Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 30 October 2013 [2013] HCA 41 Today the High Court, by majority, held that Comcare, the appellant, was not liable to pay compensation to a Commonwealth government employee who, whilst staying overnight on a work-related trip to a regional town, suffered injuries whilst engaging in sexual intercourse in the motel room her employer had booked for her. The respondent had been required by her employer to work for two consecutive days in a regional town away from her ordinary place of residence. She stayed overnight at a local motel which had been booked by her employer. Whilst at the motel, the respondent engaged in sexual intercourse with an acquaintance. In that process, a glass light fitting above the bed was pulled from its mount and struck the respondent on her nose and mouth, causing her physical injuries and a subsequent psychological injury. The respondent sought compensation from Comcare under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ("the Act"). She argued that her injuries were suffered "in the course of" her employment and that she was, therefore, entitled to compensation. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") held that the respondent's injuries were unrelated to her employment. On appeal, the Federal Court of Australia set aside the Tribunal's decision. The Federal Court's decision was then upheld by the Full Court of the Federal Court. The Full Court held that the respondent's injuries occurred in an "interval or interlude" during an overall period of work and, therefore, arose in the course of her employment. An interval or interlude existed because the respondent's employer had induced or encouraged her to spend the night at a particular place – the motel. It was not necessary to show that the respondent's employer had induced or encouraged her to engage in the particular activity in which she was engaged when her injuries were suffered. By special leave, Comcare appealed to the High Court. The High Court allowed Comcare's appeal. A majority of the High Court held that in order for an injury sustained in an interval or interlude during an overall period of work to be in the course of an employee's employment, the circumstances in which the employee was injured must be connected to an inducement or encouragement by the employer. If the employee is injured whilst engaged in an activity at a certain place, that connection does not exist merely because of an inducement or encouragement to be at that place. When the circumstances of an injury involve the employee engaging in an activity at the time of the injury, the relevant question is: did the employer induce or encourage the employee to engage in that activity? On the facts of the respondent's case, the majority held that the answer to that question was 'no'.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 4 September 2019 BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL v AMOS [2019] HCA 27 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The High Court unanimously upheld the conclusion of the majority of the Court of Appeal that s 26(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) does not extend or exclude the operation of s 10(1) of that Act. This means that a defendant is entitled to plead the shorter limitation period under s 10(1) where those limitation periods overlap. The appellant, Brisbane City Council, sought to recover overdue and unpaid rates, with interest, which were levied upon the rateable land of the respondent, Mr Amos, by rates notices issued in the period from 30 April 1999 to 9 January 2012. Under the Local Government Act 1993 (Qld) and later the City of Brisbane Act 2010 (Qld), overdue and unpaid rates are a charge on the land. At issue was which of two potentially applicable limitation periods, a 12 year limitation period under s 26(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act or a six year limitation period under s 10(1)(d) of the Limitation of Actions Act, applied to the Council's claim. Relevantly to this appeal, s 26(1) applies a limitation period for debts created by statute and secured by charge, whilst s 10(1)(d) applies a limitation period to "an action to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment". Before the late nineteenth century, any overlap that would otherwise have occurred between these provisions was resolved by applying the limitation period in the predecessor provision to s 26(1) only to real or proprietary claims and confining the limitation period in the predecessor provision to s 10(1)(d) to personal claims. However, from the late nineteenth century, the limitation period for sums of money secured by charge was extended also to bar personal claims. In Barnes v Glenton [1899] 1 QB 885, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales held that while there may be overlapping limitation periods for a personal claim to recover a sum secured by a mortgage or other charge, any longer limitation period in the predecessor provision to s 26(1) would not extend the shorter limitation period applicable under the predecessor to s 10(1)(d). When Parliament re-enacts provisions with a well-understood meaning, it will generally be assumed that Parliament intended the words to have that meaning. Barnes v Glenton had been consistently followed by judicial authority and textbook writers when the Limitation of Actions Act was enacted in 1974 in light of this history. The more recent authorities, including ANZ Banking Group Limited v Douglas Morris Investments Pty Ltd [1992] 1 Qd R 478, do not gainsay the approach set out in Barnes v Glenton. On this basis, the High Court dismissed the appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 10 December, 2002 DOW JONES & COMPANY INC v JOSEPH GUTNICK The High Court of Australia has unanimously dismissed an appeal brought by Dow Jones in connection with a defamation action commenced against it in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The action was