Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 18 October 2017 CHRISTOPHER CHARLES KOANI v THE QUEEN [2017] HCA 42 Today the High Court published its reasons for allowing an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland on 17 August 2017. The High Court held unanimously that the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that a criminally negligent act or omission could found a conviction for the offence of murder under s 302(1)(a) of the Criminal Code (Q) ("the Code"). The appellant was charged with the murder of his de facto partner. The deceased's death was caused by a single gunshot wound to the head. The appellant had loaded a shotgun, presented it to the deceased and pulled the hammer back to be at least almost fully cocked at the time of discharge. The expert evidence was that the gun, which had been modified, might discharge when not fully cocked as the result of the shooter's finger slipping off the shortened hammer spur. The trial judge considered that, under the Code, the "act" causing death in a firearms case is the pulling of the trigger or another deliberate act causing the weapon to discharge. In these circumstances, the trial judge left the prosecution's alternative case to the jury: if the jury was not satisfied that the discharge of the gun was caused by a willed act, but was satisfied that the deceased's death was the result of the appellant's failure to use reasonable care in his management of the gun at a time at which he intended to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased, he would be guilty of murder. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder and the appellant was later sentenced to life imprisonment. By majority, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal against his conviction. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that it was an error of law to leave the alternative case for the jury's consideration: the act causing death and the intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm must coincide for a person to be found guilty of murder under s 302(1)(a) of the Code. It is incongruous to attach a requirement of proof of intent to conduct that is made an offence because it falls short of an objectively determined standard of reasonableness. The High Court further held that the perceived need to leave the alternative case to the jury was based on a wrongly confined understanding of the "act" to which criminal responsibility attaches. Under the Code, as under the common law, it was open to the jury to find that the appellant's actions in loading the gun, presenting it to the deceased and pulling back the hammer were connected, willed, acts, which caused the death of the deceased. The appellant's conviction was quashed and a new trial was ordered.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 December, 2003 APPELLANT S395 OF 2002 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS APPELLANT S396 OF 2002 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS The High Court of Australia today allowed an appeal from two men who claimed to have a well- founded fear of persecution in their native Bangladesh because of their homosexuality. The men arrived in Australia in 1999 and applied for protection visas, claiming refugee status. Their application was rejected by the Immigration Department, the Refugee Review Tribunal, the Federal Court and the Full Court of the Federal Court. The RRT raised doubts about their credibility, rejecting claims they were forced to leave their Dhaka home, that they had lost their jobs and that a religious court had issued a fatwa sentencing them to death by stoning. It also rejected the claim by one that he could not get work between 1980 and 1991, was sentenced to 300 lashes in 1985, and was attacked in his home with a previous male partner. The RRT said the men had conducted themselves discreetly in the past and rejected their claims that they had suffered, and would suffer, serious harm. The RRT did accept that the men were shunned by their families and may have been the subject of neighbours’ gossip, but held that this did not constitute persecution. The men claimed the Federal Court erred in failing to hold that the RRT’s decision involved an error of law, involving incorrect interpretation of the Migration Act or an incorrect application of the Act to the facts. They said that, having determined that homosexuality was unacceptable in Bangladesh and could lead to potential harm such as being bashed by police, the RRT erred in then holding that the men did not have a well-founded fear of persecution. The High Court, by a 4-3 majority, allowed the men’s appeals. It held that the RRT should have considered what might happen if they had lived openly as a homosexual couple. The majority held that the RRT also fell into jurisdictional error by dividing Bangladeshi homosexuals into two groups – discreet and non-discreet – and failed to consider whether the men might suffer harm if police, employers or others became aware of their homosexuality. Although they were discreet, it did not necessarily follow that they would not be persecuted. The question was whether particular individuals had a well-founded fear of being persecuted even though other members of a particular social group had not suffered persecution. The Court ordered the RRT to redetermine its review of the Immigration Department’s decision.