Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 August 2015 FILIPPOU v THE QUEEN [2015] HCA 29 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales ("the CCA") against the convictions and sentence imposed upon the appellant, Christopher Angelo Filippou, for two counts of murder. In 2010, the appellant shot and killed two brothers, Sam and Luke Willis. During a dispute, the brothers confronted the appellant outside his house. The appellant shot them at close range. The next day, the appellant admitted to police that he had killed the brothers. But he claimed that Luke Willis had pulled out the gun, and that he had taken the gun from Luke before shooting the brothers. The appellant was charged with two counts of murder. To each count, he pleaded not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter by reason of provocation. He was tried before a judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, sitting without a jury. The sole issue at trial was provocation. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, not one of the brothers, brought the gun. The judge found that the allegation was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the judge found that there was no reasonable possibility that the appellant had lost self-control before he shot the brothers, and therefore the partial defence of provocation failed. The appellant was found guilty and convicted of both counts of murder. In sentencing, the trial judge was neither satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant brought the gun nor satisfied on the balance of probabilities that one of the brothers brought the gun. The origin of the gun was, therefore, not proved to the standard required of either an aggravating factor or a mitigating factor in sentencing. Accordingly, the trial judge sentenced the appellant on the basis that the origin of the gun was unknown. On appeal, the CCA held that the trial judge erred in fact as to the sequence of events before the killings, and possibly erred in law in directing herself as to the requirements of the partial defence of provocation, but that there was no miscarriage of justice because the appellant had been proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The CCA found no error in the appellant's sentence. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court against his convictions and sentence. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. In relation to the appeal against conviction, the plurality held that the alleged errors of the trial judge were either not made out or of no consequence, and therefore there was no miscarriage of justice that would warrant allowing the appeal and remitting the matter to the CCA. On the appeal against sentence, the Court held that the judge was not bound to adopt the view of the facts most favourable to the appellant, and was therefore correct in sentencing on the basis that the origin of the gun was unknown.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 February 2014 MILNE v THE QUEEN [2014] HCA 4 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales which had upheld the conviction of Michael John Milne for money laundering under s 400.3(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) ("the Code"). Mr Milne was the sole director and shareholder of Barat Advisory Pty Ltd. Barat Advisory owned shares in a company called Admerex Ltd. In February 2005, Mr Milne arranged for certain Admerex shares to be swapped for shares in another company, Temenos Group AG. He intended at that time that Barat Advisory would not declare, in its income tax return, the capital gain derived from that transaction. An intentional failure by Barat Advisory to declare the capital gain would be an offence against the Code. In November 2006, Mr Milne caused an income tax return to be lodged for Barat Advisory that did not declare the capital gain derived from the swap of Admerex shares. Mr Milne was convicted of money laundering under s 400.3(1) of the Code after a trial by jury in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Section 400.3(1) makes it a crime for a person to deal with property worth $1,000,000 or more intending that it "will become an instrument of crime". An "instrument of crime" is defined in s 400.1(1) as property that is "used in the commission of, or used to facilitate the commission of, an offence". Mr Milne's appeal against that conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal was dismissed. By special leave, he appealed to the High Court. He argued that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in its interpretation of the definition of "instrument of crime" and wrongly held that the Admerex shares were capable of falling within that definition in the circumstances of the case. The question in this appeal was whether the Admerex shares upon which the capital gain was made could be said to have been intended to become an "instrument of crime". Allowing the appeal, the High Court held that s 400.3(1) requires that there be a dealing with the property and an intended future use of the property. On the Crown case, there could not be an intended future use of the Admerex shares after they were swapped for the Temenos shares. The Court quashed Mr Milne's conviction for money laundering and entered a verdict of acquittal on that charge.