Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 September 2021 DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS REFERENCE NO 1 OF 2019 [2021] HCA 26 Today the High Court dismissed an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria on a reference by the Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) ("the DPP") concerning the correct interpretation of recklessness in s 17 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Section 17 of the Crimes Act provides that a person who, without lawful excuse, recklessly causes serious injury to another person is guilty of an indictable offence. In 1995, in R v Campbell [1997] 2 VR 585, the Court of Appeal held that in order for a person to be convicted of recklessly causing serious injury under s 17, the prosecution must establish that the person foresaw that serious injury probably would result from the act or omission which in fact caused the serious injury. In 2017, in Aubrey v The Queen (2017) 260 CLR 305, the High Court cast doubt on the correctness of Campbell. The Court in Aubrey held that for the similar offence of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm under s 35(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), recklessness meant foresight of the possibility of harm. This appeal concerned the present correctness of Campbell. In February 2017, an accused was charged under s 17 of the Crimes Act. During the trial, the trial judge declined to direct the jury in relation to recklessness in accordance with Aubrey and, instead, directed the jury consistently with Campbell. The accused was acquitted by the jury. The DPP referred the correctness of Campbell as a point of law to the Court of Appeal for its opinion. The Court of Appeal unanimously decided that unless and until it is altered by legislation, the meaning of "recklessly" in s 17 of the Crimes Act is that stated in Campbell. A majority of the High Court found that the point of law was answered correctly by the Court of Appeal. When Parliament enacted s 17 of the Crimes Act the intention must have been to leave the development of the meaning of recklessness to the courts. The Court of Appeal took up that task in Campbell, adopting a foresight of probability test for recklessness which has since been followed in Victoria. Two legislative amendments have been made to the Crimes Act since Campbell was decided which are relevant to s 17. The first amendment, in 1997, increased the maximum penalty for the s 17 offence to 15 years' imprisonment. The second amendment, in 2013, revised the statutory definition of "serious injury" and inserted an aggravated form of the s 17 offence into the Crimes Act. Both amendments followed expert reviews and extensive consultation with key stakeholders in the criminal justice system. There was no suggestion in those reviews or consultations that the meaning given to recklessness in Campbell had caused any difficulty in directions to juries. By contrast, there could be real unfairness in departing from a long-standing decision of a State court which has been acted upon in such a way as to affect rights. Campbell should be followed unless and until it is altered by legislation.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 April 2004 WOOLCOCK STREET INVESTMENTS PTY LTD v CDG PTY LTD (formerly Cardno & Davies Australia Pty Ltd) AND JOHN CAMERON JOHNSON A company which bought a Townsville warehouse and office complex could not sue the consulting engineers who had originally designed the complex’s foundations when the building started to show structural defects, the High Court of Australia held today. In 1987 the trustee company for a property trust engaged Cardno and Davies to provide engineering services for the building project. Mr Johnson, a civil engineer with Cardno and Davies, was project manager. In 1992 Woolcock Street Investments bought the complex after having a building inspection carried out. The sale contract did not include any warranty that the building was free from defect, nor did the trustee company assign to Woolcock Street any rights it may have had in respect of such defects. In 1994 substantial structural distress appeared, due to settlement of the foundations designed by Cardno and Davies or the material below the foundations or both. Cardno and Davies and Mr Johnson denied they owed Woolcock Street a duty of care in designing the foundations and denied breach of any such duty. They said they advised the original owner to allow them to obtain soil tests but the owner told them to proceed without them and to use standard structural footing sizes. In the Queensland Supreme Court the parties consented to an order stating a case for the opinion of the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal held that Woolcock Street’s statement of claim disclosed no cause of action in negligence and concluded that although the 1995 High Court decision, Bryan v Maloney, established that the builder of a house may owe a duty of care to later purchasers, those who built or designed commercial buildings did not. (The decision in Bryan v Maloney has now been superseded in most states and territories by statutory schemes for protection of successive owners of dwellings.) Woolcock Street appealed to the High Court. The Court held that in cases involving only economic loss cases, vulnerability – in the sense of a plaintiff’s inability to protect itself from the consequences of a defendant’s lack of reasonable care – was an important consideration. Woolcock Street could have taken steps to ensure that the sale contract contained warranties or an assignment of any rights the original owner may have had in respect of claims for defects. Furthermore, it was not alleged that the engineers breached any obligation to the original owner. The owner had asserted control over the project, including