Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Manager, Public Information 26 August 2009 BRIAN GEORGE LANE v COLONEL PETER JOHN MORRISON [2009] HCA 29 The High Court today determined that Colonel Peter Morrison, a Military Judge, may not proceed with trying charges against Mr Brian Lane, a former member of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), because the legislation creating the Australian Military Court, in which the charges were to be heard, is constitutionally invalid. Mr Lane was a member of the RAN before transferring to the Naval Reserve on 14 March 2007. On 8 August 2007 he was charged with offences alleged to have occurred in August 2005 when he was still a member of the RAN. He was discharged from the Naval Reserve with effect from 3 September 2007. On 26 November 2007 the Chief Military Judge of the Australian Military Court (AMC) nominated Colonel Morrison to try the charges against Mr Lane. When the matter first came before the AMC on 25 March 2008, Mr Lane objected to the jurisdiction of the AMC. In May 2008 he filed an application in the High Court seeking an order prohibiting Colonel Morrison from hearing the charges, and a declaration that the provisions of the legislation which created the AMC are invalid. The AMC was created by the insertion of new provisions into the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth), to replace the system of courts-martial which had previously existed. The new provisions state that the AMC is a court of record, and that it consists of a Chief Military Judge and such other Military Judges as hold office from time to time in accordance with the Act. A Note to section 114 of the Act specifically states the AMC is not a court for the purpose of Chapter III of the Constitution. Having regard to the attributes of the AMC and the way in which it operates, the Court concluded that the legislation requires the AMC to exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth, without being set up as a court established under Chapter III of the Constitution (in which the power to create the federal judiciary is contained). For that reason the legislation creating the AMC was invalid. The High Court ordered that a writ of prohibition should issue, prohibiting Colonel Morrison from proceeding with the charges against Mr Lane, and made a declaration that Division 3 of Part VII of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth), which created the AMC, was invalid.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Manager, Public Information 21 May 2009 THE QUEEN v PETER EDWARDS & ANOR The High Court today decided that a judge of the Supreme Court of Tasmania applied a wrong principle and took account of irrelevant issues when he granted a permanent stay of the trial of two pilots charged with reckless operation of an aircraft. The pilots’ trial will now proceed in the Supreme Court of Tasmania. Captain Peter Edwards and First Officer Stephen Sarunic were the pilots in charge of a Qantas aircraft which arrived at Launceston Airport on 23 October 2001 to collect 70 passengers who had been stranded. The aircraft arrived at about 10.30pm and took off just after 11pm. The control tower was not staffed between 10pm and 6am, and the pilots themselves were responsible for turning on the runway lighting when arriving at and departing from the airport. While there was no issue concerning the runway lights when the plane landed, witnesses provided inconsistent statements about whether the runway lights were on or off when the aircraft taxied along the runway and took off. Electronic records, which could have assisted in determining whether the runway lights had been activated or whether the pilots had attempted to activate the runway lights, were overwritten before attempts were made to retrieve them. CASA investigated the incident and in April 2002 referred the matter to the Commonwealth DPP. Complaints against the pilots were not sworn until March 2004. The pilots were committed for trial, but the trial had still not commenced by November 2006. In November 2007 their application for a permanent stay of the trial was heard by a judge of the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The High Court held that the primary judge had applied a test of whether, on the material before him, a continuation of the trial could constitute an unacceptable injustice or unfairness. The primary judge concluded that the factors of overall delay and lost evidence made it appropriate to grant the stay. The High Court granted the Commonwealth DPP special leave to appeal that decision. In a unanimous decision the High Court confirmed that in exercising the discretion to grant a permanent stay of proceedings, a court should consider whether, in all the circumstances, the continuation of the proceedings would involve unacceptable injustice or unfairness, or whether continuation would be so unfairly and unjustifiably oppressive as to constitute an abuse of process. The Court noted that it is not uncommon for trials to proceed despite the unavailability of relevant evidence and held that the loss of evidence did not prejudice the pilots. It concluded that no feature of the delay or loss of evidence justified the extreme step of permanently staying the proceedings. The Court set aside the order of the Supreme Court of Tasmania and dismissed the pilots’ application for a permanent stay.