Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
supreme court of canada the supreme court decides how 'releases' should be interpreted. on march 3, 2009, mrs. bailey struck mr. temple while driving her husband's car. mr. temple, an employee of the city of corner brook in newfoundland and labrador, was performing road work at the time. he sued mrs. bailey for the injuries he sustained. meanwhile, the baileys sued the city for the damage to the car and the injuries mrs. bailey sustained. on august 26, 2011, the baileys settled with the city and signed a 'release'. the release stated that the baileys agreed to exempt the city from any past, present or future claims of any kind related to the accident. in the years that followed, mr. temple's lawsuit against mrs. bailey continued. in that lawsuit, mrs. bailey filed a claim against the city, in which she asked the judge to order the city to pay mr. temple for her, should she be found responsible for his injuries. this is known as a third party claim, because the city in this case was not a party to the lawsuit but was being drawn into it. the city objected to the third party claim and argued the release prevented mrs. bailey from trying to get the city to pay. the judge agreed with the city. but on appeal, the court of appeal agreed with mrs. bailey. the city then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court agreed with the city and allowed the appeal. the court concluded the release that mrs. bailey had signed prevented her from making the third party claim against the city. a 'release' is a contract the supreme court explained that a release is a contract and should be interpreted according to general principles of contract law as set out in the court's previous decision of sattva capital corp. v creston moly corp. these principles require courts to give'the words used [in a contract] their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of formation of the contract'. the surrounding circumstances consist only of objective evidence of the facts at that time. it does not include the subjective intentions of the parties, meaning what may have been going on in their minds at the time. in this case, the judges noted that the release clearly stated that mrs. bailey was giving up her rights against the city in 'all actions, suits, causes of action foreseen or unforeseen and claims of any kind or nature whatsoever arising out of or relating to the accident'. the judges concluded that mrs. bailey's third party claim against the city came within the plain meaning of those words. they also concluded that the surrounding circumstances of the case confirmed that the parties, when signing the release, had objective knowledge of the third party claim. wording to consider when interpreting a release, the question will be whether the release includes the type of claim filed. therefore, when drafting a release, a person might consider wording that makes clear what claims the release will cover, including whether the release will cover yet unknown claims. a release that is specific to a timeframe or subject matter is less likely to cause disputes.
supreme court of canada the supreme court upholds convictions for two men who were operating a sexual escort service. the question in this case is how courts should treat crimes that are committed after the supreme court of canada declares a law unconstitutional but before that declaration takes effect. that is what happened when mr. tamim albashir and mr. kasra mohsenipour were convicted in 2019 for offences that occurred between 2013 and 2016. at that time, the men were operating a sexual escort service in vancouver. among the offences was a violation of section 212(1)(j) of the criminal code, which barred pimps from living off the money made by sex workers. in 2013, in the case of canada (attorney general) v bedford, the supreme court found canada's prostitution laws were unconstitutional, including section 212(1)(j) the judges found that it had criminalized all sex work, instead of focusing on controlling and abusive pimps. the supreme court gave parliament a one year 'suspension period' to change the law, which it did in 2014. mr. albashir and mr. mohsenipour committed the section 212(1)(j) offences during that suspension period, but were charged after it ended. at their trial, the question was whether the old law had become unconstitutional, preventing the men from being convicted. the trial judge decided that the law had indeed been unconstitutional at the time the crimes were committed and quashed the charges against both men. the crown appealed to the british columbia court of appeal, which convicted the men. the court of appeal held that the supreme court's declaration of unconstitutionality had never taken effect because parliament had replaced section 212(1)(j) before the end of the suspension period. mr. albashir and mr. mohsenipour appealed their convictions to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed the appeals. the men could be charged and convicted under section 212(1)(j) of the criminal code after the suspension period had ended for conduct committed during it. writing for the majority, justice karakatsanis explained that a retroactive declaration means the law is considered to have always been invalid. a prospective declaration, on the other hand, means the law is considered to be invalid only after the suspension period has ended and the declaration of constitutional invalidity has taken effect. in the bedford case, the court had not said whether that declaration would apply retroactively or prospectively. but the purpose for the suspension was to continue to protect vulnerable sex workers while parliament replaced section 212(1)(j) with a new law. in light of this purpose, the majority in this case said section 212(1)(j) was unconstitutional only after the suspension period had ended. as a result, mr. albashir and mr. mohsenipour were liable under this provision for their conduct during the suspension period, and could be charged and convicted under it.
