Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 February 2019 [2019] HCA 5 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, quashed the appellant's conviction and ordered a new trial. The appellant was tried with a co-accused before a judge and jury in the District Court of New South Wales on an indictment charging him with drug-related offences. The appellant was the movements manager of a company that transported freight under bond from cargo terminal operators at the airport to freight-forwarding agencies. The charges related to, amongst other things, three consignments of freight and $400,150 in cash which was located in a tin box in the appellant's bedroom. The appellant gave evidence that the cash was the product of his success as a gambler. The appellant also held a number of online betting accounts, through which the appellant had made net losses, which the appellant's counsel erroneously relied upon as evidence of the appellant's success as a gambler. During the trial judge's summing-up to the jury, he suggested that the first consignment may well have contained drugs, the importation of which was the responsibility of the appellant as part of "an organisation of great sophistication". No such suggestion had been made by the prosecution at trial. The trial judge also suggested that a text message sent by the appellant to his co-accused showed that the appellant was knowingly involved in the importation of drugs. The trial judge also commented on the evidence of the appellant's online betting accounts. In doing so, the trial judge went beyond correcting the erroneous reliance by the appellant's counsel on the accounts as proof of the appellant's success as a gambler, and belittled the appellant's counsel. The appellant was convicted and subsequently sentenced to imprisonment for 18 years and nine months, with a non-parole period of 11 years and nine months. He appealed against his conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal, alleging that the trial judge's summing-up to the jury occasioned a miscarriage of justice. A majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the trial judge's comments did not occasion a miscarriage of justice. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously held that the trial judge's comments were so lacking in balance as to be an exercise in persuading the jury of the appellant's guilt, were unfair to the appellant, and gave rise to a miscarriage of justice. As a result, the Court quashed the appellant's conviction and ordered a new trial. A majority of the Court also held that trial judges should refrain from making comments that convey their opinion as to the proper determination of a disputed issue of fact to be determined by the jury.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 May 2011 SPRINGFIELD LAND CORPORATION (NO 2) PTY LTD & ANOR v STATE OF QUEENSLAND & ANOR [2011] HCA 15 The High Court today dismissed an appeal brought by Springfield Land Corporation Pty Ltd and Springfield Land Corporation (No 2) Pty Ltd ("the Springfield companies") against a decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal had upheld a decision of the Supreme Court denying the Springfield companies compensation from the State of Queensland, determined pursuant to the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Q) ("the Acquisition Act"), for the transfer of certain land to the State. The Springfield companies and the State of Queensland entered into an agreement for the Springfield companies to transfer certain land at Springfield near Ipswich to the State, with compensation for the transferred land to be assessed as if the State had acquired the land under the Acquisition Act. The transferred land was to be amalgamated with other land owned by the Department of Main Roads in an area designated as the "South West Transport Corridor". Section 20(3) of the Acquisition Act required that, in assessing the compensation to be paid, there be taken into consideration, by way of set-off or abatement, any enhancement in the value of the interest of the claimant in land adjoining the acquired land as a result of the carrying out of the purpose for which the land was acquired. The State of Queensland argued that the Springfield companies were not entitled to any compensation because of the enhancement of value of the land owned by the Springfield companies adjoining the transferred land resulting from the proposed use of the land for the facilitation of transport infrastructure. The State's claim was rejected by an arbitrator, who was appointed under the agreement between the parties to determine the quantum of compensation. The arbitrator awarded the Springfield companies $1,468,406. However, both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal accepted the State of Queensland's argument and awarded no compensation to the Springfield companies. The High Court, by majority, held that the relevant purpose of the acquisition of the land by the State of Queensland was for future transport purposes, including the facilitation of transport infrastructure for the South West Transport Corridor. As this purpose enhanced the value of the adjoining land owned by the Springfield companies so as to exceed the value of the transferred land, no compensation was required to be paid to the Springfield companies. The Springfield companies were ordered to pay the respondents' costs.