Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 March 2014 STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA v BROWN & ORS [2014] HCA 8 Today the High Court unanimously held that certain native title rights and interests held by the Ngarla People in respect of land in the Pilbara region of Western Australia were not extinguished by the grant of two mineral leases to some joint venturers for the mining of iron ore at Mount Goldsworthy. The Court held that the mineral leases did not grant the joint venturers a right to exclude any and everyone from access to the land the subject of the mineral leases. In 1964, the State of Western Australia made an agreement with some joint venturers about the development and exploitation of iron ore deposits at Mount Goldsworthy. Pursuant to the agreement, the State granted mineral leases for iron ore to the joint venturers. The agreement required the joint venturers to allow the State and third parties access over the land the subject of the mineral leases provided that such access did not unduly prejudice or interfere with the joint venturers' operations. In accordance with the agreement, the joint venturers developed the Mount Goldsworthy iron ore project. A mine, a town and associated works were constructed. The mine subsequently closed in 1982 and the town closed in 1992. Alexander Brown and others (on behalf of the Ngarla People) applied to the Federal Court of Australia for native title determinations in respect of land and waters in the Pilbara region of Western Australia. The claimed areas included the areas the subject of the mineral leases. The native title rights and interests claimed were the non-exclusive rights to access and camp on the land, to take certain traditional resources (excluding minerals) from the land, to engage in ritual and ceremony on the land, and to care for, maintain and protect from physical harm particular sites and areas of significance. It was agreed that, subject to the question of whether they had been extinguished, the claimed native title rights and interests existed in the land the subject of the mineral leases. The Federal Court concluded that the claimed native title rights and interests had been extinguished in the area where the mine, the town and the associated works had been constructed. On appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia concluded that the native title rights and interests had not been extinguished on the land the subject of the mineral leases but that those rights and interests could not be exercised for so long as the joint venturers continued to hold rights under the mineral leases. By special leave, the State appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that the grant of the mineral leases did not extinguish the claimed native title rights and interests. Although the joint venturers could prevent others from using the land for mining purposes and could use any part of the land for the extraction of iron ore, the joint venturers did not have an unqualified right to exclude any and everyone from access to the land. The Court held that the joint venturers' rights under the mineral leases were not inconsistent with the claimed native title rights and interests over the land.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 July 2012 PUBLIC SERVICE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA INCORPORATED v INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA & ANOR [2012] HCA 25 Today the High Court granted special leave to appeal, and allowed an appeal, from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, which had held that its supervisory jurisdiction did not extend to judicial review of determinations of the Industrial Relations Commission of South Australia ("the Commission") that the Commission lacked jurisdiction. In 2010, the applicant, Public Service Association of South Australia ("the PSA"), notified the Commission of two disputes, each of which was said to be an "industrial dispute" about an "industrial matter" as defined in s 4(1) of the Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) ("the Act"). In both disputes, the PSA requested the calling of a voluntary conference under s 200 of the Act. However, the Commission held that in each of the disputes, it had no jurisdiction to determine these matters. The PSA appealed the decision under s 207 of the Act to the Full Commission. The Full Commission dismissed both appeals. The PSA, by way of judicial review, then issued proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Australia seeking an order quashing the decision of the Full Commission. The Court granted permission to proceed, and the matter was heard by the Full Court. The Full Court dismissed the application on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to make the orders sought. Section 206 of the Act provides: "(1) A determination of the Commission is final and may only be challenged, appealed against or reviewed as provided by this Act. (2) However, a determination of the Commission may be challenged before the Full Supreme Court on the ground of an excess or want of jurisdiction." (emphasis added) The primary submission by the PSA in the High Court sought to apply the decision in Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531 with the result that s 206 of the Act was invalid to the extent to which it denied the jurisdiction of the Full Court to review decisions of the Commission for jurisdictional error. The majority of the High Court held that the question of invalidity did not arise because, on its proper construction, s 206 did not deny the authority of the Supreme Court to intervene where the Commission had erred in deciding that it lacked jurisdiction. Heydon J held that s 206 did purport to do so but to that extent was invalid as the PSA contended. The result was that the High Court unanimously set aside the decision of the Full Court and remitted the PSA's application for judicial review for determination by the Full Court.