Silviase/jgov_v1.4_full_ann huggingface dataset:
ownership is not always better than others in all items. Rather, we should note that different centers have advantages in different categories. In other words, the “test score” approach reports that a specific type of management does not provide the highest quality of child care.

### 5. The “Quality of Workers” Approach

Since the child care industry is labor intensive, the quality of child care workers is naturally associated with the quality of services. In this section, we will focus on the sectoral quality differentials in skills of workers, using our detailed data set.

The basic statistics of the data set are summarized in Table 8. A simple comparison demonstrates that average wage, the treatment variable in this study, is higher for nonprofits than for-profits by 553 yen(39.7%) in hourly wage $ ^{7} $ . Shares of male, regular, or qualified workers do not vary between public and private centers. However, public centers are obviously advantageous in the actual number of children per child care worker.

As observed in the large wage gap, we could not reach our conclusion based on a simple comparison in these variables to measure quality because workers are not randomly allocated. To address this bias, we utilize the treatment effect model (Barnow et al. (1981)). This model estimates the following two equations simultaneously by the full maximum likelihood: (1) to estimate whether wages for individual workers are higher or lower than the average and (2) to regress treatment effect and other explanatory variables on the continuous or binomial dependent variable to measure the quality of services.

$$ \begin{align*}(1)\quad&\mathrm{Z^{l_{i}^{*}}_{i}}=\omega+\gamma^{^{\prime}}\mathrm{V_{i}}+\mathrm{w_{i}}\quad&where\quad&\mathrm{l=I,2}\ $ 2)\quad&\mathrm{Y_{i}}=\mathrm{a^{\prime}X_{i}}+\beta^{\prime}Z^{l_{i}}_{i}+\mathrm{d^{\prime}D}+\mathrm{e_{i}}\quad&where\quad&\mathrm{e_{i},\quad w_{i}\sim\quad N\left(0,0,s^{2}_{e},s^{2}_{w},\rho\right)}\end{align*} $$

where $ Y_{i} $ stands for (1) skills of workers (share of regular workers, or qualified workers) and (2) number of workers per child (the actual number of children per worker in general, regular worker, or qualified worker). Unless an object in the sample is chosen randomly from the binomial treatments, $ Z_{i}^{1} $ is unobserved. Therefore, we define $ Z_{i}^{1} $ , in (3) a
binomial variable which is actually observed, and estimate (2) and (3) simultaneously.

$$ \begin{aligned}&(3)\ Z_{i}^{1}=1\ if\ Z_{i}^{l^{*}}\geq0\ (-w_{i}\leq\gamma^{^{\prime}}V_{i})\\ &\\&\quad Z_{i}^{1}=0if\ Z_{i}^{l^{*}}<0\ (-w_{i}>\gamma^{^{\prime}}V_{i})\quad\quad where\quad l=l,2\\ \end{aligned} $$

The results on the difference between public-owned and private licensed child centers are reported in Table 9. We calculate the total effect of being private licensed on quality indicators as the sum of a treatment effect and a multiplied effect of private licensed dummies on the 1st and 2nd stages. The results show that private facilities have higher shares of regular and qualified workers, though they are not significant. Moreover, those facilities are more likely to reduce the number of children per regular and qualified worker. These results mean that the quality of services in private centers is better than those in public ones regarding quality of workers.

Next, we will continue to investigate the difference in quality of care between private-licensed centers and non-licensed ones in the same way. We choose six municipal areas within Tokyo Prefecture where the data on care workers in both non-licensed for-profit and private licensed not-for-profit facilities are available. Table 10 reports that wage rates are higher for private-licensed than non-licensed by 398 yen (28.3%) in hourly wages $ ^{8} $ . A simple comparison shows private-licensed centers are advantageous in most characteristics, such as share of regular or qualified workers.

Table 11 reports the results. The total effects of private non-licensed status show that they are statistically positive for the number of children per worker. Thus, the quality of services provided by private-licensed centers is much better than that of private non-licensed.

In sum, the total effects imply that quality measures such as the shares of regular or qualified workers and the number of children per worker are much better in private-licensed than in public centers. Moreover, we also found that private-licensed centers offer the best quality of services in some aspects among three types of centers.

### 6. The “Users’ Requests” Approach
Finally, we will try to evaluate the quality of child care on the demand-side. Specifically, we will mainly investigate the extent to which specific types of services are actually provided and what kinds of services are requested by parents. This strategy is straightforward, and could contribute toward evaluating the quality of care from the user side that was unexplored by the previous two approaches.