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 February 2004 BROADCAST AUSTRALIA PTY LTD v MINISTER ASSISTING THE MINISTER FOR NATURAL RESOURCES (LANDS) A piece of land that the New South Wales government allowed the Commonwealth to use to build a television transmitter could validly be handed over to a company after the Commonwealth privatised its transmission network, the High Court of Australia held today. In 1961 the Minister granted a permissive occupancy to the Commonwealth over land at Mt Sugarloaf, near Newcastle, to build a transmission station. In 1998 the Minister gave notice of a redetermination of the rent. The Commonwealth objected but rent was set at $74,000 a year and in April 1999 the Commonwealth appealed to the NSW Land and Environment Court. Later that month, pursuant to the National Transmission Network Sale Act 1998, the Commonwealth Minister for Finance and Administration made a declaration vesting the Commonwealth’s entitlement to certain sites, including Mt Sugarloaf, in the company now known as Broadcast Australia. The company was then substituted for the Commonwealth in the Land and Environment Court proceedings. The Minister claimed the 1961 permissive occupancy was revoked by the Commonwealth ministerial declaration. This claim was rejected by the Land and Environment Court but upheld by a majority of the NSW Court of Appeal which held that without the Minister consenting to the transfer, the permissive occupancy would be terminated. In the High Court the Minister argued that while the permissive occupancy was in a sense a Commonwealth asset, it was a creation under NSW law and not an asset capable of being vested by Commonwealth statute in another body. The High Court unanimously held that for the Minister’s argument to be correct there had to be some provision of State law preventing the Commonwealth Act from taking effect and insulating the permissive occupancy from Commonwealth law. If there was such a State law it would have altered, impaired or detracted from the operation of the Commonwealth Act and would thus be invalid under section 109 of the Constitution to the extent of the inconsistency. Therefore, both the Commonwealth Act and the Commonwealth ministerial declaration took effect. The Court also held that the ministerial declaration did not revoke the permissive occupancy. It allowed Broadcast Australia’s appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 December 2005 A home owner holding a garage sale had not been negligent in failing to take measures to stop a customer tripping on an uneven driveway surface, the High Court of Australia held today. Ms Junkovic, then 53, attended the garage sale Ms Neindorf held at her home on Saturday, 5 February 2000. As she walked up the driveway she tripped on an uneven join in the concrete. One slab of concrete was 10 to 12mm higher than the other. The difference in height was clearly visible. Ms Junkovic fractured a bone in her right foot. She successfully sued Ms Neindorf in the Magistrates Court of South Australia. The Magistrate held that Ms Neindorf had breached the duty of care she owed Ms Junkovic and awarded damages of $24,464. Ms Neindorf successfully appealed to a single judge of the Supreme Court but this decision was overturned by a majority of the Full Court. She then appealed to the High Court. The Court, by a 4-1 majority, allowed the appeal. It held that Ms Neindorf had a duty to take reasonable care but in the circumstances this did not extend to taking action such as painting lines, erecting warning signs, carpeting over the join or placing a table over it. The Court said that the danger was minor and obvious and such cracks and unevenness were to be found in footpaths and driveways throughout suburban Australia. Eliminating or warning against all potential hazards encountered at most homes was not practicable. The SA Wrongs Act listed factors to be taken into account in assessing the appropriate standard of care owed by an occupier such as a home owner. However, section 17(3) provided that the fact that an occupier had not taken measures to eliminate, reduce or warn against a danger arising from the condition of premises does not necessarily show that the occupier had failed to exercise a reasonable standard of care. The Court held that there was no failure to exercise reasonable care in this case.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 4 March 2015 KORDA & ORS v AUSTRALIAN EXECUTOR TRUSTEES (SA) LIMITED [2015] HCA 6 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The Court held that the proceeds of the sale of timber and scheme land, which were payable to the operators of a timber plantation investment scheme, were not subject to an express trust in favour of the scheme investors. The third appellant, "the Forest Company", planted pine trees on land it owned or leased. When the trees were mature, they were felled and the logs were sold by the fourth appellant, "the Milling Company". After making certain allowances and deductions, the Milling Company was to pay the residue of the proceeds of sale of the timber to the Forest Company by instalments. Prospectuses were issued seeking investment in the scheme. The scheme investors, "Covenantholders", entered into "Covenants" with the Forest Company. Each Covenant recorded that it entitled the Covenantholder to "the net proceeds from the timber apportionable" to a specified portion of the area planted by the Forest Company in the year stated in the Covenantholder's application. As the relevant legislation required, the Forest Company also made a deed with the respondent, "the Trustee Company", as trustee for the Covenantholders. Upon receiving the proceeds of sale of the timber from the Milling Company, the Forest Company was to retain specified expenses and then pay the balance of the proceeds to the Trustee Company for distribution to Covenantholders. The Trust Deed imposed numerous obligations on the Forest Company, but contained no provision expressly declaring or providing that the Forest Company was, or was to act as, a trustee. In September 2012, the first and second appellants were appointed as the receivers and managers over the Forest Company and Milling Company. The Trustee Company claimed on behalf of the Covenantholders that the proceeds of a sale of timber which was payable to the Milling Company, and the proceeds of a sale of land on which timber was grown which was payable to the Forest Company, were subject to an express trust in the hands of the Forest Company or the Milling Company in favour of the Covenantholders, and thus not available to the receivers and managers. The Trustee Company succeeded in the Supreme Court of Victoria and declarations were made that it was beneficially entitled to the tree sale proceeds and a proportion of the land sale proceeds. An appeal to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria was dismissed by majority. By special leave, the receivers and managers and others appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that the scheme documentation did not support the existence of a trust or trusts over the proceeds in the hands of the Forest Company and Milling Company.