1. The Appellant was convicted after trial before a jury of the offence of trafficking in 1 kilogram of a mixture containing 0.86 kilogram of cocaine. 2. The Prosecution’s (i.e. the Respondent’s) case at trial was that the Appellant was arrested by a group of policemen, after a tip-off, at about 5:55 pm on 15 July 2011 in the corridor of King Wah House, Shan King Estate, Tuen Mun. A police officer searched the Appellant on the spot, and found that the Appellant was carrying a brick of suspected drugs. The police officer then arrested the Appellant for trafficking in a dangerous drug, and cautioned him. The Appellant replied “Ah Sir, I am caught. I carried the drugs for somebody else.” This oral statement was the relevant statement to be considered in the present appeal, as it was a confession that the Appellant knew that he was carrying a dangerous drug. Subsequently, the police made a post-recorded statement, and conducted a video-recorded interview. 3. The Defendant’s (i.e. the Appellant’s) case at trial was that as the Appellant was walking in the corridor, at least four to five people rushed towards him, and twisted his arms. At the same time, one of the policemen pressed his head down, while another took out a white paper bag from his shoulder bag. The Appellant was then handcuffed, but he was not cautioned, nor was he formally arrested. He was made to stand against a wall for about 9 minutes. The Appellant denied he made the oral statement. 4. At trial, a voir dire (i.e. a preliminary hearing) was held. The trial judge ruled that the post-recorded statement and the video-recorded interview were not admissible as evidence to be put before the jury, as he was not satisfied that they were made voluntarily. While the voluntariness of the oral statement did not appear to have been dealt with in the voir dire, this was of no consequence to the issues which arose in the present appeal, because it was in issue before the jury. 5. The trial judge directed the jury to consider whether the Appellant had in fact made the oral statement. He did not give any direction as to the voluntariness of the oral statement. 6. The Appellant was convicted. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. The Appellant appealed to the Court of Final Appeal. 7. Two issues arose before the Court. First, in what circumstances should a direction be given to a jury about the voluntariness of a confession, notwithstanding the fact that an accused denies making the confession. Secondly, if such a direction is required, whether the trial judge must direct the jury that if they conclude that a confession may have been obtained as a result of oppression, they are required to disregard it. 8. As to the first issue, the Court held that where there is a possibility that a jury may conclude that (1) a confession was made by the defendant, (2) the confession was true, but (3) the confession was, or may have been, induced by oppression, the trial judge should direct the jury on the voluntariness of the statement. This is so even where the defendant denies making the confession. 9. As to the second issue, the Court held that, in cases where the three conditions above are satisfied, the trial judge must direct the jury that if they conclude that a confession may have been obtained as a result of oppression, they must disregard it. This is known as the Mushtaq direction. 10. The defendant’s right to silence is the main rationale for the Mushtaq direction. 11. In the present case, even though the Appellant denied he made the oral statement, a Mushtaq direction should have been, but was not, given. 12. The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the Appellant’s conviction. A re-trial was ordered.