Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 9 October, 2003 HOYTS PTY LIMITED v DIANE BURNS The High Court of Australia today unanimously allowed an appeal by Hoyts from a New South Wales Court of Appeal decision that the cinema operator was liable for injuries incurred by a patron who injured her back when she did not notice her seat was in the upright position. Ms Burns, a teacher’s aide, helped supervise a group of disabled children on an outing to the Hoyts cinema complex at Bankstown in Sydney in March 1997. The cinema had automatically retracting seats. During the movie, the four-year-old boy Ms Burns was looking after became very agitated and crawled rapidly away. She left her seat to retrieve the boy who was was screaming and kicking as she sat down without noticing the seat had become upright again. Ms Burns injured her spine when it struck a metal bar under the seat as she fell. No other such incident had been recorded by the Bankstown complex, which was then 10 years old and could seat more than 2,400 people. Ms Burns sued Hoyts for negligence, claiming that if signs had been placed inside or outside the cinema she would have read them and known to check whether the seat was up. In the NSW District Court, Judge Susan Gibb held Hoyts was not negligent. The NSW Court of Appeal unanimously allowed Ms Burns’s appeal and held that signs warning that the seats retracted automatically should have been displayed in the foyer. Hoyts appealed to the High Court. The Court held that the Court of Appeal had not given sufficient regard to the manner in which Ms Burns came to give evidence about warning signs, in effect as an afterthought. It was far from clear that such warnings would have been heeded and the Court of Appeal had not considered what Ms Burns herself would have done while her attention was distracted by a distressed child.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 21 October 2005 CSR LIMITED AND MIDALCO PTY LTD v JARRADD EDDY AS ADMINISTRATOR AD LITEM REPRESENTING THE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOHN LEONARD THOMPSON A person who has suffered personal injury cannot recover special damages on account of a loss of capacity to care for a disabled family member, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Thompson claimed that he had developed malignant mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos dust and fibre while working in a factory owned by CSR and Midalco in Adelaide between 1960 and 1963. CSR ran the factory while Midalco supplied asbestos from the Wittenoom mine. The companies admitted liability. Mr Thompson was diagnosed in 2002 and died in November 2003, aged 61. He sued the two companies in the New South Wales Dust Diseases Tribunal, which in April 2003 awarded him damages of $465,899.49, including $165,480 for Mr Thompson’s loss of capacity to care for his disabled wife, Beverley May Thompson. Mrs Thompson suffered from osteoarthritis and was unable to undertake heavy domestic duties. Mr Thompson performed these tasks until he became too debilitated. The $165,480 was a head of damages known as Sullivan v Gordon damages and was the subject of the appeal by CSR and Midalco. The NSW Court of Appeal rejected CSR and Midalco’s application for leave to re-argue Sullivan v Gordon, a 1999 NSW decision, and upheld this aspect of the damages. The companies appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal and held that Sullivan v Gordon should be overruled. The Court held that Sullivan v Gordon losses should be covered by general damages rather than as a head of special damages.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 April 2013 SZOQQ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP & ANOR [2013] HCA 12 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, which held that the appellant was not a person to whom Australia owed "protection obligations" for the purposes of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Migration Act"). The appellant is an Indonesian national from Irian Jaya who was active in the Free Papua Movement. In 1973 he was detained and tortured by Indonesian officials and, in 1975, he was seriously injured after being shot by Indonesian soldiers. The appellant was granted temporary entry into Australia in June 1985 and was granted a protection visa in January 1996. While travelling to Indonesia to visit his father in September 1996, the appellant was detained and assaulted by members of the Indonesian military. The appellant escaped and returned to Australia. Back in Australia, the appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of manslaughter for which he was sentenced in September 2001 to seven years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and six months. The Minister cancelled the appellant's protection visa in March 2003, in accordance with the "character test" provisions of the Migration Act. In December 2008, the Minister determined that it was in the public interest to allow the appellant to make a further application for a protection visa. A delegate of the Minister considered the application and determined that, although the appellant had a well-founded fear of political persecution should he be returned to Indonesia, Australia owed him no "protection obligations" under the Migration Act because he constituted a danger to the community, having been convicted of a "particularly serious crime". The delegate's determination was affirmed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("AAT"), the Federal Court and the Full Court of the Federal Court. The determination made by the Minister's delegate and the decisions of the AAT and the courts below proceeded on the footing that because the appellant had been convicted of a "particularly serious crime", Australia owed him no "protection obligations" for the purposes of s 36 of the Migration Act. That was contrary to the 2005 decision of the High Court in NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 222 CLR 161; [2005] HCA 6. The Court unanimously held that the proceedings in the courts below miscarried. It ordered the AAT to review, according to law, the original decision of the Minister's delegate to refuse the appellant a protection visa.