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 7 December 2005 The High Court of Australia today dismissed an appeal against convictions for sexual offences. MWJ was charged with several offences of sexual misconduct involving his partner’s daughter, M, when she was aged between eight and 13. The offences were alleged to have occurred at two different addresses where the family lived in Whyalla in South Australia, first at Sutcliffe Street in Whyalla Stuart, then at Jeffries Street in Whyalla Playford. MWJ met M’s mother, D, in 1987 and moved in with her at Sutcliffe Street. The family, including M and two siblings, moved in 1991 to Jeffries Street. By the time of MWJ’s trial, by judge alone, M was 25. MWJ was convicted at trial by a judge sitting without a jury. The South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal upheld the convictions. The argument for MWJ was based largely on supposed inconsistencies between the evidence of M and her mother. Upholding the decision of the trial judge and the Court of Criminal Appeal, although disagreeing with some observations made by the Court of Criminal Appeal about the conduct of the trial, the High Court held that the supposed inconsistencies were not such as to cast doubt on the outcome of the trial or on the guilt of MWJ. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 28 September 2006 AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION v JAMES RYAN O’NEILL The High Court of Australia today lifted an injunction on the broadcasting by the ABC of a documentary about Mr O’Neill, entitled “The Fisherman”. In November 1975, Mr O’Neill was convicted of the murder in Tasmania in February 1975 of a nine-year-old boy. In May 1975, he signed a confession to the murder of another boy, also aged nine, a month before. After his conviction for the first murder and sentencing to life imprisonment, Tasmanian prosecutors decided not to proceed with charges in relation to the April 1975 murder. The documentary alleges Mr O’Neill is linked with the disappearance of a number of other children, including the Beaumont children – Jane, aged nine, Arnna, aged seven, and Grant, aged four – at or near Glenelg beach in Adelaide on Australia Day 1966. Allegations that Mr O’Neill had murdered other children were widely reported by Tasmanian media. Former Victorian detective Gordon Davie and Roar Film Pty Ltd produced “The Fisherman”, which the ABC was to screen on 28 April 2005. On 15 April 2005, Mr O’Neill commenced action for defamation against the ABC, Mr Davie and Roar Film following the showing of the film at the Hobart Summer Film Festival in January 2005. He also applied for an interlocutory injunction against the ABC to prevent the televising of the documentary pending the defamation trial. In the Tasmanian Supreme Court, Justice Ewan Crawford granted the application. The ABC conceded the film was capable of conveying imputations that Mr O’Neill is a suspect in the disappearance and murder of the Beaumont children and that he is a multiple killer of children. Tasmania’s new Defamation Act took effect on 1 January 2006, but the 1957 Defamation Act applied to the proceedings for the injunction. The ABC relied on the statutory defence that the film was both true and for the public benefit. Justice Crawford accepted that the ABC could probably show the imputations were true but held that it would be difficult to establish that publication was for the public benefit. The Full Court of the Supreme Court, by majority, dismissed an appeal by the ABC. The ABC appealed to the High Court. The Court, by a 4-2 majority, allowed the appeal. The majority held there was a strong case against the granting of the interlocutory injunction. It held that Justice Crawford and the Full Court majority erred by failing to give enough weight to the significance of free speech in considering prior restraint of publication and to the consideration that only nominal damages may be awarded if the showing of “The Fisherman” were found to be defamatory.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 October 2011 SHOALHAVEN CITY COUNCIL v FIREDAM CIVIL ENGINEERING PTY LIMITED [2011] HCA 38 Today the High Court held that an expert's determination of issues in dispute between parties to a construction contract was made in accordance with the contract. The High Court allowed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales which had held that the expert's determination was not binding on the parties because it was internally inconsistent. Firedam Civil Engineering Pty Ltd ("Firedam") agreed to design and construct a waste water collection and transport system for Shoalhaven City Council ("Shoalhaven"). Under the contract, Firedam claimed an entitlement to variations and payment for additional works, extensions of time for those works and contractual compensation for the extended time. Shoalhaven claimed an entitlement to costs incurred from delayed completion. An expert was appointed under the contract to determine these issues. Under the contract, the parties were required to treat the expert determination as final and binding if the aggregate liability of one party to the other did not exceed $500,000. Where the aggregate liability exceeded $500,000, either party could commence proceedings. In the determination, the expert refused to allow certain extensions of time claimed by Firedam arising from variations to works. Firedam argued that this was inconsistent with the expert's use of a discretion conferred on Shoalhaven in the contract to extend the time for the works to be completed. The expert had used Shoalhaven's discretion to assess Shoalhaven's claim for compensation for Firedam's delays to allocate responsibility for delays between Shoalhaven and Firedam. The primary judge dismissed Firedam's claim to a declaration in the Supreme Court of New South Wales that the expert's determination did not bind the parties. The Court of Appeal disagreed. Shoalhaven appealed to the High Court by special leave. The High Court held that the expert had adequately explained that he had used Shoalhaven's discretion to extend time as a device to allocate responsibility for delay caused by Shoalhaven. The Court held that that was not inconsistent with the expert's refusal to allow Firedam's claimed extensions of time. The High Court therefore held that the Court of Appeal erred and reinstated the orders of the primary judge.