Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 5 August, 2003 IAN WAYNE GIBBS AND PARAGLIDE PTY LTD v MERCANTILE MUTUAL INSURANCE (AUSTRALIA) LTD A parasailing company cannot claim on its insurance policy to cover injuries to a customer after the High Court of Australia today held that the policy was covered by the federal Marine Insurance Act, rather than the Insurance Contracts Act. The High Court, by a 3-2 majority, upheld a decision of the Full Court of the Western Australian Supreme Court that the Marine Insurance Act applied. Helen Morrell was seriously injured on January 30, 1989, when the power boat driven by Mr Gibbs came too close to Heirisson Island in Perth's Swan River and she was dragged through trees. Mr Gibbs and Paraglide did not inform Mercantile of the accident for another four years and had also not informed Mercantile of another accident in February 1988. Paraglide ceased trading in January 1990. Mrs Morrell successfully sued Mr Gibbs and Paraglide. They sought indemnity under the policy but Mercantile denied liability. Mr Gibbs and Paraglide claimed the policy was for public liability, not marine losses, and that the accident was unrelated to the sea, and so was covered by the Insurance Contracts Act. The failure to give timely notice to Mercantile may not then have barred a claim for indemnity. The WA District Court held that the policy was not a contract for marine insurance. This decision was reversed by the Full Court of the WA Supreme Court. Mr Gibbs and Paraglide then appealed to the High Court. The majority of the Court held that the cover provided by the policy was for liability arising from events occurring during the navigation of the boat and from exposure to maritime perils. Indemnity against legal liability to third parties had long been a form of marine insurance. Careless operation of the boat that caused Mrs Morrell to crash into trees was a form of maritime peril. The policy was one for marine insurance and the Marine Insurance Act applied.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Manager, Public Information 21 April 2009 Today, the High Court allowed Mr Carroll’s appeal and remitted to the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales for reconsideration the Director of Public Prosecution’s appeal against the sentence imposed on Mr Carroll for his plea of guilty to manslaughter. The decision of the five member High Court was unanimous. One evening in May 2007 Mr Carroll and his friends left a hotel at about the same time as Mr Criniti. A dispute arose between some members of the group and Mr Criniti and Mr Criniti made some threats to harm them. Mr Carroll responded by head-butting Mr Criniti, who fell backwards onto the road and hit the back of his head on the roadway. Ten days later Mr Criniti died. Mr Carroll pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced by a judge of the District Court of New South Wales to a three-year term of imprisonment, to be served by way of periodic detention, with a non-parole period of 18 months. The sentencing judge gave detailed reasons for that decision. The DPP appealed against that sentence to the Court of Criminal Appeal and submitted that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. By majority, the Court of Criminal Appeal accepted the submissions put by the DPP and re-sentenced Mr Carroll to a period of full- time incarceration. Mr Carroll was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court on the question of whether the majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in concluding that the sentence imposed by the primary judge was manifestly inadequate. The High Court found that the majority in the Court of Criminal Appeal was wrong to assess the adequacy of the sentence on the footing that Mr Carroll should not have been provoked by Mr Criniti’s conduct. The primary judge had found that Mr Carroll had been subject to some provocation and the Crown had not challenged this finding. Secondly, the High Court said that it was an error for the Court of Criminal Appeal to assess the seriousness of the offence by characterising it as one in which “severe injury was clearly foreseeable and death at least a possibility”. Mr Carroll’s admission of guilt acknowledged no more than that his act in striking Mr Criniti carried an appreciable risk of serious injury. The High Court remitted the DPP’s appeal against the inadequacy of the sentence to the Court of Criminal Appeal for determination because the task of deciding that question is better undertaken by that Court.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 4 March 2003 THE QUEEN v SIPAI SOMA The High Court of Australia today dismissed a prosecution appeal against a decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal, quashing Mr Soma’s conviction on the ground that the prosecution had impermissibly split its case at trial and ordering a new trial. Mr Soma had been charged with rape. He admitted to having had carnal knowledge of the complainant, but claimed that he had acted with the complainant's consent. During an interview with police, which was tape-recorded, Mr Soma gave an account of what happened between him and the complainant on the night of the alleged rape. At trial, when it presented its case, the prosecution did not lead any evidence of Mr Soma’s police interview. When Mr Soma then gave evidence in his defence, extracts from the tape-recorded police interview became the subject of cross-examination and the recorded interview was tendered in evidence. Mr Soma appealed. