Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 7 October 2015 McCLOY & ORS v STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES & ANOR [2015] HCA 34 Today the High Court upheld the validity of certain provisions of the Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Act 1981 (NSW) ("the EFED Act"), which impose caps on political donations, prohibit property developers from making such donations, and restrict indirect campaign contributions. Division 2A of Pt 6 of the EFED Act ("Div 2A") provides for general caps on the amount of political donations which a person can make to or for the benefit of a particular political party, elected member, group, candidate or third-party campaigner. Division 4A of Pt 6 ("Div 4A") prohibits the making or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of a political donation by a "prohibited donor" or the soliciting of a person by or on behalf of a "prohibited donor" to make a political donation. "Prohibited donor" is defined to include "a property developer". Section 96E prohibits the making or acceptance of "indirect campaign contributions". Div 4A and s 96E apply in New South Wales to State and local government elections and to elected members of Parliament and councils. Div 2A applies only to State elections and elected members of Parliament. The first and third plaintiffs are "property developers" and the second plaintiff made an "indirect campaign contribution" within the meaning of each expression in the EFED Act. Each of the plaintiffs intended, if permitted by law, to make donations in excess of the caps imposed by Div 2A. The plaintiffs brought proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the High Court, challenging the validity of Div 2A, Div 4A (as it applied to "property developers") and s 96E on the basis that these provisions impermissibly burden the implied constitutional freedom of communication on governmental and political matters. They submitted that the impugned provisions burden the freedom of political communication by restricting the funds available to political parties and candidates to meet the costs of political communication, and further that the restrictions imposed upon the plaintiffs' ability to gain access and make representations to politicians and political parties were also such a burden. The High Court accepted that the impugned provisions indirectly burden political communication by restricting the funds available to political parties and candidates. However, the Court unanimously held that the burden imposed by the donation caps in Div 2A is not impermissible and the provisions are a legitimate means of pursuing the legitimate objective of removing the risk and perception of corruption and undue influence in New South Wales politics. The Court held that the provisions in fact enhance the system of representative government which the implied freedom of political communication protects. Section 96E was also held to be valid, on the basis that as an anti-avoidance provision its validity depends on that of Div 2A. By majority the Court held, taking note of a history of corruption in New South Wales, that the prohibition on donations by property developers in Div 4A is also valid.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 7 March 2006 THE TRUSTEES OF THE PROPERTY OF JOHN DANIEL CUMMINS A BANKRUPT v MARY ELIZABETH CUMMINS AND AYMCOPIC PTY LTD Property and shares transferred to a spouse before barrister John Cummins was made bankrupt were available to trustees acting for his creditors, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Cummins became bankrupt in December 2000. At 30 January 2001, his assets totalled $259,614 and his liabilities $1.04 million. His largest creditor is the Australian Taxation Office which instituted proceedings to recover $955,672.92, following the lodging of income tax returns in February 2000 for the years 1991-92 to 1998-99. Mr Cummins had not lodged any returns since 1955. He was admitted as a solicitor in 1957, then practised at the NSW Bar from 1961, becoming a Queen's Counsel in 1980. He married Mary Elizabeth Power in 1964 but they separated in February 2002. Aymcopic is the trustee of the Cummins family trust, of which Mrs Cummins and their four children are the beneficiaries. In August 1987, Mr Cummins transferred to his wife his interest in the family home in Hunters Hill in Sydney and transferred to Aymcopic his shares in Wentworth Chambers in Phillip Street, Sydney. The trustees in bankruptcy sought declarations that the transfers were void, pursuant to section 121 of the Commonwealth Bankruptcy Act. In the Federal Court, Justice Ronald Sackville made the declarations and ordered consequential relief. He held that the main purpose of the transfers was to prevent property becoming divisible among Mr Cummins's creditors or to hinder or delay the process of making property available for division among creditors. Mrs Cummins and Aymcopic appealed to the Full Court which, by majority, allowed the appeal. The trustees appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal by the trustees and ordered that Justice Sackville's orders be reinstated.