Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 1 February 2007 ALAN DAVID JOHN KLEIN v MINISTER FOR EDUCATION The High Court of Australia today revoked its grant to former Perth security guard Mr Klein of special leave to appeal. Mr Klein worked for Falcon Investigations and Security, which had a contract with the Minister to provide security for designated public schools in the State. On the night of 1 November 1999, while patrolling Perth schools, he was called to a primary school where a youth was smashing windows. Chasing the intruder through knee-high grass in the school grounds, Mr Klein fell. His injuries included a broken kneecap. He was unable to continue to work for Falcon. Mr Klein brought an action against the Minister in the WA District Court under the Occupiers’ Liability Act. The Minister argued he was a deemed employer under section 175(1) of the then Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act. He relied on the 2002 decision by the Full Court of the WA Supreme Court, Hewitt v Benale Pty Ltd, that the deeming by section 175(1) of both principal and contractor as employers meant that the constraints on damages in the Act applied to injured workers bringing action, independently of the Act, against a person who was deemed by section 175 to be their employer. Mr Klein argued that, because section 175(3) provided that a principal contractor was not liable unless the work on which the worker was employed was directly a part or process in the principal’s trade or business, the Occupiers’ Liability Act applied. The District Court held that provision of security services was not work which is directly a part or process in the trade or business of the Minister and the Minister had a duty as an occupier of land to protect entrants in respect of the state of the premises under the Occupiers’ Liability Act. Mr Klein was awarded damages of $100,187. The WA Court of Appeal allowed the Minister’s appeal, holding that maintaining government schools, including securing them, was to be treated as the trade or business of the Minister and Mr Klein’s work was directly a part of that trade or business. Mr Klein was then granted special leave to appeal to the High Court in relation to the construction of section 175. The Court, by a 3-2 majority, revoked the special leave to appeal granted to Mr Klein. The minority would not have revoked special leave but would have dismissed the appeal. In 2004, the WA Parliament amended the Act to prevent section 175 curtailing the rights of workers to make claims against such persons independently of the Act. The majority held that the Parliament’s reliance on the correctness of Hewitt v Benale Pty Ltd, coupled with the closing of the class of cases in which issues of the kind raised in this case, make it inappropriate for the High Court now to consider whether to disturb the state of the law as stated in Hewitt.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 December 2020 UMINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS v DUA16 & ANOR; MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS v CHK16 & ANOR [2020] HCA 46 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal in Minister for Home Affairs v CHK16 & Anor and allowed the appeal in Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 & Anor. CHK16 and DUA16 each paid a registered migration agent to provide submissions on their behalf to the Immigration Assessment Authority ("the Authority"). The agent acted fraudulently by providing pro forma submissions to the Authority and concealing this fact from her clients in the belief that, if she disclosed this fact, her clients would not have paid for her professional services. In CHK16's case the entirety of the personal circumstances referred to in the submissions concerned the wrong person; they contained no personal information relevant to CHK16's claims. In DUA16's case the submissions contained some personal information that was relevant to DUA16's claims, but they also contained information that related to a different applicant. In both cases the Authority was unaware of the agent's fraud, but noticed that the submissions contained information that concerned another individual and disregarded this information. effect on The Federal Circuit Court set aside the Authority's decision in both cases on the basis that the performance of the Authority's functions had been stultified by the agent's conduct. An appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court was dismissed by a majority of that Court. The Minister appealed to the High Court on the basis that the agent's fraud had not been shown to have had any the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). By notices of contention each of CHK16 and DUA16 argued that the Full Court's decision should be upheld because it was legally unreasonable for the Authority not to have exercised its power to obtain corrected submissions, involving potentially new information, from the agent when it knew that the submissions concerned the wrong person in whole or in part. the Authority under Pt 7AA of function of statutory The High Court held that the agent's fraud did not vitiate the Authority's decision because it had not been shown that the agent's fraud had affected a particular duty, function, or power of the Authority. However, the Court upheld the notice of contention in CHK16's case, concluding that it was legally unreasonable for the Authority to have failed to request submissions pursuant to s 473DC of the Migration Act in circumstances where it was aware that CHK16 intended to provide submissions, that those submissions might contain new information, and that the submissions in fact provided concerned the personal circumstances of another individual entirely. There was no such unreasonableness in DUA16's case because the Authority drew the reasonable conclusion that the information relating to another individual had been included by mistake.