1. This appeal concerns the proper construction of a will. Mr. Tan Kiam Toen (the “Testator”) was a successful businessman. His main assets included shares (the “Shares”) in one Afro-Asia International Enterprises PTE Limited, which in turn held interest in one Singaporean listed company, EnGro Corporation Ltd. The Shares are registered in the names of the Testator’s 2 daughters, namely the 3rd Appellant and the 1st Respondent. 2. The Testator executed the will in question in 2008 (the “Will”). The Will provides that it governs “all the properties under [the Testator’s] name [wheresoever situate worldwide]”. It provides that his wife, Madam Ng, who survives the Testator, is to “enjoy during her lifetime the income derived from the estate of” the Testator, and that upon her death, the entire residue is to pass to specified charities. The Testator further declares that he does not intend to give any portion of his residuary estate to his children, stating that they have received adequate and appropriate care during their parents’ lifetime. 3. The Testator passed away in 2008. The Respondent as sole executrix of the Will included the Shares in the probate’s Schedule of Assets and Liabilities as the Testator’s assets in Hong Kong, along with other assets including the Testator’s art collections. 4. The Appellants, being the Testator’s 3 sons and 1 daughter, issued proceedings to seek the Court’s interpretation of the Will. They contended that words “under [the Testator’s] name” (the “Words”) mean the Will only governs assets held in the name of the Testator. Since the Shares are not held in the name of the Testator, but in his 2 daughters’ names on trust for him, the Shares are excluded from the Will and should not pass under the Will to the charities, but pass by way of partial intestacy to the Testator’s children. The 1st Respondent disagreed, submitting that the Words were intended to merely mean “belonging to the Testator”, encompassing property held on trust for him. 5. At the Court of First Instance, DHCJ B Chu (as she then was) concluded that the Shares are not excluded in the Will, holding that the Words are wide enough to cover assets beneficially belonging to the Testator. Furthermore, the Judge held that since the meaning of the Words was clear, it was not necessary to consider s. 23B of the Wills Ordinance to ascertain the meaning of the Words by adducing extrinsic evidence, as the section only operates only when the words in a will are ambiguous. In any event, the Judge held that even if s. 23B were engaged, the outcome would have been the same. The Court of Appeal upheld the Judge, and held that the Words in their dictionary meaning mean assets “belonging” to the person concerned. 6. The Court also questioned the validity of the Appellant’s narrower interpretation, as it would implausibly suggest that the Testator had gone to the trouble of making a will to provide for how his property should be dealt with after his death, but had chosen to exclude his most valuable assets from this exercise, leaving them to be dealt with on a partial intestacy. 7. Similarly, the Court reasoned that, on the Appellant’s narrower interpretation, by excluding the Shares, the gift of income to his widow could have no meaningful effect, as this effectively excludes the only obvious income-earning assets from the operation of the Will. Hence the Court concluded on the Will’s true construction, unaided by any extrinsic evidence, the Words apply to all properties belonging to the Testator, including properties held on trust for him. Other alternative meanings are less than reasonably arguable when the Will is read as a whole, and the Court dismissed the appeal. 8. Nonetheless, although it was unnecessary to do so since the Court had found an absence of ambiguity, the Court held that even if potential extrinsic evidence were adduced via s. 23B, it would not have led to a different outcome. 9. The evidence showed that before and after the Testator executed the Will, he had wished to make a gift whilst he was living of the Shares to Madam Ng and the children. This was not achieved before the Testator passed away. The Court found that this evidence, even if admissible, would not throw any light on the Testator’s testamentary intentions. Evidence that the Testator had intended when alive to make a gift of the Shares to his family, was not evidence of an intention to dispose of such property outside his Will if the intended gift failed to materialise. CONCURRING JUDGMENT OF TANG PJ: 10. Tang PJ took the view that, given the extrinsic evidence shows that in a previous will in 2006, the Testator had declared that he has no assets held by his daughters, it would seem clear that the Shares, now said to be beneficially held by the Testator, were not then regarded by the Testator as part of his estate. This declaration was not repeated in subsequent wills, and hence there is no way of knowing whether the Shares held in the names of others were regarded by the Testator as part of his “remaining properties”. 11. Tang PJ did not find it necessary to resort to the clause in the Will that gave Madam Ng life interest in the income, as Tang PJ regarded it as a standard clause normally found in wills that provide for life interests. On the evidence of the potential gift, Tang PJ agreed that the Testator could not have intended by the use of the Words to indicate that should the gift fail it would devolve as on intestacy.