Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 6 November 2008 RUBEN MAS RIVADAVIA v THE QUEEN On 3 September 2008 the High Court of Australia allowed appeals by two men who had been convicted, in the New South Wales District Court, in June 2004 of conspiracy to import a commercial quantity of ecstasy into Australia. Rafael Cesan and Ruben Mas Rivadavia had been sentenced in March 2005, Mr Cesan to 13 years and six months’ imprisonment and Mr Mas Rivadavia to 11 years’ imprisonment. The High Court allowed the men’s appeals because the trial judge, who had repeatedly fallen asleep during their trial, did not exercise the supervision of the trial required by law. The jury had become distracted and a substantial miscarriage of justice resulted. The Court ordered new trials. Today the High Court published its reasons for allowing the appeals. Mr Cesan and Mr Mas Rivadavia were convicted after a 17-day trial. In 2007 they appealed to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal (CCA) against their convictions and sentences, complaining that the trial judge had been asleep when evidence was being given. The CCA received evidence from friends and relatives as well as from Mr Cesan and Mr Mas Rivadavia themselves describing what occurred at the trial. They described episodes of up to 20 minutes’ sleep, sometimes accompanied by snoring. Periods of sleep became longer as the trial went on. Members of the jury were visibly detracted and, at times, amused. Mr Cesan said the judge’s snoring was disruptive when he was being cross-examined. Prosecutor Geoffrey Bellew SC also swore an affidavit referring to occasions in which the judge appeared to be asleep. Medical evidence showed the judge had been suffering from severe obstructive sleep apnoea. The CCA, by majority, dismissed the appeals on the basis that the judge’s conduct did not result in any demonstrated error, omission or misdirection. No complaint had been made at trial about the judge’s sleep episodes. Mr Cesan and Mr Mas Rivadavia appealed to the High Court on a number of grounds including the contention that there had been a miscarriage of justice and no trial by jury as required by section 80 of the Constitution in relation to indictable offences against laws of the Commonwealth. The Court confined argument initially to the question whether there had been a miscarriage of justice. At the end of that argument, on 3 September 2008, the High Court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions and ordered retrials. The Court unanimously held that the trial judge had a duty to supervise and control the conduct of the trial. Because the judge was noticeably and repeatedly asleep or inattentive the trial was flawed to such an extent that there was a miscarriage of justice. The CCA could not conclude from the trial transcript alone that each of the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court held that it could not be said that no substantial miscarriage of justice actually occurred, because the members of the jury were prevented from paying full attention to the evidence and therefore unable to perform their task properly.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 23 June 2004 KETTERING PTY LTD v NOOSA SHIRE COUNCIL A Queensland developer was entitled to make a claim for compensation for the injurious affection to its property covered by in a town plan, the High Court of Australia held today. Kettering owned 19.8 hectares of land on Noosa Hill in Noosa Shire which it wished to subdivide and develop. In 1991 the shire’s town plan was amended by the inclusion of the Noosa Hill Development Control Plan (DCP). The effect was to constrain the development potential of the land and hence diminish its market value. Kettering claimed compensation of $9.3 million. The company claimed its land could reasonably have been expected to be rezoned and subdivided to allow construction of 73 houses and 132 units. After the DCP was gazetted, the planned development was limited to 24 houses and 75 units. Kettering’s claim was rejected by the council and the company successfully appealed to the Planning and Environment Court. In 2001 the Queensland Court of Appeal upheld the appeal from Noosa Council, determining that under section 3.5(4)(d) of the Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act no compensation was payable to Kettering for the detrimental effect of the DCP. This decision is the subject of the first appeal to the High Court. The Court of Appeal’s orders also precluded Kettering from pursuing an alternative basis for its compensation claim, even though this had not been argued in and considered by the Planning and Environment Court, and was not raised before the Court of Appeal. Noosa Council joined Kettering in seeking a correction of the Court of Appeal’s all-embracing order, but the Court declined to correct its orders. This refusal is the basis of the second appeal to the High Court. The appeals centred on the construction of section 3.5 governing compensation. The Court held that section 3.5(4), listing circumstances where compensation is not payable, did not expressly or impliedly confine compensation to only direct and immediate effects of a DCP. The meaning of section 3.5(1)(a)(i) setting out the right to compensation was not to be construed by reference merely to the exceptions to the right. The Court held that the preferred approach was to identify the extent to which a very expansive right to compensation is reduced by quite specific exceptions. The Court of Appeal held that the exception denying compensation for prohibition on the use of land for particular purposes meant Kettering did not have a claim. But the High Court held that the effect of the DCP was upon the potential for subdivision, not upon the particular use of the land. Houses and units could still be built there, but fewer of them. It held that a right to compensation should be interpreted broadly. The onus was on the council to show that Kettering’s claim fell within an exception and it had not satisfied that onus. The Court unanimously allowed both appeals.