1. These are two applications for judicial review seeking to impugn the Emergency Regulations Ordinance (Cap 241) (“ERO”) and the Prohibition of Face Covering Regulation (Cap 241K)(“PFCR”) made thereunder as being invalid and unconstitutional. 2. By Ground 1, the applicants contend that the ERO is unconstitutional because it amounts to an impermissible grant or delegation of general legislative power by the legislature to the Chief Executive in Council (“CEIC”) and contravenes the constitutional framework under the Basic Law. The court holds that the ERO, insofar as it empowers the CEIC to make regulations on any occasion of public danger, is incompatible with the Basic Law, having regard in particular to Arts 2, 8, 17(2), 18, 48, 56, 62(5), 66 and 73(1) thereof. The court leaves open the question of the constitutionality of the ERO insofar as it relates to any occasion of emergency. 3. As to Ground 2, the court holds that the ERO was not impliedly repealed by s 5 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383) (“HKBORO”). Insofar as it is invoked in situations not falling within the kind of public emergency referred to in the HKBORO, the Bill of Rights is not suspended and the measures adopted will have to comply with it. 4. On Ground 3, the court holds that the ERO does not in itself fall foul of the “prescribed by law” requirement (ie the principle of legal certainty). Where regulations and measures are adopted under the ERO that curtail fundamental rights, the entire relevant body of law including the regulations and measures have to be taken together to see whether they meet the requirement of sufficient accessibility and certainty. 5. Under Ground 4, the applicants contend that the general words in s 2(1) of the ERO are not to be construed as allowing the Government to adopt measures that infringe fundamental rights of the individual and that the PFCR is therefore beyond the power conferred on the CEIC by the ERO. The court finds that it is not necessary to deal with this Ground and does not express any view on it. 6. Under Ground 5A, the applicants contend that s 3 of the PFCR fails to satisfy the proportionality test (as explained in Hysan Development Co Ltd v Town Planning Board (2016) 19 HKCFAR 372, §§134‑135). The court holds that the provisions in s 3(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the PFCR are rationally connected to legitimate societal aims that the respondents intend by those measures to pursue but the restrictions that sub‑paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) impose on fundamental rights go further than is reasonably necessary for the furtherance of those objects and therefore fail to meet the proportionality test. 7. Under Ground 5B, the applicants contend that s 5 of the PFCR fails to satisfy the proportionality test. The court holds that the measure introduced by s 5 of the PFCR is rationally connected to the legitimate societal aims pursued but the restrictions it imposes on fundamental rights also go further than is reasonably necessary for the furtherance of those objects and therefore fail to meet the proportionality test. 8. In the light of these conclusions, there will be a further hearing for the parties to make submissions on the appropriate relief and costs.