Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 May 2013 AMIRAM DAVID WEINSTOCK & ANOR v TAMAR RIVQA BECK & ANOR [2013] HCA 14 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal by Mr Amiram Weinstock and Mrs Helen Weinstock regarding the purported appointment of Mrs Weinstock as a director of LW Furniture Consolidated (Aust) Pty Ltd. The Court held that under s 1322(4)(a) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Mrs Weinstock's appointment could be validated even though Mr Weinstock had not been properly appointed as a director when he purported to appoint her as an additional director. LW Furniture was incorporated in 1971. Its articles of association required that there be no fewer than two directors. If the number of directors dropped below two, the continuing director could appoint an additional director. The two initial directors were the parents of Mr Weinstock and his sister, Mrs Tamar Beck. In 1973, Mr Weinstock and Mrs Beck were appointed additional directors of LW Furniture until the next annual general meeting of the company. Their appointment as directors ended before the meeting started. At that meeting (and those following), it was resolved to reappoint directors retiring at that meeting. Given Mr Weinstock and Mrs Beck had retired before the meeting began, the resolution did not apply to them and they were not reappointed. However, both Mrs Beck and Mr Weinstock acted as if they had been validly appointed. In 1982, Mrs Beck resigned as a director of the company. In 2003, the father of Mr Weinstock and Mrs Beck died. Their mother could not hold office as she was unable to look after her own affairs, and Mr Weinstock continued to act as the only director of the company. He purported to appoint his wife, Mrs Weinstock, as a director of the company. Mrs Beck challenged this appointment on the basis Mr Weinstock was not a director. In the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Barrett J made an order under s 1322(4)(a) of the Act declaring the appointment of Mrs Weinstock valid. On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside this order. By special leave, Mr and Mrs Weinstock appealed to the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal. The Court held that the purported appointment of Mrs Weinstock was a contravention of LW Furniture's constitution and that s 1322(4)(a) of the Act gave power to a court to declare the appointment valid. The Court remitted the matter to the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales for determination.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 September 2005 PELLEGRINO PAUL MULE v THE QUEEN The jury at Mr Mule’s drug trial was correctly instructed about the weight that it may choose to give to particular statements he made in a police interview, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Mule was convicted of possessing 27 ecstasy tablets weighing 5.5 grams with intent to sell or supply them to another and was jailed for two years and nine months. Under section 11 of the Misuse of Drugs Act, a person is deemed, unless the contrary is proved, to have an intent to supply if possessing two grams of ecstasy. The tablets, $32,750 in cash, a loaded pistol and a stun gun were found in two safes at Mr Mule’s home in the Perth suburb of Ballajura in August 2001. He was in Broome at the time but his wife phoned him during the search and they spoke in both English and Italian. This conversation was intercepted by police. Mr Mule did not give evidence at his trial in the District Court of Western Australia. A videotaped police interview and transcripts of certain intercepted telephone conversations were tendered as evidence without objection. In the interview, he and his solicitor admitted that the ecstasy tablets belonged to him but that they were for personal use. In summing up, Judge Allan Fenbury contrasted the admission of possession with the exculpatory assertions about personal use and pointed out that Mr Mule’s denials were not supported by evidence from him on oath. No objection or request for redirection were sought but this direction was the subject of the sole ground of appeal against conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal. Mr Mule appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It held that Judge Fenbury’s remarks to the jury did not amount to a misdirection. Under section 638 of the WA Criminal Code, instructions about the applicable law are mandatory, while observations on evidence are discretionary within established principles. Observations must be fair and balanced but a judge is not prohibited from making observations favourable to one side or the other if he or she makes clear that it is for the jury alone to decide the facts. Judge Fenbury instructed the jury that as a matter of law the videotaped interview became evidence for Mr Mule as well as against him and that it was not obliged to give the same weight to everything that was said in the interview. Judge Fenbury correctly instructed the jury about Mr Mule’s right to silence and did not detract from this right by pointing out that statements made during the interview were not on oath. The Court held that, in the circumstances of the case, it was appropriate for Judge Fenbury to tell the jury that it was entitled to give less weight to the assertion that the ecstasy was for Mr Mule’s own use than to the admission of possession. The summing-up as a whole made clear that this was a question for the jury.