Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 February 2004 JOHN JAMES MURPHY AND ANNE ELIZABETH GEDZ (AS NEXT FRIEND OF DAPHNE MURPHY) v OVERTON INVESTMENTS PTY LIMITED The High Court of Australia today ordered the Federal Court to assess what damages may be due to two retirement village residents after it found errors in the way the Full Court of the Federal Court reached its conclusion that the Murphys had not proved loss or damage. The couple moved into Heritage Retirement Village in Sydney’s Padstow Heights in 1992 after being told that the estimated weekly cost of management and maintenance was $55.71, but it turned out this figure did not cover all outgoings and the true cost was much higher. The Murphys understood the levy could rise but were misled about what was then the true level of outgoings. The High Court appeal was the latest episode in protracted litigation in both the Federal Court and the New South Wales Supreme Court between Heritage tenants and the owners over the levy. Matters were further complicated by Overton selling the village in 2000 to a person not party to the proceedings. It was not in issue in the appeal that there had been misleading conduct in contravention of the Trade Practices Act (TPA). The question in the appeal was what, if any, relief was then due to the Murphys. They contended the Full Court of the Federal Court was wrong to dismiss their appeal against Justice Arthur Emmett’s refusal to award damages. He and the Full Court held that the Murphys had not paid too much for their lease and Justice Emmett also held there was no evidence the Murphys did not receive value for their levy. The High Court held that it did not necessarily follow that no loss was incurred. Inducement to enter the lease by a misleading statement of estimated outgoings meant they undertook a greater than expected obligation. The Court held that the Full Court was wrong to conclude that the Murphys had not established that they had suffered or were likely to suffer loss or damage by Overton’s conduct in contravention of the TPA. Damages for past and future outgoings would make good the position they would have been in had the misrepresentation not been made. The Court held the Murphys had not shown any difference in value of the lease of the unit. If they had, awarding a further sum would have been inappropriate and unnecessary. The High Court held that the Murphys suffered a loss when Overton started to charge all the outgoings it was entitled to charge. It held the Full Court was wrong to determine the amount of that loss only by comparing the Murphys’ financial position if they had taken other accommodation, rather than determining how much larger was the burden of the extra outgoings added into the levy. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal and remitted the assessment of damages to Justice Emmett for further consideration in accordance with the High Court’s reasons.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 7 August, 2003 AMACA PTY LIMITED (formerly known as JAMES HARDIE & COY PTY LIMITED) v THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND ROLLS ROYCE INDUSTRIAL POWER (PACIFIC) LIMITED (formerly known as JOHN THOMPSON (AUSTRALIA) PTY LIMITED The New South Wales Court of Appeal must now decide whether the State of NSW owes an asbestos disease victim a duty of care and whether it should contribute to a damages pay-out after the High Court of Australia today unanimously allowed Amaca's appeal. Warren Hay was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 1993 after being exposed to asbestos dust and fibre between 1958 and 1961 during construction of the Wallerawang power station near Lithgow. Mr Hay brought proceedings in the NSW Dust Diseases Tribunal, obtaining consent judgments against his then employer Rolls Royce and the NSW Electricity Commission for $185,000 each. Rolls Royce and the Electricity Commission both sought contribution from asbestos product manufacturer James Hardie. The Electricity Commission has settled its claim, obtaining a 70 per cent contribution ($129,500). James Hardie then claimed contribution from the State, alleging NSW breached a duty of care owed to Mr Hay as it was in a position to prevent or minimise harm caused by exposure to asbestos in sites such as power stations. In the Tribunal, Judge James Curtis found it unnecessary to decide whether NSW owed a duty to Mr Hay. He held that James Hardie created a danger which the State had merely failed to avoid and said contribution to Mr Hay's damages should come out of James Hardie's profits from selling asbestos products, not from NSW taxpayers. The NSW Court of Appeal dismissed James Hardie's appeal, holding that Judge Curtis had properly exercised the power under section 5(2) of the Miscellaneous Provisions Act to exempt NSW from liability. Subsequently, the High Court gave Amaca special leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal judgment. The question for the Court was whether Amaca's claim against NSW could be decided without any determination of the State's liability towards Mr Hay. It held that contribution outcomes available under section 5(2) depended upon Amaca's entitlement to obtain contribution from another body liable for the same damage. But neither the Dust Diseases Tribunal nor the Court of Appeal ever decided whether or not the State was liable. Nor did NSW admit liability. The High Court held that Judge Curtis made two errors of law. That James Hardie was a commercial enterprise and the State raised revenue through taxes was irrelevant in deciding their responsibilities to contribute to Mr Hay's damages. Judge Curtis also made an assumption about the State's liability without determining the content of its duty of care or how the duty had been breached. These issues had to be determined before any decision concerning contribution could be made. The Court ordered that the case be remitted to the Court of Appeal to determine whether NSW owed Mr Hay a duty of care and whether Amaca could claim contribution from the State.