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 16 May 2006 MARIA SWEENEY v BOYLAN NOMINEES PTY LIMITED trading as QUIRKS REFRIGERATION Boylan Nominees was not vicariously liable for injuries caused by the substandard maintenance work performed by an independent contractor on its behalf, the High Court of Australia held today. Mrs Sweeney suffered injuries to her head, neck and hand when a door of a refrigerator at a service station fell off and landed on her when she attempted to open it to buy milk. Boylan had leased out the refrigerator and the lease obliged the company to service and maintain the refrigerator. Shortly before the accident, the service station manager had told Boylan that the refrigerator door was not closing properly. Boylan sent a mechanic who tightened the screws in the hinges and showed the manager that the door was now working. The mechanic was not employed by Boylan. He performed work at Boylan’s request then invoiced Boylan for the hours he performed and for spare parts. Boylan did not provide a uniform, tools, equipment or a vehicle. The mechanic’s van carried his own company’s name. In the New South Wales District Court Mrs Sweeney sued both the owners of the service station and the refrigeration company. The claim against the service station owners failed but the claim against Boylan succeeded and Mrs Sweeney was awarded $43,932 plus costs. Judge Christopher Robison held that Boylan was vicariously liable for the negligence of a mechanic it had sent to service the refrigerator in response to the service station’s complaint that the door was not closing properly. Judge Robison concluded that the mechanic was acting as Boylan’s servant or agent. The NSW Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by Boylan. It held that Boylan was not vicariously liable for the mechanic’s negligence. Mrs Sweeney appealed to the High Court, which by a 5-1 majority dismissed the appeal. The Court concluded that the mechanic was an independent contractor and therefore the claim against Boylan must fail. The mechanic was not a Boylan employee and he conducted his own business, invoicing Boylan for each job and supplying his own tools. An employer will generally be vicariously liable for an employee’s negligence but someone engaging an independent contractor will not generally be vicariously liable for the contractor’s negligence.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 29 September 2005 BARBARA MARY JOSEPHINE NEILSON v OVERSEAS PROJECTS CORPORATION OF VICTORIA AND MERCANTILE INSURANCE (AUSTRALIA) LTD The High Court of Australia today held that a personal injury claim by an Australian individual against an Australian company arising from an accident in China could be determined in Australia by reference to Australian law, by reason of the relevant provisions of the Chinese civil code. Mrs Neilson, now 71, was injured in 1991 when she fell down stairs in an apartment in which she and her husband were living in the Chinese city of Wuhan. Her husband, George Neilson, worked for the Overseas Projects Corporation (OPC), a company owned by the State of Victoria and involved in a joint venture with the Chinese government by which it provided experts to conduct training courses at the China Iron and Steel Training Centre at the Wuhan Iron and Steel University. Mr Neilson taught organisational behaviour and Mrs Neilson was a part-time personal assistant to the Australian director of the training centre. The accident occurred when Mrs Neilson got up during the night to get a glass of water from the kitchen downstairs. The stairwell lacked a balustrade, about which the Neilsons had complained to OPC. As Mrs Neilson reached for the light switch she miscalculated and fell heavily down the stairs, suffering head and back injuries. In 1997, after the Neilsons returned home to Western Australia, Mrs Neilson instituted proceedings in the WA Supreme Court. She sued OPC for damages for injuries suffered as a result of the company’s negligence. Mrs Neilson claimed that the stairs were dangerous and that OPC had breached its duty to take reasonable care for her safety. At the 2002 trial, OPC sought to rely on Chinese law which had a one-year limitation period for personal injury claims. Justice John McKechnie invoked Article 146 of China’s General Principles of Civil Law which provides that in compensation cases, if both parties are foreign nationals from the same country, the law of their own country may be applied. He held that Mrs Neilson’s claim was not statute-barred by Chinese law and held OPC liable and gave judgment for $300,000, a sum agreed by the parties. OPC appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court which held that Justice McKechnie was wrong to invoke Article 146 and to apply Australian law. Mrs Neilson appealed to the High Court. Questions of duty, breach and damages are not in issue. The High Court, by a 5-2 majority, allowed the appeal. It held that the Australian rule which directed Justice McKechnie to apply the law of the place where the harm happened did not require him to ignore the fact that Chinese law made special provision for claims for damages where both parties to the claim were nationals of the same foreign country.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Manager, Public Information 22 April 2009 RADIO 2UE SYDNEY PTY LTD v RAY CHESTERTON Today the High Court dismissed Radio 2UE’s appeal in relation to an earlier jury finding that comments made by John Laws about Ray Chesterton on the John Laws Morning Show were defamatory. On 8 August 2005, on his radio program, John Laws made some derogatory comments about Ray Chesterton, a journalist who had previously worked with 2UE. Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd is the licensee of the radio station over which the comments were broadcast. Mr Chesterton sued 2UE for defamation. At the trial before a judge and jury in the Supreme Court of NSW, the jury had to decide whether the comments made by John Laws conveyed certain imputations about Mr Chesterton and, if so, whether those imputations defamed him. The jury decided in Mr Chesterton’s favour on both of those issues. Radio 2UE appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal, arguing that the trial judge had given the members of the jury incorrect directions about how they should decide whether Mr Chesterton had been defamed in respect of his professional or business reputation. The Court of Appeal, by majority, found that the trial judge had given appropriate directions to the jury. 2UE was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court. A majority of justices affirmed that the general test for defamation, namely whether an ordinary reasonable person would think less of the plaintiff because of what was said about him or her, applied to imputations regarding all aspects of a person’s reputation, including business reputation. All members of the High Court considered that the trial judge had given appropriate directions to the jury about how they should approach the task of determining whether Mr Laws’ comments contained certain imputations, and if they did, whether the comments were defamatory. The members of the Court were unanimous in dismissing 2UE’s appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 May 2013 ROSEANNE BECKETT v THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES [2013] HCA 17 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had held that Ms Roseanne Beckett's claim for damages for malicious prosecution required proof of her innocence. In September 1991, Ms Beckett was convicted of eight offences against her husband. In August 2005, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal quashed the convictions on six of the counts. The Court entered a verdict of acquittal for one count, and ordered a new trial on the remaining counts. In September 2005, the Director of Public Prosecutions ("the Director") gave a direction, pursuant to s 7(2)(b) of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 (NSW), that no further proceedings be taken against Ms Beckett on the outstanding counts. In August 2008, Ms Beckett instituted proceedings against the respondent in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, claiming damages for malicious prosecution. Both parties agreed that the Court should answer separate questions regarding whether Ms Beckett needed to prove her innocence to maintain her claim for damages. The trial judge held that the Director's decision not to proceed further with the charges was equivalent to the entry of a nolle prosequi by the Attorney-General. He applied the High Court's decision in Davis v Gell (1924) 35 CLR 275, which held that where proceedings have been terminated by the entry of a nolle prosequi, as distinct from other forms of termination, a plaintiff must prove his or her innocence to succeed in a subsequent action for malicious prosecution. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's decision. By special leave, Ms Beckett appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal, holding that Davis should not be followed. The Court held that a plaintiff is not required to prove his or her innocence in an action for damages for malicious prosecution in any case in which the prosecution has terminated favourably to the plaintiff.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 4 December 2019 STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES v BRADFORD JAMES ROBINSON [2019] HCA 46 Today the High Court dismissed an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales concerning the power of a police officer to arrest a person, without a warrant, under s 99 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) ("the Act") when, at the time of the arrest, the officer had not formed the intention to charge the arrested person with an offence. A majority of the High Court held that s 99 of the Act does not confer a power to arrest a person in such circumstances. An Apprehended Violence Order ("AVO") restrained Mr Robinson from certain conduct. When Mr Robinson voluntarily entered Sydney City Police Station, a constable arrested him and told him he was being arrested for breaching the AVO. The constable had no intention, at the time of the arrest, of bringing Mr Robinson before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law unless it later emerged that there was sufficient reason to charge him. The constable offered Mr Robinson the opportunity of an interview, which he accepted. At the end of the interview Mr Robinson was released without charge. Mr Robinson brought a claim for damages for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment, which the State of New South Wales ("the State") defended on the basis that the arrest was authorised by the Act. Mr Robinson was unsuccessful in the District Court. The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal. In this Court, the State submitted that, on a proper construction of s 99 of the Act, the Court of Appeal erred in finding that at the time of arrest the arresting police officer must have formed a positive intention to charge the arrested person with an offence. Section 99(1) stipulates conditions for arrest without a warrant, namely that "the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the person is committing or has committed an offence" and that "the police officer is satisfied that the arrest is reasonably necessary for any one or more" of specified reasons. Pursuant to s 99(3), a police officer who arrests a person under s 99 must, as soon as is reasonably practicable, take the person before a magistrate (or other authorised officer) to be dealt with according to law. The High Court unanimously held that in New South Wales, at common law, an arrest can only be for the purpose of taking the arrested person before a magistrate (or other authorised officer) to be dealt with according to law to answer a charge for an offence ("the single criterion"). Nothing in the Act displaced that single criterion. An arrest under s 99 can only be for the purpose, as soon as is reasonably practicable, of taking the arrested person before a magistrate (or other authorised officer) to be dealt with according to law to answer a charge for an offence. A majority of the High Court held that it followed that the constable did not have the power to arrest Mr Robinson pursuant to s 99 when, at the time of the arrest, the constable had not formed the intention to charge him. The arrest was unlawful.