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 30 May 2012 PGA v THE QUEEN [2012] HCA 21 Today the High Court by majority dismissed an appeal from the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, which had held that a husband could be guilty of rape of his wife in 1963. In 2010, the appellant was charged with a number of criminal offences including two counts of rape. It was alleged that in 1963 the appellant raped his then wife, with whom he lived at the time. In 1963, s 48 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ("the CLC Act") criminalised rape but did not define the elements of the offence. Those elements were supplied by the common law. Legislative amendments in South Australia, which removed the limitation period in respect of offences against s 48, permitted the prosecution of the appellant despite the lapse of time between 1963 and 2010. A Judge of the District Court of South Australia stayed the trial of the appellant and reserved for determination by the Full Court the following question of law: "Was the offence of rape by one lawful spouse of another ... an offence known to the law of South Australia as at 1963?" A majority of the Full Court answered that the appellant could be guilty of rape of his wife in 1963. By special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court seeking to set aside this answer to the reserved question of law. In the Full Court and in the High Court, the appellant argued that until the High Court's decision in R v L (1991) 174 CLR 379, the common law with respect to rape in marriage was correctly stated by Sir Matthew Hale. In 1736, Hale wrote that a husband could not be guilty of raping his wife because, by marriage, she gave her irrevocable consent to intercourse. In 1991, the High Court in R v L held that, if it was ever a part of the common law of Australia that by marriage a wife gave irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse with her husband, this was no longer a part of the common law by 1991. A majority of the High Court dismissed the appeal. The majority held that if the marital exemption to rape was ever a part of the common law of Australia, it had ceased to be so at least by the time of the enactment of s 48 of the CLC Act in 1935. Local statute law, including legislation about divorce, property and voting, had removed any basis for the acceptance of Hale's proposition as a part of the common law applicable in Australia in 1963. The majority emphasised that this conclusion involved no retrospective variation or modification of a settled rule of the common law of Australia.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 7 October 2015 ALCAN GOVE PTY LTD v ZABIC [2015] HCA 33 Today the High Court published its reasons for dismissing an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Northern Territory of Australia. The High Court unanimously held that the respondent was not statute-barred from suing the appellant in negligence in respect of mesothelioma he contracted as a result of inhaling asbestos fibres during his employment with the appellant. The respondent was employed as a labourer at the appellant's alumina refinery from 1974 to 1977. Around late 2013 or early 2014, he began to experience symptoms of mesothelioma. The Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act (NT) ("the Act") abolished common law actions in negligence with respect to certain workplace injuries and provided for limited statutory rights to compensation for injured workers. Sections 52(1) and 189(1) of the Act provided, in effect, that the respondent could not sue the appellant for damages in negligence unless his cause of action accrued before 1 January 1987. The respondent commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia. The main issue in dispute was whether the respondent had suffered compensable damage before 1 January 1987. The evidence at trial was that the asbestos fibres that the respondent inhaled while working at the refinery caused changes to his mesothelial cells soon after the inhalation, which ultimately culminated in malignant mesothelioma. The changes to the cells were likely to have lain dormant until one to five years before the first manifestation of symptoms. At that point, an unknown "trigger" set off the development of abnormal genetic switches in the respondent's mesothelial cells that resulted in malignancy. The respondent's claim was dismissed at trial, but the Court of Appeal allowed the respondent's appeal. The Court of Appeal held that, with the benefit of hindsight, it was possible to infer that the mesothelial cell changes that occurred soon after exposure to asbestos between 1974 and 1977 led inevitably and inexorably to the onset of mesothelioma. The respondent's cause of action therefore arose before 1 January 1987. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. On 12 August 2015, the High Court published an order dismissing the appeal. In its reasons published today, the Court unanimously held that, on the evidence given at trial, it could be inferred that the "trigger" which led to mesothelioma was present in the respondent's mesothelial cells when the initial changes to the cells occurred. It followed that, because the mesothelial cell changes were bound to lead to mesothelioma, the respondent had suffered compensable damage at the time of the cell changes. His cause of action in negligence therefore arose before 1 January 1987 and his claim against the appellant was not barred by the Act.