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 August 2004 PACIFIC CARRIERS LIMITED v BNP PARIBAS A cargo carrier’s claim on a bank’s letters of indemnity was upheld by the High Court of Australia today. Grain trader New England Agricultural Traders Pty Ltd (NEAT) sold legumes – 10,000 tonnes each of chickpeas and dun peas – to Calcutta grain trader Royal Trading Company in 1998. While the cargo was in transit to India the world price of legumes fell and Royal delayed accepting the cargo and failed to pay the purchase price. The original bills of lading were not available to enable the cargo to be unloaded, and Pacific Carriers required bank-endorsed letters of indemnity before releasing the cargo. Two letters of indemnity, one for the dun peas and one for the chickpeas, were signed by NEAT and BNP Paribas’s documentary credits department manager Ira Dhiri who faxed them to Pacific in January and February 1999, allowing legumes to be released to Royal. Discharge of legumes occurred in stages then stopped. Pacific sustained losses and claimed against BNP. NEAT became insolvent. BNP argued that it had simply verified NEAT’s signature on the letters of indemnity and only NEAT was bound to indemnify Pacific. BNP also claimed that if the documents meant that BNP was an indemnifying party, then they were signed without its authority, and did not bind it. In the New South Wales Supreme Court, Pacific sued BNP in contract, negligence and misleading conduct contrary to section 52 of the Trade Practices Act. Justice Robert Hunter awarded damages of US$4.238 million plus interest to Pacific against BNP for negligent misrepresentation of NEAT’s financial strength rather than contract and dismissed the section 52 claim. The NSW Court of Appeal held that the letters of indemnity should be construed as showing BNP indemnifying Pacific, but held that Ms Dhiri had no authority to bind the bank to an indemnity. The Court of Appeal also rejected the negligence and section 52 claims. Pacific appealed to the High Court which unanimously held it could succeed in contract. The Court held that Ms Dhiri’s belief about what the documents were meant to convey is irrelevant. Instead, construction was determined by what a reasonable person in Pacific’s position would have understood them to mean, based on their wording and the surrounding circumstances. Nothing in the documents indicated BNP was merely authenticating NEAT’s signature and nothing in the circumstances suggested Pacific would be satisfied by such verification. Ms Dhiri had authority to sign and stamp documents verifying NEAT’s undertaking but no authority to sign letters of indemnity. Nothing put Pacific on notice or inquiry as to her lack of authority. The High Court held that Ms Dhiri did have apparent authority, Pacific reasonably relied on that authority, and BNP was bound. The Court allowed the appeal by Pacific and remitted the matter to the Court of Appeal to deal with outstanding issues including calculation of damages.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 September 2015 DUNCAN v INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION [2015] HCA 32 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an application seeking a declaration that Pt 13 of Sched 4 to the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW) ("the ICAC Act") is invalid. In July 2013, the respondent published a report containing findings that the applicant had engaged in "corrupt conduct" within the meaning of s 8(2) of the ICAC Act. The applicant commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales challenging the validity of those findings. His claim was dismissed by the primary judge. The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal against that decision. On 15 April 2015, prior to the determination of the Court of Appeal proceedings, the High Court delivered its judgment in Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cunneen [2015] HCA 14, holding that "corrupt conduct" within the respondent's investigative jurisdiction under the ICAC Act does not encompass conduct which does not adversely affect the probity, even if it adversely affects the efficacy, of the exercise of the functions of a public official. It was common ground that the applicant's conduct the subject of the respondent's findings in the report did not affect the probity of the exercise of the functions of a public official. As a result, the applicant added to the grounds of his appeal the contention that the respondent lacked jurisdiction to make findings of corrupt conduct against him. On 6 May 2015, the New South Wales Parliament enacted the Independent Commission Against Corruption Amendment (Validation) Act 2015 (NSW), which added Pt 13 of Sched 4 to the ICAC Act. Pt 13 purports to ensure the validity of the respondent's activities before 15 April 2015, notwithstanding the decision in Cunneen. The applicant sought a declaration from the Court of Appeal that Pt 13 is invalid. The applicant's challenge to the validity of Pt 13 was removed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously dismissed the application. The Court held that cll 34 and 35 of Pt 13 deem those acts done by the respondent before 15 April 2015 to be valid to the extent that they would have been valid if the definition of corrupt conduct in s 8(2) of the ICAC Act encompassed conduct which adversely affected the efficacy, but not the probity, of the exercise of official functions. A majority of the Court held that cll 34 and 35 of Pt 13 operate to effect an alteration in the substantive law as to what constitutes corrupt conduct, and the whole Court held that cll 34 and 35 of Pt 13 retrospectively confer jurisdiction upon the respondent. In doing so, the provisions attach new legal consequences and a new legal status to things done which otherwise would not have had such legal consequences or status.