Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Manager, Public Information 29 April 2009 CHRISTOPHER CLARK JONES v THE QUEEN In April 2007 Christopher Jones and James Roughan were convicted of murdering Morgan Jay Shepherd, a 17 year old youth. Today five Justices of the High Court unanimously dismissed Mr Jones’ appeal against the Queensland Court of Appeal’s determination that there had been no substantial miscarriage of justice arising out of his trial. Mr Shepherd’s decapitated body was found in a shallow grave in bushland near Dayboro, a township north of Brisbane, in April 2005. He had been stabbed numerous times though it was impossible to determine which wound had actually caused his death. Mr Jones and Mr Roughan were charged jointly with his murder. Each pleaded not guilty to murder but guilty to being an accessory after the fact. At their joint trial the evidence that both were present when Mr Shepherd died was uncontroverted, however each argued that the other had killed him. A tape recording made secretly while both were in a prison van did not contain unequivocal admissions of guilt from either of them. The jury convicted both men of murder. Both appealed against the jury’s verdict to the Queensland Court of Appeal. That Court allowed Mr Roughan’s appeal and he was retried, however, he was convicted at his second trial. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Jones’ appeal, and the High Court granted special leave to Mr Jones to appeal to this Court. In the High Court Mr Jones’ counsel submitted that the primary judge had erred in refusing to allow him to lead evidence concerning allegations that Mr Roughan, in circumstances unrelated to the death of Mr Shepherd, had attempted to murder a friend by attacking him with a knife. The evidence, it was submitted, was relevant to Mr Jones’ argument that Mr Roughan was a violent man of whom Mr Jones was afraid, and thus more likely to have committed the murder than was Mr Jones. However, the Court considered that the evidence Mr Jones wanted to lead about that issue was hearsay and not admissible. Mr Jones also submitted that the Court of Appeal had been wrong to dismiss his appeal given that it had found that the trial judge had misdirected the jury in one respect. The High Court considered that it was open to the Court of Appeal to find that the misdirection did not result in a substantial miscarriage of justice. It considered that the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, that the Crown’s case against Mr Jones was overwhelming, was one that was well open to it. The Court unanimously dismissed Mr Jones’ appeal against his conviction.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 30 November 2011 AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION v LOUISE STODDART & ANOR [2011] HCA 47 Today the High Court upheld an appeal by the Australian Crime Commission ("the ACC") against the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, which had granted a declaration that the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) ("the Act") had not abrogated the common law privilege against spousal incrimination. The High Court held that the common law does not recognise a privilege against spousal incrimination. The ACC is established by s 7(1) of the Act. One of its functions is to investigate matters related to "federally relevant criminal activity". Section 24A of the Act empowers an examiner appointed by the Governor-General under s 46B of the Act to conduct an examination for the purposes of a "special ACC operation/investigation". In response to a summons issued under s 28 of the Act by the second respondent, an examiner, the first respondent, Louise Stoddart, attended an examination to give evidence of "federally relevant criminal activity" involving named persons including the first respondent's husband. Section 30(2)(b) of the Act provides that a person appearing as a witness before an examiner shall not refuse or fail to answer a question that he or she is required to answer by the examiner. Failure to answer questions as required is an offence punishable on conviction by penalties including imprisonment. In the course of answering questions concerning details of her husband's business, the first respondent claimed to be entitled to "the privilege of spousal incrimination", meaning she had a right not to give evidence that might incriminate her husband. The Act contains no mention of such a privilege. The examination was adjourned to enable the first respondent to bring proceedings in which the questions whether the claimed privilege existed, and if so whether it continued to have effect, could be determined. In the Federal Court the primary judge dismissed the first respondent's application for declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that a spousal privilege existed at common law but that it was abrogated by the Act. On appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court held by a majority that the common law privilege against spousal incrimination existed and that the Act had not abrogated that privilege, and granted declaratory relief. The appellant appealed to the High Court, submitting that the Full Court erred in recognising a common law privilege against spousal incrimination, and, in the alternative, that the Full Court should have held that s 30 of the Act dealing with the privilege against self-incrimination abrogated the spousal privilege if it otherwise existed. The High Court held by majority that the claimed privilege against spousal incrimination does not exist at common law. The first respondent was a competent witness to be examined under the Act and was compelled by the provisions of that Act to give evidence. No privilege of the kind claimed could be raised in answer to that obligation. It was therefore not necessary to consider the appellant's alternative submission.