Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 November 2014 ALPHAPHARM PTY LTD v H LUNDBECK A/S & ORS [2014] HCA 42 Today the High Court, by majority, held that s 223(2) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) conferred power on the Commissioner of Patents to extend the time within which the first respondent, H Lundbeck A/S ("Lundbeck"), could apply under s 70(1) of the Act for an extension of the term of its Australian patent. Section 71(2) of the Act required that an application for an extension of the term of a standard patent be made during the term of the patent and within six months after the latest of three specified dates. Section 223(2) provided that, in certain circumstances, where a "relevant act" which was required to be done within a certain time was not done within that time, the Commissioner could extend the time for doing the act. Section 223(11) defined "relevant act" to mean an action (other than a "prescribed action") in relation to a patent. Regulation 22.11(4)(b) of the Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth) provided that "filing, during the term of a standard patent as required by subsection 71(2) of the Act, an application under subsection 70(1) of the Act for an extension of the term of the patent" was a prescribed action. Lundbeck applied to the Commissioner for an extension of time within which to make an application under s 70(1) of the Act to extend the term of its Australian patent. The application for an extension of time was opposed by the appellant, Alphapharm Pty Ltd. Lundbeck made the application during the term of the patent but more than six months after the latest of the three dates specified in s 71(2). The Commissioner's delegate granted Lundbeck the extension of time sought. This decision was affirmed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and an appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia was dismissed. By special leave, Alphapharm appealed to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal. The Court held, by majority, that s 71(2) of the Act imposed two cumulative time requirements. The first was that an application under s 70(1) for an extension of the term of a patent be made during the term of the patent. The second was that such an application be made within six months after the latest of the three dates specified in s 71(2). Properly understood, s 223(2) permitted the Commissioner to enable an application under s 70(1) to be made during the term of the patent but more than six months after the latest of the three dates specified in s 71(2).
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 October 2016 KJERULF AINSWORTH & ORS v MARTIN ALBRECHT & ANOR [2016] HCA 40 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The High Court held that opposition to a motion which was required to be passed by a body corporate without dissent was not unreasonable in circumstances where the proposal in question was apt to create a reasonable apprehension that it would affect adversely the interests of opponents of the proposal. The Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Q) ("the BCCM Act") regulates the determination of disputes between the owners of lots in a community titles scheme. Here the dispute concerned a proposal for the alteration of the rights of lot owners in the scheme by an owner who sought exclusive use of part of the common property airspace in order to amalgamate the two balconies forming part of his lot so as to create one larger deck. Under the BCCM Act, approval of the proposal required a resolution without dissent of the Body Corporate. The motion was defeated. Item 10 of Sched 5 to the BCCM Act makes provision for an adjudicator to order that a proposal, otherwise required to be passed without dissent, be approved notwithstanding dissent by a lot owner if the opposition to the proposal was unreasonable in the circumstances. The adjudicator accepted that individual lot owners voted against the motion in good faith, and in genuine reliance on architectural and other advice, but nevertheless considered that their opposition to the proposal was unreasonable. An order was made deeming the motion supporting the proposal to be passed. The appellants appealed to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, which concluded that the adjudicator had impermissibly substituted her own opinion as to the reasonableness of the proposal, rather than focussing on whether the opponents' grounds of opposition were reasonably held. The adjudicator's orders were set aside. The first respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal, which held that the adjudicator did not adopt the wrong approach in resolving the dispute. The decision of the adjudicator was upheld. By grant of special leave, the appellants appealed to the High Court. The Court held that the adjudicator had adopted the wrong approach in resolving the dispute. The adjudicator's task under Item 10 of Sched 5 to the BCCM Act is not to determine whether the outcome of the vote of the general meeting of the Body Corporate achieved a reasonable balancing of competing considerations, but whether the opposition to the proposal was unreasonable. The Court further held that a lot owner may not be regarded as acting unreasonably in declining to assist another lot owner gratuitously to enhance that lot owner's interest, where the enhancement of that interest is reasonably viewed as adverse to the interests of the other lot owner. In the result, the Tribunal's decision to set aside the adjudicator's orders was reinstated.