brought by Melbourne businessman Mr Joe Gutnick, who claims to have been defamed in an article made available on a subscription website on the Internet. The Court was asked to determine where that article was published. It has made no findings on the merits of the defamation action itself. Dow Jones publishes Barron’s Magazine, an American high-circulation weekly investment and finance magazine, available both in hard copy and on the Internet. Dow Jones’s website servers are located in New Jersey in the United States. An October 2000 edition of Barron’s Magazine carried an article making several references to Mr Gutnick. Mr Gutnick is a resident of Victoria and has his business headquarters there. He commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria claiming damages for being defamed in Victoria. Dow Jones applied to have the proceedings stayed. It raised an issue as to whether the allegedly defamatory material was published in Victoria. Dow Jones claimed it was published only in New Jersey. The Supreme Court held that publication of the web article occurred in Victoria, where the article was available for viewing. The Supreme Court refused Dow Jones’s application. The Victorian Court of Appeal refused Dow Jones leave to appeal. Dow Jones then obtained special leave to appeal to the High Court, which heard and dismissed the appeal. Mr Gutnick’s action can now proceed in the Supreme Court.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 April 2018 WET044 v THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU [2018] HCA 14 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from the Supreme Court of Nauru. The Court held that there was no merit to the appellant's contentions that the Refugee Status Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") had failed to consider relevant country information or that he had been denied procedural fairness. The appellant is an Iranian citizen of Faili Kurdish ethnicity. He arrived by boat at Christmas Island in 2013 and was subsequently transferred to Nauru. There he applied under the Refugees Convention Act 2012 (Nr) to be recognised as a refugee or, alternatively, as a person to whom Nauru owed complementary protection under its other international obligations. The application was refused by the Secretary of the Department of Justice and Border Control ("the Secretary"). The appellant appealed to the Tribunal. The appellant's legal representative placed before the Tribunal additional evidence, submissions, and material in support of those submissions, including country information. The Tribunal accepted that failed asylum seekers may be at risk if returned to Iran, but did not accept that mere membership of that group gave rise to a well-founded fear of persecution. The Tribunal adopted the reasons and affirmed the decision of the Secretary. The appellant appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Nauru. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The appellant appealed as of right to the High Court. The appellant alleged error by the Tribunal, arguing that it failed to deal with the country information submitted by the appellant regarding the risk of returning to Iran as a failed asylum seeker. The appellant subsequently sought leave to amend his notice of appeal to expand the first ground and insert a new ground contending that the Tribunal acted in a way that was procedurally unfair by failing to put to him the nature and content of country information it relied upon concerning the risk of harm to Kurds who are Shia Muslim. Neither ground was raised before the Supreme Court of Nauru. The High Court considered there to be no merit in either ground of appeal. The country information regarding failed asylum seekers was read by the Tribunal. Further, most of the additional information was before the Secretary in one form or another and did not contradict the opinions stated by the Secretary. In relation to the second ground, the Court found that the country information relied upon by the Tribunal was in fact known to the appellant. The Court therefore refused leave to amend the notice of appeal and dismissed the appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 29 March 2017 DAVID KENDIRJIAN v EUGENE LEPORE & ANOR [2017] HCA 13 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in relation to the second respondent to the appeal. The High Court held that advocates' immunity from suit does not extend to negligent advice not to compromise a proceeding which then proceeds to a judicial decision. In November 1999, the appellant was injured in a car accident. In 2004, he commenced legal proceedings in the District Court of New South Wales against the other driver involved in the accident, who admitted liability. On the first day of the trial on quantum, the other driver's legal representatives made a settlement offer to the appellant's solicitor (the first respondent) and barrister (the second respondent) of $600,000 plus costs. The settlement offer was not accepted so the trial proceeded. Ultimately, the appellant obtained judgment for $308,432.75 plus costs. An appeal to the Court of Appeal in relation to quantum was dismissed. In 2012, the appellant brought a claim in the District Court against the respondents. The appellant alleged that the respondents were negligent in advising him in relation to the settlement offer. Central to his claim were allegations that the respondents did not advise him of the amount of the settlement offer, "but merely of the fact that an offer had been made". The appellant also pleaded that the respondents rejected the settlement offer, "absent any express instructions" from him, because the offer was "too low". The respondents successfully brought an application in the District Court for summary judgment. The District Court held that the respondents' conduct was covered by advocates' immunity. This conclusion was upheld by the Court of Appeal. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. In November 2016, the Court made orders by consent allowing the appeal in relation to the first respondent. Today, the Court unanimously allowed the appeal in relation to the second respondent. The Court held that advocates' immunity did not extend to the advice given in relation to the settlement offer because the advice did not affect the judicial determination of the case. The Court declined to distinguish or reopen its most recent decision on advocates' immunity, Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd (2016) 90 ALJR 572; 331 ALR 1; [2016] HCA 16.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 30 August 2006 MOBIL OIL AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED v TRENDLEN PTY LIMITED A single petrol retailer could not commence representative proceedings to recover invalid licensing fees from Mobil on the basis that other retailers may join in the proceedings later, the High Court of Australia held today. The appeal raised many of the same issues as those raised in the Campbells Cash and Carry v Fostif group of cases heard at the same time. Five States and the ACT had schemes for the licensing of petroleum sellers. The relevant legislation was similar to tobacco licensing legislation struck down by the High Court’s 1997 decision in Ha v New South Wales which held that tobacco licensing fees amounted to constitutionally invalid excise duties. (Only the Commonwealth can impose excise.) Mobil is a petrol wholesaler and Trendlen a retailer. Mobil had paid licence fees to the State of New South Wales based on the value of petrol sold and passed those fees on to retailers including Trendlen. Trendlen contends it was entitled to recover fees paid to Mobil but which Mobil no longer had to pay to NSW following the Ha decision. Trendlen brought proceedings in the NSW Supreme Court against Mobil and these proceedings were commenced as representative proceedings. Two other representative proceedings were commenced at the same time by other petroleum retailers against petrol wholesalers. All three were commenced on their behalf by litigation funder Firmstones Pty Ltd which was to receive one-third of any amounts recovered from wholesalers plus any costs awarded to the retailers. Firmstones would bear any costs made against the retailers. The Trendlen summons claimed the refund of fees on behalf of itself and a class of unnamed persons who could potentially opt in to be represented by it. Trendlen also sought discovery of the names of other petroleum retailers supplied by Mobil. Justice Robert McDougall, in light of what the NSW Court of Appeal had already decided in the Fostif group of cases, dismissed Mobil’s application for orders terminating proceedings or requiring that the proceedings not continue as representative proceedings. He ordered Mobil to provide Trendlen with a list of petrol retailers across five States and the ACT. Mobil appealed directly to the High Court, which allowed the appeal by a 5-2 majority.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 November 2019 FENNELL v THE QUEEN [2019] HCA 37 Today the High Court published its reasons for unanimously allowing an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. On 11 September 2019, the High Court quashed the appellant's ("Mr Fennell") conviction for murder and ordered that a verdict of acquittal be entered. In March 2016, Mr Fennell was convicted by a jury of the murder of Liselotte Watson in her home on Macleay Island and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Crown case at trial was entirely circumstantial: it relied on opportunity in the form of Mr Fennell's access to Mrs Watson's home where she was known to keep large amounts of cash; motive in the form of Mr Fennell's interest in concealing alleged thefts by him from Mrs Watson and his gambling habits; and a miscellany of other allegedly inculpatory matters, including evidence from a couple, Mr and Mrs Matheson, that a number of years before the murder, they lent Mr Fennell a hammer which they identified as the hammer alleged to be the murder weapon. The hammer alleged to be the murder weapon was found in mangroves off Macleay Island, a short distance from banking documents and a shaving bag belonging to Mrs Watson. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Fennell's appeal and held that the jury could have regarded Mr Matheson's evidence as convincing proof linking Mr Fennell to the alleged murder weapon. The Court of Appeal also found that there was sufficient evidence to support the Crown case on motive and opportunity. In the High Court, Mr Fennell appealed his conviction on the sole ground that the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence. The High Court unanimously held that the Crown case on opportunity and motive was extremely weak and it did not put Mr Fennell in a relevantly different position from numerous other residents of Macleay Island who had the common knowledge that Mrs Watson kept large amounts of cash in her house. Police had searched Mr Fennell's home and examined his person and found nothing linking him to the murder. Neither his DNA nor fingerprints were found at the crime scene and he was excluded as a contributor of DNA taken from the shaving bag. In light of CCTV footage, his opportunity was, at best, a very small window of time, which required an assumption about the time of the murder that was contradicted by other evidence. Accounting evidence showed that his gambling habits had not changed, that he was not in debt, and that he was ahead on his mortgage repayments. The Crown conceded that if the Crown case on opportunity and motive was weak, Mr and Mrs Matheson's identification of the hammer found in the mangroves became essential evidence for a reasonable jury to convict Mr Fennell. The Court held that the evidence of Mr and Mrs Matheson identifying the hammer was glaringly improbable. Their evidence should have been given so little weight that, at best, it was barely admissible. The Court unanimously held that on the evidence it was not open