Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 22 May 2008 COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v RELIANCE CARPET CO PTY LIMITED Goods and services tax (GST) was payable on a deposit forfeited by a purchaser when a contract for the sale of commercial property was terminated for default by the purchaser, the High Court of Australia held today. Reliance Carpet entered into a contract on 10 January 2002 to sell commercial premises in Camberwell in Melbourne for $2,975,000, with the purchaser paying a deposit of $297,500. Settlement was to take place 12 months later, but Reliance exercised its option to defer settlement for six months to allow time to relocate its business. The purchaser failed to complete on 10 July 2003. After giving 14 days’ notice to complete, Reliance rescinded the contract and forfeited the deposit. In 2004, the Commissioner assessed Reliance as liable to pay GST on the forfeited deposit. It disallowed Reliance’s objection. The Commissioner funded the matter as a test case. The disallowance of the objection was affirmed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, but an appeal by Reliance to the Full Court of the Federal Court succeeded. The Full Court held that there was no taxable supply because the contract was rescinded. The deposit was not consideration for a taxable supply. The Commissioner appealed to the High Court, which unanimously allowed the appeal. The Court held that the forfeited deposit was consideration for a taxable supply subject to GST. Under the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act, there is an extended definition of supply and the issue was whether there was a “taxable supply”. The Court held that upon execution of the contract Reliance made a supply in that it entered into an obligation to do certain things under the contract, including maintaining the property, paying rates, taxes, insurance premiums and other outgoings. Upon its forfeiture for failure by the purchaser to perform its obligation under the contract, the deposit was to be treated as consideration for a taxable supply. Under the Act, if the contract had proceeded to completion then the deposit would have been counted towards payment of the purchase price and GST would have been payable on the purchase price. Where, as here, the contract was terminated for breach, the deposit, when forfeited, was treated by the Act as consideration for supply and this was a taxable supply.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 2 December 2020 MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ORS v DMA18 AS LITIGATION GUARDIAN FOR DLZ18 & ANOR; MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR v MARIE THERESA ARTHUR AS LITIGATION REPRESENTATIVE FOR BXD18; MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR v FRX17 AS LITIGATION REPRESENTATIVE FOR FRM17; MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR v DJA18 AS LITIGATION REPRESENTATIVE FOR DIZ18 [2020] HCA 43 Today the High Court allowed appeals from four judgments of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia concerning the proper construction and application of s 494AB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The High Court also dismissed cross-appeals in the matters relating to BXD18 and Section 494AB(1) provides that certain "proceedings against the Commonwealth may not be instituted or continued in any court". Those proceedings, listed in s 494AB(1)(a)-(d), are all described as "proceedings relating to" a particular subject matter. In the case of s 494AB(1)(b), the proceedings are further defined by reference to a time period. Section 494AB(3) provides that nothing in the section is intended to affect the jurisdiction of the High Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution. Each respondent, while in a country designated a regional processing country, instituted proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia alleging, in various ways, that the appellants ("the Commonwealth") breached a duty of care to provide them with adequate medical treatment on Nauru. At least part of the relief sought was to compel the Commonwealth to provide adequate medical treatment. After the proceedings were instituted, each respondent was transferred to Australia for the temporary purpose of receiving medical treatment. In each of the proceedings, the Commonwealth alleged that the Federal Court did not have jurisdiction by reason of s 494AB(1)(a), (ca) or (d). Argument in the Full Court treated s 494AB as defining the Federal Court's jurisdiction by limiting or withdrawing the Federal Court's authority to decide the respondents' claims. The High Court unanimously held that s 494AB does not take away the jurisdiction of courts to hear and determine proceedings of the kinds described in s 494AB(1). It does not limit the authority of the relevant courts to decide those specific claims but provides the Commonwealth with an available answer to those claims (analogous to a time bar) if they are made in a court other than the High Court. It is a provision which the Commonwealth may plead as a defence where one of the identified subject matters in s 494AB(1) is an issue in the proceeding, when and if that pleading would be consistent with its model litigation obligations. Whether an identified subject matter is raised as an issue in the proceeding will depend on the pleadings viewed in light of the relief claimed or, if there are no pleadings, the application and other documents filed in the proceeding. The High Court further held that: s 494AB(1)(a) applied to DLZ18's proceedings; s 494AB(1)(d) applied to FRM17's proceedings; and each of s 494AB(1)(a) and (d) applied to BXD18 and DIZ18's proceedings.