Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 9 March 2006 HELEN MARGARET SWEEDMAN v TRANSPORT ACCIDENT COMMISSION Victoria's Transport Accident Commission (TAC) could pursue an indemnity claim against a New South Wales resident to recover compensation it paid to two Victorian accident victims, the High Court of Australia held today. Mrs Sweedman was driving her son's NSW-registered car when it collided with a Victorian- registered car carrying John and Helen Sutton on a NSW road in July 1996. The Suttons were both injured and the TAC paid them $35,310.29 compensation in accordance with Victoria’s Transport Accident Act. Victoria’s compensation scheme is funded by a transport accident charge paid by owners of registered vehicles. For the purposes of the litigation it was assumed that the accident was caused by Mrs Sweedman's negligent driving, but the Suttons did not sue her in tort, the alternative remedy open to them under the NSW Motor Accidents Act. The TAC sued Mrs Sweedman for indemnity for that proportion of the compensation paid to the Suttons which was attributable to her negligence, pursuant to section 104(1) of the Victorian Act. The TAC claimed that her third-party insurance, which was compulsory under the NSW Act, extended to cover her for any liability to indemnify the TAC under the Victorian Act. Mrs Sweedman claimed that section 104 of the Victorian Act was inoperative or inapplicable because the Constitution prevented a court from applying it to the exclusion of the NSW Act. The Victorian County Court, in which the TAC initiated action, referred questions to the Court of Appeal, which answered the questions in favour of the TAC. Mrs Sweedman appealed to the High Court, which, by a 5-1 majority, today dismissed the appeal. The Court held that there was no constitutional impediment to applying the usual rule that the law of Victoria should apply to the case. Victorian law applied because the obligation to indemnify is sourced in section 104(1), the recovered money will go into the TAC's Transport Accident Fund, and the indemnity obligation only arose after payments had been made from the Fund to the Suttons as Victorian residents. The Court held there was no relevant inconsistency between the Victorian and NSW Acts, because the NSW Act was not directed to blocking claims of the kind created by section 104 of the Victorian Act and also because the compulsory third-party insurance policy does not in any way hinder the ability of the TAC to pursue its indemnity claim. A majority of the Court also rejected Mrs Sweedman’s argument that she suffered discrimination contrary to section 117 of the Constitution because if she lived in Victoria she would not have been subjected to the indemnity claim under section 104(1). It held that there was no differential treatment in the Victorian Act attributable to residence that would enliven section 117.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 March 2013 SEM v THE QUEEN [2013] HCA 6 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed three appeals from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia ("the Full Court") which upheld the appellants' convictions for murder. The appellants were convicted of murder in the Supreme Court of South Australia following a fight at a party in suburban Adelaide in which a young man was stabbed. The appellants were part of a group that had descended on an 18th birthday party after a dispute between one of the appellants and others attending the party. The appellants were convicted on the basis that they were participants in a joint criminal enterprise to kill or to cause really serious bodily harm to a person or persons at the party using a knife or similar bladed weapon. The appellants appealed against their convictions to the Full Court, arguing that their trials had miscarried because the trial judge had not told the jury that it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that each appellant had participated in the joint criminal enterprise. The appellants also argued that their trial had miscarried because the trial judge had not addressed each appellant's case separately in his summing-up to the jury. The Full Court dismissed the appeal on both grounds. Huynh was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court, and the special leave applications of Duong and Sem were referred to an enlarged bench of the High Court to be heard at the same time The High Court granted Duong and Sem leave to appeal, but unanimously dismissed all three appeals. The High Court held that, although participation in furtherance of an agreement to kill or to cause really serious bodily harm to a person was an element that had to be proved against each appellant, the trial judge had not erred because the appellants' participation was not a live issue at their trial. The appellants did not dispute that they were present when the crime was committed. Their presence pursuant to the agreement constituted participation in the joint criminal enterprise. The High Court held that the trial judge had not erred in failing to address each appellant's case separately in his summing-up, because almost all the evidence in the trial was admissible against each appellant and his Honour had adequately identified the evidence relevant to the determination of the issues in each case and the criticisms each appellant had made of that evidence.