Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA NEWCREST MINING LIMITED v THORNTON [2012] HCA 60 13 December 2012 Today a majority of the HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA held that s 7(1)(b) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors' Contribution) Act 1947 (WA) ("the Act"), which provides that a person bringing more than one action in respect of damage suffered as the result of a tort cannot recover more than "the amount of the damages awarded by the judgment first given", does not apply to a consent judgment entered to give effect to an agreement to settle a proceeding. In 2004 the respondent injured his knee in the course of his employment at a mine site in Western Australia. The respondent claimed workers' compensation payments and common law damages from his employer. The claim was settled in 2007 by way of a consent judgment entered in the District Court of Western Australia, with no admission as to liability in respect of any cause of action. In 2008, the respondent commenced proceedings for negligence against the appellant, which owned and operated the mine site where the respondent had been injured. The appellant invoked s 7(1)(b) of the Act. A Deputy Registrar of the District Court dismissed the respondent's action, and a Judge of that Court dismissed an appeal from that decision. The Court of Appeal allowed the respondent's appeal. The appellant appealed, by special leave, to the High Court. A majority of the High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the consent judgment did not fall within the terms of s 7(1)(b) because there had been no judicial determination of liability and no consequent award of damages. Instead, the consent judgment was a means of giving effect to a settlement agreement between the parties. The majority observed that excluding consent orders from the operation of s 7(1)(b) was not inconsistent with the intended purpose of the provision.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 February 2019 WILLIAMS v WRECK BAY ABORIGINAL COMMUNITY COUNCIL & ANOR [2019] HCA 4 Today the High Court, by majority, allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. The appeal concerned the extent to which the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (ACT) applies to leases granted pursuant to the Aboriginal Land Grant (Jervis Bay Territory) Act 1986 (Cth) ("the Land Grant Act") over certain land, known as "Aboriginal Land", within the Jervis Bay Territory ("the JBT"). The Wreck Bay Aboriginal Community Council ("the Council") is empowered under the Land Grant Act to grant leases over Aboriginal Land within the JBT. Section 46 of the Land Grant Act provides that "[t]his Act does not affect the application to Aboriginal Land of a law in force in the [JBT] to the extent that that law is capable of operating concurrently with this Act". By statute, laws in force in the ACT apply in the JBT as if the JBT formed part of the ACT. The Residential Tenancies Act provides that all leases to which it applies include "standard residential tenancy terms", including a term requiring the lessor to "maintain the premises in a reasonable state of repair having regard to their condition at the commencement of the [lease]". Subject to an exception, the Residential Tenancies Act renders void terms of a lease that are inconsistent with the standard residential tenancy terms. The appellant has resided in premises leased from the Council since 1989. A dispute arose between the Council and the appellant as to whether the Council was obliged, under the Residential Tenancies Act, to keep the premises in a reasonable state of repair. Ultimately, a special case was filed in the Supreme Court, asking whether, and to what extent, the Residential Tenancies Act is a law which is not capable of operating concurrently with the Land Grant Act within the meaning of s 46 of the Land Grant Act. The Supreme Court held that the Residential Tenancies Act is a law capable of operating concurrently with the Land Grant Act. The Court of Appeal held that the Residential Tenancies Act is not capable of operating concurrently with the Land Grant Act insofar as it requires a lease granted by the Council to contain the standard residential tenancy terms and renders void terms of a lease granted by the Council that are inconsistent with the standard residential tenancy terms. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. A majority of the Court held that the provisions of the Land Grant Act considered together do not purport to provide a complete statement of the law governing the rights and obligations of parties to leases granted by the Council so as to exclude the application of the law generally applicable to leases within the JBT. The majority held that the Residential Tenancies Act does not apply to Aboriginal Land for the purposes of s 46 of the Land Grant Act only to the extent that certain provisions of the Residential Tenancies Act would prohibit subletting by a tenant of the Council.