Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 4 November 2015 MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION v WZARH & ANOR [2015] HCA 40 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The High Court held that the first respondent was denied procedural fairness in the conduct of an Independent Merits Review ("IMR") of his Refugee Status Assessment ("RSA"). The first respondent is a Sri Lankan national of Tamil ethnicity. He entered Australia by boat in 2010, arriving at Christmas Island. In January 2011, he requested an RSA to determine whether he was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. A delegate of the appellant made an adverse assessment of the first respondent's claim to refugee status. In May 2011, the first respondent requested an IMR of the adverse RSA. In January 2012, he was interviewed by an independent merits reviewer. At the interview, the reviewer told the first respondent that she would undertake a re-hearing of his claims and make a recommendation to the appellant as to whether the first respondent was a refugee. The reviewer became unavailable to complete the IMR and a second reviewer assumed responsibility for its completion. The first respondent was not informed of the change in the identity of the reviewer. The second reviewer, the second respondent in this matter, did not conduct an interview with the first respondent, but based his decision on a consideration of certain materials, including the transcript and an audio recording of the first respondent's interview with the first reviewer. The second reviewer formed an adverse view of the first respondent's credibility, and did not accept that certain inconsistencies in the first respondent's account of his circumstances in Sri Lanka were due to memory lapse or confusion, or the effect of detention. The second reviewer recommended that the first respondent not be recognised as a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations. The first respondent applied to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for judicial review of the decision of the second reviewer, arguing that the second reviewer's failure to conduct an interview meant that he was denied procedural fairness. The primary judge dismissed the application. The first respondent appealed successfully to the Full Court of the Federal Court, a majority of which found that the first respondent had a legitimate expectation that the person by whom he had been interviewed would be the person to complete the IMR, and which found that, notwithstanding the change in identity of the reviewer, he was unfairly denied an opportunity to make submissions as to how the IMR should proceed. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously held that the first respondent was denied procedural fairness. The Court held that procedural fairness required that the first respondent be informed that the IMR process had changed so that he would have an opportunity to be heard on the question of how the IMR should proceed. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 August 2014 EDWARD POLLENTINE & ANOR v THE HONOURABLE JARROD PIETER BLEIJIE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND & ORS [2014] HCA 30 Today the High Court unanimously upheld the validity of s 18 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1945 (Q) which allows a trial judge to make directions for the indefinite detention of a person found guilty of an offence of a sexual nature committed upon or in relation to a child. Section 18 of the Act provides that a judge presiding at the trial of a person found guilty of an offence of a sexual nature committed upon or in relation to a child may direct that two or more medical practitioners inquire as to the mental condition of the offender, and in particular whether the offender "is incapable of exercising proper control over the offender's sexual instincts". The section provides that if the medical practitioners report to the judge that the offender "is incapable of exercising proper control over the offender's sexual instincts", the judge may, either in addition to or in lieu of imposing any other sentence, declare that the offender is so incapable and direct that the offender be detained in an institution "during Her Majesty's pleasure". An offender the subject of a direction to detain is not to be released until the Governor in Council is satisfied on the further report of two medical practitioners that it "is expedient to release the offender". In 1984 Edward Pollentine and Errol George Radan each pleaded guilty in the District Court of Queensland of sexual offences committed against children. In each case, on the report of two medical practitioners, the District Court declared that Mr Pollentine and Mr Radan were incapable of exercising proper control over their sexual instincts and directed that they be detained in an institution during Her Majesty's pleasure. Mr Pollentine and Mr Radan brought proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the High Court challenging the validity of s 18 of the Act on the ground that it was repugnant to or incompatible with the institutional integrity of the District Court, thereby infringing Ch III of the Constitution. The High Court upheld the validity of the provision. The Court held that while a court may direct the detention but not the release of an offender under s 18, the court has discretion whether to direct detention. Furthermore, release of an offender is not subject to the unconfined discretion of the Executive and does not lack sufficient safeguards. Rather, a decision to release is dependent upon medical opinion about the risk of an offender reoffending, and the decision is subject to judicial review. The Court held that the provision is not repugnant to or incompatible with that institutional integrity of the State courts which bespeaks their constitutionally mandated position in the Australian legal system.