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 March 2015 GRANT SAMUEL CORPORATE FINANCE PTY LIMITED v FLETCHER & ORS JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION & ANOR v FLETCHER & ORS [2015] HCA 8 Today the High Court unanimously held that the rules of courts of the States and Territories cannot apply so as to vary the time dictated by s 588FF(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for the bringing of proceedings for orders with respect to voidable transactions. The first respondents in these appeals are the liquidators of the second and third respondents. Section 588FF(1) of the Corporations Act provides that a court, on the application of a company's liquidator, may make certain orders where the court is satisfied that a transaction of the company is voidable because of s 588FE. Section 588FF(3) provides that an application under s 588FF(1) "may only be made" during a period of limitation set out in par (a) ("the par (a) period") or "within such longer period as the Court orders" on an application made by the liquidator during the par (a) period. The effect of s 588FF(3) was to require an application under s 588FF(1) to be made by the liquidators of the second respondents by 4 June 2011, unless the court ordered that an application could be made within a longer period under s 588FF(3)(b). On 10 May 2011, the liquidators applied for an order extending the period within which they might bring proceedings under s 588FF(1). On 30 May 2011, the Supreme Court of New South Wales extended that period to 3 October 2011 ("the extension order"). A further application was made to the Supreme Court within the period of that extension, but after the par (a) period had expired. On 19 September 2011, the Supreme Court made an order on that application, under r 36.16(2)(b) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) ("the UCPR"), varying the extension order by changing the date by which the liquidators could make an application under s 588FF(1) to 3 April 2012 ("the variation order"). Under s 79(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), the UCPR is binding on all courts exercising federal jurisdiction in New South Wales, "except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth". The appellants' applications to set aside the variation order were dismissed by the Supreme Court and appeals from that decision were dismissed by a majority of the Court of Appeal. By grant of special leave, the appellants appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeals. The Court held that the bringing of an application within the time required by s 588FF(3) is a precondition to the court's jurisdiction under s 588FF(1), and that the only power given to a court to vary the par (a) period is that given by s 588FF(3)(b). The Court concluded that, once the par (a) period had elapsed, the UCPR could not be utilised to further extend the time within which proceedings under s 588FF(1) could be brought, because s 588FF(3) "otherwise provided".
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 September 2017 SZTAL v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION & ANOR; SZTGM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION & ANOR [2017] HCA 34 Today the High Court, by majority, dismissed two appeals from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The High Court held that "cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment" or "degrading treatment or punishment" within the complementary protection regime in s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) require the existence of an actual subjective intention by a person to inflict pain or suffering or to cause extreme humiliation. SZTAL and SZTGM ("the appellants") came to Australia from Sri Lanka and applied for protection visas under the complementary protection regime. The appellants' applications for protection visas were refused by delegates of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The appellants each applied for review of these decisions by the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). The issue for the Tribunal was whether the appellants were eligible for protection visas under the complementary protection regime in the Migration Act. The complementary protection regime allows a protection visa to be granted to a non-citizen if there is a real risk that the non-citizen would suffer "significant harm" as a consequence of being removed from Australia. The definition of "significant harm" includes "cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment", relevantly defined as an act or omission by which pain or suffering is "intentionally inflicted", and "degrading treatment or punishment", relevantly defined as an act or omission which is "intended to cause" extreme humiliation. The Tribunal found that the appellants would likely be held in remand for a short period if they were returned to Sri Lanka and accepted that prison conditions in Sri Lanka were such that the appellants may be subjected to pain or suffering, or humiliation. However, the Tribunal concluded that there was no intention to inflict pain or suffering, or to cause extreme humiliation. Country information indicated that the conditions in prisons in Sri Lanka were the result of a lack of resources, which the Sri Lankan government acknowledged and was taking steps to improve. On applications for judicial review, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia considered that the Tribunal did not err in concluding that "intentionally inflicted" and "intended to cause" connote the existence of an actual subjective intention on the part of a person to bring about pain or suffering, or extreme humiliation. A majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court agreed. By grant of special leave, the appellants appealed to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal. A majority of the Court held that the expressions "intentionally inflicted" and "intended to cause" require actual subjective intention to bring about pain or suffering or humiliation. The majority rejected the appellants' contention that the element of intention was satisfied where a person did an act knowing that the act would, in the ordinary course of events, inflict pain or suffering or cause extreme humiliation.