Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 17 June 2015 CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION v BORAL RESOURCES (VIC) PTY LTD & ORS [2015] HCA 21 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria and held that the appellant was amenable to an order under r 29.07(2) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) ("the Rules") to make discovery of particular documents in proceedings brought to punish it for contempt of court. The first to sixth respondents (together, "Boral") applied under r 75.06(2) of the Rules to punish the appellant for contempt of court, alleging that the appellant had disobeyed court orders by establishing a blockade of a construction site. The blockade was alleged to have been organised and implemented by an employee of the appellant. Boral sought an order under r 29.07(2) directing the appellant to make discovery of particular documents going to the question of whether the appellant had authorised its employee to establish the blockade. The appellant's status as a corporation meant it could not invoke either the privilege against self-incrimination or the privilege against self-exposure to a penalty to resist the order sought by Boral. In the Supreme Court of Victoria, Daly AsJ refused to make an order for discovery under r 29.07(2) on the basis that the contempt proceeding was properly characterised as a criminal proceeding, and so the Rules did not apply. Digby J allowed an appeal from that decision, holding that the contempt proceeding was a civil proceeding to which the Rules did apply, and that it was appropriate to order discovery in the circumstances. The Court of Appeal refused the appellant leave to appeal from that decision on the basis that there was insufficient reason to doubt its correctness and the appellant would suffer no substantial injustice if the order for discovery were permitted to stand. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The appellant contended that it could not be ordered to make discovery under r 29.07(2) because to do so would conflict with the principle that a defendant to an accusatorial proceeding cannot be required to assist the prosecution to prove its case. The Court accepted that this principle applies to criminal proceedings but held that the contempt proceeding was a civil proceeding. Rule 29.07(2) applied to the contempt proceeding according to its tenor enabling an order for discovery to be made.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 May 2013 [2013] HCA 19 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which held that even if the respondent, Dr Kam, had failed to warn the appellant, his patient Mr Wallace, of all the material risks inherent in a surgical procedure, that failure did not cause the injury suffered by Mr Wallace as a result of one of those risks eventuating. Dr Kam performed a surgical procedure on Mr Wallace in an effort to relieve him of a condition of his lumbar spine. The surgical procedure had inherent risks, one of which was of temporary damage to Mr Wallace's thighs, or "neurapraxia". Another was a one-in-twenty chance of permanent and catastrophic paralysis. The first risk materialised. The second risk did not. At trial, the Supreme Court of New South Wales found that while Dr Kam negligently failed to warn Mr Wallace of the risk of neurapraxia, Mr Wallace would have chosen to undergo the surgical procedure even if warned of that risk. The Supreme Court also concluded that the legal cause of the neurapraxia could not be the failure to warn of some other risk that did not materialise. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Mr Wallace argued that the Supreme Court erred in holding that the legal cause of the neurapraxia could not be the failure to warn of the risk of paralysis. The Court of Appeal assumed that Dr Kam negligently failed to warn Mr Wallace of the risk of paralysis and that, if warned of that risk, Mr Wallace would not have undergone the surgical procedure. On that assumption, a majority of the Court of Appeal found that Dr Kam was not liable for the neurapraxia. Mr Wallace appealed by special leave to the High Court. The High Court held that it was not appropriate for Dr Kam's liability to extend to the physical injury in fact sustained by Mr Wallace, in circumstances where Mr Wallace would not have chosen to undergo the surgical procedure had he been properly warned of all material risks, but where he would have chosen to undergo the surgical procedure even if he had been warned of the risk that in fact materialised. The policy underlying the requirement that a medical practitioner exercise reasonable care and skill in warning a patient of material risks inherent in proposed treatment is to protect the patient from the occurrence of physical injury the risk of which is unacceptable to the patient. The High Court held that Mr Wallace was not to be compensated for the occurrence of physical injury, the risk of which he was willing to accept.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 September 2014 PLAINTIFF S4/2014 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION & ANOR [2014] HCA 34 Today the High Court unanimously held invalid the grant by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection of a temporary safe haven visa to the plaintiff which had the effect of precluding the plaintiff making a valid application for a protection visa, in circumstances where the plaintiff's detention had been prolonged for the purpose of the Minister considering the exercise of power to allow the plaintiff to make a valid application for a visa of his choice. The plaintiff arrived at Christmas Island without a visa to enter or remain in Australia and was lawfully taken into immigration detention. Section 46A(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) prevented the plaintiff from making a valid application for any visa unless the Minister determined, under s 46A(2), that the prohibition in s 46A(1) did not apply to an application by the plaintiff. The Minister decided to consider whether to exercise his power under s 46A(2) to permit the plaintiff to apply for a