Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 23 June 2005 BRIAN WILLIAM POVEY v QANTAS AIRWAYS LIMITED AND BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC Mr Povey, who suffered from deep-vein thrombosis after an international flight, would not be able to establish a cause of action against the airlines, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Povey, now 63, left Sydney for London on a Qantas flight on 15 February 2000 and arrived back on 20 February 2000 on a British Airways flight. Both seats were in economy class. Mr Povey alleged that during or immediately after these flights he suffered from DVT and consequently suffered a stroke, pulmonary embolism, chronic chest, lung and leg pain, breathing difficulties, impaired mobility, thrombosis of the right leg, and shock, anxiety and depression. He alleged the DVT was caused by the conditions of travel, including cramped seating from which it was not easy to move, discouragement of movement around the cabin, the serving of alcohol, tea and coffee, and the lack of warning about the risk of DVT and information on reducing that risk. Mr Povey commenced proceedings in the Victorian Supreme Court against Qantas and BA, claiming damages for personal injury pursuant to the Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act and Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention on international air carriage. He also claimed damages for negligence from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, but those proceedings are in abeyance, pending the outcome of the High Court appeal. Qantas and BA each sought summary judgment, alleging the claims made against them were bound to fail. The applications failed, and the airlines appealed to the Court of Appeal. By majority, it allowed the appeal and struck out Mr Povey’s pleading against the carriers and permanently stayed the action. He appealed to the High Court. Article 17 provides that a carrier is liable for the death, wounding or bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage took place on board the aircraft or while embarking or disembarking. Mr Povey submitted that “accident” should be interpreted broadly to include omissions as well as acts occurring on an aircraft, and that it covered a failure to warn of the known dangers of DVT, possibly combined with the flight conditions. Both sides endorsed a formulation from the United States Supreme Court in Air France v Saks, that a passenger’s injury is caused by an accident only if caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger. The High Court held that, on the facts alleged, Mr Povey’s condition was not caused by an accident. It held that Mr Povey’s allegations, if proved, would not establish a cause of action against the carriers. The Court, by a 6-1 majority, dismissed the appeal. One Justice would have allowed the appeal in part.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 April 2022 ZAGI KOZAROV v STATE OF VICTORIA [2022] HCA 12 Today, the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The appellant was employed by the respondent as a solicitor in the Specialist Sexual Offences Unit ("the SSOU") of the Victorian Office of Public Prosecutions. The primary question in the appeal was whether the respondent's failure to take reasonable measures in response to "evident signs" of the appellant's psychiatric injury from vicarious trauma suffered in that role caused the exacerbation and prolongation of the appellant's psychiatric injury. The appellant commenced employment in the SSOU in June 2009. Her work there involved "cases of an abhorrent nature involving child rape and offences of gross depravity". In February 2012, the appellant was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from vicarious trauma which she had suffered in the course of employment. The appellant was later diagnosed with major depressive disorder as a corollary of her post-traumatic stress disorder. The appellant sued the respondent and was awarded damages for negligence at trial. On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the respondent had been placed on notice of a risk to the appellant's mental health by the end of August 2011. However, the Court of Appeal rejected the trial judge's finding that, at the end of August 2011, the appellant would have accepted an offer to rotate out of the SSOU. On that basis, the Court of Appeal found that the respondent's breach of duty did not cause the exacerbation of the appellant's psychiatric injury between August 2011 and the appellant's departure from the SSOU in February 2012. The High Court found that the respondent had been placed on notice by the end of August 2011 that the appellant was at risk of harm from her work. The High Court also found that the Court of Appeal erred in rejecting the trial judge's finding that the appellant would have co-operated with steps to rotate the appellant out of the SSOU, had those steps been taken subsequent to occupational screening at the end of August 2011. The considerations supporting that conclusion included: the appellant's cooperative conduct in February 2012 in liaising with the respondent about her future role; her preparedness to be assessed by a psychologist in August 2011; and expert evidence led at trial that a very significant majority of people, if assessed as having a work-related psychiatric injury, and after having had the diagnosis and its relevant consequences explained to them, will accept the advice of a clinician in respect of that injury. The Court of Appeal thus erred in finding a lack of causation between the breach of duty and the appellant's injury.