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 December 2010 AID/WATCH INCORPORATED v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION [2010] HCA 42 Today the High Court held that an organisation involved in promoting and campaigning for effective foreign aid policies through the generation of public debate was a charitable institution for the purpose of tax exemptions and concessions. Aid/Watch Incorporated is an organisation concerned with promoting the effectiveness of Australian and multinational aid provided in foreign countries by means which include investment programs, projects and policies. In October 2006, the Commissioner of Taxation revoked Aid/Watch's endorsements as a charitable institution for the purposes of income tax, fringe benefits tax and GST. In 2008, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal set aside the Commissioner's decision and determined that Aid/Watch was a charitable institution notwithstanding that it sought to influence government policy through its activities. The Full Court of the Federal Court allowed an appeal by the Commissioner, holding that because Aid/Watch's activities necessarily involved a criticism of government activities and policies, its main purpose was a political purpose and it could not therefore be categorised as a charitable institution. The High Court by majority allowed Aid/Watch's appeal from the Full Court's decision, and restored the decision of the AAT. The Court referred to authorities establishing that free communication on matters of government and politics is an indispensable incident of the system of representative and responsible government established by the Constitution. The Court stated that the generation by lawful means of public debate concerning the efficiency of foreign aid directed to the relief of poverty is itself a purpose beneficial to the community. It held that in Australia there is no broad general rule excluding "political objects" from charitable purposes, and that because Aid/Watch's activities contribute to the public welfare, it was entitled to be regarded as a charitable institution.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 24 April 2020 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v HELICOPTER RESOURCES PTY LTD & ORS [2020] HCA 16 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia concerning the compulsory examination of an employee in a coronial inquest while parallel criminal proceedings against his employer were pending. The appellant ("the Commonwealth") engaged the first respondent ("Helicopter Resources") to provide helicopter services in the Australian Antarctic Territory. On 12 January 2016, Captain Wood, a pilot employed by Helicopter Resources to provide some of those services, died from hypothermia after falling into a crevasse in the West Ice Shelf. An inquest into the manner and cause of his death was commenced on 19 September 2017 by the Chief Coroner of the Australian Capital Territory pursuant to the Coroners Act 1997 (ACT), which applies in the Australian Antarctic Territory. On 20 December 2017, the Commonwealth and Helicopter Resources were charged as co-accused with summary offences against the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth), which extends to the Australian Antarctic Territory. Two of the charges alleged breaches in relation to Captain Wood and another employee, and one arose directly out of the circumstances giving rise to Captain Wood's death. At the Commonwealth's request, the Coroner issued a subpoena pursuant to s 43 of the Coroners Act for Helicopter Resources' Chief Pilot, Captain Lomas, to attend to give evidence at the inquest. An application by Helicopter Resources to the Federal Court for judicial review of that decision was dismissed at first instance. Allowing an appeal, the Full Court held that compelling Captain Lomas to give evidence in the coronial inquest would infringe the rule that an accused cannot be required to assist the Crown in proving its case, because s 87(1)(b) of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) would make his evidence before the inquest admissible in the criminal proceedings as evidence of an admission by Helicopter Resources itself. Section 87(1)(b) relevantly entails that a representation by an employee of a party relating to a matter within the scope of the employee's employment may be taken as an admission by the party. By grant of special leave, the Commonwealth appealed to the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the High Court unanimously held that the fact that an employee can be compelled to give evidence that may be treated as an admission against his or her employer does not mean that the employer is compelled in effect to give evidence or otherwise to assist the Crown in proof of its case. By majority, the High Court refused to extend the time for Helicopter Resources to file a notice of contention alleging that compelling Captain Lomas to give evidence at the coronial inquest would constitute a contempt of court by creating a real risk of interference with justice according to law, on the basis that Helicopter Resources had been acquitted of the offences by the time of the hearing of the appeal and thus would suffer no prejudice in any event.