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 7 April 2005 DANIEL WILKIE v GORDIAN RUNOFF LIMITED (formerly known as GIO INSURANCE LIMITED) AND MARKEL SYNDICATE 702 AT LLOYDS, LONDON (formerly known as RE BROWN SYNDICATE AT LLOYDS, LONDON) Mr Wilkie, FAI Insurance’s former chief operating officer, was entitled to indemnity under an insurance policy for his defence costs in criminal proceedings, the High Court of Australia held today. Directors, officers and employees of FAI were insured for up to $20 million against certain losses, including for wrongful acts committed or allegedly committed up to 31 May 1999. In 2003, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission instituted criminal proceedings against Mr Wilkie for alleged offences under the Corporations Act. ASIC alleged that in 1998 he permitted misleading information to be provided to FAI’s auditors and acted dishonestly in the discharge of his duties with the intention of deceiving the auditors. Mr Wilkie has not admitted the offences and they have yet to be adjudicated. He claimed for the costs to be incurred in his defence against the ASIC charges. The policy contained terms called extensions and Extension 9, on which Mr Wilkie relied, was headed “Advance payment of defence costs”. After GIO’s solicitors reviewed the brief of evidence GIO denied indemnity for the claim pursuant to Exclusion 7 of the policy. Exclusion 7 provides that the policy does not insure loss arising out of any claim based upon dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious acts or omissions or any deliberate breach of any statute where such act, omission or breach has in fact occurred. “In fact” was defined as meaning that the conduct is admitted by the insured person or is subsequently established by a court. Under Extension 9, GIO paid all reasonable defence costs provided that GIO has not denied indemnity for the claim, but it reserved the right to recover payments if a court established that the insured person was not entitled to indemnity. In the New South Wales Supreme Court Mr Wilkie sought a declaration that the insurers were not entitled to rely on Exclusion 7 to deny him indemnity under Extension 9. Justice Henric Nicholas held that insurers were not obliged to indemnify Mr Wilkie. The High Court granted special leave to appeal directly from Justice Nicholas’s decision. The Court held that GIO was responsible for the costs, charges or expenses incurred in defending, investigating or monitoring the ASIC proceedings and related appeals. It held that there is as yet no ground to which GIO can point as a legal basis for a denial of indemnity. Therefore, GIO was not free of an obligation to indemnify Mr Wilkie under Extension 9, on a basis located in Exclusion 7. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 31 August 2006 CENTRAL BAYSIDE GENERAL PRACTICE ASSOCIATION LIMITED v COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE Central Bayside General Practice is entitled to a payroll tax exemption because it met the definition of a charity, the High Court of Australia held today. Central Bayside was registered as a company limited by guarantee in 1994. Its constitution provided that the company must not distribute any of its profit, income or assets directly or indirectly to its members and it income, assets and profit could only be used for the objective of improving patient care and health in Melbourne’s bayside area. In 2002 Central Bayside had 180 local GPs as primary members and 70 GPs from outside the area as associate members. In the 2001-02 financial year, Central Bayside had total revenue of $1,048,979, of which $1,006,997 came from the Commonwealth. Of the Commonwealth funding, 45 per cent was an outcomes- based funding (OBF) grant while the rest was as grants for particular projects. Central Bayside was required to devise a strategic plan and business plans identifying relevant outcomes for the OBF Agreement. In December 2001, the State Revenue Office refused Central Bayside a payroll tax exemption under section 10(1)(bb) of Victoria’s Pay-roll Tax Act, because Central Bayside was predominantly a professional body promoting the interests of its members. A delegate for the Commissioner, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Victorian Supreme Court and, by majority, the Court of Appeal upheld that refusal because Central Bayside was not accepted to be a charitable body. The Tribunal accepted that Central Bayside existed for purposes beneficial to the community but held that its services were not charitable as it was an arm of government or the bureaucracy. Central Bayside appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal. It held that Central Bayside’s constitution and purposes brought it within the legal definition of a charity. The Commissioner contended that Central Bayside acted so much under the control and influence of government that it could be seen to be furthering government objectives rather than performing its own. The Court held that Central Bayside, like many charities, has a purpose shared by the Commonwealth, in this case to improve patient care and health. This did not alter its essential character as a charity. The Court held that Central Bayside’s purpose is charitable, within the legal meaning of that term, even though the government is the source of its funds and even though Central Bayside consents to conditions being attached to those funds.