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 4 April 2006 A bankruptcy notice was not invalidated by a minor error in identifying the particular provision that was the basis for a liability to pay interest on a judgment debt, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Adams obtained judgment for $54,000 against Mr Lambert in the New South Wales District Court on 22 March 2004. The amount was an agreed sum, being the balance of a loan plus interest and legal costs up to the date of judgment. On 1 April 2004, Mr Adams served on Mr Lambert a bankruptcy notice claiming as a debt $54,066.58. The $66.58 represented interest of nine per cent from 22 to 26 March inclusive. The notice gave these dates and the amount was correctly calculated, however the notice mistakenly cited section 83A of the District Court Act which deals with interest prior to judgment, instead of section 85 which deals with post-judgment interest. The official receiver issued the notice on 26 March. Mr Lambert failed to comply with the bankruptcy notice. On 27 May 2004, Mr Adams filed a creditor’s petition alleging that such failure was an act of bankruptcy and seeking a sequestration order against Mr Lambert’s estate (an order to have his property placed in the hands of a trustee for division among creditors). In the Federal Court of Australia, Justice Roger Gyles found that the bankruptcy notice was invalid and dismissed the petition. He was bound by an earlier 3-2 decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court, The Australian Steel Company (Operation) Pty Ltd v Lewis in 2000, in which he was in the minority. An appeal by Mr Adams to the Full Court was dismissed. In an appeal to the High Court, Mr Adams argued Lewis had been wrongly decided. The Court agreed that Lewis should be overruled and unanimously allowed the appeal. Section 306 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that a bankruptcy notice is not invalidated by a formal defect or an irregularity, unless substantial injustice has been caused. The Court held that section 306 saved the notice from invalidity. The Court remitted the proceedings to the Federal Court for further hearing.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 13 August, 2003 NEWS LIMITED, NATIONAL RUGBY LEAGUE INVESTMENTS PTY LTD, AUSTRALIAN RUGBY LEAGUE LIMITED AND NATIONAL RUGBY LEAGUE LIMITED v SOUTH SYDNEY DISTRICT RUGBY LEAGUE FOOTBALL CLUB AND OTHERS The High Court of Australia today upheld an appeal by News Ltd against a decision that South Sydney was dropped from the National Rugby League competition in contravention of the Trade Practices Act. News Ltd and the Australian Rugby League agreed in 1997 to merge Super League, involving 10 clubs, and the ARL, involving 12 clubs, including South Sydney, into one competition, the NRL. The NRL was to be national, and to have less than the total number of clubs in the existing competitions. The formation of the NRL was not challenged on the basis that the merger had the purpose of substantially lessening competition, but on a narrower ground concerning the number of teams in the NRL being reduced to 14 by 2000. Two teams dropped out of the original 22, and the NRL was to progress from having no more than 20 clubs in 1998 and no more than 16 in 1999, to no more than 14 in 2000. Some clubs merged with other clubs to stay in the competition while a new team, Melbourne Storm, became one of the eventual 14. South Sydney was ultimately excluded from the 2000 competition and challenged the 14-team limitation on the basis that it was an exclusionary provision in contravention of sections 45(2)(a)(i) and 45(2)(b)(i) of the Trade Practices Act. The question was whether the 14-team term in the NRL partnership agreement had the purpose of preventing, restricting or limiting the supply of services by News Ltd and the ARL to, or the acquisition of services by News Ltd and the ARL from, particular persons or classes of persons. In the Federal Court, Justice Paul Finn held that the term did not have that purpose. The Full Court of the Federal Court, by a 2-1 majority, reached the opposite conclusion. News Ltd appealed to the High Court. The Court, by a 4-1 majority, upheld Justice Finn's decision and allowed News Ltd's appeal against the decision of the Full Court.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 December 2005 STEPHEN GARRY BANDITT v THE QUEEN Directions by a New South Wales District Court judge to a jury on the meaning of “reckless” in relation to consent to sexual intercourse were appropriate, the High Court of Australia said today. Mr Banditt was convicted of breaking and entering into a house and having sexual intercourse with a 25-year-old woman without her consent early on 6 October 2001 at Bellingen in central NSW. He was jailed for five years with a three-year non-parole period. The woman, alone in her house, awoke to find Mr Banditt having sex with her. Within seconds she pushed him off and he left, leaving behind his glasses and a payslip. The woman had previously rebuffed his advances and earlier on the same night at the local tavern had complained to him about his coming around to her house late at night and banging on her door. Mr Banditt said