Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 21 April 2004 MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS v RESPONDENTS Attacks and abuse by some Ukrainians on people engaging in Jehovah’s Witness activities were not shown to involve persecution, the High Court of Australia held today, in rejecting a claim for refugee status. The respondents, who cannot be named by courts under section 91X of the Migration Act, are a Ukrainian de facto couple. The husband became involved with the Jehovah’s Witnesses in May 1998 and began distributing publications and engaging in other forms of proselytising. As well as meeting hostility, he was set upon and beaten twice by groups of males, his front door was set alight, and was sacked from his job. The wife is not a Jehovah’s Witness. The couple left for Australia in December 1998 and applied for protection visas. Their applications were rejected by the Immigration Department, the Refugee Review Tribunal and the Federal Court of Australia but the respondents appealed successfully to the Full Court of the Federal Court. The Full Court unanimously held that the RRT failed to consider the right question, that is, whether in a practical sense the State was able to protect the man from harm. The Minister appealed to the High Court. The husband claimed the Ukrainian government encouraged persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses and that police condoned such violence. Their claims were rejected by the RRT. The question then was whether there was a failure by the Ukrainian State in its protection obligations. The RRT noted that country information by the United States State Department, the British Home Office and Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs has never carried the suggestion that the Ukrainian government was not in control or that the police and judiciary were not reasonably fair and effective. That information also indicated the government allowed religious freedom, including for more than 100,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses. The church itself did not claim to be persecuted in the Ukraine. The RRT regarded the assaults as random and uncoordinated incidents. It found the police responded appropriately when the man called them after one attack but he was unable to identify his attackers. The RRT had no evidence that the man sought the protection of Ukrainian authorities, either in the Ukraine or after he arrived in Australia. The High Court held that the RRT was not in error and overturned the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court. It unanimously allowed the Minister’s appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 2 August 2007 ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRLIA v CAMERON OWEN CHAFFEY AND SANTOS LIMITED SANTOS LIMITED v CAMERON OWEN CHAFFEY AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRLIA Northern Territory legislation providing that employers’ superannuation contributions were not to be treated as part of earnings for compensation paid to an injured worker was constitutionally valid and did not amount to an acquisition of property, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Chaffey was injured in September 2003 while working for Santos as a maintenance operator at Mereenie Gasfield, 200km west of Alice Springs. Santos accepted liability to pay compensation pursuant to section 53 of the Work Health Act. During Mr Chaffey’s employment, Santos made superannuation contributions on his behalf of 10 per cent of salary, but did not continue to make these as part of his compensation payments. In 2004 the Full Court of the NT Supreme Court held in Hastings Deering (Australia) v Smith (No. 2) that “remuneration” included employers’ superannuation contributions. The Act was then amended to exclude these contributions from the definition of “normal weekly earnings”, backdated to 1 January 1987. Justice Dean Mildren referred two questions to the Full Court of the Supreme Court for determination. These were whether before and whether after the commencement of the amendment, 26 January 2005, it constituted an acquisition of Mr Chaffey’s property inconsistent with section 50 of the Commonwealth Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act. Section 50 provides that the legislative power of the NT Assembly does not extend to the making of laws for the acquisition of property other than on just terms. By majority, the Full Court answered Yes to both questions. The NT Attorney-General intervened in the Full Court proceeding and instituted its own appeal to the High Court. Santos also appealed. The High Court unanimously allowed both appeals. It held that section 53 of the Work Health Act, which imposes obligations upon employers to make payments to injured workers, is subject to the rest of the compensation scheme set out in the Act’s Part V, as amended from time to time. The method prescribed for quantifying the amount of compensation payable by an employer had not been fixed in permanent form at the date of Mr Chaffey’s injury and was always subject to change. Therefore, there was no acquisition of property and section 50 of the NT (Self- Government) Act had no application to the change made to the Work Health Act. The Court held that both questions should be answered No.