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. The prosecutor then appealed to the High Court, arguing that the Court of Appeal had failed to give proper effect to certain provisions of Queensland’s Evidence Act. By majority, the High Court dismissed the appeal, applying the general principle that the prosecution must offer all its proof during the progress of its case. The Evidence Act provisions do not modify this general principle.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 10 April, 2003 ANTHONY GORDON OATES v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA The High Court of Australia dismissed Oates’s appeal against extradition from Poland on March 4 and today handed down its reasons for judgment. Oates, a former Bond Corporation executive, is accused under the Western Australian Criminal Code of one count of conspiracy to defraud, and under the WA Companies Code of eight counts of improper use of his position as a company director and eight counts of acting dishonestly as a company director. He has lived in Poland since 1991. In response to Australia’s extradition request, Oates was arrested by Polish authorities in October 1996 and held in custody for seven months. He sought leave to appeal in the High Court from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court that the extradition request was valid. In his application for special leave to appeal, Oates sought a declaration that the extradition request was invalid. He claimed the offences were not among those listed in the 1932 extradition treaty between Poland and the United Kingdom on Australia and New Zealand’s behalf. (A new Australia- Poland treaty took effect in 1999, but the relevant events took place when the first treaty was in operative.) The High Court found it unnecessary to decide that issue. The Court held that neither a UK Order in Council (by which the 1932 treaty became applicable in Australia), nor the treaty itself, nor Australia’s Extradition (Foreign States) Act imposed any limitations, conditions, exceptions or qualifications which affected the Attorney-General’s power to
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 November 2021 [2021] HCA 36 Today, the High Court dismissed an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeal concerned whether certain questions asked by the Crown prosecutor in cross-examination of the appellant were impermissible and prejudicial such that they resulted in a miscarriage of justice within s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). It also concerned whether the trial miscarried on account of the alleged incompetence of the appellant's counsel. The Court then considered whether, despite those errors, the proviso in s 6(1) applied, in that no substantial miscarriage of justice actually occurred. The appellant was convicted of eight counts of having sexual intercourse with another person knowing that the other person does not consent. The offences were committed against two complainants on consecutive days in similar circumstances. The appellant's belief as to consent was the key issue at trial and accordingly his credibility was important. During cross-examination of the appellant, it became apparent that certain of his evidence which contradicted that of the complainants had not been put to them by defence counsel for comment, in breach of the rule in Browne v Dunn. On each occasion, the prosecutor asked the appellant to acknowledge the omission. In respect of two of these omissions, the prosecutor put to the appellant that those aspects of his evidence were, in effect, of recent invention. Defence counsel did not pursue objections to these suggestions of recent invention and the trial judge did not direct the jury as to the use which could be made of this evidence. The High Court unanimously held that the prosecutor's questioning amounted to a miscarriage of justice. The questioning was highly prejudicial because, absent any directions from the trial judge, there was a real chance that the jury may have assumed that the appellant had recently made up his story and rejected his evidence as not credible. The Court found it unnecessary to consider whether the inaction of the appellant's counsel separately resulted in a miscarriage. However, a majority of the Court held that the proviso in s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act applied because no substantial miscarriage of justice had actually occurred. In applying the proviso, an appellate court must decide whether, notwithstanding the error, guilt was proved to the criminal standard on the admissible evidence at the trial that was had. Here, the appellant's evidence was so glaringly improbable as to be incapable of belief, such that it could not have given rise to a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Nor was this a case where there had been a failure of process that involved a serious breach of the presuppositions of the trial, such that the proviso could not be applied; rather, the Crown's impermissible contention of recent invention was of little significance in the determination of the real issue in the trial.