1. These appeals concerned the protection conferred by Articles 6 and 105 of the Basic Law (“BL6 and BL105”) on private property rights in connection with planning restrictions laid down by the Town Planning Board (“TPB”). 2. The appellants, who are property owners and developers, had succeeded in having the TPB’s decisions quashed on traditional judicial review grounds in the lower courts, but unsuccessfully contended that the planning restrictions represented a disproportionate and therefore unconstitutional infringement of their property rights. 3. The Court of Appeal made orders for remitter to direct the TPB to reconsider its decisions in accordance with the Court of Appeal’s judgment, which included its conclusion that the planning restrictions did not engage the constitutional rights in BL6 and BL105. The appellants challenged that conclusion in these appeals and sought a direction that the TPB consider whether the restrictions were unconstitutional. 4. The first question for the Court was whether BL6 and BL105 are engaged in relation to planning restrictions imposed by the TPB on the use of land. 5. Both Articles stipulate that the obligation to protect private property rights is to be discharged “in accordance with law”. Such a phrase does not serve to qualify or limit the protection conferred but provides an additional layer of legal certainty. 6. Even though the statutory power to impose planning restrictions existed prior to the appellants’ acquisition of the sites, this did not mean that the new and more intrusive constraints imposed by the TPB after the land’s acquisition could be disregarded as mere incidents of ownership so as to exclude the protection of BL6 and BL105. The Court thus concluded that both Articles were plainly engaged. 7. BL6 and BL105 are not absolute rights. It is for the Court to determine the permissible extent of any restrictions that limit such rights by a process referred to as a proportionality analysis. In addition to the existing three-step inquiry taken in a proportionality analysis, a fourth step should be added which involves asking whether a reasonable balance has been struck between the societal benefits of the encroachment and the inroads made into the constitutionally protected rights of the individual, asking in particular whether pursuit of the societal interest results in an unacceptably harsh burden on the individual. 8. The first two steps of the proportionality analysis were satisfied as it was assumed that the planning restrictions did pursue a legitimate aim and that they were rationally connected thereto. It was at the third stage of the inquiry, assessing the permissible extent of the incursion into the protected right, that two main standards have been applied: (i) whether the intruding measure is “no more than necessary” to achieve the legitimate aim (for which standard the appellants and interveners argued), and (ii) whether the encroaching measure is “manifestly without reasonable foundation” (for which standard the respondents argued). 9. The difference between the standards is one of degree and both standards are on a spectrum of reasonableness. The “manifest” standard has been used in cases where the Court recognizes that the originator of the impugned measure is better placed to assess the appropriate means to advance the legitimate aim espoused and is afforded a wide margin of discretion. It has been applied in cases involving implementation of political, social or economic policies but is not confined to such cases. 10. Having considered jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights, the Court concluded that the application of either standard would depend on the circumstances of the underlying case and the factual bases claimed for the incursion. The location of the standard in the spectrum of reasonableness depends on many factors relating principally to the significance and degree of interference with the right, the identity of the decision-maker, and the nature and features of the encroaching measure relevant to setting the margin of discretion. 11. In general, where the TPB reaches decisions which are not flawed on traditional judicial review grounds, any planning restrictions should be subject to review applying the “manifestly without reasonable foundation” test. It is highly unlikely that decisions arrived at lawfully and in conformity with principles of traditional review would be susceptible to constitutional review unless the incursions are exceptionally unreasonable. 12. The views of the Court on BL6 and BL105 differed from those of the Court of Appeal. It was ordered that the order of the Court of Appeal remitting the matter to the TPB for reconsideration of its decisions would remain, but the order for such reconsideration to be in accordance with the Court of Appeal’s views on the two Articles would be deleted.