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 June 2018 CRI028 v THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU [2018] HCA 24 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from the Supreme Court of Nauru. The High Court held that the Supreme Court was wrong to uphold the approach adopted by the Refugee Status Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") to the "internal relocation principle". That principle provides that a person is not a refugee if there is an area in the country of their nationality where the person would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and to which the person could, in all the circumstances, reasonably be expected to relocate. The appellant was born in a district in the province of Punjab, Pakistan ("K District"). In 2004, the appellant moved to Karachi, where his wife and child remain. In 2013, the appellant arrived in Australia at Christmas Island and was transferred to Nauru. The appellant applied under the Refugees Convention Act 2012 (Nr) to be recognised as a refugee. The Secretary of the Department of Justice and Border Control ("the Secretary") refused that application. The appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Secretary's decision. The Tribunal found that the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution in Karachi. However, the Tribunal affirmed the Secretary's determination on the basis that the appellant could relocate to K District. The Tribunal's principal thread of reasoning focused on whether K District was a "home area" of the appellant. In the alternative, based on "ordinary relocation principles", the Tribunal purported to consider whether relocation by the appellant was reasonable. No reference was made to issues that might arise, in relation to relocation, from the fact that the appellant had a wife and child. The Supreme Court dismissed the appellant's appeal, upholding the reasoning of the Tribunal in relation to the appellant's relocation to K District. The appellant appealed as of right to the High Court. The High Court held that the Supreme Court erred in affirming the Tribunal's decision. The Tribunal was distracted by an inquiry into whether K District was a "home area" of the appellant and did not properly consider whether K District was an area to which the appellant could reasonably be expected to relocate, having regard to all the circumstances particular to the appellant. The Tribunal failed to take into account the appellant's wife and child. The High Court set aside the order of the Supreme Court, quashed the decision of the Tribunal, and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 May 2015 UELESE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION & ANOR [2015] HCA 15 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The High Court held that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") erred in its application of s 500(6H) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") by failing to consider information adduced during the cross-examination of a witness. The appellant is a Samoan-born citizen of New Zealand, who has been living in Australia since 1998 on a visa tied to his New Zealand citizenship. The appellant has a "substantial criminal record" for the purposes of s 501(7)(c) of the Act. In 2012, on the basis of that criminal record, a delegate of the Minister made a decision under s 501(2) of the Act to cancel the appellant's visa. The appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision. Under a ministerial direction made pursuant to s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal was obliged to consider the best interests of any minor children in Australia affected by the cancellation of the appellant's visa. The appellant made submissions about the best interests of three of his children. In the course of the hearing, during cross-examination of the appellant's partner, it emerged that the appellant has an additional two younger children from a different relationship. Section 500(6H) of the Act provides that, in matters of this kind, the Tribunal must not have regard to any information presented orally in support of a person's case unless it has been provided in a written statement to the Minister at least two days before the Tribunal holds a hearing. The Tribunal regarded s 500(6H) as precluding consideration by it of the position of the appellant's two youngest children and affirmed the delegate's decision to cancel the appellant's visa. The appellant applied to the Federal Court for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. That application was dismissed. The appellant appealed from that decision to the Full Court of the Federal Court. That appeal was also dismissed. By special leave, the appellants appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal, holding that s 500(6H) does not preclude the Tribunal from considering information which is not presented by or on behalf of an applicant for review as part of his or her case. The Court held that by applying s 500(6H) in the way that it did, the Tribunal had truncated the review that it was required to undertake. The Court also held that s 500(6H) does not fetter the power of the Tribunal to grant an adjournment to enable the applicant to give the required notice to the Minister, where this is necessary to ensure that a review is conducted thoroughly and fairly.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 20 March 2019 OKS v THE STATE OF WESTERN OF AUSTRALIA [2019] HCA 10 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The appellant was charged with four counts of indecently dealing with a child under the age of 13 years contrary to s 320(4) of the Criminal Code (WA). The trial took place nearly 20 years after the alleged offences. The central issue at the trial was the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence in light of certain inconsistencies in her evidence and admitted or asserted lies told by her. In the course of summing up the case to the jury, the trial judge directed the jury not to follow a process of reasoning to the effect that, just because the complainant was shown to have told a lie or had admitted to telling a lie, all of her evidence was in fact dishonest and could not be relied upon ("the impugned direction"). The appellant was convicted of the first count and acquitted of the second count. The remaining counts had been withdrawn from the jury. The appellant appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the impugned