Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 November 2017 HFM045 v THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU [2017] HCA 50 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from the Supreme Court of Nauru. The High Court held that the Supreme Court erred in failing to hold that the Refugee Status Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") had failed to accord the appellant procedural fairness. The appellant is a Nepalese citizen and has spent most of his life in the Jhapa district of Nepal. He is a member of the Chhetri caste. In September 2013, the appellant arrived by boat at Christmas Island. He was subsequently transferred to the Republic of Nauru ("Nauru") under the regional processing arrangement between Australia and Nauru. There he applied to the Secretary of the Department of Justice and Border Control of Nauru ("the Secretary") for a refugee status determination. As part of that application, the appellant claimed to fear persecution in Nepal from Maoists on account of his political opinion. He also claimed to fear persecution from Mongols (members of the Limbu tribe in particular) in his home district of Jhapa on account of his membership of the Chhetri caste. The Secretary determined that the appellant was not a refugee and that his return to Nepal would not breach Nauru's international obligations ("complementary protection"). The appellant applied unsuccessfully to the Tribunal for a merits review of the Secretary's determination. The Tribunal rejected aspects of the appellant's account, including that Maoist militia had been absorbed into the police force and army. The Tribunal referred to a report published on the website of the Nepalese army stating that "Chhetris are heavily represented in the army". The Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant faced a real possibility of persecution if he returned to Nepal or that he was owed complementary protection by Nauru. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Nauru contending, among other things, that the Tribunal had denied him procedural fairness by failing to put him on notice of the information concerning the Nepalese army and had applied the wrong test to the determination of the complementary protection claim. The Supreme Court of Nauru dismissed the appeal. The appellant appealed to the High Court as of right. The High Court held that the Tribunal was obliged to put the appellant on notice of the significance that it was disposed to attach to the reported level of representation of Chhetris in the Nepalese Army and to give him the opportunity to address the issue. The Court upheld the Supreme Court's conclusion that the Tribunal had not applied the wrong test in determining the appellant's complementary protection claim. The appeal was allowed and the appellant's application for review of the Secretary's decision was remitted to the Tribunal to be dealt with according to law.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 August 2018 [2018] HCA 36 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, holding that a new trial should be granted to the appellant on the basis that he was denied procedural fairness in the conduct of a trial involving the respondent's claim for probate of a will in solemn form. The appellant was unrepresented. He claimed an interest in challenging a will made in 2013 ("the 2013 Will"), which left the whole of the estate to the respondent. The appellant filed two caveats against a grant of probate without notice to him. The respondent brought proceedings for orders that the caveats cease to be in force ("the caveat motion"). The respondent also filed a summons for probate of the 2013 Will and a statement of claim, in which the appellant was not named as a defendant. Although the appellant was served with the statement of claim and filed an appearance, he was not directed to take any steps in the proceedings. His preparation was essentially limited to the caveat motion, which was listed for hearing. At a directions hearing, it was explained to the appellant that the trial would be limited to determination of the caveat motion. Three clear business days before the trial, at a further directions hearing, the trial judge told the appellant that the trial would be of the claim for probate and directed that the appellant be joined as a defendant. At trial, the appellant's defence was in disarray. His applications for adjournments were refused. The trial judge delivered judgment orally, granting probate of the 2013 Will in solemn form. The appellant was ordered to pay costs. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, but for different reasons. Ward JA concluded that, although the appellant had been denied procedural fairness, that denial did not deprive him of the possibility of a successful outcome. Emmett AJA concluded that the appellant did not have an interest in challenging the 2013 Will. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The appellant argued that the Court of Appeal erred in not ordering a retrial. The respondent argued that there was no denial of procedural fairness, and, if there was, there was no substantial miscarriage of justice by reason of any such denial. The Court unanimously held that the appellant had an interest in challenging the 2013 Will and he was denied procedural fairness. The denial of procedural fairness arose from the consequences, and effect on the appellant, of altering the hearing, at short notice, from a hearing of the caveat motion to a trial of the claim for probate. The denial amounted to a "substantial wrong or miscarriage" because the appellant was denied the possibility of a successful outcome.