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 16 May 2014 [2014] HCA 19 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had held that Mr Sidhu was precluded from departing from his assurances that he would transfer certain real property to Ms Van Dyke. In 1996, Ms Van Dyke and her then husband moved into a house known as Oaks Cottage, which was located on a block of land known as the Homestead Block owned by Mr Sidhu and his wife. Towards the end of 1997, Mr Sidhu and Ms Van Dyke commenced a relationship, during which Mr Sidhu gave assurances to Ms Van Dyke to the effect that he would subdivide the land and transfer Oaks Cottage to her once the site had been subdivided. Ms Van Dyke continued in her relationship with Mr Sidhu, performed unpaid work on the Homestead Block and Oaks Cottage and did not pursue gainful employment elsewhere. She also did not seek a property settlement from her husband when they divorced in 1998. In 2006, the relationship between Mr Sidhu and Ms Van Dyke came to an end and Mr Sidhu refused to transfer the property on which the Oaks Cottage sat ("the Oaks property") to Ms Van Dyke. Ms Van Dyke commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, claiming that Mr Sidhu was estopped from departing from his assurances on the basis that she had acted in reliance on those representations to her detriment. The Supreme Court dismissed her claim on the basis that the trial judge was not satisfied that Ms Van Dyke had acted to her detriment in reliance on Mr Sidhu's assurances. The Court of Appeal allowed Ms Van Dyke's appeal, holding that, where inducement by the promise may be inferred from Ms Van Dyke's conduct, there was a presumption that Ms Van Dyke acted to her detriment in reliance on Mr Sidhu's representations. The Court found that Mr Sidhu had failed to rebut that presumption. The Court concluded that Mr Sidhu was precluded from departing from his assurances, and ordered Mr Sidhu to pay Ms Van Dyke equitable compensation in an amount to be assessed by reference to the market value of the Oaks property. By grant of special leave, Mr Sidhu appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously dismissed Mr Sidhu's appeal. The Court held that the Court of Appeal erred in proceeding upon a presumption that Ms Van Dyke had acted to her detriment in reliance on Mr Sidhu's representations. Ms Van Dyke bore the onus of proof in relation to detrimental reliance. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that Ms Van Dyke's evidence at trial established that she had acted to her detriment in reliance on Mr Sidhu's representations. On that basis, Ms Van Dyke was entitled to equitable compensation in an amount to be assessed by reference to the value of the Oaks property.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 February 2020 COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF CUSTOMS v PHARM-A-CARE LABORATORIES PTY LTD [2020] HCA 2 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia concerning the classification of certain goods for the purpose of the Customs Tariff Act 1995 (Cth) ("the Tariff Act"). The Tariff Act imposes duties of customs on goods imported into Australia. Chapter 30 of Sch 3 to the Tariff Act contains heading 3004 under which medicaments consisting of mixed products for therapeutic or prophylactic uses put up in measured doses are relevantly classifiable. Note 1(a) to Ch 30 states that the chapter does not cover "[f]oods ... such as ... food supplements". Pharm-A-Care Laboratories Pty Ltd imports into Australia pastilles (referred to as "vitamin preparations" and "garcinia preparations") containing sucrose, glucose syrup, gelatin, flavours and other substances including vitamins of specified descriptions or a quantity of hydroxycitric acid. On an application for review under the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") found that the vitamin preparations and the garcinia preparations were classifiable under heading 3004, with the consequence that no duty was owed on the importation of the preparations. The Comptroller-General of Customs ("the Comptroller-General") appealed from the decision of the Tribunal to the Federal Court on questions of law under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The Comptroller-General contended that the vitamin preparations and the garcinia preparations were each classifiable as either a type of "sugar confectionery", under subheading 1704.90.00, or as "food preparations", under subheading 2106.90.90, so that each was dutiable at a rate of 5% or 4%. The Comptroller-General contended that the vitamin preparations and the garcinia preparations were excluded from heading 3004 because they answered the description of "food supplements" within Note 1(a) to Ch 30. The Full Court of the Federal Court upheld the Tribunal's classification of the vitamin preparations and the garcinia preparations under heading 3004. By grant of special leave, the Comptroller-General appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously found that, while the Tribunal made an error of law in considering that the vitamin preparations and the garcinia preparations had to answer the description not just of "food supplements" but also of "[f]oods" in order to be excluded from heading 3004 by Note 1(a) to Ch 30, the Tribunal was correct in law in independently concluding that the preparations fell outside the description of "food supplements". The Court further held that the Tribunal did not wrongly equate the expression "food preparations" in heading 2106 with the expressions "[f]oods" or "food supplements" in Note 1(a).