1. The New Territories Small House Policy provides that a male New Territories Indigenous Inhabitant (“NTII”) may apply for permission, once in his lifetime, to erect a small house on a suitable site within his own village. Under the Policy, three kinds of grant are available for application: (1) free building licenses, (2) private treaty grants, and (3) exchanges. The Appellant sought judicial review of the Policy on the ground that it is unconstitutional for being discriminatory on the basis of birth, sex and social origin. All parties agreed that the Policy is, on its face, discriminatory. The central issue is whether it is protected by Article 40 of the Basic Law (“BL40”), which provides that: “The lawful traditional rights and interests of the indigenous inhabitants of the ‘New Territories’ shall be protected by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”. 2. The Court of First Instance (“CFI”) held that the rights or interests enjoyed by male NTIIs under the Policy (“Ding rights”) were “lawful” ones within the meaning of BL40 as “lawful” was merely descriptive of the Ding rights enjoyed by the male NTIIs in April 1990 when the Basic Law was promulgated. However, the Court held that private treaty grants and exchanges are not “traditional” rights and interests under BL40 because they are not traceable to the rights and interests enjoyed by NTIIs prior to the New Territories lease in 1898. Only free building licenses were held to be “traditional” rights for the purposes of BL40 because they are so traceable. The Policy was held to be unconstitutional to the extent of private treaty grants and exchanges. 3. On appeal, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) held that the Policy is constitutional in its entirety. A right or interest is “traditional” under BL40 if it was recognised as such by the Basic Law drafters at the time of its promulgation in April 1990. As at that date, all Ding rights were so recognised. Alternatively, even if they had to be “traceable” to 1898, they were so traceable as they originated from, and retained the essence of, the NTIIs’ pre-1898 custom of building a house for their own occupation on village land. The CA agreed with the CFI on the meaning of “lawful”. Ding rights are accordingly protected under BL40. In any event, the CA would have refused to grant relief on the grounds of standing and delay. 4. Before this Court, the Appellant argued that “lawful” means the scope of BL40 is qualified by, and ought to be interpreted in line with, the anti-discrimination provisions in Articles 25 and 39 of the Basic Law (“BL25” and “BL39”) and Article 22 of the Bill of Rights (“BOR22”). The Appellant also argued that “traditional” means the Ding rights have to be traceable to 1898 and they are not. The Respondents’ and the Interested Party’s case was that BL40 limits and qualifies the application of the anti-discrimination provisions, not the other way round. They also argued that “traditional” means traditional by 1990, not 1898. The proper construction of BL40 5. The Court rejected the Appellant’s arguments. The starting point is to identify the nature of the “right” or “interest” which an applicant under the Policy may be said to have. The Policy is implicitly acknowledged in several ordinances and the Basic Law itself, but does not have a statutory basis. The Policy is applied as a matter of administrative discretion. Accordingly, the relevant right is founded entirely on public law. It is a right to have one’s application dealt with in accordance with the criteria laid down in the government’s statements of current policy, subject to the lawfully exercised discretion of the Lands Department. It falls within “rights and interests” in BL40. 6. The word “lawful” in BL40 refers to the lawfulness of the way that the discretion to make a grant under the Policy is exercised as a matter of public law. The relevant right or interest of an applicant under the Policy is lawful if such discretion is lawfully exercised. “Lawful” in BL40 is not intended to refer to the absence of discrimination forbidden by BL25, BL39 and BOR22, whose application in the special context of indigenous rights is excluded by BL40. 7. Furthermore, this Court held that the CA was correct to find that the word “traditional” in BL40 is to be determined by reference to the state of affairs in April 1990, and does not require that a protected right or interest be traceable to the period before 1898. BL40 does not say this, nor is such an approach necessary to give effect to BL40. The principle of traceability is not implicit in the concept of tradition as a matter of language. More importantly, such an interpretation is not consistent with the purpose of BL40. In line with the principle of continuity, the fact that only male descendants of pre-1898 villagers were eligible under the Policy was part of the description of the system which the HKSAR inherited and which BL40 intends to protect. Standing and delay 8. The Court disagreed with the CA on the issues of standing and delay. On delay, this Court observed that the rule that judicial reviews must be brought promptly has never been absolute. When, as in this case, the proceedings concern some general issue of legal or constitutional principle, prejudice to individuals or disruption to good administration are less likely and the public importance of having the issue resolved is greater. If a policy is unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful, it is in the public interest that the court should say so. Thus, the CFI Judge’s decision to grant relief (on the view that he took of the merits) was within his discretion. 9. On standing, when an applicant does not have a direct interest in the subject matter of the case, but seeks to raise a general legal or constitutional issue, the crucial question is whether the purpose of judicial review and the rule of law will be served by allowing him to proceed. The CFI was right to hold that the Appellant has standing because the only people who would have a greater interest in the constitutionality of the Policy are beneficiaries of the Policy who clearly have no interest in challenging it. Disposition 10. Accordingly, the Court unanimously dismissed the appeal.