1. The Appellants were unsuccessful in their applications for the issue of dependant visas by the Respondent. They applied to the Court of First Instance for leave to apply for judicial review to challenge the Respondent’s decisions. Since both applications were considerably outside the 3-month time limit under Order 53 rule 4 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A) (“RHC”), the Appellants each applied for an extension of time in which to apply for leave to apply for judicial review. In both cases, Chow J dismissed the application for extension of time and refused leave to apply for judicial review. 2. The Appellants applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against Chow J’s decisions under section 14AA(1) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4) (“HCO”), which provides that leave to appeal is required to appeal against an interlocutory judgment or order. The Court of Appeal dismissed both applications. The Court of Appeal further dismissed the Appellants’ applications for leave to appeal to this Court, on the ground that section 14AB of the HCO states that the Court of Appeal’s decision as to whether leave to appeal to it should be granted is final. 3. The main issue in these appeals was whether section 14AA(1) of the HCO applies to a decision by a judge of the Court of First Instance to refuse extension of time to apply for leave to apply for judicial review, so that leave is required to appeal to the Court of Appeal. If leave to appeal is required, the Appellants further argued that section 14AB of the HCO is inconsistent with Article 82 of the Basic Law, which provides that the power of final adjudication of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the Court of Final Appeal, insofar as section 14AB restricts appeals to this Court in judicial review proceedings. 4. Section 21K(3) of the HCO and Order 53 rule 3(1) of the RHC provide that an application for judicial review can only be made when leave to apply has been granted. Order 53 rule 4(1) of the RHC states that an application for leave to apply for judicial review shall be made promptly, and in any event within 3 months, but the court retains a discretion to extend time where it considers there is good reason to do so. Section 21K(6) of the HCO states that when the Court of First Instance considers that there has been undue delay in making an application for leave to apply for judicial review, the court may refuse to grant leave if the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause hardship or prejudice or be detrimental to good administration. 5. Order 59 rule 21(1)(g) of the RHC provides that section 14AA(1) of the HCO does not apply to an order under Order 53 rule 3 refusing to grant leave to apply for judicial review. 6. The Court held that, upon proper construction of Order 53 rule 4(1) of the RHC and section 21K(6) and (7) of the HCO, the issue of delay is intrinsically bound up with the question of whether leave to apply for judicial review should be granted. A decision by a judge of the Court of First Instance to refuse extension of time is therefore not a discrete and separate decision. It leads to, and is part and parcel of, the decision to refuse leave to apply for judicial review. Such decision falls within the exception in Order 59 rule 21(1)(g) of the RHC, so that leave to appeal is not required. By reason of this conclusion, it was unnecessary for the Court to consider the issue of the compatibility of section 14AB of the HCO with Article 82 of the Basic Law in relation to judicial review proceedings. DISPOSITION: 7. Accordingly, the Court unanimously allowed the appeals, to the extent that the Appellants did not require leave to appeal against Chow J’s decisions to the Court of Appeal. The further course of the appeals would depend on the Appeal Committee’s consideration of the other questions of law for which leave to appeal to the Court was sought by the Appellants and these would be dealt with on a date to be fixed.