Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 5 August, 2003 KAMALJEET DHANHOA v THE QUEEN The convictions of the appellant, Mr Dhanhoa, for kidnapping and robbery in company with wounding were upheld by the High Court of Australia. The victim, Anthony Herbert Schembri, invited four men with whom he had been playing pool at the Bridge Hotel, Rozelle, in Sydney, back to his flat to smoke marijuana on January 19, 1999. At the flat, he was head-butted, grabbed around the throat, kicked and punched, and stabbed in the liver and lungs, and his wallet was stolen. He escaped as his attackers tried to bundle him into their car at knifepoint to take him to an automatic teller machine. He later found he had also been stabbed in the back. Mr Schembri could not say with certainty who committed each assault but said all four men participated. Two neighbours said they glimpsed Mr Schembri scuffling with three men. Mr Schembri identified Mr Dhanhoa from photographs as one of the four men. Mr Dhanhoa's fingerprints were found at the flat. He claimed in evidence at his trial in the New South Wales District Court that he had already left the flat and caught a taxi home before the attack took place. The principal question for the jury was whether Mr Dhanhoa was still at the flat when the attack occurred. Mr Dhanhoa initially told police he had never been to either Mr Schembri’s flat or the Bridge Hotel but at his trial admitted having been to both places. He also told police he knew nothing about the stabbing or the robbery. He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge's directions and warnings about identification evidence, and lies, were inadequate. His convictions were upheld by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal. The High Court, by a 4-1 majority, dismissed his appeal. The majority held that section 116 of the Evidence Act, which is concerned with warnings to juries about warning juries in relation to identification evidence, was not mandatory unless the reliability of the identification was disputed. Mr Dhanhoa’s identification as one of the four men who went to the flat was not in dispute; only whether he was still present during the attack. On the issue of inconsistencies between what Mr Dhanhoa told police and his evidence at the trial, the prosecutor ran the case on the basis that such inconsistencies raised questions about his reliability. They were not relied upon as evidence of guilt. The Court held that there were no material misdirections.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 27 September 2007 EAST AUSTRALIAN PIPELINE PTY LIMITED v AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION AND AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION TRIBUNAL The Competition Tribunal had been correct in overruling a decision of the ACCC concerning charges to be fixed for third-party access to a natural gas pipeline, the High Court of Australia held today. East Australian Pipeline (EAPL) purchased the natural gas pipeline running from Moomba in South Australia to Sydney from the Commonwealth in 1994 for $534.3 million. The regulatory regime required EAPL to establish a system for third-party access to the pipeline within the framework of national competition policy. If the ACCC withheld approval it could approve its own access arrangement. Section 8 of the National Third-Party Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems sets out the objectives to be considered by the ACCC in determining whether to approve tariffs charged to third parties. The charges are calculated by reference to the capital assets of the pipeline, in particular the initial capital base (ICB). In 1999, EAPL proposed an access arrangement with an ICB value of $666.7 million based on the depreciated optimised replacement cost of the pipeline. In 2003, after various exchanges and revisions, the ACCC ultimately rejected EAPL’s proposed access arrangement and substituted its own, which set an ICB of $545.4 million. EAPL then applied to the Competition Tribunal for a review of the ACCC’s decision. The Tribunal found that the ACCC had wrongly exercised its discretion by substituting its own access arrangement. It was incorrect and unreasonable for the ACCC to put aside known valuation methods and devise a method which adjusted the optimised replacement cost in a novel fashion after misconstruing section 8.10 of the Code. Section 8.10 deals with the methodology for establishing the ICB for existing pipelines. The Tribunal construed section 8.10 as setting out the 11 factors to be considered in order and that the sequential process mandated by the section was important to the integrity of any determination of an ICB. It varied the ACCC’s decision and substituted an ICB of $834.66 million. The ACCC sought judicial review in the Full Court of the Federal Court which concluded that the ACCC had not erred in exercising its discretion in substituting its own access arrangement and utilising a novel method for calculating the ICB. While the Full Court recognised that the ACCC did not use known valuation methods in determining the ICB, it concluded that the ACCC had considered all the factors set out in section 8.10. EAPL appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal and held that the Tribunal was correct in its construction and in its application of section 8.10.