supreme court of canada the supreme court rules a quebec media company may not access court documents that had been filed, and then removed, from a civil lawsuit once proceedings ended. this case involves the company mediaqmi inc., which publishes the journal de montr al newspaper. the news outlet wanted to publish details about a case involving mr. magdi kamel and his former employer, the centre int gr universitaire de sant et de services sociaux de l'ouest‑de‑l'ele‑de‑montr al (ciusss). the ciusss had sued its former manager, mr. kamel, claiming he had misappropriated approximately $400,000 of its money by channeling it into four different bank accounts over several years. it also asked the court to issue an order to learn who owned the four bank accounts. among the documents the ciusss filed with the court to support its case was a forensic accounting report. the quebec superior court agreed to order the identification of the bank account holder or holders. it also ordered the entire court record be sealed. mediaqmi subsequently asked the quebec superior court to unseal the documents so it could access the court record and its exhibits. however, before a judge could decide that issue, the ciusss dropped the lawsuit. as such, there was no trial, and both the ciusss and mr. kamel sought to retrieve documents from the court record. yet mediaqmi objected to the ciusss's efforts to remove its exhibits. the quebec superior court judge who ruled on the matter ordered the unsealing of the court records, but said that because the lawsuit had ended, the parties could retrieve their exhibits and shield them from the public. mediaqmi appealed to the quebec court of appeal and lost. it then appealed to the supreme court of canada. does the public still have access to exhibits once parties have retrieved them from the court record? the main question for the supreme court was whether the public can still have access to exhibits in court records once a lawsuit has ended and the parties have removed their exhibits from the court record. in quebec, the code of civil procedure gives any member of the public the right to access court records. the code of civil procedure also contains a provision dealing with the removal of exhibits filed in a court record. during proceedings, parties may withdraw their exhibits if all of them consent. once the proceedings have ended, parties have one year to retrieve their exhibits. if they do not, the exhibits may be destroyed. the majority of the judges of the supreme court of canada has upheld the finding of the court of appeal. they said that once parties retrieve their exhibits at the end of a proceeding, members of the public may continue to consult court records, but will no longer have access to exhibits that have been removed. the supreme court also emphasized that the general rule is that court proceedings and records are open and public.
supreme court of canada a law preventing residents of new brunswick from stocking up on alcohol from another province is constitutional, the supreme court has ruled. provinces have flexibility to make laws to address particular conditions and priorities within their borders. they can do this even if those laws may incidentally restrict the movement of goods across their borders. the court unanimously allowed the crown's appeal in a case of a new brunswick man who bought alcohol from neighbouring quebec. section 134(b) of the new brunswick's liquor control act forbids residents from possessing large amounts of alcohol not purchased from the new brunswick liquor corporation for example, purchased from other provinces. the rcmp was watching new brunswick residents who crossed the border into quebec to buy cheaper alcohol. on october 6, 2012, gerard comeau drove to quebec from his home in new brunswick to stock up. when he returned to new brunswick, mr. comeau was stopped by the rcmp with large amounts of beer and some spirits he bought in quebec. he was fined $240, plus fees. mr. comeau fought the fine. he said that section 121 of the constitution act, 1867 guarantees free trade across provincial borders. the crown disagreed. it argued that section 121 was only meant to prevent provinces from charging tariffs or similar costs at the border. the crown said the provision did not apply in mr. comeau's situation. the trial judge, breaking with longstanding supreme court precedent, agreed with mr. comeau and dismissed the charge. the new brunswick court of appeal dismissed the crown's request for permission to appeal. the crown appealed to the supreme court. the supreme court held that while section 121 prohibits laws whose main purpose is to prevent the movement of goods across provincial borders, it does not prohibit legislation that has incidental effects on trade. while the new brunswick law mr. comeau challenged restricted the movement of alcohol across the provincial border, this was not its main purpose. its main purpose was to manage the supply and demand of liquor in new brunswick. therefore, the law is constitutional. this case turned on the meaning of section 121 of the constitution act, 1867. to understand its meaning, the court looked at the wording, history, and position of the provision within the constitution. it also looked at the legal principles that guide how courts understand the constitution. the court concluded that section 121 prohibits laws restricting inter-provincial trade, but only where restricting trade is the laws' main purpose. if section 121 were understood to guarantee free inter-provincial trade, it would have far-reaching effects on agricultural supply management, public health prohibitions, environmental controls, and similar schemes. section 121 lets provinces enact these types of measures, as long as their main purpose is not simply to prevent the importation of goods from other provinces.
supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that new brunswick missed its deadline to file a $50 million claim. in 2009, the province of new brunswick agreed to guarantee $50 million in bank loans for a company called atcon, which provides construction, energy, industrial and waste management services. the province had agreed to act as a guarantor on the basis of a report prepared by an auditing company called grant thornton. atcon hired the company to review its financial statements. the report from grant thornton concluded that atcon's financial statements were accurate and were prepared according to proper accounting principles. however, atcon subsequently defaulted on its bank loans and asked the province to pay. it paid the entire $50 million in march 2010. in june 2010, the province hired another auditing company to review and report on atcon's finances. on february 4, 2011, the new auditors submitted a draft report stating that atcon's finances had not been prepared according to proper accounting principles. the report contained evidence that atcon had overstated its assets, revenues and profits. it also found atcon had understated its liabilities, expenses and losses. the final report, which was almost identical to the draft, was completed on november 30, 2012. on june 23, 2014, the province filed a $50 million claim against grant thornton, arguing that it had been negligent in preparing its report of atcon's finances. grant thornton responded that it had not been negligent and asked the judge to dismiss the claim, arguing that the province had run out of time to file it. grant thornton invoked the limitation of actions act, a law in new brunswick that says a plaintiff has two years to file a claim after 'discovering' it. the judge sided with grant thornton, but the court of appeal sided with the province. the supreme court of canada has agreed with grant thornton. the province filed its claim too late. when is a claim 'discovered'? in a unanimous judgment, the supreme court said a claim is 'discovered' when the plaintiff has enough information to know the defendant was probably at fault. in this case, the court was satisfied the province had discovered the claim against grant thornton on february 4, 2011, the date it received the draft report. by then, the province knew or ought to have known a loss occurred that grant thornton had been hired to detect. this was sufficient information to know grant thornton had been negligent. although the province knew this on february 4, 2011, it did not bring its claim until june 23, 2014, more than two years later. as a result, the court concluded that under new brunswick's limitation of actions act, the province had filed its claim too late. deadline for filing a claim anyone filing a claim should consider the deadlines that apply in their province or territory. otherwise, they risk losing the opportunity to have courts uphold their rights.
supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that an insurance company with no knowledge of a policy violation may deny full coverage once made aware of the violation. on may 29, 2006, mr. steven devecseri died in a motorcycle accident where other people were injured. among them, mr. jeffrey bradfield and mr. jeremy caton decided to sue his estate. mr. devecseri's insurance company, royal & sun alliance (rsa), proceeded to defend the estate in the two lawsuits. three years after the accident, and more than a year into litigation, rsa learned mr. devecseri had consumed alcohol immediately before the accident, putting him in breach of his insurance policy. rsa promptly stopped defending mr. devecseri's estate and denied coverage. in doing so, mr. bradfield and mr. caton were no longer eligible for $1 million under the insurance policy. nearly three years later, mr. caton's action went to trial. the result was a judgment against mr. devecseri's estate as well as against mr. bradfield. there was also a judgment in favour of mr. bradfield on his counter-claim against the estate. mr. bradfield sought a declaration allowing him to recover judgment against rsa on the basis that the insurance company had waived its right to deny full coverage because it had provided a defence to mr. devecseri's estate as the litigation progressed. the trial judge granted the declaration, finding that rsa had indeed waived its right to deny full coverage. the ontario court of appeal allowed rsa's appeal. it held that rsa could deny coverage, despite having provided a defence to mr. devecseri's estate, because it did not know of his policy breach. mr. bradfield sought to appeal the decision to the supreme court of canada, but after being granted leave, he settled with rsa and dropped his appeal. the trial lawyers association of british columbia was permitted to be substituted as the appellant. although the appeal was moot, the trial lawyers association wanted to know how the court would have decided the issue. an appeal is moot if the dispute is already resolved. however, a court may decide to hear a case nonetheless, to clarify the law on the issue. the supreme court agreed to hear the appeal, but ultimately sided with rsa. waiver by conduct was not possible under the statute as it read at the time. writing for a majority of the judges, justices moldaver and brown observed that the trial lawyers association had conceded, rightfully in their view, that waiver by conduct was precluded by the insurance act as it read at the time. the statute required that waiver be given in writing and, in this case, the parties agreed that rsa had not given a waiver in writing. also, the majority agreed with the court of appeal that rsa could deny coverage, despite having defended claims against mr. devecseri's estate, because it did not know of his policy breach.
