Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 31 July 2008 The High Court of Australia today ordered the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal to rehear Mr Burrell’s appeal against conviction for the kidnap and murder of Kerry Whelan in 1997 after the CCA reopened the original appeal hearing to correct an error. Mrs Whelan disappeared on 6 May 1997. Her body has never been found. Mr Burrell had once worked for her husband Bernie Whelan’s company but had been made redundant. Shortly before Mrs Whelan’s disappearance Mr Burrell re-established contact with the Whelans. He was later charged with detaining Mrs Whelan for advantage and with murdering her on or about 6 May 1997. A trial in 2005 ended with a hung jury but Mr Burrell was convicted after a second trial in 2006. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and 16 years’ jail for the kidnapping charge. Mr Burrell appealed to the CCA against his convictions and sought leave to appeal against the sentences. On Friday 16 March 2007, the CCA published reasons for its decision to dismiss the appeal against convictions, grant leave to appeal against the sentences, but dismiss that appeal. That same day, notification to Mr Burrell of the CCA’s orders was prepared in the Court’s Registry, signed on behalf of the Registrar and stamped with the Court’s seal. Particulars of the notification were entered in to the records of the NSW Supreme Court as the court of trial. After the orders were formally recorded, the CCA discovered that its reasons contained substantial factual errors. On Monday 19 March, the matter was called on by the CCA. Chief Judge at Common Law Peter McClellan said that the judgment, which he had written on behalf of the CCA, had some inaccuracies in its recounting of the Crown case. He said he had drawn upon a statement of facts alleged in the Crown case and mistakenly assumed it was correct. In further argument on 21 March, Mr Burrell submitted that the CCA had no power to reopen the appeals and that the matter should be redetermined by a newly constituted Bench because of a reasonable apprehension of bias. In reasons delivered on 23 March, the CCA rejected those submissions and held that it had power to reopen the appeals. It held that because the appeals were not determined in relation to the relevant evidence they had not been finally determined. The CCA ordered that its orders dismissing the appeals should be confirmed. Mr Burrell appealed to the High Court against the first orders made on 16 March 2007 and the second orders made on 23 March 2007. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal. It held that the CCA lacked power to reopen the appeals after the first orders had been formally recorded. The second orders were made without power so must be set aside. As there was no dispute that the first orders were flawed because of the factual errors, those orders must also be set aside. The Court ordered that Mr Burrell’s appeal against conviction and his application for leave to appeal against sentence be remitted to the CCA for rehearing.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 15 December 2006 CHARLES STUART GORDON v RAYMOND GORDON TOLCHER in his capacity as liquidator of Senafield Pty Ltd (in liquidation) AND SENAFIELD PTY LTD (in liquidation) The New South Wales District Court Rules allowing for orders for extensions of time in a lawsuit had not been displaced by the Commonwealth Corporations Act, the High Court of Australia held today. Charles Stuart Gordon is the father of Hugh Charles Gordon, the sole director and shareholder of Senafield, a rural landholding company. Senafield gave Charles Gordon, for no consideration, mortgages over various properties it owned. Mr Tolcher and Senafield now seek the recovery of money Mr Gordon received from the sale of those properties. On 3 May 2003 they filed a claim in the District Court seeking various declarations and orders, including an order that, pursuant to section 588FF of the Corporations Act, Mr Gordon pay them $522,504.07. Section 588FF provides for the making of court orders in respect of voidable transactions on the application of a company’s liquidator. The statement of claim was never filed on Mr Gordon so no defence was filed. Under the District Court Rules, dormant actions are taken to be dismissed after six months and 28 days and this was the case with the action by Mr Tolcher and Senafield on 1 December 2003. However in January 2004 they sought orders to revive the action, claiming to have had difficulties and delays in obtaining funding for the substantive proceedings. The District Court held that prejudice to Mr Gordon, given his health, in now being called upon to defend the original proceeding, outweighed the relief sought. On 3 May 2005, the Court of Appeal ordered that the time for service of the claim be extended for 60 days to 2 July, 18 months after the matter was taken to have been dismissed. It based its orders on the District Court Rule which states that the Court may extend or abridge any time fixed by the rules or by a judgment or order. Section 79 of the Commonwealth Judiciary Act provides that the laws of each State or Territory shall, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth, be binding on all courts exercising federal jurisdiction in that State or Territory. Mr Gordon was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court on the issue of whether the Corporations Act “otherwise provides” within the meaning of section 79. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It held that section 588FF sets a three-year period in which the liquidator’s application may be made to a court vested with federal jurisdiction. Thereafter, the conduct of the litigation is left to the procedures of that court. Section 588FF is not a law of the Commonwealth which “otherwise provides” so as to deny the operation of section 79 to pick up so much of the Rules as supported the orders made by the Court of Appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 April 2019 KATHLEEN CLUBB v ALYCE EDWARDS & ANOR; JOHN GRAHAM PRESTON v ELIZABETH AVERY & ANOR [2019] HCA 11 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed so much of two appeals as had been removed from the Supreme Court of Victoria and the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The High Court unanimously rejected the appellants' challenges to two laws whichs prohibit certain communications and activities in relation to abortions in "access zones" around premises at which abortions are provided. Section 185D of the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic) ("the Victorian Act") relevantly prohibits a person from communicating in relation to abortions in a manner able to be seen or heard by persons accessing or attempting to access premises at which abortions are provided, if the communication is reasonably likely to cause distress or anxiety ("the communication prohibition"). Section 9(2) of Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) ("the Tasmanian Act") relevantly prohibits protests in relation to terminations that are able to be seen or heard by a person accessing premises at which terminations are provided ("the protest prohibition"). The communication prohibition and the protest prohibition each apply within a radius of 150 metres from premises at which abortions are provided. the Reproductive Health (Access Mrs Clubb was convicted in the Magistrates' Court of Victoria of an offence against s 185D of the Victorian Act. Mr Preston was convicted in the Magistrates Court of Tasmania of an offence against s 9(2) of the Tasmanian Act. The appellants each sought review of their convictions, including on the ground that the provision under which they had been convicted is invalid because it impermissibly burdens the freedom of communication on governmental and political matters which is implied in the Constitution ("the implied freedom"). Those parts of the proceedings in each of the Supreme Courts relating to the implied freedom were removed into the High Court. In relation to the Victorian Act, a majority of the Court considered that the burden imposed by the communication prohibition was justified by reference to its legitimate purposes, including the protection of the safety, wellbeing, privacy and dignity of persons accessing lawful medical services. The other members of the Court considered that the challenge to the communication prohibition should be dismissed without determining the validity of the prohibition because it was not established that Mrs Clubb's conduct involved political communication. In relation to the Tasmanian Act, the Court unanimously held that the burden imposed by the protest prohibition was justified by reference to its legitimate purposes, which include the protection of the safety, wellbeing, privacy and dignity of persons accessing premises at which abortions are provided and ensuring unimpeded access to lawful medical services.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA THIESS v COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS & ORS [2014] HCA 12 2 April 2014 Today the High Court dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The High Court held that s 167(4) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) ("the Act") operates to bar all actions for the recovery of duty paid to Customs, irrespective of whether a dispute as to the amount or rate of duty payable arises at the time of payment, subject only to two statutory exceptions. The appellant, Mr Alan Thiess, imported a yacht into Australia for home consumption. On 15 December 2004, Mr Thiess' customs agent transmitted a computer import entry on his behalf. The customs agent mistakenly believed that the gross weight of the yacht was 108 tonnes, when in fact it was 160 tonnes. The effect of this error was that Customs' COMPILE computer system automatically calculated that the customs duty payable was $494,472, with an additional $49,447 payable as GST. In fact, yachts exceeding 150 tonnes were duty free. Upon payment by the customs agent, Customs authorised delivery of the yacht. Mr Thiess only discovered the mistake after the expiration of the statutorily prescribed period for making an application for a refund. On 15 December 2010, he brought proceedings in the trial division of the Supreme Court of Queensland seeking to recover the amount of $543,919 as money had and received, relying on the money having been paid under a mistake of fact, and in the alternative as a claim for restitution in equity or equitable compensation. Questions of law were reserved for the consideration of the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the Collector of Customs and the Commonwealth had lawful defences to Mr Thiess' claim: by s 167(4) of the Act, in so far as the claim was to recover the amount paid as customs duty; and under s 36 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), in so far as the claim was to recover the GST paid. Mr Thiess sought to argue that s 167(4) had no application because no "demand" had been made and hence no "dispute" had arisen within the meaning of s 167(1) at the time of payment. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that a demand had been made. By special leave, Mr Thiess appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously held that irrespective of whether a dispute has arisen at the time of payment within the meaning of s 167(1) of the Act, s 167(4) operates to bar all actions for the recovery of duty paid to Customs, subject only to either a statutory action for recovery under s 167(2) of the Act, or any action to enforce a right or to compel the exercise of powers under s 163 of the Act. It followed that because the appellant could not recover the amount paid as customs duty, he could not recover the amount paid as GST.