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 23 April 2008 VINCENT THOMAS O’DONOGHUE v IRELAND AND GRAHAM NEIL CALDER CHARLES ZENTAI v REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY, STEVEN HEATH, MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA AND COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA LARRY RICHARD WILLIAMS v UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND MAGISTRATES APPOINTED BY COMMISSION UNDER THE PUBLIC SEAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES Commonwealth laws conferring jurisdiction on State magistrates in relation to extradition applications were valid, the High Court of Australia held today. Ireland has sought the extradition of Mr O’Donoghue on fraud charges, Hungary has sought the extradition of Mr Zentai in relation to his alleged involvement in the murder of a Jewish teenager in Budapest in 1944, and the United States has sought the extradition of Mr Williams on tax charges. In each case, pursuant to section 19 of the Extradition Act, they were brought before a magistrate to determine their eligibility for surrender in relation to the extradition offences. Section 46 of the Act provides that the Governor-General may arrange with the Governor of a State for the performance by magistrates of functions under the Act. All three men asserted that section 19 of the Extradition Act was invalid because it involved a constitutionally impermissible attempt by the Commonwealth Parliament to impose a duty upon magistrates as holders of a State statutory office. They argued that Commonwealth Parliament lacked the power, without State legislative approval, to impose upon the holder of a State statutory office an enforceable administrative duty where the functions and incidents of that office were exhaustively defined by State legislation. They all applied to the Federal Court of Australia to restrain the further pursuit of extradition proceedings by Western Australian magistrates, in the cases of Mr O’Donoghue and Mr Zentai, and by New South Wales magistrates, in the case of Mr Williams. Mr O’Donoghue and Mr Zentai had their applications dismissed and they lost appeals to the Full Court of the Federal Court. They appealed to the High Court. Mr Williams’s application was dismissed by the Full Court of the Federal Court in its original jurisdiction. His application for special leave to appeal to the High Court was heard with the two appeals. The High Court, by a 6-1 majority, dismissed the appeals. The application for special leave to appeal was granted, and the appeal treated as heard immediately but dismissed. The Court held that section 19 of the Extradition Act was valid. Section 19 did not impose a duty on State magistrates. It conferred a power which, under the Crimes Act, the State magistrates were not obliged to accept.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 12 December, 2002 MEMBERS OF THE YORTA YORTA ABORIGINAL COMMUNITY v VICTORIA & ORS The High Court of Australia has dismissed an appeal by eight members of the Yorta Yorta community against decisions by the Federal Court and the Full Court of the Federal Court rejecting their native title claim. The Yorta Yorta claim covered an area in southern New South Wales and northern Victoria bisected by the Murray River. Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia, together with shire councils, water authorities, tourism and recreation bodies, business and industry groups, Telstra, the Murray Darling Basin Commission and dozens of landholders, were respondents to the claim. The case involved interpretation of the definition of native title in the Native Title Act. The Act requires that rights and interests in relation to land and waters are held under traditional laws and customs, that the peoples still have a connection with the land and waters, and that the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia. The High Court, by majority, held that the Yorta Yorta claim failed on all three counts. Justice Howard Olney in the Federal Court found that by 1881 the claimants’ ancestors were no longer in possession of their traditional lands and had ceased to observe traditional laws and customs. The Full Court of the Federal Court upheld Justice Olney’s finding that sometime after 1788 the Yorta Yorta community had lost its character as a traditional Aboriginal community. The High Court, by majority, has upheld the Full Court of the Federal Court’s determination that forebears of the Yorta Yorta claimants had ceased to occupy their lands in accordance with traditional laws and customs and that the claimants had not established that they had continued to acknowledge and observe those laws and customs. Such laws and customs needed to have continued substantially uninterrupted if the definition of native title in the Native Title Act were to be satisfied.