any investigations the engineers might have undertaken. Unlike Bryan v Maloney, there was neither reliance by the owner nor the assumption of responsibility by the engineers. The High Court, by a 6-1 majority, dismissed the appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 2 October 2012 COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v QANTAS AIRWAYS LIMITED [2012] HCA 41 Today the High Court held, by majority, that Qantas Airways Limited ("Qantas") was liable to pay goods and services tax ("GST") when it received fares on unclaimed flights. Qantas and its subsidiary Jetstar Airways Pty Limited ("Jetstar") provide domestic airline travel services. These airline travel services have variable fare rules and conditions of carriage. Not all passengers take the flight they book. Whether the fare the passenger has paid is refundable is determined by the applicable fare rules and conditions of carriage. Even if a refund can be claimed, not all passengers who have not taken the booked flight claim the refund. The Commissioner of Taxation ("Commissioner") assessed a GST liability on the fares received for flights not taken. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed the assessment. On appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court held that as actual travel was the sole purpose of the transaction, there was no taxable supply if the travel does not occur. This meant a GST liability was not incurred. By special leave, the Commissioner appealed to the High Court of Australia. The High Court held, by majority, that Qantas made a taxable supply which attracted GST when it received fares whether or not the passenger took the flight that was booked. Flights were sold and bookings taken on the basis that Qantas would use its best endeavours to carry the passenger and baggage, having regard to the circumstances of the business operations of the airline. Consequently, even if the passenger did not actually travel, there was a taxable supply incurring GST liability and Qantas was liable to remit the GST received on fares for unclaimed flights to the Commissioner.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 June 2022 HILL v ZUDA PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE HOLLY SUPERANNUATION FUND & ORS [2022] HCA 21 Today, the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia concerning the operation of reg 6.17A of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth). That regulation relevantly prescribed standards for how a member of a regulated superannuation fund is to give notice requiring the trustee of the fund to pay the member's benefits to a nominated person on or after the member's death. The primary issue in the appeal was whether reg 6.17A applied to a self managed superannuation fund ("SMSF"). Zuda Pty Ltd ("Zuda") was the trustee of an SMSF known as the Holly Superannuation Fund ("the Fund"). Mr Sodhy and Ms Murray were each a member of the Fund and a director of Zuda. The relevant trust deed for the Fund was amended in 2011 to insert a clause described as a "binding death benefit nomination", according to which, if either member of the Fund died, Zuda was required to distribute the whole of the deceased member's balance in the Fund to the surviving member. Mr Sodhy died on 22 November 2016. Ms Hill, the only child of Mr Sodhy, commenced a proceeding in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, arguing that the binding death benefit nomination clause was of no force and effect on the basis that it did not comply with the standards prescribed by reg 6.17A. The Supreme Court summarily dismissed the proceeding on the basis that reg 6.17A did not apply to the Fund as an SMSF. The Court of Appeal concluded that there was no error in that holding and so dismissed an appeal from the order for summary dismissal. In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeal adopted a construction of reg 6.17A expressed by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, on the basis that it was bound to follow the "seriously considered dicta" of an intermediate appellate court unless convinced that the other court's reasoning was "plainly wrong". The High Court held that reg 6.17A, properly construed, did not apply to an SMSF. That construction was consistent with the extrinsic materials and the purposes of reg 6.17A. The Court of Appeal was therefore correct in its conclusion, although it ought to have reached that conclusion by construing reg 6.17A for itself. Intermediate appellate courts and trial judges are not bound to follow obiter dicta of other intermediate appellate courts, although they would ordinarily be expected to give great weight to them.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 6 August, 2003 RODNEY NATHAN KING v THE QUEEN Mr King was convicted in the Western Australian District Court in December 1999 of aggravated burglary involving breach of a restraining order and deprivation of liberty, after holding his wife, Sandra King, captive for several hours. He was sentenced to seven years' jail. The prosecution case alleged that at the time of the offences in November 1998, the couple were separated. Mrs King had obtained a restraining order. Despite the order, she met her husband several times so he could see their children, then aged eight, five and three. After time at a women's refuge, Mrs King and the children moved to a house in Forrestfield, Perth, without telling her husband. Mr King discovered where she was living a week later and gained entry by saying he was a neighbour. When Mrs King opened the door, he knocked her to the ground then pulled her to her feet and slapped her. She ran from the house screaming but returned to the children. When she made a dash to the living room to call police he dragged her back to the kitchen, leading to the deprivation of liberty