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 29 September 2005 JILL McNAMARA (McGRATH) v CONSUMER TRADER AND TENANCY TRIBUNAL AND ROADS AND TRAFFIC AUTHORITY The Roads and Traffic Authority is not entitled to the statutory rights and immunities of the Crown in all its functions, and could not escape the operation of New South Wales legislation covering landlords and tenants, the High Court of Australia held today. The RTA attempted to evict Mrs McNamara from the house she has rented in the Sydney suburb of Croydon Park since 1981, first from the Commissioner of Main Roads and then from the RTA. In October 2000, the RTA sought to obtain vacant possession of the house and served on Mrs McNamara a 60-day termination notice. When she failed to comply, the RTA applied to the Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal for an order terminating the agreement and an order for possession of the premises. Mrs McNamara alleged the tribunal lacked jurisdiction as the Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act applied and the later Residential Tenancies Act did not. The Residential Tenancies Act was one of the Acts under which the tribunal had jurisdiction but the Act did not apply to properties that were “prescribed premises” under the Landlord and Tenant Act. In April 2002, the tribunal determined that it did have jurisdiction as the RTA had the benefit of an exemption in section 5 of the Landlord and Tenant Act which provided that this Act shall not bind the Crown or the Housing Commission. This meant Mrs McNamara could not resist the RTA’s application for vacant possession by relying on the house being “prescribed premises”. She filed a summons in the NSW Supreme Court which was dismissed by Justice John Dunford who referred to section 46(2)(b) in the Transport Administration Act which provided that the RTA is a statutory body representing the Crown. The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal. Mrs McNamara then appealed to the High Court. The High Court, by a 5-1 majority, allowed the appeal and held that the RTA was bound by the Landlord and Tenant Act. The Court ordered that the matter be remitted to the tribunal to be determined according to law.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 December 2010 ANTHONY JOSEPH LUIS HILI v THE QUEEN; GLYN MORGAN JONES v THE QUEEN [2010] HCA 45 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed appeals by two individuals against the sentences imposed on them by the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales in respect of tax evasion offences prosecuted as part of Project Wickenby. It held that there is no judicially determined norm or starting point for the period of imprisonment that a federal offender should actually serve in prison before release on a recognizance release order. Anthony Hili and Glyn Jones were convicted of federal offences under the Criminal Code (Cth) and the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ("the Crimes Act") in respect of tax evasion covering over $750,000 of income tax. In the New South Wales District Court, Morgan DCJ sentenced each offender to 18 months' total imprisonment, with a recognizance release order to take effect after seven months. On appeal by the prosecution, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the sentences imposed were manifestly inadequate, and sentenced each accused to a total of three years' imprisonment with a recognizance release order to take effect after 18 months. The Court of Criminal Appeal noted the submission put by the prosecution that there was an appropriate ratio between a non-parole period and the head sentence, and that the non-parole period should be between 60 and 66% of the total sentence. It was argued before the High Court that there ought to be no "norm or starting point, expressed as a percentage" for the period of imprisonment that a federal offender should actually serve prior to release on a recognizance release order, and that the Court of Criminal Appeal had given insufficient reasons for its conclusion that the sentences imposed by Morgan DCJ were manifestly inadequate. The High Court held that there neither is, nor should be, a judicially determined norm or starting point for the period of imprisonment that a federal offender should actually serve in prison before release on a recognizance release order. The Court held that the applicable provisions of Part IB of the Crimes Act, which govern the sentencing of federal offenders, made no provision fixing any relationship between the head sentence and a recognizance release order, and that the sentencing court had power to fix a recognizance release order to take effect at any time during the period of the head sentence. The Court considered that the Court of Criminal Appeal was incorrect in saying that the "norm" for a period of mandatory imprisonment under the Crimes Act is between 60 and 66%, but that the Court of Criminal Appeal was correct in concluding that the sentences imposed by Morgan DCJ were manifestly inadequate.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 September 2005 JEFFREY THOMAS JARRATT v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE FOR NEW SOUTH WALES AND STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES Under the rules of natural justice, Mr Jarratt was entitled to be given an opportunity to answer criticisms of his performance before he was removed from his role as Deputy Commissioner of the NSW Police Service, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Jarratt, who joined the NSW Police Service in 1967, was appointed one of two Deputy Commissioners in February 1997 for three years. In 2000, his appointment was renewed for five years. In September 2001, Mr Jarratt was removed from office by the Governor on the recommendation of Police Commissioner Peter Ryan made with the approval of Police Minister Paul Whelan. In a media release Mr Ryan said the removal was on grounds related to performance. Mr Jarratt complained that he was given no opportunity to be heard on the substance of any criticisms of his performance before the recommendation that he be removed was made. The Commissioner and the State Government argued that he was not entitled to such an opportunity. Section 51 of the Police Service Act provided that a Deputy Commissioner may be removed from office at any time by the Governor on the recommendation of the Commissioner submitted with the approval of the Minister. Mr Jarratt instituted proceedings against the Commissioner and the State in the NSW Supreme Court, claiming that he had not been validly removed under section 51. The Commissioner and the State argued that the common law rule that servants of the Crown hold office only at the pleasure of the Crown, and may be dismissed at any time without notice or justification, was not displaced by the Act. In July 2002, Justice Carolyn Simpson held that there had been a denial of natural justice to Mr Jarratt, that his removal was invalid, that his discharge constituted a repudiation of his contract and that, after allowing for compensation already paid to him, he was entitled to damages of $642,936.35, the salary he would have received during the remainder of his five-year term. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, holding that Mr Jarratt had not been entitled to a hearing by the Commissioner before recommending removal and that the common law principle relied on by the Commissioner and the State applied. In the High Court his application for special leave to appeal was referred to a Full Court and argued as on an appeal. The Court unanimously granted Mr Jarratt’s application for special leave and allowed the appeal. It held that under the Act there was an obligation to give Mr Jarratt procedural fairness and the"dismissal at pleasure" principle did not apply. The Court held that unless excluded by plain words, an exercise of power by a public official, such as the Commissioner to prejudice the rights of Mr Jarratt, was to accord with the rules of natural justice.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 3 November 2021 CATHERINE VICTORIA ADDY v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION [2021] HCA 34 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The principal question for determination was whether Pt III of Sch 7 to the Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) ("the Rates Act") contravened Art 25(1) of the Convention between Australia and the United Kingdom for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains ("the United Kingdom convention") by imposing a more burdensome taxation requirement on a national of the United Kingdom than that imposed on an Australian national in the same circumstances. Article 25(1) of the United Kingdom convention relevantly provides that nationals of the United Kingdom shall not be subjected in Australia to "other or more burdensome" taxation than is imposed on Australian nationals "in the same circumstances, in particular with respect to residence". From 1 January 2017, Pt III of Sch 7 to the Rates Act applied a new tax rate to people holding a Working Holiday (Temporary) (Class TZ) (Subclass 417) visa (a "working holiday visa"). The new tax rate was a flat rate of tax of 15 per cent to the first $37,000 of an individual's "working holiday taxable income", a maximum tax liability of $5,550. Under Pt I of Sch 7 to the Rates Act, the tax burden for an Australian national deriving taxable income from the same source during the same period was less: an Australian national was entitled to a tax-free threshold for the first $18,200 and was then taxed at 19 per cent up to $37,000, a maximum tax liability of $3,572. The appellant, Ms Addy, is a national of the United Kingdom who, between August 2015 and May 2017, lived and worked in Australia while holding a working holiday visa. On appeal to the High Court, there was no dispute that Ms Addy was an Australian resident for tax purposes during the 2017 income year. The respondent, the Commissioner of Taxation, issued Ms Addy with an amended notice of assessment for that income year which applied Pt III of Sch 7 to Ms Addy's assessable income after 1 January 2017. The High Court unanimously held that Art 25(1) of the United Kingdom convention requires a comparison between a national of the United Kingdom and an Australian national who is, otherwise than with respect to nationality, "in the same circumstances, in particular with respect to residence". The "same circumstances" that must be considered under Art 25(1) cannot include being or not being the holder of a working holiday visa, because that status depends on nationality. Ms Addy was an Australian resident for tax purposes and was taxed at rates applied under Pt III of Sch 7 to the Rates Act. An Australian national deriving taxable income from the same source during the same period would have been taxed at a lower rate under Pt I of Sch 7. The more burdensome taxation was imposed on Ms Addy owing to her nationality and, for that reason, contravened Art 25(1) of the United Kingdom convention.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 April 2014 ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE NORTHERN TERRITORY & ANOR v EMMERSON & ANOR [2014] HCA 13 Today the High Court, by majority, held that a statutory scheme for the forfeiture of property, effected by the combined operation of s 36A of the Misuse of Drugs Act (NT) and s 94 of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act (NT), was within the legislative power of the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly and was valid. Section 36A of the Misuse of Drugs Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory can declare that a person who, within a 10 year period, has been convicted three or more times of certain offences is a "drug trafficker". Section 94(1) of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act provides for the forfeiture to the Northern Territory of property owned, effectively controlled or given away by that person without the need for a further court order. The Director of Public Prosecutions applied successfully to the Supreme Court for a declaration that Mr Emmerson was a drug trafficker. The Court of Appeal of the Northern Territory, by majority, allowed Mr Emmerson's appeal and set aside the primary judge's declaration. The majority concluded that the statutory scheme was invalid because it required the Supreme Court to act in a manner incompatible with the proper discharge of the Court's function as a repository of federal jurisdiction and with its institutional integrity. All members of the Court of Appeal rejected Mr Emmerson's submission that the statutory scheme effected an acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms, within the meaning of s 50(1) of the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth), and rejected his purported construction of s 52(3) of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act. By special leave, the Attorney-General for the Northern Territory appealed to the High Court. The High Court, by majority, allowed the appeal and held that s 36A of the Misuse of Drugs Act and s 94(1) of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act were compatible with the limits imposed on State and Territory legislative power by Ch III of the Constitution. The impugned provisions did not operate to deny the Supreme Court such independence and impartiality as is compatible with its constitutional role as a repository of federal jurisdiction. The Court held that ss 36A and 94(1) did not effect an acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms. Further, the Court held that s 52(3) of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act did not contain any temporal limitation on restraining orders imposed under that Act.