Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 April 2005 BRETT GEORGE JERZY CZATYRKO v EDITH COWAN UNIVERSITY The University failed in its duty of care to Mr Czatyrko by not providing him with a safe system of work, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Czatyrko, 43, was a general assistant at the University in 1997 when he was injured while loading boxes of books and documents on to a truck with colleague Reece John Fendick. The truck had a hydraulic lifting platform which emitted a loud noise when being raised and a clanging sound when it reached its full height but no sound was emitted when it was lowered. Both men loaded boxes on to trolleys and took them up into the truck with the platform. When they were told they needed to hurry, Mr Fendick went back and forth collecting boxes on his trolley while Mr Czatyrko arranged the boxes inside the truck. When the truck was almost full and Mr Fendick was taking the platform down Mr Czatyrko stepped backwards and fell heavily. He sued the University in the Western Australian District Court for damages for negligence arising from an alleged failure to provide safe equipment and a safe system of work. Mr Czatyrko claimed the University failed to take reasonable precautions for his safety by not providing a warning device to indicate that the platform was descending, by instructing him and Mr Fendick to do their work hurriedly and in a manner that ignored safety issues, and by failing to have a system in place requiring that an employee lowering the platform alert other employees. The University denied liability and contended that Mr Czatyrko’s injuries were caused by his own negligence because he failed to look behind him. District Court Judge Peter Martino awarded him $379,402 after finding that the University was entirely responsible. Judge Martino held that the University had exposed Mr Czatyrko to unnecessary risk of injury, that it was foreseeable that Mr Czatyrko would not realise the platform had been lowered, and that his belief that the platform was in place when he stepped backwards was reasonable. The University successfully appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of WA which held that Mr Czatyrko was under an obligation to take reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risk of injury to himself and that his injuries were caused by his own negligence. He then appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal. It held that employers must take reasonable care to avoid risks of workplace injury. Employers must take into account possible thoughtlessness, inadvertence or carelessness, particularly with repetitive work. In its failure to implement necessary safety measures the University was in breach of its duty to take reasonable care to prevent the risk of injury. The Court held that the issue was not simply of failing to warn Mr Czatyrko of a risk, but of creating a risk by failing to adopt a safe system of work. Repetitive work in a diminishing space under pressure to do the job quickly left wide scope for inadvertently stepping backwards without noticing whether the platform was raised.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 March 2004 SIEMENS LTD v SCHENKER INTERNATIONAL (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD AND Siemens could recover just a portion of the cost of damage to a shipment of telecommunications equipment because a limit on liability for such loss while the goods were airlifted from Germany to Melbourne applied all the way to the transport company’s warehouse, the High Court of Australia held today. In 1996 Siemens Australia imported from its German parent a consignment of equipment as part of a contract with Telstra. Transport was undertaken by the German and Australian arms of Schenker. Siemens and Schenker had had a standing arrangement since the 19th century. At Tullamarine Airport the consignment was collected by Schenker Australia for delivery to its warehouse. Some equipment fell off the truck due to the driver’s negligence. Siemens Australia sued Schenker Australia and Schenker Germany in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Schenker companies did not dispute their liability for the accident but sought to limit it either by reference to the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (the Warsaw Convention) or by reference to the air waybill issued by Schenker Germany. The Court rejected both limitation provisions and awarded Siemens $1.69 million including interest. The Court of Appeal agreed the Warsaw Convention did not apply but held that the waybill governed the rights and obligations of the parties, including limitation on liability, and reduced damages to $US74,680 plus interest. Siemens Australia appealed to the High Court which upheld the Court of Appeal decision. The High Court agreed the Warsaw Convention did not apply beyond the limits of an aerodrome and that the waybill did. Clause 4 of the waybill specified that where the Warsaw Convention did not apply, the carrier’s liability was limited to $US20 per kilogram of goods damaged or lost. Siemens Australia argued that the waybill only applied to “carriage by air”. The Schenker companies argued that the waybill continued to operate at least until the consignment was delivered to the warehouse so it applied to damage to the consignment en route there. The High Court held that the Schenker argument was valid because Clause 4 operated only in respect of carriage to which the Warsaw Convention did not apply so “carriage” had a different meaning. Secondly, the terms of the standing agreement appeared to include transport to the warehouse. Thirdly, the statutory regime permitted no other possibility as Schenker Australia had permission under the Customs Act to have customs inspections performed at the warehouse, provided goods were taken directly there. Therefore, the damage sustained while complying with such requirements fell within the terms of clause 4 of the waybill. The High Court, by a 3-2 majority, dismissed the appeal with costs.