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 11 September, 2003 CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL ROGERS v NATIONWIDE NEWS PTY LIMITED The High Court of Australia today allowed an appeal by Sydney eye surgeon Dr Rogers who had sued for defamation for the misreporting of the circumstances of earlier litigation in which he had been successfully sued by a patient. Maree Lynette Whitaker was awarded almost $875,000 in damages and interest by the New South Wales Supreme Court in 1990. Dr Rogers had operated on her blind right eye. She was left blind in both eyes. Dr Rogers was found liable because he had failed to warn Mrs Whitaker of a remote risk in the surgical procedure he recommended and performed. He was not negligent either in recommending the procedure or in the manner in which it was performed. The Australian Taxation Office assessed the interest component of the award as income and taxed Mrs Whitaker on it. In the Federal Court in 1996 Justice Graham Hill rejected Mrs Whitaker’s challenge to the assessment. The Daily Telegraph’s story on this second case referred to her being blinded by her surgeon’s negligence. The story imputed to Dr Rogers negligence in the performance of the surgery. Dr Rogers sued Nationwide News, publisher of The Daily Telegraph, for defamation and was awarded $250,000 by the NSW District Court. Judge Robyn Tupman found that the journalist was more concerned with sensationalism than accuracy and did not check earlier stories in her own newspaper or other newspapers which widely reported the original Rogers v Whitaker decision. The NSW Court of Appeal, by majority, allowed an appeal by Nationwide News, holding that the publisher had made out a defence under section 24 of the NSW Defamation Act protecting fair reports of court proceedings. The Court of Appeal also unanimously held that the damages awarded to Dr Rogers were excessive. He appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously held that The Daily Telegraph’s story was not a fair report of court proceedings and defamed Dr Rogers by adding to what was actually said by Justice Hill. Nationwide News’s conduct in publishing the story was not reasonable in the circumstances so the story was not entitled to the statutory defence of qualified privilege. The Court also unanimously held that the $250,000 damages were not excessive.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA LYONS v STATE OF QUEENSLAND 5 October 2016 [2016] HCA 38 Today the High Court dismissed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The High Court held that the Court of Appeal did not err in holding that the appellant was not discriminated against when she was excluded from jury service. The appellant is profoundly deaf. She was summoned for jury service by the Deputy Registrar of the Ipswich District Court ("Deputy Registrar"). She contacted the Ipswich Courthouse advising that she would require the services of two Australian Sign Language ("Auslan") interpreters. The Deputy Registrar responded that there was no provision under the Jury Act 1995 (Q) to administer an oath to an interpreter for a juror and that it was not possible for an interpreter to be present in the jury room during its deliberations. The appellant made a complaint which was referred to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal ("QCAT"). The appellant alleged that the Deputy Registrar contravened the prohibitions, under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Q), against direct and indirect discrimination in the performance of a function or the exercise of a power under Queensland law. The appellant asserted that the Deputy Registrar had excluded her on the basis of her impairment so as to constitute direct discrimination and that the Deputy Registrar had imposed a condition on her participation in the jury process so as to constitute indirect discrimination. QCAT found that the Deputy Registrar's understanding of the Jury Act was incorrect but it accepted that the Deputy Registrar had not unlawfully discriminated against the appellant. The appellant appealed to QCAT's Appeal Tribunal which dismissed the appeal, holding that the Deputy Registrar's understanding of the Jury Act was correct. The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal from the Appeal Tribunal's decision. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The Court held that, absent specific legislative provision, Queensland law did not permit an Auslan interpreter to be present during jury deliberations. It followed that the appellant was not qualified to serve as a juror and the Deputy Registrar was required to exclude her from the jury panel. The exercise of the Deputy Registrar's powers in conformity with the Jury Act therefore did not infringe the relevant prohibitions, under the Anti-Discrimination Act, against discrimination.