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 December, 2003 JASON SHAW v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS The High Court of Australia today upheld a section of the Migration Act that enabled the Minister to cancel the visa of a British man who had lived in Australia since he was a child but who had never become an Australian citizen. Mr Shaw was born in the United Kingdom on 27 December 1972 and arrived in Australia on 17 July 1974 and has not left Australia since. He has two children who are citizens. Mr Shaw had criminal convictions dating back to age 14. In 1998 he was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for property offences and two years’ jail for drug offences. On 17 July 2001 the Minister used his power under section 501(2) to cancel Mr Shaw’s visa because Mr Shaw failed the character test in section 501(6). He had a substantial criminal record within the meaning of section 501(7). The Court was asked whether Parliament’s power to make laws with respect to naturalisation and aliens under section 51(xix) of the Constitution supported section 501(2) to the extent that it authorised the Minister to cancel Mr Shaw’s visa. The Court, by a 4-3 majority, answered that section 501(2) was within power. Mr Shaw argued he was not an alien when he arrived in Australia and nothing since had placed him within reach of the aliens power because he was a British subject. The Court held that British subject was not a synonym for the constitutional expression “subject of the Queen”. The Court held that the relationship between the UK and Australia had changed since federation, so that the UK was now regarded as a foreign power and its citizens as aliens, and that the Constitution contemplated such change. UK citizens could not be regarded as subject to implicit protection from the legislative power with respect to aliens.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 June 2004 ROSELLIE JONNELL COLE v SOUTH TWEED HEADS RUGBY LEAGUE FOOTBALL CLUB LIMITED AND ANGELA JANE LAWRENCE A woman who was struck by a vehicle while intoxicated failed in her appeal against the rugby league club where she had spent the day drinking. The High Court of Australia held the club had not breached any duty it owed to the woman. Ms Cole, then aged 45, attended a regular Sunday champagne breakfast at the club with friends and stayed on drinking while football matches were played. She was asked to leave at 5.30pm and was struck by a four-wheel drive vehicle driven by Mrs Lawrence near the club at 6.20pm and seriously injured. She was found to have a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.238 per cent. The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the evidence did not support a finding that Mrs Lawrence had driven negligently. It held that the club owed Ms Cole only the general duty of care owed by the occupier of premises to a lawful entrant. This duty did not extend to protecting patrons from harm of the kind suffered by Ms Cole caused by inebriation. Ms Cole appealed to the High Court. In the High Court Ms Cole argued that the club supplied her with drink when a reasonable person would know she was intoxicated and that it allowed her to leave in an unsafe condition. However other people bought alcohol that she drank, drinks could also be bought at the adjoining football ground and the club refused her service from 3pm. The High Court accepted the Court of Appeal finding that the club had not served her after 12.30pm. When the club manager asked Ms Cole to leave, he offered her both the club’s courtesy bus and a taxi, but she swore at him, and two men she had befriended said they would take care of her. The High Court, by a 4-2 majority, dismissed the appeal. It held that an adult in Ms Cole’s position knew the effects and risks of excessive drinking and that the club had done all that could be expected of it to ensure her safety. The Court held the club could not be expected to monitor the number of drinks consumed by each patron or to compel her to stay on its premises to sober up after she refused its offers of transport. Without deciding the content and extent of any duty of care owed by an operator of licensed premises, which might depend on the circumstances of a particular case, the Court held that the club had not failed in any duty toward Ms Cole.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 7 August, 2003 RE MEMBERS OF THE FULL BENCH OF THE AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE MARITIME UNION OF AUSTRALIA, THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF MARINE AND POWER ENGINEERS, AND THE AUSTRALIAN MARITIME OFFICERS' UNION; EX PARTE CSL PACIFIC SHIPPING INC The Australian Industrial Relations Commission had jurisdiction to consider an application to add the owners of a Bahamas-registered ship crewed by Ukrainians to an award governing the rates of pay and conditions of employment of crews of ship operating in Australian waters, the High Court of Australia held today. CSL Pacific Shipping is incorporated in Barbados. The company and an Australian corporation, CSL Australia Pty Ltd, are members of the Canadian-owned CSL Group Inc. In July 2000, CSL Pacific acquired a ship, River Torrens, from CSL Australia and renamed it CSL Pacific and registered it in the Bahamas. CSL Pacific recruited a crew in the Ukraine and traded in North Asia before returning to Australia in October 2001 under charter to CSL Australia. CSL Pacific did not hold a licence to engage in coasting trade but carried cargoes between ports around Australia under either continuing voyage or single voyage permits issued under the Navigation Act. The permits carried no conditions about crew pay rates, which were less than award rates. The three unions applied to the AIRC to have CSL Pacific added to the award's schedule of employers. None of the crew are members of those unions. The Full