In dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the judgment of Andrew Chan J dated 13 October 2017 finding him liable of criminal contempt, the Court of Appeal held: As regards whether proof of specific intent to interfere with administration of justice is required 1. In Hong Kong where the rule of law reigns, the due administration of justice can in no way be obstructed or interfered with. When executing court orders, bailiffs act as an extended arm of the court in administering justice. Public policy dictates that bailiffs must be fully protected by the law from obstruction or interference by parties when executing orders against them in the discharge of their duty. Thus obstructing or interfering with a bailiff in discharge of his duty when executing a court order by a party bound by the order amounts to a criminal contempt, and proof of a specific intent to interfere with the administration of justice is not required. 2. The present case is a particular strong case for holding that proof of a specific intent to interfere with the administration of justice is not required: (1) The appellant was a party to the underlying proceedings bound by the Amended Injunction Order, yet he had acted in breach of the same by conducting himself in the manner complained of. (2) The Amended Injunction was widely publicized through the local media. It targeted at the sizeable crowd of occupiers who had been unlawfully occupying large portions of several main public roads in Kowloon for quite a long time, thereby creating serious obstruction and interference with normal vehicular access which had been seriously affecting the livelihood of the Plaintiffs and causing significant inconvenience and nuisance to the public at large. The purpose of the Amended Injunction Order was to immediately restore the normal vehicular traffic to the public roads affected and remove the public nuisance occasioned pending the final determination of the disputes between the parties by court process, which might well take some time to conclude. There were accordingly considerable public interests involved in the occupiers fully obeying the Amended Injunction in a timely manner. The public at large as well as the court itself had very substantial interests in seeing that was done. (3) Given the immense public interests involved in the due administration of justice by the appellant complying with the Amended Injunction Order, by thwarting it in the manner complained of, the appellant had seriously (a) frustrated its very purpose; (b) undermined the public confidence in its effective enforcement; (c) diminished the respect for it as a court order and the court’s authority in granting it; and (d) defied the bailiff’s authority in enforcing it. His conduct had seriously interfered with the administration of justice by the established courts of law as a whole and constituted an affront to the rule of law. His conduct plainly warranted the imposition of a punitive sanction. (4) Involvement of the bailiff for execution of the Amended Injunction Order became necessary when there had been a real and substantial risk that the due administration of justice and the respect for the authority of the court and therefore the rule of law would be seriously undermined. Plainly, without the bailiff’s involvement, execution of the Amended Injunction Order in the then prevailing circumstances would be extremely difficult if not impossible. The court appointed the bailiff to execute the Amended Injunction Order with a view to arresting the imminent and serious risk of interference with the administration of justice posed by the occupiers’ continuous disobedience and flouting of the injunctions granted by the court. Through the wide publication of the judgment in granting the Amended Injunction Order in the local media, the appellant must have been fully aware of the reason why the bailiff was so appointed. When the appellant breached the Amended Injunction Order in the manner complained of, he knew that his conduct was more than a breach. He knew that the very terms that he had breached, that is, those that specifically envisaged the involvement of the bailiff, were provided for in the Amended Injunction Order to prevent interference with the administration of justice. He knew by committing the breach, he had interfered with the due administration of justice. On those facts, the deliberate and knowing breach of the Amended Injunction Order was in substance the same as the specific intent to interfere with the administration of justice, and the latter was therefore unnecessary and not required. As regards the findings of fact made by the trial judge 3. All the factual findings made by Andrew Chan J in respect of how the appellant had conducted himself on 26 November 2014 were upheld. Not only were these findings of fact not “plainly wrong” – the threshold for the Court of Appeal to disturb on appeal a finding of fact by a trial court, they were in fact “plainly right”. Based on those findings, it was beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had by so conducting himself, including obstructing the bailiff officers in discharge of their duty when executing the Amended Injunction Order, interfered with the due administration of justice.