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 December 2005 APPLICANT VEAL OF 2002 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL A failure to inform a visa applicant of adverse information so that the applicant could have the opportunity to respond led to a denial of procedural fairness, the High Court of Australia held today. Applicant VEAL and his wife, an Eritrean couple, applied for protection visas in 2001 but were refused. They sought review by the Refugee Review Tribunal. In the meantime the Immigration Department received a letter about VEAL. The letter, which included the author’s name and address, said VEAL had admitted being accused of killing a prominent political figure in Eritrea and that VEAL supported and worked for the Eritrean government. The writer asked that the information remain confidential. The department sent the letter to the RRT but the RRT did not tell VEAL about the letter or the allegations in it. It affirmed the decision not to grant protection visas. The RRT, in its written reasons, said it gave no weight to the letter as it had been unable to test the claims. The Federal Court allowed an appeal, but the Minister successfully appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court. VEAL then appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously held that procedural fairness required the RRT to inform VEAL of the existence of the letter and the substance (although not the detail) of its contents before affirming the refusal to grant a visa, although the RRT was correct in this case not to have provided the letter or its author’s identity to VEAL. The Court held that because the information was credible, relevant and significant the RRT was required to give VEAL an opportunity to deal with that information. Deciding it could reach the conclusion to withhold a visa on other grounds did not discharge the obligation on the RRT to accord VEAL procedural fairness by giving him an opportunity to respond. The Court held that the material in the letter did pertain to whether he had a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons covered by the Refugees Convention. The Court held that the application of principles of procedural fairness depend on the particular circumstances of each case, so there are no absolute rules about disclosure of information from an informer or disclosure of the informer’s identity to an interested person such as VEAL. In this case, procedural fairness at least required that VEAL know the substance of what was said about him in the letter. It did not however mean that the RRT was bound to give him a copy of the letter, or to tell him who sent it, or even to tell him the allegations were in writing. This balanced the principles of procedural fairness against the public interest in ensuring that informers came forward with information about asylum seekers.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 September 2004 JOHN VINCENT MULHOLLAND v AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION Provisions of the Commonwealth Electoral Act concerning registration of political parties that require registered parties to have 500 members and that none of those members be shared with another party were constitutionally valid, the High Court of Australia held today. The AEC in 2001 asked Mr Mulholland, the registered officer of the Democratic Labor Party, to provide names and details of at least 500 DLP members so it could check that these people were indeed DLP members and ensure there was no overlap with other parties’ membership. Mr Mulholland refused to comply with the request and the AEC gave notice, pursuant to section 137 of the Electoral Act, that it was considering deregistering the DLP. Mr Mulholland argued that the 500 rule and the no-overlap rule infringed the implied constitutional freedom of political communication because the ballot paper was a form of communication with voters and an unregistered party cannot have its name printed on it. The scheme for registering parties to receive public funding was introduced in 1983, with the DLP registered since 1984, and the no-overlap rule was added to the scheme in 2000. Mr Mulholland issued proceedings in the Federal Court seeking an order restraining the AEC from deregistering the party on grounds including that the 500 and no-overlap rules were invalid. Justice Shane Marshall dismissed the application and the Full Court dismissed an appeal. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal in May and today handed down its written reasons for judgment. Mr Mulholland submitted that the two rules contravened the constitutional requirement of direct choice by the people because they impaired the making of an informed choice by voters and they unreasonably discriminated between candidates from registered and unregistered parties. The Court rejected both reasons, holding that electors retained a full and free choice between competing candidates and that Parliament’s requirement of a minimum level of public support for a party before it received election funding did not involve unreasonable discrimination. The no-overlap rule was designed to avoid confusion, deception and frustration of the democratic process by using the same block of members to register multiple parties, including front parties channelling voters’ preferences to another party. The Court held that both rules were consistent with the constitutional requirements of direct choice by the people and with representative government.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 November 2014 KUCZBORSKI v THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND [2014] HCA 46 Today the High Court, by majority, rejected a challenge to the validity of certain provisions of the Criminal Code (Q) and the Liquor Act 1992 (Q). The Court also held that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the Vicious Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (Q) ("the VLAD Act") and certain other provisions of the Criminal Code and the Bail Act 1980 (Q) introduced by the Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (Q) ("the Disruption Act"). The Disruption Act and the Tattoo Parlours Act 2013 (Q) inserted new offences into the Criminal Code and Liquor Act respectively, elements of which involved being a "participant" in a "criminal organisation", or wearing symbols of membership of a "declared criminal organisation". The VLAD Act introduced penalties for a person convicted of a designated offence, which were more severe than would otherwise be applicable, if that individual was also proved to be a "participant in the affairs of an association". The Disruption Act amended the Criminal Code by providing for mandatory minimum penalties and increasing the maximum penalties for certain existing offences, in circumstances where the individual charged was found to be a participant in a criminal organisation. It