Bench of the AIRC concluded it had jurisdiction to hear and determine an application to vary the award as the matter was an industrial issue under section 5 of the Workplace Relations Act. It allowed 15 working days to show cause why the award should not be varied to add CSL Pacific and to add a provision that the award applied to voyages within Australian waters, or while operating under a permit or licence granted under the Navigation Act, or on a voyage to or from an Australian port. In the High Court, CSL Pacific sought constitutional writs to quash the AIRC decision and to prohibit any further proceeding on the unions' application to vary the award. CSL Pacific argued that the Commonwealth Parliament's constitutional powers did not authorise the making of laws regulating employer-employee relations when the employer has no presence in Australia and the employees are foreign seafarers. The Court unanimously held that the Workplace Relations Act and the Navigation Act should be read together, the Workplace Relations Act did enable the varying of the award to cover CSL Pacific crew and the legislation was within power.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 8 April, 2003 The High Court of Australia today dismissed an application for special leave to appeal by a man convicted of murder. Michael Heron was found guilty of fatally stabbing Bill Jularic with a knife during a fight at the Beresford Hotel in Darlinghurst in Sydney in 1996. The principal issue at Heron’s trial in the New South Wales Supreme Court was whether Jularic was stabbed or whether he accidentally impaled himself on a shard of broken glass. Heron was sentenced to 14 years’ jail. The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected his appeal. Heron then sought leave to appeal to the High Court on the ground that the trial judge misdirected the jury on provocation, despite Heron’s defence counsel not raising the issue during the trial, not seeking any redirection and not raising this ground in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal. The High Court unanimously held that the trial judge had misdirected the jury on provocation by asking it to consider what an ordinary person must or would have done rather than what an ordinary person could have done. But the Court held that this did not result in any miscarriage of justice, given the manner in which the trial was fought and the weight of evidence against Heron. The Court followed previous decisions that in exceptional circumstances it could hear criminal appeals on grounds neither raised at trial nor in the intermediate court of appeal but held that the circumstances of Heron’s case did not warrant such a course.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 17 December 2015 PLAINTIFF M64/2015 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION [2015] HCA 50 Today, the High Court unanimously held that a decision by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection ("the Minister") to refuse to grant Refugee and Humanitarian (Class XB) (Subclass 202) visas ("Subclass 202 visas") to the plaintiff's family was not affected by jurisdictional error. On 29 May 2010, the plaintiff arrived in Australia and became an "unlawful non-citizen" within the meaning of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act"). The plaintiff was granted a protection visa by the Minister. The plaintiff's family subsequently applied for Subclass 202 visas under the Australian Government's Special Humanitarian Programme. Subclass 202 visas are directed to the immigration of people who are subject to substantial discrimination in their home country and who are members of the immediate family of a person in Australia who has already been granted a protection visa. The plaintiff proposed his family's visa application in accordance with the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) ("the Regulations"). The application was refused by a delegate of the Minister. In a letter to the plaintiff's family, the delegate wrote that, in deciding to refuse the application, he had considered that Australia does not have the capacity to resettle all humanitarian visa applicants, and that only the highest priority applications can be successful. The plaintiff commenced proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the High Court seeking an order to quash the delegate's decision to refuse to grant the Subclass 202 visas and an order requiring the Minister to determine the application according to law. The plaintiff argued that the delegate misconstrued and misapplied cl 202.222(2) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations, which provides for the grant of a visa if the Minister is satisfied that there are compelling reasons for giving special consideration to granting the applicant a visa. The plaintiff also argued that the delegate unlawfully applied a policy of the Department for Immigration and Border Protection that required that the lowest priority be accorded to the plaintiff's family's application on the basis of the type of visa that the plaintiff had been granted and the circumstance that he arrived in Australia as an "irregular maritime arrival". In refusing the plaintiff's application, the High Court held that the delegate's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error. The Court held that cl 202.222(2) raises only one criterion for the grant of a visa: namely, that the Minister is satisfied that there are compelling reasons for giving special consideration to granting that visa. The capacity of the Australian community to provide for the permanent settlement of an applicant in Australia and the number of places in Australia's Special Humanitarian Programme are considerations that may inform the Minister's state of satisfaction. The Court also held that the departmental policy was not inconsistent with the Act or Regulations and that it had not been applied inflexibly.