1. This appeal arose out of a prosecution for the offence of obtaining access to a computer with a view to dishonest gain for oneself or for another under s.161(1)(c) of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap.200) (“the CO”). 2. Primary school teachers and a friend who used phones and a computer to transmit to third parties questions to be used in competitive admission interviews were charged with the offence. There were limited places for admission to the primary school in question. Children applying for admission were interviewed for selection. The 1st to 3rd Respondents (“R1”, “R2”, “R3”) were teachers at the primary school, while the 4th Respondent (“R4”) was a teacher at another primary school and also a former classmate of R2. 3. At a briefing session held the day before the interviews, in which R1-3 all participated, each teacher was provided with a set of interview questions and the marking scheme, which were returned to the teacher in charge after the briefing. During the briefing, R1 took photographs of the interview questions with her mobile phone and sent them to a fellow member of her church via Whatsapp. R2 took photographs of the interview questions with her mobile phone and sent them to R3. R3 was late to the briefing and received four images of the interview questions from R2 via her mobile phone. She later used a desktop computer at the primary school to type out the interview questions in a Word file which she then emailed to R2 and another friend. R4 received the Word file from R2 through email, took photographs of the Word file with her mobile phone, and sent them to two friends via Whatsapp. 4. All four Respondents were charged with obtaining access to a computer with a view to dishonest gain for another, contrary to s.161(1)(c) of the CO, the intended benefit being the enhanced chances of success enjoyed by the relevant parents and children at the interview. The Magistrate found that there was reasonable doubt as to whether the Respondents had been reminded of the need for confidentiality, and that the prosecution had failed to prove that a reasonable person would consider the Respondents’ acts dishonest. She therefore acquitted all Respondents and maintained that decision on a review hearing. 5. On appeal by way of case stated to the Court of First Instance, the Judge questioned whether the Respondents’ acts amounted to obtaining access to a computer under s.161(1)(c). The Appellant argued for a wide construction of the scope of the offence but the Judge rejected that argument and held that the prosecution had to prove the unauthorised extraction and use of information from a computer. As none of the Respondents’ acts amounted to that, the Judge held that the relevant offence had not been committed, and dismissed the appeal. 6. The Appellant brought a further appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the decision of the Court of First Instance. ISSUES 7. The central question in this appeal was one of statutory construction, namely whether the offence created by s.161(1)(c) of the CO covers the use by a person of their own computer with the requisite intent. Given the absence of any evidence of a limit on R3’s authority to use the relevant desktop computer, the Appellant conceded that for the purposes of this appeal the school computer could be treated as though it was her own. This concession was limited to this appeal and does not create a precedent for future cases involving the use by a person of a computer allocated to them by their employer. 8. The Court applied the well-established principles of statutory construction by looking to (1) the text of the provision to be construed, (2) its context, and (3) its purpose. 9. The text of the provision, including the words “obtain” and “access”, suggested an unauthorised use of a computer, and did not sit easily with the use by a person of their own device. 10. The context included the amendments to a number of statutes made by the Computer Crimes Ordinance No 23 of 1993 (the “CCO”), which created new offences and broadened the range of existing offences. The other provisions enacted by the CCO appear to define the offences by reference to access to or misuse of a computer other than the offender’s own computer. 11. The purpose of the provision can be seen clearly from the Legislative Council Brief, which was to create a new offence of dishonest accessing, making it unlawful to “gain access to computers” with the relevant intent. 12. All in all, the text, context, and purpose in this case pointed towards construing s.161(1)(c) of the CO so that it does not extend to the use of the offender’s own computer. 13. The Appellant’s other argument that a wider construction of the provision would secure a beneficial public policy was rejected, as this is not the function of the court in statutory construction. The court ascertains the purpose of the statute to inform its construction, and does not identify a beneficial purpose and construe the statute to fit it. DISPOSITION 14. The Court therefore concluded that s.161(1)(c) of the CO, on its proper construction, does not apply to the use by a person of his own computer, not involving access to another’s computer. Accordingly, the appeal was unanimously dismissed against all of the Respondents.