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 December 2004 WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION v TEMWOOD HOLDINGS PTY LTD A developer had no right to compensation for the Crown taking over ownership of a foreshore reserve, the High Court of Australia held today. Temwood in 1992 acquired an area on the coast south of Perth which it proceeded to subdivide and develop in 1993 as the Bayshore Garden Estate with houses, a primary school, a recreation reserve and other facilities. Thirty years earlier a 200-metre-wide 20-hectare strip running the length of the foreshore frontage of the land was reserved as parks and recreation area on the gazettal of the Metropolitan Region Scheme (MRS). This reservation did not divest ownership from the former owner, who was never paid compensation. The WA Town Planning and Development Act conferred a power of compulsory acquisition of land for a town planning scheme but that power was not taken up. The MRS forbade any development on the foreshore reserve with approval of the Planning Commission. In 1999 and 2000, Temwood lodged three applications with the commission for subdivision approval. Each was approved, subject to the condition that the foreshore reserve be ceded to the Crown free of cost and without any compensation paid. Temwood appealed to the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal against the Planning Commission tying the approvals to the condition. The tribunal dismissed the appeal. Temwood then appealed to the WA Supreme Court, arguing that the condition was invalid because the commission had no power to impose it and it was imposed for the improper purpose of defeating Temwood’s subsisting right to compensation. Justice Carmel McLure dismissed the appeal, holding that Temwood did not have a vested right to compensation and the commission’s power was not improperly exercised. Temwood successfully appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court, which held that it had an unequivocal right to compensation. The Full Court held that this right was deferred until an event stipulated in section 36 of the MRS Act. This was either when the land was first sold following the date of reservation or when the commission refused an application for subdivision or approved the subdivision subject to conditions that were unacceptable. The Full Court held that the condition was beyond power and invalid and served no planning purpose and was not imposed as a bona fide exercise of the commission’s powers. The commission appealed to the High Court, contending that the Full Court erred in characterising the condition as an extinguishment of a statutory right, and the condition was imposed for a proper planning purpose of securing the land for public access. The High Court, by a 3-2 majority, allowed the appeal. It held that the tribunal did not err in law in approving the condition. The condition was one the tribunal had power to approve, was imposed for a legitimate planning purpose, and was reasonably related to the proposed development. Only the person who owned the land when the reservation was made could obtain compensation. Temwood as a subsequent purchaser of the land had no right to compensation.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 18 November 2004 LOCKWOOD SECURITY PRODUCTS PTY LTD v DORIC PRODUCTS PTY LTD The High Court of Australia today rejected challenges by Doric to claims made by Lockwood in its patent on a new type of door lock. Lockwood registered the patent on the lock which it said overcame the problems of deadlocks, which have a second key-operated lock inside needing to be unlocked separately to be able to exit the house. These were designed to prevent anyone breaking into the house from being able to open the door to remove bulky goods. However if a key was left in the outside lock or misplaced without the inner lock being unlocked, occupants could be trapped during a fire or other danger. The patent was for a deadlock that could open both the outside and inside locks simultaneously. The issue was whether the 33 claims defining the scope of the patent were fairly based in the patent specification within the meaning of section 40(3) of the Patents Act or whether the claims were wider. Claims 2 to 32 were built upon claim 1, so were narrower than claim 1. (Claim 33 was described by reference to drawings of the latch assembly.) The appeal to the High Court was conducted on the footing that the issue of fair basing might be determined in regard to claim 1 alone, so that if it were fairly based then all were. In October 2000 Lockwood’s lawyers accused Doric (and others) of infringing the patent. Doric commenced proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia alleging Lockwood had made unjustified threats of legal action against it and its distributors. Lockwood cross-claimed for infringement of 19 of the 33 claims. Doric in turn cross-claimed seeking revocation of the patent, alleging the patented lock was not novel, that it was obvious and involved no inventive step, that the specification did not fully describe the invention, that certain claims were unclear or not clear and succinct, and that none of the claims were fairly based on the matters described in the specification. Justice Peter Hely found Doric’s products infringed 14 claims, but he found that claims 1 to 32 were not fairly based on matters described in the specification and that nine claims were not novel. The Full Court dismissed an appeal, upholding Justice Hely’s conclusion that claims 1 to 32 were invalid. Lockwood appealed to the High Court. In that Court, neither side pursued issues other than fair basis. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal, declared that claims 1 to 32 of the patent were fairly based on matters described in the complete specification, and remitted the matter to the Full Court of the Federal Court to determine the remaining issues not fully dealt with on appeal to that Court.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 9 March 2006 KEVIN PHILIP NUDD v THE QUEEN Mr Nudd complained that he was incompetently represented after he was convicted of being knowingly concerned in the importation of cocaine. The High Court of Australia dismissed his appeal, saying that no miscarriage of justice had occurred. In the Queensland Supreme Court in 2003, Mr Nudd was convicted and sentenced to 22 years’ jail with a non-parole period of 11 years. Police and Customs had intercepted the yacht Sparkles Plenty in Moreton Bay near Brisbane in May 2001 and found 89 kilograms of cocaine (plus some water- damaged packets of the drug). Mr Nudd was apprehended at the same time in Los Angeles where he was living and later extradited to Australia. Aboard the yacht were American father and son Peter and Gareth Jackson, who left Mexico on the yacht 12 months earlier. The yacht sat in Noumea for five months before making the final leg to Australia. During that time, the Jacksons spent three months in Sydney while buyers were sought, then returned to the US when their visas expired. While they were in Sydney, Mr Nudd’s sister attempted to obtain a false passport for Peter Jackson but was unsuccessful. Mr Jackson then obtained one in the US and flew to Noumea to sail the yacht to Australia. Police had installed listening devices in the Jacksons’ Sydney hotel room and taped telephone conversations, including 11 with Mr Nudd. He allegedly helped with arrangements to get the cocaine to Australia, put Peter Jackson in contact with another American, Jorge Velarde, who was to help with distribution of the cocaine, assisted Mr Jackson to obtain the false passport, and resolved various problems that arose. At the trial his defence counsel was under a misapprehension as to the elements of the offence which the trial judge, Justice Anthe Philippides, corrected. In the Court of Appeal, Mr Nudd claimed that his trial counsel had failed to give him proper advice, had made admissions of fact, had failed to object to prejudicial material in the telephone tapes being admitted, and should have called him to give evidence. The appeal was dismissed and Mr Nudd appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal and upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision. The Court held that the case against Mr Nudd was very strong and any errors that might otherwise have caused the trial to miscarry were properly corrected by Justice Philippides. The Court held that there had been no departure from the requirements for a fair trial and that the tactics of inexperienced counsel had not affected the fairness of the process.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 4 March 2021 UMINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS v AAM17 & ANOR [2021] HCA 6 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal concerned the Federal Court's conclusion that the circumstances of the Federal Circuit Court's delivery of an ex tempore judgment without translation denied the first respondent procedural fairness. The first respondent's application for a protection visa was rejected by a delegate of the appellant. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision. The first respondent sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in the Circuit Court. The first respondent was not represented before the Circuit Court, but he asked for and obtained the assistance of an interpreter. The Circuit Court dismissed the application for judicial review and delivered an ex tempore judgment. The orders were translated for the first respondent's benefit, but the oral reasons for judgment were not. Written reasons for judgment were delivered after the first respondent filed his notice of appeal in the Federal Court. The Federal Court concluded that neither the written reasons of the Tribunal nor of the Circuit Court disclosed any error. However, the Federal Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made by the Circuit Court, and remitted the matter to that Court to be reheard by a different Circuit Court judge. The Federal Court considered that the Circuit Court's failure to have the oral reasons for judgment translated for the first respondent's benefit constituted a denial of procedural fairness, and that undoing this denial required the Circuit Court's judgment to be set aside. Allowing the appeal, the High Court accepted that as a matter of general fairness, rather than independent legal duty, the first respondent ought to have had the benefit of translated ex tempore reasons or written reasons at an earlier time. However, the High Court held that the final instance of any right or entitlement of the parties arising from the Circuit Court's obligation to afford procedural fairness occurred at the time the parties made their concluding submissions. As such, any delay in the provision of written reasons did not constitute a denial of procedural fairness before the Circuit Court. Further, any practical injustice that may have followed the delay in the Circuit Court's provision of written reasons could have been addressed by the Federal Court inviting the first respondent to amend his grounds of appeal to address the contents of the Circuit Court's published reasons, and, if necessary, adjourning the hearing of the appeal to permit this to take place. In that regard, the High Court noted that the first respondent never independently sought to amend his grounds of appeal to take account of the published reasons of the Circuit Court. Setting aside the Circuit Court's judgment and remitting the matter to be reheard went beyond that which was necessary to provide practical justice to the first respondent.