Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 September 2020 APPLICANT S270/2019 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION [2020] HCA 32 Today the High Court dismissed an appeal from a judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia concerning the validity of the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not to revoke the cancellation of the appellant's Class BB Subclass 155 Five Year Resident Return visa, which is not a protection visa. Section 501(3A) of the Migration Act relevantly provides that the Minister must cancel a visa if satisfied that the person does not pass the character test because they have a substantial criminal record and the person is serving a sentence of imprisonment on a full-time basis. Section 501CA(4) provides that the Minister may revoke the decision to cancel a visa if two conditions are met. The first is that the person makes representations in accordance with the invitation from the Minister (s 501CA(4)(a)). The second is that the Minister is satisfied that either the person passes the character test or there is another reason why the decision should be revoked (s 501CA(4)(b)). The appellant was born in Vietnam and arrived in Australia on a humanitarian visa in 1990. The visa did not have as a criterion that the appellant was entitled to protection under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as modified by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. In 1994, the appellant was granted a Class BB Subclass 155 Five Year Resident Return visa. That visa was cancelled pursuant to s 501(3A). The appellant was sent a notice of the decision, a copy of the relevant ministerial direction and other enclosures including a revocation request form. The appellant filled out the revocation request form and sent it to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. Subsequently, in a letter from the Department, the appellant was provided with particulars of information including an "International obligations and humanitarian concerns assessment" ("the Assessment") and invited to comment. The Assessment concluded that no non-refoulement obligations were owed with respect to the appellant. The appellant responded to the request for comment but not in relation to the Assessment. The Minister declined to revoke the cancellation. The appellant's application for judicial review and appeal to the Full Court were unsuccessful. The appellant was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court on the ground that, when exercising the power under s 501CA(4), the Minister was obliged to, and failed to, consider whether non-refoulement obligations were owed to the appellant. A majority of the High Court held that the Minister was not required to consider whether Australia owed non-refoulement obligations to the appellant as "another reason" under s 501CA(4)(b)(ii). There was nothing in any of the material submitted by the appellant in support of his revocation request that indicated or suggested that he now held a subjective or well-founded fear of persecution in Vietnam.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 May 2013 COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v UNIT TREND SERVICES PTY LTD [2013] HCA 16 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia concerning the interpretation of s 165-5(1)(b) of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) ("the GST Act"). Unit Trend Services Pty Ltd ("Unit Trend") is the representative member of a GST group of companies which, at the relevant time, included Simnat Pty Ltd ("Simnat"), Blesford Pty Ltd ("Blesford") and Mooreville Investments Pty Ltd ("Mooreville"). Simnat was the developer of residential building unit projects. When construction of the projects was at an advanced stage, Simnat sold the projects for their then value as going concerns to Blesford and Mooreville, which completed the projects and sold the completed units. The Commissioner of Taxation ("the Commissioner") issued a declaration to Unit Trend under the anti-avoidance provisions in Div 165 of the GST Act negating a total GST benefit in excess of $21 million. This declaration was contested by Unit Trend in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the AAT"), which found in favour of the Commissioner. The AAT found that the companies were engaged in a "scheme" under s 165-10(2) of the GST Act. The GST benefit got from the scheme, which Div 165 was being invoked to negate, was the benefit obtained as a result of intermediate sales by Simnat to Blesford and Mooreville of a going concern. The GST benefit reflected the amount agreed to be paid to Simnat by Blesford and Mooreville as the consideration for the intermediate sales, which brought about an uplift in the intermediate cost base of the units supplied by them to buyers of the units. As a result, the amount of GST payable by Unit Trend was less than it would have been had the scheme not existed. The AAT's decision was subsequently overruled by the Full Court in favour of Unit Trend. The Full Court held that the GST benefit obtained by Unit Trend was attributable to the making of a choice, election, application or agreement expressly provided for by the GST Act and, therefore, Div 165 did not apply. On appeal by special leave to the High Court, the issue before the Court was whether the GST benefit obtained by Unit Trend was not attributable to the making of a choice, election, application or agreement that was expressly provided for by the GST Act. The High Court unanimously held that the phrase "not attributable to" in s 165-5(1)(b) is concerned with whether the GST benefit in question is not one to which the taxpayer was entitled by exercise of a statutory choice. Reference to the undisputed facts showed that the GST benefit in question was not attributable to the making of a statutory choice by Unit Trend provided for by the GST Act. The GST Benefit was, therefore, negated by the anti-avoidance provisions in Div 165.