Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 November 2012 STANFORD v STANFORD [2012] HCA 52 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from two decisions of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia concerning the settlement of property owned by a husband and wife. The High Court held that there was no basis to conclude that it was just and equitable to make an order altering interests in the marital property between them. The husband and wife married in 1971. In December 2008, the wife suffered a stroke and moved into full time residential care. She was later diagnosed with dementia. The husband continued to provide for her care and set aside money in a bank account to meet the costs of her medical needs or requirements. He continued to live in the matrimonial home. In 2009, the wife (by one of her daughters as case guardian) applied to the Family Court for orders altering interests in the marital property between the wife and her husband. Under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), a court can make a property settlement order if it is "just and equitable" to do so. At first instance, a magistrate ordered that the husband pay his wife $612,931, which represented the amount assessed as her contribution to the matrimonial assets. The husband appealed to the Full Court of the Family Court. After the appeal had been heard but before judgment was delivered, the wife died and her daughters continued the proceedings as her legal personal representatives. Under the Family Law Act, if a party dies before the conclusion of proceedings, a court may make a property settlement order if it would have made an order had the party been alive and if it is still appropriate despite the party's death to make an order. In its first judgment, the Full Court allowed the husband's appeal, holding that the magistrate erred in considering whether it was just and equitable to make a property settlement order. In a second judgment, the Full Court ordered that $612,931 be paid to the wife's legal personal representatives upon the husband's death to reflect her contributions to the marriage and the husband's moral obligations to her. By special leave, the husband appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal. The Court held that there was no basis to conclude that it would have been just and equitable to make a property settlement order had the wife been alive. She had not expressed a wish to divide the property, a property settlement order would require the husband to sell the matrimonial home, in which he still lived, and the Full Court had found, on the material before the magistrate, that her needs were being met or could be met by a maintenance order. The bare fact of physical separation, when involuntary, does not without more show that it is just and equitable to make a property settlement order.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 March 2015 FORTRESS CREDIT CORPORATION (AUSTRALIA) II PTY LIMITED & ANOR v WILLIAM JOHN FLETCHER AND KATHERINE BARNET AS LIQUIDATORS OF OCTAVIAR LIMITED (RECEIVER AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) (IN LIQUIDATION) AND OCTAVIAR ADMINISTRATION PTY LIMITED & ORS [2015] HCA 10 Today, the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and held that a court can make an order under s 588FF(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("the Act") to extend the time within which a company's liquidator may apply for orders in relation to voidable transactions entered into by the company, in circumstances where those transactions cannot be identified at the time of the order. Such orders are known as "shelf orders". Section 588FF(1) of the Act empowers a court, on the application of a company's liquidator, to make a number of orders in relation to voidable transactions. Section 588FF(3), as it stood at the date of the order giving rise to this appeal, provided that an application for orders under s 588FF(1) had to be made: (a) during a specified period ("the paragraph (a) period"); or (b) "within such longer period as the Court orders on an application under this paragraph made by the liquidator during the paragraph (a) period". The first respondents are the liquidators of the second and third respondents, Octaviar Limited and Octaviar Administration Pty Limited. The paragraph (a) period in relation to the third respondent expired on 3 October 2011. Before that date, the first respondents applied for an order under s 588FF(3)(b) extending the time for making an application under s 588FF(1) in relation to the third respondent to 3 April 2012. On 19 September 2011, the order sought was granted, expressed without reference to an identified transaction. On 3 April 2012, the first respondents commenced proceedings against the appellants for orders under s 588FF(1). The primary judge in the Supreme Court of New South Wales dismissed an application by the appellants to set aside the extension of time order, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' appeal. Both the primary judge and the Court of Appeal followed the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in BP Australia v Brown (2003) 58 NSWLR 322. By grant of special leave, the appellants appealed to the High Court, submitting that the extension of time order was required to specify the particular transactions in respect of which the order was made. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that a court can make an order extending time under s 588F(3)(b) without identifying the particular transaction or transactions to which it would apply. That construction is consistent with the evident purpose of s 588F(3)(b), to allow the court to mitigate the strictness of the time limits imposed by s 588FF(3)(a) in an appropriate case. The re- enactment of s 588FF(3), which took place after the holding in BP Australia v Brown that a court could make an order granting an extension of time in general terms, may be taken to support that construction.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 November 2012 NIGEL CUNNINGHAM SWIFT MANSFIELD v THE QUEEN & ANOR JOHN KIZON v THE QUEEN & ANOR [2012] HCA 49 Today the High Court unanimously held that a person can contravene the prohibitions on insider trading by trading in securities while in possession of "inside information" as described in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) even if that information proves to be false. It was alleged that the managing director of AdultShop.com Limited, a listed public company, told each of the appellants, Mr Nigel Mansfield and Mr John Kizon, information about AdultShop's prospects and that Mr Mansfield and Mr Kizon shared that information with each other. It was alleged that, armed with this "inside information", Mr Mansfield and Mr Kizon bought or procured the purchase of shares in AdultShop. The appellants were charged with committing or conspiring to commit numerous offences against the insider trading provisions of the Corporations Act. In the District Court of Western Australia, the prosecution conceded that a jury could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the information about AdultShop's prospects allegedly in the possession of Mr Mansfield and Mr Kizon was true. The trial judge held that a person could generally only commit insider trading if he or she possessed information that was factually correct and therefore entered judgments of acquittal on the AdultShop counts. A majority of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia disagreed, allowed the prosecution's appeal and ordered that there be a new trial. By special leave, Mr Mansfield and Mr Kizon appealed to the High Court. They submitted that a person cannot be guilty of insider trading by buying or procuring the purchase of shares while in possession of information that is objectively false. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. The Court held that a person can contravene the insider trading provisions of the Corporations Act even if the information he or she possesses is false, as long as the statutory criteria for insider trading are met.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 October 2021 [2021] HCA 32 Today, the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal concerned the scope of the intellectual freedom protected by a clause of an enterprise agreement of a university. Dr Ridd was employed by James Cook University for 27 years. From 2016, the University took various disciplinary actions against Dr Ridd for conduct that it concluded breached the University Code of Conduct and constituted misconduct and serious misconduct under the University's Enterprise Agreement. Dr Ridd was issued with two censures ("the 2016 Censure" and "the Final Censure") and, on 2 May 2018, his employment was terminated for serious misconduct under the Enterprise Agreement. Dr Ridd brought proceedings against the University alleging that its actions and the termination of his employment contravened the Enterprise Agreement and s 50 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ("the Act"). Dr Ridd did not dispute that the conduct occurred and that it would be misconduct or serious misconduct. He submitted that all of his conduct was an exercise of the intellectual freedom protected by cl 14 of the Enterprise Agreement and could not be a serious breach of the Code of Conduct. The primary judge: concluded that 13 actions taken by the University were contrary to cl 14 of the Enterprise Agreement; made a declaration of 13 contraventions of s 50 of the Act; and ordered the payment of compensation and pecuniary penalties. A majority of the Full Court allowed an appeal and concluded that none of the actions of the University were contrary to the Enterprise Agreement. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. The Court held that the intellectual freedom protected by cl 14 of the Enterprise Agreement was not a general freedom of speech. The exercise of intellectual freedom was subject to constraints contained in cl 14, including some adopted from the Code of Conduct. These constraints upon exercise included respect for the legal rights of others, and required that an expression of disagreement with University decision-making be in accordance with applicable processes, including confidentiality obligations. The exercise of intellectual freedom was not constrained by other Code of Conduct undertakings, such as respect or courtesy. The 2016 Censure and part of the basis of the Final Censure were unjustified because they related to the expression of honestly held views by Dr Ridd within his academic expertise. The Final Censure was justified only insofar as it relied upon expressions of opinion unrelated to Dr Ridd's academic expertise, and findings that he repeatedly failed to comply with his confidentiality obligations. Since Dr Ridd ran his case on an all-or-nothing basis, the termination decision was justified in its reliance upon conduct of Dr Ridd which was the subject of 18 findings of serious misconduct which were not protected by cl 14.