Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 4 March, 2003 THE QUEEN v ROBERT GORDON GEE & ANOR The High Court of Australia today overturned a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia which held that it did not have jurisdiction to deal with certain questions of law referred to it by the District Court. While the Full Court ordinarily has the statutory power to hear a question of law referred to it by the District Court, in this case, the District Court was exercising federal jurisdiction and hearing a case of persons charged with Commonwealth offences. The respondents were charged on information filed by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions in the District Court on nine counts of defrauding the Commonwealth in relation to income tax. They pleaded not guilty. Before a jury was empanelled, the trial judge ruled on the admissibility of certain evidence. It was that ruling that was the subject of questions of law reserved for the Full Court. When it came to consider the questions of law reserved to it, the Full Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to deal with them. The DPP appealed against this decision. The High Court unanimously allowed the DPP's appeal, holding that the Full Court had jurisdiction.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 December 2011 Matter No S219/2011 AMACA PTY LTD (UNDER NSW ADMINISTERED WINDING UP) Matter No S220/2011 AMABA PTY LTD (UNDER NSW ADMINISTERED WINDING UP) JOHN WILLIAM BOOTH & ANOR [2011] HCA 53 Today the High Court held that there was sufficient evidence to justify a finding by the Dust Diseases Tribunal of New South Wales that brake linings containing asbestos manufactured by Amaca Pty Ltd and Amaba Pty Ltd caused Mr John Booth's malignant pleural mesothelioma. Mr John Booth is a retired motor and brake mechanic suffering from malignant pleural mesothelioma. This disease is caused by the inhalation of asbestos fibres. Mr Booth had three brief exposures to asbestos between 1943 and 1959, two as a child and youth when helping his father with home renovations and another when he spent about 20 minutes loading bags containing asbestos onto a truck in 1959. In addition, Mr Booth was exposed to asbestos in brake linings during his career as a motor and brake mechanic between 1953 and 1983 with a three-year interregnum. His work included the replacement of brake linings made from asbestos. The frequency of the replacement tasks varied from twice a month to three times a week. Amaca manufactured brake linings containing asbestos between 1953 and 1962. Amaba manufactured brake linings containing asbestos from 1962 to 1982. Seventy per cent of the asbestos fibres to which Mr Booth was exposed occupationally were released from brake linings manufactured by Amaca and Amaba. In July 2008, Mr Booth commenced proceedings in the Dust Diseases Tribunal of New South Wales against Amaca and Amaba in negligence. Mr Booth alleged that Amaca and Amaba had failed to warn about the dangers of use of their brake linings. The primary judge held that exposure to asbestos dust liberated from brake linings manufactured by Amaca and Amaba materially contributed to Mr Booth's contraction of mesothelioma. The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales dismissed Amaca and Amaba's appeals. Amaca and Amaba appealed to the High Court by special leave. Special leave was limited, in effect, to the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the primary judge's finding that exposures to asbestos in the brake linings manufactured by Amaca and Amaba had each been a cause of Mr Booth's mesothelioma. The High Court held by majority that the evidence was sufficient to support the Tribunal's conclusion that Amaca's and Amaba's products were a cause of Mr Booth's mesothelioma.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 7 March, 2003 KATHRYN FAY BARNS v MALCOLM PHILLIP BARNS (first respondent), ALICE ELIZABETH BARNS (second respondent), and MICHELLE LOUISE FISHER and RHIANNA KATE FISHER by their next friend PETER CHARLES SYMES (third respondents) The High Court of Australia today allowed an appeal from Kathryn Barns against a decision by the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court that a deed entered into by her parents effectively excluded her from making a claim under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act in respect of the estate of her late father, Lyle Phillip Barns. Kathryn Barns is the adopted daughter of Lyle and Alice Barns. Malcolm Barns is the Barneses’ natural son who took over the running of their farm near Wudinna in SA and is also the executor of his father’s will. The Barnses made some financial provision for their daughter but wished their son to inherit the farm. To try to protect the property from any claim by Kathryn Barns, the parents entered into a deed in 1996 under which they agreed to make mutual wills under which their son would inherit the whole estate from the surviving parent. Lyle Barns died in 1998. The Full Court of the Supreme Court held that the deed and accompanying wills did preclude Kathryn Barns and her children though this was not contrary to public policy. Her claim was dismissed and she appealed to the High Court. The merits of her claim have yet to be litigated. The point of law involved was upon which there were conflicting decisions of the Privy Council but no decision of the High Court. The High Court, by a 4-1 majority, overturned the Full Court’s orders and held that the deed did not prevent Kathryn Barns and her children from seeking access to her father’s estate.