1. The testatrix, Nina Kung, passed away leaving a home-made Chinese will dated 28 July 2002 (the “Will”) that bequeathed all of her properties to the Appellant, a registered Hong Kong charitable company. After introductory words, the Will contained four clauses, which are summarised as follows: - Clause 1 contained a gift of Nina’s property to the Foundation. - Clause 2 contained provisions about the appointment of a managing organisation to supervise the Foundation, about the continuation of existing projects, and about the funding of “a Chinese prize of worldwide significance to that of the Nobel Prize”. - Clause 3 related to the Foundation’s management of the Chinachem Group [for both business and charitable purposes]. - Clause 4 contained provisions about the Foundation providing support for members of the family of Nina’s late husband Teddy Wang (“Teddy”), and staff of the Chinachem Group and their children. 2. The principal issue that divided the Foundation and the Secretary for Justice in the proceedings was whether the Foundation should take the properties bequeathed to it (i) as a gift absolutely for the general charitable objects set out in its memorandum; or (ii) as a charitable trustee and be obliged to give effect to all or some of the directions in clauses 2, 3, and 4 of the Will. 3. The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal held that the language used in clauses 2, 3, and 4 of the Will was imperative in nature and sufficiently clear that the Foundation would hold the estate as a trustee and would be obliged to give effect to clauses, 2, 3, and 4 of the Will in so far as it would be possible. 4. The Court of Final Appeal held that the words of the home-made Will must be read and understood in their context, and that the Will must be read as a whole. The Court further held that a gift to a charitable company is a gift to the company unless it was sufficiently clear that the imposition of a trust was intended. 5. In the present case, the Court considered the effects of the imperative language and specific phrases used in the entire context of the home-made Will, and held it was sufficiently clear that clause 2(2) imposed a trust for charitable purposes. The alternative argument, that the clause 2(2) imposed a personal obligation on the Foundation, was held to be unworkable and unnatural. 6. The Court held that clause 3, which concerned the administration and management of the trust property rather than the application of its income for charitable purposes, must be taken to be aspirational or declaratory in nature. The Court held that the objects in clause 4 were discretionary, the powers of which the Foundation would have an obligation to consider exercising from time to time. In view of the foregoing findings, the Court concluded that the Foundation would hold the entire estate as a trustee and would not receive any part of the estate as an absolute gift. 7. Finally, the Court further held that the language of 2(1) was sufficiently clear to indicate that Nina wished to “entrust” the Foundation to the supervision of a managing organization outside the Foundation, and accordingly the Court would exercise its inherent jurisdiction to establish a scheme for the administration of the charitable trusts under the Will. 8. Accordingly, the appeal was unanimously dismissed.