charge. Mr King took his family to two service stations for milk and cigarettes and to his workplace to collect his pay. Mrs King was eventually able to call police when he went outside to his son who had fallen off his bicycle. Mr King told police Mrs King had called him to ask him to fix her car so was at her house with her consent, but in a tape-recorded call from prison after his arrest he said another person had given him Mrs King's address. Mr King, who was mostly unrepresented at his trial, gave no evidence. Judge Peter Nisbet told the jury the prosecution bore the onus of proof and must satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt that Mr King's claim that he had Mrs King's consent was false. Judge Nisbet did not mention a consent defence under section 62 of WA's Restraining Orders Act under which Mr King may have borne the onus of proof on the balance of probabilities, had he been charged with that offence. On appeal, this was argued to be a misdirection. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that Judge Nisbet erred in not directing the jury on section 62 but held that there was no miscarriage of justice. Mr King appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. Four members of the Court held that there was no error on the part of Judge Nisbet, and one held that there would have been no miscarriage of justice in any event.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 June 2013 [2013] HCA 27 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed Mr Robert Agius' appeal against his conviction in the Supreme Court of New South Wales for conspiring to dishonestly cause a loss to the Commonwealth, contrary to s 135.4(5) of the Criminal Code (Cth) ("the Code"). Mr Agius was charged with two counts of conspiracy. Both arose out of a single scheme to defraud the Commonwealth of taxation revenue which began in 1997 and continued until 2006. The first count alleged that he conspired with others to defraud the Commonwealth, contrary to ss 86(1) and 29D of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ("the Crimes Act"), between 1 January 1997 and 23 May 2001. The second count alleged that he conspired with others to dishonestly cause a loss to the Commonwealth, contrary to s 135.4(5) of the Code, between 24 May 2001 and 23 October 2006. Mr Agius was charged with two separate counts because the relevant provision of the Crimes Act was repealed with effect from 24 May 2001. From 24 May 2001, the offence of conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth was contained exclusively in s 135.4 of the Code. Mr Agius was convicted of both counts. By special leave, he sought to appeal to the High Court against his conviction on the second count. In this Court, he argued that the conduct criminalised by s 135.4(5) of the Code was the formation of a conspiratorial agreement. Mr Agius contended that he should not have been convicted on the second count because he had not entered into a second agreement after s 135.4(5) commenced. He also argued that the offence in s 135.4(5) could not be satisfied by his participation in an existing conspiratorial agreement, otherwise the section would be given retrospective effect. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. The Court held that the offence in s 135.4(5) of the Code required the existence of, and participation in, an agreement. But the agreement did not need to be formed after s 135.4(5) commenced. Mr Agius' continued participation in the agreement was capable of constituting the offence. The Court also held that, because Mr Agius' offence was his continued participation in the conspiratorial agreement after s 135.4(5) commenced, the provision did not operate retrospectively.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 August 2014 ANTHONY CHARLES HONEYSETT v THE QUEEN [2014] HCA 29 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal brought by Anthony Charles Honeysett against his conviction for armed robbery. In 2011, Mr Honeysett was convicted following a trial by jury in the District Court of New South Wales of the armed robbery of an employee of a suburban hotel. The robbery was recorded by closed-circuit television cameras ("CCTV"). The head and face of one of the robbers ("Offender One") was covered, as was the remainder of Offender One's body, save for a small gap between sleeve and glove. At trial, over objection, the prosecution adduced evidence from an anatomist, Professor Henneberg, of anatomical characteristics that were common to Mr Honeysett and Offender One. Professor Henneberg's identification of these characteristics was based on looking at the CCTV footage of the robbery and at images of Mr Honeysett taken while he was in police custody. Mr Honeysett appealed against his conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, submitting that Professor Henneberg's evidence was inadmissible evidence of opinion. The Court of Criminal Appeal agreed with the trial judge that Professor Henneberg's evidence was admissible because it was evidence of an opinion that was wholly or substantially based on his "specialised knowledge" within the meaning of s 79(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). The Court accepted that Professor Henneberg's specialised knowledge was based on his study of anatomy and his experience in viewing CCTV images. By special leave, Mr Honeysett appealed to the High Court. On the hearing of the appeal, the prosecution did not maintain that Professor Henneberg had specialised knowledge based on his experience in viewing CCTV images. The prosecution relied solely on Professor Henneberg's knowledge of anatomy. The Court held that Professor Henneberg's opinion was not based wholly or substantially on his knowledge of anatomy: his opinion regarding each of the characteristics of Offender One was based on his subjective impression of what he saw when he looked at the images. As Professor Henneberg's opinion did not fall within the exception in s 79(1), the Court held that it was an error of law to admit the evidence. The Court quashed Mr Honeysett's conviction and ordered a new trial.