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 2 August 2007 JOSEPH TERRENCE THOMAS v GRAHAM MOWBRAY, FEDERAL MAGISTRATE; MANAGER, COUNTER-TERRORISM – DOMESTIC, AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE; AND COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA The High Court of Australia today upheld the constitutional validity of that part of the anti- terrorism laws under which an interim control order was made in respect of Mr Thomas. Mr Thomas allegedly undertook paramilitary training, including in the use of firearms and explosives, at Al Qa’ida’s Al Farooq training camp in Afghanistan in 2001. He was arrested in Pakistan in 2003 and in 2004 was charged in Australia with terrorism-related and passport offences. Mr Thomas was convicted in the Victorian Supreme Court of intentionally receiving funds from a terrorist organisation and of possession of a false passport. The Victorian Court of Appeal set aside the convictions in August 2006 and last December ordered a retrial which has yet to be held. After the convictions were quashed, the AFP applied, with the consent of the federal Attorney-General, for an interim control order (ICO) under Division 104 of the Criminal Code Act. At a hearing on 27 August 2006, Federal Magistrate Mowbray issued the ICO on grounds that related to allegations concerning Mr Thomas’s Al Qa’ida training and his links to extremists. The ICO imposed conditions which include a midnight to 5am curfew, reporting to police three times a week, and prohibitions from contacting particular individuals and from using certain communications technology. A Federal Magistrates Court hearing to determine whether the ICO should be confirmed for a specified period was listed for 1 September 2006 but was postponed until after Mr Thomas’s challenge to the validity of Division 104 was heard by the High Court. The questions agreed by the parties for determination by the Court were whether Division 104 is invalid because it confers on a federal court non-judicial power contrary to Chapter III of the Constitution, whether it is invalid because in so far as it confers judicial power on a federal court it authorises the power to be exercised in a manner contrary to Chapter III; and whether it is invalid because it is not supported by one or more express or implied heads of legislative power under the Constitution. By a 5-2 majority, the High Court held that Subdivision B of Division 104 is valid. It held that the subdivision is supported by at least the defence power. The Court held that the defence power is not limited to external threats or to war between nations but extends to protecting the public from terrorist acts. Mr Thomas contended that Subdivision B invalidly confers non-judicial power on federal courts. This contention was rejected. The functions exercised in making ICOs, and the standards according to which they are to be exercised, are such that they involve an exercise of judicial power and thus may be conferred upon the federal judiciary.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 September 2004 PATRICK JOHN COLEMAN v BRENDAN JASON POWER, ADAM CARNES AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL (QUEENSLAND) The High Court of Australia today overturned Mr Coleman’s convictions for insulting police but upheld his convictions for obstructing police and assaulting police. The case raised issues concerning freedom of political communication. Mr Coleman was arrested in Townsville Mall where he was distributing pamphlets alleging four police officers, including Constable Power, were corrupt. He stood in front of a placard which read, “Get to know your local corrupt type coppers, please take one.” When Constable Power approached, Mr Coleman loudly accused him of being a corrupt officer. He resisted arrest by locking his arms around a power pole, and hit and kicked officers during the struggle to put him in a police van. Mr Coleman was convicted in Townsville Magistrates Court of two counts of serious assault, two of obstructing police, one count of insulting words and one count of publishing insulting words. Under section 7(1)(d) of Queensland’s Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act (which has since been repealed) it was an offence to use threatening, abusive or insulting words to a person in a public place or where they could be heard in a public place. The offence attracted penalties of $100 or six months’ jail. The District Court dismissed an appeal and the Queensland Court of Appeal allowed an appeal only against conviction for publishing insulting words. Mr Coleman appealed to the High Court, which focused on construction of section 7(1)(d). Mr Coleman contended that in relation to his conduct the provisions was invalid for contravening the implied constitutional freedom of communication concerning political or government matters. The Queensland Attorney-General agreed that the practical operation of section 7(1)(d) may in some cases burden the freedom of political communication but argued that the section was valid because it was proportional to the objective of maintaining public order. By a 4-3 majority, the High Court allowed the appeal in relation to the conviction for using insulting words. Six members of the Court held that section 7(1)(d) was not invalid but three members of the majority held that its operation was limited to situations which could lead to violence. The use of words such as those used by Mr Coleman would constitute no offence unless those hearing him were reasonably likely to be provoked to physically retaliate. Police would be expected to be able to resist reacting to insults directed at them. The other member of the majority held that the legislation was invalid. The majority held that Mr Coleman’s convictions for insulting words should be quashed. However a majority of the Court dismissed appeals against convictions for obstructing police and assaulting police.