Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 20 October 2010 WORKCOVER QUEENSLAND v AMACA PTY LTD & ANOR [2010] HCA 34 Today the High Court unanimously held that limitations on damages recoverable by an estate suing on behalf of a deceased person under s 66 of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) ("the Succession Act") do not apply to a workers' compensation insurer seeking to recover from wrongdoers under the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ("the Compensation Act") compensation paid to a worker who died before the insurer's action came to trial. Mr Rex Noel Thomson was a worker who died in 2006 from malignant mesothelioma contracted as a result of inhaling asbestos in products manufactured by the respondents. Prior to his death, WorkCover Queensland paid to Mr Thomson the sum of $340,000 as compensation under the Compensation Act. Mr Thomson had not instituted any action for damages against either respondent before his death. WorkCover was consequently able to pursue its entitlement under s 207B(7)(a) of the Compensation Act to be indemnified by a wrongdoer to the extent of the wrongdoer's liability for the damages. Section 66(2) of the Succession Act operates to limit the damages recoverable where a cause of action survives a person's death for the benefit of that person's estate under s 66(1), by excluding matters such as damages for pain and suffering, for any bodily or mental harm or for curtailment of expectation of life. In a case stated for the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland, that Court considered that the Succession Act did operate to reduce the amount of the indemnity that WorkCover was entitled to claim in the circumstances. It held by majority that the extent of the indemnity was delineated by the statutory limitations which would operate if an action was pursued by the deceased's personal representative after death. The High Court allowed an appeal by WorkCover, holding that s 66(2) of the Succession Act operates as a limitation on the remedy available, which applies only to an action brought by the estate of the person in whose favour a liability existed. The Court held that the section does not operate to limit the liability of a wrongdoer towards the deceased person, and thus the quantum of WorkCover's indemnity was not reduced following Mr Thomson's death or the consequent impact of s 66(2) on any action which may have been brought by Mr Thomson's estate. The respondents were ordered to pay WorkCover's costs.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 April 2021 ALO-BRIDGET NAMOA v THE QUEEN [2021] HCA 13 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales ("the CCA"). The appeal concerned the interpretation of s 11.5(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) ("the Code"), which creates a statutory offence of conspiracy, and whether that offence applies to spouses who agree between themselves, and no other person, to commit an offence against a law of the Commonwealth. Following a trial by jury in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the appellant was convicted of conspiring to do acts in preparation for a terrorist act contrary to ss 11.5(1) and 101.6(1) of the Code. The offence occurred between 8 December 2015 and 25 January 2016. Prior to the trial, the trial judge rejected an application for a permanent stay which had been made on the basis that the appellant and her co-conspirator married on 30 December 2015, and, as husband and wife, could not be guilty of conspiracy under the Code. On 6 April 2020, the CCA held that on the clear language of the Code, a husband and wife are each a "person" and can be guilty of conspiring with each other within the meaning of s 11.5. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The Court upheld the CCA's decision, holding that the proper interpretation of s 11.5(1) of the Code is not affected by any common law rule that spouses alone cannot conspire. Irrespective of whether there is or was such a common law rule, that rule had not been incorporated into the offence in s 11.5 by the words "conspires" and "conspiracy". It was therefore unnecessary for the Court to consider whether the common law includes or included such a rule at any relevant time. The Court confirmed that whatever may have been the historical position, there is no longer any principle in Australian common law respecting the single legal personality of spouses. Section 11.5(1) applies to spouses who agree between themselves, and no other person, to commit an offence against a law of the Commonwealth. Accordingly, the offence in s 11.5 applied to the appellant and the appeal was dismissed.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA THE QUEEN v PHAM [2015] HCA 39 4 November 2015 Today the High Court unanimously held that the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria was wrong to determine that the respondent should be sentenced for a federal offence in accordance with current sentencing practices in Victorian courts, rather than current sentencing practices throughout the Commonwealth. The High Court also held that the Court of Appeal erred in its use of a statistical analysis of past sentences in finding that the respondent's sentence was manifestly excessive. In 2013, the respondent travelled to Vietnam from Australia. Upon his return to Melbourne Airport, flight crew informed officers of the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service that the respondent had required medical attention during the flight for a potential drug overdose, and that a crew member had found two clear plastic packages containing white powder in a bathroom that the respondent had used. Customs officers detained the respondent, who admitted under caution that the packages were his and that he guessed they contained heroin. Testing established that the packages contained heroin mixed with caffeine. The total weight of pure heroin was 577.1 grams. The respondent pleaded guilty to one count of importing a marketable quantity of a border controlled drug, contrary to s 307.2(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth). Under the Criminal Code, a marketable quantity of heroin is between two grams and 1.5 kilograms. He was convicted in the County Court of Victoria and sentenced to eight years and six months' imprisonment with a non- parole period of six years. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal against his sentence. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and re-sentenced the respondent to six years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of four years. The presiding judge of appeal said that the appellant pleaded guilty in the reasonable expectation that he would be sentenced in accordance with current sentencing practices in Victorian courts. The judge considered that, having regard to a statistical analysis which plotted the correlation between past sentences for drug couriers and the weight of the drug imported, the sentence imposed was outside the range of available sentences indicated by current Victorian sentencing practices. The other members of the Court of Appeal also took into account the statistical analysis in finding that the sentence was manifestly excessive. By grant of special leave, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously held that the need for sentencing consistency throughout Australia requires courts to have regard to sentencing practices across the country when sentencing federal offenders. Further, the Court of Appeal's use of the statistical analysis erroneously treated the weight of the drug imported as the only variable affecting the seriousness of past offences for the purpose of determining current sentencing practices. The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Court of Appeal for redetermination according to law.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 3 November 2010 SELECTED SEEDS PTY LTD v QBEMM PTY LIMITED & ORS [2010] HCA 37 The High Court today held an insurer could not rely upon an exclusion clause in an insurance policy to deny liability to its insured, a seed merchant, sued by a grower in connection with the supply of seed contaminated with a weed. The appeal involved the purchase and sale of Jarra grass seed, a type of livestock fodder. The appellant, a seed merchant, bought and sold a batch of Jarra grass seed unaware that it was contaminated with seed of Summer grass, a weed. The seed was purchased, planted, harvested and on-sold several times. With each progressive harvest, the presence of Summer grass seed increased. Seed traceable to the contaminated batch sold by the appellant was purchased by Mr and Mrs Shrimp. The Shrimps planted the seed for fodder. By this time, the seed was almost entirely Summer grass seed and the Shrimps reaped only Summer grass. They brought proceedings to recover for the damage to their land, and the appellant was eventually joined as a party to the proceedings. The Shrimps' claim was settled and the appellant sought indemnity from its insurer, the respondents, in respect of its contribution to settlement and its costs. The indemnity request was refused. In the proceedings brought by the appellant in the Supreme Court of Queensland to enforce its insurance policy, the respondents relied upon an efficacy clause in the policy. The clause excluded liability caused or arising from the failure of any product to correctly fulfil its intended use or function and/or meet the level of performance, quality, fitness or durability warranted or represented by the appellant. The trial judge found for the appellant, concluding that liability for damages arose not from what the product failed to do but from the damage it caused to the Shrimps' property. On appeal, the Queensland Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's decision, holding that the appellant's liability arose because the seed did not correctly fulfil its represented or warranted quality as Jarra grass seed or correctly fulfil its intended function of producing Jarra grass and seed. By special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. Today, the High Court overturned the Court of Appeal's decision. It held that the liability excluded by the efficacy clause was for property damage caused by or arising from a failure of a product to fulfil its use or function. The damage to the Shrimps' land did not arise out of the failure of the seeds that were sown to fulfil their intended use or function to produce Jarra grass and seed. Rather, the damage was caused by the introduction of Summer grass, a weed, to the land. The insurance policy held by the appellant with the respondents therefore covered the liability to the Shrimps.