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 7 August 2013 FORTESCUE METALS GROUP LIMITED AND ORS v THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA [2013] HCA 34 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed proceedings brought by Fortescue Metals Group Limited (and certain of its wholly-owned subsidiaries) ("Fortescue") claiming that some provisions of the Minerals Resource Rent Tax Act 2012 (Cth) ("MRRT Act") and the Minerals Resource Rent Tax (Imposition–Customs) Act 2012 (Cth), Minerals Resource Rent Tax (Imposition–Excise) Act 2012 (Cth) and Minerals Resource Rent Tax (Imposition–General) Act 2012 (Cth) ("the Imposition Acts") were not valid laws of the Commonwealth. The MRRT Act and the Imposition Acts created and imposed a minerals resource rent tax ("MRRT"), which commenced on 1 July 2012. Under the MRRT Act, liability to pay MRRT arises only when a miner derives an annual profit of $75 million or more after taking into account certain deductions for expenditure and allowances. Once MRRT is payable, it is calculated so that a reduction in the mining royalty payable to a State government would, all other things being equal, result in an equivalent increase in a taxpayer's liability and vice versa. The State legislative regimes for mining royalties are different and may be varied from time to time. Fortescue's wholly-owned subsidiaries held registered mining leases in Western Australia and were required to pay MRRT. Fortescue brought proceedings in the High Court in its original jurisdiction, contending that certain provisions of the MRRT Act and Imposition Acts were invalid on four bases: first, as laws with respect to taxation which discriminate between States contrary to s 51(ii) of the Constitution; second, as laws or regulations of trade, commerce or revenue, which, contrary to s 99 of the Constitution, give preference to one State over another State; third, as laws which contravene the Melbourne Corporation doctrine, on the basis that the legislative powers of the Commonwealth do not authorise legislation directed to the control or hindrance of the States in the execution of their governmental functions; and fourth, as laws that are inconsistent with s 91 of the Constitution, which preserves a State's power to grant an aid or bounty on the mining for other metals. The Attorneys-General for Western Australia and Queensland intervened in support of Fortescue's challenge to the validity of the MRRT Act and the Imposition Acts. Pursuant to s 18 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), questions were reserved for determination by the Full Court of the High Court on the basis of the parties' pleadings and documents referred to in the pleadings. The Full Court unanimously dismissed the challenge to the validity of the Acts. The Court held that the treatment of State mining royalties by the MRRT Act and the Imposition Acts did not discriminate between States and that the Acts did not give preference to one State over another. The Court also rejected the submissions that the Acts breached the Melbourne Corporation doctrine or contravened s 91 of the Constitution.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer May 7, 2003 ROBERT JAMES MACLEOD v THE QUEEN The High Court of Australia today unanimously dismissed an appeal from Mr Macleod against conviction of five offences of fraud. The charges related to an enterprise run by Mr Macleod between 1989 and 1994. He controlled three companies, including Trainex Pty Ltd, which were designed to obtain tax concessions for film production. Investors contributed more than $6 million but only $718,000 was used to make films or videos. Mr Macleod allegedly used more than $2.2 million for his own benefit, including buying a $1 million Gold Coast unit. The five charges with which the appeal to the High Court was concerned involved the fraudulent misuse during 1991 of $1.3 million of Trainex funds in contravention of section 173 of the New South Wales Crimes Act. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal rejected Mr Macleod’s claim that as the sole shareholder and director of Trainex he, and therefore Trainex, consented to the particular applications of company property. It also rejected challenges to the District Court trial judge’s directions to the jury on the question of what constituted fraud. The High Court rejected Mr Macleod’s submission that the prosecution had failed to prove lack of consent by the victim of the fraud, as the self-interested consent of the controller could not be said to represent the consent of the company. The Court held that under section 173 criminal liability depended upon the application of company property by an accused for his own benefit and in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the company. The Court also rejected claims that the jury was misdirected. It said the judge correctly directed the jury that it should decide whether Mr Macleod was acting honestly by the standards of ordinary decent people, and that it was open to the jury to conclude that he knew his actions were dishonest. There was ample evidence of a deliberate and sustained course of deception to indicate a lack of genuine belief in an entitlement to use Trainex’s property for his own benefit instead of fulfilling his obligations to investors.