Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 4 February 2004 A SOLICITOR v THE COUNCIL OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF NEW SOUTH WALES The High Court of Australia today unanimously allowed in part an appeal by a solicitor struck off after convictions for sexual offences and ordered his name be reinstated to the Roll of Legal Practitioners. The NSW Court of Appeal made declarations he was guilty of professional misconduct in two respects and that he was not a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner and ordered his name be removed from the roll. The solicitor, now 42, was convicted of four counts of indecent assault on two girls aged under 16 who are now his stepdaughters. A magistrate sentenced him to imprisonment. On appeal to the District Court this jail sentence was set aside and he was placed on a three-year good behaviour bond. At the time of the offences, April-May 1997, he and others had been made redundant by his law firm and his father had been diagnosed with mesothelioma. He was suffering depression and physical exhaustion from long hours as an instructor training Army special forces. He was a major in the Army Reserve but the convictions led to the end of that career. The offences involved undressing the girls and rubbing them on the back, buttocks and stomach and once touching one girl outside her vagina. The girls complained of two offences. The solicitor admitted the offences and sought psychiatric help. The District Court accepted the conduct was out of character, unlikely to recur and not the most serious examples of indecent assault and noted the support he had, including from the family of the girls’ mother, whom he married in 2000. In that year, one stepdaughter made further allegations, which the solicitor denied. He was originally convicted but in 2001 his convictions were quashed on appeal. These later charges were pending when the Law Society initiated proceedings by summons in the Court of Appeal in relation to the first set. The Law Society was unaware of them until the solicitor filed an affidavit in the proceedings in which he referred to the charges and his successful appeal. The Law Society then added a second charge of professional misconduct for failure to disclose. The Court of Appeal found this charge to be made out, a finding upheld by the High Court because the solicitor’s professional obligations required him to disclose facts material to the Law Society’s decision on any action against him. However the Court overturned the Court of Appeal’s finding that he was guilty of professional misconduct in relation to the original convictions. It held that the nature of the trust he breached was too remote from his professional practice and to characterise his personal misconduct as professional misconduct was erroneous. The Court also held that at the time of the Court of Appeal decision in March 2002 it could not be concluded that the solicitor was unfit to practise. The solicitor had not renewed his practising certificate for five years and the High Court held that this was as long as an appropriate suspension and no other sanction was required.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 7 November 2012 MONTEVENTO HOLDINGS PTY LTD & ANOR v SCAFFIDI & ANOR [2012] HCA 48 Today the High Court allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia concerning the interpretation of a clause in the trust deed for a discretionary trust called The Scaffidi Family Trust ("the trust"). The High Court held that the clause did not prevent the appointment of the first appellant, Montevento Holdings Pty Ltd ("Montevento"), as trustee of the trust. The clause at issue was cl 11.03 of the trust deed, which provided that "[i]f, and so long as any individual Appointor is a Beneficiary that individual shall not be eligible to be appointed as a Trustee." The second appellant, Eugenio Scaffidi, was both the appointor and a beneficiary of the trust. He was also the sole director and shareholder of Montevento. On 18 February 2009, in his capacity as appointor, Eugenio Scaffidi appointed Montevento as trustee of the trust. The first respondent, Giuseppe Scaffidi, was also a beneficiary of the trust. On 19 April 2010, he commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of Western Australia seeking a declaration that the appointment of Montevento as trustee of the trust was invalid because it breached cl 11.03 of the trust deed. The primary judge dismissed Giuseppe Scaffidi's proceedings. However, a majority of the Court of Appeal (Murphy JA and Hall J; Buss JA dissenting) allowed Giuseppe Scaffidi's appeal. By special leave, Montevento and Eugenio Scaffidi appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal. The Court held that cl 11.03 of the trust deed did not extend to prohibit the appointment of a trustee which was a corporation, and that the construction of cl 11.03 adopted by Buss JA in dissent in the Court of Appeal was plainly correct.