We have 532 child care users, randomly selected from Chiba, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Tokyo Prefectures. Out of 532 households, 363 households utilize services provided by public-owned facilities and 125 use private-licensed facilities. The remaining households use services from private non-licensed centers $ ^{9} $ . Note that there is no regulation for those services and provision of services depends on each center.

Table 12 reports the results. The upper table shows the results on current services and services requested by parents. First, we look at the difference in shares of requested services between public and private licensed centers. Parents using public centers are not satisfied with extended care, care on holidays and education for children. They are more satisfied with only a few items such as education for English or provision of transportation. The most requested service is care for diseased children or post acute care. However, more than half of public or private-licensed centers do not provide them.

These results imply that private licensed centers provide higher quality of services, especially in flexible operation hours and parents' convenience. If we compare private-licensed with non-licensed, licensed centers provide better services in education for children, lunch meals, care support or consulting, and transportation. On the other hand, non-licensed centers provide services that are more flexible for the operation hours or care for diseased children.

The lower part in Table 12 reports additional various services provided. If we compare those between public and private-licensed, the latter provides higher quality in many items, such as child care support centers, monitoring children with cameras, keeping daily records, and claim acceptance. Contrary to the upper parts, the quality of non-licensed centers is not better than that of public facilities in many items.

One might suspect that different types of care centers are used by households with
different characteristics. In order to address this possibility, we choose several important services contents and regress the response to those services currently provided and demanded in future on many household characteristics. They include family demographics, employment condition (working hours and income) and other variables. Table 13-1 presents the basic statistics of variables used in the regressions. Table 13-2-1 and Table 13-2-2 report the results. Basically, they replicate what we observe from a simple comparison. As regards services currently provided, extended care service, education, care if in disease are provided more in private licensed facilities than public ones. There is no difference in transportation and child care supports are more offered in public centers. As regards services demanded, public centers have higher figures in most of services except care if in diseases. Private non-licensed centers are required to provide education, child care supports and transportation, compared with private licensed centers.

In sum, the “users’ requests” approach reveals the following. The quality measured in requested services by parents is better in private-licensed centers than it is in public centers. If we measure the quality of services in additional care services, this is also the case. Private-licensed centers are more likely to provide a higher quality of services. These results are also confirmed after controlling for household characteristics.

### 7. Conclusion

This study is a comprehensive empirical assessment on the quality of child care in Japan, using unique survey data with the largest sample and the best quality available in Japan. We have an empirical challenge in this study on how to measure the quality of child care. We adopt three types of approaches generally used as quality measurements: “test score,” “quality of workers,” and “users’ request” methods.

The “test score” approach demonstrates that no specific type of management gets the highest scores in all detailed evaluation aspects. The “quality of workers” approach finds that the quality of private-licensed facilities is better than the public or private non-licensed facilities. Moreover, the “users’ request” approach finds the results consistent with the “quality of workers” approach such that the quality is better in private-licensed than public centers regarding parents’ convenience and additional care such as acute and temporary care.
These results show that private-licensed centers are more likely to provide various needs demanded by parents and thus to provide a higher quality of services than any other types of centers. Together with the results of Noguchi, Shimizutani and Suzuki (2003), higher wage rates in public centers cannot be justified by higher quality of services.

The Japanese government has currently been promoting the introduction of market competition and efficiency into various industries, including the child care, long-term care, and medical care industries, which used to be considered non-market sectors. Under the circumstances, those who believe that a Hausmann-type of “non-distributional constraint” may be anxious about the worsening of the quality of care, since market competition and efficiency may concentrate on lowering costs, not on the quality of services. Our conclusions on private-licensed centers’ behavior in child care market might provide us with clues to solve the problem of how to properly balance between the costs and quality of care.
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Table 1: Correlation coefficients among small scores and small principal scores

(1) Small Scores

Structural	Developmental Psychological	Parent's Convenience	Other
Structural Characteristics	1.00
Developmental Psychological Character	0.06	1.00
Parent's Convenience Characteristics	-0.15	0.20	1.00
Other Characteristics	0.00	0.25	0.30	1.00

(2) Small Principal Scores

Structural	Developmental Psychological	Parent's Convenience	Other
Structural Characteristics	1.00
Developmental Psychological Character	-0.15	1.00
Parent's Convenience Characteristics	-0.23	0.07	1.00
Other Characteristics	-0.15	0.09	0.29	1.00
Table 2: Small scores and total scores

Public	Private and Licensed	Private and Non-licensed	(X) vs (Y)	(X) vs (Z)	(Y) vs (Z)
(X)	(Y)	(Z)
Structural Characteristics	5.54	4.53	4.39	(X) > (Y)	**	(X) > (Z)	**
Developmental Psychological Characteristics	11.67	11.90	10.67	(X) < (Y)	**	(X) > (Z)	**	(Y) > (Z)	**
Parent's Convenience Characteristics	3.62	4.93	4.39	(X) < (Y)	**	(X) < (Z)	**	(Y) > (Z)	**
Other Characteristics	1.92	1.98	1.76
Total Score	22.77	23.39	22.86	(X) < (Y)	**

(note) $ ^{**} $ refers to significance level of 5%. The blank cells means no significant difference.