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 June 2018 BORIS ROZENBLIT v MICHAEL VAINER & ANOR [2018] HCA 23 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria concerning an order for a stay of proceedings. Mr Rozenblit brought proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria in which he alleged that the first respondent had fraudulently, and without his knowledge or consent, transferred shares owned by him to the second respondent. By three separate summonses, Mr Rozenblit sought leave to amend his statement of claim. Leave was twice refused and the primary judge ordered that Mr Rozenblit pay the costs of the respondent and that those costs be taxed immediately. Mr Rozenblit was unable to meet the costs orders due to his limited means. Mr Rozenblit lives with his wife in government housing. Neither he nor his wife has any appreciable assets. Their sole income is social security payments from Centrelink and a small pension from Russia. On the third occasion that Mr Rozenblit sought leave to amend his statement of claim, the respondents sought to have the proceeding stayed under r 63.03(3)(a) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic). Rule 63.03(3)(a) empowers the Court to stay a proceeding where the Court has made an interlocutory order for costs to be taxed immediately, and those costs have been fixed, but remain unpaid by the plaintiff. The primary judge granted Mr Rozenblit's third application for leave to amend on condition that the proceedings be stayed until he had paid the interlocutory costs orders. The primary judge accepted that Mr Rozenblit was so impecunious that the stay would effectively terminate the proceeding and prevent him from litigating his claims. Mr Rozenblit appealed to a single judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria and later to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. Each appeal was dismissed. By grant of special leave, Mr Rozenblit appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal, holding that the primary judge's discretion miscarried. The serious consequences of making an order under r 63.03(3) against an impecunious plaintiff mean that a stay should be granted where it is the only practical way to ensure justice between the parties. The Court held that the primary judge could not be satisfied that the stay was the only practical way to ensure justice between the parties. At the time of the third application, Mr Rozenblit had a genuine claim, properly pleaded. He had not engaged in conduct sufficiently serious in its nature and effect to warrant the proceedings being brought to an end. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 20 July 2016 [2016] HCA 27 Today the High Court dismissed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland arising out of the appellant's convictions of attempted murder and unlawful wounding with intent to maim. A majority of the High Court held that the trial judge had not erred in directions given to the jury regarding self-defence. On 28 April 2012, the appellant was involved in a confrontation with another man, Jacques Teamo ("Teamo"), at a shopping centre on the Gold Coast. The men were members of rival motorcycle clubs. In the course of the confrontation, Teamo produced a knife and the appellant produced a gun and fired two shots. One of the bullets struck Teamo in the arm and the other bullet struck and injured an innocent bystander. The appellant was charged with, relevantly, attempted murder and unlawful wounding with intent to maim. At trial, the appellant raised the defence of self-defence. Under the applicable provisions of the Criminal Code (Q), the person who is claiming the benefit of the defence must have been "assaulted". A threat by one person to apply force to another can constitute an assault. The defence is not available if the threatened application of force was done with the consent of the person threatened. During his closing address to the jury, the prosecutor suggested that Teamo's production of the knife could be considered part of a "consensual confrontation" between Teamo and the appellant and, therefore, was not an assault. Counsel for the appellant did not address this submission in his closing address. In summing up to the jury, the trial judge gave the jury a list of 10 questions setting out the sequence of matters to be found and, in redirections, gave the jury detailed written directions on self-defence. The trial judge referred orally to the prosecutor's closing address and his reference to the term "consensual confrontation" but the trial judge described this as a matter of "interpretation, construction and argument". No redirection was sought on this point. The appellant was convicted of both offences. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the prosecutor's reference to a "consensual confrontation" was wrong and misleading and that the trial judge had erred in failing to deal properly with that submission. In particular, it was argued that the trial judge should have directed the jury that the alleged assault to which the appellant made self-defence was the production of the knife and that there was no evidence of consent on the part of the appellant to that assault. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge had correctly directed the jury. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The High Court held, by majority, that there was no misdirection by the trial judge. The relevant legal tests were put before the jury. In light of what were considered to be the real issues in the trial, no further elaboration on the issue of consent was required.