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 7 October 2015 D'ARCY v MYRIAD GENETICS INC & ANOR [2015] HCA 35 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The High Court held that an isolated nucleic acid, coding for a BRCA1 protein, with specific variations from the norm that are indicative of susceptibility to breast cancer and ovarian cancer, was not a "patentable invention" within the meaning of s 18(1)(a) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ("the Act"). The term "nucleic acid" includes two kinds of molecules, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and ribonucleic acid (RNA), which are found inside a human cell. A gene is a functional unit of DNA which encodes a particular protein produced by the cell. The protein produced depends on the sequence of nucleotides. The BRCA1 gene codes for the production of a protein called BRCA1. The first respondent filed a patent which contained 30 claims. Relevantly, Claims 1 to 3 concerned a nucleic acid coding for a BRCA1 protein, and with one or more specified variations from the norm in its nucleotide sequence, isolated from its cellular environment. Those specified variations, characterised as mutations or polymorphisms, are indicative of susceptibility to breast cancer and ovarian cancer. Section 18(1)(a) of the Act requires that, for an invention to be patentable, it must be "a manner of manufacture" within the meaning of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. The appellant commenced proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia challenging the validity of Claims 1 to 3 on the basis that the invention claimed did not meet the requirement of s 18(1)(a). The primary judge dismissed the appellant's challenge, holding that the invention fell within the concept of a "manner of manufacture". The Full Court dismissed an appeal from that decision. The Full Court held that an isolated nucleic acid was chemically, structurally and functionally different from a nucleic acid inside a human cell. The invention was a manner of manufacture because an isolated nucleic acid with the characteristics specified in Claims 1 to 3 resulted in an artificially created state of affairs for economic benefit. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal, holding that the invention claimed did not fall within the concept of a manner of manufacture. The Court held that, having regard to the relevant factors, an isolated nucleic acid, coding for the BRCA1 protein, with specified variations, is not a manner of manufacture. While the invention claimed might be, in a formal sense, a product of human action, it was the existence of the information stored in the relevant sequences that was an essential element of the invention as claimed. A plurality of the Court considered that to attribute patentability to the invention as claimed would involve an extension of the concept of a manner of manufacture which was not appropriate for judicial determination.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 30 March 2004 The Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal made errors in reviewing the prison sentence of a convicted drug courier, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Johnson’s co-accused, Jurgen Helmut Schwarz, was apprehended as he arrived in Perth in November 2000 carrying 5,533 ecstasy tablets and almost 1.5kg of cocaine. He agreed to participate in a controlled delivery of material substituted for the confiscated drugs. Mr Schwarz checked into a hotel in the suburb of Como and by arrangement Mr Johnson arrived to collect the supposed drugs. The Australian Federal Police arrested him as he left the hotel room and arrested Phillip David Smart who was waiting with $10,688 in Mr Johnson’s sister’s car outside the hotel. Mr Johnson was charged with attempting to obtain a commercial quantity of ecstasy (more than 500 grams) and attempting to obtain a trafficable quantity of cocaine (between two grams and 2kg). Mr Johnson pleaded guilty in the WA Supreme Court. Justice Graeme Scott said the appropriate sentence for the first count was 10 years’ jail and for the second count five years’ jail, to be served cumulatively. The sentence for the second count was reduced on account of the totality principle. The total sentence of 15 years was reduced by a further 3½ years for Mr Johnson’s guilty plea to 11½ years, with a 5½-year non-parole period. Mr Johnson’s appeal against his sentence was rejected by the CCA. He contended that he collected only one package with no knowledge of the particular drugs he was collecting, and that insufficient allowance was made for the fact that the offences arose from a single course of conduct. The High Court held that the two offences had much in common, including one inducement, one payment, one occasion, one package and one receipt of it, and that the CCA had made factual errors in its reasoning. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the CCA for reconsideration of Mr Johnson’s sentence in accordance with the Court’s reasons.