Mr Leung Chun Ying (“Mr Leung”) was declared the returned candidate in the elections for the Chief Executive held on 25 March 2012. On 4 July 2012, Mr Ho Chun Yan Albert (“Mr Ho”), a candidate in the same election, lodged an election petition and on 5 July 2012, Mr Ho and Mr Leung Kwok Hung both issued a notice of application of leave to apply for judicial review. All three proceedings put in issue whether Mr Leung was duly elected, alleging that he made false or misleading statements in the course of the election which amounted to illegal conduct within the meaning of the Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Conduct) Ordinance (Cap 554) and that this rendered him not a “person of integrity, dedicated to his or her duties” for the purposes of Article 47(1) of the Basic Law. On 30 July 2012, the Court of First Instance refused leave to apply for judicial review, ruling that Mr Ho and Mr Leung Kwok Hung cannot rely on grounds for election petitions in a judicial review, that Mr Ho has abused the process in bringing both an election petition and judicial review in relation to the same matter and that the challenge based on Article 47 of the Basic Law was unsustainable. In a judgment of 12 September 2012, the Court of First Instance held that in relation to Mr Ho’s out-of-time election petition, the 7-day time limit contained in s34(1) of the Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap 569) (“CEEO”) was unconstitutional. A remedial interpretation was adopted and the section was held to be subjected to the court’s discretion to extend time. However, the Court of First Instance held that the complaints made by Mr Ho against Mr Leung did not have any real prospect of success, thus the extension of time to lodge the election petition was refused on 5 October 2012. The judge ordered Mr Ho and Mr Leung Kwok Hung each to pay half of the costs of Mr Leung on 28 September 2012. The Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal held in the Determination of 13 November 2012 that no reasonably arguable grounds existed to appeal the Court of First Instance judgment regarding Mr Leung’s statements in relation to the unauthorized building works at his home. The challenges made by Mr Ho and Mr Leung Kwok Hung were disposed of but in view of the importance of some of the issues raised, leave was granted on two issues: (1) the scope of election petitions in the CEEO and their relationship to judicial review and other proceedings; and (2) the constitutionality of the absolute 7-day time limit for lodging election petitions in s34(1) of the CEEO. On the first issue, the Court emphasised the importance of considering the context and purpose of relevant provisions when engaging in statutory interpretation. In the present case, election of the Chief Executive is obviously of great importance and interest to Hong Kong people, thus the sooner any doubts as to election results are resolved the better. S32(1) of the CEEO stipulated grounds on which election petitions may be brought to challenge the result and s33 identifies the category of persons who may lodge an election petition (e.g. candidates in the election like Mr Ho) (“s33 persons”). S34 provides that the time limit for lodging an election petition is 7 days after declaration of an election result. Given this elaborate structure, the Court held that the intention must have been for election petitions to be the primary and most speedy means of questioning the result since a s33 person will likely be the class of persons most affected by an adverse election result. The limited time allowed for lodging of election petitions indicated speed was of essence. The Court held that where results of an election are challenged by someone within the class of s33 persons on the grounds set out in s32(1) of the CEEO, this can only be done by way of election petition. Judicial review is not available to any s33 persons on these grounds, but they may bring judicial review proceedings on any grounds other than those in s32(1) provided the usual requirements for judicial review proceedings have been satisfied. As for non s33 persons, nothing in the CEEO excludes them from relying on the s32(1) grounds or otherwise to bring judicial review proceedings. Again, the usual requirements for judicial review proceedings, including whether the applicant has sufficient standing to bring the action, have to be satisfied. On whether the 7-day absolute time limit to lodge an election petition pursuant to s34(1) is unconstitutional where it infringes the right of access to courts under Article 35 of the Basic Law, the Court held that the right of access to courts is not absolute and the restriction did not impair the essence of this constitutional right. The purpose of s34 is to ensure that any challenges to elections take place quickly so that the certainty of the election of the Chief Executive can be achieved as quickly as possible. The time limit is not unduly short, given the class of persons entitled to lodge election petitions proceedings are those who can be expected to have been intimately involved in an election and to pay close attention to the activities of their opponents. This time limit is in line with those imposed for similar proceedings in other jurisdictions and it being non-extendable is by no means unusual. Further, a due margin of appreciation should be accorded by the court to the legislature in deciding whether a 7-day time limit is appropriate since elections involve not only access to court considerations but also political and policy ones. The Court further noted that where one or more of the grounds in s32(1) only came to light after the 7-day limit, the election petition procedure does not provide the only means of redress since there exist judicial review proceedings, criminal proceedings or simple political realities. The 7-day absolute time limit is thus not unconstitutional. In respect of the cost appeal, since the Court differed from the reasoning of the Judge in the 30 July 2012 judgment although the effect of the Court’s decisions is the same, the Judge’s order for cost should be set aside and that there be no order as to cost. The Court made no order as to costs in respect of these three appeals since both Mr Leung and Mr Ho have to an extent succeeded but also failed in relation both to outcome as well as in their submissions on various issues.