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 30 March 2011 NOELENE MARGARET EDWARDS & ORS v SANTOS LIMITED & ORS [2011] HCA 8 Today the High Court issued a writ of certiorari to quash decisions of the Federal Court of Australia which had dismissed proceedings instituted by registered native title claimants arising out of negotiations for an Indigenous Land Use Agreement ("ILUA") under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ("the NTA"). The plaintiffs are members of the Wongkumara People. The land the subject of their native title claim is in Queensland and New South Wales. Two of the defendants hold an authority to prospect in respect of land in Queensland falling within the boundaries of the claimed land ("the petroleum defendants"). The authority to prospect was granted by the second defendant, the State of Queensland, under the Petroleum Act 1923 (Q). Section 40 of the Petroleum Act entitled the holder of an authority to prospect to the lease of land for petroleum exploration (a "production lease"). The Wongkumara People and the petroleum defendants negotiated entry into an ILUA in relation to future grants which might be "future acts" within the meaning of the NTA. The petroleum defendants asserted that the authority to prospect which they held pre-dated the NTA and that any production leases emanating from the authority to prospect would be "pre-existing rights based acts" and not subject to the "right to negotiate" under the NTA. The plaintiffs took issue with the contention that the production leases would be pre-existing rights based acts and instituted proceedings in the Federal Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs' claim was summarily dismissed under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) on the ground that the application had no reasonable prospect of success and that the Federal Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the application. The Full Federal Court refused leave to appeal from the orders of the primary judge. Section 33(4B)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act precluded the plaintiffs from seeking special leave to appeal to the High Court against the Full Court's decision. Accordingly, the plaintiffs applied, in the High Court's original jurisdiction, for the issue of writs pursuant to s 75(v) of the Constitution in relation to the Federal Court decisions. The High Court held that the Federal Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the plaintiffs' application because there had been a "matter" arising under a federal enactment, namely, the NTA, the plaintiffs had not sought an advisory opinion and the plaintiffs had standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief. The Federal Court had wrongfully denied its jurisdiction and thereby fell into jurisdictional error attracting a writ of certiorari to quash its decisions. A majority of the High Court additionally considered that an order in favour of the plaintiffs should be made for the costs of the Federal Court proceedings under the High Court's power in s 32 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to grant remedies in the cause or matter before it to completely and finally determine so far as is possible all matters in controversy between the parties.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 March 2016 MORETON BAY REGIONAL COUNCIL v MEKPINE PTY LTD [2016] HCA 7 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The High Court held that the respondent ("Mekpine"), the holder of a retail lease in a shopping centre on certain land ("former Lot 6") that was later amalgamated with an adjacent lot of land ("former Lot 1"), did not acquire an interest over the entire amalgamated lot ("new Lot 1"). Accordingly, the High Court held that Mekpine was not entitled to compensation under the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Q) when part of new Lot 1 that was previously part of former Lot 1 was resumed by the appellant ("the Council"). Mekpine entered into a retail lease in a shopping centre. The terms of the lease relevantly gave Mekpine an entitlement to use the "Common Areas" of the "Land". "Land" was defined in the lease as former Lot 6. The lessor later purchased former Lot 1. In accordance with planning approval to extend the shopping centre, former Lot 6 was amalgamated with former Lot 1 by the registration of a plan of subdivision that created new Lot 1. Subsequently, the Council resumed a strip of vacant land from part of new Lot 1 that was previously part of former Lot 1 ("the Resumed Land"). The Resumed Land was never part of former Lot 6. Mekpine brought proceedings in the Land Court of Queensland seeking compensation on the basis that it gained an interest in the Resumed Land upon registration of the plan of subdivision that created new Lot 1. In the alternative, Mekpine claimed it had an interest in the Resumed Land because the definition of "Common Areas" in the lease was inconsistent with, and should be substituted by, the broader definition of "common areas" in the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Q) ("the RSLA"). The Land Court upheld Mekpine's claim for compensation. The Land Appeal Court of Queensland allowed the Council's appeal from the Land Court's judgment, concluding that the amalgamation of former Lot 1 with former Lot 6 did not confer on Mekpine any interest beyond the land previously comprised in former Lot 6. Mekpine appealed to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland and the