Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 December 2003 RURAL PRESS LIMITED, BRIDGE PRINTING OFFICE PTY LTD, IAN LAW AND TREVOR McAULIFFE v AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION, WAIKERIE PRINTING HOUSE PTY LTD AND PAUL TAYLOR AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION v RURAL PRESS LIMITED, BRIDGE PRINTING OFFICE PTY LTD, IAN LAW, TREVOR McAULIFFE, WAIKERIE PRINTING HOUSE PTY LTD AND PAUL TAYLOR The High Court of Australia today dismissed a Rural Press appeal and allowed an ACCC appeal, both relating to an arrangement on South Australian country newspaper markets that allegedly contravened the Trade Practices Act. Rural Press subsidiary Bridge Printing published the Murray Valley Standard while Waikerie Printing published the River News, with very few newspapers sold in each other’s prime circulation areas. When councils in the area were restructured in July 1997, River News extended southwards to take in the township of Mannum, making it a competitor with the Standard. Rural Press and Bridge repeatedly told River News’s owners Paul and Darnley Taylor and managing editor John Pick that they would have to consider reacting commercially, perhaps by establishing a rival newspaper in the Riverland area. The Taylors eventually agreed in April 1998 to revert to a line 40km north of Mannum and Rural Press took no steps to establish a Riverland newspaper. The ACCC alleged that an arrangement was made by which Waikerie Printing committed itself to withdrawing the River News from circulation around Mannum, and Rural Press and Bridge committed themselves not to introduce any new newspapers in competition with the Taylors. The Federal Court held that Rural Press and Bridge had contravened section 45 of the Act by entering into an arrangement which substantially lessened competition and which contained an exclusionary provision, and had contravened section 46 by taking advantage of market power for illegal purposes. The Court also found executives Mr Law and Mr McAuliffe were knowingly involved in these breaches. The Full Court of the Federal Court allowed an appeal by the Rural Press parties on the exclusionary provision and section 46 issues and dismissed the ACCC’s appeal and cross-appeal on penalties. Both the Rural Press parties and the ACCC appealed to the High Court. Rural Press argued there was insufficient evidence to find an arrangement, there was no purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition, and the two executives had insufficient knowledge to make them liable. The ACCC argued the Full Court should have upheld the findings on the exclusionary provision and section 46 breaches. The High Court unanimously held there was an arrangement of the type alleged by the ACCC and that this arrangement had the purpose and effect of substantially lessening competition in the region. The Court dismissed Rural Press’s appeal, allowed the ACCC’s appeal in relation to the exclusionary provision, rejected the ACCC’s appeal in relation to the section 46 issue, and revised the declarations made by the Full Court of the Federal Court.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 3 October 2007 WESTFIELD MANAGEMENT LIMITED v PERPETUAL TRUST COMPANY LIMITED Westfield is not entitled to use an easement to access two extra shopping malls it has acquired next to the one originally serviced by the easement, the High Court of Australia held today. Westfield owns Skygarden and Perpetual the adjacent Glasshouse shopping complex. Both face Pitt Street Mall in Sydney’s CBD, while Glasshouse also fronts King Street. It has a private underground laneway running off King Street behind it and stopping at the boundary of Skygarden. Westfield now owns the neighbouring Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint, which also face Pitt Street Mall, and it wants to redevelop all three sites into a single complex. In 1987, in return for Glasshouse granting Skygarden access via its laneway to help keep the then new Pitt Street Mall pedestrian precinct free of delivery vehicles, Sydney City Council allowed the Glasshouse developers to construct a larger building. In 1988, the original owners of Skygarden and Glasshouse agreed to terms for the easement and it was registered under the Torrens system. Westfield now wishes to use the laneway to access all three of its sites from King Street. In the New South Wales Supreme Court, Westfield successfully sought a declaration that the easement permitted vehicles using the laneway to continue under Skygarden to access driveways, parking spaces and loading docks to be built on the Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint sites. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by Perpetual. Westfield appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It said that it was significant that the terms of easement did not use the word “across” in relation to Skygarden but the words “to and from”. It rejected Westfield’s argument that the phrase “for all purposes” encompassed the purpose of accessing Skygarden and from there travelling to some further property. The Court held that the phrase had to be read as part of the longer expression “for all purposes with vehicles to and from [Skygarden] or any such part thereof across [Glasshouse]” and did not include going to and from and across Skygarden. It also held that Westfield could not use extrinsic material to ascertain the intention or contemplation of the parties to the grant of the easement beyond the terms of the grant itself. The easement was registered but third parties inspecting the register cannot be expected to look for extrinsic material which might establish facts or circumstances existing at the time of registration of the kind relied upon by Westfield. The use of such material is inconsistent with the definitive nature of the Torrens register.