direction was a wrong decision on a question of law. The Court of Appeal unanimously concluded that it was, but held that the appeal should nonetheless be dismissed under s 30(4) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) because no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred ("the proviso"). By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously held that, if the jury accepted or found that the complainant had told lies, it was open to the jury to find that those lies, without more, precluded acceptance of the complainant's evidence of the commission of the offences beyond reasonable doubt. The impugned direction took away that process of reasoning and was apt to lessen the weight which it was otherwise open to the jury to give to the complainant's lies. In those circumstances, the natural limitations on an appellate court proceeding on the record meant that it could not be assumed that the impugned direction had no effect upon the jury's verdict. As a result, the proviso could not be applied. Accordingly, the Court unanimously allowed the appeal, quashed the appellant's conviction and ordered a new trial.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 6 February, 2003 STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES v ANGELO LEPORE AND ANOR VIVIAN CHRISTINA SAMIN v STATE OF QUEENSLAND, THE MINISTER FOR EDUCATION OF QUEENSLAND AND WILLIAM THEODORE D’ARCY SHEREE ANNE RICH v STATE OF QUEENSLAND, THE MINISTER FOR EDUCATION OF QUEENSLAND AND WILLIAM THEODORE D’ARCY State education authorities will not generally be held liable for the sexual abuse of pupils by teachers unless there has been shown to be fault on the part of the authorities, the High Court of Australia held today. The Lepore appeal, from a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, and the Rich and Samin appeals, from a decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal, were heard together by the Court. Each case involved alleged abuse by a primary teacher on school premises during school hours. The teacher in the Queensland cases is serving a jail sentence for sexual offences committed at a one-teacher school in the 1960s. The cases raise the issue of liability of education authorities for damage suffered by pupils even when there is no fault on the part of such authorities, such as negligence in their engagement and supervision of staff, in their systems or procedures, or in a failure to respond to complaints of misconduct. A majority of the NSW Court of Appeal had held that a state school authority had a legal obligation to ensure pupils were not physically injured by a teacher on school premises during school hours, whether that teacher is acting negligently or intentionally, and whether or not the authority was therefore at fault. The Queensland Court of Appeal disagreed with this approach. By majority, the High Court has overruled the decision of the NSW Court of Appeal. The High Court, by majority, held that education authorities were vicariously liable for acts performed in the course of teachers’ employment, but that sexual abuse was generally too far removed from a teacher’s duties to be regarded as occurring in the course of their employment. The High Court allowed in part the appeal from NSW and ordered a new District Court trial for Mr Lepore’s case, because of the way the original trial was dealt with. The Court dismissed Ms Samin and Ms Rich’s appeals.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 20 June 2007 JUSTIN PATRICK LIBKE v THE QUEEN A Brisbane man convicted of sexual offences against an intellectually disabled woman was not disadvantaged by the trial judge’s directions to the jury about the woman’s capacity to give consent and his trial was not unfair, the High Court of Australia held today. The woman was 18 at the time but had a mental age of eight to 10 with an IQ of 61. Mr Libke, 43, was charged with three counts of rape, one count of indecent dealing with an intellectually impaired person, and one count of sodomy of an intellectually impaired person in 2002. The first count of rape arose from an incident in a park where he first met the woman while walking their dogs. Mr Libke allegedly digitally penetrated the woman. Some days later he telephoned the woman and arranged to come to her house where they had sex. Mr Libke denied any anal penetration and denied being aware that she was intellectually impaired. At the trial in the Queensland District Court, the main issues concerned consent and whether he reasonably believed the woman was not intellectually impaired. Mr Libke was convicted of the count of rape involving digital penetration. He was acquitted of the other counts of rape, and the counts of sodomy and indecent dealing, but was found guilty of three alternative lesser offences: two of unlawful carnal knowledge with an intellectually impaired person and an offence of exposing such a person to an indecent act. Mr Libke was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeal cut the sentence to five years but dismissed the appeal against conviction. Mr Libke appealed to the High Court, alleging that the prosecutor’s cross-examination was unfair and that Judge Milton Griffin gave incorrect and insufficient directions to the jury. He said many of the cross-examiner’s questions were confusing, harassing, oppressive and repetitive and that the prosecutor expressed inappropriate comment about his answers. Mr Libke said Judge Griffin failed to give adequate directions on consent as it related to cognitive capacity and intellectual impairment; that he failed to tell the jury that if Mr Libke honestly and reasonably believed that the woman’s capacity for communication, social interaction and learning was not substantially reduced, or that he believed that she did not need support, he was entitled to be acquitted; and that flow charts given to the jury as part of Judge Griffin’s directions were inadequate. The High Court, by a 3-2 majority, dismissed the appeal. It held that the prosecutor’s conduct did not result in an unfair trial. The Court held that Judge Griffin did not make errors in his directions. In particular, he adequately instructed the jury about the defences available to Mr Libke.