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 October 2013 BONANG DARIUS MAGAMING v THE QUEEN [2013] HCA 40 Today the High Court, by majority, upheld the validity of a provision of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") which prescribed a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for the offence of facilitating the bringing or coming to Australia of a group of at least five non-citizens with no lawful right to come to Australia. The High Court held that the provision was not beyond the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament and did not confer judicial power on prosecuting authorities. On 6 September 2010, a boat carrying 52 passengers and four crew members was intercepted near Ashmore Reef. The appellant, Mr Magaming, was one of the crew members. The passengers on the boat were not Australian citizens and none had a lawful right to enter Australia. Mr Magaming was charged with one count of facilitating the bringing or coming to Australia of a group of at least five unlawful non-citizens contrary to s 233C(1) of the Act. The offence under s 233C(1) of the Act was an aggravated form of the people smuggling offence created by s 233A(1) of the Act, which prohibited facilitating the bringing or coming to Australia of an unlawful non-citizen. That offence carried no mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, whereas the offence under s 233C(1) of the Act carried a mandatory minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of three years. Mr Magaming pleaded guilty in the District Court of New South Wales and was sentenced to the mandatory minimum term of five years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years. He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, alleging that the provision prescribing the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment was invalid. The Court of Criminal Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, concluding that the relevant provision was valid. By special leave, Mr Magaming appealed to the High Court. In the High Court, Mr Magaming contended that in circumstances where prosecuting authorities could choose between charging an offence that carried a mandatory minimum sentence and charging another offence that carried no mandatory sentence, the prosecuting authorities impermissibly exercised judicial power. He also contended that the provision of the Act prescribing the mandatory minimum sentence was incompatible with the institutional integrity of the courts and that it required a court to impose a sentence that was arbitrary. By majority, the High Court dismissed the appeal. The High Court held that although prosecuting authorities had a choice as to which offence to charge, that choice did not involve an exercise of judicial power or confer on prosecuting authorities an ability to determine the punishment to be imposed for the same conduct, even where one available offence prescribed a mandatory minimum sentence. The High Court also held that the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence was not inconsistent with the institutional integrity of the courts and did not involve the imposition of an arbitrary sentence.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 October 2012 PLAINTIFF M47/2012 v DIRECTOR GENERAL OF SECURITY & ORS [2012] HCA 46 Today a majority of the High Court held invalid a regulation which prevented the grant of a protection visa to a refugee if the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation ("ASIO") had assessed the refugee to be a risk to security. Accordingly, a majority of the Court held that the decision to refuse the plaintiff a protection visa on the basis of that regulation had not been made according to law. The plaintiff, a Sri Lankan national, arrived in Australia in December 2009, and has been held in detention since that time. In June 2010, he applied for a protection visa. A delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship found that the plaintiff had a well-founded fear of persecution in Sri Lanka on the basis of his race or political opinion and was therefore a refugee. However, the delegate refused the plaintiff's application for a protection visa because, in December 2009, the plaintiff had been assessed by ASIO to be a risk to security. Clause 866.225 of Sched 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) prescribes as a criterion for the grant of a protection visa that the applicant not be assessed as a risk to security under the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth). This criterion is called public interest criterion 4002. The plaintiff commenced proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the High Court challenging the validity of the decision to refuse him a protection visa and challenging his continued detention. The plaintiff argued that ASIO had denied him procedural fairness when making a fresh adverse security assessment in 2012, that the requirement that he satisfy public interest criterion 4002 was invalid, and that the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) did not authorise the removal and detention of a person found to be a refugee. A majority of the Court held that the plaintiff was not denied procedural fairness in connection with the making of the security assessment because the plaintiff was given the opportunity to address issues of concern to ASIO in the interview that was conducted before the fresh assessment was made in 2012. However, a majority of the Court held that the Migration Regulations could not validly prescribe public interest criterion 4002 as a condition for the grant of a protection visa because doing so was inconsistent with the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Because the prescription of public interest criterion 4002 as a criterion for the grant of a protection visa was invalid, a majority of the Court held that the decision to refuse the plaintiff a protection visa on the basis of this criterion had not been made according to law. Accordingly, the plaintiff's continuing detention was valid for the purpose of determining his application for a protection visa. Given these conclusions, it was unnecessary for the majority to consider the plaintiff's other arguments about the validity of his detention and proposed removal from Australia.