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 April 2015 COMMUNICATIONS, ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC, ENERGY, INFORMATION, POSTAL, PLUMBING AND ALLIED SERVICES UNION OF AUSTRALIA & ORS v QUEENSLAND RAIL & ANOR [2015] HCA 11 Today the High Court unanimously held that Queensland Rail is a trading corporation within the meaning of s 51(xx) of the Constitution, with the consequence that the relations between Queensland Rail and its employees are governed by federal industrial relations law and not Queensland industrial relations law. Queensland Rail operates as a labour hire company and provides labour used by a related entity, Queensland Rail Limited, in the operation of rail services in Queensland. Queensland Rail was established by the Queensland Rail Transit Authority Act 2013 (Q) and, by that Act, Queensland Rail "is not a body corporate" but it has all the powers of an individual to create and be made subject to legal rights and duties, and it may sue and be sued in its own name. The Act also provided for the relations between Queensland Rail and its employees to be governed by Queensland industrial relations law. The plaintiffs, each an association or organisation of employees, brought a proceeding in the original jurisdiction of the High Court alleging that Queensland Rail and its employees are subject to federal industrial relations law. They alleged that Queensland Rail is a "trading corporation" within the meaning of s 51(xx) of the Constitution and therefore, by the terms of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), an employer subject to the operation of that Act. The plaintiffs also alleged that provisions in the Queensland Rail Transit Authority Act 2013 (Q) and in the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Q) which sought to apply Queensland industrial relations law to Queensland Rail and its employees were inconsistent with the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), and to that extent were invalid by operation of s 109 of the Constitution. The High Court unanimously found that Queensland Rail is a trading corporation within the meaning of s 51(xx) of the Constitution and subject to the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). It followed that the provisions in the Queensland Acts which sought to apply Queensland industrial relations law to Queensland Rail and its employees were invalid.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 October 2014 KENTWELL v THE QUEEN O'GRADY v THE QUEEN [2014] HCA 37 [2014] HCA 38 Today the High Court unanimously allowed two appeals against decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales refusing the appellants' applications to extend time within which to apply for leave to appeal against sentence. In 2009, Mr Kentwell was convicted in the District Court of New South Wales of two offences which were subject to standard non-parole periods at the time at which they were committed. In 2010, Mr O'Grady was separately convicted in the District Court of one offence subject to a standard non-parole period. In each case, the sentencing judge sentenced the appellant conformably with the approach to sentencing for standard non-parole period offences laid down by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Way (2004) 60 NSWLR 168. Neither Mr Kentwell nor Mr O'Grady applied for leave to appeal against their respective sentences within the relevant time period required by the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) and the Criminal Appeal Rules (NSW). In 2011, in Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120, the High Court held that Way was incorrectly decided. In turn, each appellant separately applied to the Court of Criminal Appeal for an extension of time within which to apply for leave to appeal against sentence, asserting, amongst other things, error of the kind identified in Muldrock. The Court of Criminal Appeal separately dismissed each application. In each case, the Court approached the exercise of the discretion conferred by the Act and the Rules to extend time by applying a test formulated in Abdul v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 247 for applications based on "Muldrock error". That test requires the court to ask whether refusal of the application would occasion substantial injustice. In each case, the Court found that the sentencing of the appellant was affected by material error, but nonetheless dismissed the application because the appellant had failed to demonstrate that substantial injustice was occasioned by the sentence. By grant of special leave, Mr Kentwell and Mr O'Grady appealed to the High Court. The Court held that Abdul was wrongly decided. The wide discretion conferred on the Court of Criminal Appeal under the Act and the Rules is to be exercised by consideration of what the interests of justice require in the particular case. It was an error to introduce in applications for an extension of time based on asserted "Muldrock error" consideration of whether refusal of the application would occasion substantial injustice. In applying the Abdul test in the appellants' cases, the Court of Criminal Appeal wrongly confined its discretion. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the appeals, set aside the orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal and remitted the applications for extension of time to that Court for determination.