# Frequently Asked Questions on Broad-area Disposal of Disaster Waste

(1) Even if radioactive concentration is low, is landfilling a large amount of disaster waste safe?

Evaluations of the impact of landfilling incineration ash containing radioactive cesium on local residents and workers have been thoroughly conducted to ensure full safety. Specifically, the evaluations assume completely landfilling incineration ash at 8,000 Bq/kg in a disposal field with a capacity of 400,000 square meters $ (200 \times 200 \times 10 $ meters $ ). Even in this situation, the impact on the health of local residents remains insignificant (less than 0.01 mSv per year) after completion of the landfill. Of course, the amount of incineration ash that will actually be landfilled is far smaller than this and the concentration far less.

(2) When disaster waste is incinerated at an incineration facility, does radioactive cesium turn into a gas and leak out?

To prevent dioxin leaks, incineration facilities are equipped with high-end exhaust-gas treatment equipment (e.g., bag filters). These consist of a cooling system to keep exhaust gas temperatures under $ 200\ °C $ and a device to remove ash microparticles (soot dust) in the exhaust gas. Cesium gasifies at around $ 650\ °C $ , but the exhaust gas is cooled before being discharged into the air by the cooling system, so cesium cannot remain in a gaseous state. Cesium clumps together or is absorbed by the soot dust. The exhaust-gas treatment equipment can remove almost 100% of the soot dust containing radioactive cesium.

In fact, no elevated levels of radioactive cesium in exhaust gas have been detected even at incineration facilities for waste excluded from broad-area disposal due to high radioactive cesium content. Even in rare cases where it has been detected, its concentration remained within a level far below the concentration limit for monitoring criteria.

## Section 2 Response to the Limited Electric Power Supply

1 Response to the Limited Electric Power Supply Immediately after the Earthquake

(1) Response to the limited electric power supply immediately after the earthquake

With the effects of the Great East Japan Earthquake, power plants generating about 21 million kW were halted immediately following the disaster. This resulted in a sharp drop in power supply capability versus ordinary times, resulting in an extremely tight power supply in areas serviced by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and Tohoku Electric Power Company.

Before the earthquake, Tohoku Electric Power was capable of generating 13.36 million kW (excluding temporary stoppages due to inspections before the earthquake). After the earthquake, an installed capacity of about 6.28 million kW (including 1.35 million kW of nuclear power and 4.93 million kW of thermal/geothermal power) went out of operation. TEPCO's installed capacity before the disaster was 50.04 million kW (excluding temporary stoppages due to inspections before the earthquake), but 14.90 million kW (including 6.43 million kW of nuclear power and 8.48 million kW of thermal power) was halted immediately after the earthquake.

In response, the government confirmed that projects defined as reconstruction projects under the disaster recovery plan are exempted from the Environmental Impact Assessment Law (the provisions of Article 52). The project target is installation of new generators which is implemented by either TEPCO or Tohoku Electric Power under the restoration program, with the aim of supplementing the enough power supply, except the power stations which are so damaged to be no longer restorable due to the earthquake.

The government has offered the following guidance: avoid or minimize the environmental impact of project implementation; make every feasible effort to minimize the environmental impact caused by a project to ensure accurate consideration of environmental conservation; and implement measures such as organizing presentations or collecting opinions from local governments.

## (2) Energy-saving efforts

The tight power supply caused partial planned outages in the TEPCO service area. In response, there was an increased need for new initiatives that targeted people's lifestyles and business operations.

The government called for energy conservation efforts in the industry as well as in households. At the end of March, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the

Cabinet Secretariat carried out an extensive collaborative media campaign calling for energy-saving efforts. The Ministry then launched an energy-saving website introducing specific energy-saving measures and their predicted results.

The Ministry of the Environment called for energy-saving lifestyles, listing seven specific actions that were easy for people to implement at home: (1) turning off home electrical appliances after each use; (2) reducing standby electricity consumption by home appliances when they are not in use; (3) adjusting the thermostat or fan direction of air conditioners; (4) effectively using refrigerators (for example, by opening the door for shorter periods); (5) adjusting lighting and lengthening lights-out times; (6) effectively using home appliances, such as by adjusting the main switch and brightness of TVs; and (7) making lifestyle changes, such as reducing nighttime activities.