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 3 August 2011 MARTIN FRANCIS BYRNES & ANOR v CLIFFORD FRANK KENDLE [2011] HCA 26 Today the High Court allowed an appeal from the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia dismissing a claim by Mr Martin Byrnes and his mother against Mr Clifford Kendle for breach of trust in relation to the renting of a property in Murray Bridge ("the property"). Mrs Joan Byrnes and Mr Kendle married in 1980 and separated in early 2007. In 1994 the property was purchased. Mr Kendle was the sole registered proprietor. In 1997 Mr Kendle executed an Acknowledgement of Trust declaring that he held a half interest in the property "upon trust" for Mrs Byrnes. In March 2007 Mrs Byrnes assigned to Mr Byrnes her interest in the property. In December 2001 Mrs Byrnes and Mr Kendle moved out of the property. The property was let by Mr Kendle to his son, Mr Kym Kendle. Kym lived there until early 2007 but paid only two weeks' rent. In 2008 Mr Byrnes and his mother instituted proceedings in the District Court of South Australia seeking an order for an account for Mr Kendle's breach of trust in failing to collect rent. The primary judge held that there was no trust because, although the deed used the words "upon trust", evidence extrinsic to the Acknowledgement of Trust revealed that Mr Kendle nevertheless lacked the intention to create a trust. His Honour also held that, even if there had been a trust, Mr Kendle was not under a duty to rent the property and that Mrs Byrnes "co-operated" in Mr Kendle's decision not to press for rent. On appeal, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia held that the Acknowledgement of Trust created a trust and that Mr Kendle's subjective intentions were not relevant. However, the Full Court held that Mr Kendle did not have a duty to rent the property or collect rent and that Mrs Byrnes had consented to or acquiesced in Mr Kendle's inaction. Mr Byrnes and his mother appealed by special leave to the High Court. The High Court held that, by the terms of the Acknowledgement of Trust, Mr Kendle held a half interest in the property on trust for Mrs Byrnes. Evidence extrinsic to the Acknowledgement of Trust was not admissible to show that there was no intention to create a trust. The High Court also held that Mr Kendle had a duty to rent the property even without any express provision to that effect in the Acknowledgement of Trust. Mr Kendle had a continuing duty to ensure that the rent was paid and, if it were not paid, that a new tenant was found. Mr Kendle's failure to do so was a breach of duty. He was therefore required to compensate Mrs Byrnes for her interest in the unpaid rent (less her share of the outgoings). The Court held that Mrs Byrnes' failure to insist upon collection of the rent did not amount to consent to or acquiescence in Mr Kendle's breach.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 13 June 2007 SZBYR AND SZBYS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL A family quarrel was not sufficient basis for a well-founded fear of persecution which would enable asylum seekers to be granted refugee status, the High Court of Australia held today. Indian husband and wife, SZBYR and SZBYS, arrived in Australia in 2002. They are Ismaili Muslims and followers of the Aga Khan, the sect’s leader. SZBYR was previously married to a woman named Salima whose family were Muslims of a different sect and a higher social status and were influential in the city of Hyderabad. Despite her family’s disapproval, Salima married SZBYR in 1997. He claims to have been falsely arrested and imprisoned by police on a number of occasions between 1997 and 2001 at the corrupt instigation of Salima’s family, and suffered other forms of harassment from them, including assault. In 1999, SZBYR agreed to Salima’s father’s request to divorce her. He married SZBYS in 2000. Salima later allegedly committed suicide. The couple moved to Mumbai where they were charged with murdering Salima and jailed for 15 days until released on bail. They left for Australia using their own passports, despite the charge relating to Salima’s death. They say they fear that if returned to India they will be imprisoned due to the outstanding charge and will suffer continued animus from Salima’s family. The couple applied for a protection visa which was refused. They claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of religion within the meaning of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The Immigration Department concluded that the couple’s difficulties arose out of SZBYR’s relationship with Salima and her family which was a private matter outside the scope of the Convention. The Refugee Review Tribunal refused their applications for review, the Federal Magistrates Court rejected an application for judicial review of the RRT’s refusal, and the Federal Court of Australia dismissed an appeal by the couple. The RRT did not consider SZYBR to be a reliable witness. SZBYR and SZBYS appealed to the High Court. The Court upheld the RRT’s finding that the claims lacked any nexus with the Convention. The couple also argued that the RRT had not complied with section 424A of the Migration Act which provides that the RRT must give the applicant written particulars of any information that it considers would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming a decision under review. This argument was rejected. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 December 2018 TTY167 v REPUBLIC OF NAURU [2018] HCA 61 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Nauru. The High Court quashed the decision of the Refugee Status Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") that the appellant was neither a refugee nor owed complementary protection and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He applied under the Refugees Convention Act 2012 (Nr) to the Secretary of the Department of Justice and Border Control ("the Secretary") to be recognised as a refugee or a person owed complementary protection. He was assisted in preparing his application by a representative of a Nauru claims assistance provider called CAPS. His application was refused by the Secretary. The appellant applied to the Tribunal for merits review of the Secretary's determination. By a letter addressed to a "Team Leader" at CAPS, the Tribunal invited the appellant to appear before it. The appellant provided a statement to the Tribunal that highlighted the appellant's deteriorating physical and mental health, including his depression and anxiety. He also stated that he would provide further information in relation to his protection claims at the hearing. His lawyers provided submissions indicating their expectation that the appellant would take the opportunity to appear before the Tribunal. Although the appellant had been highly engaged with the application process, he failed to attend the scheduled hearing. Also, it could be inferred that no representative of the appellant attended the hearing. The Tribunal affirmed the determination of the Secretary, observing that the appellant's failure to attend the hearing prevented it from exploring many aspects of his claims. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, which dismissed his appeal and held, relevantly, that it was open to the Tribunal to make a decision without taking further action to enable the appellant to appear. The appellant appealed as of right to the High Court on two bases. First, the appellant alleged that he was not given an invitation to appear before the Tribunal. The High Court held that, because of the absence of evidence as to whether the Team Leader at CAPS had been authorised by the appellant to receive the invitation, the issue could not be raised for the first time on this appeal. Secondly, the appellant alleged that the Tribunal acted unreasonably in deciding the matter without taking further action to allow or enable the appellant to appear before it. The High Court held that the circumstances of this case were so exceptional that it was legally unreasonable for the Tribunal to proceed to decide the matter without making an enquiry about the appellant's absence on the date of the hearing.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 4 December 2013 APOTEX PTY LTD v SANOFI-AVENTIS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD & ORS [2013] HCA 50 Today the High Court, by majority, held that methods of medical treatment of the human body are patentable inventions within the meaning of s 18(1) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH, the second respondent, was the registered owner of a patent which claimed a method of preventing or treating psoriasis by the administration of the compound leflunomide. Apotex Pty Ltd, the appellant, intended to supply leflunomide in Australia, under the trade name "Apo-Leflunomide", for the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis and psoriatic arthritis. Almost every person with psoriatic arthritis has or will develop psoriasis. The respondents commenced proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia claiming, among other things, that the appellant would infringe the patent by supplying Apo-Leflunomide to treat psoriatic arthritis. By cross-claim, the appellant sought to have the patent revoked as it did not claim a patentable invention under s 18(1) of the Patents Act. The primary judge found that the patent was valid. The Full Court of the Federal Court dismissed the appellant's appeal concerning the validity of the patent. By special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The High Court, by majority, held that the patent claimed a "manner of manufacture" within the meaning of s 18(1) of the Patents Act and thus a patentable invention.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 2 August 2007 SZFDE, SZFDF, SZFDG AND SZFDH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL A Lebanese family seeking asylum in Australia should have their case reconsidered by the Refugee Review Tribunal after they were defrauded into not appearing before the RRT, the High Court of Australia held today. The family arrived in Australia in February 2002. The wife, SZFDE, claimed a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of her published views questioning the position of women in the Islamic tradition. The Immigration Department refused to grant the family protection visas and they sought a review by the RRT. According to the family, Fahmi Hussain represented himself to be a solicitor and licensed migration agent. In fact, the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales had cancelled his practising certificate in December 2001 and the Migration Agents Registration Authority had cancelled his registration in March 2002. He was struck off the Roll of Legal Practitioners in NSW in February 2005. SZFDE paid Mr Hussain $8,400 for him to act for the family and lent him another $5,000. She followed his advice not to accept the RRT’s invitation to attend a hearing. Mr Hussain told her he would instead write to the Minister and that