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 February 2014 PASQUALE BARBARO v THE QUEEN [2014] HCA 2 Today the High Court rejected the argument of Mr Barbaro and Mr Zirilli (the applicants) that they suffered unfairness at their sentencing hearing because the sentencing judge refused to receive any submission from the prosecution about what range of sentences could be imposed on each applicant. The High Court held, by majority, that the practice in Victoria of permitting or requiring counsel for the prosecution, in certain circumstances, to make a submission as to the available range of sentences for an offence is wrong in principle and should cease. The applicants each pleaded guilty in the Supreme Court of Victoria to three offences: conspiring to traffic a commercial quantity of MDMA, trafficking a commercial quantity of MDMA and attempting to possess a commercial quantity of cocaine. They agreed to enter pleas of guilty in relation to those offences following discussions between their lawyers and the prosecution. During those discussions, the prosecution expressed its view as to the range of sentences that might be imposed on each applicant. In R v MacNeil-Brown (2008) 20 VR 677, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria held that if a sentencing judge asked, the prosecution was bound to submit what the prosecution considered to be the available range of sentences that could be imposed on an offender. At the applicants' sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge made it plain that she did not intend to ask any party for submissions about sentencing range. Counsel for the prosecution, therefore, made no submission about what range of sentences could be imposed. Mr Barbaro was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 30 years. Mr Zirilli was sentenced to 26 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years. The applicants sought to challenge their sentences in the Court of Appeal on the basis (among others) that it was procedurally unfair for the sentencing judge to have refused to hear a submission from the prosecution on the available range of sentences in light of the discussions between the applicants and the prosecution. The Court of Appeal rejected this challenge to the sentences. By special leave, the applicants appealed to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeals. The Court held, by majority, that it is neither the role nor the duty of the prosecution to proffer some statement of the bounds within which a sentence may be imposed. It is for the sentencing judge alone to decide what sentence will be imposed. The practice which resulted from the decision in MacNeil-Brown was therefore wrong in principle and should cease. The Court held that because the prosecution's submission as to an available sentencing range is no more than a statement of opinion, it was not unfair for the sentencing judge to have refused to receive such a submission. The Court also held that this refusal did not amount to a failure to take into account a relevant consideration in sentencing the applicants.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 4 December, 2003 BRADLEY JOHN DOSSETT v TKJ NOMINEES PTY LTD The High Court of Australia today allowed an appeal by an injured worker after courts in Western Australia held he could not take action against his employer because of a change in the law. Mr Dossett suffered back and shoulder injuries in 1996 while operating a front-end loader at the Moore River limestone quarry. At that time, he required the leave of the WA District Court to commence proceedings at common law to recover damages for personal injury if there was a serious disability. On 1 July 1998, by originating summons filed in the Court, Mr Dossett sought such leave under section 93D of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1981. The application was listed for hearing on 8 October 1999, but on 5 October the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Amendment Act received royal assent and came into effect. The amendment Act replaced several sections including section 93D. A transitional provision, section 32, said the new Act did not apply to proceedings commenced before 5 October, or to proceedings where the District Court had already given leave. Mr Dossett said he was entitled to proceed under the earlier regime even though his application did not fall within section 32, because his application was saved by section 37 of the Interpretation Act. This provides that a repeal does not affect any legal proceeding in respect of a right created under an earlier proceeding so that the proceeding may be continued as if the repeal had not happened. The District Court held that it lacked power to grant leave to commence proceedings because his injury did not meet criteria under the new Act. The Full Court of the WA Supreme Court dismissed Mr Dossett’s appeal, holding that because his application for leave had not been determined before 5 October 1999 the transitional provision did not save his application. The High Court overturned the Full Court’s decision. It rejected the employer’s submission that there was no repeal in the sense required by the Interpretation Act because new provisions were substituted for the old ones. The High Court held that section 32 of the amendment Act contained no intention to oust section 37 of the Interpretation Act. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal, holding that section 93D of the 1981 Act continued to apply to Mr Dossett’s pending application and that the District Court erred in dismissing the application. It remitted the application for leave to the District Court for determination.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 7 February, 2003 BORAL BESSER MASONRY LTD (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION The High Court of Australia today allowed an appeal by concrete brick and paver manufacturer Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (BBM) against a finding that it contravened section 46 of the Trade Practices Act by its conduct during a price war in Victoria between 1994 and 1996. The price war, sparked by a severe downturn in the Victorian building industry, broke out in 1993 between BBM and its four rivals in tendering for major projects. The ACCC alleged BBM used its market power for a proscribed purpose between April 1994 and October 1996. In the Federal Court, Justice Peter Heerey at first instance found against the ACCC, holding that BBM did not have substantial market power and did not take advantage of that power in pricing its products. The Full Court of the Federal Court unanimously allowed an appeal, upholding the contention of the ACCC. The High Court, by a 6-1 majority, allowed BBM’s appeal and reversed the decision of the Full Court and upheld the decision of Justice Heerey.