1. The Appellant was charged with an offence of contempt, contrary to s.17(c) of the Legislative Council (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance (Cap. 382) (“LCPPO”). S.17(c) LCPPO provides that: “Any person who – … (c) creates or joins in any disturbance which interrupts or is likely to interrupt the proceedings of the Council or a committee while the Council or such committee is sitting, commits an offence…” 2. The Prosecution alleged that on 15 November 2016, during a joint meeting of the Legislative Council (“LegCo”) Panel on Housing (of which the Appellant was a member) and the Panel on Development, the Appellant, then a LegCo member, snatched the Under Secretary for Development’s folder from the bench in front of him. He then passed the folder containing confidential documents to another LegCo member to read. The Appellant ignored the Chairperson’s repeated demands for him to return the folder and resume his seat. Eventually, the joint meeting was suspended. 3. At the defence’s request, the Magistrate gave a ruling on preliminary issues concerning the ambit of s.17(c) LCPPO. The Magistrate ruled that s.17(c) LCPPO did not apply to the Appellant as a LegCo member. Upon appeal by the Prosecution, the Court of Appeal held that s.17(c) LCPPO did apply to LegCo members and that the privilege under s.3 LCPPO (as explained below) did not apply to conduct contrary to s.17(c) LCPPO. 4. In the appeal before this Court, the Appellant contended that he was not subject to liability under s.17(c) LCPPO for the following reasons. 4.1.First, the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and debate or proceedings in LegCo, as provided by s.3 LCPPO, in addition to s.4 LCPPO and art.77 of the Basic Law (“BL”), was absolute. Section 3 provides that: “There shall be freedom of speech and debate in the Council or proceedings before a committee, and such freedom of speech and debate shall not be liable to be questioned in any court or place outside the Council.” 4.2.Second, the principle that the courts will not intervene in the conduct of LegCo proceedings, as explained by this Court in Leung Kwok Hung v President of the Legislative Council (No.1) (2014) 17 HKCFAR 689. 5. At the outset, the Court held that “disturbance” was defined as the interruption or breaking up of the proper functioning of LegCo, particularly when the rights of others have been interfered with. On its face, the Appellant’s alleged conduct was caught by s.17(c) LCPPO. Freedom of speech and debate or proceedings in LegCo 6. However, the Appellant argued that, so long as his alleged conduct occurred during the business of a LegCo meeting, s.3 LCPPO granted him, as a LegCo member, immunity from prosecution. The Appellant relied on art.9 of the UK Bill of Rights 1689 (on which s.3 LCPPO is modelled), which extended its protection to “proceedings in Parliament”. The Court noted that s.3 LCPPO and art.9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 are different. Unlike art.9, s.3 LCPPO does not refer to “proceedings” generally, but to “speech and debate”. Similarly, s.4 LCPPO refers to “words spoken…or written”, whilst art.77 BL refers to “statements”. At the same time, s.17(c) provides a criminal offence of contempt for interruptive disturbances. 7. The question of whether any particular conduct falls within the protected freedom of speech and debate therefore depends on a proper construction of the relevant provisions of the LCPPO as a whole. The LCPPO is designed to protect the freedom of speech and debate in LegCo, allowing members to express their opinions without inhibition. Equally, the LCPPO is also designed to create a secure and dignified environment in LegCo, allowing it to perform its constitutional functions without disruption or disturbance. 8. The Court held that the Appellant’s conduct did not fall within the speech or debate protected by ss.3 and 4 LCPPO or art.77 BL. If the Prosecution’s case were to be established, the Appellant’s conduct would have created a disturbance by various acts, including crossing the floor of the chamber during a debate and snatching property belonging to someone else which he passed to a third party over the owner’s objections. In doing so, he was not making a speech, nor was he participating in debating any business that was before the meeting. 9. The Court observed that its conclusion the Appellant did not come within the protection of ss.3 and 4 or art.77 BL did not mean that the freedom of speech and debate in LegCo was qualified. The freedom of expression includes the manner in which a person expresses their views. Nevertheless, conduct which does not form part of any speech or debate in LegCo falls outside the s.3 LCPPO privilege. Here, the Appellant plainly was not engaged in speech and debate in LegCo when he acted in the way alleged. Non-intervention principle 10. The Appellant further submitted that courts should not exercise jurisdiction over charges under s.17(c) LCPPO, as the courts recognise the exclusive authority of LegCo in managing its own internal processes in the conduct of its business. 11. The Court rejected this argument and held that it is for the courts to determine the scope of the legislature’s privilege. By enacting s.17(c) LCPPO as primary legislation, LegCo had deliberately conferred criminal jurisdiction on the courts. As to any concern of overlapping jurisdiction between LegCo and the courts, should LegCo commence internal disciplinary proceedings over a particular incident, it would be a factor for the Secretary for Justice to consider before consenting to any prosecution, as required under s.26 LCPPO. Disposition 12. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal and held that the Appellant is not immune from prosecution for the alleged offence and that the courts are not precluded from exercising jurisdiction over the charge.