Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 20 April 2005 IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (VIC) (four matters) No grounds existed for the permanent suppression of aspects of police operations which led to two murder convictions, the High Court of Australia held today. At the conclusion of an August 2004 hearing, the Court unanimously dismissed all four applications for the identities of undercover police and covert police methods to be permanently suppressed. The Court issued its reasons today. During two unrelated trials of Alipapa Tofilau and Lorenzo Favata for murder in the Victorian Supreme Court in September-October 2003, evidence was presented that had been gathered by undercover police. In each case the trial judge made an order prohibiting publication of the methods used and of any material that would identify the officers involved but the orders had specific expiry dates. The Victorian Court of Appeal dismissed the Commissioner’s two applications for leave to appeal and held that indefinite suppression would be both offensive to the principle of open justice and ineffective in practice. By special leave, the Commissioner appealed to the High Court against each order on the grounds that the Court of Appeal erred in failing to hold that she had an appeal as of right, and that the Court of Appeal had denied her procedural fairness because she was allegedly denied the opportunity to present argument on whether the trial judges were in error in making only limited suppression orders. In the event that the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to hear appeals (whether as of right or by leave) against the trial judges’ orders, the Commissioner also applied for further special leave to appeal from those orders. The original suppression orders were extended until the matters were dealt with by the High Court. Those additional applications for special leave were heard by the Court along with the appeals. At the end of the hearing, the Court ordered that both appeals and both applications for special leave be dismissed and that the Commissioner pay the costs of The Age newspaper which had been given leave to intervene. The special leave applications were dismissed because an appeal was deemed to have insufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of special leave. The Court held that no appeal by the Commissioner lay as of right to the Court of Appeal. If an appeal lay at all to the Court of Appeal it lay only by leave. Orders made by the trial judges did not finally dispose of any rights and no exceptions set out in the Supreme Court Act were engaged. The Court held that the Commissioner had not been denied procedural fairness and that the Court of Appeal had not confined argument to the question about its jurisdiction. It was for the Commissioner to demonstrate to the Court of Appeal why leave should be granted. What arguments were advanced and what evidence was relied on was a matter for her. Filing further evidence and submissions without leave after argument had concluded, as the Commissioner did, did not demonstrate any want of procedural fairness.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 9 February 2006 WARREN HALLORAN AND THE PERSONS NOMINATED IN THE ATTACHED SCHEDULE OF OWNERSHIP v MINISTER ADMINISTERING NATIONAL PARKS AND WILDLIFE ACT 1974 A series of steps taken to produce certain stamp duty consequences in connection with changes in the ownership of land the subject of claims for compensation were not effective to achieve their purpose, the High Court of Australia held today. In 1998, the Minister acquired parcels of land totalling about 2,639 hectares to establish the Jervis Bay National Park on the New South Wales south coast. Section 37 of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act entitles land owners to compensation from the State of NSW when land is resumed. Land in NSW adjacent to the Commonwealth Territory of Jervis Bay, formed in 1915, was subdivided for the building of a town to support a proposed port in the Territory but the town never proceeded. Before the resumption, Mr Halloran and the other appellants sought to transfer lots held by several companies to 770 different owners and claimed more than $46.7 million in compensation under section 37. The transfers were done in May 1998 by way of a 23-step scheme that included the execution of 770 trust deeds, with each trust settled for $10. No stamp duty was paid on the transfers. The Minister disputed that the scheme achieved its intended purpose. In the NSW Land and Environment Court, Justice Angus Talbot found in favour of the parties to the scheme. The Minister successfully appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal, which held that the purported transactions had not in fact occurred. In an appeal to the High Court, the appellants claimed the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that they had not established that equitable interests had been created or acquired so as to attract an entitlement to compensation when the land was resumed. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It held that the steps taken were ineffective to avoid stamp duty and, because no stamp duty was paid, proof of the transactions was denied by the Stamp Duties Act.