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 28 May, 2003 DAVID HAROLD EASTMAN v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY, IAN PIKE, ATTORNEY-GENERAL (ACT) AND THE The High Court of Australia today unanimously allowed an appeal by Mr Eastman against a decision of the Federal Court blocking an inquiry into his fitness to plead to a charge of murder. Mr Eastman was convicted in 1995 of the 1989 murder of Australian Federal Police Assistant Commissioner Colin Winchester. During the ACT Supreme Court trial lasting almost six months, Mr Eastman was sometimes without legal representation and exhibited what the Full Court of the Federal Court described as erratic behaviour. He appealed unsuccessfully against his conviction as far as the High Court. Mr Eastman then petitioned the then ACT Chief Justice Jeffrey Miles for a judicial inquiry under section 475 of the ACT’s Crimes Act. In 2001, Chief Justice Miles appointed Mr Pike, a former New South Wales chief magistrate, to head an inquiry into Mr Eastman’s fitness to plead. Just before Mr Pike’s inquiry began taking evidence in 2002, the DPP began proceedings seeking a declaration that the inquiry was not authorised by s 475 and an injunction restraining Mr Pike from conducting it. Both actions were dismissed, but the Full Court of the Federal Court, by majority, allowed the DPP's appeal. Mr Eastman then appealed to the High Court. The question in the appeal was the construction of s 475, particularly the meaning of guilt. The DPP argued it referred only to the alleged wrongdoing that constituted the offence, not the process by which guilt was established. Mr Eastman and the ACT Attorney-General argued guilt meant guilt established by conviction, so that a doubt or question as to guilt could include matters affecting the process by which guilt was established, in particular fitness to plead. The High Court held that the latter meaning was what was intended by s 475 and that Chief Justice Miles’s decision to direct a s 475 inquiry was valid.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 7 April 2011 DANELLE EVELYN MILLER v MAURIN ASHTON MILLER [2011] HCA 9 Today the High Court allowed an appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia regarding the duty of care between joint participants in an illegal enterprise: the use of a stolen car. The events giving rise to the case took place early one morning in 1998. The plaintiff, then aged 16, had been drinking and wandering in the streets in a Perth suburb with her sister and cousins. She had no money to get home and the last train had left, so she decided to steal a car. She managed to start a car in a nightclub car park. An older cousin, the defendant, then aged 27, offered to drive the plaintiff and her cousin and sister home. He got into the driver's seat and several of his friends also got into the car, totalling nine passengers. Initially the defendant drove safely, but then sped up and began to drive dangerously. The plaintiff twice asked to be let out; the defendant refused her requests. The car struck a pole, killing one passenger and injuring the plaintiff, leaving her a tetraplegic. In jointly using the stolen car, the plaintiff and the defendant together contravened s 371A of The Criminal Code (WA) ("the Code"), which provides that a person who uses a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner is said to steal that vehicle. Section 8 of the Code provides that two persons who jointly prosecute a common unlawful purpose will both be guilty of any offence that is a probable consequence of that prosecution, unless one of those persons withdraws from the prosecution by words or conduct accompanied by reasonable steps to prevent the commission of the offence. Referring to s 371A and relevant case law, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia held that the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty of care and that her action should therefore fail. The HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA today held that whether the prosecution of a joint illegal enterprise negates the existence of a duty of care between participants depends on the statutory purposes of the section creating the offence. The Court held that the statutory purposes of s 371A of the Code are not consistent with a finding of duty of care between those who joined in committing the crime. The purposes of s 371A encompass not only the protection of property rights, but also road safety and the prevention of dangerous driving. In the circumstances of the case, however, a majority of the Court held that the plaintiff withdrew from the joint illegal enterprise when she asked to be let out of the car, and that there were no reasonable steps then available to her to prevent the further commission of the offence. Accordingly, she was owed a duty of care by the defendant when the car struck the pole, and could recover damages for her injuries. The Court allowed the appeal, and set aside the order of the Court of Appeal, ordering that the appeal to that Court be dismissed.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 November 2013 JOHN DALY v ALEXANDER THIERING & ORS [2013] HCA 45 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had held that s 130A of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) ("the MAC Act") did not preclude an award of damages in respect of the treatment and care needs of a participant in the Lifetime Care and Support Scheme ("the Scheme") where those needs had been met by services rendered gratuitously. On 28 October 2007, the first respondent suffered catastrophic and permanent injuries in a motor vehicle accident. Since that time, he has been a participant in the Scheme established under the Motor Accidents (Lifetime Care and Support) Act 2006 (NSW) and administered by the Lifetime Care and Support Authority of New South Wales ("the Authority"). Pursuant to arrangements between the Authority and the second respondent (the first respondent's mother), a significant part of the first respondent's domestic care provided for under the Scheme was undertaken gratuitously by the second respondent. The first respondent sued the appellant (the driver of the motor vehicle allegedly at fault) for damages in negligence, claiming, among other things, the value of the services provided by the second respondent. In reliance upon s 130A of the MAC Act, the appellant denied liability for that part of the claim on the basis that it was for economic loss in respect of the first respondent's treatment and care needs which were already provided for under the Scheme. The Court of Appeal held that, to the extent that the first respondent's treatment and care needs were not paid for, they were not provided for under the Scheme, and might therefore be regarded as economic loss compensable by an award of damages. The High Court held that s 130A of the MAC Act precluded participants in the Scheme from recovering damages for economic loss in respect of their treatment and care needs which were provided for under the Scheme, even though they were rendered gratuitously.