Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 17 December 2015 WEI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION [2015] HCA 51 Today the High Court unanimously held that a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection ("the Minister") to cancel the plaintiff's student visa under s 116(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for failure to comply with a condition of his visa was affected by jurisdictional error. The plaintiff, a citizen of the People's Republic of China, held a student visa. It was a condition of his visa that he be enrolled in a "registered course" provided by a "registered provider" under the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth) ("the ESOS Act"). Section 19 of the ESOS Act requires registered providers to give information about student visa holders to the Secretary of the Department of Education and Training, including information confirming their enrolment. The information is stored on an electronic database known as "PRISMS" and can be accessed by officers of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection ("the Department"). Between June 2013 and June 2014, the plaintiff was enrolled in a registered course provided by a registered provider. However, confirmation of the plaintiff's enrolment was not recorded in PRISMS. On the basis of outdated information in PRISMS, officers of the Department formed the view in early 2014 that the plaintiff was not enrolled in a registered course. The officers formally complied with statutory requirements to notify the plaintiff that consideration was being given to cancelling his visa, but the plaintiff did not receive notice of that consideration. The plaintiff's visa was cancelled by a delegate of the Minister on 20 March 2014. The plaintiff discovered that his visa had been cancelled on 2 October 2014 and sought review of the cancellation decision in the Migration Review Tribunal. The Tribunal determined that it did not have jurisdiction to review the decision. The plaintiff filed an application for an order to show cause in the original jurisdiction of the High Court, seeking writs of certiorari and prohibition to quash the decision of the delegate and to prevent the Minister from giving effect to the delegate's decision. The Court unanimously held that the delegate's decision to cancel the plaintiff's visa was affected by jurisdictional error. By majority, the Court held that the delegate's satisfaction that the plaintiff was in breach of a visa condition was formed by a process of fact-finding tainted by the registered provider's failure to perform its imperative statutory duty to upload onto PRISMS confirmation of the plaintiff's enrolment. The Court granted the relief sought by the plaintiff.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 October 2012 INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION PARTNERS PTE LTD v CHAMELEON MINING NL (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) & ORS [2012] HCA 45 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Court held that International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd ("ILP") was entitled to an early termination fee under a litigation funding agreement ("the Funding Deed") with Chameleon Mining NL ("Chameleon"). ILP agreed to fund Chameleon's litigation against another company in return for a share of the proceeds of that litigation. The Funding Deed allowed ILP to terminate this arrangement, and entitled it to an early termination fee, if there was a "change in control" of Chameleon. A change in control did take place, and ILP terminated the arrangement and claimed the early termination fee. Chameleon refused to pay, arguing that ILP was not entitled to the fee because ILP did not hold an Australian financial services licence under Pt 7.6 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("the Corporations Act"). The High Court held that ILP was entitled to the early termination fee. The Funding Deed was a form of financial accommodation in that ILP agreed to pay Chameleon's legal costs when asked to do so in return for a share of any amount recovered in Chameleon's litigation. The Funding Deed was therefore a credit facility within the meaning of the Corporations Act, and ILP was exempt from the requirement to hold an Australian financial services licence.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 May 2019 RUDY FRUGTNIET v AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION [2019] HCA 16 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The High Court held that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the AAT"), on review of a decision by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ("ASIC") to impose a banning order, is prohibited from taking into consideration a spent conviction within the meaning of Pt VIIC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) which ASIC was prohibited from taking into account in making the decision to impose the banning order. In 1978 and 1997, the appellant was found guilty of offences which at all relevant times constituted spent convictions within the meaning of Pt VIIC of the Crimes Act. In 2014, a delegate of ASIC made a banning order against the appellant under s 80(1) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) ("the Credit Protection Act") on the basis that ASIC had reason to believe that the appellant was not a fit and proper person to engage in credit activities. On a review of the delegate's decision, the AAT took into consideration the appellant's spent convictions. The appellant appealed to the Federal Court on grounds including that the AAT had erred in law in taking the spent convictions into consideration. Division 3 of Pt VIIC of the Crimes Act has the relevant effect that a person whose conviction is spent is not required to disclose to any Commonwealth authority the fact that the person was charged with or convicted of the offence, and that a Commonwealth authority is prohibited from taking account of the fact that the person was charged with or convicted of the offence. Although a Commonwealth authority includes both the AAT and ASIC, s 85ZZH(c) of the Crimes Act provides that Div 3 does not apply in relation to the disclosure of information to, or the taking into account of information by, a tribunal established under a Commonwealth law. Dismissing an appeal from the judgment of the Federal Court at first instance, the Full Court of the Federal Court held that s 85ZZH(c) of the Crimes Act entitled the AAT to take into consideration material which ASIC was prevented from taking into consideration by Div 3 of Pt VIIC. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that the jurisdiction of the AAT on a review of a decision made by ASIC under s 80 of the Credit Protection Act is unaffected by s 85ZZH(c) of the Crimes Act. Except where altered by statute, the jurisdiction conferred on the AAT is to stand in the shoes of the decision-maker whose decision is under review so as to determine for itself, on the material before it, the decision which can and should be made in the exercise of the power conferred on the primary decision-maker. The AAT exercises the same power as the primary decision-maker, subject to the same constraints, and a consideration which the primary decision-maker must not take into account must not be taken into account by the AAT.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 14 November 2007 DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v PHAN THI LE Only the wife’s interest in an apartment owned by her and her husband, rather than the whole apartment, should have been quarantined from confiscation after being used for criminal purposes by the husband, the High Court of Australia held today. In 2003, Ms Le’s husband, Roy Le, was charged with a number of offences including trafficking in a commercial quantity of heroin. He pleaded guilty in 2005 and was sentenced to four years’ jail with a two-year non-parole period. The Les married in Vietnam in 1997. In 1998 Mr Le bought an apartment in Sunshine in Melbourne and Ms Le has lived there since she came to Australia in 1999. Two months after being charged, Mr Le transferred the apartment into their joint names, with the consideration for the transfer expressed as “natural love and affection”. Ms Le was concerned that if anything happened to Mr Le his children from a former marriage would get the apartment and she would have nowhere to live. After Mr Le was charged, the DPP obtained from the Victorian County Court a restraining order under Victoria’s Confiscation Act over the property. The apartment was “tainted property” because Mr Le had used it to store and prepare heroin for sale. It was automatically forfeited to the State 60 days after his conviction. Ms Le later sought an order under section 52 of the Act excluding the property from forfeiture. Judge Stuart Campbell said that the transfer appeared to be no more than a recognition of Ms Le’s matrimonial rights. He and the majority of the Court of Appeal held that an order under section 52 excluded all of the property in which Ms Le claimed an interest, and not merely her interest in the property. The Court of Appeal unanimously agreed with Judge Campbell that “natural love and affection” in the circumstances of the case constituted “sufficient consideration” under section 52 for acquiring an interest in property and that Ms Le lacked a reasonable suspicion that the apartment was “tainted property”. The DPP had sought to have the exclusion order apply only to Ms Le’s interest as a joint tenant. The DPP appealed to the High Court. Three judges of the Court allowed the appeal in part. Two judges would have allowed it entirely. The majority allowed the appeal on the ground that the exclusion order should have applied only to Ms Le’s interest rather than to the whole property. It upheld the Court of Appeal’s findings that “sufficient consideration” encompassed “natural love and affection” and that Ms Le had not held a reasonable suspicion that the apartment had become “tainted property” through criminal activity there. The minority held that the original restraining order had applied to the whole property, but held that “natural love and affection” did not amount to “sufficient consideration” under section 52. The DPP had undertaken to pay Ms Le’s costs whatever the outcome.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 11 June 2008 CTM v THE QUEEN Honest and reasonable mistake of fact about the age of a girl was a potential ground of exculpation in a charge of sexual assault of a girl under 16, the High Court of Australia held today. The Court also held that CTM had not discharged the evidential burden of raising that ground at his trial. In October 2004, in Coffs Harbour, the complainant had been out drinking with two friends and they ended up at CTM’s flat where he was also drinking with four other males. The girl fell asleep and was taken to a bedroom and her friends left. CTM, a co-accused and another male whom the girl could not positively identify, allegedly sexually assaulted her. CTM and the girl had become friends that year through attending the same high school. CTM was aged 17 and in year 11. He told police he thought the girl was in year 10 and that she had told him some time before that she was 16, but she was 15 and in year nine. He also denied having sex with the girl. CTM was charged with sexual intercourse with the girl, knowing she was not consenting. In the NSW District Court, he was acquitted of this charge, but