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 April 2015 INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION v MARGARET CUNNEEN & ORS [2015] HCA 14 Today the High Court held, by majority, that the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption ("ICAC") has no power to conduct an inquiry into allegations that were made against the respondents, because the alleged conduct was not "corrupt conduct" as defined in s 8(2) of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW) ("the ICAC Act"). The first respondent is a Deputy Senior Crown Prosecutor of the State of New South Wales. In late 2014, ICAC summoned the respondents to give evidence at a public inquiry. The purpose of the inquiry was to investigate an allegation that the first and second respondents had, with the intention to pervert the course of justice, counselled the third respondent to pretend to have chest pains in order to prevent police officers from obtaining evidence of the third respondent's blood alcohol level at the scene of a motor accident. The respondents commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales seeking, amongst other orders, a declaration that ICAC did not have power to conduct the inquiry. The Supreme Court dismissed the proceedings. But the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and declared that ICAC did not have power to conduct the inquiry because the alleged conduct was not "corrupt conduct" as defined in the ICAC Act. ICAC applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court, and the application was referred to a Full Court to be heard as on an appeal. Section 8(2) of the ICAC Act relevantly provides that "corrupt conduct" is "any conduct of any person ... that adversely affects, or that could adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, the exercise of official functions by any public official" and which could involve certain kinds of misconduct listed in the sub-section, including perverting the course of justice. The alleged conduct did not concern the exercise of the first respondent's official functions as a Crown Prosecutor. ICAC contended that the alleged conduct was corrupt conduct because it could adversely affect the exercise of official functions by the investigating police officers and by a court that would deal with any charges arising from the motor vehicle accident. The High Court unanimously granted special leave but, by majority, dismissed the appeal. The majority held that the expression "adversely affect" in s 8(2) refers to conduct that adversely affects or could adversely affect the probity of the exercise of an official function by a public official. The definition of "corrupt conduct" does not extend to conduct that adversely affects or could adversely affect merely the efficacy of the exercise of an official function by a public official in the sense that the official could exercise the function in a different manner or make a different decision. The alleged conduct was not conduct that could adversely affect the probity of the exercise of an official function by a public official. The alleged conduct was therefore not corrupt conduct within the meaning of s 8(2) of the ICAC Act and ICAC has no power to conduct the inquiry.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 March 2004 NETWORK TEN PTY LIMITED v TCN CHANNEL NINE PTY LIMITED, QUEENSLAND TELEVISION LIMITED AND GENERAL TELEVISION CORPORATION PTY LIMITED The High Court of Australia today held that the Ten network had not infringed copyright laws with its use of snippets from the Nine network’s programs on its weekly comedy chat show, The Panel. The Panel ran extracts from other networks’ programs, including pieces ranging from eight to 42 seconds from Nine’s shows including the news, The Today Show, Midday, Sunday, Wide World of Sports, A Current Affair, Australia’s Most Wanted, Crocodile Hunter, Days of Our Lives, the Academy Awards, and the Allan Border Medal Dinner. The 20 extracts were run on 15 episodes of The Panel broadcast in 1999 and 2000. Nine sought an injunction to restrain Ten from re- broadcasting such segments without consent and claimed a declaration of infringement of the broadcast copyright of Nine in its programs. In the Federal Court of Australia Justice Richard Conti held that Ten had not taken the whole or a substantial part of any of Nine’s broadcasts. He defined “a television broadcast” in the Copyright Act as a broadcaster’s program or discrete segments of a program. The Full Court reversed his decision, holding that every image seen on a television screen and the accompanying sound was a television broadcast in which copyright subsisted. It held that Ten had infringed Nine’s copyright under section 87(a) – subject to fair dealing defences for some segments that did not arise for consideration in the High Court. In the High Court Ten argued that the Full Court of the Federal Court had misread the term “a television broadcast” in the Act and had erred in holding that it had infringed copyright. It also argued that the Full Court’s decision expanded the ambit of copyright monopoly beyond the interests the legislation sought to protect. The High Court, by a 3-2 majority, accepted Ten’s arguments. The majority held that there was no indication that legislative protection was provided for each and every image discernible by viewers, as this would place broadcasters in a position of advantage over other copyright stakeholders, such as the owners of cinema films and sound recordings. It held that to understand “a television broadcast” as a tiny portion of the signal transmitted virtually continuously gave the term a very artificial meaning but did not decide whether a segment of a news or current affairs program constituted a broadcast. The Court allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the Full Court of the Federal Court to determine the remaining grounds of appeal to that Court.