1. This appeal concerns an application for judicial review brought by the Appellant challenging the lawfulness of a policy adopted by the Respondent. The policy required applicants submitting building plans for approval under section 14 of the Buildings Ordinance (Cap. 123) (“Ordinance”) to provide proof and particulars of ownership or realistic prospects of control of the site shown on the plans (“policy”). 2. In support of the policy, the Respondent relied on section 16 of the Ordinance which specifies the grounds on which approval of plans or consent to the commencement of building works may be refused. The Appellant however contended that the Ordinance does not expressly or by implication require an applicant to be the owner or have a realistic prospect of control of the site. As “site” is not defined in the Ordinance or in the subsidiary legislation, the Appellant argued that it is simply the physical area that an applicant chooses to put on the plan. 3. In the light of the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney General v Cheng Yick Chi [1983] 1 HKC 14 (“Cheng Yick Chi”), that a site can only include land which an applicant owns or has a realistic prospect of controlling, which was binding on them, the Court of First Instance dismissed the application for judicial review, and the Court of Appeal similarly dismissed the Appellant’s appeal. The Appellant now appeals to the Court of Final Appeal, contending, inter alia, that Cheng Yick Chi was wrongly decided and that on a proper construction of the Ordinance and the subsidiary legislation, a site is simply the physical area which an applicant chooses to put on the plan. 4. The Court first considered the proper construction of the Ordinance. It held that “site” is the single most important determining factor in a building plan and the word should be interpreted according to its context and purpose. The approval of building plans is dealt with in the context of prohibition against building works without the necessary approval. The building plans were required to be approved or disapproved within a tight time table, and it was not envisaged that a site could be hypothetical. Given that the plans to be submitted were expected to be plans for bona fide intended developments, as a matter of statutory construction, “site” can only include land which an applicant owns or has a realistic prospect of controlling. Therefore, the Respondent was entitled to require particulars of ownership or realistic prospects of control of the site. 5. The Court came to the same conclusion reached by the Privy Council in Cheng Yick Chi, with which it was in respectful agreement. Accordingly, the appeal was unanimously dismissed. Concurring judgment of Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ: 6. Construing section 16 of the Ordinance in the light of its context and purpose, the policy is reasonably necessary to enable the Respondent fully to consider whether submitted building plans should be approved. 7. First, section 16(1)(d), taken in combination with section 16(1)(i), supplies a statutory basis for the policy. Ownership and realistic prospects of control are often directly relevant to ascertaining the extent, position and nature of the site as an essential step in calculating the permitted parameters of the development. Possible grounds for disapproval because of contravention by exceeding the statutory maxima may only emerge as a result of the Respondent requiring particulars and proof of ownership or control of the site in the first place. 8. Second, the policy is justifiable on a broader construction of section 16 in the context of other provisions in the Ordinance. The statutory intent maintains its focus on an actual, and not a purely hypothetical, development project. Resources naturally being limited, the state of affairs following from the Appellant’s contention would place heavy administrative burdens on the Respondent and cause delays in the approval process in relation to genuine and bona fide development projects.