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 19 May 2005 ALLIANZ AUSTRALIA INSURANCE LIMITED v GSF AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED AND An employer’s directive to use crowbars to unload heavy transport containers after a mechanical breakdown was the predominant cause of a worker’s injury, rather than the breakdown itself, the High Court of Australia held today. This determined which particular legislation would apply for deciding liability for compensation to Mr Oliver. GSF, which packed food in containers for airline transport, employed Mr Oliver as a maintenance technician. A truck used to carry the containers was fitted with a set of rollers and a motorised T- bar for loading and unloading. In February 1998, the gearbox broke down and the T-bar mechanism became inoperative. GSF sent Mr Oliver and another employee to Sydney Airport to unload the truck by using crowbars to lever the containers, each weighing about a tonne, along the rollers. Mr Oliver suffered an injury to his lower back. Mr Oliver sued GSF for damages in the New South Wales District Court. The action was referred to arbitration and in November 2001 an award was made in his favour. GSF then applied to the District Court for a limited rehearing to determine whether the case gave rise to an indemnity under either or both of the Workers Compensation Act and the Motor Accidents Act. If damages were assessed under the former there would be a verdict of $450,000 for Mr Oliver and insurer QBE would be liable to indemnify GSF; if assessed under the latter the award would be $460,000 and Allianz, the compulsory third party insurer of the vehicle, would be liable. The District Court held that the Motor Accidents Act was attracted so entered a judgment for Mr Oliver against GSF for $460,000. The Court also ordered Allianz, which has been joined as a party to the proceedings, to pay GSF $230,000 by way of indemnification on the basis that it was a case of dual insurance. Allianz appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal on the ground that the injury was not an “injury” as defined by the Motor Accidents Act. The appeal was dismissed, by majority. Allianz appealed to the High Court, arguing that Mr Oliver’s injury was not a result of the use or operation of the vehicle but was caused by the unsafe system of work. GSF contended that the defective mechanism was a cause of his injury and occurred in the course of the vehicle’s use or operation for unloading, so the requirements under the Motor Accidents Act that the injury be a result of the defect and caused during such use or operation by a vehicle defect were satisfied. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal, holding that Mr Oliver’s back injury was not an injury for the purposes of the Act. It held that there is an “injury” within the meaning of the Act “if, and only if” the injury was the result of a defect in the vehicle. The unsafe system of the employer, in particular the direction to use crowbars to lever the containers, not the defective unloading mechanism, was the predominant and more immediate cause of the back injury.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 December 2004 HILLPALM PTY LTD v HEAVEN’S DOOR PTY LTD Hillpalm was not bound to provide an easement over its property despite a proposed easement having been approved by Tweed Shire Council, the High Court of Australia held today. Hillpalm and Heaven’s Door in 1998 bought adjoining blocks of land, Tanglewood and Emerald Mountain respectively, which were once part of a larger banana farm which had been subdivided and sold off by its former owners, Winchcombe Carson Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd. The subdivision plan showing a proposed right of way from Heaven’s Door’s land across a corner of Hillpalm’s land to join Clothiers Creek Road was registered by the New South Wales Registrar- General in 1979. The Tweed Shire Council approved the subdivision in 1977. Further subdivisions were made of the section of land which includes Tanglewood. Hillpalm was unaware that the owners of Emerald Mountain had any easement or right of way over its land. Heaven’s Door contended that it was entitled to a declaration that Hillpalm was in breach of a condition of the council’s consent for the original subdivision and to orders requiring Hillpalm to create a right of carriageway and to construct a track within the carriageway. The NSW Land and Environment Court made the declaration and orders sought. Hillpalm appealed unsuccessfully to the NSW Court of Appeal and appealed to the High Court. Heaven’s Door accepted it had no easement over Tanglewood or other interest in the property, but it contended it was entitled to compel Hillpalm to perform conditions imposed by the shire council when the land was subdivided by Winchcombe Carson. The plan lodged with the Registrar-General bore the Shire Clerk’s certificate that Local Government Act requirements had been met, but the High Court held that this certificate showed only that conditions which had to be met before the subdivision was certified had been met. The certificate could not specify whether conditions to be fulfilled after the subdivision had been put into effect were actually satisfied. On its face, the plan did no more than indicate that Winchcombe Carson had intended at some future time to create an easement. Whatever might have been the commercial significance to a party buying the land from Winchcombe Carson of its stated intention on the plan, nothing in the Local Government Act obliged it to give effect to that intention. Such an intention was not binding on Hillpalm. Any conditions imposed by the council when it approved the subdivision were also not enforceable against Hillpalm. When it bought Tanglewood it obtained a registered title free from any encumbrance or interest of the kind which Heaven’s Door contended it was now entitled to have created. The Court, by a 3-2 majority, allowed the appeal with costs.