was found guilty of the alternative charge of sexual intercourse with a person aged between 14 and 16, contrary to section 66C(3) of the NSW Crimes Act, which carries a penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. He was given a suspended 18- month sentence. Before the Act was amended in 2003 it provided a defence to heterosexual acts with under-age people if the offender reasonably believed that the child to whom the charge related was aged at least 16, and provided that the child was at least 14 and had consented to the sexual activity. After the 2003 amendments, the Act said nothing expressly about mistake as to age. CTM appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal against both his conviction and his sentence. The CCA upheld the conviction but held that the District Court had made errors in sentencing and remitted the case to the District Court. CTM appealed to the High Court in relation to his conviction. The Court, by a 6-1 majority, dismissed the appeal. The majority held that the ground of exculpation applied, but that in the circumstances of the trial CTM could not rely on it. The Court held that the NSW Parliament had not excluded the principle of criminal responsibility that a person who does an act under an honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief was not criminally responsible to any greater extent than if their belief had been correct. An honest and reasonable belief that the girl was aged 16 was an answer to a charge under section 66C(3). The evidential onus of raising such a ground of exculpation for consideration lay with the accused. If it were raised the prosecution then had the onus of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not honestly believe on reasonable grounds that the other person was consenting and was at least 16. In CTM’s case, he did not give evidence at his trial and it was not put to the girl in cross- examination that she had said anything to CTM about her age.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 19 June 2013 JOAN MONICA MALONEY v THE QUEEN [2013] HCA 28 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland which held that a law restricting possession of alcohol on Palm Island was not invalid by reason of inconsistency with s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). The appellant, an Indigenous resident of Palm Island in Queensland, was convicted in the Magistrates Court in Townsville of the offence of being in possession of more than a prescribed quantity of liquor in a restricted area on Palm Island contrary to s 168B of the Liquor Act 1992 (Q). Schedule 1R of the Liquor Regulation, made under the Act, has the effect of restricting the nature and quantity of liquor which people may have in their possession in public areas on Palm Island. The Palm Island community is composed almost entirely of Indigenous people. The appellant's appeal against her conviction to the District Court of Queensland was dismissed. Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was also dismissed. By special leave, she appealed to the High Court. By force of s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act, where a law has the effect that persons of a particular race enjoy a right to a more limited extent than persons of another race, the persons adversely affected shall enjoy that right to the same extent as the persons of that other race. However s 10 does not apply if the law is a "special measure" taken for the sole purpose of securing the adequate advancement of a racial group requiring such protection as may be necessary to ensure that group's equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In the High Court, the appellant argued that s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act applied to the provisions of Sched 1R of the Liquor Regulation because those provisions affected her enjoyment of three rights: the right to equal treatment before courts and tribunals; the right to own property; and the right to access places and services intended for use by the general public. She also argued that Sched 1R was not a "special measure" within the meaning of s 8 of the Racial Discrimination Act. The High Court found, by majority, that the impugned provisions were inconsistent with s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act. However, the Court was unanimously of the view that s 10 did not apply because the provisions constituted a "special measure" designed to protect the residents of Palm Island from the effects of prevalent alcohol abuse and associated violence. Accordingly, the Court held that Sched 1R was valid and dismissed the appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 5 February, 2003 ROBERT PETER AUSTIN AND KATHRYN ELIZABETH KINGS v THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA The High Court held invalid Commonwealth legislation imposing a superannuation contributions surcharge on state judges, holding by majority that it placed an unconstitutional burden or disability on the operations or activities of states and was beyond power. Justice Austin is a New South Wales Supreme Court judge and Master Kings is a member of the Victorian Supreme Court. They argued the surcharge did not apply to their pension entitlements, but if it did apply it was invalid. Their argument that the surcharge was invalid was supported by the states of NSW, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia which intervened. The High Court held unanimously that the legislation applied to Justice Austin but by majority held that in its application it was invalid. The Court unanimously held that Master Kings was not liable to pay the surcharge because she was appointed before the surcharge took effect in 1997. It did not apply to serving judges, and the Court held that she was, within the meaning of the legislation, a judge.