is two years with unlimited banking and limited borrowing.

Offsets: The total limit on offset use is the same as that in the ACESA but the division between the domestic and international offsets differs. The programme allows use of 2 billion tonnes of qualified offsets per year, with 1.5 billion from domestic projects (forestry and agriculture overseen by the Department of Agriculture) and 0.5 billion from international projects or programmes. If domestic supply is not sufficient, the use of international offsets can be increased up to 1.25 billion. Like the ACESA, this programme will set a discount for international offsets: after 2018, 1.25 international offsets for each tonne of emissions. The programme also allows the use of offset credits based on sectoral crediting mechanisms in eligible countries and the issuance of credits in exchange for credits issued by other programmes (e.g. the CDM) that give equal or greater assurance of the environmental integrity of the US programme.

Cost containments: Sectors are presumed to be eligible for rebates under the same conditions as described in the ACESA. Each sector is rebated at 100% of the average direct and indirect