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 2 April 2014 TAYLOR v THE OWNERS – STRATA PLAN NO 11564 & ORS [2014] HCA 9 Today the High Court, by majority, allowed an appeal brought by Susan Joy Taylor from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Court of Appeal had found, by majority, that section 12(2) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ("the CLA") applied to and limited awards of damages under sections 3 and 4 of the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW) ("the CRA"). Mrs Taylor is the widow of the late Mr Taylor. Mr Taylor died when an awning outside a shop collapsed on him in 2007. Mrs Taylor commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales claiming damages pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of the CRA against some of the respondents. The proceedings were brought for the benefit of Mrs Taylor and children of the late Mr Taylor. A preliminary question arose before the primary judge for separate determination as to whether any award of damages claimed by the plaintiffs pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of the CRA would be limited by the operation of section 12(2) of the CLA. Section 12(2) of the CLA directs a court when awarding damages to disregard the amount (if any) by which a claimant's gross weekly earnings would, but for the injury or death, have exceeded three times the average weekly earnings at the date of the award. The limitation invoked by section 12(2) applies to specified heads of damages, including, relevantly, for the loss of expectation of financial support. The primary judge held that insofar as the damages claimed included damages for the loss of expectation of financial support, the court is to disregard the amount (if any) by which the deceased's gross weekly earnings would (but for his death) have exceeded three times the average weekly earnings at the date of the award. An appeal to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales was dismissed by majority. By special leave, Mrs Taylor appealed to the High Court. The issue on appeal was whether in the case of an award of damages for the loss of expectation of financial support, the limitation in section 12(2) ought to be construed as applying to the deceased's gross weekly earnings. The High Court, allowing Mrs Taylor's appeal by majority, held that on no view could the word "claimant" as it is used in section 12(2) of the CLA be read as referring to the gross weekly earnings of the deceased. That construction, which was adopted by the primary judge and the majority of the Court of Appeal, could not be reconciled with the language of the statute as enacted by Parliament. The High Court held that the court is not required to disregard the amount by which the gross weekly earnings of Mr Taylor, but for his death, would have exceeded three times the average weekly earnings.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 31 August 2016 THE MARITIME UNION OF AUSTRALIA & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION & ANOR [2016] HCA 34 Today the High Court unanimously held that a determination made by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection ("the Minister") pursuant to s 9A(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") exceeded the limits of the power conferred on the Minister by s 9A(6) and for that reason is invalid. The determination had purported to negate certain visa requirements for non-citizens engaged in the offshore resources industry. The plaintiffs are associations of employees including persons employed in the offshore resources industry. The offshore resources industry is concerned with the exploration and exploitation of offshore natural resources including greenhouse gas, petroleum and other minerals. Since 1982, provisions of the Act have provided to the effect that the migration zone, and therefore the requirement for a non-citizen to hold a visa, extends to non-citizens working on "Australian resources installations". In 2013, the Act was amended to extend Australia's migration zone to non-citizens participating in or supporting an "offshore resources activity" and to impose specified visa requirements in respect of those persons. The amendments also conferred power on the Minister under s 9A(6) to make a determination excepting an operation or activity from the statutory definition of "offshore resources activity". In 2015, the Minister made a determination excepting from that definition all operations and activities to the extent that they use any vessel or structure that is not an Australian resources installation. The purported effect of the determination was thus to negate the operation of the specified visa requirements in relation to non-citizens engaged in operations and activities to the extent that they use any vessel or structure that is not an Australian resources installation. The parties stated a special case and questions of law arising for the opinion of the Full Court. The questions of law were directed to whether the determination was beyond power and therefore invalid, and, if so, what relief should flow from that. The High Court unanimously held that the broad-ranging exception contemplated by the determination exceeded the limited terms of the power conferred on the Minister by s 9A(6) of the Act. The text and context of s 9A(6) imply that its purpose is to provide for limited exceptions for particular activities or operations to which it may be determined from time to time the visa regime should not apply. By entirely negating the extension of the visa regime to non-citizens on vessels and structures that are not Australian resources installations, where those non-citizens are in an area in order to participate in or support an offshore resources activity, the determination purported in effect to repeal the operation of the amending provisions' extension of the visa regime, and thereby to thwart that legislative purpose. Accordingly, the High Court declared the determination is invalid and of no effect.