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 November 2004 HTW VALUERS (CENTRAL QLD) PTY LTD v ASTONLAND PTY LTD Damages of $406,194.60 for negligent real estate advice awarded to a couple who bought a shopping arcade were not excessive, the High Court of Australia held today. After moving to Mackay in central Queensland Lyn and John Foster decided to sell their Brisbane house and invest the proceeds and borrowings in commercial property with a better return. Astonland was the investment vehicle. Mrs Foster was the sole director of Astonland and she and her husband were the sole shareholders. Before buying Central Street Plaza, an arcade of eight shops in Sarina south of Mackay generating nearly $60,000 rent a year, the Fosters sought advice from Barry Deacon of HTW Valuers about the retail rental market in Sarina, including demand for tenancies and availability of tenants. Based on Mr Deacon’s advice that current rental levels were maintainable, Astonland entered a contract to buy the Plaza for $485,000 in April 1997 and completed the purchase in July. At this time the Beach Road Shopping Centre, a supermarket and 10 speciality shops, was under construction. It opened in mid-1998. Rentals for the Plaza collapsed from about March 1999, dropping to less than $16,000 a year later. Four shops had been vacant for up to 12 months, rent on another was heavily in arrears and rents on another two had fallen sharply. Astonland has been unable to sell the arcade. Astonland sued HTW Valuers in the Queensland Supreme Court. Justice Peter Dutney found the collapse in rentals was almost solely due to the opening of the Beach Road Shopping Centre. He found that Mr Deacon negligently failed to qualify his opinion by cautioning that the effect of the new shopping centre was uncertain. The duties breached were those created by the contract under which HTW was paid $250, by the law of tort in relation to negligent advice, and by section 52 of the Trade Practices Act in relation to misleading and deceptive conduct. In March 2000, Jeffrey Dodds, retained by Astonland, valued the Plaza at $130,000. Justice Dutney awarded Astonland $355,000, the difference between the price paid and the value it reached due to the effect of the Beach Road Shopping Centre, plus another $51,194.60, consisting of trading losses, additional purchase costs, refurbishments and interest. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from HTW against the $355,000 component of the damages award. HTW appealed to the High Court, which held that in assessing damages courts are not limited to assessing the risk as at April 1997 but are entitled to take account of how those risks later evolved into certainties. The cause of the decline in the value of the Plaza was not independent, extrinsic, supervening or accidental but lay in circumstances crucial to the value of the Plaza when Astonland acquired it, that is, the impending opening of the Beach Road Shopping Centre. The Court held that the damages figure was appropriate in all the circumstances. It unanimously dismissed the appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 16 November 2016 CASTLE v THE QUEEN; BUCCA v THE QUEEN [2016] HCA 46 Today the High Court unanimously allowed two appeals from the orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of South Australia dismissing the appellants' appeals against conviction for the murder of Adrian McDonald. The prosecution case at trial was that Castle lured the deceased to a meeting at which he was fatally shot by Bucca. The appellants' case was that the shooter was a man named Gange, who had died prior to the trial. Bucca and Gange both entertained hostility towards the deceased. Both had been looking for the deceased in the hours before the killing. The prosecution relied on the evidence of Gange's partner, M, to establish the agreement between the appellants to lure the deceased to the meeting and to prove that Gange had been at home with M at the time of the shooting. The prosecution also relied on the evidence of Pascoe that after the shooting she had heard Bucca say to her father: "he didn't mean to do it". Pascoe's evidence was left for the jury's consideration as capable of constituting an admission by Bucca that he was the shooter. The appellants appealed against their convictions to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeal found that Pascoe's answers in cross-examination and in re-examination unequivocally established that Bucca had been referring to a third person in his statement to her father. The Court said that the evidence was incapable of being viewed as an admission; its only effect was exculpatory and the trial judge erred in failing to so direct the jury. Nonetheless, the Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that the error had not occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice. The Court of Criminal Appeal considered that the other evidence "overwhelmed" the "admission", which was a minor part of the evidence and unlikely to have had any influence on the verdicts. The Court of Criminal Appeal was satisfied that the appellants' guilt had been proved beyond reasonable doubt. By grant of special leave, the appellants appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that the question the Court of Criminal Appeal should have asked itself was not whether the circumstantial case against the appellants overwhelmed the weight of the "admission", which properly understood was an exculpatory statement, but whether the jury might regard the statement as itself a sufficient basis to entertain a doubt as to the strength of the circumstantial case. The Court of Criminal Appeal's conclusion that guilt had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt relied on acceptance of M's disputed oral evidence. The natural limitations of an appellate court proceeding on the record of the trial precluded that conclusion. Accordingly, there had been a substantial miscarriage of justice. The appellants' convictions were quashed and new trials ordered.