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 April 2016 FISCHER & ORS v NEMESKE PTY LTD & ORS [2016] HCA 11 Today the High Court, by majority, dismissed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The High Court held that a trustee had validly exercised a power to "advance" and "apply" trust capital or income by creating a debt reflecting the value of shares held by the trustee at the time the advance was made. The appellants are beneficiaries of the Nemes Family Trust ("the Trust"), of which the first respondent, Nemeske Pty Ltd, is trustee ("the Trustee"). The Trust's principal assets are shares in a second company, Aladdin Ltd ("Aladdin"). In July 1994, the value of those shares, $3,904,300, was recorded in an "asset revaluation reserve". In September 1994, the Trustee passed a resolution which distributed the whole of the asset revaluation reserve to two other beneficiaries of the Trust, Mr Emery Nemes and Mrs Madeleine Nemes. In August 1995, the Trustee executed a deed purportedly charging the shares in Aladdin in Mr and Mrs Nemes' favour ("the Deed of Charge"). In the Deed of Charge, the Trustee recited that it was indebted to Mr and Mrs Nemes in the sum of $3,904,300, and covenanted that it would pay the amount of that debt upon their demand. Mr and Mrs Nemes both died before any demand was made. Mr Nemes bequeathed all the shares in the Trustee and in Aladdin to the appellants. The residuary estate was left to other persons. The appellants commenced proceedings against the Trustee, the executors of Mr Nemes' estate ("the executors") and other beneficiaries of the Trust, seeking declarations including that the distribution made from the Trust was of no effect or void. The executors cross-claimed, seeking payment of the amount allegedly owing to Mr Nemes' estate. The primary judge in the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the resolution was a valid exercise of the Trustee's power to advance and apply trust capital or income under the terms of the trust deed. That conclusion was upheld by the Court of Appeal, which also held that although there was no power to charge the shares, the covenant in the Deed of Charge confirmed that the debt owing to Mr and Mrs Nemes was payable on demand. By grant of special leave, the appellants appealed to the High Court. The majority of the High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the resolution was an effective exercise of the Trustee's power to advance and apply trust capital or income, notwithstanding that there was no change in the beneficial ownership of the shares. The majority held that the resolution created a creditor/debtor relationship, enforceable at law, between Mr and Mrs Nemes and the Trustee. Further, the covenant in the Deed of Charge supported the advance and application made by the Trustee's resolution.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 2 March 2006 TREVOR KINGSLEY FERDINANDS v COMMISSIONER FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT A South Australian police officer sacked after being convicted of a criminal offence did not have a right to appeal to the Industrial Relations Commission of SA, the High Court of Australia held today. The rights of police officers were governed by a separate legislative scheme. In March 2001, Mr Ferdinands was convicted of assaulting a man taken into custody for drink driving. In November 2001, the Police Commissioner terminated his employment as a police officer. Mr Ferdinands applied to the Industrial Relations Commission complaining of wrongful dismissal and seeking reinstatement. Both the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court and the Full Court of the Supreme Court held that the Industrial Relations Commission had no jurisdiction to deal with Mr Ferdinands' case. The two Courts held that the legislative scheme relating to appointment of police officers under the SA Police Act, and termination of their appointment, was not subject to review under the Industrial and Employee Relations Act (IER Act). Mr Ferdinands appealed to the High Court, which by a 4-1 majority dismissed the appeal. It held that the Police Act impliedly excluded operation of the IER Act, the earlier of the two Acts. The nature of the Police Act and its apparent exhaustive coverage of termination created an incompatibility with the IER Act's provisions on terminations that were harsh, unjust or unreasonable. Section 40 of the Police Act confers a range of powers, from counselling to termination, upon the Police Commissioner if an officer is found guilty of a State, Territory or Commonwealth offence. A decision to dismiss an officer under section 40 is subject to review by the Supreme Court, and the conviction itself is subject to the ordinary avenues of appeal. The Court held that the Police Act should be read as a comprehensive statement of the Commissioner's powers to terminate an officer's appointment, the matters to be taken into account in exercising that power, the availability of review, and the processes for review.