1. The appellant is a registered medical practitioner and was indicted for gross negligence manslaughter (“GNM”). The prosecution alleged that she had administered to her patients a highly contaminated blood product, causing the patient’s death. As the jury was unable to reach a verdict at her first trial, a retrial (which has yet to take place) was ordered. 2. This appeal arises out of a ruling by Barnes J regarding the essential elements of the offence of GNM in determining a preliminary issue for the purposes of the retrial. It involves as a question of law, what the prosecution must prove to establish that the death of the deceased was caused by “gross negligence” on the part of the accused, and in particular, whether such negligence can be proved by applying an objective “reasonable man” test or whether the prosecution must prove that the accused was subjectively aware of an obvious and serious risk of death to the deceased. 3. Barnes J held that the prosecution must prove subjective awareness on the defendant’s part but her decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal. 4. On appeal before the Court of Final Appeal, the appellant made two main arguments in support of the proposition that under the law in Hong Kong subjective awareness must be proved. First, it was argued that the definition of the offence of GNM based on an objective standard of negligence is objectionably “circular” in that the jury are left to define for themselves whether an offence has been committed rather than being given proper guidance by the court. Secondly, it was contended that it is unacceptable in principle and contrary to case authority that liability for an offence as serious as manslaughter should rest on an objective test rather than on proof of the accused’s subjective awareness of the risk of causing death as reflecting the necessary culpability to justify conviction for manslaughter. 5. The Court rejected the circularity argument, holding that the objective test is not circular but is one which requires the jury to determine the facts regarding the accused’s conduct and to evaluate, in all the circumstances of the case, to what (if any) degree such conduct fell short of the required objective standard, such an evaluative task often being allocated to the jury, applying community standards. The court directs the jury that they can only convict if they find that there was a very high degree of negligence on the part of the defendant. 6. The Court also rejected the argument that guilt established on an objective standard did not reflect a sufficient finding of culpability. It emphasised that the offence of GNM requires proof that the accused owed a duty of care to the deceased, that such duty was breached, causing the death of the deceased when, in all the circumstances, the defendant’s conduct fell so far short of what could reasonably be expected of him or her that such conduct could properly be characterised as grossly negligent. The Court held that such conduct is justifiably treated as highly culpable and deserving of being castigated as manslaughter. 7. The Court considered various decided cases cited by the appellant and held that, properly understood, they did not support the appellant’s proposition that subjective awareness of an obvious risk of death had to be established for the offence of GNM. 8. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal holding that gross negligence is proved by application of the objective standard of reasonableness, there being no additional requirement that the prosecution must also prove that the defendant was subjectively aware of an obvious and serious risk of death to the deceased. Such awareness, if proved, is relevant to liability but not a necessary ingredient of the offence.