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 3 April 2013 HUNT & HUNT LAWYERS v MITCHELL MORGAN NOMINEES PTY LTD & ORS [2013] HCA 10 Today a majority of the High Court allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which held that the loss caused to the first and second respondents (together "Mitchell Morgan") by the negligent drafting of a mortgage by the appellant ("Hunt & Hunt") was distinct from the loss caused by two fraudsters who induced Mitchell Morgan to advance money on the security of the mortgage. On the basis of a fraudulently obtained certificate of title and forged documentation presented by the fraudsters, Mitchell Morgan advanced a sum of money to a bank account. The money was advanced on the security of a mortgage over a property. One of the fraudsters withdrew the money using forged cheques and then closed the account. Hunt & Hunt, a firm of lawyers, acted for Mitchell Morgan on the transaction and drafted the mortgage. Mitchell Morgan sought compensation from Hunt & Hunt. In the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Hunt & Hunt was held to have drafted the mortgage negligently, causing the loss claimed by Mitchell Morgan. However, the primary judge held that the conduct of each of the fraudsters was also a cause of that loss. Hunt & Hunt, together with each of the fraudsters, was therefore a concurrent wrongdoer and, under s 35(1) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), the loss was apportioned between them according to what the primary judge considered was just. The Court of Appeal allowed Mitchell Morgan's appeal from that decision and held that Hunt & Hunt was wholly responsible for Mitchell Morgan's loss. The Court held that the loss suffered by Mitchell Morgan due to Hunt & Hunt's negligence was different from the loss suffered due to the fraudsters' conduct. Therefore, the fraudsters did not cause the loss claimed by Mitchell Morgan against Hunt & Hunt and they were not liable as concurrent wrongdoers in respect of it. By special leave, Hunt & Hunt appealed to the High Court. A majority of the High Court held that the loss suffered by Mitchell Morgan was its inability to recover the money advanced. While Hunt & Hunt's negligent drafting of the mortgage was a cause of that loss, Mitchell Morgan would never have needed to take a mortgage had it not been induced by the fraudsters to enter into the transaction. The fraudsters' conduct was a material cause of the loss Mitchell Morgan suffered. The majority reinstated the primary judge's conclusion on apportioning loss between the concurrent wrongdoers.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 May 2013 ARISTOCRAT TECHNOLOGIES AUSTRALIA PTY LTD & ORS v GLOBAL GAMING SUPPLIES PTY LTD & ORS; ARISTOCRAT TECHNOLOGIES AUSTRALIA PTY LTD & ORS v ALLAM & ORS [2013] HCA 21 On 2 May 2013, the HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA refused special leave to appeal against two decisions of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in which the Full Court characterised evidence as tendency evidence, but held that it could not be relied upon as tendency evidence because there had been no compliance with the tendency evidence rule in s 97(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ("the Act") at first instance. Today the High Court delivered its reasons for refusing special leave. The respondents were in the business of refurbishing and selling second-hand gaming machines in overseas markets. The applicants alleged that the respondents had infringed their copyright under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) by selling second-hand gaming machines assembled using pirated copies of material in which the applicants held the copyright. At first instance, a single judge of the Federal Court admitted email communications of the respondents which were used by the primary judge to satisfy the knowledge element of the alleged copyright infringements. The applicants succeeded at first instance. On appeal, the Full Court held that the primary judge had relied on those email communications to infer that the respondents had a tendency to engage in copyright infringing conduct, thereby satisfying the knowledge element of the alleged infringement. Section 97(1) of the Act provides that evidence of a person's tendency to act in a particular way is not admissible to prove that tendency unless reasonable notice is given and the court thinks that the evidence has significant probative value. As there had been no compliance with the tendency rule at first instance, the Full Court held that the email communications could not be used as tendency evidence. The applicants were unable to otherwise prove the knowledge element of the relevant infringements and the appeals were allowed. The applicants applied for special leave to appeal the decisions of the Full Court to the High Court. The High Court held that it was open to the Full Court to characterise the primary judge's reasoning as based upon the discernment of a tendency on the part of the respondents, that the applications did not raise any question of public importance and that the Full Court's decisions were not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant a grant of special leave.