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 August 2014 DANIEL GLENN FITZGERALD v THE QUEEN [2014] HCA 28 On 19 June 2014, the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal against a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of South Australia, which had upheld the appellant's convictions for murder and aggravated causing serious harm with intent to cause serious harm contrary to ss 11 and 23(1) respectively of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the appellant's convictions and directed that a judgment and verdict of acquittal be entered. Today, the High Court delivered reasons for making those orders. On 19 June 2011, a group of men forced their way into a house in Elizabeth South in South Australia and attacked two of the occupants with weapons including a gardening fork and a pole. One victim died four days after the attack and another sustained serious brain injuries. After a trial before a judge and jury in the Supreme Court of South Australia, the appellant was convicted and was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 years. At the appellant's trial, the prosecution contended that the appellant was a member of the group that had forced entry into the house armed with weapons and was a party to a common plan to cause grievous bodily harm to persons inside the house. There was no direct evidence that the appellant inflicted harm on the deceased or the other victim. The prosecution relied on DNA evidence obtained from a sample taken from a didgeridoo found at the crime scene to establish the appellant's involvement in the attack. The prosecution's circumstantial case was that the DNA in the sample derived from the appellant's blood and was transferred by him to the didgeridoo at the time of the attack. The appellant argued that alternative hypotheses consistent with his innocence were open on the evidence. One such hypothesis was that a member of the group who was present at the crime scene had transferred the appellant's DNA onto the didgeridoo, after the two men shook hands the night before the attack. The appellant appealed unsuccessfully against his convictions to the Court of Criminal Appeal, arguing that the verdicts were unreasonable and could not be supported by the evidence. By special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously held that the prosecution's main contention, that the appellant's DNA in the sample obtained from the didgeridoo derived from his blood, was not made out beyond reasonable doubt. Further, the recovery of the appellant's DNA from the didgeridoo did not raise any inference about the time when or circumstances in which the DNA was deposited there. The Court held that it could not be accepted that the evidence relied on by the prosecution was sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was present at, and participated in, the attack. The jury, acting reasonably, should have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the appellant's guilt. As the evidence was not capable of supporting the appellant's conviction for either offence, no question of an order for a new trial arose.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 August 2021 FREDERICK CHETCUTI v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA [2021] HCA 25 Today, the High Court by majority dismissed an appeal from a final judgment given by a single justice of the High Court after a trial on agreed facts in a proceeding in the original jurisdiction of the High Court. The appellant had challenged his detention under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) on the ground that he was not within the reach of the legislative power concerning aliens conferred by s 51(xix) of the Constitution ("the aliens power"). The appellant was born in Malta on 8 August 1945, then still a colony of the United Kingdom, and arrived in Australia on 31 July 1948. At the time of his arrival, the appellant had the status of a British subject under the Nationality Act 1920 (Cth) and he subsequently retained that status under the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) from its commencement on 26 January 1949 through to the abolition of that status on 1 May 1987 (other than during a short period between 1964 and 1965). In 2017 by reference to the appellant's conviction in 1993 of murder, and after having served a 24 year term of imprisonment, a decision was made to cancel the appellant's visa under the Migration Act and the appellant was subsequently taken into detention. In challenging his detention, the appellant argued for an exception to the settled understanding that it is in general open to the Parliament to treat as an alien any person who was born outside Australia, whose parents were not Australians, and who has not been naturalised as an Australian. The exception contended for by the appellant was in respect of a person who was a natural born British subject and who commenced residing permanently in Australia before 26 January 1949. The appellant argued that the status of a non-alien attaches indelibly to a person in that category either by reason of the person having been born within the allegiance of an as yet undivided Imperial Crown or by reason of the Parliament having once and for all determined the person not to be an alien under the Nationality Act. At first instance, the single justice concluded that the appellant was within the reach of the aliens power and gave judgment for the respondent. The High Court, by majority, dismissed the appeal. By majority, the High Court held that it was open to the Parliament in the exercise of the aliens power, through prescription of the criteria for the conferral of Australian citizenship set out in the Australian Citizenship Act, to deny the appellant the status of an Australian citizen and thereby to treat him as an alien in the transition that occurred on the commencement of that Act on 26 January 1949. The appellant's problem was that he did not take the available course of action under the Australian Citizenship Act to become an Australian citizen after that date.