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 3 February 2021 WESTPAC SECURITIES ADMINISTRATION LTD & ANOR V AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMISSION [2021] HCA 3 Today the High Court dismissed an appeal from a judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal concerned whether financial product advice given by the appellants (collectively, "Westpac") to members of superannuation funds of which they are trustees was "personal advice" within the meaning of s 766B(3)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the "Act"). During a campaign, Westpac had contacted members via phone and advised each to accept an offer to roll over their external superannuation accounts into their account with Westpac. Section 766B(3)(b) of the Act defines "personal advice" so as to include "financial product advice" given or directed to a person in circumstances where a reasonable person might expect the provider to have considered one or more of the person's objectives, financial situation and needs. Section 766B(4) defines "general advice" as financial product advice that is not personal advice. The Act imposes more onerous obligations on an adviser who provides personal advice, obligations Westpac accepted they had breached if they had provided personal advice. The Court held that Westpac had provided personal advice to the members during their campaign. "Considered" in s 766B(3) refers not to an active process of evaluation and reflection but rather means "took account of", consistent with its counterpoint in s 949A(2)(a) and the protective purpose of s 766B(3). The words "one or more of the person's objectives, financial situation and needs" in s 766B(3) contemplate that consideration be of at least one aspect of the client's objectives, financial situation or needs. A reasonable person in the position of each of the members called by Westpac might expect Westpac to have in fact taken into account at least one aspect of the member's objectives, financial situation or needs. This expectation was engendered by the fact that Westpac had elicited from each member, with whom Westpac had a pre-existing relationship, an indication of his or her personal objectives of saving on fees and improving the manageability of superannuation; proceeded to confirm the validity of the expressed objectives and appropriateness of the roll-over service to achieve them; and then segued into an offer to effect the roll-over. That the members' objectives were "generic" or generally applicable did not mean they ceased being personal objectives capable of giving rise to that expectation.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 December 2020 GERNER & ANOR v THE STATE OF VICTORIA [2020] HCA 48 Today the High Court published unanimous reasons for allowing the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiffs' claim in this proceeding on 6 November 2020. The demurrer concerned whether the Constitution implicitly guarantees a freedom of movement. The Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic) ("the Act") empowers authorised officers to exercise emergency powers when a state of emergency has been declared by the Minister for Health. A state of emergency was declared to exist in the whole of Victoria by reason of the serious risk to public health posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Directions restricting the movement of people within Victoria ("the Lockdown Directions") had been made from time to time in exercise of emergency powers conferred by s 200(1)(b) and (d) of the Act, and remained in force on 6 November 2020. The plaintiffs sought declarations that s 200(1)(b) and (d) of the Act and the Lockdown Directions made thereunder were invalid as an infringement of a guarantee of freedom of movement said to be implicit in the Constitution. The defendant demurred to the plaintiffs' claim on the ground that the Constitution does not imply the freedom of movement for which the plaintiffs contended. The High Court held that no freestanding guarantee of freedom to move wherever one wishes for whatever reason is implicit in the Constitution on any of the three grounds contended for by the plaintiffs. First, the Court held that such a limitation on the legislative and executive power of the Commonwealth and States could not be implied from the fact of federation. Rather, the legal nature and effect of the federation established by the Constitution can be known only from the terms and structure of the Constitution itself; those terms and that structure provide no support for the limitation on power for which the plaintiffs contended. Secondly, the Court held that while legislated limits on movement that burden political communication may infringe the implied freedom of political communication, a limit on movement which does not have a political character will not. Thirdly, the Court held that s 92 of the Constitution does not imply a freedom of movement of the kind for which the plaintiffs contended. Such an implication would render otiose the delineation clearly drawn by the text of s 92 between protected interstate intercourse and intrastate intercourse which it does not purport to protect. It would also attribute to the text a meaning rejected by the framers of the Constitution.