protection visa. The plaintiff remained in detention for more than two years while the Minister's department inquired into the plaintiff's eligibility for such a visa. The department determined that the plaintiff satisfied the requirements for the grant of the visa. However, the Minister made no decision to permit or refuse the making of a valid application. Instead, the Minister, acting of his own motion under s 195A(2) – which gives the Minister power to grant a visa to a person in immigration detention if the Minister thinks it is in the public interest to do so – granted the plaintiff a temporary safe haven visa and a temporary humanitarian concern visa. Although the prohibition in s 46A(1) no longer applied once the plaintiff became a lawful non-citizen by reason of the grant of the visas, the grant of the temporary safe haven visa engaged a similar prohibition in s 91K. In proceedings commenced in the High Court, the plaintiff claimed that the grants of the visas were invalid and that, that being so, the Minister must determine under s 46A(2) that the plaintiff may make a valid application for a protection visa or, alternatively, determine how the s 46A(2) power will be exercised. A special case stated questions of law for determination by the Full Court. The High Court held that where a person's detention is prolonged for the purpose of considering the exercise of power under s 46A(2), other powers given by the Act do not permit the making of a decision which would foreclose the exercise of the power under s 46A(2) before a decision is made, thus depriving the prolongation of detention of its purpose. The Court quashed the decision to grant both visas and held that it was not appropriate to answer the questions stated about whether and how the Minister is bound to exercise his power under s 46A(2).
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 March 2013 TCL AIR CONDITIONER (ZHONGSHAN) CO LTD v THE JUDGES OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA & ANOR [2013] HCA 5 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an application by TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd ("TCL") for constitutional writs directed to the judges of the Federal Court of Australia. The High Court held that s 16(1) of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), which gives "the force of law in Australia" to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration ("the Model Law"), is not invalid. TCL entered into a written distribution agreement with Castel Electronics Pty Ltd ("Castel"). The agreement provided for the submission of disputes to arbitration. Following an arbitration, awards were made which required TCL to pay Castel a sum of money ("the awards"). In default of payment, Castel applied to the Federal Court for enforcement of the awards in accordance with Art 35 of the Model Law. In separate proceedings instituted in the High Court, TCL applied for an order restraining the judges of the Federal Court from enforcing the awards, and for an order quashing decisions of that Court in relation to the awards. TCL submitted that the Model Law provided for the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth in a manner contrary to Ch III of the Constitution. Under the Model Law, the Federal Court has no power to refuse to enforce an arbitral award on the ground that an error of law is apparent on the face of the award. TCL argued that consequently, the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal Court under the Act requires that Court to act in a manner which substantially impairs its institutional integrity. Further, the Model Law was said to vest the judicial power of the Commonwealth in arbitral tribunals. The High Court unanimously dismissed the application.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 February 2023 UNIONS NSW & ORS v STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES [2023] HCA 4 Today, the High Court answered questions in a special case concerning whether ss 29(11) and 35 of the Electoral Funding Act 2018 (NSW) ("the EF Act") were invalid under the Constitution because they impermissibly burdened the implied freedom of political communication. The EF Act, among other things, provides for the capping of electoral expenditure for election campaigns in NSW. The plaintiffs were registered third-party campaigners ("TPCs") under the EF Act, defined broadly as a person or entity, other than a political party, elected member or candidate, who seeks to participate in an election campaign and incurs over $2,000. Section 29(11) capped electoral expenditure by TPCs before a State by-election for the Legislative Assembly to $20,000 (indexed to inflation). The parties accepted that s 29(11) imposed an effective and direct burden on political communication and that the State of NSW bore the persuasive onus of establishing that the burden was justified. After the Court reserved its decision, the State informed the High Court that the NSW Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters had delivered a report to Parliament that recommended the expenditure cap in s 29(11) be increased to $198,750. In light of that report, the State conceded that the answer to Question 1 in the special case (which asked whether s 29(11) was invalid) should be answered "Yes". By majority, the High Court answered Question 1 that way, holding that the law was invalid because the State did not seek to justify, and had not justified, the burden that s 29(11) imposed on political communication. The plaintiffs had a sufficient interest to seek that relief because s 29(11) remained a purported law of NSW affecting their expenditure in future by-elections. Section 35 created an offence, applicable only to TPCs, to act in concert with another person or persons to incur electoral expenditure that exceeded the cap applicable to the TPC for the election. Two weeks before the hearing, the Parliament repealed s 35. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that s 35, as it stood from 1 July 2018 to 2 November 2022, was invalid. The amended questions in the special case asked whether the Court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of s 35 and, if so, whether it should in its discretion hear and determine the question. The High Court unanimously held that there was no longer a "matter" within federal jurisdiction with respect to the purported invalidity of s 35, because the plaintiffs did not have standing to seek a declaration of invalidity following its repeal. The plaintiffs did not demonstrate that they had a sufficient interest to seek a declaration or that there would be any foreseeable consequences from the grant of a declaration.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Manager, Public Information 21 April 2010 REEMA TABET (BY HER TUTOR GHASSAN SHEIBAN) v MAURICE GETT [2010] HCA 12 The law of negligence does not provide for compensation where negligence causes a plaintiff to lose only a less than 50 per cent chance of a better medical outcome, the High Court held today. At six years old the appellant was suffering from headaches, nausea and vomiting and was admitted to hospital under the care of the respondent. At trial, the respondent was found negligent in not ordering a CT scan after a particular incident. The day after the incident, the appellant suffered a seizure. A CT scan on that day revealed that the appellant had a brain tumour. The appellant suffered irreversible brain damage, 25 per cent of which was caused by the increased intracranial pressure between the time the scan should have been ordered and it being undertaken. Due to the appellant's age, she brought an action in negligence against the respondent through her tutor, her uncle, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The trial judge was not satisfied that the respondent's negligence caused, on the balance of probabilities, any part of the appellant's brain damage; rather, if a scan had been administered when it should have been, there was only a 40 per cent chance that she would have avoided some of the brain damage she suffered. Finding that such a loss of chance constituted "damage" for the purposes of the law of negligence, the trial judge awarded the appellant compensation proportional to that lost chance. The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales upheld the respondent's appeal, finding that the loss of a 40 per cent chance of a better medical outcome did not constitute the required "damage" for a cause of action in negligence. Accordingly, the appellant had not proved on the balance of probabilities that the negligence of the respondent caused her damage and the respondent, therefore, was not liable. On appeal to the High Court, the appellant argued that a loss of a chance of a better medical outcome should be considered as "damage" giving rise to a cause of action in negligence. The High Court held that to allow a plaintiff to recover compensation in negligence actions for only the loss of a chance of a better medical outcome would diminish the requirement for a plaintiff to prove on the balance of probabilities that his or her damage was caused by the negligence of the defendant and extend liability too far in medical negligence cases. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 November, 2003 ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA AND THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA v LAURENCE BERNHARD MARQUET (CLERK OF THE PARLIAMENTS OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA) (two matters) Two pieces of legislation aimed at changing Western Australia’s electoral laws could not be presented to the WA Governor for assent as neither Bill was passed by an absolute majority of all Legislative Council members, the High Court of Australia held today, confirming a decision of the Supreme Court of WA. On 19 and 20 December, 2001, the Electoral Distribution Repeal Bill and Electoral Amendment Bill were passed by a majority of Legislative Council members present, but not by an absolute majority. The Bills had already been passed by an absolute majority of the Legislative Assembly. The first Bill would have repealed the Electoral Distribution Act 1947 which currently provides for the drawing of electoral boundaries for both houses of the WA Parliament. Section 13 of the Act, a “manner and form” provision, stated the Act could not be amended unless a Bill had concurrence of an absolute majority of both houses. The second Bill would have inserted a new electoral boundaries’ regime into the Electoral Act to reduce the disparity between voter numbers in various electorates and would have increased the number of Legislative Council members from 34 to 36. On 21 December, Mr Marquet began proceedings in the WA Supreme Court seeking declarations about the lawfulness of presenting each Bill to the Governor for assent. Each Bill was the subject of separate proceedings. The proceedings were referred to a specially constituted five-member Full Court of the Supreme Court, which decided by a 4-1 majority that the Bills could not be lawfully presented. The WA Attorney-General and the State of WA then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court. The special leave application was referred by a Full Court of three Justices to an enlarged Bench and argued as on appeal. In the High Court, those who had argued in the Full Court that the Bills were not validly passed (including political parties and rural groups) appeared to present arguments against the validity of the Bills. The Attorneys-General for the Commonwealth, Queensland and New South Wales also appeared. The High Court granted special to leave to appeal in each matter, but by a 5-1 majority dismissed each appeal. It held that “amend” in section 13 of the Electoral Distribution Act included “repeal” and held that compliance with section 13 was mandatory. Because each Bill was a law in respect of the constitution of a state parliament, section 6 of the Australia Act 1986 required compliance with manner and form provisions. It also held that section 2(3) of WA’s Acts Amendment Act 1978, stating that every Bill after its passage through both houses shall be presented to the Governor for assent, did not impliedly repeal section 13, as “passage” meant “due passage” or “passage in accordance with applicable requirements”.