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 2 September 2004 ELECTROLUX HOME PRODUCTS PTY LIMITED v AUSTRALIAN WORKERS UNION, AUTOMOTIVE FOOD METAL ENGINEERING PRINTING AND KINDRED INDUSTRIES UNION, COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRICAL ELECTRONIC ENERGY INFORMATION POSTAL PLUMBING AND ALLIED SERVICES UNION OF AUSTRALIA, AND THE MINISTER FOR EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS A certified agreement could not include a provision requiring employers to collect on behalf of unions a bargaining agent’s fee from non-union employees, the High Court of Australia held today. During negotiations with the AWU, AMWU and CEPU over a new certified agreement in 2001, whitegoods manufacturer Electrolux objected to the inclusion of a $500 bargaining agent’s fee to be deducted from non-union employees’ wages. No agreement was forthcoming and in September 2001 the unions gave Electrolux notice of intended industrial action, in the form of rolling stoppages. The union claimed the stoppages were a protected action, pursuant to section 170ML of the Workplace Relations Act. Electrolux claimed the industrial action was not protected because the issue of a bargaining agent’s fee was not a matter pertaining to the relationship between employer and employee, within the meaning of section 170LI of the Act. Electrolux commenced litigation in the Federal Court which made declarations that the industrial action was not protected action and breached the Act. The declarations made by Justice Ronald Merkel were set aside by the Full Court of the Federal Court. Electrolux then appealed to the High Court in each of three related matters. The unions argued even if the bargaining agent’s fee was not a matter pertaining to the employer- employee relationship referred to in section 170LI that did not necessarily mean an agreement containing such a term was not an agreement in accordance with section 170LI. The Court held that the principle was well-established that matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees are matters which affect them in their capacity as employers and employees. A particular application of the principle, as decided by a line of earlier cases, was that a proposal for an employer to deduct union fees from employees’ wages and remit them to a trade union was not one that affected employers and employees in their capacity as such. The introduction of certified agreements via the Workplace Relations Act did not change the meaning of matters pertaining to the employer-employee relationship. If any objectionable provisions were included in a proposed agreement then that agreement could not be certified by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. The Court, by a 6-1 majority, allowed the three appeals and restored the orders of Justice Merkel.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 2 September 2015 ASTRAZENECA AB & ANOR v APOTEX PTY LTD; ASTRAZENECA AB & ANOR v WATSON PHARMA PTY LTD; ASTRAZENECA AB & ANOR v ASCENT PHARMA PTY LTD [2015] HCA 30 Today the High Court unanimously held that a patent which disclosed a method of treatment for hypercholesterolemia was invalid because it lacked an inventive step within the meaning of s 7(2) and 7(3) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ("the Act"). Section 18(1)(b)(ii) of the Act provided as a requirement for a patentable invention that the invention must involve an inventive step. Sections 7(2) and 7(3) defined the condition on satisfaction of which an invention would not be taken to involve an inventive step. Relevantly, that condition was satisfied if the invention would have been obvious to a person skilled in the relevant art in light of the common general knowledge considered separately or together with prior art information publicly available in a single document before the priority date of the patent. The single document had to contain prior art information which could reasonably be expected to have been ascertained, understood and regarded by the skilled person, before the priority date, as relevant to work in the relevant art in the patent area. The first appellant in each appeal is the registered proprietor of Australian Patent Number AU200023051 ("the Patent"). The second appellant is the exclusive licensee of the Patent. The Patent disclosed as a method of treatment for hypercholesterolemia the administration of rosuvastatin and its pharmaceutically acceptable salts at a starting dosage of 5-10 milligrams per day. The respondents supplied generic compounds using rosuvastatin at like dosages. The appellants commenced proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia claiming infringement of the Patent by that supply and obtained interlocutory injunctions. The respondents sought revocation of the Patent. The primary judge found the Patent invalid on three grounds: that the appellants were not entitled to the Patent; that the invention disclosed in the Patent was not novel in light of two prior art publications; and that the invention disclosed in the Patent did not involve an inventive step and was obvious within the meaning of s 7(2) of the Act. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia overturned only the finding of lack of novelty and dismissed the appeals from the primary judge's decision. On its appeals to the High Court, the appellants sought to agitate all grounds of invalidity which had been upheld by the Full Court. The respondents raised other issues by notice of contention. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeals on the basis that the invention claimed lacked an inventive step and was obvious in light of the common general knowledge together with either of the two prior art publications considered separately. It was unnecessary for the Court to consider the other ground of invalidity and issues raised in the notice of contention. This statement is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the High Court or to be used in any later consideration of the Court’s reasons.