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 October 2020 AUS17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION & ANOR [2020] HCA 37 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Court of Australia ("the Federal Court") concerning a review by the Immigration Assessment Authority ("the Authority") under Pt 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection ("the Minister") to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa. Section 473DD of the Act relevantly provides that the Authority must not consider "new information" unless: the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information (s 473DD(a)); and the applicant satisfies the Authority that the new information was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision (s 473DD(b)(i)) or that it is "credible personal information" which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the applicant's claims (s 473DD(b)(ii)). The issue on appeal was whether in finding that "new information" could not be considered, the Authority was required to assess the information against the criteria in both ss 473DD(b)(i) and 473DD(b)(ii) before assessing whether there were "exceptional circumstances" under s 473DD(a). The Minister's delegate refused to grant the appellant a protection visa. On review by the Authority, the appellant's representative provided the Authority with a letter that post-dated the decision of the delegate and was supportive of the appellant's claims. The Authority found that the letter was "new information" and did not take it into account in reaching its decision. In doing so, the Authority assessed the letter against the criterion in s 473DD(b)(i), finding that criterion not to be met. It went on to assess the letter against the criterion in s 473DD(a), finding that criterion to also not be met. It did not assess the letter against the criterion in s 473DD(b)(ii). The Federal Circuit Court relevantly held that the Authority fell into error by not considering both sub- paragraphs of s 473DD(b) so as to inform its consideration of s 473DD(a). The Federal Court allowed an appeal from the Federal Circuit Court's decision. The High Court unanimously overturned the Federal Court's decision, holding that the Authority erred by not considering both sub-paragraphs of s 473DD(b) and then taking those assessments into account in its consideration of s 473DD(a). The Court held that s 473DD requires the Authority to assess new information against the criteria in both ss 473DD(b)(i) and 473DD(b)(ii), and then, providing that at least one of those criteria are met, take that assessment into account in its consideration of whether there are exceptional circumstances under s 473DD(a), before concluding that it is prohibited from considering the new information. This statement is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the High Court or to be used in any later consideration of the Court’s reasons.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 November, 2003 ALEXANDER PURVIS on behalf of DANIEL HOGGAN v THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION The High Court of Australia today dismissed an appeal from the foster father of a boy expelled from South Grafton High School for violent behaviour towards teachers and fellow students. Daniel, now 18, attended the school from April to September 1997 and was suspended five times and finally expelled for repeated kicking, punching and swearing. Daniel, born on December 8, 1984, suffered encephalopathic illness at six months of age which left him with brain damage, intellectual disabilities, sight problems and epilepsy. He had difficulty communicating which led to frustration and behavioural problems, including offensive language, lack of self-control and violence. In 1996, his foster parents sought to have Daniel enrolled at South Grafton High School for the 1997 school year. A teacher’s aide and a casual teacher were engaged to assist Daniel. After the fifth suspension, the principal recommended that he be taught at home, apart from sport and school excursions, or be transferred to the Special Unit at Grafton High School. He cited his responsibility for the welfare and safety of other students and staff as his reason for his decision ultimately to expel Daniel. Mr Purvis complained to HREOC that Daniel had been discriminated against by the State of NSW, alleged that Daniel had been suspended, and later excluded, and been subjected to various detriments in his education, on the ground of his disability, in contravention of the federal Disability Discrimination Act. HREOC Commissioner Graeme Innes found that the State had discriminated against Daniel on the grounds of his disability and ordered the State to pay $49,000 in compensation. The State sought judicial review in the Federal Court of Australia, which set aside Mr Innes’s decision. The Full Court of the Federal Court unanimously dismissed Mr Purvis’s appeal and he appealed to the High Court. The Court, by a 5-2 majority, dismissed the appeal. It held that the principal had not discriminated against Daniel on the ground of his disability.