1. The Legislative (Amendment) Bill 2012 (the “Bill”) was introduced into the Legislative Council (the “LegCo”) for a first reading on 8 February 2012 and a second reading on 2 May 2012. The Bill sought to disqualify a person who had resigned as a member of the LegCo from standing for a by-election scheduled to be held within 6 months of his resignation. Prior to the second reading, two legislators proposed a total of 1,306 amendments to the Bill. This was part of an avowed attempt by the Appellant and other legislators to filibuster the Bill. 2. On 17 May 2012, the debate had continued for over 33 hours, during the course of which the President had on numerous occasions ruled speeches made by the Appellant and other filibusters to be irrelevant to the clauses and amendments. A Legislative Councillor referred to a “closure motion” that exists in other legislative bodies and suggested that the President conclude the debate immediately. 3. Subsequently, the President announced his decision at 9:00am on the same day to give all those involved until 12:00 noon to conclude the debate. He based his decision on rule 92 of the Rules of Procedure of the LegCo (the “Rules”) which provides that “in any matter not provided for” in those rules, the practice and procedure to be followed shall be as decided by the President. The debate ended as directed. The amendments to the Bill proposed by the legislators were put to the vote and were all defeated. The Bill eventually became law on 1 June 2012. 4. Two issues arise on the appeal: First, having regard to the Basic Law (the “BL”) and the Rules, under what circumstances may a decision of the President of LegCo made during the legislative process be judicially reviewed? Second, in light of the answer to that question, is the decision of the President of LegCo on 17 May 2012 to close the debate of the committee of the whole Council on the amendments to the Bill purportedly pursuant to Article 72(1) of the BL and Rule 92 of the Rules, amenable to judicial review? 5. Regarding the first issue, the Court held that on the basis of public policy, the provisions on the constitutional separation of powers set out in the BL and the doctrine of separation of powers and the principle of non-intervention embedded in the common law, the Court will only exercise jurisdiction to determine the existence, but not the manner of exercise, of a power, privilege or immunity of LegCo or its President. 6. Regarding the second issue, the Appellant submitted that the decision of the President is amenable to judicial review because Article 73(1) of the BL confers on the Appellant as a member of LegCo a right to participate in the legislative process of LegCo which he was deprived of by the President’s decision, and because rule 92 of the Rules confers no power on the President to close the debate. The Court held that the purpose of Article 73 of the BL is to confer certain powers and functions on LegCo as a law-making body but not on individual members of LegCo. The Court further held that the President has power to set limits to and to terminate a debate which is inherent in or incidental to his power under Article 72(1) of the BL to “preside over meetings”; and that it is not for the Court to consider whether the President’s power was properly exercised nor whether the President’s decision constituted an unauthorised making of a rule of procedure. 7. The Court accordingly unanimously dismissed the appeal.