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 September 2014 MAXWELL v HIGHWAY HAULIERS PTY LTD [2014] HCA 33 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, and held that s 54(1) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) operated to prevent the insurers from refusing to pay claims for indemnity made by the insured, in circumstances where the insured failed to comply with an endorsement forming part of the contract of insurance. Section 54(1) of the Act states that "where the effect of a contract of insurance would, but for [that] section, be that the insurer may refuse to pay a claim, either in whole or in part, by reason of some act of the insured or of some other person, being an act that occurred after the contract was entered into ... the insurer may not refuse to pay the claim by reason only of that act", but that "the insurer's liability in respect of the claim is reduced by the amount that fairly represents the extent to which the insurer's interests were prejudiced" by that act. Section 54(2) provides that the insurer may nonetheless refuse to pay a claim where the relevant act could reasonably be regarded as being capable of causing or contributing to a loss in respect of which insurance cover is provided by the contract. The respondent, Highway Hauliers Pty Ltd, had been refused indemnity for two accidents involving its vehicles. An endorsement forming part of the contract of insurance stated that no indemnity was provided when a vehicle was being operated by a driver unless, among other things, the driver had a PAQS driver profile score of at least 36 (or an approved equivalent). Drivers of the respondent's vehicles in both accidents had not undertaken a PAQS test or an equivalent. It was conceded that the fact that each vehicle was being operated by an untested driver could not reasonably be regarded as being capable of causing or contributing to any loss incurred by the respondent as a result of each accident, and that the insurers' interests were not prejudiced as result of the vehicles being operated, at the time of the accidents, by untested drivers. The respondent was successful in proceedings for indemnity under the policy and for damages for breach of the insurance contract in the Supreme Court of Western Australia and before the Court of Appeal. By special leave, the appellant, a nominated authorised representative of the insurers, appealed to the High Court. Rejecting the appellant's argument that the "claim" to which s 54(1) refers is a claim for an insured risk, the High Court held that, the respondent having made claims in relation to accidents which occurred during the period of insurance, it was sufficient to engage s 54(1) that the effect of the contract of insurance was that the insurer may refuse to pay those claims by reason only of acts which occurred after entry into the contract. Section 54(1) applied to the respondent's claims because the operation of each vehicle by an untested driver was properly characterised as having been by reason of an "act" that occurred after entry into the contract of insurance.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 November 2010 COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v ANSTIS [2010] HCA 40 Today the High Court held that a university student in receipt of youth allowance payments was entitled to claim various self-education expenses as income tax deductions. Symone Anstis was enrolled as a full-time student in a teaching degree at the Australian Catholic University. In the 2006 income year she earned $14,946 in wages as a part-time sales assistant, and $3,622 in youth allowance payments. In her tax return for that period she claimed a $920 deduction for self-education expenses, comprising the depreciation in value of a computer, textbooks and stationery, a student administration fee, supplies for children during her teaching rounds, and travel expenses other than to university. Section 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ("the 1997 Act") relevantly provides that a person can deduct from their assessable income any loss or outgoing to the extent that it is incurred in gaining or producing their assessable income except to the extent that it is a loss or outgoing of a private or domestic nature. The Commissioner of Taxation disallowed the deduction, and Ms Anstis was unsuccessful in an application for review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("AAT"). In 2009, the AAT's decision was reversed by the Federal Court. The Full Federal Court dismissed an appeal by the Commissioner against that decision. The High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal by the Commissioner of Taxation. The Court held that youth allowance payments amounted to assessable income under the 1997 Act as they fell within the concept of "ordinary income". Because Ms Anstis' entitlement to youth allowance arose from her undertaking full-time study, the expenses claimed were incurred in gaining or producing her assessable income. The Court also held that the expenses were not of a private or domestic nature, and as such were deductible under s 8-1 of the 1997 Act. The Commissioner of Taxation was ordered to pay Ms Anstis' costs.