if she appeared at the hearing she may say something conflicting with what he wrote. He also told SZFDE that she would be refused anyway as no visa applications were being accepted. Mr Hussain wrote to the Minister seeking a favourable decision but his requests were rejected. In October 2003, the RRT affirmed the Immigration Department decision. It noted that SZFDE had not appeared before it and there were matters the RRT would have wished to explore with her. In December 2005, the Federal Magistrates Court upheld the family’s application for judicial review and found that the family had been dissuaded from appearing before the RRT by Mr Hussain’s fraud. It quashed the RRT’s decision and remitted the matter for reconsideration. In October 2006, the Full Court of the Federal Court, by a 2-1 majority, allowed an appeal by the Minister. The family then appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal. It held that on the evidence fraud had been perpetrated on the RRT as well as upon the family. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the RRT remained unexercised and the Federal Magistrates Court was correct to grant the writ of certiorari to quash the RRT’s decision and the writ of mandamus to compel the RRT to redetermine the review of the Immigration Department’s refusal of the family’s visa applications. The High Court held that Mr Hussain’s conduct had the effect of stultifying the operation of the legislative scheme for the review of refugee decisions and denying the family natural justice. The RRT’s redetermination would include a fresh invitation to the family to appear before it.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 30 September, 2003 LIDO RUSSO AND ZUCCHINI PTY LTD v JOHN DOMINIC AIELLO The High Court of Australia today dismissed an appeal by a man who failed to comply with the statutory time limit for giving notice of personal injury insurance claim after a motor vehicle accident. In January 1997, Mr Russo, then 21, was a passenger in a car driven by Mr Aiello who, Mr Russo alleged, negligently failed to negotiate a sharp bend on a road in Terrey Hills, Sydney, resulting in his car colliding with a rock face. Mr Russo sought damages for injuries, lost earnings and medical expenses. He was the co-owner of Zucchini, which traded as the Red Zucchini Bar. He spent the second half of 1997 in Italy where his condition improved but his condition later deteriorated back in Australia. He had headaches, dizziness, shoulder and back pain and was left with a permanent neck injury. Mr Russo initially saw a solicitor 10 days after the accident and another law firm in October 1998 but did not lodge a personal injury claim form with Mr Aiello’s insurer until March 1999, despite a six-month time limit under New South Wales’ Motor Accidents Act. The first solicitor had informed Mr Russo of the time limit and handed him a claim form and later wrote to check it had been submitted. The Act allowed extensions if a claimant had a full and satisfactory explanation for the delay. NSW District Court Judge Ian Dodd dismissed Mr Russo’s proceedings, holding that his explanation for the 10-month period between his return to Australia and consulting new solicitors could not be regarded as full. The Court of Appeal, by majority, dismissed Mr Russo’s appeal. The High Court, by a 4-1 majority, dismissed his further appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 April 2016 WARRICK COVERDALE, VALUER-GENERAL OF THE STATE OF TASMANIA v WEST COAST COUNCIL [2016] HCA 15 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania ("the Full Court"). The High Court held that the seabed and waters of Macquarie Harbour on the west coast of Tasmania are "Crown lands" within the meaning of s 11(1) of the Valuation of Land Act 2001 (Tas) ("the VLA"). The respondent ("the Council") sought to levy rates on eight marine farming leases over parts of the seabed and waters within Macquarie Harbour. To that end, it requested the appellant ("the Valuer-General") to value the leases in accordance with s 11(1) of the VLA. In substance, s 11(1) of the VLA provides that the Valuer-General must value all lands within each valuation district, including certain Crown lands that are liable to be rated. The Valuer-General declined to value the leases on the basis that, in the Valuer-General's opinion, the leases were not over "lands" or "Crown lands" within the meaning of s 11(1) because those terms did not include the seabed and waters above it. The Council instituted proceedings in the Supreme Court of Tasmania for, among other relief, a declaration that the Valuer-General was obliged to value the marine farming leases. At first instance, the Council's action was dismissed on the basis that the leases were not over lands within the meaning of s 11(1) of the VLA and, therefore, were not liable to be rated. The Council appealed to the Full Court and a majority of the Full Court allowed the appeal. It held that the leases were over Crown lands that were liable to be rated. By grant of special leave, the Valuer-General appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that "Crown lands" in s 11(1) of the VLA had the same meaning as that ascribed to it in s 2 of the Crown Lands Act 1976 (Tas). Accordingly, "Crown lands" in s 11(1) of the VLA included the seabed and so much of the sea as lies above it.