appeal was allowed. The Court of Appeal held that Mekpine had an interest in the Resumed Land because, on registration of the plan of subdivision that created new Lot 1, the reference to "Land" in the lease became a reference to new Lot 1. It also held that the RSLA, in effect, amended the lease so that the "Common Areas" as defined in the lease became the "common areas" in new Lot 1. By grant of special leave, the Council appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal, holding that, despite the registration of the plan of subdivision that created new Lot 1, the terms of the lease confined Mekpine's interest to so much of new Lot 1 as had previously been comprised in former Lot 6. The Court also held that the RSLA definition of "common areas" did not supplant the definition of "Common Areas" in the lease to give Mekpine a compensable interest in the Resumed Land.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 21 October 2005 GREG COMBET AND NICOLA ROXON MP v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AND THE HONOURABLE KEVIN ANDREWS MP AND SENATOR THE HONOURABLE The Federal Government’s expenditure on its advertising campaign to promote its proposed industrial relations reforms was permitted by the Appropriation Act (No 1) 2005-2006, the High Court of Australia held today. Prime Minister John Howard announced the workplace reform package on 26 May 2005 and the ACTU immediately began a national campaign of rallies and advertising. On 9 July 2005 the Federal Government began a newspaper, television and radio advertising campaign. Mr Combet, the secretary of the ACTU, and Ms Roxon, the shadow attorney-general, contended that expenditure of public money on the advertisements was unlawful. The High Court handed down its orders on 29 September 2005, after hearing Mr Combet and Ms Roxon’s challenge on 29 and 30 August, and today handed down its written reasons for those orders. The Court, by a 5-2 majority, held that Mr Combet and Ms Roxon had not made out a case for the relief sought. They had sought declarations that paying for the advertisements and the drawing of money for those payments were not authorised and also an injunction restraining any further drawing of money. A majority of the Court held that it had not been shown that the drawings were not covered by the Appropriation Act and, in particular, the terms of Schedule 1 to that Act relating to the Employment and Workplace Relations portfolio.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 April 2005 NUHA JAMIL KOEHLER v CEREBOS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED Cerebos was not liable for a psychiatric condition suffered by Ms Koehler as Cerebos had no reason to suspect that her working conditions were a risk to her psychiatric health, the High Court of Australia held today. Ms Koehler, 50, claimed she was unable to cope with the workload she was given in her three-day- a-week job as a merchandiser, setting up displays of goods in Perth supermarkets. She had worked as a full-time sales representative for 18 months, negotiating sales of Cerebos’s products to independent supermarkets. When Cerebos lost the right to distribute a brand of tea, it retrenched Ms Koehler but offered her the part-time merchandising job. On her first day when she was shown the list of stores for which she would be responsible she said she could not possibly cover them all in three days, but her supervisor asked her to try it for a month. Ms Koehler repeatedly complained orally and in writing that she had too big an area, too many stores and too little time, and suggested ways to improve the situation, but never mentioned that the work was affecting her health. After five months in the new position she consulted her doctor about aches and pains from lifting boxes of goods. Ms Koehler was eventually diagnosed with fibromyalgia syndrome, a psycho-physical disorder resulting in severe pain, and a depressive illness, both caused by her work. Ms Koehler sued Cerebos, alleging its failure to take the steps she suggested breached its duty to provide a safe system of work. This duty was a common law duty giving rise to the negligence claim, a duty under the Occupational Safety and Health Act and an implied term of her employment contract. Commissioner Rodney Greaves in the Western Australian District Court found Ms Koehler’s workload was excessive, that Cerebos needed no particular expertise to foresee the risk of the kind of injury suffered, and that Cerebos failed in its duty to ensure all reasonable steps were taken to provide a safe system of work. Ms Koehler was awarded damages of $856,742.81. On appeal, the Full Court of the WA Supreme Court held that Cerebos could not reasonably have foreseen that Ms Koehler’s duties exposed her to a risk of psychiatric injury. Ms Koehler appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It held that a reasonable person in the position of Cerebos would not have foreseen the risk of psychiatric injury to Ms Koehler. She had agreed to perform the duties which caused her injury and Cerebos had no reason to suspect that she susceptible to psychiatric injury. Within the bounds of applicable statutes, parties are free to contract so that an employee will do more work than may be the industry standard, often rewarded with higher pay. Employers are entitled to assume, in the absence of signs warning of the possibility of psychiatric injury, that employees can do the job. There was no indication that Ms Koehler had any particular vulnerability. Her complaints suggested an industrial relations problem rather than a health risk. Cerebos was not shown to have breached a duty of care.