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 October 2004 The High Court of Australia today upheld the validity of New South Wales legislation dealing with the determination of minimum sentences of prisoners whom trial judges had recommended never be released. Mr Baker, now 56, and Kevin Gary Crump were convicted in the New South Wales Supreme Court in 1974 of the shooting murder of Ian Lamb, whom they robbed of $20, near Narrabri in NSW in November 1973 and conspiracy to murder of Virginia Morse a few days later. Mr Baker had worked on the farm on which Mrs Morse, her husband and three children lived near Collarenebri in north-west NSW. When Brian Morse was absent, Mr Baker and Mr Crump stole his car and two firearms, abducted Mrs Morse and took her over the border into Queensland. During a period of 20 hours, they tortured and raped Mrs Morse then shot her through the eyes. In sentencing them, Justice Robert Taylor told them: “I believe you should spend the rest of your lives in jail and there you should die. If ever there was a case where life imprisonment means what it says … this is it.” Under section 13A of the Sentencing Act (since repealed by the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act), prisoners serving life sentences could apply to the Supreme Court to determine a minimum period before being eligible for parole. But where a judge recommended against release, a prisoner had to have served at least 20 years and the Court had to be satisfied that “special reasons” justified a determination of a minimum term. The Court was required to give substantial weight to recommendations and comments by the trial judge. When Mr Baker applied for a determination, Justice Greg James was not satisfied that special reasons existed. Mr Baker had argued that his good conduct in jail, his strong prospects of rehabilitation and the fact that Mr Crump had his sentence determined in 1997 (before section 13A was amended to include the “special reasons” requirement) justified a determination. Mr Baker appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Criminal Appeal, then appealed to the High Court. The Court held that the NSW Parliament was entitled to treat prisoners such as Mr Baker as exceptional cases. The Parliament had the power to create a special regime for the most serious offenders and to select non-release recommendations as the criterion for distinguishing them from other offenders. The requirement of special reasons did not lack meaning or content. Mr Baker failed to show that establishing special reasons was a futile charade and that no application could succeed. He failed to show that determining an application under section 13A of the Sentencing Act was not an exercise of judicial power. The High Court, by a 6-1 majority, dismissed the appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 August 2018 HFM043 v THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU [2018] HCA 37 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from the Supreme Court of Nauru. The High Court held that the Supreme Court of Nauru erred in holding that s 31(5) of the Refugees Convention Act 2012 (Nr) made it futile to remit the appellant's application for merits review to the Refugee Status Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). The appellant applied to the Secretary of the Department of Justice and Border Control of Nauru ("the Secretary") to be recognised as a refugee in January 2014. The Secretary determined that the appellant was not a refugee and that she was not owed complementary protection. In March 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the Secretary's determination. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Nauru. Prior to the determination of her appeal, the appellant married Mr B, who had been recognised as a refugee. The appellant's solicitors sent an email to the Republic of Nauru's Refugee Status Determination Lawyer informing the Government of Nauru of her "dependency on her husband" and attaching submissions and statements in support of her "Application for Derivative Status". A document entitled "Refugee Determination Record" issued to the appellant in August 2016 stated that the Secretary had determined that she was a refugee. There was no dispute that this document refers to the appellant's derivative status as a dependant of her husband. On 9 June 2017, the Supreme Court of Nauru held that the Tribunal had made an error of law by failing to adjourn the hearing so that the appellant could obtain a full medical report. The Supreme Court of Nauru made an order dismissing the appellant's appeal on the basis that it would be futile to remit the matter to the Tribunal "due to the operation of s 31(5)". Section 31(5) provides that an application for merits review by the Tribunal "that has not been determined at the time the person is given a Refugee Determination Record, is taken to have been validly determined at that time". The appellant appealed as of right to the High Court. The High Court held that s 31(5) did not apply to the appellant. Section 31(5) applies only to persons who have been given a "Refugee Determination Record" as defined by s 3 of the Refugees Convention Act, which confines the meaning of that term to a document issued under s 6(2A). The document issued to the appellant in August 2016 was not a document issued under s 6(2A), as that provision came into effect on 23 December 2016 and was not given retrospective effect. The High Court set aside the orders of the Supreme Court of Nauru and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for determination according to law.