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 27 February 2013 ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA v CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF ADELAIDE & ORS [2013] HCA 3 Today a majority of the High Court allowed an appeal against a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, which had held that a by-law made by the Corporation of the City of Adelaide ("the Council") infringed the implied constitutional freedom of communication on government and political matters. Certain provisions of the by-law prohibited persons from preaching or distributing printed matter on any road to any bystander or passer-by without permission ("the impugned provisions"). The second and third respondents, Caleb and Samuel Corneloup ("the Corneloups"), were members of an association, "Street Church". They wished to preach in the streets of the City of Adelaide. The Corneloups each commenced proceedings in the District Court of South Australia, seeking a declaration that the impugned provisions were invalid. The District Court declared that parts of the impugned provisions exceeded the by-law making powers conferred on the Council by the Local Government Act 1934 (SA) and the Local Government Act 1999 (SA) ("the Local Government Acts"). The Full Court dismissed an appeal from the District Court's decision. Although the Full Court held that the impugned provisions were not invalid for want of compliance with the Local Government Acts, the Full Court held that they infringed the implied constitutional freedom of communication on government and political matters and were therefore invalid. By grant of special leave, the Attorney-General for South Australia (who was a party to the appeal in the Full Court) appealed to the High Court. A majority of the High Court held that the Local Government Acts empowered the Council to make the impugned provisions. The impugned provisions were a valid exercise of the Council's statutory power to make by-laws for the good rule and government of the area, and for the convenience, comfort and safety of its inhabitants. The majority also rejected the contention that the impugned provisions were constitutionally invalid. Although the impugned provisions effectively burdened political communication, they did not infringe the implied constitutional freedom. The impugned provisions served a legitimate end in a manner compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 4 August 2021 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v ZU NENG SHI [2021] HCA 22 Today, the High Court allowed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia ("the Full Court") dismissing an appeal from a decision of the Federal Court refusing to make an order under s 128A(6) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) that a privilege affidavit be filed ("the Commissioner"). and the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation served The Commissioner obtained orders in the Federal Court freezing the worldwide assets of the respondent ("Mr Shi"). Ancillary orders required Mr Shi to disclose matters relating to the assets ("the disclosure order"). Section 128A(2) provides that if a person subject to a disclosure order objects to complying with it on the grounds of the privilege against self-incrimination, the person must prepare an affidavit containing the information to which the objection is taken ("privilege affidavit"). If the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, s 128A(5) provides that the court must not require the information in the privilege affidavit to be disclosed, subject to an exception in s 128A(6). Under s 128A(6) the court may order that the privilege affidavit, in whole or in part, be disclosed if satisfied that, (a) any information in it may tend to prove that the person has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law; and (b) the information does not tend to prove that the person has committed an offence against or arising under, a law of a foreign country; and (c) the interests of justice require the information to be disclosed. Mr Shi objected to complying with part of the disclosure order on the grounds of self- incrimination. The primary judge was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for the objection and was also satisfied of the matters in s 128A(6)(a) and (b) but held that because there were other means by which the Commissioner could obtain the information in the privilege affidavit, the interests of justice did not require it to be disclosed. On appeal, the Full Court, by majority, upheld the primary judge's holding that the interests of justice did not require disclosure, taking into account other available ways that the information could be obtained. The High Court, by majority, allowed the appeal. The Court held that the Full Court and the primary judge took an irrelevant consideration into account in failing to be satisfied that the interests of justice required disclosure of the information in the privilege affidavit. The inquiry mandated by s 128A(6)(c) proceeds on the premise that, as part of or in connection with an extant freezing or search order in a civil proceeding, there is an extant disclosure order operating to require provision of the information. No part of the inquiry is to question whether information required to be provided in compliance with that extant disclosure order would more appropriately be obtained through some other compulsory process.