they had slept together six weeks earlier but she denied that. Section 61R(1) of the NSW Crimes Act provides that a person who has sexual intercourse with another and who is reckless as to whether the other person consents is to be taken to know that the other person does not consent. Judge David Freeman’s explanation of recklessness to the jury included that if an offender is aware that there is a possibility that the woman is not consenting but he goes ahead anyway, then that is recklessness. Mr Banditt objected to Judge Freeman’s directions, arguing there should have been an additional direction that he had to be indifferent about the risk or determined to have sexual intercourse whether consent was present or not, but the NSW Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. He appealed to the High Court, where he also argued that recklessness cannot be satisfied by an awareness of a risk, but is satisfied by a mental state that, “Even if I knew, I would continue”. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It held that Judge Freeman's direction to the jury did not misstate the concept of recklessness in section 61R(1). The Court further held that Judge Freeman properly emphasised that the jury was to consider Mr Banditt’s state of mind, not the reaction of some notional reasonable man, and that this was to be undertaken with regard to the surrounding circumstances, including the past relationship between Mr Banditt and the woman. It was proper for Judge Freeman to have directed the jury in the terms he did.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 March 2019 PAUL OLAF GRAJEWSKI v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (NSW) [2019] HCA 8 Today the High Court, by majority, allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and quashed the appellant's conviction and sentence for the offence of intentionally or recklessly destroying or damaging property belonging to another, contrary to s 195(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). During a protest, the appellant climbed onto a ship loader, which was shut down due to safety concerns. The appellant used a harness and rope to lock himself to the ship loader and lowered himself into a position which posed a risk of serious harm to him. The ship loader remained inoperable until the appellant was removed. This was a period of around two hours. The appellant was charged with an offence against s 195(1)(a), particularised as doing "damage [to] property causing the temporary impairment of the working machinery" of the ship loader. He was convicted of this offence before the Local Court at Newcastle. The appellant appealed against his conviction to the District Court of New South Wales at Newcastle, which stated a case to the Court of Criminal Appeal asking whether the facts could support a finding of guilt for an offence contrary to s 195(1)(a). The Court of Criminal Appeal answered the question "yes". By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. By majority, the Court held that damage to property within the meaning of s 195(1) requires proof that a person's act or omission has occasioned some alteration to the physical integrity of the property, even if only temporarily. The majority reasoned that, as a matter of ordinary English, a thing is not damaged if the physical integrity of the thing is not altered in any respect. The majority held that nothing in the authorities justified an interpretation of the expression "destroys or damages" in s 195(1) as extending to conduct which does not in any respect alter the physical integrity of the thing said to be damaged. Here, the ship loader was shut down because of safety concerns, not because the appellant had brought about any alteration to its physical integrity.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 5 December, 2002 GRAHAM BARCLAY OYSTERS PTY LTD & ANOR v GRANT RYAN & ORS GRANT RYAN v GREAT LAKES COUNCIL & ORS THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES v GRANT RYAN & ORS The issue was whether Graham Barclay Oysters and Graham Barclay Distributors Pty Ltd (the Barclay companies), Great Lakes Council and the State of NSW were liable in negligence towards Grant Ryan and others who contracted hepatitis A from eating oysters from Wallis Lake near Forster on the NSW central coast. Heavy rain in November 1996 caused run-off which increases the risk of viral contamination. Mr Ryan instituted a representative action in the Federal Court, on behalf of those who became ill from eating oysters, against the Barclay companies, other oyster growers and distributors, the council and the state. The Barclay companies, the council and the state entered cross-claims against one another. A Federal Court judge held the Barclay companies, the council and the state all liable in negligence to Mr Ryan and those class members who proved they suffered damage. The Full Court of the Federal Court by differently constituted majorities allowed the council’s appeal and dismissed appeals by the state and the Barclay companies. The Barclay companies, the state and Mr Ryan then appealed to the High Court of Australia. Mr Ryan claimed the state and the council were negligent by omission as they could and should have done more to prevent the hepatitis outbreak. The High Court unanimously held that such public authorities had responsibilities for public health and safety – including fisheries and sewage management – but that Mr Ryan failed to establish that they owed a duty of care to individual consumers of Wallis Lake oysters. The state and the council were therefore not liable. The Barclay companies accepted that they owed a duty to consumers to take reasonable care to see that their oysters were fit for human consumption but the High Court by majority found the companies did not breach that duty, so were not liable in negligence. Mr Ryan had succeeded in the Federal Court in having Barclay Oysters found liable under sections 74B (fitness for purpose) and 74D (unmerchantable quality) of the Trade Practices Act. The Full Court of the Federal Court dismissed Barclay Oysters’ appeal and the company did not challenge those findings in the High Court, so the judgment obtained by Mr Ryan against that company remains undisturbed.