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 October 2015 MOUNT BRUCE MINING PTY LIMITED v WRIGHT PROSPECTING PTY LIMITED & ANOR WRIGHT PROSPECTING PTY LIMITED v MOUNT BRUCE MINING PTY LIMITED & ANOR [2015] HCA 37 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales ("NSWCA") in Mount Bruce Mining Pty Limited v Wright Prospecting Pty Limited and unanimously allowed an appeal from the NSWCA in Wright Prospecting Pty Limited v Mount Bruce Mining Pty Limited. The High Court held that Mount Bruce Mining Pty Limited ("MBM") is liable to pay royalties to Wright Prospecting Pty Limited and Hancock Prospecting Pty Limited (together, "Hanwright") in respect of iron ore mined in two areas of the Pilbara region of Western Australia known as "Eastern Range" and "Channar". Hanwright, MBM and Hamersley Iron Pty Limited entered into an agreement dated 5 May 1970, which, among other things, concerned the payment of royalties by MBM in relation to iron ore mined from areas of land the subject of the agreement ("the 1970 Agreement"). Pursuant to cl 2.2 of the 1970 Agreement, MBM acquired from Hanwright the "entire rights" to the "MBM area", a term defined by reference to certain "temporary reserves" granted under the Mining Act 1904 (WA). Under cl 3.1 of the 1970 Agreement, royalties were payable to Hanwright on "[o]re won by MBM from the MBM area". The obligation to pay royalties extended to "all persons or corporations deriving title through or under" MBM to the "MBM area". MBM claimed that the term "MBM area" did not refer to an area of land to which rights of occupancy had been transferred to MBM; rather, it referred to the rights themselves. The consequence of this construction would be that Eastern Range and Channar did not fall within the "MBM area" and royalties would not be payable on iron ore extracted therefrom. If MBM’s construction of the term "MBM area" was incorrect, MBM claimed that royalties were, in any event, not payable in respect of iron ore extracted from a part of Channar (referred to as "Channar A") because such ore was not extracted by entities "deriving title through or under" MBM. The Supreme Court of New South Wales rejected MBM’s claims and held that royalties were payable in respect of iron ore extracted from both Eastern Range and Channar. On appeal, the NSWCA held that royalties were payable in respect of Eastern Range but not Channar A. By grant of special leave, each of the parties appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that the term "MBM area" referred to the physical area of land that had been transferred to MBM and was not limited to the rights under the tenements that affected that land at the time of the 1970 Agreement. The Court further held that iron ore was being won from Channar A by entities "deriving title through or under" MBM. The exploitation of Channar A was carried on under a title the derivation of which was facilitated by the deployment by MBM of its own title.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 December 2015 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v DIRECTOR, FAIR WORK BUILDING INDUSTRY INSPECTORATE & ORS CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION & ANOR v DIRECTOR, FAIR WORK BUILDING INDUSTRY INSPECTORATE & ANOR [2015] HCA 46 Today the High Court unanimously held that, in civil penalty proceedings, courts are not precluded from considering and, if appropriate, imposing penalties that are agreed between the parties. The Court therefore allowed two appeals from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia ("the Full Court"). The Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate ("the Director") commenced a proceeding in the Federal Court of Australia against the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union ("the CFMEU") and the Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia ("the CEPU") (together, "the Unions"). The Director alleged that the Unions had contravened s 38 of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth), a civil penalty provision which prohibited unlawful industrial action. The Unions admitted the contraventions and, in accordance with longstanding practice in civil penalty proceedings, agreed with the Director to seek from the Court declarations as to the contraventions and pecuniary penalties of $105,000 against the CFMEU and $45,000 against the CEPU. At a pre-trial directions hearing, the primary judge raised a concern about whether the decision of the High Court in Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58 applied to the proceedings. In Barbaro, a plurality of the High Court held that criminal prosecutors are not permitted to make a submission to a sentencing judge nominating a quantified range of sentences that the prosecution considers to be open. The proceeding was referred to the Full Court. The Commonwealth was granted leave to intervene. The Full Court held that the principle in Barbaro applies to civil penalty proceedings, with the result that it was impermissible for parties to make joint submissions to a court seeking the imposition of an agreed penalty. The Full Court adjourned the proceeding for further hearing. By grants of special leave, the Commonwealth and the Unions each appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously held that the principle in Barbaro does not apply to civil penalty proceedings. The task of a court is to determine whether, in all the circumstances, the agreed penalty is an appropriate penalty. The court is not bound to accept the agreed penalty if it does not consider it appropriate. The High Court set aside the Full Court's adjournment order and remitted the proceedings to the Federal Court.