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 2 October 2013 WILLIAM DAVID BUGMY v THE QUEEN [2013] HCA 37 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had increased the sentence imposed on William David Bugmy for intentionally causing grievous bodily harm to a correctional services officer. Mr Bugmy, an Aboriginal Australian who grew up in circumstances of social deprivation, had been sentenced for the offence in the District Court of New South Wales to a term of imprisonment comprising a non-parole period of four years with a balance of term of two years. The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal on the ground that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. The Court of Criminal Appeal, allowing the Director's appeal, re-sentenced Mr Bugmy for the offence to a non-parole period of five years with a balance of term of two years and six months. In the High Court, Mr Bugmy argued that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in allowing the Director's appeal without having held that the original sentence was manifestly inadequate and without having considered the exercise of its residual discretion to dismiss an appeal by the Director. Mr Bugmy also argued that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in holding that the extent to which his deprived background as an Aboriginal Australian could be taken into account in sentencing diminished with time and repeat offending. The High Court unanimously allowed Mr Bugmy's appeal. The High Court held that since the Court of Criminal Appeal had not addressed the question of whether the original sentence was manifestly inadequate, which was in truth the sole ground of the Director's challenge, and had not considered its residual discretion to dismiss the Director's appeal, its authority to re-sentence the appellant had not been enlivened. The High Court therefore set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal relating to the offence and remitted the Director's appeal to that Court. The High Court also held that the same sentencing principles apply irrespective of the identity of a particular offender or his or her membership of an ethnic or other group. Additionally, the joint reasons held that the effects upon an offender of profound deprivation do not diminish over time and should be given full weight when sentencing the offender. However, those effects do not necessarily serve to mitigate an offender's sentence given the conflicting purposes of punishment, such as rehabilitation and personal and general deterrence, which must be balanced in each individual case.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 18 October 2017 BROWN & ANOR v THE STATE OF TASMANIA [2017] HCA 43 Today the High Court held invalid certain provisions of the Workplaces (Protection from Protesters) Act 2014 (Tas) ("the Protesters Act") in their operation in respect of forestry land and business access areas relating to forestry land. Various provisions of the Protesters Act prohibit "protesters" – that is, persons engaging in conduct in furtherance of, or for the purposes of promoting awareness of or support for, "an opinion, or belief, in respect of a political, environmental, social, cultural or economic issue" – from engaging in certain conduct on "business premises" or "business access areas". "Business premises" relevantly comprises "forestry land", which includes land on which "forest operations" are being carried out. "Business access area" is defined as so much of an area of land, outside business premises, as is reasonably necessary to enable access to an entrance to, or to an exit from, business premises. Police officers may direct any person to leave or stay away from "business premises" or "business access areas" in certain circumstances under pain of arrest or criminal penalty. The plaintiffs were present in the Lapoinya Forest in North West Tasmania when forest operations were being conducted there. The plaintiffs were each arrested and charged with offences under the Protesters Act in relation to their conduct in opposing the logging of part of a coupe in that forest. The charges against each plaintiff were not later pursued. It was not disputed that, but for directions made under the Protesters Act, and to the extent permitted by other laws, the plaintiffs would have gone back to the Lapoinya Forest for the purpose of raising public awareness of logging in that forest. In the High Court, the plaintiffs challenged the validity of certain provisions of the Protesters Act on the basis that the Constitution protects freedom of political communication and that those provisions impermissibly burden that freedom. A majority of the High Court held that, in their operation in respect of forestry land and business access areas relating to forestry land, the impugned provisions of the Protesters Act effectively burdened the implied freedom of political communication. A majority of the Court held that the Protesters Act pursued the legitimate purpose of protecting businesses and their operations by ensuring that protesters do not prevent, hinder or obstruct the carrying out of business activities on business premises. However, by majority, the Court held that the burden imposed by the impugned provisions on the implied freedom of political communication was impermissible because those provisions were not reasonably appropriate and adapted, or proportionate, to the pursuit of that purpose in a manner compatible with the maintenance of the system of representative and responsible government that the Constitution requires. A majority of the Court therefore declared that the impugned provisions were invalid in their operation in respect of forestry land and related business access areas.