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 October 2021 [2021] HCA 28 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeal concerned whether the verdict at trial was affected by a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) in that the prosecution did not provide "full and proper" disclosure of certain data to the appellant prior to trial, contrary to the requirements of ss 141 and 142 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ("the Act"). The appellant was convicted by a jury of six counts of aggravated sexual intercourse with a person aged above 10 and under 14 years of age, contrary to s 66C(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The appellant contended that the trial miscarried by reason of the prosecution's failure to provide to his lawyers, in advance of the trial, a hard drive containing a copy of data stored on the appellant's mobile phone ("the Cellebrite Download"), which had been seized by police upon his arrest. The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions ("the ODPP") informed the appellant's lawyers of the existence of the Cellebrite Download in writing on three occasions prior to the trial but did not serve a copy of the Cellebrite Download or otherwise provide any information from the Cellebrite Download. The appellant's lawyers only became cognisant of the Cellebrite Download after the ODPP served a witness statement on the Friday before the trial was scheduled to commence. The High Court unanimously held that in this case the verdict was not affected by a miscarriage of justice and dismissed the appeal. The majority of the High Court found that there was no prosecutorial duty to disclose a copy of the Cellebrite Download because the appellant, even with the benefit of hindsight, was unable to show how the contents of the Cellebrite Download "would reasonably be regarded as relevant to the prosecution case or the defence case" as required by s 142(1)(i) of the Act or were "relevant to the reliability ... of a prosecution witness" as required by s 142(1)(k) of the Act. The majority found that the appellant's arguments about the forensic value of the Cellebrite Download did not rise above the level of speculation. In any event, the appellant was unable to show any respect in which his entitlement to a fair trial was adversely affected by not being provided with a copy of the Cellebrite Download. The High Court rejected the appellant's argument that, without the Cellebrite Download, he had lost the chance of a different outcome at trial that might have resulted from further investigations, cross-examination and submissions.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 October 2005 GLORIA JEANETTE YORK v THE QUEEN The Queensland Court of Appeal was not justified in overruling a primary judge’s decision to suspend a prison sentence imposed on Ms York, the High Court of Australia held today. Ms York, 59, pleaded guilty to drugs charges in June 2004. She had an extensive criminal history. Justice Roslyn Atkinson sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment but suspended the sentence for five years. Justice Atkinson said a head sentence of 10 to 12 years was appropriate but she discounted this by 60 per cent as Ms York had not offended since her arrest in April 2001 and, more importantly, had given extensive assistance to the police resulting in the conviction of a major drug dealer, Alan John Lace, for an execution-style murder in 1999. Her conduct, throughout Mr Lace’s original trial and a subsequent retrial, was described by Justice Atkinson as very brave. She said Ms York, who had received death threats, faced a high risk of violent retribution in prison, but that she would have no compunction in sending Ms York to prison if she re-offended within five years. Threats included a visit after Mr Lace’s committal from a masked and armed former prisoner who told her she would be shot if she testified against Mr Lace. Further threats were made after the first trial and after his appeal. Ms York refused witness protection. The Crown appealed on the ground that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. In the Court of Appeal, the Attorney-General submitted information from the Department of Corrective Services that options to be considered for Ms York were a protection unit at the Brisbane Women’s Correctional Centre or the Townsville jail. The Court of Appeal, by majority, held that, despite the uncontradicted findings about the risks to Ms York’s safety, it could not bow to pressure from criminals, and that jail was the only appropriate penalty, despite her cooperation with authorities and her guilty plea. It sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment to be suspended after she served two years. That sentence has not taken effect, pending the outcome of her appeal to the High Court. The Court unanimously allowed her appeal. It held that Justice Atkinson was entitled to take Ms York’s safety in prison into account and that it was within the scope of her discretion to sentence her as she did.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 December 2021 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v CHANGRAN HUANG [2021] HCA 43 Today the High Court allowed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal concerned the Federal Court's power to make an order restraining a person from disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the value of assets, including assets located in or outside Australia (a "Worldwide Freezing Order") conferred by r 7.