The Supreme Court unanimously dismisses the Secretary of States Appeal holding that the Reception Directive can apply to second and subsequent applications for asylum. Lord Kerr delivered the judgment of the Court. The Supreme Court identified two principal issues in the appeal: (1) whether Article 11 of the Reception Directive applies to a person who has had an application for asylum in the United Kingdom finally determined against him when he makes a further application for asylum, and (2) whether the Court should apply for a reference to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the proper interpretation of the Reception Directive, in particular whether it is intended to cover only the first application for asylum made by an individual to a Member State (paras [8][9]). In relation to the first issue, considering the context in which the Reception Directive was made, it is clear that it was part of a comprehensive charter dealing with the various aspects of asylum applications. The Procedures Directive, which was adopted ten months after the Reception Directive was required to be transposed into national law and sets out minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, is part of that charter. Article 2 of both Directives contain virtually identical definitions for the terms application for asylum and applicant or asylum seeker. There can be no doubt that subsequent applications for asylum come within the definitions contained in Article 2 of the Procedures Directive. For the Secretary of State to be correct therefore, the expression application for asylum must be given a different meaning in each of two Directives. Whilst as a matter of general principle, later legislation should not operate to change the established meaning of an earlier enactment, the later legislation may give an insight into the proper interpretation of the earlier instrument. In any event, in this case the matter is put beyond doubt by an examination of the legislative history of the two measures (paras [14][15], [22][28]). The proposal for the Reception Directive makes it clear that it had always been intended not only that the definitions of applicant for asylum in both Directives should be the same but also that an application should not be regarded as having been subject to a final decision until all possible remedies had been pursued and determined. This can only mean that subsequent applications would fall within the definitions of application for asylum and asylum seeker in the Reception Directive. Accordingly, an application for asylum in the Reception Directive must be interpreted to include a subsequent application made after an original application has been determined and asylum seeker should be construed accordingly to include a person who makes such a subsequent application (paras [29][30]). Having decided to dismiss the appeals for the reasons set out above, the Court then considered the Secretary of States arguments that numerous anomalies would arise if the Reception Directive was held to apply to subsequent asylum claims. The Court concludes that none of the claimed anomalies leads to the view that it was intended that the Reception Directive should not apply to subsequent asylum applications. On the contrary, curious consequences would follow if the Reception were held not to apply to such applications (paras [33][42]). The Secretary of State further argued that if the Reception Directive is held to apply to subsequent applications for asylum, the potential for abuse of the system would be greatly increased. The Secretary of States concern was that applicants would bring wholly unmeritorious claims with the aim of delaying their removal and gaining access to the benefits that the Reception Directive confers. Whilst there was some force in the Secretary of States arguments in this context, the Court considers that the problem of unmeritorious applications should be dealt with not by disapplying the Reception Directive to all repeat applications but by identifying and disposing promptly of those which have no merit and ensuring that genuine applicants are not deprived of the minimum conditions that the Reception Directive provides for (paras [43][49]). On the second issue, the Court concluded, particularly in light of the legislative history of the Reception Directive and the Procedures Directive, that a reference to the ECJ was not required (paras [50][51]).