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 11 September, 2003 DOVURO PTY LIMITED v ROBERT JOHN WILKINS, EILEEN JOYCE WILKINS, TREVOR IAN WILKINS, SUSAN CAROLINE WILKINS AND LOCHIEL NOMINEES PTY LIMITED AS TRUSTEE FOR THE R & E WILKINS FAMILY TRUST; CROP MARKETING NEW ZEALAND SOCIETY LIMITED; AND QBE INSURANCE (INTERNATIONAL) LIMITED The High Court of Australia today allowed an appeal by canola seed distributor Dovuro against a finding of negligence after seed it imported contained weed seeds that were declared prohibited species by Western Australian agricultural authorities. Dovuro imported New Zealand-grown canola seed that was cleared by the Australian Quarantine Inspection Service. The seed contained small amounts of seeds from three common weeds, a common occurrence with such a product. The canola was sold in bags labelled “minimum 99% purity”. The weeds were not noxious for humans or animals, and canola seed containing the weed seeds was not prohibited anywhere in Australia. But after Dovuro imported it, distributors had sold it and farmers planted it in 1996, the WA government decided in July 1996 that farmers should take steps to prevent the growth of the weeds and to eradicate any that did grow. None of the many farmers who sowed Dovuro’s seed reported growth of any of the weeds or reported harm to their crops or their land, but they suffered financial loss and expense in preventive measures which they sued to recover. Declarations for two of the three weeds were cancelled in May 1998. The Wilkinses, who planted one tonne of Dovuro’s canola seed in April and May 1996, brought action in the Federal Court against Dovuro claiming damages and alleging negligence and contravention of section 52 of the Trade Practices Act. They brought the action as a class action on behalf of WA canola growers who had bought and planted Dovuro seed in 1996. Justice Murray Wilcox held that Dovuro had been negligent but had not contravened section 52. The Full Court of the Federal Court, by majority, dismissed Dovuro’s appeal and Dovuro appealed to the High Court. The Court, by a 5-2 majority, allowed Dovuro’s appeal. The Court held that Dovuro did have a duty of care not to expose the farmers to harm, including financial loss, but the majority held that it did not breach its duty of care. Where none of the seeds were known to be dangerous or had been prohibited, Dovuro could not reasonably have foreseen the actions of the WA government.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 December 2019 [2019] HCA 48 Today the High Court, by majority, dismissed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The appeal concerned whether the trial judge should have given the jury a direction of the type proposed in Liberato v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 507, known as a "Liberato direction". A Liberato direction is a direction typically given in cases which turn on the conflicting evidence of a prosecution witness and a defence witness. It is to the effect that, even if the jury does not positively believe the defence witness and prefers the evidence of the prosecution witness, they should not convict unless satisfied that the prosecution has proved the defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant was convicted by a jury of one count of rape. The prosecution case at trial was dependent upon acceptance of the complainant's evidence. The appellant did not give, or call, evidence. A recorded interview between the appellant and the police, in which the appellant denied the offending, was in evidence in the prosecution case. The trial judge was not asked to give, and did not give, a Liberato direction. The appellant appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal, arguing that a miscarriage of justice occurred by reason of the trial judge's failure to give a Liberato direction. The Court of Appeal held that, as the appellant had not given sworn evidence before the jury, there was no need for the trial judge to give a Liberato direction. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. A majority of the Court observed that in some cases it may be appropriate to give a Liberato direction, notwithstanding that the accused's conflicting version of events is not before the jury on oath. The majority explained that a Liberato direction serves to clarify and reinforce directions on the onus and standard of proof in cases in which there is a risk that the jury may be left with the impression that the evidence upon which the accused relies will only give rise to a reasonable doubt if they believe it to be truthful, or that a preference for the evidence of the complainant suffices to establish guilt. As such, a Liberato direction should be given in cases in which the trial judge perceives that there is a real risk that the jury might view their role in this way, whether or not the accused's version of events is on oath or in the form of answers given in a record of police interview. In dismissing the appeal, the majority of the High Court found that a Liberato direction was not needed in the circumstances of this case. The trial judge had given repeated, correct directions as to the onus and standard of proof. Nothing in the summing-up suggested that the jury might have been left with the impression that its verdict turned on a choice between the complainant's evidence and the appellant's account in the interview. In the result, the trial did not miscarry by reason of the omission of a Liberato direction.