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 18 December 2013 COMMONWEALTH MINISTER FOR JUSTICE v ADRIAN ADAMAS & ANOR [2013] HCA 59 Today the High Court held that the Commonwealth Minister for Home Affairs and Justice correctly determined to surrender to Indonesia an Australian citizen who, in his absence, had been convicted by an Indonesian court of an offence under Indonesian law and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court, unanimously allowing the Minister's appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, held that Australian standards of a fair trial were relevant to, but not determinative of, the Minister's decision. Mr Adamas was the President Director of Bank Surya in Indonesia between 1989 and 1998. He moved to Australia in 1999 and became an Australian citizen in 2002. In 2002, in his absence, an Indonesian court convicted Mr Adamas of a corruption offence, involving misuse of bank funds that caused liquidity problems for Bank Surya and extensive losses to the Indonesian Central Bank. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Indonesian authorities sought his extradition from Australia. The Minister was required to determine whether Mr Adamas should be surrendered to Indonesia. By force of an extradition treaty between Australia and Indonesia given effect in domestic legislation, Mr Adamas was to be surrendered only if, among other things, the Minister was satisfied that, in the circumstances of the case and taking into account the nature of the offence and the interests of Indonesia, surrender would not be "unjust, oppressive or incompatible with humanitarian considerations". Adopting the analysis and recommendation of officers of the Attorney-General's Department, the Minister determined that Mr Adamas should be surrendered to Indonesia. Mr Adamas sought judicial review of the Minister's determination. The Federal Court, both at first instance and on appeal to the Full Court, held that the Minister applied a wrong legal test because the analysis that he adopted failed to recognise that whether or not it would be unjust, oppressive or incompatible with humanitarian considerations to surrender Mr Adamas was to be determined according to "Australian standards", which would not ordinarily permit the trial and conviction of a person for a serious criminal offence in his or her absence. By special leave, the Minister appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that the standard of "unjust, oppressive or incompatible with humanitarian considerations", being contained in a bilateral treaty between Australia and Indonesia, encapsulated a single broad evaluative standard to be applied alike by Australia and Indonesia. Domestic standards, and international standards to which Australia and Indonesia had assented, were relevant to the application of the standard in the treaty but were not determinative. The Minister was correct not to confine his consideration to the application of Australian standards.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 9 November 2006 LIAM NEIL MAGILL v MEREDITH JANE MAGILL An action for the tort of deceit brought by a man said to be the victim of paternity fraud failed, the High Court of Australia held today. The Magills married in April 1988 and separated in November 1992, divorcing in 1998. They had two sons and a daughter between April 1989 and November 1991. After separation Mr Magill paid child support for all three children. After each birth, Ms Magill gave him birth registration forms to sign with him named as the father. In 1995, Mr Magill learned that Ms Magill at least suspected that her second son was not her husband’s child. In April 2000, DNA testing established that Mr Magill had fathered neither this boy nor the girl. Child support payments were adjusted to allow for past overpayments and an extinguishment of arrears. In January 2001, Mr Magill commenced proceedings against his ex-wife in the Victorian County Court for deceit. He claimed damages for personal injury in the form of anxiety and depression resulting from Ms Magill’s fraudulent misrepresentations. He also claimed financial loss, including loss of earning capacity by reason of his psychiatric problems and expenditure on the children under the mistaken belief he was their father, and exemplary damages. Mr Magill did not claim in respect of the child support payments. He was awarded $70,000: $30,000 for general pain and suffering, $35,000 for past economic loss and $5,000 for future economic loss. The County Court found Ms Magill’s presentation of the birth registration forms to Mr Magill constituted the representation by Ms Magill that he was the father. The Victorian Court of Appeal reversed that decision on the ground that Mr Magill had failed to establish the essential elements of the tort of deceit. He appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It rejected Ms Magill’s contention that section 119 of the Family Law Act, which permits spouses to sue each other, and section 120, which abolishes certain actions such as damages for adultery, exclude any action for deceit. However, three members of the Court held that no action for deceit could lie for representations about paternity made between spouses, and three members of the Court held that, while there could be circumstances in which such an action might succeed, they were exceptional and did not cover Mr Magill’s case.