1. The matter underlying these appeals was connected with the case of Ao Man-long (“Ao”), formerly Secretary for Transport and Public Works in Macau, who was convicted there on multiple counts of corruption, money laundering and related offences. Madam Tam Kit-I (“Tam”), who resided in Macau, had a bank account at the Wing Hang Bank in Hong Kong (“Account”). In 2006, there were transfers of funds between Tam’s Account and certain accounts maintained or controlled by Ao. It was alleged that those funds were the proceeds of corrupt transactions involving Ao. After Ao was arrested, a balance of $22.4 million remained in the Account. The appeal concerned the fate of that balance. 2. The authorities in Hong Kong initially contemplated proceedings against Tam under the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Cap. 201). In 2007, they obtained a restraining order under that ordinance freezing the Account. Later, the authorities shifted their focus to a potential charge of money laundering under the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 455) (“OSCO”). Thus, on 12 January 2011, prosecutors obtained a magistrate’s warrant for Tam’s arrest for such offence. Then, on 14 January 2011, the Secretary for Justice (“SJ”) obtained a restraint order under OSCO, again freezing the Account (“the Restraint Order”). The court later ordered the Restraint Order to be extended and to remain in force until further order of the court. Those orders were served on Tam in Macau. Apart from one occasion in June 2008 when she came to Hong Kong and left on the same day, she has remained outside the jurisdiction, so no criminal proceedings against her have taken place. 3. In 2014, the SJ applied under section 8(1)(a)(ii)(B) of OSCO to confiscate the funds in the Account on the basis that Tam had absconded. Campbell-Moffat J (“the Judge”) dismissed the application. She did so on the basis that Tam had not been shown to have absconded without embarking on the process of inquiry and determination prescribed by sections 8(3) to 11 for deciding whether to grant a confiscation order. The Judge held, however, that the Restraint Order remained in force. 4. In 2019, Tam applied to discharge the Restraint Order. Relying on sections 2(16A)(a) and 15(5)(b) of OSCO, Tam contended that the Restraint Order was automatically discharged when the Judge decided in 2016 not to grant the confiscation order sought. The Judge rejected that argument, holding that those sections did not apply to discharge the Restraint Order since the reason for her refusal of the confiscation order sought was that Tam had not been shown to have absconded. 5. The Court of Appeal allowed Tam’s appeal. The court held that sections 2(16A)(a) and 15(5)(b) operated to discharge the Restraint Order when the Judge decided not to grant the confiscation order sought, no matter what the reason for that decision was. 6. The Appeal Committee granted leave to appeal to this Court on two questions. Leave was initially granted to the SJ to appeal from the Court of Appeal’s judgment following both civil and criminal routes of appeal (FACV 12/2022 and FACC 4/2022). However, concerns were canvassed at the leave hearing as to the possibility that the Court of Appeal’s judgment was a nullity, depending on this Court’s decision as to whether the appeal should be characterised as civil or criminal. Consequently, the parties took steps to cater for different contingencies with appropriate fresh orders issued for the grant of leave. 7. The two questions arising on these appeals were as follows: (a) Whether a restraint order freezing certain assets made under OSCO fell to be discharged as a matter of law where the court decided not to grant an application for a confiscation order (“Question 1”); (b) Whether an appeal relating to the discharge of such a restraint order was to be characterised for procedural and jurisdictional appellate purposes as civil or criminal (“Question 2”). Restraint order not discharged unless purpose spent 8. On Question 1, this Court held that the Judge’s decision not to grant a confiscation order on the basis of her conclusion that Tam had not absconded did not result in the automatic discharge of the Restraint Order. On a proper contextual and purposive construction of the OSCO provisions, a restraint order would be discharged pursuant to those sections only if the purpose of that order was spent, as where there was no longer any extant or prospective confiscation order for the enforcement of which the freezing of the affected assets had to continue. In the present case, the Judge’s decision to refuse the confiscation order sought was taken for a reason which did not involve any decision on the merits of the application. It was also taken without eliminating the prospect of a confiscation order eventually being made, for example, upon Tam’s demise pursuant to section 8(1)(a)(ii)(A). The mere fact that the Judge had decided not to grant the confiscation order sought was not itself sufficient to trigger discharge of the Restraint Order. The Court of Appeal was wrong to hold that the reason for a court’s decision not to grant a confiscation order did not matter. Judge’s approach to “abscond” doubted 9. Although not strictly arising for consideration, this Court questioned the correctness of the Judge’s approach to the meaning of “abscond” under OSCO, and decided to review her reasoning for future reference. Without seeking to define the term, the Court considered the essence of “abscond” to involve the evasion of apprehension to face criminal proceedings for the offence concerned. In deciding whether a person had absconded, there was no requirement that the person must have been arrested or charged, or for proceedings to have been instituted, prior to the person’s act of absconding. On the facts of the present case, it was hard to avoid the conclusion that Tam was an absconder evading arrest. Had this been the Judge’s conclusion, the disposal of the SJ’s confiscation application would have followed a more normal course of events focusing on the merits of that application. Appeal relating to discharge of restraint order civil in character 10. On Question 2, this Court held that decisions relating to restraint orders are civil in character. The regime for the enforcement of confiscation orders underlies decisions relating to restraint orders. Despite the criminal nature of proceedings for a confiscation order, the enforcement regime is collateral to the criminal process and is civil in character. Therefore, in the present case, the appeal against the Judge’s decision refusing to discharge the Restraint Order was civil in character. The Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and in giving its judgment the Court of Appeal was properly constituted. Disposition 11. Accordingly, this Court unanimously allowed the appeal in FACV 12/2022 (being the civil appeal from the Court of Appeal’s judgment) and set aside the Court of Appeal’s order discharging the Restraint Order. There was no need to make any order in the other appeals. They were accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.