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 March 2014 [2014] HCA 6 Today the High Court, by majority, dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria upholding the conviction of Samuel James. Mr James was convicted following trial in the Supreme Court of Victoria of intentionally causing serious injury to Khadr Sleiman. Mr Sleiman suffered multiple injuries as the result of being struck by a vehicle The prosecution's case at trial was that Mr James deliberately struck Mr Sleiman intending to cause him serious injury. In the alternative, the prosecution charged that Mr James recklessly caused serious injury to Mr Sleiman. The defence case was that Mr Sleiman was struck accidently as Mr James manoeuvred his vehicle in reverse. While the jury was deliberating the prosecutor raised, for the first time, the question of whether the jury should be instructed of the availability of a further alternative verdict that Mr James intentionally caused injury, as opposed to serious injury, to Mr Sleiman. The trial judge declined to do so because the prosecution had not run its case on that basis and because the introduction of an alternative verdict might have deprived Mr James of the possibility of acquittal. Mr James' counsel at trial made no submission on that issue and for this reason was taken to have agreed with the trial judge. Mr James appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal contending that the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury of the availability of alternative verdicts had occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr James' appeal. Mr James was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court. By majority, the High Court held that the trial judge's duty with respect to leaving to the jury alternative verdicts is to be understood as part of the duty to secure a fair trial to the accused. The question of whether the failure to leave an alternative verdict had occasioned a miscarriage of justice is answered by consideration of what justice to the accused required in the circumstances of the particular case. This consideration takes into account the real issues at the trial and the forensic choices made by trial counsel. The High Court held that the central issue at the trial was whether the prosecution had excluded the reasonable possibility that Mr James had struck Mr Sleiman inadvertently. To have instructed the jury about lesser alternative offences which had not been relied upon by the prosecution or the defence might have blurred that central issue and jeopardised Mr James' chances of acquittal. The Court held that fairness to Mr James did not require that the trial judge direct the jury on the uncharged alternative verdicts.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 May, 2003 Public Information Officer PERMANENT TRUSTEE AUSTRALIA LIMITED AND PERMENT TRUSTEE COMPANY LIMITED v FAI GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) The High Court of Australia today ordered FAI to pay a claim of more than $10.2 million made under an insurance contract. The contract had been extended for a month but the claimants, the Permanent Trustees companies, did not intend to renew the contract for the full year. FAI was among companies providing professional indemnity cover to the Permanent Trustee companies which explored the possibility of effecting insurance with other insurers before their 1990-91 cover with FAI expired. Credit rating agency Standard and Poor’s had recently downgraded FAI. The existing cover was in several layers totalling $70 million and each layer was provided by various insurers, including FAI. Just before the 1990-91 cover expired, the lead underwriter sought information about Permanent Trustees’ involvement in property trusts. It offered a one-month extension of existing cover while the information was obtained. The price of the extension cost one-12th of the ordinary annual premium with an add-on of 20 per cent. FAI provided cover on the terms proposed. Permanent Trustees’ insurance broker did not tell FAI they were considering not renewing their annual contract. During the extension, claims were made against Permanent Trustees for which they sought indemnity. Proceedings were settled for $100.1 million of which the insurers’ contribution totalled $34.65 million. When FAI refused to meet its share, Permanent Trustees brought action in the New South Wales Supreme Court. The federal Insurance Contracts Act requires the insured disclose every matter it knows to be relevant to the decision of the insurer whether to accept the risk and, if so, on what terms. The trial judge held that had FAI known of Permanent Trustees’ intentions it would not have provided the extension. He ordered FAI to return the extension premium ($4,242.22) and held that FAI had no other liability. Permanent Trustees appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal, which held that the silence of the broker, which was negotiating for the Permanent Trustees companies, amounted to misrepresentation, and further that Permanent Trustees had acted fraudulently in failing to correct an untrue representation. Permanent Trustees then appealed to the High Court. The High Court, by a 3-2 majority, held that the Act did not require Permanent Trustees to tell FAI they were considering other insurers. The Court held that matters for disclosure were those relevant to FAI’s acceptance of the risk. Insurers had no right to continuing custom and no right to know that an insured might be looking for a different insurer, or a better or more competitive