This judgment is concerned with a number of points which arise from the Supreme Courts decision in Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13. That decision held the occupiers of a Stadium, David Coventry trading as RDC Promotions, and a Track, Moto Land UK Limited, liable in nuisance to the appellants, Katherine Lawrence and Raymond Shields. The appellants were the owners and occupiers of a residential bungalow, Fenland, some 850 yards away. The nuisance arose from the use of the Stadium for speedway racing and other motorcar racing, and the use of the Track for motorcycle racing and similar activities. The appellants brought their proceedings not only against Mr Coventry and Moto Land (the respondents), but also against their respective landlords, Terence Waters and Anthony Morley and a predecessor landlord (the landlords). The effect of the Supreme Courts decision was to reverse the Court of Appeal and restore the trial judges order, which was based on his finding that the respondents, but not the landlords, were liable in nuisance. By the time of the trial, Fenland was unoccupied due to a fire, and is still fire damaged today. The order made by the judge included: (i) An injunction against the respondents limiting the noise which could be emitted from the Stadium and the Track to take effect on 1 January 2012 or, if earlier, when Fenland is again fit for occupation; (ii) Permission to the parties to apply to vary the terms of this injunction not earlier than 1 October 2011; (iii) A provision dismissing the claims against the landlords; and (iv) A direction that the respondents pay 60% of the appellants costs. The effect of the Supreme Courts earlier decision is to restore the orders for an injunction and for damages, as well as the order for costs. Four further issues now arise: (1) Should the injunction be suspended until Fenland is rebuilt? (2) When should the parties be able to apply to the judge to vary the terms of the injunction? (3) Are the landlords also liable to the appellants in nuisance?; and (4) Does the order for costs against the respondents infringe article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention), which protects the right to a fair hearing? Lord Neuberger, with whom Lord Clarke and Lord Sumption agree, gives the main judgment. The injunction imposed by the judge against the respondents should be suspended until Fenland is fit to be occupied, subject to any party having liberty to apply at any time to vary or discharge the injunction. The respondents claim in nuisance against the landlords is dismissed as the landlords neither authorised nor participated in the nuisance. Lord Carnwath, with whom Lord Mance agrees, would have held that the landlords participated in, and were consequently liable for, the nuisance. Consideration of the respondents contention that the judges order for costs infringes the respondents rights under article 6 of the Convention is adjourned for a further hearing after notice is given to the Attorney General and the Secretary of State for Justice. The first two issues are of no general application, the third issue is of some significance, and the fourth issue concerns a matter which is important [4]. The two minor issues On the first issue, the injunction should not take effect before Fenland is restored, unless it could be shown that the fact that the injunction is still suspended in some way prevented Fenland being restored [6] [7]. On the second issue, there should not be a delay before the parties are able to apply to vary the injunction [8]. The third issue: the liability of the Landlords in nuisance The law relating to the liability of a landlord for his tenants nuisance is tolerably clear in terms of principle. In order to be liable a nuisance, the landlords either must have authorised it by letting the property or they must participate directly in the commission of the nuisance [11]. In the present case, there can be no question of the landlords having authorised the nuisance on the ground that it was an inevitable, or nearly certain, consequence of the letting the Stadium and the Track to the respondent tenants. The intended uses of the Stadium and the Track were known to the landlords at the time of the lettings and those uses have in fact resulted in nuisance, but that is not enough to render the landlords liable in nuisance as a result of the letting. It is clear that those uses could be, and could have been, carried on without causing a nuisance to the appellants [15]. Accordingly, if the claim in nuisance against the landlords is to succeed, it must be based on their active or direct participation [18]. Although there is little authority on the issue, the question whether a landlord has directly participated in a nuisance must be largely one of fact for the trial judge, rather than law [19]. The issue whether a landlord directly participated in his tenants nuisance must turn principally on what happened subsequent to the grant of the leases, although that may take colour from the nature and circumstances of the grant and what preceded it [20]. None of the factors upon which the appellants rely establish that the landlords authorised or participated in the nuisance [21] [30]. Lord Carnwath, with whom Lord Mance agrees, would have held that the landlords actively encouraged the tenants nuisance, and are therefore liable for that nuisance [66, 69]. The fourth issue: the level of costs The appellants costs at first instance consisted of three components in the light of the Court and Legal Services Act 1990, as amended by Part II of the Access to Justice Act 1999, and in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules: (1) Base costs: what their lawyers charged on the traditional basis; (2) Success fee: the lawyers were entitled to this because they were providing their services on a conditional fee (no win, no fee) basis; and (3) ATE premium: a sum payable to an insurer who agreed to underwrite the appellants potential liability to the respondents for their costs if the respondents had won. The appellants base costs were 398,000, the success fee was approximately 319,000, and the ATE premium was around 350,000. As a result of the judges order, therefore, the respondents are liable for over 640,000 of a total of around 1,067,000. Even if one ignores the success fee and ATE premium, the fact that it can cost two citizens 400,000 in legal fees to establish and enforce their right to live in peace in their home is on any view highly regrettable [32] [36]. The consequences of the judges order that the respondents pay 60% of the appellants costs means that they have to pay 60% of the 100% success fee as well as 60% of the ATE premium. The respondents contend that, if the court required them to pay 60% of the success fee and of the ATE premium, their rights under article 6 would be infringed [38]. In the light of the facts of this case and the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, it may be that the respondents are right in their contention that their liability for costs would be inconsistent with their Convention rights [41]. However, it is unclear whether such infringement of the respondents human rights, if established, should be recognised by a declaration of incompatibility or by other relief, and a declaration of incompatibility ought not to be made without the Government having the opportunity of addressing the court [42]. Accordingly, if the respondents wish to maintain their contention that article 6 is infringed by the order for costs in this case, the present appeal should be re listed for hearing before the Supreme Court, after appropriate notice has been given to the Attorney General and the Secretary of State for Justice [44].