The 2nd and 3rd Appellants are partners of the 1st Appellant, a firm of Certified Public Accountants. The Respondent is the principal regulator of the accountancy profession. There were concerns over the standard of the Appellants’ work as the auditors of Tiffit Securities (Hong Kong) Ltd. after Tiffit was found to have misappropriated substantial numbers of securities held for its clients. Pursuant to the Professional Accountants Ordinance (PAO), an Investigation Committee (“IC”) was appointed by the Respondent to investigate the matter. It had to decide whether there was a prima facie case against the Appellants. If so, the Council of the Respondent would then decide whether to constitute a disciplinary committee. A consultant, hired by the Council to assist the IC, examined the relevant evidence and prepared a draft report stating that there was a prima facie case against the Appellants. The meetings of the IC were attended by the consultant and by officers of the Compliance Department of the Respondent. The IC adopted the draft report. The Appellants complained, among others, that the IC was not acting independently and impartially, as manifested in an appearance of “simply rubber stamping a draft report which was wholly or substantially prepared by the staff”. The Appellants also requested the Council to reconstitute a different IC. The Council rejected the Appellants’ complaints about the IC and refused to reconstitute a different IC. The Appellants sought judicial review of the Council’s decisions.The trial judge rejected the Appellants’ arguments on the facts and dismissed the Appellants’ application for judicial review. Both the Court of Appeal and Court of Final Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision. The Court observed from the outset that it is difficult to relate either of the impugned decisions to any exercise of statutory power by the Council. The Council does not have a statutory function of resolving complaints about an IC or duty to reconstitute a different IC. The Court also found it difficult to relate the challenges to the decisions to the recognized grounds of judicial review of administrative action. The Appellants advanced three criticisms of the reasoning of the lower courts, but were all rejected by the Court. The first criticism was that the trial judge wrongly sanctioned and applied, and the Court of Appeal wrongly approved, a variable or flexible standard of independence and impartiality. The Court examined the statutory scheme under the PAO in relation to the complaints and disciplinary procedures. In particular, having regard to the nature and work of the IC, the Court found that, at least in substantial cases, the IC will need assistance, and the assistance of people such as the consultant in the present appeal and the officers of the Compliance Department is clearly within legislative contemplation. The Court noted that the IC is undoubtedly obliged to act fairly and to be, and appear to be, independent and impartial. However, while recognizing that the concept of independence and impartiality does not vary in its meaning as between different kinds of administrative body, the Court held that the practical content of such concept varies according to circumstances which include the functions assigned to the body, and its place in a wider statutory scheme. Conduct that may compromise the appearance of independence and impartiality of one person or body required to form an opinion for the purpose of one statutory scheme may not have that effect in the case of another. The function of investigation, even where it is required by statute to be performed independently and impartially, almost always involves contact between the investigator and third parties. The circumstances of the case will determine what is a fair and efficient procedure. In this respect, the PAO is not prescriptive. The investigative process will be tailored to the individual case; some investigations may call for more extensive outside input and assistance than others. In the end, what was essential was that the IC made up its own mind, and formed its own opinion, on the question it was directed by the Council to consider, and then informed the Council of its opinion. The Court pointed out that the issue faced by the lower courts was whether the IC and those upon whom it relied for assistance created a reasonable apprehension that the IC was not independent and impartial. This is a question of fact. The Court held that in answering that question in the negative, the lower courts rightly recognized that the kind of conduct that may warrant an apprehension of lack of independence and impartiality in the case of one kind of statutory body or tribunal may not do so in the case of another. The Appellants’ first criticism was rejected. The Appellants’ second criticism was that the courts should not have relied on the evidence given by one of the IC members. The Appellants argued that since their case was based on appearances of lack of independence and impartiality, evidence from the IC member that he made up his own mind in the decision-making process of the IC was irrelevant. The Court rejected this criticism and pointed out that the evidence that the IC member made up his own mind was prefatory to an account of the IC’s work and procedure. Such an account is relevant and admissible. Where a court, undertaking judicial review, has to deal with an allegation that a decision-making process was such as to create in the mind of a reasonable person an appearance of bias or lack of independence and impartiality, evidence which gives a full account of the objective facts and circumstances of the process will often be necessary. In the present case, given the nature of the Appellants’ challenge to the work of the IC, the lower courts were entitled, and obliged, to consider all the objective facts concerning that process referred to in the IC member’s evidence, regardless of whether they were known to the Appellants at the time the allegation was first made. Further, the Court noted that such evidence was in reply to allegation put to the IC member, and held that the allegation was made in terms that invited the response that was given, and the response was relevant. The third criticism was that the Court of Appeal failed to apply a relevant case law. That case was distinguished by the Court on the basis that it concerned a body that made decisions dealing with the merits of charges of professional misconduct, and therefore not applicable to the present case.