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 September 2005 APLA LIMITED, MAURICE BLACKBURN CASHMAN AND ROBERT LESLIE WHYBURN v LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER OF NEW SOUTH WALES AND STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES The High Court of Australia today upheld the constitutional validity of a NSW ban on lawyers advertising their services in relation to personal injury claims. The plaintiffs challenged the validity of Part 14 of the Legal Profession Regulation made under the Legal Profession Act. Part 14 makes it both an offence and professional misconduct for a barrister or solicitor to publish an advertisement that includes any reference to personal injury or to any legal service that relates to an entitlement to recover money for personal injury. The regulation, which took effect in May 2003, was one of several measures said by the NSW Government to be designed to reduce the volume of personal injury litigation and the growing cost of public liability insurance premiums. The plaintiffs wish to run advertisements in newspapers, the Yellow Pages and trade union journals and on the internet and, in Maurice Blackburn Cashman’s case, to send letters to legally unrepresented people affected by faulty heart pacemakers to invite them to seek legal advice regarding a class action against the manufacturers. The plaintiffs contended that the Part 14 regulations are invalid because they infringe the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of communication on government and political matters; infringe the requirements of Chapter III of the Constitution and of the rule of law; infringe section 92 of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of interstate trade, commerce and intercourse; exceed NSW’s legislative and regulatory powers by their operation beyond NSW; and are inconsistent with various Commonwealth laws. By a 5-2 majority, the Court rejected each of these contentions and upheld the validity of the regulations.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 May 2016 MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION v [2016] HCA 19 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The High Court held that the respondent, Mr May, did not suffer an "injury" as defined in s 4(1) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ("the Act"). He was therefore not entitled to compensation under s 14 of the Act. Mr May enlisted in the Royal Australian Air Force ("the RAAF"). At the time he enlisted, he was healthy and fit. In the course of his employment with the RAAF, Mr May was required to undergo a series of vaccinations. He said that he suffered a series of adverse reactions to these vaccinations. Mr May subsequently applied under s 14 of the Act for compensation in respect of "low immunity, fatigue, illnesses, dizziness – immune system/whole body", which, he maintained, he sustained as a result of the vaccinations he received while he was employed with the RAAF. A delegate of the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission ("the MRCC") denied Mr May's claim. The MRCC later reconsidered but affirmed the determination. Mr May then applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") for a review of that second decision. The Tribunal accepted that Mr May was (and became shortly after joining the RAAF) "significantly disabled" by his condition, which it "loosely described" as "vertigo". However, the Tribunal concluded that Mr May had failed to establish his case: he had not demonstrated that he had suffered a physical injury amounting to a "sudden or identifiable physiological change" in the normal functioning of the body or its organs attributable to the vaccinations received while serving in the RAAF. Therefore, Mr May had not suffered an "injury (other than a disease)" for the purposes of par (b) of the definition of "injury" in s 4(1) of the Act. The Tribunal also held that he had not suffered a "disease" within par (a) of the definition of "injury" in s 4(1) of the Act. The Federal Court of Australia dismissed an appeal by Mr May, but the Full Court of the Federal Court allowed an appeal. By grant of special leave, the MRCC appealed to the High Court. In the High Court, Mr May did not challenge the Tribunal's conclusion that he did not have a "disease". Rather, Mr May contended that he suffered an "injury (other than a disease)" within par (b) of the definition of "injury" in s 4(1) of the Act. The Court held that Mr May did not suffer an "injury (other than a disease)" because the evidence did not establish the nature and incidents of any physiological or psychiatric change.