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 November, 2003 KEVIN WAYNE GILLARD v THE QUEEN The High Court of Australia today ordered a new trial for a man deprived of the possibility of a verdict of manslaughter in a South Australian murder trial. Mr Gillard and Gerald David Preston were convicted of the murder in 1996 of two men and attempted murder of a third. A man named Tognolini and/or the Hell’s Angels allegedly wanted one of the murdered men, Leslie Knowles, killed in relation to his involvement in police investigations into drug dealing. Mr Preston allegedly agreed to perform the contract killing for Mr Gillard stole a van for Mr Preston and drove him to Mr Knowles’s car repair workshop. Mr Preston walked into the workshop and shot dead Mr Knowles and an employee and injured a mechanic. Mr Gillard then drove Mr Preston away and later destroyed the van. Mr Gillard denied knowing Mr Preston was armed. He also asserted that he believed they went to the workshop to rob Mr Knowles. The SA Supreme Court trial judge directed the jury that, for a murder conviction, the prosecution must prove Mr Gillard and Mr Preston shared a common purpose to kill Mr Knowles and had to exclude the possibility that his purpose was to participate in a robbery. The prosecution argued at trial and before the Full Court of the Supreme Court that, even on the robbery hypothesis, the jury should have been told that the facts could be consistent with murder, and that they could convict Mr Gillard of manslaughter. The Full Court unanimously upheld his conviction. The High Court held that on the robbery hypothesis Mr Gillard was party to a common design involving the hostile use of a loaded gun. If he foresaw as a possible incident of carrying out the common design that Mr Preston might shoot Mr Knowles with intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm then he was guilty of murder. If he foresaw that Mr Knowles might shoot Mr Knowles during a robbery, but without foreseeing such intent, then he was guilty of manslaughter. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal and held that the trial judge’s refusal to leave a case of manslaughter to the jury was an error of law. The Court also held that it was not possible to say that despite this error there was no miscarriage of justice. It was not inevitable that a jury, properly instructed and given manslaughter as an alternative to consider, would find that Mr Gillard foresaw that Mr Preston intended to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. The Court ordered that his convictions be quashed and that there be a new trial.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 February 2017 CLIVE FREDERICK PALMER v MARCUS WILLIAM AYRES, STEPHEN JAMES PARBERY AND MICHAEL ANDREW OWEN IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS LIQUIDATORS OF QUEENSLAND NICKEL PTY LTD (IN LIQ) & ORS; IAN MAURICE FERGUSON v MARCUS WILLIAM AYRES, STEPHEN JAMES PARBERY AND MICHAEL ANDREW OWEN IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS LIQUIDATORS OF QUEENSLAND NICKEL PTY LTD (IN LIQ) [2017] HCA 5 Today the High Court published its reasons for orders made after a hearing on 10 November 2016, which dismissed writs of summons seeking, amongst other relief, a declaration that s 596A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) is invalid as contrary to Ch III of the Constitution. The High Court held that s 596A of the Corporations Act, which provides for the mandatory examination of certain persons in relation to a corporation's examinable affairs, does not confer non-judicial power on federal courts or on courts exercising federal jurisdiction and so is not invalid as contrary to Ch III of the Constitution. The plaintiff in each proceeding – Mr Palmer and Mr Ferguson – was a former director of Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd ("QN"). QN was placed under administration and the creditors of QN subsequently resolved that QN be wound up in insolvency. Additional liquidators of QN were subsequently appointed by an order of the Federal Court of Australia ("the Special Purpose Liquidators"). The Special Purpose Liquidators applied to the Federal Court for, and obtained, an order for the issue of a summons under s 596A of the Corporations Act requiring, among others, Mr Palmer and Mr Ferguson to attend for examination about QN's examinable affairs. Mr Palmer and Mr Ferguson both attended the Federal Court and were each examined. Mr Palmer and Mr Ferguson then each filed a writ of summons in the High Court. In each proceeding, the following question was reserved for the consideration of a Full Court – is s 596A of the Corporations Act invalid as contrary to Ch III of the Constitution in that it confers non-judicial power on federal courts and on courts exercising federal jurisdiction? The High Court unanimously held that an application for the issue of a summons for mandatory examination under s 596A is a "matter" in the constitutional sense and its determination engages the judicial power of the Commonwealth. Therefore, s 596A does not confer non-judicial power on federal courts or on courts exercising federal jurisdiction and so is not invalid as contrary to Ch III of the Constitution.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 December 2022 REALESTATE.COM.AU PTY LTD v JAMES KELLAND HARDINGHAM; RP DATA PTY LTD v JAMES KELLAND HARDINGHAM [2022] HCA 39 Today, the High Court allowed an appeal, and allowed another appeal in part, from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The appeals concerned the scope and terms of a licence and subsequent sub-licence to use photographs and floor plans of residential properties ("works") produced by Mr Hardingham and his company Real Estate Marketing Australia Pty Ltd ("REMA"), for the marketing of real estate properties. Mr Hardingham and REMA supplied works produced by Mr Hardingham to real estate agencies for use in the marketing of properties for sale or lease by way of informal contract. One of the uses of the works by the agencies was to upload them to the platform operated by Realestate.com.au ("REA"). REA then provided the works to RP Data Limited ("RP Data"). RP Data operated a website and provided a subscription service for agencies where the works remained after the