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 30 September, 2003 VICTIMS COMPENSATION FUND CORPORATION v SCOTT BROWN, SHARON LEWIS AND THE DISTRICT COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES The High Court of Australia today unanimously held that “and” meant “and”, not “or”, in New South Wales victims’ compensation legislation. Mr Brown was stabbed, punched and kicked after answering the door at his Wollongong home in March 1998. His partner, Ms Lewis, witnessed the attack. Both applied for compensation from the Victims Compensation Tribunal. Mr Brown received compensation for physical injuries, but his and Ms Lewis’s claims for shock were dismissed. Clause 5(a) in Schedule 1 of the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act provided that compensation for shock was only payable if the symptoms and the disability persisted for more than six weeks. The couple had symptoms persisting for six weeks but neither had a disability. Clause 5 listed typical psychological and physical symptoms and typical disabilities. District Court Judge Joseph Phelan held that the “and” in Clause 5(a) meant “or” and allowed Mr Brown’s and Ms Lewis’s appeal. That decision was upheld by a majority of the Court of Appeal. The Victims Compensation Fund Corporation appealed to the High Court, which upheld the approach of the dissenting Court of Appeal judge, NSW Chief Justice James Spigelman. The High Court held “and” should be given its ordinary meaning as a conjunction. It held that in the context of the Act there was no reason to give “and” the meaning “or”, especially when “or” was used elsewhere in Schedule 1 to convey a disjunctive meaning. Neither earlier Acts covering victims’ compensation nor the Act’s second reading speech indicated an intention that “and” mean “or”. Before the Act was introduced, the NSW Auditor-General had warned about the financial viability of the earlier scheme, and the Brahe Review of that scheme suggested a sliding scale of payments for different injuries. Therefore, the Act as a whole and its background pointed to “and” being a conjunction, which had the effect of limiting eligibility. The Court held that the Act endeavoured to define the circumstances for paying compensation in precise language which did not permit universal recovery, and allowed the corporation’s appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 November 2014 WELLINGTON CAPITAL LTD v AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION & ANOR [2014] HCA 43 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The High Court held that the responsible entity of a managed investment scheme ("Wellington") was not authorised by the scheme constitution to distribute scheme property in specie to unit holders. Perpetual Nominees Ltd ("Perpetual") was the custodian of the scheme, appointed by Wellington as its agent to hold scheme property on its behalf. On 4 September 2012, Wellington sold assets of the scheme to Asset Resolution Ltd ("ARL") in consideration of the issue of 830,532,768 shares in ARL to Perpetual. The assets disposed of had a publicly stated value of $90.75 million and represented about 41% of the value of the assets comprising the scheme property. On the same day, Wellington instructed Perpetual to transfer the ARL shares held by Perpetual to the unit holders in the scheme in proportion to the number of units held by each unit holder. That transfer was effected on the following day. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission commenced proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia challenging the validity of the transfer. Its application was dismissed by the primary judge. The Full Court of the Federal Court allowed an appeal from that decision and made declarations that the in specie distribution was beyond the power of Wellington under the scheme constitution and that, by making the distribution, Wellington had contravened s 601FB(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Section 601FB(1) required Wellington to operate the scheme and perform the functions conferred on it by the scheme's constitution and by the Corporations Act. By grant of special leave, Wellington appealed to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the scheme constitution, properly construed, confined the return of capital to specified circumstances and did not authorise Wellington to make an in specie distribution of scheme property to unit holders. The High Court also held that the declarations made by the Full Court of the Federal Court were appropriate.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 August 2015 SMITH v THE QUEEN [2015] HCA 27 Today the High Court unanimously held that the appellant was not denied procedural fairness when the trial judge who had been informed of a jury’s interim votes for and against conviction did not disclose those votes or the voting pattern to counsel. The appellant was tried on one count of rape in the District Court of Queensland in February 2014. During its deliberations, the jury sent three notes to the trial judge. The trial judge disclosed to counsel the precise contents of the first two notes. The jury’s third note indicated that the jury could not agree on a unanimous verdict. It also stated two iterations of the jury's interim votes for and against conviction. The trial judge informed counsel that the jury could not agree and that the note contained the jury’s interim voting patterns, but decided not to disclose the interim votes or voting patterns to counsel. Neither counsel objected. At this point, the judge proposed to permit the jury to consider a majority verdict. Under s 59A of the Jury Act 1995 (Q) (“the Jury Act”), a trial judge has a discretion to permit a jury to return a majority verdict if, after a prescribed period of deliberation, the judge is satisfied that the jury is unlikely to reach a unanimous verdict. A trial judge also has a discretion to discharge a jury at any time under s 60 of the Jury Act. The trial judge asked the jury if further time for deliberation would assist the jury to return a majority verdict. The jury indicated that it might. Accordingly, the trial judge permitted the jury to retire to consider a majority verdict. Neither counsel objected. The jury subsequently returned a guilty verdict by a majority of 11 to 1. The appellant appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. He contended that he was denied procedural fairness when the judge failed to disclose the precise contents of the jury's third note. He argued that the jury's interim voting patterns were relevant to the trial judge’s discretion either to allow a majority verdict or to discharge the jury, and so ought to have been disclosed to counsel. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no denial of procedural fairness. Procedural fairness requires that a trial judge disclose to counsel all information available to the trial judge but not available to counsel, where that information is relevant to an issue before the court. However, the jury’s interim votes and voting patterns were not and could not be relevant to an issue before the court because of the protean and changeable character of the jury's deliberations. Nothing in the Jury Act otherwise made the interim votes and voting patterns relevant.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 23 June 2011 WAINOHU v THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES [2011] HCA 24 The High Court today held the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW) ("the Act") invalid. In July 2010, the Acting Commissioner of Police for New South Wales applied to a judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales for a declaration under Part 2 of the Act in respect of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club in New South Wales ("the Club"). Under the Act, a judge who had been designated an "eligible Judge" by the Attorney-General could make a declaration in relation to an organisation. The eligible Judge had to be satisfied that the members of the organisation associated for the purposes of organising, planning, facilitating, supporting or engaging in serious criminal activity and that the organisation represented a risk to public safety and order in New South Wales. Section 13(2) of the Act provided that an eligible Judge had no obligation to provide reasons for making or refusing to make a declaration. If a declaration was made in respect of an organisation, the Supreme Court was empowered, on the application of the Commissioner of Police, to make control orders against individual members of that organisation. A person the subject of a control order was referred to in the Act as a "controlled member". It is an offence for controlled members of an organisation to associate with one another. They are also barred from certain classes of business and certain occupations. The plaintiff, Mr Wainohu, is a member of the Club. He applied to the High Court for a declaration that the Act was invalid on the basis that it conferred functions on the Supreme Court and its judges which undermined its institutional integrity in a way inconsistent with Ch III of the Constitution. He also argued that the Act infringed the implied constitutional freedom of political communication and political association. The parties agreed a special case which was referred to the Full Court of the High Court in October 2010. The High Court held, by majority, that the Act was invalid. The Act provided that no reasons need be given for making a declaration. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to make control orders was enlivened by the decision of an eligible Judge to make a declaration. Six members of the High Court held that, in those circumstances, the absence of an obligation to give reasons for the declaration after what may have been a contested application was repugnant to, or incompatible with, the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court. Because the validity of other parts of the Act relied on the validity of Part 2, the whole Act was declared invalid. The State of New South Wales was ordered to pay Mr Wainohu's costs.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 2 October 2013 ERNEST MUNDA v THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2013] HCA 38 Today the High Court, by majority, dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, which had allowed an appeal against the original sentence imposed on Mr Ernest Munda for the manslaughter of his de facto spouse ("the deceased") on the basis that it was manifestly inadequate. On 12 July 2010, Mr Munda and the deceased attended a local tavern. Both became intoxicated and Mr Munda used some cannabis. When they returned to their house, an argument developed which soon turned violent. Mr Munda punched the deceased on numerous occasions, threw her about the bedroom and repeatedly rammed her head into the wall. After Mr Munda had finished assaulting the deceased, they both went to sleep. The next morning, Mr Munda had sexual intercourse with the deceased. He then briefly left the house. When he returned, he noticed that the deceased had stopped breathing. The deceased was transported to hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. She had died from traumatic brain injury. Mr Munda pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced in the Supreme Court of Western Australia to a term of imprisonment of five years and three months, with a non-parole period of three years and three months. The sentencing judge took Mr Munda's personal circumstances into consideration as a mitigating factor, noting that he was a traditional Aboriginal man who had been exposed to the negative influences of alcohol and family violence from a young age. The Court of Appeal allowed the State's appeal against the sentence and resentenced Mr Munda to seven years and nine months imprisonment. Mr Munda remained eligible for parole. By special leave, Mr Munda appealed to the High Court on the grounds that the Court of Appeal failed to correctly apply the principles concerning State appeals against sentence and that it failed to give proper regard to Mr Munda's antecedents and personal circumstances. A majority of the High Court upheld the Court of Appeal's decision that the original sentence was manifestly inadequate. While it was relevant to take into consideration an offender's circumstances of severe social disadvantage, the High Court held that the same sentencing principles must be applied in every case irrespective of an offender's identity or his or her membership of an ethnic or other group. It was also held that the Court of Appeal did not err in not exercising its residual discretion to refuse to allow the State's appeal.