contract of insurance, both matters which any insurer would realise might be happening. The Court allowed the appeal with costs and entered judgment against FAI for a total of $10.2 million plus interest. FAI was allowed to retain the $4,242.22 premium. The Court also expressly overruled the finding of fraud made by the Court of Appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 February 2015 PLAINTIFF S297/2013 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION & ANOR [2015] HCA 3 Today the High Court unanimously held that a decision made by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection in July 2014 to refuse to grant the plaintiff a permanent protection visa was not made according to law and that the plaintiff was entitled to have that visa granted. The plaintiff, a Pakistani national, entered Australia by sea at Christmas Island in May 2012. He did not have a visa and was, therefore, an "unlawful non-citizen" within the meaning of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). By later amendments to the Act he became an "unauthorised maritime arrival". In September 2012, the Minister permitted the plaintiff to make a valid application for a permanent protection visa. The plaintiff made an application for a protection visa which was refused by a delegate of the Minister. The plaintiff sought review of that decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The Tribunal remitted the plaintiff's application to the Minister for reconsideration because the plaintiff was found to be a refugee. The Minister did not decide the plaintiff's application. The plaintiff initiated proceedings in the High Court claiming that various regulatory and other steps which were thought to permit the Minister not to decide the plaintiff's application were invalid or ineffective. In June 2014, the High Court held in favour of the plaintiff and ordered that the Minister consider and determine the plaintiff's application for a permanent protection visa according to law. In July 2014, the Minister decided to refuse to grant the plaintiff a protection visa. The only reason for the refusal was that the Minister was not satisfied that the grant of a protection visa to the plaintiff "is in the national interest" because he was an unauthorised maritime arrival. The plaintiff challenged the validity of the "national interest" criterion on which the Minister relied and asked for orders directing the Minister to grant the plaintiff a permanent protection visa. The plaintiff also alleged that amendments made to the Act in late 2014 did not affect his right to a grant of that visa. The High Court unanimously found that the decision made by the Minister to refuse to grant the plaintiff a protection visa was not made according to law. The Court found that the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) stated exhaustively what visa consequences attached to being an unauthorised maritime arrival, and the Minister could not refuse an application for a visa only because the applicant was an unauthorised maritime arrival. The Court also held that the amendments to the Act did not affect the plaintiff's right to obtain a permanent protection visa. It was not necessary for the Court to address the validity of the "national interest" criterion upon which the Minister relied in refusing the plaintiff's application. Immediately following the Full Court making its orders answering the questions reserved for its opinion, French CJ made an order commanding the Minister to grant the plaintiff a permanent protection visa.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 August 2010 ROWE & ANOR v ELECTORAL COMMISSIONER & ANOR On 26 July 2010, proceedings were commenced in the Melbourne Registry of the Court seeking a declaration that certain provisions of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) effecting cut-off dates for consideration of applications for enrolment and transfers of enrolment as an elector are invalid. One of those provisions, s 102(4), prevents the Electoral Commissioner from considering claims for enrolment lodged after 8 pm on the date of the issue of writs for an election for the House of Representatives or the Senate until after the close of polling. Another provision, s 102( 4AA), prevents consideration of claims for transfer of enrolment from one divisional roll to another from 8 pm on the date of the close of the rolls for an election until after the close of polling. A third provision, s 155, provides that the rolls close on the third working day after the date of the writs. The challenged provisions had been introduced into the Commonwealth Electoral Act by the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures) Act 2006 (Cth) ("the Amendment Act"). The application for the declaration and for writs of mandamus was referred to the Full Court by Justice Hayne on 29 July 2010 and argument on the application was heard by the Full Court on 4 and 5 August 2010. The application was amended at the hearing so that the declaration sought related to the validity of some other provisions of the Amendment Act. Today the Court by majority declared that provisions of the Amendment Act which introduced the challenged provisions into the Commonwealth Electoral Act are invalid. The declaration also covered certain consequential amendments made by the Amendment Act including other provisions effecting cut-off dates relating to the enrolment of persons living outside Australia (s 94A(4)(a» and itinerant electors (s 96(4», and the eligibility of spouses, de facto partners or children of eligible overseas electors for enrolment (s 95(4». The orders of the Court were: 1. Declare that Items 20, 24, 28, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 and 52 of Sched 1 to the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures) Act 2006 (Cth) are invalid. 