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) ("the Rules"). Rule 7.32(1) states that the purpose of the order must be "preventing the frustration or inhibition of the Court's process" and the order must serve that purpose "by seeking to meet a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment of the Court will be wholly or partly unsatisfied". The respondent, Mr Huang, was a tax resident of Australia for a number of years. In December 2018, he left Australia for the People's Republic of China ("the PRC") while the Australian Taxation Office was conducting an audit into his income tax affairs. Subsequently, the Commissioner of Taxation issued to Mr Huang assessments for tax liabilities and a shortfall penalty totalling almost $141 million. On application by the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation the primary judge made a Worldwide Freezing Order against Mr Huang until further order. Mr Huang sought leave to appeal against the freezing order to the extent it applied to his assets located outside Australia. The Full Court granted leave and set aside the Worldwide Freezing Order on the basis that there was presently no realistic possibility of enforcement of any judgment obtained by the Deputy Commissioner against Mr Huang's assets in the PRC or Hong Kong. The High Court by majority held that the power in r 7.32 of the Rules is not constrained by a precondition that it may only be exercised if there is proof of a realistic possibility of enforcement of a judgment debt against the person's assets in each foreign jurisdiction to which the proposed order relates. Provisions granting powers to a court are not to be read down by making implications or imposing limitations which are not found in the express words. The power conferred by r 7.32 is broad and flexible. It is the court's authority to make orders against a person who is subject to the court's jurisdiction that is relevant to the power to make a freezing order, rather than the location of the person's assets. Requiring proof of a realistic possibility of enforcement in each jurisdiction would render the power to make a freezing order largely impotent to protect the Federal Court's process from frustration by defendants who are able to secrete assets or move them almost instantaneously across international borders. Further, such a precondition is effectively inconsistent with the power to make a Worldwide Freezing Order as it would necessitate identification of the defendant's foreign assets as well as potential means of enforcement in a relevant foreign jurisdiction. However, the likely utility of a freezing order is undoubtedly relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion to grant a Worldwide Freezing Order.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 7 September 2012 P T GARUDA INDONESIA LTD v AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMMISSION [2012] HCA 33 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal by P T Garuda Indonesia Ltd ("Garuda") and held that Garuda had no claim to immunity under the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) ("the Act") from proceedings brought in the Federal Court by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ("the ACCC"). The ACCC alleged that, with respect to commercial freight services to Australia, Garuda and several other airlines had engaged in anti-competitive conduct which contravened s 45 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the TPA"). The remedies sought by the ACCC included an injunction, declaration and pecuniary penalties under the TPA. It was not disputed in the High Court that Garuda was a "separate entity" of the Republic of Indonesia. The High Court held however, that Garuda could not claim immunity because the proceedings against it concerned a commercial transaction within the meaning of s 11(1) of the Act. The conduct alleged by the ACCC against Garuda comprised dealings of a commercial trading and business character. It was no answer to the denial of immunity that the ACCC proceedings were not brought to vindicate private law contractual rights.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 4 May 2011 KUHL v ZURICH FINANCIAL SERVICES AUSTRALIA LTD & ANOR [2011] HCA 11 Today the High Court allowed an appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia and held that Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd ("Zurich") was liable in negligence to Mr Geoffrey Lawrence Kuhl. In 1999 Mr Kuhl, an employee of Transfield Construction Pty Ltd, suffered injuries on a work site when his left arm was sucked into a vacuum hose after the hose was passed to him by another person. Mr Kuhl commenced an action in negligence against Zurich and QBE Insurance Services Australia Ltd ("QBE") in the District Court of Western Australia. Mr Kuhl alleged that WOMA (Australia) Pty Ltd ("WOMA") and Hydrosweep Pty Ltd ("Hydrosweep") were liable in negligence for his injuries. Zurich and QBE were the respective insurers of these two companies. The District Court held that neither Zurich nor QBE were liable to Mr Kuhl in negligence. Mr Kuhl appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the basis that neither Zurich nor QBE owed Mr Kuhl the duties of care contended for, and that there was no breach of duty in any event. A majority of the High Court allowed the appeal, and made an order setting aside the orders of the Court of Appeal and the District Court in respect of Zurich and entering judgment against Zurich in the amount of $265,000. The High Court held that WOMA had a duty of care to users of the hose which extended to risks in relation to the passing of the hose. The Court further held that WOMA had breached that duty by failing to issue instructions not to pass the hose while the power was turned on and by failing to install a "break box" close to the head of the hose which could be employed to break the vacuum pressure, and that each of these breaches had caused Mr Kuhl's injuries. The High Court also held that the trial judge erred in drawing an inference adverse to Mr Kuhl, on the basis of Mr Kuhl's oral evidence, that some action by him subsequent to the passing of the hose caused his arm to be drawn in to the hose. The nature of this error was the trial judge's failure to give reasons for his inference and his failure to give Mr Kuhl an opportunity to address the point. The High Court upheld the orders of the District Court and the Court of Appeal in favour of QBE.