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 16 July, 2003 STEPHEN ALFRED CATTANACH AND THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND v KERRY ANNE The High Court of Australia today dismissed an appeal by Dr Cattanach and the State of Queensland against an award of damages requiring them to pay the costs of bringing up an unplanned child conceived as a consequence of medical negligence. After having two daughters in 1985 and 1988, Mrs Melchior wanted no more children and consulted Dr Cattanach, an obstetrician and gynaecologist, about sterilisation. She told him that at age 15 her right ovary and fallopian tube had been removed during an appendectomy. When Dr Cattanach performed a tubal ligation on Mrs Melchior in 1992, what he saw was consistent with that history, so he attached a filshie clip to the left fallopian tube. In fact, only the right ovary had been removed, due to a blood clot, but the right fallopian tube had not. Mrs Cattanach became pregnant at age 44 and gave birth to a son on May 29, 1997. Experts for both sides were present at the birth and after a caesarean delivery her uterus was lifted out, showing the right fallopian tube still intact, although twisted out of its normal position. Mrs Cattanach appeared to have conceived by transmigration of an egg from the left ovary to the right fallopian tube. The Melchiors sued both Dr Cattanach and the State of Queensland, as the sterilisation was performed in the Redland Hospital, a public hospital in Brisbane. In a trial in the Queensland Supreme Court, Justice Catherine Holmes held Dr Cattanach was negligent in uncritically accepting Mrs Melchior’s assertion that her right fallopian tube had been removed, failing to inform Mrs Melchior of the risk of pregnancy if the tube was still there, and failing to inform her of a procedure that would reveal the existence of a functioning fallopian tube. But Justice Holmes did hold that Dr Cattanach’s failure to observe the right fallopian tube during the sterilisation procedure was not negligent. She awarded Mrs Melchior $103,672.39 in damages related to the pregnancy and birth, Mr Melchior $3,000 for loss of consortium as a result of his wife’s pregnancy, and Mr and Mrs Melchior jointly $105,249.33 for the costs of raising and maintaining a child to age 18. Dr Cattanach and the State appealed against the awarding of the third category of damages, but the Court of Appeal, by majority, dismissed their appeal. They then appealed to the High Court in relation to the third head of damages. By a 4-3 majority, the High Court also dismissed their appeal. The majority held that the costs of the child’s upbringing were directly connected to Dr Cattanach’s negligence and constituted legally recognisable damage to Mr and Mrs Melchior. The majority also held that the arrival of a healthy child could not be treated as a benefit to be offset against the financial burden suffered as a consequence of negligence.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 August 2013 LEGAL SERVICES BOARD v SIMON GILLESPIE-JONES [2013] HCA 35 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria, which had held that the respondent was entitled to make a claim for compensation against the Legal Practitioners Fidelity Fund ("the Fidelity Fund"). The respondent, a barrister, was briefed by a solicitor to appear for a client in criminal proceedings. The client made a series of payments to the solicitor on account of his legal costs, including barristers' fees. However, the solicitor misappropriated most of this money, such that the amount remaining was insufficient to meet the respondent's fees. The respondent made a claim against the Fidelity Fund, which is maintained by the Legal Services Board ("the Board") under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) ("the Act"). The respondent argued that his claim should be allowed under Pt 3.6 of the Act, on the basis that he had suffered a pecuniary loss as a result of the solicitor's default. The default was said to be that the solicitor had failed to pay or deliver trust money to the respondent. The Board rejected the respondent's claim. The respondent then successfully appealed to the County Court of Victoria. The County Court held that the respondent had suffered a pecuniary loss as a result of the solicitor's default, constituted by the solicitor's failure to pay or deliver trust money to the respondent in accordance with a direction given by the client. The County Court's decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal, which would have allowed the respondent's claim on the basis that the solicitor had failed to pay him money to which he was beneficially entitled. By special leave, the Board appealed to the High Court. The High Court allowed the Board's appeal. The joint reasons of French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ held that the respondent's claim against the Fidelity Fund should be disallowed, because he had not suffered a relevant pecuniary loss. There can be no failure to pay or deliver trust money unless there is an instruction to the solicitor to pay or deliver the money, and it is not complied with. The County Court had not made any finding that the instructions the client gave to the solicitor amounted to an instruction to pay the respondent. That Court's findings were not challenged in the Court of Appeal, and could not be revisited by the High Court. Therefore, the joint reasons held that it could not be said that the solicitor had failed to pay or deliver trust money to the respondent. In the reasons of Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ, the respondent had no entitlement to, or expectation of, payment of trust money and suffered no loss by reason of the failure of the solicitor to pay or deliver trust money to him.