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Manager, Public Information 13 October 2009 RONALD JOHN BOFINGER & ANOR v KINGSWAY GROUP LIMITED FORMERLY WILLIS & BOWRING MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS LIMITED (ACN 089 265 127) & ORS [2009] HCA 44 Today the High Court of Australia held that where guarantors of a secured loan have contributed to the repayment of that loan they may recoup that contribution from the borrower out of the remaining surplus securities before the surplus is used to repay a second loan that is secured over the same property, even though the guarantors have also guaranteed the second loan. The appellants, Mr and Mrs Bofinger, were guarantors of three separate and sequential loans to a developer. Those loans were secured by first, second and third mortgages over the developer's properties. The guarantees were also secured by first, second and third mortgages over the guarantors' properties. The guarantors then sold their properties, the proceeds from which were used to repay some of the first loan. The three mortgages over the guarantors' properties were discharged at this time. The first lender then sold some of the developer's properties in order to repay the remainder of the first loan. The surplus funds and remaining properties were then made available to the second lender. The guarantors claimed to be subrogated to the rights of the first lender over the surplus proceeds and unsold properties in priority over the second lender. They claimed that they should have been able to recoup what they had paid to the first lender out of the surplus funds and remaining properties before the surplus and properties could be used by the second lender to repay the second loan. The Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the guarantors could not recoup what they had repaid of the first loan from the securities ahead of the second lender. On 3 December 2008, the appellants' appeal to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales was dismissed. The High Court granted the guarantors special leave to appeal. In a unanimous decision the High Court held that the guarantors were entitled to recoupment from the surplus funds and remaining properties before the second lender, notwithstanding that they had guaranteed the second loan. The Court held that once the first loan had been repaid, the first lender was obliged in good conscience to provide the surplus funds and remaining properties to the guarantors. By transferring the surplus funds and remaining properties to the second mortgagee the first mortgagee had breached this obligation. The High Court allowed the guarantors’ appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 3 August 2011 CUMERLONG HOLDINGS PTY LTD V DALCROSS PROPERTIES PTY LTD [2011] HCA 27 The High Court today allowed an appeal by Cumerlong Holdings Pty Limited ("the appellant") from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had upheld the decision of Smart AJ of the Supreme Court dismissing the appellant's suit. The appellant had sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce a restrictive covenant which burdened land owned by Australasian Conference Association Ltd ("the third respondent") for the benefit of land owned by the appellant. In resisting the suit, the third respondent and the previous owner of the burdened land (the first respondent) relied upon cl 68(2) of the Ku-ring-gai Planning Scheme Ordinance ("the Ordinance"), as amended by the Ku-ring-gai Local Environment Plan No 194 ("LEP 194"), which purported to suspend the operation of the restrictive covenant. However, the High Court (Gummow ACJ, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Bell JJ) held that the amendments to cl 68(2) of the Ordinance made by LEP 194 were ineffective to suspend the operation of the restrictive covenant. This was by reason of failure to comply with s 28 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW). Section 28 required that a planning instrument that had the effect of suspending the operation of a restrictive covenant, such as LEP 194 purported to do, must be approved by the Governor acting on the advice of the Executive Council. This requirement had not been complied with in making LEP 194. As a result, LEP 194 was ineffective to amend cl 68(2) of the Ordinance to effect the suspension of the restrictive covenant burdening the third respondent's land. As a result, the High Court granted the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by the appellant. The third respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the appellant's appeal to the High Court.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 27 November 2013 [2013] HCA 49 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia and quashed a conviction for the service offence of creating a disturbance on service land. The High Court held that "creating a disturbance" involves the intentional doing of an act which results in a non-trivial interruption of order, the person charged being reckless as to the occurrence of that result. Major Ting Li, a member of the Australian Defence Force, was involved in an incident in the Campbell Park Offices in the Australian Capital Territory. Responding to statements made by Andrew Snashall, a Commonwealth public servant, which he found offensive and suspected to have been racially motivated, Major Li became involved in an altercation with Mr Snashall that was witnessed by others working in the Campbell Park Offices. He refused to leave Mr Snashall's office when Mr Snashall asked him to do so, followed Mr Snashall out of the office while speaking in a raised voice, forcefully pushed against the office door when Mr Snashall returned and attempted to close it, and stood close to Mr Snashall's face speaking in an agitated and aggressive manner. Major Li was charged before a restricted court martial with the service offence of having created a disturbance on service land. The judge advocate directed the court martial that the prosecution did not need to prove that Major Li intended to create a disturbance, but needed to prove only that Major Li intended to engage in the acts that amounted to a disturbance. Major Li was convicted and sentenced to be severely reprimanded and fined. The Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal dismissed an appeal by Major Li, who