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 December 2012 WESTFIELD MANAGEMENT LIMITED AS TRUSTEE FOR THE WESTART TRUST v AMP CAPITAL PROPERTY NOMINEES LIMITED AS NOMINEE OF UNISUPER LIMITED IN ITS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE COMPLYING SUPERANNUATION FUND KNOWN AS UNISUPER [2012] HCA 54 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales regarding the terms of a unitholders' agreement between two corporations. The High Court held that the terms of the agreement did not fetter a party's statutory right to vote for the winding up of a managed investment scheme under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("the Act"). Westfield and AMP Capital Property Nominees are the unitholders of a trust set up to acquire and operate a shopping centre in Perth. The trust is a managed investment scheme registered under the Act. AMP sought to invoke its right under the Act to vote on a resolution to direct that the scheme be wound up, and requested that a members' meeting be convened for that purpose. AMP was in a position to carry the resolution alone because it holds two-thirds of the units in the trust. Westfield opposed the resolution and obtained an injunction from the Supreme Court of New South Wales preventing AMP from voting in favour of it without Westfield's prior consent. Westfield relied upon two provisions of its unitholders' agreement with AMP. The first prohibits the sale of trust property without the written consent of the unitholders, and the second requires members to exercise their voting rights in a way that gives effect to the "intent and effect" of the agreement. The Supreme Court held that by voting for a winding up without Westfield's consent, AMP would breach the second provision because a winding up would inevitably lead to the shopping centre being sold. AMP appealed to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Court of Appeal held that "intent and effect" of the prohibition on selling trust property without consent did not include preventing a sale following a determination of the trust. Therefore, the restriction on how voting rights could be exercised did not preclude AMP from voting in favour of the resolution to wind up the scheme. The injunction was set aside. Westfield appealed by special leave to the High Court. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. The Court held that, on its proper construction, the prohibition on selling trust property without consent is directed to a sale during the continuance of the scheme; it does not apply where a resolution is passed by members to wind up the scheme, even if that would result in the trust property being sold.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 10 May 2006 LEIGH WILLIAM DALTON v NSW CRIME COMMISSION, COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND NEW SOUTH WALES ATTORNEY-GENERAL The ability of a State or Territory to serve, in other parts of Australia under Commonwealth law, a summons to appear before a tribunal, was upheld by the High Court of Australia today. Section 76 of the Commonwealth Service and Execution of Process Act empowers Supreme Courts of States and Territories to grant leave to serve subpoenas outside the relevant State or Territory to compel a person to appear before a tribunal or to produce documents or other items to a tribunal. The Crime Commission, which investigates illegal drug trafficking, organised crime and other criminal activity, met the SEP Act’s definition of tribunal. In November 2003 it began a drug operation codenamed “Gymea IV”. On 12 March 2004, the Commission issued a summons for Mr Dalton to appear before it on 5 April 2004 to give evidence. The summons was a subpoena relating to an investigative function as required by the Act. The NSW Supreme Court granted leave to serve the subpoena on Mr Dalton whose address was in St Kilda East in Melbourne. Service took place in Melbourne on 22 March 2004. In the Supreme Court Mr Dalton challenged the subpoena on the ground that section 76 of the SEP Act is unconstitutional. Proceedings were referred to the Court of Appeal which, by majority, rejected the challenge. Mr Dalton then appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It held that Mr Dalton failed to demonstrate the invalidity of section 76, therefore service was effective in accordance with federal law. Section 76 is a law supported by section 51(xxiv) of the Constitution which provides that Parliament can make laws with respect to the service and execution throughout the Commonwealth of the civil and criminal process and the judgments of the courts of the States. Mr Dalton had argued that the summons did not answer the description “the civil and criminal process” because this was said to refer only to the process of bodies which determine disputes between persons or the enforcement of the