1. The Basic Law, not the legislature, is supreme in Hong Kong. It provides for the exercise of the independent judicial power of adjudication of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by the courts and the courts alone. 2. When a constitutional requirement in the Basic Law is in issue, the common law doctrine of separation of powers and of non-intervention must give way to the court’s constitutional duty to apply the Basic Law to adjudicate and rule on the matter. In so doing, the court does not undermine the Legislative Council (“LegCo”)’s authority or function, or diminish the mandate the electors gave to its members. It ensures that the LegCo and its members exercise their powers lawfully in accordance with the constitutional requirement of the Basic Law. 3. Article 104 of the Basic Law lays down a constitutional requirement on oath taking by members of the LegCo. The scope of the constitutional requirement extends to the consequence of its non-compliance which is laid down in article 104 itself as interpreted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress under the Interpretation dated 7 November 2016 (“the Interpretation”), as well as section 21 of the Oaths and Declarations Ordinance (Cap 11) (“ODO”). Compliance with the constitutional requirement under article 104 of the Basic Law is not a matter of the internal business or process of the LegCo. 4. The court, and the court alone, has the constitutional power and duty to adjudicate on the question of non-compliance with the constitutional requirement and its consequence, and the principle of non-intervention does not apply. 5. In deciding this question, the court conducts a full merit review. The views of the oath administrator may be of evidential value but are not binding on the court. 6. Under article 104 (as interpreted) and section 21(a) of the ODO, disqualification and vacation of office are automatic by operation of law. Proceedings under section 73 of the Legislative Council Ordinance (Cap 542) (“LCO”) are not confined to the situations described in section 15(1) of the LCO, or dependent on a declaration by the LegCo President under article 79(1) of the Basic Law. In fact, article 79(1) does not apply to the relevant situation described in article 104 (as interpreted) and section 21(a) of the ODO. 7. The Chief Executive has a constitutional responsibility to implement the Basic Law pursuant to article 48(2) of the Basic Law. He may do so by means of judicial review under sections 21J and 21K(1)(b) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) in the present type of dispute. Section 73(7) of the LCO does not prevent him from doing so. 8. The immunity from suit granted under article 77 of the Basic Law to LegCo members does not extend to cover a LegCo member’s taking of the LegCo Oath when assuming office as required by article 104. 9. The Interpretation sets out the true and proper meaning of article 104 from day one. It speaks from 1 July 1997 and applies to all cases save as provided in article 158(3) of the Basic Law. It is binding on the courts in Hong Kong. The court does not have jurisdiction under the Basic Law to entertain the argument that the Interpretation is in substance a purported amendment of the Basic Law and therefore not binding. In any event, no evidential foundation has been laid for the argument. 10. On the facts, Leung and Yau declined to the take the LegCo Oath when duly requested to do so on 12 October 2016. By operation of law under article 104 (as interpreted) and section 21, they were disqualified forthwith and have automatically vacated their offices. There is no question of allowing them to retake the oath as a matter of law.