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 March 2005 RYAN D’ORTA-EKENAIKE v VICTORIA LEGAL AID AND IAN DENIS McIVOR Declining to depart from a 1988 decision of the Court, the High Court of Australia today upheld advocates’ immunity from lawsuits for negligence in the conducting of cases and in making decisions about such conduct. In 1996 Mr D’Orta-Ekenaike was charged with rape. He sought legal assistance from Victoria Legal Aid which retained Mr McIvor as his barrister. At the committal proceeding Mr D’Orta- Ekenaike entered a plea of guilty, but on arraignment in the County Court he pleaded not guilty. His guilty plea was led in evidence during the trial. He was convicted and sentenced to three years’ jail. The Victorian Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and ordered a retrial on the ground that the trial judge had failed to give proper directions about the use the jury might make of the original guilty plea. At the retrial evidence of the guilty plea was not admitted and Mr D’Dorta-Ekenaike was acquitted. He then sued VLA and Mr McIvor who had allegedly advised him during conferences before the committal that he had no defence to the rape charge, a guilty plea would earn him leniency. Mr D’Orta-Ekenaike alleged that undue pressure was exerted upon him by both Mr McIvor and Robyn Greensill from the VLA. He claimed that he suffered loss and damage including being jailed between his conviction and the quashing of that conviction, lost income, psychotic illness, and the expense of the appeal, retrial and the civil proceeding. Judge Thomas Wodak in the County Court ordered a permanent stay of proceedings. The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal. In the High Court, Mr D’Orta-Ekenaike’s application for special leave to appeal was argued as though on appeal. The Court unanimously granted special leave but by a 6-1 majority dismissed the appeal. It declined to depart from the Court’s 1988 decision in Giannarelli v Wraith that an advocate cannot be sued by a client for negligence in the conduct of a case or in out-of-court work affecting the conduct of the case. The Court held that the central concern is the finalisation of controversies which are not to be reopened except in a few narrowly defined circumstances. The judicial system’s concerns are wider than the concerns of the particular parties to the controversy in question. Restraints on the nature and availability of appeals, rules about what points may be taken on appeal and rules about when fresh evidence may be called are all based on the finality principle. Other rules, affecting persons other than the parties in a case, including immunity from suit, are also justified by the need for finality in judicial decisions. Along with advocates, judges, witnesses and jurors enjoy immunity from suit. The Court held that the immunity also extends to advice leading to a decision (such as a guilty plea) which affects the conduct of a case in court.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 20 June 2018 CRAIG WILLIAM JOHN MINOGUE v STATE OF VICTORIA [2018] HCA 27 Today the High Court held, in answer to questions stated in a special case, that s 74AAA of the Corrections Act 1986 (Vic) ("the Act") does not, on its proper construction, apply to the plaintiff, In 1988 the plaintiff was sentenced by the Supreme Court of Victoria to a term of life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 28 years for the murder of Angela Rose Taylor, a constable in the Victorian police force. Constable Taylor was killed following the detonation of an explosive device contained in a car parked in the vicinity of a number of public buildings in Melbourne, including the Russell Street Police Complex and the Melbourne Magistrates' Court building. The plaintiff's non-parole period expired on 30 September 2016 and, on 3 October 2016, he submitted an application for parole. On 20 October 2016, the Adult Parole Board of Victoria ("the Board") decided to proceed with parole planning to consider the plaintiff's suitability for release on parole. On 14 December 2016, s 74AAA was inserted into the Act. Section 74AAA relevantly provides that the Board must not make a parole order in respect of a prisoner "convicted and sentenced" to a term of imprisonment "for the murder of a person who the prisoner knew was, or was reckless as to whether the person was, a police officer" unless the Board is satisfied that the prisoner is in imminent danger of dying or is seriously incapacitated. On 20 December 2017, s 127A was inserted into the Act. Section 127A relevantly provides that s 74AAA applies regardless of whether, before the commencement of s 74AAA, the prisoner had become eligible for parole, the prisoner had taken any steps to ask the Board to grant parole, or the Board had begun consideration of whether the prisoner should be granted parole. Before s 127A was enacted, the plaintiff commenced proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the High Court. After commencing his proceedings, the plaintiff asked the Board not to take any further action in relation to his application for parole until the determination of these proceedings. The Board acceded to that request. In answering questions stated in the special case, the High Court held that s 74AAA, on its proper construction, applies to a prisoner sentenced on the basis that the prisoner knew, or was reckless as to whether, the person murdered was a police officer. The plaintiff was not sentenced on that basis. The remarks of the sentencing judge contain no reference to the plaintiff's state of mind concerning the identity of the police constable who was killed. The offence committed was indiscriminate and no particular person or class of persons was targeted. Therefore, the Court concluded that s 74AAA does not apply to the plaintiff.