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 May 2017 [2017] HCA 18 Today the High Court dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. A majority of the High Court held that causing a complainant to contract the human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") was capable of constituting infliction of grievous bodily harm contrary to s 35(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), as that provision stood in 2004. The Court also held that recklessness, within the now repealed definition of "maliciously" in s 5 of the Crimes Act, could be established by an accused's foresight of the possibility, rather than the probability, of the risk in question materialising. The appellant engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse with the complainant between January and July 2004 in circumstances where the appellant had been diagnosed as, and therefore knew that he was, HIV positive. The appellant was charged with one count of maliciously causing the complainant to contract a grievous bodily disease with the intent of causing the complainant to contract that grievous bodily disease (Count 1) and, in the alternative, one count of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm upon the complainant (Count 2). In March 2012, the appellant moved for an order from the District Court of New South Wales that Count 2 be quashed. Sorby DCJ stayed the proceedings in relation to Count 2 due to uncertainty as to whether causing another person to contract a serious disease constituted the infliction of grievous bodily harm contrary to s 35(1)(b) of the Crimes Act. On appeal by the Crown the Court of Criminal Appeal dissolved this stay, holding that the word "inflicts" should not be given a limited and technical meaning. At his subsequent trial in the District Court, the appellant conceded that he had known that there was a real possibility that he could infect the complainant by having unprotected sexual intercourse with him. The appellant was acquitted of Count 1 but convicted of Count 2. He unsuccessfully appealed against his conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal on grounds including that Count 2 disclosed no offence known to law and that the trial judge erred in directing the jury that the element of malice was satisfied. A majority of the High Court held that the meaning of "inflicts" in s 35 of the Crimes Act does not require the infliction of force productive of immediate physical injury, but rather extends to the communication of disease or infection. The Court also held that recklessness in the context of s 35 does not require an accused to have foresight of the probability that certain consequences will eventuate; foresight of the possibility of such consequences is sufficient. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 18 May 2005 ANTHONY VASKEN MARKARIAN v THE QUEEN The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in the formulation and application of sentencing principles when it dealt with Mr Markarian’s sentence for drug offences, the High Court of Australia held today. The Court remitted the matter to the CCA for further consideration. Mr Markarian, 41, was a heroin user and Vincent Caccamo his dealer. In April 1998, Mr Markarian was jailed and by the time of his release 18 months later he had taken himself off both heroin and methadone. He resumed contact with Mr Caccamo and started taking drugs again. Mr Markarian worked as a driver for Mr Caccamo and was paid in heroin. He was still on parole when charged with knowingly taking part in the supply of a commercial quantity (415 grams) of heroin, which carries a maximum penalty of 20 years’ jail. Mr Markarian pleaded guilty and asked that four other offences be taken into account in sentencing. Judge Greg Hosking in the District Court sentenced him to prison for two years and six months, with a non-parole period of 15 months which would have expired in October 2003. Mr Caccamo was sentenced to eight years’ jail with a non-parole period of five years. The Crown appealed, alleging Mr Markarian’s sentence was inadequate. The CCA allowed the appeal and re-sentenced Mr Markarian to eight years’ jail with a non-parole period of four-and-a-half years. He is eligible for parole in January 2007. The CCA held that the 15-year maximum penalty for an offence involving less than 250 grams should be reduced by a third to 10 years due to Mr Markarian’s lesser role in the drug operation, his plea, the finding of contrition, his addiction, and his progress in drug rehabilitation. The sentence was then reduced by 25 per cent for his plea of guilty to the other four offences. A sentence of 18 months to two years was imposed for these. Mr Markarian then appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that sentencing judges should exercise as much flexibility in sentencing as would accord with consistency of approach and with the applicable statutory regime. It agreed that sentencing judges should explain the factors in each case which influenced the final sentence. The Court however held that the CCA’s approach of starting with a maximum penalty based on the quantity of the drug alone and then making proportional deductions from it, based on other factors in the case, was not appropriate. The number and complexity of factors which Judge Hosking had had to weigh did not lend themselves to the arithmetical process used by the CCA. A majority of the Court stated that the preferable approach to sentencing is by “instinctive synthesis”, whereby the sentencing judge weighs all the competing factors and arrives at one final sentence, as opposed to an approach whereby the judge quantifies the individual factors leading to a final determination. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the CCA for its reconsideration of the sentence in accordance with its reasons for judgment.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 February 2018 PROBUILD CONSTRUCTIONS (AUST) PTY LTD v SHADE SYSTEMS PTY LTD & ANOR [2018] HCA 4 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The High Court held that the Supreme Court of New South Wales does not have jurisdiction to make an order in the nature of certiorari to quash a determination made by an adjudicator appointed under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) ("the Security of Payment Act") for a non-jurisdictional error of law on the face of the record. The Security of Payment Act relevantly grants, to any person who undertakes to carry out construction work under a construction contract, an entitlement to a "progress payment" and sets out a procedure for recovering such a payment. A person who is or claims to be entitled to a progress payment may make a payment claim. Disputed payment claims may be referred to an adjudicator for determination. The adjudicator must determine the amount of the progress payment (if any) to be paid. In doing so, the adjudicator is to consider, among other things, the provisions of the Security of Payment Act and the construction contract. The appellant ("Probuild") and the first respondent ("Shade Systems") were parties to a construction contract. Shade Systems served on Probuild a payment claim stating that a progress payment was due. Probuild responded that it did not propose to pay any of the amount claimed, because it claimed to be owed a considerably higher amount for liquidated damages. Shade Systems applied for adjudication of its payment claim. The adjudicator rejected Probuild's liquidated damages claim and determined an amount payable by Probuild. Probuild commenced judicial review proceedings in the Supreme Court, seeking an order in the nature of certiorari quashing the adjudicator's determination. The primary judge made the order sought on the basis that the adjudicator had made errors of law that appeared on the face of the record, which included the reasons for the determination. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Shade Systems successfully argued that the Security of Payment Act excluded the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to quash the determination for non-jurisdictional error of law on the face of the record. By grant of special leave, Probuild appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that the Security of Payment Act ousted the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to make an order in the nature of certiorari quashing an adjudicator's determination for non-jurisdictional error of law on the face of the record. Although the Security of Payment Act did not contain an express statement providing that the jurisdiction was ousted, the scheme of the Act disclosed an intention that such review would not be available having regard to the fact that the Act creates an interim entitlement that is determined informally, summarily and quickly, and then summarily enforced without prejudice to parties’ common law rights. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 17 August 2017 JULIAN KNIGHT v THE STATE OF VICTORIA & ANOR [2017] HCA 29 Today the High Court unanimously held, in answer to a question posed in a special case, that s 74AA of the Corrections Act 1986 (Vic) ("the Act") is not invalid on the ground that it is contrary to Ch III of the Constitution. In 1988, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to seven counts of murder and 46 counts of attempted murder. The Supreme Court of Victoria sentenced him to imprisonment for life for each count of murder and imprisonment for 10 years for each count of attempted murder, and fixed a non-parole period of 27 years. The plaintiff's non-parole period expired on or about 8 May 2014. On 2 April 2014, the Victorian Parliament inserted into the Act a new s 74AA, headed "Conditions for making a parole order for Julian Knight". The effect of s 74AA is to prevent the Adult Parole Board ("the Board") from ordering that the plaintiff be released on parole unless satisfied, amongst other things, that he is in imminent danger of dying or is seriously incapacitated and that, as a result, he no longer has the physical ability to do harm to any person. On 11 March 2016, the plaintiff lodged an application for a parole order with the secretary of the Board. On 27 July 2016, a division of the Board consisting of a retired Judge of the County Court of Victoria and two non-judicial members decided to require certain reports, including a report from the Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation under s 74AA(3). Those reports have not yet been received and the Board has taken no further steps to progress the plaintiff's application. The plaintiff brought proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the High Court seeking a declaration that s 74AA is invalid on the ground that it is contrary to Ch III of the Constitution. Invoking the principle associated with Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; [1996] HCA 24, the plaintiff submitted first, that s 74AA interferes with the sentences imposed by the Supreme Court in a manner which substantially impairs the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court, and second, that s 74AA enlists judicial officers who are members of the Board in a function that is incompatible with the exercise of federal jurisdiction by the courts of which those judicial officers are members. The High Court held that s 74AA did not interfere with the sentences imposed by the Supreme Court. Whether or not the plaintiff would be released on parole at the expiration of the non-parole period was outside the scope of the exercise of judicial power constituted by imposition of the sentences. The High Court also held that, because the Board has not in fact been constituted, and does not need to be constituted, to include a current judicial officer, it was unnecessary and inappropriate to determine whether s 74AA would be invalid in circumstances in which the function conferred by s 74AA might be sought to be exercised by a division of the Board which included a judicial officer.