1. These proceedings concern the questions (a) whether the oaths purportedly taken by Mr. Leung and Ms. Yau at the LegCo meeting on 12 October 2016 before the Clerk to the LegCo (“the Clerk”) contravene the requirements under Art. 104 of the Basic Law (“BL104”) and/or the Oaths and Declarations Ordinance (“ODO”), and (b) if so, whether they shall be regarded as having vacated their respective office (“the Office”) of a LegCo member as a matter of law. 2. BL104 constitutionally mandates, among others, an elected LegCo member when assuming his office to take an oath in accordance with the laws under the ODO (a) to swear to uphold the Basic Law and (b) to swear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. 3. Sections 16 and 19 of the ODO further require that a LegCo member elect must take the Legislative Council Oath (“the LegCo Oath”) which is in the form prescribed under the ODO. Section 21 of the ODO further relevantly provides that if a LegCo member who “declines or neglects” to take the LegCo Oath when requested to do so shall vacate the Office (if he has already entered on it); or shall be disqualified from entering on it (if he has not yet entered on it). 4. There is no dispute among the parties that, on 12 October 2016, Mr. Leung and Ms. Yau purported to take the oath in the following ways and manners: (a) Each of them used the term “Hong Kong nation” at the outset of the oath-taking; (b) After the interjection by the Clerk, each of them mispronounced the word “China” as “Geen-na” or “Sheen-na” (“支那”); (c) Ms. Yau mis-pronounced “People’s Republic of China” as “the People’s Refucking of Sheen-na”; (d) Each of them unfolded and displayed a blue banner bearing the words “HONG KONG IS NOT CHINA”; (e) Mr. Leung displayed dismissive and not-serious tone in taking the oath after the Clerk’s interjection and crossed his index and middle finger of his right hand over the Bible; and (f) Ms. Yau emphasized “Hong Kong” with a distinctly loud tone of voice but adopted a lower voice and hurried manner for the rest of the oath. 5. The Court notes that Mr. Leung and Ms. Yau have not put forward any positive case by way of submissions or evidence that the oaths they purportedly took on 12 October 2016 complied with BL104 or the requirements under the ODO. Nor have they put forward any positive case by way of submissions or evidence that their above conducts did not amount to declining or neglecting to take the LegCo Oath under BL104 or the ODO. 6. Instead, Mr. Leung and Ms. Yau oppose the application on the principal grounds that the court could or should not intervene in the matters now under challenged in light of: (1) the non-intervention principle; and (2) the LegCo member’s immunity provided under Article 77 of the Basic Law (“BL77”) and sections 3 and 4 of the Legislative Council (Power and Privilege Ordinance (Cap 382) (“LCPPO”). So far as the President is concerned, his only objection is that he should not be joined as a party in these proceedings. 7. On 7 November 2016, in exercise of its power under Article 158 of the Basic Law (“BL158”) the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“NPCSC”) pronounced an interpretation of the meaning of BL104 (“the Interpretation”). The Interpretation is binding on all Hong Kong courts and the courts should give effect to it[1]. 8. Relevant for the present purposes, the meaning of BL104 under the Interpretation essentially provides that an elected LegCo member when assuming office must take the LegCo Oath as prescribed under the ODO (being the laws of HKSAR) solemnly and sincerely and in compliance with it both in substance and in form. If he intentionally declines to so take the LegCo Oath, whether in form or in substance, the oath taken is invalid and he shall be disqualified from assuming the Office. 9. On the other hand, the Court also accepts CE/SJ’s submissions that the laws of Hong Kong as set out in relevant provisions of the ODO, when properly construed independent of the Interpretation, carry effectively the same meanings and legal effects as those of the above meaning of BL104. 10. Adopting a purposive construction and common law[2], the Court holds that sections 16, 19 and 21 of the ODO have the following meanings and effects[3]: (a) These relevant provisions in the ODO reflect and underline the requirements under BL104; (b) A LegCo member must take the oath as soon as possible after being elected and before his assumption of office; (c) A LegCo member must take the oath in the same form, manner and substance of the LegCo Oath as prescribed under the ODO; (d) An oath must be taken solemnly and sincerely and is a form of attestation by which a person signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully. An oath of allegiance or loyalty means that a person promises and binds himself to bear true allegiance to a particular sovereign and government and to support its constitution. In determining the validity of the taking of an oath, the essential question to be answered is whether it can be seen objectively that the person taking the oath faithfully and truthfully commits himself or herself to uphold and abide by the obligations set out in the oath. (e) For the purposes of the ODO, the word “decline” means an intentional act to refuse or object to the taking of the oath as prescribed by law; and the word “neglect” means a deliberate or willful (in contrast to an inadvertent or accidental) omission to perform the duty to take the oath as prescribed. (f) If a LegCo member “declines or neglects” to take the LegCo Oath whether in form or in substance, by the operation of law, he must (“shall”) be regarded as having vacated his office if he has entered upon it, or be disqualified from entering his office if he has not done so. 11. The Court agrees with the CE/SJ that the undisputed and unchallenged evidence in the present cases shows that (a) Mr. Leung and Ms. Yau had been requested to take the LegCo Oath on 12 October 2016, (b) the manner and way in which they purported to take the oaths show objectively and clearly that they did not truthfully and faithfully intend to commit themselves to uphold and abide by the two obligations under the LegCo Oath and BL104, as they objectively clearly did not recognize the principle of “one country, two systems” and the importance of “one country” under that principle, which (as well recognized by the Court of Final Appeal[4]) is the foundation for the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under the People’s Republic of China and of the Hong Kong’s constitutional model under the Basic Law. 12. In the premises, Mr. Leung and Ms. Yau therefore objectively manifested a clear conduct to refuse (thus “decline”) to take the LegCo Oath, whether in form or in substance, as required under BL104 and the ODO. It is again noted that neither Mr. Leung nor Ms. Yau has suggested otherwise by way of submissions or evidence. 