criminal law by prosecution and trial. He said the laying of criminal charges preceded by an investigation does not render the investigative process of a body such as the Commission part of the criminal process. The Court held that “civil and criminal” in section 51(xxiv) of the Constitution were not words of limitation or qualification, but words of universal description embracing all that might be described as a “process”. The Court also rejected Mr Dalton’s argument that a subpoena served under section 76 of the SEP Act was one issued in relation to an investigative function, rather than an adjudicative function, so did not fall within section 51(xxiv). Mr Dalton submitted that because courts do not have investigative functions there could be no extension by analogy to tribunals. However, the Court held that Australian courts have always had a range of investigative functions and Mr Dalton’s argument failed.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 13 June 2007 AJS v THE QUEEN AJS was entitled to be acquitted of a charge of incest and should face a trial on the alternative charge of committing an indecent act, the High Court of Australia held today. In 2004 AJS was convicted of incest by digital penetration of his 13-year-old granddaughter. The Victorian Court of Appeal held that that verdict was not open on the evidence and ordered that the conviction be quashed and a new trial held. If the jury had found AJS not guilty of incest they could have considered the alternative charge of committing an indecent act with a child under 16. AJS appealed to the High Court, arguing that the Court of Appeal should have entered a verdict of acquittal on the charge of incest and ordered a new trial on the indecency charge. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal. It ordered his acquittal on the incest charge and ordered a new trial on the indecency charge. The Court held that a new trial would not be a second or subsequent prosecution but would be the continuation of so much of the original prosecution as remained alive after the Court of Appeal’s determination of the appeal. While the charge of incest has been resolved in AJS’s favour, the other lesser alternative offence remains unresolved. The Court held that no question of double jeopardy arises. Entering a verdict of acquittal on the incest charge does not found a plea that AJS has already been acquitted of the indecent dealing charge, just as a jury verdict of not guilty on the incest count would not have precluded the jury from going on to consider this alternative offence. The power to order a new trial extends to ordering a new trial for an offence for which AJS could have been convicted at the first trial.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 October 2014 RHIANNON GRAY BY HER TUTOR KATHLEEN ANNE GRAY v RICHARDS [2014] HCA 40 Today the High Court unanimously allowed, in part, an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had held that Ms Gray was not entitled to recover, as a component of a damages award, an amount in respect of the costs associated with managing a lump sum damages award. In 2003, Ms Gray sustained a traumatic brain injury as a result of a collision with a motor vehicle driven by Mr Richards, causing a need for constant care and an incapacity to manage her own affairs. Through her tutor, she commenced proceedings against Mr Richards claiming he was liable in negligence for her loss. Those proceedings were compromised on terms that obliged Mr Richards to pay Ms Gray $10 million ("the compromise monies"), plus an amount of damages, to be assessed at a later date, to cover expenses associated with managing the compromise monies ("the fund management damages"). Subsequently, Ms Gray was declared incapable of managing her own affairs, and a private trustee was appointed to manage her estate. That private trustee charged management fees on the whole of the funds under management, comprising the compromise monies and the fund management damages. There was no suggestion that that arrangement was atypical. In 2011, the Supreme Court of New South Wales determined that the fund management damages should include an amount to offset the cost of managing the fund management damages, and a further amount to offset the cost of managing the fund's predicted future income. Those amounts were awarded on the basis that the fund management damages and the fund's predicted future income would need to be managed, and would therefore attract their own management charges. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the primary judge in relevant respects, holding that an amount of damages for the cost of managing the fund management damages and the fund's predicted future income should not be awarded. By special leave, Ms Gray appealed to the High Court. Allowing the appeal in part, the Court held that the Court of Appeal had erred in deciding that no allowance should be made for the cost of managing the fund management damages, but was correct in deciding that no allowance should be made for the cost of managing the fund's predicted future income.