Table 3: Small principal scores and total principal scores

Public	Private and Licensed	Private and Non-licensed	(X) vs (Y)	(X) vs (Z)	(Y) vs (Z)
(X)	(Y)	(Z)
Structural Characteristics	0.26	-0.35	2.63	(X) > (Y)	**	(X) < (Z)	**	(Y) < (Z)	**
Developmental Psychological Characteristics	0.15	0.06	-2.06	(X) > (Z)	**	(Y) > (Z)	**
Parent's Convenience Characteristics	-0.54	0.42	1.80	(X) < (Y)	**	(X) < (Z)	**	(Y) < (Z)	**
Other Characteristics	0.05	-0.02	-0.23	(X) > (Z)	**
Total Score	-0.15	0.23	-2.42	(X) < (Y)	**	(X) > (Z)	**	(Y) > (Z)	**

(note) $ ^{**} $ refers to significance level of 5%. The blank cells means no significant difference.
(note) 1. $ \^{**} $ refers to significance level of 5%. The blank cells in last three columns mean no significant difference.

2. Outside playground area in number 9 excludes public parks near the center as substitute.

Table 4: Structural Characteristics

Public	Private and Licensed	Private and Non-licensed	(X) vs (Y)	(X) vs (Z)	(Y) vs (Z)
(X)	(Y)	(Z)
(a) Child care workers' characteristics
1 Qualified workers per child (compared with the standard)	1.32	1.24	1.41	(X) > (Y) **	(X) < (Z) **	(Y) < (Z) **
2 Share of qualified workers	0.79	0.86	0.75	(X) < (Y) **	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
3 Years of workers' experiences	14.60	7.95	9.40	(X) > (Y) **	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) < (Z) **
4 Provision of training program for freshmen	0.85	0.81	0.39	(X) > (Y) **	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
5 Provision of outside training program	0.92	0.94	0.76	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
6 Provision of leadership training program	0.92	0.86	0.22	(X) > (Y) **	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
(b) Child care facilities' characteristics
7 Area per child of special room for infants (compared with the standard)	2.92	1.88	2.40	(X) > (Y) **	(Y) < (Z) **
8 Area per child of nursery room (compared with the standard)	1.68	1.70	4.23	(X) < (Z) **	(Y) < (Z) **
9 Outside playground area	6.52	4.62	1.84	(X) > (Y) **	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
10 Inside playground area	1.51	0.92	3.60	(X) > (Y) **	(X) < (Z) **	(Y) < (Z) **
Table 5: Developmental Psychological Characteristics

Public	Private and Licensed	Private and Non-licensed	(X) vs (Y)	(X) vs (Z)	(Y) vs (Z)
(X)	(Y)	(Z)
(a) Developmental psychology
11 Field day	0.99	0.97	0.54	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
12 Excursions outside the center	0.99	0.99	0.87	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
13 Playing in small swimming pools	0.99	0.99	0.93	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
14 Special rhythm gymnastics for infants	0.88	0.83	0.75	(X) > (Y) **	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
15 Playing outdoor in parks	4.70	4.58	5.03	(X) > (Y) **
16 Education for children	0.18	0.23	0.04	(X) < (Y) **	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
(b) Children's health and safely management
17 Diary record for children	0.92	0.92	0.98	(Y) < (Z) **
18 Health examination for children	1.00	0.99	0.89	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
19 Accountability for accidents for parents	0.96	0.96	0.96	(Y) > (Z)
20 Communication notes between child care workers and parents	0.96	0.96	0.97
21 Meeting among care workers	0.98	0.97	0.91	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
22 Health examinations for care workers	0.99	0.99	0.87	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
23 Collaboration with medical facilities besides affiliated physician	0.09	0.33	0.27	(X) < (Y) **	(X) < (Z) **
Enrollment into the insurance for any accidents or troubles
24 related to children within the center	0.99	0.98	0.97
25 Safety video camera located at nursery room or outside play g	0.02	0.11	0.07	(X) < (Y) **	(X) < (Z) **

(note) 1. $ * $ $ * $ refers to significance level of 5%. The blank cells in last three columns mean no significant difference.
Table 6: Parent's Convinience Characteristics