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 December 2004 SERGE ANIKIN v ALFONSO SIERRA AND STATE TRANSIT AUTHORITY The High Court of Australia today restored a damages award of $750,000 to a man who was seriously injured when hit by a bus in the northern Sydney suburb of Epping. Mr Anikin, 30, had been with his girlfriend and other friends at a rock concert at Macquarie University on 29 March 1997. He argued with his girlfriend and left. While still within the grounds he telephoned his father to say he was lost and his father told him to wait for him at the university offices. When the father arrived he could not find his son, who had set off on foot along Epping Road towards Epping railway station. Why he did this is unknown. The footpath ran out and some unsigned steps ran over a section of rock wall. Nearby street lights were not working. Rubbish was strewn along the shoulder and asphalt had broken away. Mr Anikin was wearing dark clothes but his shoes had a white strip around them. As he walked along the edge of the roadway facing oncoming traffic, he was struck by the bus driven by Mr Sierra about 9pm. The bus struck him on its front left-hand corner, throwing him against the rockface beside the road. Mr Anikin was unconscious for nine days and was left with brain damage and no memory of the accident. His left arm had to be amputated. Mr Annikin sued Mr Sierra and the STA for negligence, successfully arguing that Mr Sierra had failed to exercise due care and attention, failed to keep a proper lookout, failed to sound his horn, and failed to either stop the bus or to deviate slightly. Mr Sierra claimed Mr Anikin had suddenly jumped in front of the bus, apparently trying to flag it down, when the bus was only 10 to 15 metres away. District Court Judge Margaret Sidis rejected Mr Sierra’s version of events due to inconsistencies in his evidence; the nature of Mr Anikin’s injuries, the damage to the bus, lack of skidmarks and other objective factors; and the evidence of Matthew Fatches, a passenger in a car travelling on the other side of the road. Mr Fatches said no vehicles were in front, behind or beside the bus but it did not deviate around Mr Anikin. Expert witnesses said the bus’s lights would have illuminated 50 to 60 metres of the road and had a leftwards slant. Judge Sidis estimated Mr Anikin was about 70cm on to the roadway. She entered judgment for Mr Anikin, but reduced his $1 million damages by 25 per cent for his contributory negligence. The New South Wales Court of Appeal, by a 2-1 majority, overturned the judgment. Mr Anikin appealed to the High Court which held that the Court of Appeal was not justified in reversing the findings of Judge Sidis who had the advantage of assessing the credibility of various witnesses. The High Court held that the Court of Appeal majority erred in concluding there was no evidence of negligence. While Mr Anikin needed to look out for his own safety, Mr Sierra had obligations to exercise care for pedestrians while in charge of a powerful vehicle. The Court allowed the appeal by a 4-1 majority.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 3 April, 2003 YOUYANG PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE OF THE BILL HAYWARD DISCRETIONARY TRUST v MINTER ELLISON MORRIS FLETCHER (LATER MINTER ELLISON) A family trust which lost a $500,000 investment today won its High Court of Australia appeal against a firm of solicitors for errors made in the handling of the investment. Youyang was trustee of a family trust which controlled substantial funds through various companies and trusts. In 1993, Youyang invested $500,000 in a preference share issue by EC Consolidated Capital Limited (ECCCL). The money was paid into Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher’s trust account. ECCCL was to use part of each subscription to purchase a bearer deposit certificate issued by Dresdner Bank subsidiary, Dresdner International Financial Markets (Australia) Limited, which could then be traded on the money market. In Youyang’s case, Minters deposited with Dresdner $256,800 – due to grow to $500,000 on maturity in 2003 – but there was no bearer certificate of deposit and therefore no security of the kind agreed. Minters paid ECCCL the rest of the money (apart from legal fees) in breach of an obligation not to do so unless the certificate of deposit had been procured. ECCCL went into liquidation in 1997. The High Court, upholding an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Appeal, unanimously held that the unauthorised disbursements involved dealing with Youyang’s property in breach of trust and ordered Minters to restore the trust fund in the amount of $500,000 plus interest and costs.