1. The appellant, a triad member, along with his fellow gang members received an order from their triad boss to locate and “chop” members of a rival faction. They armed themselves with weapons and set off in two cars to search for their rivals. Having heard that gang members in the other car had located the intended victims, those in the appellant’s car immediately drove to the scene to help. When the appellant arrived at the scene, the deceased was already lying on the ground after having been attacked by four or five persons with knives and also run over by a car. There was no evidence that the appellant had been present during the attack on the deceased or that he had himself done any act which caused injury or death of the deceased. 2. The appellant was convicted of murder, based on his active participation in a joint criminal enterprise, meaning an agreement with others to chop the followers of the rival faction with intent to cause them grievous bodily harm. The appellant’s conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal which also held that his conduct constituted encouragement to the others in the gang, including the actual killers. 3. The present appeal concerns the principles for finding a person guilty as a participant in another person’s crime. The issue is whether the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise, treated in Hong Kong as supplying such a principle as laid down in the 1985 decision in Chan Wing Siu v R, should continue to be applied in the light of the decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in R v Jogee and R v Ruddock disapproving Chan Wing Siu. The UK Supreme Court held that Chan Wing Siu was wrongly decided and that the doctrine of joint enterprise should be abolished so that criminal liability for participation in another person’s offence should only be established applying a different set of principles involving aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring that other person’s crime. 4. The Court respectfully disagrees with Jogee for three reasons. First, it does not accept that the joint criminal enterprise doctrine over-extends the accomplice’s liability. It considers that persons who participate in a criminal joint venture foreseeing that in the course of carrying it out, one of the joint venturers might commit a more serious offence (such as murder) and proceeds with the joint venture with such foresight should be treated as gravely culpable and held liable as an accomplice. Secondly, the Court considers abolition of the joint criminal enterprise doctrine to leave a serious gap in the law of criminal complicity depriving it of valuable principles for dealing with evidentially unclear and fluid situations arising in relation to crimes committed by more than one person. Thirdly, it considers that the concept of “conditional intent” introduced in the Jogee decision causes conceptual and practical difficulties. 5. The Court therefore concludes that Jogee should not be adopted and that the joint criminal enterprise doctrine as expounded in Chan Wing Siu continues to apply in Hong Kong. 6. The appellant’s guilt was properly established both on principles of accessorial and joint criminal enterprise liability. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal.