Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 November 2004 The conduct of Ms Subramaniam’s trial under the New South Wales Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act did not fully comply with the Act, the High Court of Australia held today. In August 1995, a car owned by Sydney solicitor Leigh Johnson failed to stop at a red light on Crown Street, Surry Hills. The driver’s identity could not be made out from the red-light camera photograph. Ms Johnson contested the charge. In February 1996, her employee Ms Subramaniam made a statutory declaration that she had been driving the car. However, the prosecutor refused to discontinue the case and to send an infringement notice to Ms Subramaniam. Ms Johnson was convicted in absentia in the NSW Local Court but successfully appealed to the District Court. In December 1996, Ms Subramaniam was charged with knowingly making a false statutory declaration and giving false evidence to the District Court. She was committed to stand trial. At her first trial in the NSW District Court in August 1999 the jury failed to reach a verdict. Her mental health had begun to deteriorate and she applied for a permanent stay of proceedings. The District Court rejected this and the Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed an appeal. In March 2001, the District Court directed that there be a hearing with respect to Ms Subramaniam’s fitness to stand trial. In September 2001, the Mental Health Review Tribunal found she was unfit to stand trial. She had been diagnosed with an adjustment disorder with severe anxiety and depressive features. The NSW Attorney-General, in accordance with section 19 of the Act, directed that a special hearing be conducted into the charges. The late Judge Charles Luland refused an application for a permanent stay and the trial by special hearing before a jury of 12 proceeded. A special hearing is similar to a criminal trial, with some added requirements. Among these, section 21(4) of the Act specifies that the judge at the outset must explain to the jury that the accused is unfit to be tried under normal procedures, the meaning of unfitness to be tried, the purpose of the special hearing, the verdicts available and the legal and practical consequences of those verdicts. Ms Subramaniam was found not guilty of giving false evidence but guilty of making the false statutory declaration. The Court of Criminal Appeal, by majority, dismissed an appeal. Ms Subramaniam appealed to the High Court on a number of grounds, including the ground that the special hearing miscarried because Judge Luland failed to comply with requirements imposed by section 21(4). The Court unanimously allowed the appeal on this ground, holding that his introductory remarks fell short of what was required. The mandatory nature of section 21(4) was not satisfied by Judge Luland’s other remarks during the trial, his summing-up, his answer to a question from the jury, or counsel’s submissions. Such a departure from section 21(4) constituted a miscarriage of justice which required the conviction to be quashed. The Court ordered a new trial, pointing out that it would be for the prosecution to decide whether to proceed.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 June 2016 HALL v HALL [2016] HCA 23 Today the High Court dismissed an appeal from the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia. The High Court held, by majority, that the Full Court had correctly concluded that just cause had been shown for the discharge of an interim spousal maintenance order pursuant to s 83(1)(c) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"). Under the Act, a person is liable to maintain their spouse to the extent that person is reasonably able to do so, if their spouse is unable to support herself or himself adequately. The appellant ("the wife") and the respondent ("the husband") were separated. The wife commenced proceedings against the husband in the Family Court seeking, among other relief, an interim spousal maintenance order. Her financial circumstances included ownership of two luxury cars which her brothers had purchased for her and an "interest", the value of which she did not know, in the estate of her late father that related to a family business ("the Group") founded by her father and controlled by her brothers. In the absence of information about the nature and extent of that interest, the primary judge did not take it into account as a financial resource of the wife. The primary judge made an interim spousal maintenance order. The husband applied for the discharge of that order. He relied on new evidence of the father's testamentary "wish[es]" that, first, the wife should receive from the Group a lump sum cash payment of $16,500,000 in the event of her divorce from the husband, and, second, that the wife should receive from the Group an annual payment of $150,000 until the date (if any) of the lump sum payment. The wife stated that she had not received any income or capital payment from the father's estate, but did not state whether she had requested payment from the Group. The primary judge dismissed the husband's application for discharge. On appeal, the Full Court found that the primary judge erred in failing to consider, and make any finding, as to whether there was sufficient new evidence before her to discharge the interim spousal maintenance order. Although the Full Court accepted that the making of the annual payment from the Group would have been voluntary, it found that the wife would have received the annual payment had she requested it of her brothers. The Full Court held that just cause had been shown for the discharge of the interim spousal maintenance order because, on the evidence before it, the wife was able to support herself adequately. By grant of special leave, the wife appealed to the High Court. By majority, the High Court held that the Full Court's finding that the wife would have received the annual payment had she requested it was well open on the evidence before it. On that finding, the annual payment was both a "financial resource" under s 75(2)(b) of the Act and a "fact or circumstance" under s 75(2)(o) of the Act, relevant to whether the wife was able to support herself adequately. The wife was also on notice of the risk of the Full Court's finding being made, such that she had not been deprived of any opportunity to lead further evidence.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 December 2012 TONY PAPACONSTUNTINOS v PETER HOLMES A COURT [2012] HCA 53 Today a majority of the High Court dismissed an appeal brought by the appellant, Mr Tony Papaconstuntinos, against a finding that the respondent, Mr Peter Holmes à Court, had successfully made out a defence to a defamation claim brought against him by the appellant. The defamation claim arose out of events surrounding a proposal put forward by the respondent in 2005, according to which he and Mr Russell Crowe would inject $3 million into the South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club ("the Club") in exchange for a controlling interest in its management. The proposal was to be put to a vote of the Club's members at a general meeting. The appellant, a board member of the Club, was firmly opposed to the proposal. Two days prior to the scheduled meeting, the respondent sent a letter to the appellant's employer making certain allegations about the appellant. At a trial in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, it was found that the letter conveyed three imputations that were defamatory of the appellant. The respondent pleaded the common law defence of qualified privilege. The trial judge rejected that defence on the basis that the respondent lacked a sufficient interest in making the statements complained of. The respondent successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. In his appeal to the High Court, the appellant submitted that the respondent could only make out the defence of qualified privilege if he could show that there had been a "pressing need" for him to make the statements. The requirement of "pressing need" was said to arise from the fact that the respondent's statements were made voluntarily and in the protection of interests that were purely personal. The High Court, by majority, rejected that contention. The defence of qualified privilege requires the maker of a defamatory statement to demonstrate reciprocity of duty and interest: that the maker had a duty to make, or an interest in making, the statement and that the recipient of the statement had a duty to hear, or an interest in hearing, that statement. There is no superadded requirement of "pressing need" that arises in circumstances where a defamatory statement was made voluntarily and to protect personal interests. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 June 2016 HAMDI ALQUDSI v THE QUEEN [2016] HCA 24 Today the High Court published its reasons for orders made after a hearing on 10 February 2016 dismissing the applicant's motion for an order that he be tried by a judge without a jury. The High Court held that provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ("the CPA") which provided for trial by a judge without a jury were not capable of being applied to the applicant's trial because their application would be inconsistent with s 80 of the Constitution. The applicant was charged on indictment with seven offences under the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 (Cth) ("the Act"). Section 9A of the Act provided that a prosecution for an offence against the Act "shall be on indictment". Section 68 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ("the Judiciary Act") confers jurisdiction on the courts of a State or Territory to try offences against a law of the Commonwealth and applies the laws of the State or Territory respecting procedures for trials on indictment. The applicant was arraigned on the indictment in the Supreme Court of New South Wales and pleaded "not guilty" to each charge. His trial was listed to commence on 1 February 2016 before a judge and jury. By notice of motion filed in the Supreme Court, the applicant sought an order under s 132 of the CPA that he be tried by a judge alone. That notice of motion was removed into the High Court and a case stated for consideration by the Full Court. The question referred to the Full Court by the case stated was whether s 132(1) to (6) of the CPA were incapable of being applied to the applicant's trial by s 68 of the Judiciary Act because their application would be inconsistent with s 80 of the Constitution, which states, "[t]he trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury". The majority found that that question could only be answered favourably to the applicant by overruling Brown v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 171; [1986] HCA 11. The majority declined to do so, holding there was no reason to doubt the correctness of Brown. Their Honours rejected the argument that s 80 could be read as subject to exception when, for example, a court assesses it is in the interests of justice that the trial on indictment of an offence against a law of the Commonwealth be by judge alone.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 21 October 2005 The High Court of Australia today ordered a retrial for Mr Stevens who was convicted of the shooting murder of his friend and business partner Murray Cameron Brockhurst. Mr Stevens and Mr Brockhurst co-owned Australian Carbide Saws in the Brisbane suburb of Newmarket. They were also friends who holidayed, fished, dived and socialised together. However, Mr Brockhurst wished to buy out Mr Stevens’s interest in their company and to sell him his interest in another company, JLM Grinding. Negotiations were inconclusive. On the day of his death, 22 June 2000, Mr Brockhurst bought into another competing business, Stotts Saws. Mr Stevens arrived at their premises to discuss their business affairs. He said he walked into Mr Brockhurst’s office to find him with Mr Stevens’s old .22 calibre rifle held up in front of him. Fearing his friend was about to commit suicide, he lunged for the rifle but it discharged and Mr Brockhurst was shot in the head. Mr Stevens attempted to revive Mr Brockhurst and called an ambulance, telling the operator the shooting had been an accident. Scientific officers and a ballistics expert called by the prosecution found that the rifle was prone to discharge if dropped on its butt. The ballistics expert found that striking the gun with his hand caused it to discharge one in five times. There had been conflicting evidence about Mr Brockhurst’s state of mind. In 2002, Mr Stevens was charged with murdering Mr Brockhurst. At his first trial in the Queensland Supreme Court, the jury could not reach a verdict. He was later convicted at another trial in 2003. He unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal. Mr Stevens contended that the trial judge had failed to direct the jury on the defence of accident. He appealed to the High Court, which allowed his appeal by a 3-2 majority. The majority held that the evidence did raise a defence of accident which was for the prosecution to negative. It held that the trial judge should have instructed the jury that Mr Stevens could not be convicted of murder unless the prosecution had satisfied it beyond reasonable doubt that the death of Mr Brockhurst was not an accident.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 April 2016 [2016] HCA 12 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The High Court held that where proof of intention to produce a particular result is made an element of liability for an offence, the prosecution is required to establish that the accused meant to produce that result by his or her conduct. The majority reasoned that knowledge or foresight of result, whether possible, probable or certain, is not a substitute for proof of specific intent. The appellant was convicted by a jury in the District Court of Queensland of unlawfully transmitting a serious disease to another with intent to do so under s 317(b) of the Criminal Code (Q). The serious disease that he transmitted to the complainant was the human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV"). The appellant was diagnosed with HIV in 1998 and was informed then that there was a risk of transmission of the disease through unprotected sexual intercourse. He commenced a relationship with the complainant in 2007 but did not disclose to her that he was HIV positive. They engaged in frequent unprotected sexual intercourse during their relationship, which lasted until September 2008. The complainant was diagnosed as HIV positive a year after their relationship ended. The appellant lied to the complainant about his HIV status several times during and after their relationship. The appellant appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal contending, that the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence did not establish that he intended to transmit HIV to the complainant. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The majority held that it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to transmit HIV to the complainant, in circumstances in which he had engaged in frequent acts of unprotected sexual intercourse with her, knowing that he was HIV positive. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that where liability for an offence requires proof of intention to produce a particular result, the prosecution must establish that the accused had that result as his or her purpose or object at the time of engaging in the conduct. Purpose is not to be equated with motive and a person may engage in conduct having more than one purpose. A person's awareness of the risk that his or her conduct may result in harm does not, without more, support the inference that the person intended to produce the harm. The High Court held that, apart from the evidence that the appellant engaged in frequent unprotected sexual intercourse with the complainant, there was no evidence to support the inference that the appellant had the intention to transmit HIV to her. It followed that the conviction must be quashed. The Court set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal and substituted for the verdict of the jury a verdict of guilty of unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm to the complainant, to which the appellant had pleaded guilty. The proceedings were remitted to the District Court of Queensland for sentence.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 28 February 2007 Z v NEW SOUTH WALES CRIME COMMISSION A solicitor appearing before the New South Wales Crime Commission was obliged to provide the name and address of a client and could not rely on legal professional privilege, the High Court of Australia held today. In September 2003, the solicitor, Z, was summonsed to attend the Commission to give evidence in relation to an investigation into the attempted murder of M. Z’s client, X, had twice given Z certain information about M and, as instructed by X, Z had passed on that information to police. M was attacked in 2002, some years after X had consulted Z. When asked at a Commission hearing who had provided the information he had passed on to police and where that person could be contacted, Z declined to answer on the ground that the communications conveying that information were the subject of legal professional privilege. The Commission member conducting the hearing ruled that the communications were not privileged. Section 18B(4) of the New South Wales Crime Commission Act provides that, if a lawyer is required to answer a question at a hearing and the answer would disclose a privileged communication with someone else, the lawyer is entitled to refuse to comply, but if required the lawyer must provide the Commission with the name and address of the person with whom the communication was conducted. The NSW Supreme Court dismissed an application for review of that ruling and the Court of Appeal refused Z leave to appeal. Z then appealed to the High Court. In a 5-0 decision, the Court dismissed the appeal. Three members of the Court held that even if the communication of X’s name and address to Z were otherwise subject to legal professional privilege, the qualification in section 18B(4) gave the Commission power to require disclosure of the name and address. Two members held that, because what X told Z was for the express purpose of being passed on to the police, the communications were not privileged, not confidential and not for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 October 2013 JASON LEE (AKA DO YOUNG LEE) & ANOR v NEW SOUTH WALES CRIME COMMISSION [2013] HCA 39 Today the High Court, by majority, dismissed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had ordered that the appellants be compulsorily examined under oath before a registrar of the Supreme Court of New South Wales pursuant to s 31D of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) ("the Act"). The appellants were each charged with drug and firearm offences and the first appellant was also charged with an offence of money laundering. The New South Wales Crime Commission ("the Commission") applied to the Supreme Court for orders under s 31D(1)(a) of the Act that the first appellant be examined on oath concerning his own affairs and that the second appellant be examined on oath concerning the affairs of the first appellant and a third party. There was a risk that the subject matter of those examinations would overlap with the subject matter of the pending criminal proceedings. A judge of the Supreme Court declined to make the orders sought by the Commission, holding that the risk such examinations posed to the appellants’ pending trials may not be avoided by provisions of the Act. The Commission applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. At that time, the appellants had been convicted of some of the drug and firearm charges and had lodged appeals against those convictions. The original money laundering charge and further money laundering charges against the first appellant were listed for trial. The Court of Appeal granted the Commission leave to appeal, allowed the appeal and made orders for the examination of the appellants. By special leave, the appellants appealed to the High Court. In the High Court, the appellants argued that s 31D of the Act should not be construed as conferring power to order the examination on oath of a person against whom criminal proceedings have been commenced but not completed, to the extent that the subject matter of the examination would overlap with the subject matter of those proceedings. The High Court, by majority, dismissed the appeal. The Court held that s 31D, when read in the context of the Act, authorised the Supreme Court to order such an examination. The potential prejudice to the fair trial of the examinee was mitigated by limitations on how information elicited from an examination could be used in criminal proceedings and by the discretion of the Supreme Court to decline to make an examination order in exercise of its inherent power to prevent the misuse of its processes. The minority Justices held that the case was governed by the High Court’s decision in X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 87 ALJR 858; (2013) 298 ALR 570; [2013] HCA 29 and that the appeal should be allowed.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 16 March 2022 UNS nsNSW COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v TREVOR COTTLE & ANOR [2022] HCA 7 Today, the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeal concerned whether the first respondent, who had been retired on medical grounds as a non-executive police officer by the appellant ("the Police Commissioner") under s 72A of the Police Act 1990 (NSW), could make an unfair dismissal application to the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales ("the IR Commission") pursuant to s 84(1) of Pt 6 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) ("the IR Act"). The High Court held that s 72A of the Police Act did not expressly, or by necessary implication, exclude or modify the operation of Pt 6 of Ch 2 of the IR Act. Accepting that the NSW Police Force performs unique functions within the community, the plurality concluded that that characterisation must yield to the express terms of Pt 6 of Ch 2, and ss 85 and 218 of the Police Act. Relevantly, Pt 6 of Ch 2 applied to the dismissal of "any public sector employee", which was further defined to include a member of the NSW Police Force; s 85 provided that the Police Commissioner was to be the employer of non-executive police officers for proceedings dealing with industrial matters; and s 218(1) evinced a parliamentary intention that, subject to sub-s (2), the IR Act was not affected by the Police Act. The majority distinguished s 72A from the power to dismiss probationary police officers in s 80(3) of the Police Act, which was found to be inconsistent with s 84(1) of the IR Act in Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Eaton (2013) 252 CLR 1. Section 72A was also distinguishable from the very similar power under s 50 to cause the retirement of executive police officers, which was expressly immunised from the reach of Pt 6 of The High Court therefore held that the Court of Appeal was correct to conclude that the IR Commission had jurisdiction to hear and determine the first respondent's application for unfair dismissal. The plurality concluded that, although the Police Commissioner was under no obligation to give reasons for an exercise of power under s 72A of the Police Act, the three objective criteria in s 72A provided a stable basis for the IR Commission to assess whether a non-executive police officer's retirement was "harsh, unreasonable or unjust". A similar power to s 72A existed in respect of other public sector employees, who enjoyed rights to seek review in the IR Commission for unfair dismissal. Even where the primary remedies for unfair dismissal – reinstatement or re- employment – were not apt to be applied in respect of non-executive police officers, the IR Commission would still have the power to order compensation.