13. In such circumstances, s.21 of ODO should apply and operate as a matter of law to disqualify Mr. Leung and Ms. Yau from continuing to be a LegCo member. 14. The Court rejects the opposition ground based on the non-intervention principle. The principle has its origin in common law based on the doctrine of separation of powers as practised in England, where there is the principle of Parliamentary supremacy and the absence of a written constitution. The extent and limit of this principle’s application in another jurisdiction must be subject to and considered in the context of that other jurisdiction, in particular where there is a written constitution. 15. In Hong Kong, there is a written mini-constitution of the Basic Law and the Basic Law is supreme instead of the legislature (see: Cheng Kar Shun v. Li Fung Ying[5]). The scope and limit of the non-intervention principle as applied in Hong Kong has since been laid down by the CFA in Leung Kwok Hung v. The President of the Legislative Council (No. 1)[6]. Deriving from the CFA’s judgment: (1) the principle of non-intervention as applied in Hong Kong is necessarily subject to the constitutional requirements of the Basic Law; (2) where the Basic Law confers law-making powers and functions on the legislature, the court has powers to determine whether the legislature has a particular power, privilege or immunity; and (3) what can be properly regarded as the “internal business” or “internal process” of the LegCo must be viewed under the above caveat. 16. Applying the above principles, the non-intervention principle as applied in Hong Kong therefore does not prohibit the court from determining the questions of (a) whether an oath taken by the LegCo member complies with the important constitutional requirements under BL104 (and hence also the legal requirements under the ODO), and (b) whether, in failing to so comply with these constitutional and legal requirements, the LegCo member shall be disqualified from the Office under BL104 and/or section 21 of the ODO. 17. In this respect, neither sections 19 and 21 of the ODO nor paragraph (4) of the Interpretation provides expressly that the decision of those administering the oath as to whether an oath is in compliance with BL104 and the laws of Hong Kong is final. Accordingly, although the Clerk or the President has an incidental duty and power to determine whether the oath taken is in compliance with the law as and when circumstances practically require, the Court holds that it does have power to finally adjudicate the matters under challenged in the present cases. 18. The court also rejects the ground based on LegCo members’ immunity. The Court holds that, on proper construction, the protection provided under BL77 and sections 3 and 4 of the LCPPO only covers statements and speeches made by a LegCo member in the course of official debate on the floor of the LegCo when exercising his powers and discharging his functions as a LegCo member. The words expressed by a LegCo member in taking an oath cannot be properly regarded as falling within these meanings nor could they be regarded as expressed in the course of the exercise of a LegCo member’s power or carrying out his functions since he has not yet validly assumed the Office. 19. The Court also holds alternatively that, in any event, the court must have jurisdiction as expressly granted by section 73 of the Legislative Council Ordinance (Cap 542) (“LCO”) to adjudicate the underlying question of whether a LegCo member has been disqualified when proceedings are brought under that provision against a person purporting to act as a LegCo member when disqualified. The Court rejects Mr. Leung and Ms. Yau’s submissions that section 73 of the LCO does not intend to cover the circumstances where a member has been disqualified under section 21 of the ODO. 20. The Court further holds that the decision of the President to allow Mr. Leung and Ms. Yau to re-administer the oath in substance and in effect implies that Mr. Leung and Ms. Yau did not decline or neglect to take the LegCo Oath on 12 October. Hence, the decision of the President has a substantive effect and is amenable to judicial review and the President was properly joined as a party. 21. As regards the locus of CE, the Court holds that, since under Article 48 of the Basic Law, the CE has the constitutional responsibility for the implementation of the Basic Law and other laws in Hong Kong, the CE therefore does have locus to bring either the judicial review or HCMP 2819/2016. On the other hand, in so far as proceedings concerning section 73 of the LCO are concerned, the Court accepts that the CE in his capacity as the CE has no locus to bring such proceedings against Mr. Leung and Ms. Yau. However, this does not materially affect these proceedings, as the SJ as one of the plaintiffs is a proper party to bring the section 73 proceedings. 22. Finally, Mr. Leung and Ms. Yau contend that the Court is not bound by the Interpretation since, properly construed under common law, the Interpretation amounts to amendments of BL104 instead of an interpretation as understood under BL158. The Court does not find this submission to be relevant to the present cases as it agrees with the submissions of CE/SJ that, with or without the Interpretation, the Court would reach the same above conclusion. The Court therefore does not see the need to determine on this question. 23. Upon the President’s request, the Court further clarifies that Mr. Leung and Ms. Yau have vacated their office since 12 October 2016. [1] See: Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen (2001) 4 HKCFAR 211 [2] Having referred to authorities such as Leung Kwok Hung v. Clerk to the Legislative Council (HCAL 112/2005, 6 October 2004, per Hartmann J), Haridasan Palayil v. The Speaker,Kerala Legislative Assembly AIR 2003 Ker 328, 2003 (3) KLT 119, and AG v. Bradlaugh (1885) 14 QBD 667 [3] These are in any event not disputed or challenged in a material way by the President, Mr. Leung and/or Ms. Yau. [4] See Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4, and HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu (1999) 2 HKCFAR 442 [5] [2011] 2 HKLRD 555 [6] (2014) 17 HKCFAR 689