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 13 April 2006 STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES v JOYCE AMERY, LYN BOVARD, MARGARET DENISE McHUGH, KAREN MORS, CHERYL O’LOAN, MARION PLATT, MEGAN Different pay scales for casual and permanent New South Wales teachers were not unlawfully discriminatory, the High Court of Australia held today. Permanent teachers are paid on a 13-level pay scale while the casual pay scale has only five levels. The highest casual rate equated to level eight on the permanent pay scale. Thirteen female teachers who have been supply casuals (some are now permanent again) argued that the differences in salary had the effect of indirectly discriminating against them on the ground of sex, in contravention of section 24(1)(b) of the Anti-Discrimination Act. Very few casual teachers are men. Most of the women had ceased teaching on a permanent basis while they brought up children or for other family reasons as they required greater flexibility in their working hours and did not wish to be posted to distant locations. The teachers claimed they performed work of a value equal to that performed by permanent teachers but they were not paid the same and this affected women teachers much more so than male teachers. The 13 women established their claims for damages in the Equal Opportunity Division of the NSW Administrative Decisions Tribunal. This decision was overturned by the tribunal’s Appeal Panel. The teachers appealed to the Court of Appeal which, by majority, allowed the appeal. The State appealed to the High Court. NSW argued that the statutory ground for claiming discrimination had not been made out. It also argued that the system was reasonable because permanent teachers were subject to statutory requirements that did not apply to casuals, including having to transfer anywhere in NSW; the 13 teachers had placed geographical limitations on their acceptance of permanent positions; and that the enterprise agreement and the award were relevant for determining reasonableness. The Court, by a 6-1 majority, allowed the appeal. Three members of the majority held that there was no requirement or condition on casuals that potentially contravened the Anti-Discrimination Act and three members of the majority held that the basis of differentiation between casual and permanent teachers had not been shown to be unreasonable.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 June 2011 AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION v LANEPOINT ENTERPRISES PTY LTD (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) [2011] HCA 18 The High Court today allowed an appeal brought by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ("ASIC") against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court (North and Siopis JJ, Buchanan J dissenting). The Full Court had allowed an appeal by Lanepoint Enterprises Pty Ltd ("Lanepoint") from the decision of Gilmour J in which his Honour had, on an application by ASIC made under s 459P of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("the Act"), granted leave to ASIC to apply to the Court for a winding up order, and ordered that Lanepoint be wound up in insolvency pursuant to s 459A of the Act and that liquidators be appointed to the company. The Full Court accepted submissions by Lanepoint that the discretion exercised by Gilmour J under ss 459A and 467, to order that the company be wound up rather than to stay or dismiss the proceedings, had miscarried, and that the winding up application was an inappropriate vehicle for the determination of questions as to Lanepoint's solvency. At the hearing before Gilmour J, Lanepoint had sought to establish its solvency so as to rebut the presumption of insolvency, which arose by reason of s 459C(2)(c) of the Act, following the appointment of receivers and managers to Lanepoint by two creditor companies. However, Gilmour J held that certain transactions relied upon by Lanepoint to establish its solvency were ineffective to reduce its indebtedness and therefore Lanepoint could not rebut the presumption of insolvency. The High Court unanimously allowed ASIC's appeal from the decision of the Full Court, holding that the winding up application was not an inappropriate vehicle for the determination of Lanepoint's solvency, and that the discretion exercised by Gilmour J to order the winding up of Lanepoint did not miscarry. Lanepoint was unable to point to further evidence relevant to rebutting the presumption of insolvency that was not adduced at the hearing of the winding up application. Furthermore, it was not necessary that other parties be joined to the proceedings before the question of Lanepoint's solvency should be determined. Rather, the postponement of the winding up application would have added to the considerable delays which had already been encountered by ASIC since the application had been filed. The Court set aside the orders of the Full Court, and instead ordered that the appeal by Lanepoint to the Full Court be dismissed with costs.