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 February 2016 CGU INSURANCE LIMITED v ROSS BLAKELEY, MICHAEL RYAN & QUENTIN OLDE AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF AKRON ROADS PTY LTD (IN LIQ) & ORS [2016] HCA 2 Today the High Court dismissed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The High Court held that the federal jurisdiction invested in the Supreme Court of Victoria authorised that Court to grant a declaration in favour of a plaintiff against a defendant's insurer that the insurer is liable to indemnify the defendant. The first respondents are liquidators of the second respondent, Akron Roads Pty Ltd ("the company"). They commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court seeking an order under s 588M(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("the Act") that the directors of the company, including Mr Trevor Crewe and Crewe Sharp Pty Ltd ("the directors"), pay to them as a debt due to the company, an amount equal to the amount of loss or damage suffered by creditors of the company due to alleged insolvent trading in breach of s 588G of the Act. Crewe Sharp made a claim on a professional indemnity policy with the appellant, CGU Insurance Ltd ("CGU"). Mr Crewe was also insured under that policy. CGU denied the claim on the basis that the insurance policy did not cover the liability asserted by the directors as a result of various exceptions in the policy. The directors were not in a position to challenge CGU's denial of liability. In the interlocutory stages of the proceedings, the liquidators sought an order to join CGU as a defendant and for leave to file and serve amended points of claim seeking a declaration that CGU was liable to indemnify the directors under the policy. In contending that they had a sufficient interest in the determination of CGU's liability to support their claim for a declaration and joinder, the liquidators relied on s 562 of the Act. Section 562 afforded the liquidators a priority in respect of any insurance proceeds payable by CGU to Crewe Sharp. Section 117 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) would have imposed a similar priority, if Mr Crewe were to become bankrupt. The primary judge in the Supreme Court made the orders sought, and the Court of Appeal dismissed CGU's appeal. By grant of special leave, CGU appealed to the High Court, submitting that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to join CGU and to grant declaratory relief at the suit of the liquidators regarding the effect of the private insurance contract between CGU and the directors, where the directors were not in a position to pursue any claim against CGU. In relation to federal jurisdiction, CGU's argument reduced to the proposition that there was no justiciable controversy between the liquidators and CGU and therefore no "matter" on which to found federal jurisdiction. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the liquidator's claim for relief was within the subject matter area of federal jurisdiction and constituted a justiciable controversy between the liquidators and CGU. It was confirmed that the Supreme Court had federal jurisdiction to entertain the liquidators' claim and grant the declaration sought.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 26 May 2005 APPLICANT NABD OF 2002 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL The finding of the Refugee Review Tribunal that an Iranian Christian convert would not have a well-founded fear of persecution should he be returned to Iran was not affected by jurisdictional error, the High Court of Australia held today. NABD, 36, claimed that in Indonesia before arriving in Australia he had embraced the Christian faith and that he feared he would be executed by the authorities because he had converted from Islam to Christianity. NABD was refused a protection visa in 2001, a decision affirmed by the RRT. Following his successful application to the Federal Court of Australia for judicial review, a differently constituted tribunal also affirmed the decision to refuse him a visa. The RRT did not accept that NABD, a frequent traveller on business, had to flee to Turkey with a people smuggle rather than leaving legally on his own passport, or that authorities raided a house of a friend who was encouraging him to convert. It did accept, however, that NABD had been baptised in Indonesia, joined the Uniting Church, undertaken a Bible study course, attended religious gatherings in Indonesia and in immigration detention, distributed pamphlets, spoken to others about his faith, and encouraged others to attend church services. The RRT concluded from Australian and American official country information on Iran that Christians do not suffer persecution unless they engage in aggressive outreach or conspicuous proselytising. It held that in Iran NABD would be able to practise as a Christian in the same ways he had done so in Australia without facing a real chance of persecution. It did not accept that his activities since leaving Iran constituted proselytisation rather than quiet sharing of his faith so he would be unlikely to behave more openly or aggressively back in Iran. NABD applied to the Federal Court for writs to quash the RRT’s decision, to compel it to review its decision, and to prevent the Minister giving effect to the decision. The Federal Court dismissed the application and the Full Court of the Federal Court dismissed an appeal. NABD appealed to the High Court, arguing that the RRT paid insufficient regard to his individual circumstances and had fallen into jurisdictional error by attaching significance to different forms of behaviour. The High Court, by a 3-2 majority, dismissed the appeal. It held that the RRT had correctly addressed the fundamental question of whether NABD had a well-founded fear of persecution on the ground of religion. The Court held that the RRT had properly considered NABD’s individual circumstances in the light of the available information.