The appellant was employed by the Hospital Authority as a doctor to provide medical consultations to out-patients in a clinic. On 16 occasions, the appellant booked appointments in the clinic, bought consultation tickets, wrote consultation summaries and prescribed medicines worth a total of $247 for his parents and his son. However, his parents and his son did not attend the clinic for these consultations. The diagnoses of his parents were conducted over long distance phone calls as they were overseas and the diagnoses of his son were conducted at home. The appellant was convicted of one count of misconduct in public office by the Deputy Magistrate. The conviction was upheld on appeal by the Deputy High Court Judge. There are two key issues: First, did the appellant falsify records of the Hospital Authority? Second, was the appellant’s conduct sufficiently serious to amount to the offence of misconduct in public offence? In respect of the falsification issue, the Deputy Magistrate and the Deputy High Court Judge held that the appellant falsified consultation summaries and computer records (the “Records”) as a whole as he failed to clearly state in the Records that his family members did not attend the clinic, knowing that such Records would give rise to the impression that they did. The Court of Final Appeal disagreed with the lower courts and concluded that the appellant’s omission did not amount to falsification of records for several reasons: firstly, the commonly understood meaning of “falsification” involves creating a false document or record, or changing any entry or adding any false entry in a document or record; the appellant did not do any of these. Secondly, there was no evidence of any requirement for a doctor to state in the Records whether a patient personally attended the clinic; nor was there any evidence showing that the Records were intended to record such personal attendance. Thirdly, there was no clear evidence as to any other way in which a doctor could get medicine for his family members whom he had diagnosed outside the clinic. In respect of the “seriousness” issue, the Court of Final Appeal held that the appellant’s conduct was not sufficiently serious to amount to the offence of misconduct in public office. The aim of this offence is to punish an abuse by a public officer of the power and duty entrusted to him for the public benefit or of his official position. It would be wrong simply to conclude that if the misconduct in question is not trivial, then it must be serious enough to merit criminal sanction. The Deputy Magistrate’s reasoning overlooked the fact that the appellant was not required by any rule or the Code of Professional Conduct to diagnose patients inside the clinic and that the appellant’s family members were entitled to public medical services. Further, it was not proved that the public had been deprived of medical services as a result of the appellant’s conduct. Accordingly, though the appellant showed preferential treatment to his family members by dispensing them with attendance at the clinic, his conduct was not so far below acceptable standards as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in the office holder.