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 December 2012 THE PUBLIC SERVICE ASSOCIATION AND PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION AMALGAMATED OF NSW v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT & ORS [2012] HCA 58 Today the High Court unanimously upheld the validity of a provision of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) which requires the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales to give effect to regulations declaring aspects of government policy. The Industrial Relations Commission is constituted by judicial and non-judicial members and it exercises certain functions conferred upon it by the Act. Other functions conferred by the Act are exercised by the Industrial Court of New South Wales, and that Court is constituted only by the judicial members of the Commission. The central provision in this appeal was s 146C(1) of the Act. That sub-section provides that the Industrial Relations Commission must "give effect to any policy on conditions of employment of public sector employees ... that is declared by the regulations to be an aspect of government policy that is required to be given effect to by the Commission" when making or varying any award or order. The Industrial Relations (Public Sector Conditions of Employment) Regulation 2011 (NSW) stated policies affecting the conditions of employment of public sector employees, among which was a limitation upon the increases in remuneration that the Commission could award. The appellant brought proceedings in the Industrial Court challenging the validity of s 146C(1). The appellant claimed that it undermined the integrity of the Industrial Court for its judicial members to be required to give effect to policy declared in regulations when sitting as, and exercising the functions of, the Commission. The Industrial Court rejected that claim and the appellant, by special leave, appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. Although s 146C(1) and the Industrial Relations (Public Sector Conditions of Employment) Regulation used the words "policy" and "government policy", the policies contemplated by s 146C(1) (and those contained in the Regulation) were no different from any other laws (including any applicable statutes and regulations) which the Industrial Relations Commission must apply in exercising its functions. It cannot undermine the integrity of the Industrial Court for its judicial members to apply the law as it stands from time to time when sitting as, and exercising the functions of, the Commission.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 17 August 2022 GOOGLE LLC v DEFTEROS [2022] HCA 27 Today, the High Court allowed an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The appeal primarily concerned whether, by operating an internet search engine which, in response to a user-designed search query, provided search results including a link to the webpage of another containing defamatory matter, the appellant had published the defamatory matter. The appellant is a technology company that operated an internet search engine which allowed users to navigate information on the World Wide Web through user-designed search queries. In response to a search query, the search engine used computer programs and algorithms to return search results in the form of a list of links to webpages that were likely to be of interest to the user, ranked according to relevance. Each search result relevantly consisted of the title of a webpage, a snippet of the content found on that webpage and a hyperlink that, when clicked, would take the user to that webpage. In early 2016, the respondent became aware that inputting his name as a search query in the appellant's search engine returned a search result ("the Search Result"), which hyperlinked to an article published by The Age newspaper in 2004 ("the Underworld article"). He alleged the Underworld article defamed him, although there was no suggestion that the Search Result itself was defamatory. The respondent requested the appellant to remove the Search Result, which the appellant did not do. The respondent commenced proceedings, claiming damages for defamation from the appellant as publisher of the Search Result and the Underworld article. The trial judge held, in a finding that was unchallenged on appeal, that the Underworld article defamed the respondent. In the courts below, the appellant was found to have published the defamatory matter because the provision of the Search Result was instrumental to the communication of the content of the Underworld article to the user, in that it lent assistance to its publication. The courts below rejected, in part, the appellant's reliance on the statutory and common law defences of innocent dissemination and qualified privilege. The High Court, by majority, found that the appellant was not a publisher of the defamatory matter. A majority of the Court held that the appellant did not lend assistance to The Age in communicating the defamatory matter contained in the Underworld article to the third party users. The provision of a hyperlink in the Search Result merely facilitated access to the Underworld article and was not an act of participation in the bilateral process of communicating the contents of that article to a third party. There was no other basis for finding publication because the appellant had not participated in the writing or disseminating of the defamatory matter. There being no publication, the majority found it unnecessary to consider the defences raised by the appellant.