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 4 August 2005 RE SENATOR THE HONOURABLE AMANDA VANSTONE, THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS; EX PARTE AMOS BODE AME The High Court of Australia today upheld the validity of Australian laws which provided that when Papua New Guinea became independent in 1975 its indigenous people who then became citizens of PNG ceased to be citizens of Australia. Mr Ame had argued that he had remained an Australian citizen and never become a PNG citizen because he never took steps to renounce Australian citizenship. He was born in 1967 in Papua, which with New Guinea was administered by Australia. People born in Papua after the Australian Citizenship Act was passed in 1948 were Australian citizens but under the Migration Act required an entry permit to enter or live in Australia. Mr Ame first entered Australia in December 1999 on a three-month visa. Since then he has held a series of visas, the latest a bridging visa that will expire 28 days from today. Mr Ame began proceedings against the Minister seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus and a declaration as he contends that he did not cease to be an Australian citizen on PNG’s Independence Day, 16 September 1975, that he is not an “alien” according to the Australian Constitution and that the provisions of the Migration Act relating to detention and removal of unlawful non-citizens do not apply to him. Australia’s Papua New Guinea Independence Act provided that after Independence Day Australia ceased to have any sovereignty, sovereign rights or administrative rights in relation to PNG. The PNG Constitution did not allow dual citizenship and declared that anyone who was born in PNG and had two indigenous grandparents was automatically a PNG citizen. All four of Mr Ame’s grandparents were born in his district in Papua. Under the policy against dual citizenship, children who also had “real foreign citizenship” had to renounce their other citizenship by age 19 or they ceased to be PNG citizens. Australian citizenship acquired simply by being born in Papua or New Guinea was not “real foreign citizenship” so did not need to be renounced. Regulation 4 under the PNG Independence Act provided that a person in the position of Mr Ame who became a citizen of the new nation of PNG ceased to be an Australian citizen. The Court unanimously held that Mr Ame ceased to be an Australian citizen on Independence Day, that regulation 4 was authorised by the PNG Independence Act, and that the Act was constitutionally valid. On Independence Day Mr Ame became a citizen of PNG by virtue of the PNG Constitution. In recognition of the anti-dual citizenship policy, Australia, by regulation 4, withdrew Mr Ame’s Australian citizenship. The legislation under which that was done was within the constitutional power to make laws with respect to naturalization and aliens.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 20 June 2014 PLAINTIFF S297/2013 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION & ANOR [2014] HCA 24 Today the High Court unanimously held that the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection ("the Minister") did not have the power under s 85 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") to limit the number of protection visas that may be granted in a specified financial year. The judgment in this matter should be read with the judgment handed down today in the concurrently heard matter Plaintiff M150 of 2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 25. The plaintiff is a Pakistani national who entered Australia by sea at Christmas Island in 2012. He did not have a visa and was, therefore, an unlawful non-citizen within the meaning of the Act. He made a valid application for a protection visa. The Refugee Review Tribunal determined that he was a refugee within the meaning of the Refugees Convention, satisfying the criterion for a protection visa under s 36(2)(a) of the Act. However, he has been neither granted nor refused a protection visa because of an instrument signed by the Minister on 4 March 2014, which purported to determine under s 85 of the Act the maximum number of protection visas that may be granted in the financial year ending 30 June 2014. That maximum number having been reached, the grant of a protection visa to the plaintiff in this financial year would exceed that limit. Section 85 of the Act provides that the Minister may, by notice in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, determine the maximum number of visas of a specified class that may be granted in a specified financial year. Protection visas are a class of visa provided for by s 36. Under s 65, the Minister has a duty, after considering a valid application for a visa, to grant the visa if satisfied that certain conditions are met and to refuse to grant the visa if not so satisfied. Section 65A imposes a duty on the Minister to make a decision on protection visa applications within 90 days. In proceedings initiated in the High Court, the plaintiff claimed that the instrument limiting the number of protection visas which may be granted was invalid and that the Minister was bound to consider and determine his application and grant him a protection visa. A special case stated questions of law for determination by the Full Court. The High Court held that the instrument was invalid. In light of the time limit imposed by s 65A on the determination of protection visa applications, s 85 did not empower the Minister to determine the maximum number of protection visas that may be granted in a financial year. The Court ordered that the Minister consider and determine the plaintiff's application for a protection visa according to law.