supreme court of canada the supreme court restores a foster parent's convictions for the death of a child and for causing bodily harm to another. kevin goforth and his wife were charged with the second degree murder of a four-year old and unlawfully causing bodily harm to a two-year old. both children were being foster parented by the goforths. the parents were accused of failing to provide the children with the necessaries of life, such as food and water, contrary to section 215 of the criminal code. in 2016, a jury convicted both foster parents of unlawfully causing bodily harm to the younger child. as to the older child, the jury found the wife guilty of second degree murder, whereas it found mr. goforth guilty of manslaughter. second degree murder is a more serious offence than manslaughter because someone who murders intends to kill (or at least cause the victim serious harm), while someone who commits manslaughter does not. mr. goforth appealed to saskatchewan's court of appeal, which set aside his convictions and ordered a new trial. the court of appeal said the trial judge made errors in her instructions to the jury in two ways. first, she was wrong in how she described the guilty mind requirement, known as the 'mens rea'. second, she failed to properly instruct the jury regarding mr. goforth's evidence that he was only a secondary caregiver to the children. the crown then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court agreed with the crown. the jury was properly instructed. writing for a majority of the judges of the supreme court, justice suzanne côté said the jury was properly instructed. 'this court has long held that an accused is entitled to a jury that is properly   and not necessarily perfectly   instructed', she wrote. trial judges must be allowed some flexibility in the language they use to instruct a jury since their role is to simplify the law and evidence. an appeal court must review any alleged errors in the instructions in the context of the evidence, the entire jury instructions and the trial as a whole. in this case, the trial judge's instructions were not perfect but were adequate. the majority of judges said there was no reasonable possibility that the jury would have been confused about the mens rea requirement or been misled about what the crown had to prove for mr. goforth to be found guilty of either manslaughter or unlawfully causing bodily harm. also, the trial judge's instructions were sufficient as to mr. goforth's evidence relating to his busy schedule and that he was only a secondary caregiver, which he argued prevented him from foreseeing the risk of harm to the children. finally, the judge's instructions necessarily allowed the jury to make a common sense assessment about whether failing to provide food and water to young children was a marked departure (significantly different) from what a reasonably prudent person would do.
supreme court of canada the supreme court rules the city of montreal could not apply payments from quebec's voluntary reimbursement program to cover the amount it owed to a contractor. this case involves the city of montreal and one of its contractors, an engineering firm called sm group. in 2018, sm group sought to avoid bankruptcy by applying to quebec's superior court for protection under the companies' creditors arrangement act (ccaa). this process is called restructuring. sm group had also participated in a two-year voluntary reimbursement program under a quebec law meant to help recover money paid 'in the course of the tendering, awarding or management of a public contract in relation to which there may have been fraud or fraudulent tactics'. the 2015 law was in response to the charbonneau commission of inquiry into collusion and corruption in public contracts with the construction industry. the superior court granted sm group's application. it appointed deloitte restructuring (deloitte) to monitor the company's restructuring and ordered a 'stay of proceedings'. the stay meant that all legal actions against the company were put on hold to give the engineering firm the opportunity to get its business back on track. following that initial court order, sm group continued with the construction of the samuel de champlain bridge and the rebuilding of the turcot interchange in montreal. however, the city refused to pay for that work. it said it could use 'pre-post compensation' to reduce or cancel the amount owed for the work performed by sm group. this meant the city would apply payments from the voluntary reimbursement program (vrp) to cover the amount owed for the work done on the bridge and interchange. pre-post compensation is usually not allowed by the courts, but the city said it should be allowed in this case because the money sm group owed through the vrp resulted from fraud. in response to the city's refusal to pay, deloitte applied to the superior court to stop the city from using pre-post compensation. the court granted deloitte's application, which the city then appealed. when the court of appeal agreed the city could not use pre-post compensation, the city turned to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has also agreed the city could not use pre-post compensation. the city failed to prove the vrp claim was fraudulent. writing for the majority, chief justice wagner and justice côté explained that a vrp claim is not necessarily fraudulent. they wrote, 'the mere fact that a debtor company participated in the vrp is not sufficient to infer that the company defrauded a public body'. in this case, the city of montreal still had the burden of proving that sm group had committed fraud, which the city failed to do. the majority said a court should generally not allow pre-post compensation, unless there are exceptional circumstances. they said there were no such exceptional circumstances in this case.