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 2 March 2005 NAGV AND NAGW OF 2002 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL Australia had an obligation to grant protection visas to a Russian father and son, despite their right to settle in Israel, the High Court of Australia unanimously held today. NAGV and NAGW arrived in Australia as tourists in 1999 and applied for protection visas, claiming they had a well-founded fear of persecution in the Russian Federation because they were Jewish and because of NAGV’s political activities. The Refugee Review Tribunal found the men had a genuine fear of persecution if they were returned to Russia, so were entitled to refugee status. However the RRT affirmed the Immigration Department’s decision to refuse to grant them protection visas as Israel was a country in which they would have effective protection under Israel’s Law of Return, which gives every Jew the right to live there. NAGV’s wife is not Jewish (she and their daughter were in Lithuania) and the family rejected the option of moving to Israel, partly because of a concern about discrimination against mixed-marriage families and partly because compulsory military service would conflict with the family’s pacifism. The RRT was not satisfied that these reasons were relevant to the question of whether they would have effective protection in Israel. The Federal Court rejected their application for relief and the Full Court of the Federal Court, by majority, rejected an appeal. The Full Court agreed that the 2000 Full Court decision, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Thiyagarajah, relating to an asylum seeker who had been granted refugee status in France then travelled to Australia in a bid for asylum here, was wrongly decided. However the majority concluded that the Full Court should not depart from what had become settled law and that NAGV and NAGW should be denied protection visas. They then appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that the availability of another country which would accept asylum seekers did not mean Australia did not have protection obligations under the United Nations Refugee Convention. The Court held that the RRT erred in its construction of section 36(2) of the Migration Act, which stated that the criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant is a non-citizen to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention. The Minister contended that Australia owed no obligation to provide NAGV and NAGW with asylum because of the availability of a third state – Israel – in which they could live without having a well-founded fear of persecution or facing the risk that they would be sent back to the Russian Federation or to anywhere else where their lives or freedom would be threatened. But the Court held that section 36(2) did not provide for such a qualification on Australia’s protection obligations. Although an asylum seeker might have obtained protection elsewhere, Australia still owed protection obligations to them. The Court quashed the RRT’s decision to refuse NAGV and NAGW protection visas and ordered that it redetermine their case according to law.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 20 June 2014 PLAINTIFF M150 OF 2013 BY HIS LITIGATION GUARDIAN SISTER BRIGID MARIE ARTHUR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION & ANOR [2014] HCA 25 Today the High Court unanimously held that the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection ("the Minister") did not have the power under s 85 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") to limit the number of protection visas that may be granted in a specified financial year. The judgment in this matter should be read with the judgment handed down today in the concurrently heard matter Plaintiff S297/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 24. The plaintiff is an Ethiopian national who arrived in Australia as a stowaway on a cargo ship in 2013. He did not have a visa and was, therefore, an unlawful non-citizen within the meaning of the Act. He made a valid application for a protection visa. The Refugee Review Tribunal determined that he was a refugee within the meaning of the Refugees Convention, satisfying the criterion for a protection visa under s 36(2)(a) of the Act. However, he has been neither granted nor refused a protection visa because of an instrument signed by the Minister on 4 March 2014, which purported to determine under s 85 of the Act the maximum number of protection visas that may be granted in the financial year ending 30 June 2014. That maximum number having been reached, the grant of a protection visa to the plaintiff in this financial year would exceed that limit. Section 85 of the Act provides that the Minister may, by notice in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, determine the maximum number of visas of a specified class that may be granted in a specified financial year. Protection visas are a class of visa provided for by s 36. Under s 65, the Minister has a duty, after considering a valid application for a visa, to grant the visa if satisfied that certain conditions are met and to refuse to grant the visa if not so satisfied. Section 65A imposes a duty on the Minister to make a decision on protection visa applications within 90 days. In proceedings initiated in the High Court, the plaintiff claimed that the instrument limiting the number of protection visas which may be granted was invalid and that the Minister was bound to consider and determine his application and grant him a protection visa. A special case stated questions of law for determination by the Full Court. The High Court held that the instrument was invalid. In light of the time limit imposed by s 65A on the determination of protection visa applications, s 85 did not empower the Minister to determine the maximum number of protection visas that may be granted in a financial year. The Court ordered that the Minister consider and determine the plaintiff's application for a protection visa according to law.