then commenced an appeal on a question of law in the Federal Court. A majority of a Full Court of the Federal Court found no error in the judge advocate's direction to the court martial. Major Li appealed to the High Court by special leave. The High Court held that "creating a disturbance" is the doing of an act which results in a disturbance. It must be proved that the person charged intended to do the act. But it must also be proved that the act resulted in a disturbance and that the person charged either believed that the act would result in a disturbance or was aware of a substantial risk that the act would result in a disturbance and, having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it was unjustifiable to take that risk. The High Court also held that a "disturbance" is a non-trivial interruption of order and that violence or a threat of violence is not necessary to the existence of a disturbance. The High Court quashed Major Li's conviction and remitted the case to the Defence Force Discipline Appeal Tribunal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 1 August 2007 STUART ALEXANDER BLACK, VAUGHAN LEE CHAPMAN AND ANDREW PHILIP CARTER v BRYCE LACHLAN GARNOCK, SARAH JANE GARNOCK, ROBERT LEONARD LUFF, LYNETTE ANNE LUFF, SHERIFF OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND MARILYN The sale of a farm in southern New South Wales was blocked by the registration of a judgment debt two hours before settlement, the High Court of Australia held today. Ms Smith and her husband Peter Smith owned “Wanaka”, a 1600-acre property at Bukalong near Bombala. In September 2004, the judgment creditors (Mr Black, Mr Chapman and Mr Carter) obtained judgment in the NSW District Court for $228,000 against the Smiths. On 15 July 2005, the Garnocks and the Luffs agreed to buy Wanaka from the Smiths for $1 million with a deposit of $100,000. Settlement was due to take place at 2pm on 24 August 2005. The day before settlement, the judgment creditors obtained a writ of execution from the District Court. That writ was recorded in the Torrens register at 11.53am on 24 August. In due course, the recording of the writ would entitle the Sheriff to sell the property to pay the judgment debt. Settlement proceeded at 2pm but the transfer could not be registered due to the writ. The Garnocks and Luffs began proceedings in the NSW Supreme Court to stop the judgment creditors and the Sheriff from executing the writ and selling the land. Justice Joseph Campbell granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the execution the writ but in December 2005, Acting Justice David Lloyd dismissed the proceedings. The Court of Appeal allowed the purchasers’ appeal by majority and granted an injunction. The judgment creditors then appealed to the High Court. Neither the Sheriff nor Ms Smith played an active part in the appeal. By a 3-2 majority, the High Court allowed the appeal. It held that the injunction granted by the Court of Appeal was inconsistent with the statutory scheme in the NSW Real Property Act and the system of title registration – including the recording of writs – that the Act created. The writ took priority because it was recorded before the attempted registration of the sale to the purchasers and it was irrelevant that the actual date that contracts were exchanged preceded the issue of the writ.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA [2013] HCA 32 27 June 2013 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. Dang Khoa Nguyen ("the appellant") had been convicted in the Supreme Court of Victoria on one count of murder and one count of attempted murder. The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions. The High Court quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial on both counts. On 8 November 2004, the appellant, in company with Dang Quang Nguyen ("Quang") and Bill Ho, went to a flat in Carlton to collect a drug debt. There were seven people in the flat at the time. Bill Ho shot two of the occupants, killing one of them and wounding the other. The appellant and Quang were both found guilty of murder and attempted murder for their complicity in Bill Ho's crimes. In 2009, the appellant and Quang appealed against their convictions to the Court of Appeal. Quang's convictions were quashed and a verdict of acquittal was entered on the basis that his convictions could not be supported by the evidence and were, therefore, unsafe or unsatisfactory. The appellant's appeal was dismissed. In 2010, the prosecution appealed to the High Court against the judgment of the Court of Appeal relating to Quang. Quang cross-appealed in relation to the sufficiency of the directions given by the trial judge to the jury. On 3 November 2010, the High Court held that the jury had been misdirected because the trial judge's directions did not instruct the jury that manslaughter was available as an alternative verdict with respect to the murder charge if Bill Ho was found to be guilty of murder. The High Court ordered that Quang's convictions be quashed and a new trial had on both charges. After the decision in Quang's case, the appellant appealed to the High Court substantially on the same grounds as those successfully raised by Quang. The Court accepted that there was no material difference between the position of the appellant and Quang. As in Quang's case, the trial judge erred by failing to direct the jury that it was open to them to conclude that the appellant was guilty of manslaughter, even if they were satisfied that Bill Ho was guilty of murder. The misdirection constituted a substantial miscarriage of justice which required the convictions to be quashed and a new trial had.