1. The basic issue of principle raised on these appeals is whether a person other than the Secretary for Justice (“the SJ”) who wishes to bring proceedings for criminal contempt of court must obtain the consent of the SJ before commencing such proceedings. 2. The action underlying the instant contempt application (“the underlying action”) arose from a dispute concerned with the control of a motor vessel “Grain Pearl” (“the Vessel”), which was owned by Joint Silver Limited (“JSL”), a company (i) 50% owned by the Respondent and two associates; and (ii) 50% ultimately owned by Lau Wing Yan and his associates, and the 1st and 2nd Appellants (“Lau and associates”). 3. The Respondent fell out with Lau and associates, and the disagreements between them included a dispute as to what, if anything, had been orally agreed as to how decisions relating to JSL would be made, as to the role of the 3rd Appellant in managing the Vessel, and as to the 3rd Appellant’s fee entitlement. 4. The disagreements led to the commencement of the underlying action, in which Lau and associates and the 3rd Appellant relied, among other things, on three emails (“the emails”) which were exhibited to the 1st Appellant’s affirmation, to support their ex parte application for an injunction against the Respondent. 5. The emails had actually been altered by one Yan Donghai (“Yan”) so as to bolster the case of Lau and associates. The Respondent contended that the 1st and 3rd Appellants were aware of these alterations, whereas the 1st Appellant, while accepting that the emails were altered by Yan, said that she was unaware of this until January 2016. 6. The Respondent applied on 17th August 2016 for leave to commence contempt proceedings against the Appellants and Yan in respect of their use of the emails. 7. DHCJ Kent Yee granted the Respondent leave to bring the contempt proceedings on 20th December 2016, but the grant of leave was set aside by DHCJ Saunders on 5th July 2017 on the ground of material non-disclosure. However, DHCJ Saunders held that it was unnecessary for the Respondent to obtain the SJ’s consent to bring the contempt proceedings. 8. On 25th July 2018, the Court of Appeal allowed the Respondent’s appeal against DHCJ Saunders’s decision, overruling DHCJ Saunders’s finding of material non-disclosure, but agreeing that the SJ’s consent to the bringing of the contempt proceedings was not needed. 9. On 18th July 2022, the Court of Final Appeal granted the Appellants’ application for leave on four questions: (1) Whether the SJ has the exclusive right to bring criminal contempt proceedings against an alleged contemnor; (2) if the answer to the first question is “no”, whether a private litigant who seeks to commit another for criminal contempt under Order 52 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A) is or should be required to consult the SJ; (3) if the answer to the second question is “yes”, and the SJ declines to bring the proceedings, whether the private litigant is required to join the SJ as party, and/or lay the relevant facts before the court including any views expressed by the SJ; and (4) if the answer(s) to any of the above questions is/are “yes”, whether the leave granted to the Respondent to commence committal proceedings against the Appellants and Yan should be set aside, and these contempt proceedings dismissed. The court’s jurisdiction on contempt of court 10. The function of the contempt jurisdiction is to prevent or punish conduct which tends to obstruct, prejudice or abuse the administration of justice. The Court held that an essential ingredient of “justice being effectively administered” is the ability of a court to entertain applications for contempt of court and the power to punish those who commit contempts. This power represents a well-established aspect of the court’s inherent jurisdiction, as part of the authority of the judiciary to uphold, to protect and to fulfil the judicial function of administering justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner. Nature of criminal contempt proceedings 11. The Court held that criminal contempt proceedings are ultimately civil in nature, and that the initiation of contempt proceedings should not be described as a “prosecution”. While it is open (and indeed normal) for criminal contempt proceedings to be initiated by an individual interested in the proceedings or the SJ, the court has jurisdiction to punish a person for criminal contempt of its own motion. Reasoning of the Court 12. The Court held that no entity other than the court itself should be able to fetter the ability of any person to bring an alleged contempt, whether civil or criminal, to the attention of the court. The SJ cannot prevent a court from prosecuting criminal contempt proceedings of its own motion. This view is not undermined by the fact that the SJ can initiate or intervene in or take over the conduct of criminal contempt proceedings brought by an individual. The court decides whether to let an application proceed since its leave is needed to bring contempt proceedings. 13. The Court rejected the argument that the SJ’s consent is necessary to prevent abuse by a private party bringing contempt proceedings with a vindictive or otherwise improper motive because the need for the court’s leave is a sufficient safeguard. Disposition 14. Accordingly, the Court unanimously dismissed the appeals.