Article 24(2)(4) of the Basic Law (the “Article”) provides that persons not of Chinese nationality who have entered Hong Kong with valid travel documents, have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than 7 years and have taken Hong Kong as their place of permanent residence shall be permanent residents of Hong Kong. The Appellants are both Philippine nationals who entered Hong Kong for employment as foreign domestic helpers (“FDHs”) and have lived here continuously for well over 7 years. However, section 2(4)(vi) of the Immigration Ordinance (“IO”) states that a person employed as a FDH who is from outside Hong Kong is not to be treated as “ordinarily resident” in Hong Kong and so cannot become a Hong Kong permanent resident. The appellants contend that they come within the “natural and ordinary meaning” of the words “ordinarily resided” in the Article so that the restriction in the IO is inconsistent with the Article and unconstitutional. The Court of First Instance accepted their argument but was reversed by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Final Appeal dismissed their appeals. The Court held that the words “ordinarily resided” are capable of assuming different meanings in different contexts and that the meaning asserted by the appellants was not the only meaning. It is always necessary to examine the factual position of the person claiming to be ordinarily resident to see whether there are any special features affecting the nature and quality of his or her residence. The Court held that the immigration status of persons must be taken into account in deciding whether they satisfy the 7-year ordinary residence requirement. The Article requires a valid travel document at the point of entry and makes immigration control a constant feature in the process of building up eligibility during the 7-year qualifying period. The imposition of such controls is consistent with Article 154(2) of the Basic Law which allocates constitutional responsibility for immigration control on the HKSAR Government. The nature of FDHs’ residence in Hong Kong is highly restrictive. Permission for a FDH to enter Hong Kong is tied to employment solely as a domestic helper with a specific employer with whom the FDH must reside under a specified contract. The FDH is obliged to return to the country of origin at the end of the contract and is told from the outset that admission is not for the purposes of settlement and that dependents cannot be brought to reside in Hong Kong. The quality of their residence is therefore far-removed from what would traditionally be recognised as “ordinary residence” and the Court thus held that FDHs do not, as a class, come within the meaning of “ordinarily residence” as used in the Article. As the meaning of the Article interpreted purposively and in context was clear, there was no basis for referring to any extrinsic materials in aid of its interpretation. The respondents argued that if and insofar as the Court considers it necessary to consider the effect of the Interpretation adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 26 June 1999 (the “1999 Interpretation”), the Court would be bound under Article 158(3) of the Basic Law to refer to the Standing Committee two questions: (i) what is the meaning of an “interpretation” under Article 158(1) of the Basic Law; and (ii) whether the 1996 “Opinions on the Implementation of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China” referred to in the Interpretation covering the legislative intent of the Article is binding on Hong Kong courts. The Court affirmed that in deciding whether or not to refer questions to the Standing Committee, the Court and the Court alone must be satisfied on 3 conditions: (i) classification – that the provision of the Basic Law in question relates to (a) affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People’s Government or (b) the relationship between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR; (ii) necessity – that it is necessary to interpret provisions covered in condition (i) to adjudicate the case and the interpretation will affect the judgment; and (iii) arguability – that the argument that necessitates an interpretation is not a “plainly and obviously bad” one. If all 3 conditions are satisfied, the Court must make a reference to the Standing Committee. The Court held that while the classification condition is satisfied in the present case since Article 158 of the Basic Law concerns the relationship between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR, the necessity condition is not met since the Court has reached a conclusion on the meaning of the Article without need to refer to the 1999 Interpretation. Hence, it is unnecessary to consider whether the arguability condition is satisfied. The request for a reference was therefore rejected.