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 17 June, 2003 RE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS; EX PARTE APPLICANT S20/2002 APPELLANT S106/2002 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS Both matters concern a claim to refugee status by a Sri Lankan man. The first matter concerned an application for remedies available under section 75(v) of the Constitution against the Minister and the RRT. The second matter is an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court. The man arrived in Australia in 1995 on a two-month visa. Just before a temporary resident visa ran out he applied for a protection visa, claiming to be a refugee. He claimed he had been taken into custody in Sri Lanka and tortured for two months because he gave accommodation to two Tamil Tigers (members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam). After his release he fled to Australia. The man’s claim was rejected by a delegate of the Minister in 1997. The RRT in 1999 and the Federal Court in 2000 affirmed the decision. The Full Court of the Federal Court dismissed an appeal in 2001. The man alleged the RRT’s determination refusing a protection visa was irrational, illogical and not properly based on findings or inferences of fact. The RRT held his evidence, including that his whole family had been arrested and killed by security forces, was implausible and lacked credibility. The RRT then discounted evidence from three witnesses: a former Sri Lankan Air Force flight engineer who saw that the man on his release from Colombo Fort could not walk properly, and had facial injuries and broken teeth; a Sri Lankan dentist who wrote a report saying the state of his teeth could have resulted from an assault; and an Australian doctor who wrote a report that the man had had surgery for a hernia, uncommon in 27-year-olds, and which was consistent with the man telling him he had been beaten with rifle butts. The High Court of Australia, by majority, held that the RRT’s decision had not been shown to have been illogical, irrational or lacking a basis in findings or inferences of fact supported on logical grounds. It held that someone’s credibility could be so weakened in cross-examination that a tribunal may well treat any corroborative evidence as of no weight. The Court also held that the grounds of judicial review under section 476(1) of the Migration Act had not been established and no other ground was shown for the Court to exercise its original jurisdiction. The Court rejected the application for constitutional writs and by a 4-1 majority dismissed the man’s appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 May 2014 MACARTHURCOOK FUND MANAGEMENT LIMITED & ANOR v TFML LIMITED [2014] HCA 17 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The High Court held that redemption of certain interests in a managed investment scheme did not constitute a withdrawal from that scheme within the meaning of Part 5C.6 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("the Act"). RFML Ltd ("RFML") (subsequently replaced by the respondent, TFML Ltd) was the responsible entity of an unlisted unit trust ("the Trust") which was a registered scheme. The constitution of the Trust complemented s 601KA(3)(b) of the Act by providing that a unitholder had no right to withdraw when the Trust was not liquid, unless there was a withdrawal offer currently open for acceptance by unitholders. The trustee was given power to suspend withdrawals if it was not in the best interests of unitholders for withdrawals to be made. In October 2006 and December 2007, RFML sought to raise funds by an open-ended public offer of ordinary units in the Trust. Through a series of facility agreements, the first appellant, MacarthurCook Fund Management Ltd ("MacarthurCook") underwrote the public offer by subscribing for units in the Trust. One of the terms of the facility agreements was that "[s]ubject to compliance with any requirements under the Corporations Act and the Constitution, during the Subscription Period, Subscription Units held by MacarthurCook must be redeemed by [RFML] for their Issue Price". On 29 September 2008, RFML gave notice that it had suspended all "withdrawals" from the Trust until further notice. MacarthurCook instituted proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on the basis of RFML's failure to redeem Subscription Units in accordance with the relevant term of their issue. The Court of Appeal held that RFML's redemption would have constituted a withdrawal within the meaning of Pt 5C.6 of the Act. However, as RFML had not complied with the requirements prescribed by the Act, and because the relevant term of issue of the Subscription Units expressed RFML's obligation to redeem to be subject to compliance with the Act, RFML was not in breach. By special leave, MacarthurCook appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that a member does not withdraw from a scheme merely by reason of a responsible entity performing an obligation (or exercising a power compulsorily) to redeem the interest of the member. The Court held that the withdrawal by a member that is regulated by Pt 5C.6 of the Act involves some act of volition on the part of the member. It followed that RFML had breached its obligation to redeem the Subscription Units as s 601KA(3)(b) had no application in this case.