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 March 2023 BARNETT v SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITIES AND JUSTICE [2023] HCA 7 Today, the High Court published its reasons for revoking special leave to appeal from a judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1). The appellant is the mother of a child born in the Republic of Ireland in 2019. On 30 August 2020, the mother removed the child from Ireland to Australia without the consent of the child's father. At the father's request, the respondent applied to the then Family Court of Australia under the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth) for orders seeking the return of the child to Ireland and ancillary orders. The primary judge made orders for the child's return to Ireland. The Full Court dismissed the mother's appeal. In doing so, the Full Court relied on a declaration made in April 2021 by the District Court of the Dublin Metropolitan District ("the Irish court") that the father was a guardian of the child under Irish law (the "Declaration"). As the Declaration must have been based on the cohabitation of the mother and father, which ceased on 30 August 2020, the Full Court considered the primary judge was correct to infer from the Declaration that the father had rights of custody in respect of the child before 30 August 2020, and that the mother (as a party to the proceeding in the Irish court) was therefore estopped from asserting to the contrary. The mother was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court. The key consideration underlying the grant of special leave was the Full Court's finding of an issue estoppel based on the bare Declaration, without the Irish court's reasons for making the Declaration having been available to the courts below. However, in January 2023, the respondent filed an application for revocation of special leave, after it belatedly obtained the transcript of the Irish court's reasons for making the Declaration. The High Court unanimously revoked special leave to appeal. Given the Irish court's reasons for the Declaration, the foundation for the grant of special leave was removed. The transcript disclosed that the Irish court found, as an essential element of its reasoning, that the father's guardianship commenced from 23 May 2020, and it necessarily followed that the father had rights of custody under the Regulations at 30 August 2020. It would have been contrary to the interests of the administration of justice to permit the appeal to proceed on the false premise that the Irish court's reasons were unavailable, when those reasons validated the inferences drawn by the courts below. The mother's other arguments about a lack of privity between the father and the respondent and procedural unfairness by the primary judge wrongly assumed that the grant of special leave was based on something more than the finding of the issue estoppel from the bare Declaration. Issues concerning the jurisdiction of the Irish court and the operation of Irish law were best resolved as part of the mother's extant appeal against the Declaration in Ireland.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 21 June 2017 GAX v THE QUEEN [2017] HCA 25 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The appellant was tried by jury in the District Court of Queensland on an indictment containing three counts. He was convicted of count three, which charged aggravated indecent dealing with a child, his lineal descendant, and was acquitted of counts one and two, which charged aggravated acts of indecent dealing with the same child. The amended particulars of count three alleged that the appellant touched the complainant on or near her vagina. The complainant, her sister and her mother each gave evidence that the appellant was in bed with the complainant on the occasion charged in count three. The complainant stated, when giving evidence of the incident, that she "was asleep before and ended up finding out what happened". The appellant appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal, contending the verdict was unreasonable and that it was inconsistent with the not guilty verdicts on counts one and two. Atkinson J, with whom Morrison JA agreed, reviewed the evidence in support of count three in addressing the inconsistent verdicts argument. Her Honour held that the quality of evidence given on count three, and the support given to it by the mother's and sister's evidence, provided a rational basis for a jury to convict on count three while acquitting on counts one and two. Her Honour held that those matters also showed that the guilty verdict was not unreasonable. The appeal was dismissed. McMurdo P, in dissent, would have allowed the appeal. Her Honour held that the evidence did not suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had indecently touched the complainant. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The Court held that it had not been open to the jury to draw an inference beyond reasonable doubt that there had been indecent touching of the complainant as charged by count three. The real possibility that the complainant's evidence was a reconstruction and not an actual memory could not be excluded beyond reasonable doubt. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and entered a verdict of acquittal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 October 2004 NT POWER GENERATION PTY LTD v POWER AND WATER AUTHORITY AND GASGO PTY LTD The High Court of Australia today allowed an appeal by NT Power which alleged that the Northern Territory’s Power and Water Authority (PAWA) and its wholly-owned subsidiary Gasgo had engaged in anti-competitive behaviour, contrary to section 46 of the Trade Practices Act (TPA). In 1996, Pegasus Gold Australia contracted with NT Power to operate Pegasus’s gas-powered power station at the Mt Todd gold mine. The following year, Pegasus ceased to operate the mine and NT Power acquired the power station. NT Power wished to sell electricity generated at Mt Todd to the public, including commercial users in Darwin and Katherine. That would have brought NT Power into competition with PAWA which had a monopoly over the retail electricity market. In August 1998 PAWA refused NT Power’s request for access to its transmission and distribution infrastructure to convey electricity from Mt Todd to consumers. NT Power required secure gas supplies for the Mt Todd power station. Gasgo had long-standing agreements with its suppliers under which it enjoyed pre-emptive rights to buy gas offered to other customers. NT Power sought an undertaking from Gasgo that it would not exercise its pre-emptive right but Gasgo refused. NT Power commenced proceedings in the Federal Court, alleging PAWA and Gasgo were in breach of section 46 of the TPA. That provision only binds the Crown in right of the States and Territories where the Crown carries on a business, either directly or through an authority such as PAWA. Justice John Mansfield held that in refusing access to its infrastructure PAWA was not relevantly carrying on a business, so section 46 did not apply. He held that Gasgo’s conduct was also not subject to section 46 because the company enjoyed Crown immunity because the NT Government’s interests would be prejudiced if Gasgo was precluded from exercising its pre- emptive rights. The Full Court of the Federal Court, by majority, upheld the decision. The High Court held that PAWA’s conduct was within the course of carrying on a business pursuant to section 2B of the TPA. PAWA denied access to its infrastructure, not because of a lack of capacity or technical difficulty or safety, but simply to protect its electricity sales revenue. The Court held that PAWA’s decision to refuse access contravened section 46 of the TPA. Its decision had the purpose of excluding NT Power from the retail market. That purpose could not have been achieved but for its power in the transmission and distribution markets where PAWA faced no competition. The Court held that Gasgo did not derive immunity from the Crown because it was not part of the NT Government. Its conduct was therefore open to scrutiny under section 46. The Court, by a 4-1 majority, allowed the appeal and ordered that the proceedings be returned to Justice Mansfield to determine the section 46 claim against Gasgo and to decide what remedies should be granted to NT Power in relation to PAWA’s conduct.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 September 2005 CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CUSTOMS v GRANITE ARMS PTY LTD AND OMEO WAY PTY LTD This appeal concerned the true identification of the importer of consignments of firearms. Garnet Featherstone is principal of Victorian firearms dealer Granite Arms and Ron Owen the principal of firearms dealer Omeo Way in Queensland. In 2000 Omeo Way organised to buy 3,000 pistols in two batches from a Chinese supplier for US$144,576. Mr Owen had permits for both shipments but Queensland Police rescinded them due to concerns the pistols would be modified by a method that breached weapons laws. He then arranged for the pistols to be consigned to Granite Arms while he paid all expenses including Customs clearance, storage and freight. The first batch of 1,000 pistols arrived in Melbourne in March 2000 and was transported to Omeo Way. The next batch of 2,000 arrived in May and a customs broker arranged for their storage in Melbourne to enable the safety testing of the pistols and repairs to some. Customs then seized the pistols as goods reasonably suspected to be “special forfeited goods” for failing to comply with the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations. Omeo Way as owner of the pistols claimed their return. The Customs Act requires the return of goods unless proceedings are brought in a court of summary jurisdiction for a declaration that they are special forfeited goods and an order that they be forfeited to the Crown. This Customs did. With proceedings pending, the two dealers commenced separate proceedings in the Federal Court seeking a declaration that seizure of the second shipment was unlawful. Customs cross-claimed for a declaration that the pistols were special forfeited goods. The dealers pleaded that Granite Arms was importer as agent of Omeo Way and was at all times entitled to possess the pistols either on its own account or as an agent of Omeo Way. At the parties’ request, the Court heard the cross-claim first and dismissed it. The Full Court dismissed an appeal by Customs, which then appealed to the High Court. The relevant parts of the Regulations were introduced as part of the national firearms controls adopted after the Port Arthur tragedy in 1996. Imports must comply with one of four tests, in this case the police authorisation test, requiring the importer to hold a licence or authorisation under the law of the relevant State or Territory to possess the article. The dealers contend that Granite Arms was the importer of the two shipments and the police authorisation test was satisfied because Granite Arms held a licence to possess the pistols under Victorian law. Customs argued that the police authorisation test was not satisfied and that “the importer” meant one designated entity and Granite Arms could not substitute as “the importer” for Omeo Way. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal by Customs and held that the handguns were “special forfeited goods”. It held that although Granite Arms lent its name to Omeo Way for the identification of “the consignee” on the air waybill for carriage of Omeo Way’s goods to Australia, Granite Arms was not “the importer”.