1. German customs officers intercepted three postal parcels en route from Bolivia to Hong Kong and found cocaine in them. Hong Kong customs officers carried out a controlled delivery operation of one of the parcels and arrested one Tang Kwong Ho (“Tang”) who received the parcel. The appellant was also arrested nearby. Certain items were seized from the appellant which associated him with Tang and the three parcels. 2. The appellant was charged with one count of conspiracy with Tang, a person called “Ko Lo” and other persons unknown to traffic in a dangerous drug, namely cocaine. The appellant pleaded not guilty. At trial, the appellant maintained that he was asked by “Ko Lo” to receive the parcels. He did not know that the parcels contained dangerous drugs. 3. The trial judge directed the jury that the prosecution only needed to prove that the appellant knew the parcels contained a dangerous drug and that the prosecution did not need to prove knowledge of the type of drug. 4. The jury unanimously found the appellant guilty. The trial judge sentenced him to 29 years’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s application for leave to appeal against his conviction. The appellant further appealed to this Court. THE ISSUE 5. The appellant argued that the trial judge’s direction that the prosecution did not need to prove knowledge of the particular type of drug was wrong. He contended that the fact that the substance being trafficked in is the dangerous drug as particularised in the indictment is a fact necessary for the commission of the substantive offence of trafficking in a dangerous drug. Section 159A(2) of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap.200) requires the prosecution to prove that a defendant charged with conspiracy had knowledge of this fact (the “Statutory Construction Argument”). 6. The appellant further argued that English, Canadian and Australian cases established a general common law principle such that the prosecution must prove that a defendant charged with conspiracy had knowledge of the type of drug being trafficked in (the “Common Law Argument”). The Statutory Construction Argument 7. Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance (Cap.134) created the offence of trafficking in a dangerous drug. The particular type of dangerous drug is not an essential element of the offence. The prosecution is only required to prove that the defendant trafficked in a dangerous drug. For the mental element, the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew he was trafficking in a dangerous drug. It is not necessary to prove knowledge of a particular type of dangerous drug. 8. Section 159A(1) of the Crimes Ordinance provides for the statutory offence of conspiracy. Under section 159A(2), the prosecution must prove that a defendant charged with conspiracy knew or intended that a fact or circumstance necessary for the commission of the substantive offence will exist where the substantive offence has a mental element less than knowledge or intention, such as recklessness or negligence. As a result, a defendant charged with conspiracy would not be found guilty unless he intended to carry out the substantive offence. 9. The substantive offence of trafficking in a dangerous drug does not have a lesser mental element than knowledge. The only fact or circumstance necessary for the commission of trafficking in a dangerous drug is that a dangerous drug, rather than a particular type of dangerous drug, will be trafficked in. Section 159A(2) therefore does not operate to require the prosecution to prove any additional mental element. The Common Law Argument 10. The English, Canadian and Australian cases do not establish any general common law principle as the appellant contended. DISPOSITION 11. Accordingly, the Court unanimously dismissed the appeal.