2. The second defendant to pay the plaintiffs' costs of the Further Amended Application for an Order to Show Cause. The Court will publish its reasons for decision at a later date.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 December 2012 CERTAIN LLOYD'S UNDERWRITERS SUBSCRIBING TO CONTRACT NO IH00AAQS v JOHN CROSS; CERTAIN LLOYD'S UNDERWRITERS SUBSCRIBING TO CONTRACT NO IH00AAQS v MARK GEORGE THELANDER; CERTAIN LLOYD'S UNDERWRITERS SUBSCRIBING TO CONTRACT NO IH00AAQS v JILL MARIA THELANDER [2012] HCA 56 The High Court today held that claims for personal injury damages based on intentional acts were claims for personal injury damages within the meaning of s 198D of the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) ("Legal Profession Act"). The respondents were assaulted by hotel security staff. They sued the appellant, as the insurer of the company that employed those staff, for trespass to the person claiming damages for personal injuries allegedly inflicted intentionally and with intent to injure. The damages awarded in each case were for less than $100,000, with a declaration made that each respondent’s costs for legal services were subject to s 198D of the Legal Profession Act. Section 198D of the Legal Profession Act provided that where the amount recovered on a claim for personal injury damages did not exceed $100,000 the maximum costs for legal services provided to a plaintiff were fixed at 20% of the amount recovered or $10,000, whichever was greater. Section 198C of the Legal Profession Act provided that "personal injury damages" had the same meaning as in the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ("Liability Act"). The Liability Act limited awards for personal injury damages. The awards limited by the Liability Act were subject to specific exceptions contained within the Liability Act, including where personal injury resulted from intentional acts. The central point of difference between the parties was whether the definition of "personal injury damages" was to be construed by reference only to the words of the definition in the Liability Act or by reference to both the words of the definition and the limited operation which the Liability Act had in respect of awards of personal injury damages as a result of the relevant exclusions contained within the Liability Act. In the District Court of New South Wales it was ruled that the respondents' claims were for personal injury damages as defined under s 198D of the Legal Profession Act. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the costs for legal services were not subject to s 198D of the Legal Profession Act. By special leave, the insurer appealed to the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeals. A majority of the Court held that the claims which the respondents made were claims for personal injury damages within the meaning of s 198D of the Legal Profession Act.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 28 March 2012 BBH v THE QUEEN [2012] HCA 9 Today the High Court unanimously granted BBH an extension of time to apply for special leave to appeal against his conviction, and also granted special leave, but a majority of the Court dismissed his appeal. The majority held that certain evidence admitted in proof of the applicant's propensity to commit sexual offences against his daughter was relevant and admissible. The applicant was charged with committing certain sexual offences against his daughter. Over the objection of the applicant's counsel, the complainant's brother, W, gave evidence at the applicant's trial of an uncharged incident involving the applicant and complainant. W testified that he had observed an interaction between the complainant and the applicant where the complainant was bent over and unclothed from the waist down, and the applicant had his hand on her waist and his face near her bottom. During cross-examination, W accepted that the incident may have had an innocent explanation, such as that the applicant may have been looking for an ant bite or a bee sting. The complainant testified that she could not remember the incident and the applicant denied that it occurred. On 17 May 2007, a jury convicted the applicant of one count of maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with a child under 16 years of age, four counts of indecent dealing with a child under 16 years of age and four counts of sodomy of a person under 18 years of age. He was sentenced in the District Court of Queensland to 10 years' imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently. The applicant appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. He argued, among other things, that the trial judge had erred in allowing W's evidence to be put to the jury and that the directions given to the jury were inadequate to avoid undue prejudice to the applicant. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. A majority of the High Court dismissed the appeal. Their Honours held that W's testimony was relevant because it demonstrated the applicant's sexual interest in the complainant. The majority also considered that W's testimony satisfied the Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 test for the admissibility of propensity evidence. That is, their Honours held that, when viewed in the context of the prosecution's case, there was no rational explanation for the incident consistent with the applicant's innocence.