1. This appeal arises from an action by the Appellant (“Tugu”) seeking recovery of monies paid out from its bank account (the “Account”) at the Respondent bank (the “Bank”) on the dishonest instructions of Tugu’s authorised signatories (the “Signatories”). 2. The mandate of the Account provided that any two of the Signatories could give instructions in relation to the Account. Between 1994 and 1998, through 26 transfers, a total of US$51.64 million was paid out from the Account to the Signatories and another officer of Tugu. At the final transfer, the Bank was instructed to transfer the balance and close the Account, which the Bank did. In 2006, Tugu informed the Bank that the transfers were dishonestly authorised, and demanded payment of their aggregate amount. In 2007, Tugu commenced proceedings in furtherance of that demand. 3. The Judge dismissed Tugu’s claim. The Judge held that the Bank had breached its duties by failing to make inquiries about the transfers when a pattern had emerged by the time of the third transfer indicating impropriety in the operation of the Account. Nonetheless, the Judge held that the six-year limitation period under the Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347), within which the claim had to be brought, had started running upon the closure of the Account in 1998, which the Judge held was duly authorised by Tugu. On this view, the claim had become statute-barred when the action was commenced in 2007. 4. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Judge on slightly different grounds. Materially, it held that the closure of the Account was unauthorised and a repudiation of the banking contract but that it was nevertheless effective in bringing the banker-customer relationship to an end. On this view, the six-year limitation period also began to run upon the closure of the Account in 1998 and therefore the claim was statute-barred. 5. In both courts below, the Bank also argued that Tugu was contributorily negligent, although this issue did not arise as Tugu’s claim was held to be statute-barred. Nonetheless, both the Judge and Court of Appeal assessed Tugu’s contributory fault at 50%. 6. Tugu was granted leave by the Court of Appeal to appeal to this Court on both issues of statutory limitation and contributory negligence. Limitation 7. This Court held that Tugu’s claim was not statute-barred. Tugu’s claim was essentially one for the payment of a debt owed by the Bank, and it was well settled that, in the banking context, the six-year limitation period only began to run upon the customer’s demand for payment of the debt, in this case in 2006. 8. This Court rejected the Bank’s argument that this case was different because the banker-customer relationship had come to an end when the Account was closed in 1998. For the following two reasons this Court considered that the banker-customer relationship between Tugu and the Bank had continued to subsist. 9. First, this Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the closure of the Account was unauthorised, which showed an intention on the part of the Bank to no longer be bound by its banking contract with Tugu. However, without Tugu’s acceptance this was insufficient to bring the contract to an end. Further, there was nothing in this case which called for the application of the principle that in exceptional cases a contract could be brought to an end by one party unilaterally. 10. Secondly, this Court held that whether the Account had been closed with Tugu’s authority or not, there was no principle of law which entitled the Bank to unilaterally write off a debt without paying it. The dishonest transfers were nullities, the aggregate amount of which constituted the debt that was payable by the Bank on Tugu’s demand. Since the Bank had never discharged this debt, it followed that the banker-customer relationship had not been effectually terminated. Applicability of contributory negligence 11. On the question of contributory negligence, this Court held that this defence was not available to the Bank, since Tugu’s claim was one in debt which did not fall within the scope of section 21 of the Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 23). Disposition 12. Accordingly, this Court unanimously allowed the appeal and ordered that judgment be entered for the aggregate amount of the unauthorised transfers except for the first two.