of Police, immediately after the earthquake occurred. Furthermore, officers were dispatched to related agencies such as the Prime Minister's Office and relevant government ministries and agencies immediately after the earthquake to conduct tasks such as gathering and sharing information, and discussing responses to the emergency.

Chairman Nakano of the NPSC entering the Prime Minister’s Official Residence (shortly after the earthquake) (March 11 news)

## Column: Initial Reports of a Hydrogen Explosion

At 3:36pm on March 12, 2011, a hydrogen explosion occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Immediately after the explosion, police became aware of the situation through radio reports from a police car operating near the site stating that "white smoke was emanating from the power plant" and another from a helicopter stating that "from above it was evident that the power plant building had collapsed and the interior was visible". The Fukushima Prefectural Police immediately reported this to the NPA, and although the response to an inquiry to the Offsite Center was that no reports had been received from the power plant, a report was forwarded to the Prime Minister's Office. This report was the first notice sent to the Prime Minister's Office in relation to the hydrogen explosion in the No.1 reactor of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.

## 2 ) Police Facilities Damaged and Destroyed,

## Response to Disrupted Lifelines

Many police facilities including police headquarter buildings were damaged by the earthquake. As of June 4, 2012, 1 police headquarter branch office, 3 police stations, and 42 police boxes (Koban)/residential police boxes were unusable.

As the Fukushima Prefectural Police Headquarters sustained heavy damage, police responded by transferring disaster security headquarters functions to maintain functional integrity and also proceeded in the restoration of damaged police facilities and secured substitute facilities.

## Main Issues for Review on Establishing Initial Response Structure

- Although police were able to respond quickly in establishing structures following this earthquake, in order to be prepared for instances when disasters occur out of office hours at night or on national holidays a thorough re-check of the methods of establishing structures and other matters for contacting personnel and assembling security headquarters officers and other staff should be conducted.

- Review of operational continuity structures in preparation for disasters, such as securing backup structures, including transfer of disaster security headquarters, and considerations for the expansion of stockpiled emergency food supplies and other items in order to promote swift and accurate police activities even in cases where police buildings have been destroyed or when lifelines have been disrupted.

## (2) Organization and Operation of Units

## 1 ) Organization of Units

The police in the three affected prefectures took up provisional working structures immediately after the earthquake and responded with the maximum number of available officers. In addition, other prefectural police forces dispatched the IERU as well as other units such as riot police units, Regional Police Bureau riot police units, the Community Police Special Dispatch Unit, and the Mobile Investigation Special Dispatch Unit to undertake such tasks as evacuation guidance/search and rescue for victims, searches for missing persons, autopsies and identification of bodies, securing of emergency traffic routes, victim support, patrols in the affected areas and crackdowns on crime. As of June 4, 2012, the total number of officers was about 956,800, reaching a maximum of about 4,800 officers per day.

## 2 ) Unit Operation Support

As the police in the three affected prefectures needed to allocate many officers to the search and rescue of victims and searches for missing persons and other tasks, they were unable to station enough personnel to process arriving units essential to the operation of dispatch units and the procurement of supplies, resulting in a number of problems. Consequently, on March 31, 2011, the NPA established the “NPA Support Office”, which, in collaboration with the MPD Support Office, responded to issues concerning the operation of dispatch units. Specifically, regarding the lack of officers processing arriving dispatch units, officers