also amended the Bail Act by introducing more stringent criteria for the grant of bail, in circumstances where a person was alleged to be a participant in a criminal organisation. In March 2014, the plaintiff commenced proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the Court seeking declarations that the challenged laws were invalid on the ground that they were incompatible with the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The plaintiff had not been charged with, and did not suggest that he had committed, or intended to commit, any offence. Accordingly, no restriction was imposed upon the plaintiff's freedom of action by the VLAD Act, the new penalty provisions of the Criminal Code or the new provisions of the Bail Act. The High Court unanimously held that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek a declaration that those laws were invalid. The plaintiff argued that the laws creating the new offences in the Criminal Code and the Liquor Act impermissibly enlisted the court to give effect to the Parliament's or the executive's intention to destroy criminal organisations. This argument was not accepted. The majority of the Court held that these laws did not require the courts to proceed otherwise than in accordance with the processes which are understood to characterise the exercise of judicial power.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 7 May 2014 AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL SERVICES AND LEASING PTY LIMITED v HILLS INDUSTRIES LIMITED & ANOR [2014] HCA 14 Today the High Court unanimously held that the first and second respondents would not be required to repay monies that had been mistakenly transferred to them by the appellant as a result of a fraud committed by a third party, because each respondent had established a defence that they had changed their position on the faith of the receipt of the payments. The appellant, Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd ("AFSL"), provided businesses with finance to purchase commercial equipment. The respondents, Hills Industries Ltd ("Hills") and Bosch Security Systems Pty Ltd ("Bosch"), were manufacturers and suppliers of such equipment. Hills and Bosch were both owed debts by various companies in a corporate group (referred to collectively as "TCP"). A director and shareholder of TCP created false invoices suggesting that TCP had purchased equipment from each of Hills and Bosch. On the basis of these invoices, AFSL agreed to purchase the equipment and lease it back to TCP. AFSL paid the amounts of the false invoices to Hills and Bosch. AFSL later discovered the fraud and sought repayment from Hills and Bosch. Hills and Bosch resisted AFSL's claim on the basis of their change of position. In particular, both companies relied upon the application of AFSL's payments to the discharge of TCP's debts, and the circumstances that they had ceased pursuing the recovery of the debts and continued to trade with TCP. It was not in dispute that Hills and Bosch had both acted on the faith of the receipt of AFSL's payments. In the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the primary judge rejected Hills' defence of change of position, but held that the defence had been made out in relation to Bosch. AFSL and Hills both appealed to the Court of Appeal, which held that each of Hills and Bosch was entitled to rely on a defence of change of position in response to AFSL's claim for repayment. By grant of special leave, AFSL appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously dismissed AFSL's appeal. A majority of the Court held that the relevant enquiry was whether retention of the monies by Hills and Bosch would be inequitable in all the circumstances. The Court rejected the approach argued by AFSL, which focused on the extent to which Hills and Bosch had been "disenriched" subsequent to the receipt. The principle of disenrichment, like that of unjust enrichment, is inconsistent with the law of restitution as it has developed in Australia. The Court concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, the disadvantages which would enure to Hills and Bosch if they were required to repay AFSL are such that it would be inequitable to require them to do so.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 March 2011 LEONILDA MARCOLONGO v YU PO CHEN & ANOR [2011] HCA 3 Today the High Court allowed an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Appeal and set aside a registered transfer of land from Lym International Pty Limited ("Lym") to Mr Chen by application of s 37A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). Section 37A(1) provides that, except for certain specified exceptions, every alienation of property made with the intent to defraud creditors shall be voidable at the instance of any person thereby prejudiced. Mrs Marcolongo owned and lived on a property adjacent to a property development project in which Lym was involved. Mrs Marcolongo sued Lym in the New South Wales District Court for damages for the removal of support during the building operations. During 2004 and 2005 the solicitors for Mrs Marcolongo and Lym corresponded concerning Mrs Marcolongo's desire to obtain a property preservation order over a second property development project, in which Lym was also involved, so as to protect Mrs Marcolongo's position in her District Court action against Lym. Later in 2005, the second property development project was valued with the result that the expected proceeds of sale would not exceed Lym's liabilities. In 2006, Lym transferred the property comprising the second project to Mr Chen to hinder Mrs Marcolongo's claim. On 26 November 2009, Mrs Marcolongo recovered a judgment against Lym for the damage caused to her property for $388,643.62 with costs. In a Supreme Court action against Lym and Mr Chen, Mrs Marcolongo relied upon s 37A to have the contract declared voidable at her instance and to require Mr Chen to transfer the property back to Lym. The result would be Lym retaining a substantial asset to meet any order for damages. The trial judge found in favour of Mrs Marcolongo. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's decision on the basis that Lym had not been dishonest, and the transfer was not "predominantly" motivated by the intent to defeat the claim of Mrs Marcolongo as a creditor. French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ considered that s 37A should receive a liberal construction in accordance with the provenance of the provision. Their Honours held that "defraud" includes the hindering or delaying of creditors in the exercise of their legal remedies. The plurality further held that s 37A requires a finding of intent to achieve the proscribed prejudice. French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ held that s 37A is not qualified by a notion of constructive fraud, does not require an element of dishonesty and does not require a predominant or sole intent to defraud. Heydon J held that whatever the precise test called for by s 37A, the intent underlying Lym's conduct was enough to satisfy it. The intent was as "actual" and "dishonest" as it is possible to have. The High Court held that s 37A applied despite the transferor having formed the proscribed intent by reason of the misconduct of another. The Court also held that Mr Chen was not within an exception to s 37A for purchasers in good faith not having, at the time of the alienation, notice of the intent to defraud creditors.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 October 2004 DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS FOR THE NORTHERN TERRITORY v WJI The High Court of Australia today upheld the directions to the jury of NT Supreme Court Justice Trevor Riley in relation to consent in WJI’s rape trial, and agreed with a decision of the NT Court of Criminal Appeal on the appropriateness of the directions. In May 2001 WJI was found not guilty of sexual intercourse with a female without her consent. Justice Riley had told the jury the charge had three elements: that WJI had sexual intercourse with TRR at Palmerston on or about 27 January 1988; that TRR did not give her consent; and that WJI intended to have sexual intercourse with TRR without her consent. Justice Riley directed that if WJI had mistakenly believed that TRR consented to sexual intercourse, he will not have intended to have sex with her without her consent. Therefore the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that WJI had no mistaken belief about consent. The DPP contended that the prosecution was only required to establish that WJI intended to have sex with TRR, but was not required to establish that he intended to have non-consensual sex. The DPP said that WJI may have been able to use the excuse that he had an honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief that TRR was consenting. The prosecution would then have needed to negate this excuse to establish the third element. The NT Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed an appeal from the DPP by a 4-1 majority. The DPP then appealed to the High Court. The Court held that the absence of consent was a part of the deed which attracted criminal responsibility. Criminal responsibility only arose if there was intent to have sexual intercourse without consent. An intention to have sexual intercourse was not sufficient to establish criminal responsibility. The Court held that Justice Riley’s directions were correct and dismissed the appeal by a 4-1 majority.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 February 2004 REX ANTHONY BASHFORD v INFORMATION AUSTRALIA (NEWSLETTERS) PTY LIMITED The High Court of Australia today dismissed an appeal by Mr Bashford, who claimed a trade journal defamed him when it said he, rather than his consultancy, was liable for a false report that caused another company harm and loss. In 1993, Mr Bashford’s company, RA Bashford Consulting Pty Ltd, and Risk Management Concepts Pty Ltd ran an item headed “Chemwatch wins copyright case” in a newsletter the two companies were involved in, called Infax. The Infax article erroneously asserted that Chemwatch had successfully challenged two companies for breaching copyright by using Chemwatch’s material safety data sheets (MSDS) on their database. The item implied that Chemwatch competitor Acohs Pty Ltd was one of the two companies, but Chemwatch had not in fact succeeded in its copyright action. In 1997, the Federal Court found Bashford Consulting and Risk Management Concepts had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct contravening the Trade Practices and ordered the two companies and Chemwatch’s proprietor Bernie Bialkower to pay $20,000 in damages to Acohs. The Occupational Health and Safety Bulletin, published by Information Australia, ran an article on the Federal Court case, and referred to RA Bashford, rather than to RA Bashford Consulting. Mr Bashford sued for defamation, and in the High Court he claimed both the New South Wales Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal had erred in finding that the Bulletin article attracted the defence of qualified privilege. He alleged the defence was not available because the report was inaccurate and because there was not the necessary reciprocal interest or duty between the Bulletin’s publishers and its subscribers. The High Court held, by a 5-2 majority, that there was the necessary reciprocity of duty or interest as the subscribers to the Bulletin were people responsible for health and safety in the workplace. The narrow focus of the Bulletin’s subject matter and its readership was different from general news media. The Court held that misidentification of Mr Bashford as the publisher of the Infax article did not alter or reduce the connection between the privileged occasion and the defamatory matter. Communication of the statement – that to assert successful prosecution for MSDS copyright infringement had been held to be false and misleading conduct – fulfilled the reciprocal duties or interests involved in communication of health and safety information. The Bulletin could not rely on the defence of a fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings, but the qualified privilege defence was available.