1. This appeal concerns the liability of the Appellants in relation to a family trust (“the Trust”) set up under Jersey law in 2005. 2. The 1st Appellant (“DBS Trustee”) was the trustee and held the only share of the 2nd Respondent (“Wise Lords”) as the sole trust asset. The 2nd Appellant (“DHJ Management”) was the sole director of Wise Lords. Madam Ji, a settlor and a beneficiary of the trust, was the investment adviser of Wise Lords and directed its investments. 3. In July and August 2008, during the unfolding global financial crisis, DBS Trustee and DHJ Management gave after-the-event approvals for three transactions entered into by Wise Lords, namely (i) an increase in Wise Lords’ credit facilities to USD100m; (ii) purchases of USD83m worth of AUD; and (iii) purchases of three decumulators (“Transactions”). As a result of AUD falling sharply against USD, Wise Lords suffered significant losses. 4. The courts below found DBS Trustee liable for grossly negligent breach of trust as trustee and DHJ Management liable for grossly negligent breach of fiduciary duty as director in approving the Transactions. As the Appellants’ breaches were held to have directly caused loss of the Trust assets, they were therefore ordered to pay equitable compensation to the Respondents. 5. The issues on appeal related to the bases on which the courts below found liability against the Appellants and ordered them to pay equitable compensation. The Appellants’ liability 6. The basis on which the courts below found the Appellants liable for gross negligence was that they owed a “high level supervisory duty” to the Respondents. 7. Jersey trust law applied to the Trust subject to the terms of the trust deed (“Trust Deed”). The Trust Deed contained what are commonly known as “anti-Bartlett” provisions, which relieved the trustee from any duty to interfere with or supervise the business of the Trust’s underlying company (i.e. Wise Lords), unless the trustee has actual knowledge of dishonesty in the conduct of the business. 8. The issue was whether, despite the “anti-Bartlett” provisions, the Appellants owed the “high level supervisory duty” as found by the trial judge and Court of Appeal, and whether they had breached such duty. 9. The Court held that there was no such duty and no such breach. 10. The existence of such a duty was inconsistent with the “anti-Bartlett” provisions. Such a duty would require DBS Trustee to query and disapprove of the Transactions, which would be interfering with Wise Lords’ business contrary to the terms of the Trust Deed. There was no actual knowledge of dishonesty that required DBS Trustee to interfere. 11. In any event, the Appellants’ approvals of the Transactions did not constitute gross negligence. While the Transactions were speculative and risky, the Trust Deed specifically allowed the taking of such risks. As such, the Appellants would still be protected by liability exemption clauses for any acts and omissions short of gross negligence. The proper approach to equitable compensation 12. Even if the Appellants were liable, the present case was not one where the trustee misapplied or lost the trust assets and was obliged to restore them to the trust. Rather, the present case would be categorised as involving a lack of appropriate skill or care causing a decrease in value of trust assets, for which any equitable compensation payable to the Respondents would be reparative in nature. In such a case, the courts would apply common law principles of foreseeability and remoteness to examine whether and to what extent the trustee’s breach had caused the loss in the trust assets. Discretion to deliver judgment despite post-hearing settlement 13. After the hearing but before judgment was delivered, the parties notified the Court that they had agreed to settle their dispute. The Court held that this did not necessarily prevent the publication of the judgment. The Court has discretion to deliver judgment even after a post-hearing settlement. The Court exercised its discretion to do so in this case because there are important issues of law involved and the Court’s judgment differed from those of the lower courts. DISPOSITION: 14. Accordingly, if the case had not been settled, the Court would have unanimously allowed the appeal.