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 20 July 2006 MATTHEW DAVID BOUNDS v THE QUEEN A man convicted of offences related to downloading child pornography and obscene material at a university computer laboratory had suffered no substantial miscarriage of justice by one of the charges mistakenly being put to a jury trial, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Bounds was charged with possessing child pornography and possessing indecent or obscene articles, both in the form of computer data, on 28 July 2001, at Esperance in Western Australia. Mr Bounds was a student at Curtin University which operated a computer laboratory at Esperance Community College. Curtin University students could access the laboratory after hours by using a swipe card and a personal identification number. While checking the files of students storing large amounts of data, the university’s system administrator found 105 child pornography images and 11 other indecent or obscene images on Mr Bounds’s personal computer directory. Some were downloaded during the night. The first count alleged a crime under the WA Censorship Act and so was an indictable offence. The second count alleged a “simple offence” under the Act. On 28 May 2003 in the WA District Court, Mr Bounds was presented on an indictment for both offences. He denied storing the material and claimed someone else had learned or guessed his password. Mr Bounds said a chatroom acquaintance in Canada had sent him material which he had not looked at and which he thought was pictures of the band Metallica which they had been discussing. He was found guilty and given a suspended sentence of 24 months’ jail on each count. Mr Bounds appealed to the WA Court of Criminal Appeal on various grounds, including that the conviction and sentence on count 2 should be quashed because the offence should not have been tried on indictment. He alleged that the jury’s verdict on count 1 was unsafe and unsatisfactory as evidence concerning count 2 was wrongly put before the jury. The CCA unanimously quashed the conviction on count 2 as the offence was not triable on indictment, but, by majority, it held that admission of evidence on count 2 had caused no substantial miscarriage of justice in relation to count 1. Mr Bounds appealed to the High Court, contending that the jury had before it evidence related to count 2 which, but for both counts being on the indictment, would not have been admissible in a trial on count 1. The Court, by a 4-1 majority, dismissed the appeal. It held that the case against Mr Bounds was overwhelming. No other person was identified who could have stored the images in his personal directory. Mr Bounds accepted he was in the computer laboratory, often alone and out of hours, when they were downloaded. The Court held there was no substantial miscarriage of justice.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 May 2019 PARKES SHIRE COUNCIL v SOUTH WEST HELICOPTERS PTY LIMITED [2019] HCA 14 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The issue in the appeal was whether a claim under the general law of tort for damages for negligently inflicted psychiatric harm consequent upon the death of a passenger during air carriage to which Pt IV of the Civil Aviation (Carriers' Liability) Act 1959 (Cth) ("the Act") applies was precluded by the Act. Section 28 of the Act relevantly provides that, where Pt IV of the Act applies to the carriage of a passenger, the carrier is "liable for damage sustained by reason of the death of the passenger … resulting from an accident which took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking". Section 35(2) provides that that liability is "in substitution for any civil liability of the carrier under any other law in respect of the death of the passenger or in respect of the injury that has resulted in the death of the passenger". Section 34 imposes a time limit on the availability of the right of action created by s 28. The appellant, a regional local authority, engaged the respondent to assist it to carry out by helicopter a low level aerial noxious weed survey. On 2 February 2006, a helicopter operated for that purpose by the respondent was carrying two of the appellant's officers, Mr Buerckner and Mr Stephenson. The helicopter struck power lines and crashed, killing all three occupants. Amongst a number of other claims made as a result of the accident, Mr Stephenson's widow, daughter and son ("the Stephensons") brought claims against both the appellant and respondent for damages for negligently inflicted psychiatric harm resulting from the death of Mr Stephenson. The claims brought by the Stephensons were commenced outside the time fixed by s 34 of the Act. The Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the Stephensons' claims did not fall within the ambit of s 35(2), with the result that they were not extinguished by the operation of s 34. Each of the Stephensons was successful in his or her claim against the appellant. The appellant, in turn, obtained judgment for contribution against the respondent as co-tortfeasor under the Act. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal, which allowed the appeal by majority. The majority held that the Stephensons' claims were excluded by s 35(2), and should have been dismissed. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously held that the Stephensons were entitled to claim against the respondent for damages for loss suffered by them by reason of Mr Stephenson's death pursuant to s 28 of the Act. The Court held that s 35(2) substituted that entitlement for any claim that might otherwise have been brought under the general law of tort. As the Stephensons' entitlement to claim under s 28 was extinguished by s 34 before their proceedings were commenced, the Court of Appeal rightly held that their claims should have been dismissed.