1. The Appellant and Mr Kwok Wing (“Kwok”) had been close friends for 30 years. Kwok was the chairman and a major shareholder of Tack Fat Group International Limited (“Tack Fat”), a company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 2. On 4 June 2008, Kwok caused a total of 40 million share options to be granted to two mainlanders. The options were exercised two days later by the two mainlanders. However, Tack Fat never received any money for the shares. Between 16 June and 29 July 2008, all 40 million shares, in the name of the two mainlanders, were sold in the stock market. The Appellant had no knowledge of any of the share dealings between Kwok, the two mainlanders, and Tack Fat. 3. On 1 August 2008, at Kwok’s request, the Appellant arranged to allow HK$14,049,380 to be transferred from the two mainlanders’ Hong Kong bank accounts and be deposited into a bank account of Mickles International Limited (“Mickles”), a Hong Kong company of which the Appellant was a director and sole shareholder. Unknown to the Appellant, the money derived from the sale of shares was fraudulently obtained from Tack Fat. Twenty-six days later, the same amount (minus bank charges) was, again at Kwok’s request, remitted by the Appellant from Mickles’ bank account to a bank account of Asia World Agricultural Development (Cambodia) Limited, a company controlled by Kwok. 4. The Appellant was charged with one count of dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence, contrary to sections 25(1) and (3) of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance (“OSCO”). Before the District Court, the Appellant was convicted, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years and six months. The Appellant’s appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. Three grounds were submitted by the Appellant on the appeal in the Court. 5. First, in relation to offences under section 25(1) of OSCO, when seeking to determine whether a person has reasonable grounds to believe that the property dealt with represents the proceeds of an indictable offence, the Court held that when assessing the whole of the evidence, the judge or jury are entitled to take into account the Appellant’s perception and evaluation of the facts and matters as constituting or contributing to reasonable grounds. Accordingly, since the lower courts did not take into account the Appellant’s case on the trust that existed between himself and Kwok, it failed to take into account of the Appellant’s perception and evaluation of relevant facts. The appeal was allowed on this ground. 6. Second, in the determination of whether the defendant’s grounds of belief are reasonable, the test is whether any reasonable person looking at grounds “would believe” that the property dealt with represents the proceeds of an indictable offence rather than a test of “could believe”. The Court of Appeal had erred in following an earlier case and applying the “could believe” test, which is an inappropriately low standard compared to the “would believe” test. The appeal was also allowed on this ground. 7. Third, the Appellant asked the Court to consider whether it is a defence to a charge under section 25(1) of OSCO for a defendant to show that notwithstanding the establishment by the prosecution of reasonable grounds to believe that the property dealt with represents the proceeds of an indictable offence, he nonetheless honestly and reasonably did not suspect the property to represent such proceeds. The Court held that this “halfway house” defence does not arise. 8. The appeal was allowed and the conviction set aside.