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 7 September 2012 BOARD OF BENDIGO REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNICAL AND FURTHER EDUCATION v GREGORY PAUL BARCLAY & ANOR [2012] HCA 32 Today the High Court allowed an appeal by the Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education ("BRIT") from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The High Court held that BRIT's Chief Executive Officer, Dr Louise Harvey, had not taken adverse action against the first respondent, Mr Gregory Barclay, for a reason prohibited by the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ("the Act"). Mr Barclay was an employee of BRIT and an officer of the second respondent, the Australian Education Union ("the AEU"). On 29 January 2010, Mr Barclay sent an email to all members of the AEU employed at BRIT. The email noted allegations of serious misconduct by unnamed persons at BRIT, who were said to have been involved in the production of false or fraudulent documents in connection with an upcoming audit. Mr Barclay did not report the allegations of misconduct to BRIT management when he became aware of them, and he did not provide details of the allegations to management when asked to do so. On 2 February 2010 Dr Harvey handed a letter to Mr Barclay requiring him to show cause why he should not be disciplined for this conduct. Dr Harvey suspended Mr Barclay on full pay pending a disciplinary investigation. Section 346 of the Act prohibits an employer from taking adverse action against an employee because the employee "is ... an officer or member of an industrial association" or "engages ... in industrial activity". Adverse action includes dismissing an employee and altering the position of an employee to the employee's prejudice. Mr Barclay and the AEU applied to the Federal Court for a declaration that BRIT had contravened s 346 of the Act. Dr Harvey gave evidence that she had not taken adverse action against Mr Barclay because of his industrial activities or affiliation, but because of the inappropriate way in which he had raised the allegations of serious misconduct. The trial judge accepted Dr Harvey's evidence that she had not taken the adverse action for a prohibited reason, and dismissed the application. Mr Barclay and the AEU appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court which, by majority, allowed the appeal. By special leave, BRIT appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal. The Court held that Dr Harvey's evidence, which had been accepted by the trial judge and had not been challenged before the Full Court, established that the adverse action taken against Mr Barclay had not been for a prohibited reason.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 19 May 2004 GAS v THE QUEEN SJK v THE QUEEN The High Court of Australia today upheld the increased sentences imposed by the Victorian Court of Appeal on two youths who pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of an elderly woman during a robbery of her home. It unanimously dismissed the youths’ appeals against the new sentences. The victim, aged 73, was found dead in her Seaford, Melbourne, home on 16 October 2000 where she lived with her brain-damaged son. GAS and SJK were aged 16 and 15 respectively. SJK knew the son and was friends with two of the victim’s grandchildren. GAS and SJK knew the victim kept large amounts of cash for her son’s shopping expeditions and knew the son left doors open at night. They had previously stolen her handbag from beside her bed during the night. SJK told police that on the later occasion the victim woke up and GAS attacked her, appearing to break her neck. GAS denied being at the house. The victim’s death was caused by strangulation. She had also been beaten around the head and body, had three fractured ribs and had been sexually assaulted. GAS and SJK both pleaded guilty when the original charge of murder was changed to manslaughter. The prosecutor told the Court it would be impossible to say which one killed the victim, so each should be sentenced as an aider and abettor rather than as a principal offender. Justice Bernard Bongiorno sentenced each to six years’ jail with a four-year non-parole period. The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed on the ground that the sentences were manifestly inadequate. The DPP argued that Justice Bongiorno had given undue weight to the offenders’ youth and to the prospect of rehabilitation and fell into error by allowing too great a reduction in sentence for aiding and abetting. He argued that in manslaughter of this type little, if any, disparity between being a principal and being an aider and abettor was justified. The Court of Appeal upheld all the DPP’s submissions and increased each sentence to nine years with a six-year non-parole period. GAS and SJK appealed to the High Court on the ground that the Court of Appeal erred in allowing the DPP to conduct his appeal in a manner said to be contrary to a plea agreement between the Crown and the two offenders. They objected to the DPP arguing there was little difference between a principal offender and an aider and abettor in this case. The High Court held that the Court of Appeal was right to accept that this was an extremely serious manslaughter case, occurring in circumstances of extreme aggravation, including night-time home invasion, taking advantage of knowledge from the handicapped son, robbery, and a vicious attack including sexual assault on an elderly woman. The Court held that it was not within the capacity of the parties to agree that each offender receive a substantially lesser sentence than a principal. It held that aiders and abettors were not always substantially less culpable than principal offenders and that the error was in their original sentencing.