for the jury to be satisfied of Mr Fennell's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 November 2013 OWEN JOHN KARPANY & ANOR v PETER JOHN DIETMAN [2013] HCA 47 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, which had overturned a decision of the Magistrates Court of South Australia finding the applicants not guilty of possessing undersize abalone. The applicants are Aboriginal and members of the Narrunga People. They had taken undersize Greenlip abalone in accordance with their traditional laws and customs. They were charged with possessing undersize abalone contrary to s 72(2)(c) of the Fisheries Management Act 2007 (SA). In the Magistrates Court, the respondent conceded that the applicants' native title right to take fish from the relevant waters subsisted. The applicants argued that, by reason of s 211 of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), the prohibition in s 72(2)(c) of the Fisheries Management Act did not apply to their activities in taking abalone. Section 211 of the Native Title Act provides that, if a law prohibits a person from carrying on certain activities other than in accordance with a "licence, permit or other instrument" granted under that law, that law does not prohibit a native title holder from carrying on those activities for the purpose of satisfying their personal, domestic or non-commercial communal needs. Section 115 of the Fisheries Management Act allowed the Minister to exempt a person from provisions of that Act. The Magistrate found that that an exemption under s 115 amounted to a "licence, permit or other instrument" and therefore that s 72(2)(c) did not prohibit the applicants' conduct. On appeal to the Full Court, the respondent argued that the applicants' native title right had been extinguished by the Fisheries Act 1971 (SA) and that the magistrate had erred by characterising an exemption under s 115 of the Fisheries Management Act as a "licence, permit or other instrument". The Full Court, by majority, held that the applicants' native title right had been extinguished and, unanimously, held that in any event s 211 of the Native Title Act did not apply. It remitted the matter for re-sentencing. The applicants applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court and the application was referred to an enlarged bench. The High Court unanimously held that the applicants' native title right had not been extinguished because, for the reasons given in Akiba v The Commonwealth (2013) 87 ALJR 916; 300 ALR 1; [2013] HCA 33, the Fisheries Act regulated but was not inconsistent with the continued enjoyment of native title rights. It further held that an exemption under s 115 of the Fisheries Management Act was a "licence, permit or other instrument". The consequence, provided by s 211 of the Native Title Act, was that s 72(2)(c) of the Fisheries Management Act did not prohibit the applicants, as native title holders, from gathering or fishing for undersize abalone in the waters concerned, where they did so for the purpose of satisfying their personal, domestic or non-commercial communal needs and in exercise or enjoyment of their native title rights and interests.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 27 September 2005 PAUL JOSEPH FAVELL AND DIANA GRACE FAVELL v QUEENSLAND NEWSPAPERS A story in Brisbane’s Sunday Mail newspaper was capable of bearing the defamatory meanings complained of by Mr and Mrs Favell, the High Court of Australia held today. The story, written by Ms Lawrence and published on 19 January 2003, reported that a fire had destroyed a riverside Brisbane home on a site where the Favells hoped to build a five-storey block of units. The Favell family was holidaying overseas and house-sitting relatives were absent at the time of the fire. The story quoted neighbours opposed to the development while Mrs Favell was quoted as saying that neighbours had been given the plans and “were fine about it”. A detective from the arson squad was quoted as saying all fires were treated as suspicious until proven otherwise. The link between the house burning down and what the story said was the controversial plan to redevelop the New Farm site was at the centre of the Favells’ defamation action. The headline was “Development site destroyed – Fire guts riverside mansion”. In the Queensland Supreme Court Justice John Helman struck out a large number of imputations that could not easily be differentiated from each other. He also rejected the claim that the story was capable of conveying the imputations that the Favells committed the crime of arson, that they were reasonably suspected by the police of committing arson, and that Mrs Favell lied about neighbourhood reaction to the proposed development. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the Favells, although it held that the story was capable of conveying an imputation similar to the second imputation. They appealed to the High Court. The Court held that Justice Helman was incorrect to hold that the article reported the fire and the circumstances surrounding it without comment and went no further that recording that the fire was under investigation. It unanimously allowed the appeal and held that the story was capable of conveying all three meanings complained of. It is now for a jury to determine whether the story did in fact convey those meanings. The Court held that factors which a jury could find pointed to the Favells being responsible for the fire included: the headline; opposition to the plan to build the block of units; the prospect of getting approval for the plan improving if the site were vacant; the unexplained absence of the house-sitters; the fire starting at 4am; security gates preventing access to strangers; Mrs Favell creating the impression that the development was not controversial; and the Favells’ absence overseas. The Court ordered that Queensland Newspapers’ application be remitted to the Supreme Court for further consideration of other unresolved issues about the pleading.