Public	Private and Licensed	Private and Non-licensed	(X) vs (Y)	(X) vs (Z)	(Y) vs (Z)
(X)	(Y)	(Z)
26 Distance to stations	23.18	22.62	12.09	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
27 Hours of operation	10.98	11.67	12.70	(X) < (Y) **	(X) < (Z) **	(Y) < (Z) **
28 Hours of extensive child care	18.48	18.87	19.71	(X) < (Y) **	(X) < (Z) **	(Y) < (Z) **
29 Provision of holiday care	0.02	0.05	0.14	(X) < (Y) **	(X) < (Z) **	(Y) < (Z) **
30 Provision of post-acute care	0.00	0.02	0.17	(X) < (Y) **	(X) < (Z) **	(Y) < (Z) **
31 Frequency of parents' meeting in weekdays	0.91	0.92	0.62	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
32 Provision of parents' meeting on holidays (Saturdays)	0.21	0.45	0.53	(X) < (Y) **	(X) < (Z) **
33 Provision of child care support or consulting	0.65	0.63	0.38	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
34 Provision of complaint processing system from parents	0.61	0.81	0.37	(X) < (Y) **	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
35 Communication through e-mails with parents	0.09	0.24	0.20	(X) < (Y) **	(X) < (Z) **

(note) 1. $ * $ $ * $ refers to significance level of 5%. The blank cells in last three columns mean no significant difference.

Table 7: Other Characteristics

Public	Private and Licensed	Private and Non-licensed	(X) vs (Y)	(X) vs (Z)	(Y) vs (Z)
(X)	(Y)	(Z)
36 Provision of care for disabilities	0.58	0.49	0.15	(X) > (Y) **	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
37 Provision of emergent or temporary care	0.27	0.31	0.40	(X) < (Y) **	(X) < (Z) **	(Y) < (Z) **
38 Availability for residents to use the garden on holidays	0.18	0.23	0.04	(X) < (Y) **	(X) > (Z) **	(Y) > (Z) **
39 Provision of care for foreigners	0.59	0.58	0.57
40 Provision of websites	0.29	0.39	0.42	(X) < (Y) **	(X) < (Z) **

(note) 1. $ * $ $ * $ refers to significance level of 5%. The blank cells in last three columns mean no significant difference.
Table 9: The effects of private licensed facility dummy and the treatments on quality of workers (Hourly wage>average)

Dependent variables indicating quality of workers and services	Log-likelihood	Hourly wage>average	Private licensed facility dummy	Total effect (t-statistics)
Share of regular workers	800.2	0.127 (0.019)	a	0.056 (0.007)	a	0.102 (0.498)
Share of qualified workers	3281.8	0.026 (0.009)	a	-0.006 (0.005)	0.030 (0.145)
Actual number of children per worker	-23599.5	-0.218 (0.219)	-0.749 (0.155)	a	0.256 (1.247)
Actual number of children per regular worker	-25437.2	-3.970 (0.320)	c	-1.841 (0.189)	a	-3.153 (15.342)	a
Actual number of children per qualified worker	-30613.8	-0.985 (0.699)	b	-0.172 (0.381)	-0.878 (4.271)	a

(1) All regressions are adjusted for employee and facility characteristics, area dummy, and facility dummies.

(3) The first stage estimates show that the coefficients for the dummy variable for private licensed is -0.72(S.D.=0.08).

(2) a-c describes significant difference at 5%, 10%, and 15% levels.
Table 11: The effects of for-profit facility dummy and the treatments on quality of workers (hourly wage>average)

Dependent variables indicating quality of workers and services	Log-likelihood	Hourly wage>average	Profit licensed facility dummy	Total effect (t-statistics)
Share of regular workers	-270.600	0.022 (0.060)	a	-0.016 (0.034)	0.059 (0.179)
Share of qualified workers	-263.350	-0.005 (0.055)	-0.227 (0.033)	a	0.510 (1.555)
Actual number of children per worker	-2661.430	-0.443 (0.337)	-3.042 (0.285)	a	6.824 (20.817)	a
Actual number of children per regular worker	-2513.164	0.404 (0.531)	-2.760 (0.309)	a	6.886 (21.007)	a
Actual number of children per qualified worker	-5018.682	-0.010 (4.476)	-0.505 (3.100)	a	1.172 (3.576)	a

(1) All regressions are adjusted for employee and facility characteristics, area dummy, and facility dummies.

(2) a-c describes significant difference at 5%, 10%, and 15% levels.

(3) The first stage estimates show that the coefficients for the dummy variable for private licensed is -2.39(S.D. =0.28).