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 6 March 2008 TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION, PRIMUS TELECOMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD, OPTUS NETWORKS PTY LTD, CHIME COMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD, XYZED PTY LTD, POWERTEL LIMITED, REQUEST BROADBAND PTY LTD, NEC AUSTRALIA PTY LTD, MACQUARIE TELECOM PTY LTD, AMCOM PTY LTD, ADAM INTERNET PTY LTD AND AGILE PTY LTD The telecommunications access regime set out in the Trade Practices Act (TPA) did not amount to an acquisition of Telstra’s property, the High Court of Australia held today. Telstra asserted that contrary to section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution, which provides that Parliament has the power to make laws with respect to the acquisition of property on just terms, the access regime effected an acquisition other than on just terms of some of its local loops, the twisted pairs of copper or aluminium wire running between a local exchange and a consumer’s premises. Telstra has about 10.1 million local loops and about 5,120 local exchanges. The local loops are used for either unconditioned local loop services (ULLS), which have no equipment located along the loop, or line sharing services (LSS), which allows one supplier to use the low-frequency part of the spectrum for a voiceband service to an end user’s premises while another supplier uses the high-frequency non-voiceband part of the spectrum for high bandwidth services. Telstra began proceedings in the High Court against the Commonwealth, the ACCC and 11 other telecommunications service providers. Questions were reserved for consideration of the Court. The questions asked whether sections 152AL(3) or 152AR of the TPA in their application to ULLS and LSS were beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament by reason of section 51(xxxi). The Court unanimously dismissed Telstra’s case, holding that sections 152AL(3) and 152AR of the TPA were not invalid. The rights in Telstra’s assets were rights to use the assets in connection with the provision of telecommunications services but those rights were always subject to a statutory access regime which permitted other carriers to use its assets. Telstra had always owned and operated the assets within a regulatory regime by which other carriers have the right to connect their facilities to Telstra’s network and to obtain access to Telstra services.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 September 2019 CRAIG WILLIAM JOHN MINOGUE v STATE OF VICTORIA [2019] HCA 31 Today the High Court unanimously held, in answer to questions stated in a special case, that s 74AB of the Corrections Act 1986 (Vic) ("the Act") is not invalid, and that the question of the validity of s 74AAA of the Act did not arise in the circumstances of this case. In 1988, the plaintiff was convicted of the murder of Angela Rose Taylor, a constable in the Victorian police force, and was sentenced by the Supreme Court of Victoria to imprisonment for life. The Court set a non-parole period of 28 years, during which term the plaintiff would not be eligible to be released on parole. After the plaintiff's non-parole period ended, he applied to the Adult Parole Board ("the Board") for parole. That application has not yet been determined. On 14 December 2016, a new provision in the Act, s 74AAA, commenced operation. The plaintiff challenged the constitutional validity of s 74AAA (as then in force) in the High Court, and in Minogue v Victoria (2018) 92 ALJR 668; 356 ALR 363; [2018] HCA 27, the High Court held that s 74AAA did not apply to the plaintiff. On 1 August 2018, the Act was further amended to insert a new s 74AB and to substitute a new s 74AAA. The new s 74AB sets out "[c]onditions for making a parole order for Craig Minogue". It relevantly provides that the Board may make a parole order in respect of the plaintiff "if, and only if" the Board is satisfied that the plaintiff "is in imminent danger of dying or is seriously incapacitated and, as a result, he no longer has the physical ability to do harm to any person" and "has demonstrated that he does not pose a risk to the community", and the Board "is further satisfied that, because of those circumstances, the making of the order is justified". The substituted s 74AAA imposes the same conditions for making a parole order but applies to any person convicted of murder where the victim was a police officer. The plaintiff commenced proceedings in the High Court challenging the constitutional validity of s 74AB and, if it applied, s 74AAA. As the plaintiff was not in imminent danger of dying or seriously incapacitated, the plaintiff contended that the provisions, in their substantive operation and practical effect, legislatively resentenced him for the same crime, and that the resentencing was legislative punishment contrary to Ch III of the Constitution. The High Court held that s 74AB was relevantly indistinguishable from the provision upheld in Knight v Victoria (2017) 261 CLR 306; [2017] HCA 29. Section 74AB did not, in either its substantive operation or practical effect, impose additional or separate punishment on the plaintiff beyond the punishment imposed by the sentencing court in a way that involved the exercise of judicial power. A majority considered that s 74AB did no more than alter the conditions to be met before the plaintiff could be released on parole. The Court concluded that s 74AB was valid and applied to the plaintiff. It was therefore unnecessary for the Court to consider the validity of s 74AAA.