sale or lease of the property as part of the historical information about completed transactions. Mr Hardingham and REMA brought proceedings in the Federal Court claiming RP Data had infringed the copyright in a large number of works. It was common ground that RP Data would infringe the copyright in the works if it used the works without a licence referable to Mr Hardingham or REMA. As such, this proceeding was directed to the terms of the licence Mr Hardingham or REMA gave the agencies, which in turn permitted the agencies to sub-licence the use of the works to REA. Mr Hardingham and REMA accepted that a licence was granted by REMA to the agencies which permitted them to sub-licence to REA. However, they contended that the licence was subject to a limitation that once a sale or lease of the property the subject of the works was completed, the licence came to an end. A licence in these terms would not have permitted the agencies to accept the terms of the licence required by REA, which included the ability to sub-licence to other persons such as RP Data. The primary judge found RP Data did not infringe the copyright in the works as it was to be inferred from the conduct of the parties, or to be implied into the agreements to give business efficacy to them, that Mr Hardingham and REMA licenced the agencies to upload the works to REA's platform, and in so doing to grant a licence to REA in accordance with REA's standard terms and conditions. The majority of the Full Court allowed Mr Hardingham and REMA's appeal, concluding that the licence was limited to use for the sale or lease of the relevant property. The High Court held that RP Data did not infringe copyright in the works as a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have known that one of the purposes of REMA providing the works to the agencies was so that the agencies could provide them to REA, and that the agencies had no real choice other than to accept a term requiring them to provide a licence to REA to use the works indefinitely and to provide them to RP Data.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 12 December, 2002 GEOFFREY ROBERTS AND KENNETH CASE v RODNEY BASS The High Court of Australia has allowed appeals by Geoffrey Roberts and Kenneth Case against judgments that they were liable to pay damages for having defamed former Liberal member for the South Australian seat of Florey, Rodney “Sam” Bass. He lost his seat in the 1997 state election. Mr Roberts, representing the so-called Clean Government Coalition, produced three documents making claims critical of Mr Bass, particularly about taxpayer-funded travel. The first two documents were letterboxed during the 1997 election campaign. The third, a how-to-vote card, was handed out on election day, including by Mr Case. The three documents are set out in the judgment of Justice Callinan. The SA District Court decided Mr Roberts and Mr Case injured Mr Bass by publishing false and defamatory material. The Court held that the publications were made on occasions of qualified privilege at common law but the privilege was lost by the malice of Mr Roberts and Mr Case. On appeal, the Full Court of the SA Supreme Court upheld the finding of malice and increased the damages awarded against Mr Roberts from $60,000 to $100,000, made up of $20,000 for the first publication, $35,000 for the second and $45,000 for the third. It upheld the award of damages against Mr Case of $5,000. Mr Roberts and Mr Case appealed to the High Court. They argued that the decision of the South Australian courts was affected by legal error. That argument was upheld. The High Court, by majority, overturned the orders of the Full Court of the SA Supreme Court and allowed the appeals of both Mr Roberts and Mr Case. In Mr Roberts’s appeal, it ordered a new trial. In Mr Case’s appeal it ordered that judgment be entered in his favour.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 4 September 2019 BELL LAWYERS PTY LTD v JANET PENTELOW & ANOR [2019] HCA 29 As a general rule, a self-represented litigant may not obtain any recompense for the value of his or her time spent in litigation. Under an exception to the general rule, commonly referred to as "the Chorley exception", a self-represented litigant who happens to be a solicitor may recover his or her professional costs of acting in the litigation. Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Court unanimously held that the Chorley exception should not be extended to the benefit of barristers. Further, a majority of the Court held that the Chorley exception should not be recognised as part of the common law of Australia. The appellant, an incorporated legal practice, retained the first respondent, a barrister, to appear in proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. At the conclusion of those proceedings, a dispute arose as to the payment of the first respondent's fees. The first respondent sued the appellant for her unpaid fees in the Local Court of New South Wales. She was unsuccessful in that proceeding, but she appealed successfully to the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Orders for costs were made in the first respondent's favour in relation to both the Local Court and the Supreme Court proceedings. The first respondent subsequently forwarded a memorandum of costs to the appellant pursuant to those costs orders, which included sums for costs incurred on her own behalf and the provision of legal services by her in the Local Court and Supreme Court proceedings. Although the first respondent was represented by a solicitor in the Local Court proceeding, and by solicitors and senior counsel in the Supreme Court proceeding, she had undertaken preparatory legal work and had attended court on a number of occasions. The appellant refused to pay the costs claimed for the work personally undertaken by the first respondent. A costs assessor rejected the first respondent's claim for the costs of the work she had performed and that decision was affirmed on appeal before the Review Panel and the District Court of New South Wales. The first respondent sought judicial review of the decision of the District Court in the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Court of Appeal, by majority, held that the first respondent was entitled to rely upon the Chorley exception notwithstanding that she was a barrister and not a solicitor. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The majority of the Court held that the Chorley exception should not be recognised as part of the common law of Australia because it is an anomaly that represents an affront to the fundamental value of equality of all persons before the law and cannot be justified by the considerations of policy said to support it. In addition, the anomalous nature of the Chorley exception is inconsistent with the statutory definition of "costs" in s 3(1) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 17 June 2015 MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION v WZAPN & ANOR WZARV v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION & ANOR [2015] HCA 22 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from the Federal Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN and unanimously dismissed an appeal from the Federal Court in WZARV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The High Court held that the likelihood of a period of temporary detention of a person for a reason mentioned in the Refugees Convention is not, of itself and without more, a threat to liberty within the meaning of s 91R(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act"). WZAPN and WZARV both claimed refugee status upon arrival in Australia. WZAPN is a stateless Faili Kurd whose former place of habitual residence is Iran. In 2010, he was denied refugee status by a refugee status assessment ("RSA") officer. An Independent Merits Reviewer ("IMR") reviewed the decision of the RSA officer and concluded, among other things, that the real chance of short periods of detention upon WZAPN's return to Iran did not constitute serious harm for the purposes of the Act. The Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (as it then was) dismissed WZAPN's application for judicial review of the IMR's decision. WZAPN's appeal to the Federal Court was allowed on the basis that the threat of a period of detention constitutes serious harm whatever the severity of the consequences for liberty. The Federal Court also held that the IMR's decision was vitiated by a want of procedural fairness. The Minister was granted special leave to appeal to this Court from the decision of the Federal Court. WZARV is a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity, who in 2011 was denied refugee status by an RSA officer. With respect to the possible detention of WZARV upon return to Sri Lanka, the IMR accepted that it was likely WZARV would be interviewed by Sri Lankan authorities upon arrival at the airport, but that it is usual for such questioning to be completed in a matter of hours. WZARV's application for judicial review to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and appeal to the Federal Court were dismissed. By grant of special leave, WZARV appealed to the High Court on the ground that, on the construction of s 91R(2)(a) of the Act adopted by the Federal Court in the WZAPN proceedings, the IMR had erroneously concluded that WZARV did not face serious harm upon return to Sri Lanka. The High Court held that the question of whether a risk of the loss of liberty constitutes "serious harm" for the purposes of s 91R requires a qualitative evaluation of the nature and gravity of the apprehended loss of liberty. The Court also held that the IMR's decision regarding WZAPN's claims was not vitiated by a want of procedural fairness.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 24 August 2016 MILLER v THE QUEEN; SMITH v THE QUEEN; PRESLEY v THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS [2016] HCA 30 Today the High Court allowed three appeals from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The appellants and a man named Betts were convicted of murder following a trial in the Supreme Court of South Australia. There was evidence that the four were involved in an altercation in which Betts fatally stabbed the deceased. The liability of the appellants for the murder was left for the jury's consideration on bases which included the doctrine of extended joint criminal enterprise as enunciated in McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108; [1995] HCA 37: each appellant would be guilty of murder if he was a party to an agreement to commit an assault and he foresaw that in carrying out that agreement one of his co-venturers might kill or inflict really serious bodily injury intending to do so and, with that awareness, he continued to participate in the agreed criminal enterprise. Each of the appellants had been drinking alcohol in the hours leading up to the fatal altercation. They appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal contending that the verdicts were unreasonable in light of the evidence of the extent of their intoxication. The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed this ground of appeal in each case without reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Prior to the hearing in the High Court, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in R v Jogee [2016] 2 WLR 681; [2016] 2 All ER 1 held that the doctrine of extended joint criminal enterprise should no longer be a basis for the imposition of criminal liability. The appellants were granted leave to argue that, consistent with Jogee, the decision of the High Court in McAuliffe should be reopened and overruled. After consideration of the history and basis of the doctrine, the majority held that the law in Australia should remain as stated in McAuliffe. The High Court held, by majority, that the appeals should be allowed in circumstances in which the Court of Criminal Appeal had failed to review the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the appellants' convictions. The proceedings were remitted to the Court of Criminal Appeal for determination of the ground that the verdicts were unreasonable and could not be supported by the evidence.