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 2 April 2014 ACHURCH v THE QUEEN [2014] HCA 10 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had dismissed Brian William Achurch's application under s 43 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ("the Sentencing Act") to re-open proceedings in that Court in which he had been re-sentenced after a successful Crown appeal. Mr Achurch was convicted after a trial by jury in the District Court of New South Wales of three counts of supplying prohibited drugs contrary to s 25 of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW). He was sentenced on each of the counts to a term of imprisonment. A Crown appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal against the inadequacy of the sentences, individually and collectively, was allowed. The Court re-sentenced the appellant. It was not in dispute that in re- sentencing Mr Achurch and fixing non-parole periods, the Court applied an approach which was subsequently held by the High Court in Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 to have been incorrect. Mr Achurch applied to the Court of Criminal Appeal to re-open the proceedings on the Crown appeal. He invoked ss 43(1)(a) and 43(2)(a) of the Sentencing Act, which authorise a court to re- open criminal proceedings, including proceedings on appeal, in which the court has "imposed a penalty that is contrary to law", and "impose a penalty that is in accordance with the law". The Court of Criminal Appeal, sitting a bench of five, dismissed the application. By special leave, Mr Achurch appealed to the High Court. The question in this appeal was whether s 43 of the Sentencing Act authorised the re-opening of proceedings in which a sentence open at law was reached by a process of reasoning involving an error of law. Dismissing the appeal, the High Court held that a penalty is not "contrary to law" for the purposes of s 43 of the Sentencing Act only because it is reached by a process of erroneous reasoning or factual error. Correction of errors of that type is principally available by way of appeal. The sentences imposed on Mr Achurch were open at law and, therefore, were not "contrary to law" for the purposes of s 43.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 November 2014 HUNTER AND NEW ENGLAND LOCAL HEALTH DISTRICT v MERRYN ELIZABETH MCKENNA HUNTER AND NEW ENGLAND LOCAL HEALTH DISTRICT v SHEILA MARY SIMON & ANOR [2014] HCA 44 Today the High Court unanimously allowed appeals from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and held that the Hunter and New England Local Health District, a health authority responsible for the conduct of a hospital and its medical staff in Taree, New South Wales, did not owe a duty of care to the relatives of a man killed by a mentally ill patient who had been discharged from the hospital into the man's care. In 2004, Phillip Pettigrove, a man from Victoria with a long history of chronic paranoid schizophrenia, was involuntarily admitted to, and detained in, the Manning Base Hospital at Taree under the Mental Health Act 1990 (NSW). Mr Pettigrove had at the time been with a friend in New South Wales, Stephen Rose. After a doctor at the hospital reviewed Mr Pettigrove's medical history, and spoke to Mr Pettigrove, Mr Rose and Mr Pettigrove's mother in Victoria, it was agreed that Mr Pettigrove would be kept in the hospital overnight and that, the following day, Mr Rose would drive Mr Pettigrove back to his mother's home in Victoria where he would receive continuing medical treatment. In the course of the journey, Mr Pettigrove killed Mr Rose. Relatives of Mr Rose brought proceedings in the District Court of New South Wales for damages for psychiatric injury allegedly suffered by them as a result of Mr Rose's death. The relatives alleged that the hospital and the doctor did not exercise reasonable professional care and skill in deciding to discharge Mr Pettigrove into the care of Mr Rose for the journey to Victoria, and that the health authority was therefore liable. The District Court found that there had been no breach of duty of care and entered judgment for the health authority. That decision was set aside on appeal by the Court of Appeal. By grant of special leave, the health authority appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeals. The High Court held that the hospital and doctor did not owe the alleged common law duty of care to Mr Rose's relatives. The Mental Health Act prohibited the detention, or the continuation of detention, of a mentally ill person unless the medical superintendent of the hospital formed the opinion that no other less restrictive care was appropriate and reasonably available. The High Court found that performance of that statutory obligation would not be consistent with the common law duty of care alleged by the relatives of Mr Rose.