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 17 November 2005 RINGROW PTY LTD v BP AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ULTIMATE FUEL PTY LTD v BP AUSTRALIA PTY LTD NADER-ONE PTY LTD v BP AUSTRALIA PTY LTD The High Court of Australia today upheld a clause in contracts relating to the sale of service station sites, which permitted BP to buy back the site in the event of breach of a term of a related contract under which the purchaser agreed, for a certain period, to supply only BP fuel from the site. Ringrow, Ultimate Fuel and Nader-One were Sydney service station operators who later bought their sites under a BP privately owned sites agreement (POSA). In 2002, BP served notices on all three operators that it intended to exercise its contractual option to buy back the sites as the operators had bought fuel from suppliers other than BP. In the Federal Court of Australia, Justice Peter Hely made declarations upholding the validity of BP’s termination of the POSA and its exercise of the option to buy back sites. The Full Court of the Federal Court unanimously dismissed an appeal. The service station operators then appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal and held that the option clause did not amount to a penalty. The law of penalties is attracted, for example, where a contract stipulates that if a breach occurs the contract breaker will pay an agreed sum which exceeds what can be regarded as genuine pre-estimate of the damage likely to be caused by the breach. The service station operators argued that the POSA involved three penal factors: exclusion of goodwill from the resale price even though each operator had paid for goodwill; a double remedy for the same breach from the cumulative imposition of the buyback option upon the liability to pay damages should BP enforce that liability before exercising the option; and “the indiscriminate factor” – that the entitlement to terminate the POSA was indiscriminate regarding the nature of the breach. The High Court rejected all three arguments. It held that the difference between the original price and the buyback price must be extravagant and unconscionable or disproportionate to the point of oppressiveness to amount to a penalty. Because the service station operators failed to demonstrate the monetary value of the goodwill, it was not possible to say what money would be lost on buyback. The Court held therefore that it could not be said that the imposition of the buyback option was oppressive or was extravagant and unconscionable. The service station operators argued unsuccessfully for a concept of proportionality to be applied in determining penalty questions. The Court held that parties to a contract are normally free to agree upon its terms, and exceptions from that freedom of contact require good reason to attract judicial intervention to set aside the bargains upon which parties of full capacity have agreed.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 September 2017 THE QUEEN v KRITSINGH DOOKHEEA [2017] HCA 36 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria concerning jury directions on the criminal standard of proof. The respondent was charged with the murder of the deceased and stood trial in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The sole issue at trial was whether the respondent had acted with murderous intent. The evidence showed that, shortly after the deceased arrived at the respondent's home, a violent physical altercation started between the deceased and the respondent, during which the deceased attempted to flee from the respondent. It was accepted that the respondent placed his hands around the deceased's neck and squeezed until the deceased stopped resisting. The trial judge directed the jury that the Crown had to satisfy the jury of the respondent's guilt "not beyond any doubt, but beyond reasonable doubt". The respondent was convicted of murder. The respondent appealed against conviction on a number of grounds and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the ground that the trial judge erred in directing the jury that the Crown was required to satisfy them of guilt "not beyond any doubt, but beyond reasonable doubt". The Court of Appeal concluded that it was an error to suggest to the jury that they may entertain a doubt which is not a "reasonable" doubt and on that basis proceed to convict the respondent. By grant of special leave, the Crown appealed to the High Court on the question of whether it was an error of law productive of a substantial miscarriage of justice for the trial judge to direct the jury that the Crown had to satisfy the jury of the respondent's guilt "not beyond any doubt, but beyond reasonable doubt". The Crown argued that although the trial judge had strayed from the traditional formulation of the criminal standard of proof by directing the jury in those terms, it was not an error to do so and, in any event, it was not productive of a substantial miscarriage of justice because the charge taken as a whole sufficiently made clear to the jury that the respondent was to be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt. The Court held that a reasonable doubt is what a reasonable jury considers to be a reasonable doubt. Although it is generally speaking undesirable for a trial judge to contrast reasonable doubt with any doubt, in point of principle it is not wrong to notice the distinction and it is therefore not necessarily determinative of an appeal against conviction that the trial judge directed the jury by reference to that distinction. In this case, it could not be supposed that the jury might have been left in any uncertainty as to the true meaning of the need for proof beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.