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 16 May 2014 ADCO CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD v GOUDAPPEL & ANOR [2014] HCA 18 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The High Court held that a regulation was validly made under a power to make savings and transitional regulations having the effect of amending the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) ("the WCA") and that the regulation extinguished Ronald Goudappel's entitlement to permanent impairment compensation under the WCA. On 17 April 2010, Mr Goudappel, an employee of ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd ("ADCO"), was injured at work and became entitled under the WCA to receive compensation from ADCO. He made a claim for compensation on 19 April 2010 ("the initial claim"). He was later assessed as having a six percent permanent impairment with respect to the injuries he sustained. On 20 June 2012, he made a specific claim for permanent impairment compensation. ADCO's workers compensation insurer declined liability for permanent impairment compensation, on the basis that amendments to the WCA, introduced by the Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (NSW) ("the Amendment Act"), applied to Mr Goudappel's claim. The amendments limited the entitlement to permanent impairment compensation to workers who had suffered injury resulting in permanent impairment exceeding ten percent. If applicable to Mr Goudappel's claim, the amendments would have had the effect that he had no entitlement to permanent impairment compensation. However, the Amendment Act's savings and transitional provisions protected the entitlements of workers who had claimed permanent impairment compensation before 19 June 2012 from the disentitling effect of the amendments. It was accepted in the High Court that Mr Goudappel's initial claim covered any entitlement to permanent impairment compensation. Notwithstanding that, ADCO argued that the protection conferred by the Amendment Act's savings and transitional provisions was displaced by a transitional regulation made pursuant to those provisions. The transitional regulation was said to extend the disentitling operation of the amendments to claims for compensation made before 19 June 2012, except for claims which "specifically sought" permanent impairment compensation. The Court of Appeal held that the transitional regulation did not apply to extinguish Mr Goudappel's entitlement to permanent impairment compensation. By special leave, ADCO appealed to the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the High Court held that the transitional regulation was valid and applied to extinguish Mr Goudappel's entitlement to permanent impairment compensation. Mr Goudappel's initial claim was not a claim which "specifically sought" permanent impairment compensation. The regulation could not be interpreted so as to avoid its application to his entitlement.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 31 July 2008 W.R. CARPENTER HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION W.R. CARPENTER AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION Two companies which allegedly owe income tax in relation to various international transactions could not compel the Commissioner to provide certain information which they sought in connection with their appeals against their tax bills, the High Court of Australia held today. The WR Carpenter companies are members of Perth businessman Ric Stowe’s Griffin Group of companies. The group disputed 44 income tax assessment notices issued by the Australian Tax Office (ATO) in 2004 to seven members of the group in respect of income between 1986 and 2002, following an audit of the group. Decisions on 42 assessments are pending in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. With the other two, both involving international transactions, the Carpenter companies instituted proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia by way of appeal under the Taxation Administration Act (TAA). Those appeals are also still pending. Carpenter Holdings claimed that an assessment for 1986-87 was excessive while Carpenter Australia disputed the assessment for 1992-93. The 1987 assessment concerned a transaction in which Carpenter Holdings sold to the Cyprus-based Griffin company, Carpenter Holdings International Limited (CHIL), shares in other companies in the group. The cost was $129 million of which $79 million was to be paid after 15 years. CHIL was not charged any interest. The ATO deemed the interest that would have been due over that period was $167.3 million, including $17.9 million for 1986-87. The 1993 assessment involved loans by Carpenter Australia to a group company based in the United States. No interest was charged and the loans were written off in the 1993 and 1994 years. The ATO deemed total interest payable as $4.77 million, including $986,180 in 1992-93. It said tax was owed on both transactions as neither was carried out “at arm’s length”. Under the TAA, the companies had the burden of proving that assessments were excessive. By motions filed in the Federal Court on 19 May 2006, the Carpenter companies sought orders that the ATO provide certain particulars of matters taken into account in determinations that sections 136AD(1) or 136AD(2) of the Income Tax Assessment Act should apply to the international transactions so as to produce the interest deemed or imputed to have been paid to the companies. The motions were dismissed by Justice Kevin Lindgren on 20 September 2006. The ATO had already filed a statement outlining its contentions and the facts and issues in the case. Appeals to the Full Court against Justice Lindgren’s ruling were dismissed on 11 July 2007. The companies appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeals. It held that the requests for information made by the companies were not directed to any issue that arose in the appeals and that provision of the information as requested was neither necessary nor appropriate for the resolution of the issues in the appeals.