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 June 2005 ROBERT JOHN STRONG v THE QUEEN The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal had not fallen into error in upholding a finding that Mr Strong was an habitual criminal, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Strong, 46, of Armidale, was charged with intimidation, based on writing sexually suggestive letters from prison to a woman he barely knew, and with stalking, based on pursuing the woman after his release. He moved in opposite the woman’s house and shouted abuse and sexual suggestions to her, causing her fear and anxiety. Mr Strong, from a deprived background and with a history of drug abuse, had spent almost his entire adult life in custody. He had been diagnosed with borderline retardation, mental and personality disorders, and mental illness. Mr Strong pleaded guilty to the offences. In 2001 in the Armidale District Court, Judge David Freeman sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment for the intimidation and five years for stalking. The sentences were partly cumulative and partly concurrent, so totalled eight years with a non- parole period of six years, and took into account two other summary offences. The Crown later applied for Mr Strong, who had several convictions for assaults against women, to be pronounced an habitual criminal under the Habitual Criminals Act. Judge Freeman made the pronouncement and sentenced him a maximum 14 years’ jail, to be served concurrently with the other sentences. No non-parole period is available under the Act. The Court of Criminal Appeal (CCA) allowed an appeal by Mr Strong against the sentences for the substantive offences and re-sentenced him to a total of seven years’ jail with a five-year non-parole period. The CCA dismissed an appeal against the pronouncement that he was an habitual criminal but allowed an appeal against the 14-year sentence, reducing it to eight years. Mr Strong appealed to the High Court on the ground that the CCA, having upheld the appeal against sentence for the substantive offences, was obliged to address first the question of whether a pronouncement should be made at all under the Habitual Criminals Act rather than just redetermining the sentence. He argued that, having quashed the sentences imposed by Judge Freeman for the substantive offences, the CCA was obliged to consider afresh both aspects of the decision under the Act, that is, the pronouncement and the sentence. The point was not raised in the CCA. The High Court, by a 3-2 majority, dismissed the appeal. It held that the CCA had taken into account fresh evidence in three new psychiatric reports about Mr Strong’s mental condition and had clearly considered whether using the Act to protect the public was justified. The majority held that if the point now raised in the High Court had been raised in the CCA it would not have affected the outcome.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 October 2014 TAJJOUR v STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES HAWTHORNE v STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES FORSTER v STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES [2014] HCA 35 Today the High Court by majority upheld the validity of s 93X of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) which makes it an offence habitually to consort with convicted offenders. Section 93X provides that any person who habitually consorts with convicted offenders, after having been given an official warning in relation to each of those offenders, is guilty of an offence, punishable by imprisonment, fine, or both. In Australian law, to "habitually consort" is understood to mean to seek or accept association or to keep company with persons of a particular class. Section 93W further provides that, in the relevant provisions of the Act, "consort" means consort in person or by any other means, including by electronic or other form of communication. Section 93Y provides that certain forms of consorting are to be disregarded if the person accused of consorting satisfies the court that the consorting was reasonable in the circumstances. Three plaintiffs separately charged with an offence against s 93X brought proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales seeking a declaration that s 93X is invalid. Those proceedings were removed into the High Court. Each plaintiff alleged that s 93X is invalid because it impermissibly burdens the freedom of communication concerning government and political matters implied in the Commonwealth Constitution. Two of the plaintiffs further alleged that s 93X is invalid because it infringes a freedom of association which they said should be found to be implied in the Constitution, and because the provision is inconsistent with Australia's obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("the ICCPR"). By majority the High Court upheld the validity of s 93X. The Court accepted that the provision effectively burdens the implied freedom of communication about government and political matters. But the majority of the Court held that s 93X is not invalid because it is reasonably appropriate and adapted, or proportionate, to serve the legitimate end of the prevention of crime in a manner compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative government. The High Court unanimously concluded that the provisions of the ICCPR, where not incorporated in Commonwealth legislation, impose no constraint upon the power of a State Parliament to enact contrary legislation. Each member of the High Court who considered it necessary to answer the question about a free-standing freedom of association concluded that no such freedom is to be implied in the Constitution.