On May 13, 2011, the government's emergency countermeasures headquarters for the power supply publicly announced summer countermeasures. Specifically, the announcement defined the peak season and times (09:00-20:00 on weekdays between July and September) and a target demand-management rate of -15% from the previous year for areas supplied by TEPCO and Tohoku Electric Power. To ensure that the set goals would be achieved, this target of -15% from the previous year was uniformly given to all users: commercial-scale utility customers (operators with contract demands of 500 kW or more), individual consumers (operators with contract demands of less than 500 kW), and households. The national government hammered out voluntary programs for each ministry to reduce maximum power consumption during the peak season and times by at least 15%, based on the Basic Policy for Government Energy-Saving Initiatives.

On November 1, 2011, the basic policy for the supply and demand of electricity in the coming winter was made public. It stated that more continuous efforts should be made for the supply of electricity, and that this could be achieved by the electrical companies cooperating with each other depending on supply and demand conditions. In addition to this, a balanced supply and demand was to be maintained in regions where there was a shortage of electricity for the smooth operation of the electrical power system. However, the regulation of demand for electrical power under the provisions of the Electricity Business Act will not be implemented, aiming to minimize the influence on society and economy due to the energy saving. The sensitive response was also expected to save energy in accordance with business activities and the lives of Japanese citizens.

The situation placed a severe burden on the lives of Japanese citizens and on business activities; however, this incident can be considered to be an opportunity to recognize the scarcity and importance of energy.

## (3) The results of energy-saving efforts

Follow-up measures on power supply and demand implemented by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in the summer of 2011 verified initiatives by commercial-scale utility customers, individual consumers, and households.

Due to the widely-encouraged energy-saving efforts and relatively low temperatures in TEPCO and Tohoku Electric Power service areas, the target (15% reduction in maximum peak demand) was achieved. Compared to performance in the previous year on days with the same temperature, the reduction rate in the TEPCO area reached 27% for commercial-scale utility customers, 19% for individual consumers, and 11% for households, while the Tohoku Electric Power area achieved 18% reductions for commercial-scale utility customers, 17% for individual consumers, and 18% for households. Most results were much better than the targets (Table 2-2-1). In addition, both TEPCO and Tohoku Electric Power service areas achieved a

Table 2-2-1 Achievement of Targets for Maximum Peak Demand

Commercial-scale utility customers

Maximum peak demand (kW) (Peak for 9:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. on weekdays)	TEPCO area (about 14,800 orporations)	Tohoku Electric Power Co. area (about 3,700 porations)	Kansai Electric Power Co. area	Kyushu Electric Power Co. area
Target	▲15%	▲15%	▲10% or more	No numerical target set
Versus maximum value the previous year	▲29%	▲18%	▲9%	▲6%
Versus days with the same temperature	▲27% (exceeded the target)	▲18% (exceeded the target)	▲9% (same as target)	▲2%

Individual consumers

Maximum peak demand (kW)	TEPCO area	Tohoku Electric Power Co. area	Kansai Electric Power Co. area	Kyushu Electric Power Co. area
Target	▲15%	▲15%	▲10% or more	No numerical target set
Versus maximum value the previous year	▲19%	▲20%	▲10%	▲13%
Versus days with the same temperature	▲19% (exceeded the target)	▲17% (exceeded the target)	▲10% (same as target)	▲7%

Households

Maximum peak demand (kW)	TEPCO area	Tohoku Electric Power Co. area	Kansai Electric Power Co. area	Kyushu Electric Power Co. area
Target	▲15%	▲15%	▲10% or more	No numerical target set
Versus maximum value the previous year	▲6%	▲22%	▲14%	▲14%
Versus days with the same temperature	▲11% (below the target)	▲18% (exceeded the target)	▲4% (below the target)	▲7%
Electric power sales (kwh in August) the previous year	▲17%	▲17%	▲17%	▲9%

Source: Press release data from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (October 14, 2011)