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 8 May, 2003 SERGEY DRANICHNIKOV v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS RE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS AND OTHERS; EX PARTE SERGEY DRANICHNIKOV Mr Dranichnikov sought both special leave to appeal against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court and relief under section 75(v) of the Constitution. He claimed the Federal Court wrongly dismissed his application for a review of the Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision upholding the Immigration Department’s refusal to give him a protection visa. The section 75(v) application, seeking constitutional writs against the Minister, the RRT and various departmental officers, raised the question of whether the RRT failed to exercise its jurisdiction to review the department’s decision. In 1997, Mr Dranichnikov, his wife Olga and daughter Maria arrived in Australia from Vladivostok in Russia where he had managed a company providing real estate and legal services. He said he tried to interest authorities to combat the increasing attacks, sometimes fatal, on business people. Mr Dranichnikov made representations to the mayor, organised public meetings to draw attention to corruption and lawlessness in the city, and formed a committee for the registration of property titles. He was stabbed in 1994 and claimed he agreed, under duress by police, to the investigation being discontinued. In Australia, Mr Dranichnikov claimed refugee status on the basis of a well- founded fear of persecution if he returned to Russia for speaking out on law and order issues. The RRT dismissed his case on the basis that any persecution Mr Dranichnikov had suffered was not due to membership of a particular social group and that his claim had no connection with the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. A single judge of the Federal Court, and the full Federal Court on appeal, held that no error on the part of the RRT was shown. But the High Court, by a 4-1 majority, held that the RRT misunderstood Mr Dranichnikov’s case and failed to make a preliminary determination of whether the narrower group or class to which Mr Dranichnikov claimed to belong – business people who publicly protested against organised crime and state-sanctioned corruption – constituted a social group for the purposes of the Convention. The majority held that Mr Dranichnikov, who represented himself, had made out his entitlement to relief under section 75(v), and ordered the issuing of writs of certiorari to quash the RRT’s decision, mandamus to compel it to again review the department’s decision, and prohibition to prevent the Minister implementing the RRT’s original decision.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 December 2021 [2021] HCA 40 Today, the High Court unanimously dismissed appeals from a judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeals concerned whether a plaintiff whose vehicle is negligently damaged can recover as damages the reasonable costs incurred in hiring a replacement vehicle of broadly equivalent value to the damaged vehicle while that vehicle is being repaired. Both respondents, Mr Rixon and Mr Cassim, owned prestige vehicles that were damaged in accidents for which the appellants, Mr Arsalan and Mr Nguyen, by their insurers, admitted liability in negligence. The vehicles were used for social and domestic purposes but not for income-earning purposes. The respondents hired replacement vehicles of similar value to their damaged vehicles while the vehicles were being repaired. In the Local Court of New South Wales, the magistrate held that Mr Rixon had not demonstrated a need for a prestige replacement vehicle and awarded damages representing the market rate of hire for a Toyota Corolla, which would have met his needs. A different magistrate found that, although a Toyota Corolla would also have met Mr Cassim's needs, he was entitled to damages representing the actual hire costs incurred because the hired replacement vehicle was of broadly equivalent value to the damaged vehicle. The Supreme Court of New South Wales dismissed Mr Rixon's appeal. The Supreme Court allowed Mr Nguyen's appeal and substituted an award of damages representing the market rate of hire for a Toyota Corolla. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed further appeals by Mr Rixon and Mr Cassim. Mr Rixon was held to be entitled to the reasonable hire costs he had incurred, and the matter was remitted to the Local Court for assessment. In Mr Cassim's appeal, the magistrate's award was reinstated. The High Court dismissed the appeals, holding that both respondents were entitled to damages representing the costs of hiring replacement vehicles of broadly equivalent value to their damaged vehicles. Where a plaintiff's vehicle is negligently damaged and unavailable during a period of repair, loss will readily be inferred from the plaintiff's ownership and past use of the vehicle. That loss consists of (i) physical inconvenience from the inability to use the vehicle and (ii) loss of amenity or enjoyment of the use of the vehicle. Loss of amenity of use of a chattel should be recognised as a recoverable head of damage for negligent damage to a chattel, consistent with the compensatory principle. A plaintiff's loss of amenity of use includes the loss of convenience or pleasure derived from the use of their vehicle, and it may be inferred that a plaintiff who incurs significant expenditure on a prestige vehicle derives amenity from its functions. Once a plaintiff mitigates their loss by hiring a replacement vehicle of broadly equivalent value to the damaged vehicle, the onus lies upon a defendant to prove that the costs incurred in mitigation were unreasonable. The appellants did not prove that the respondents acted unreasonably in incurring any of the hire costs for the replacement vehicles.