Background 1. On 13 June 2014, while the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council was scrutinizing a funding application relating to advanced works at the North East New Territories New Development areas, the Appellant took part in a demonstration outside the LegCo Complex. The protesters attempted to enter the LegCo Complex by removing the Mills barriers outside. The then President of LegCo requested the assistance of the police and invited them to enter into the precincts of LegCo Chamber. He claimed that he made the request in his capacity as the Chairman of the Legislative Council Commission (“LCC”). Conflicts broke out between the police officers and the protesters. The Appellant and others were arrested. 2. After trial, the Appellant was convicted of two charges, namely: (1) taking part in an unlawful assembly, contrary to section 18 of the Public Order Ordinance (Cap. 245) and (2) obstructing an officer of LegCo in the execution of his duty, contrary to section 19(b) of the Legislative Council (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance (Cap. 382) (“LC(PP)O”). On appeal, the Appellant’s convictions were upheld by the Court of First Instance. 3. Subsequently, the Court of Final Appeal granted leave to appeal in respect of his conviction on charge (2). Thus, this appeal is solely concerned with charge (2). Grounds of Appeal 4. The Appellant advanced two grounds to challenge his conviction. First, he contended that without a prior invitation to enter made by the President, the police officer obstructed by the Appellant did not, as a matter of law, qualify as an officer of the Council, and therefore charge (2) was not made out. 5. The Appellant’s second ground was that since there was no written authority in place (such as a LegCo Rule of Procedure, a Council Resolution or an administrative instruction issued by the President) to restrict the public right of access to the LegCo, even if the police officer in question was an officer of the Council, he was not acting in the execution of his duty in denying the protesters entry through the entrances to LegCo. The Court’s decision 6. The Court rejected both of the Appellant’s grounds and provided guidance on the circumstances in which the police may lawfully enter and perform policing duties in the precincts of the LegCo Chamber. 7. First, having surveyed the relevant provisions of LC(PP)O and Administrative Instructions for Regulating Admittance and Conduct of Persons, the Court held that a prior invitation by the President of LegCo is not needed for a police officer to be on duty within the precincts of the LegCo Chamber and to qualify as an officer of the Council for the purposes of charge (2). 8. Further, the Court observed that even if a prior invitation to enter is necessary, in the present case such an invitation had been issued by the President of LegCo. It did not matter that he considered himself to be acting as the Chairman of the LCC when requesting police assistance, since objectively and as a matter of law, he was also President of LegCo. 9. Lastly, the Court observed that, pursuant to the Administrative Instructions, the protesters were lawfully refused entry into the precincts of the LegCo Chamber by the security officers. The Court held that the police officers were acting lawfully in the execution of their duty (as police officers and officers of the Council) in helping to enforce such refusal of entry. 10. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal.