Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 16 February 2022 ARS WWALTON & ANOR v ACN 004 410 833 LTD (FORMERLY ARRIUM LIMITED) (IN LIQUIDATION) & ORS [2022] HCA 3 Today, the High Court allowed an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeal concerned the purposes for which a court may, on the application of an eligible applicant, summon an officer or provisional liquidator of a corporation in external administration for examination about the corporation's examinable affairs pursuant to s 596A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The appellants were shareholders of the first respondent, formerly Arrium Limited ("Arrium"). In October 2014, Arrium completed a capital raising, having published its 2014 financial results and provided shareholders with an Information Memorandum for that purpose. In January 2015, Arrium announced the suspension or closure of one of its principal mining operations. In April 2016, Arrium was placed into administration and, in June 2019, liquidators were appointed. The appellants, having been authorised by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission to do so, applied to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for an order pursuant to s 596A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that a summons be issued for the examination of the third respondent, a former director of Arrium. A Registrar in Equity duly made that order. The appellants' purpose was to investigate and pursue potential personal claims arising from the 2014 capital raising in their capacity as shareholders against the former directors and auditors of Arrium. It was accepted that any future proceedings would be confined to a limited class of shareholders of Arrium. Arrium applied to the Supreme Court for that order to be stayed or set aside as an abuse of process. The Supreme Court declined to stay or set aside the order. The Court of Appeal allowed Arrium's appeal and decided that an examination sought predominantly for the purpose of pursuing private litigation against third parties, and not for the purposes of conferring a demonstrable or commercial benefit on the corporation or its creditors, was an abuse of process. By majority, the High Court allowed the appeal. In deciding if the use of a court process authorised by statute is an abuse of process, the question is whether the litigant's predominant purpose is inconsistent with the scope and purpose of the statutory process. The purpose and concern of s 596A is not confined to the interests of the corporation, its creditors, or its contributories, or to the bringing of criminal or regulatory proceedings in connection with the affairs of the corporation. Examining an officer of a corporation for the purpose of pursuing a claim against the corporation in external administration or one of its officers or advisers for the enforcement of the law can be a legitimate use of the power conferred by s 596A, irrespective of whether it is in the interests of the corporation or whether the claim relates to all or only some of the corporation's creditors or contributories. The summons was therefore not issued for a purpose that was an abuse of process.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 13 February, 2003 ANTHONY PHILLIP MAURICI v CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE The High Court of Australia today allowed an appeal from a resident of the Hunters Hill municipality in Sydney who objected to having the value of his land gauged against sales of the few vacant blocks left in the district. A 1998 assessment for land tax was based on an unimproved value of Mr Maurici’s land in Woolwich of $2.44 million, later reduced to $2 million. Mr Maurici argued the unimproved value was $1.25 million, derived by deducting improvements including a substantial house from a notional selling price, rather than by comparison with recent sales of vacant land. The valuation relied on only four sales, including a quick resale, of vacant land. Commissioner Anthony Nott, of the Land and Environment Court, accepted the method of valuation by comparison with sales of rare vacant blocks, but reduced the unimproved value by $50,000 to $1.95 million. Justice Dennis Cowdroy accepted Mr Maurici’s argument that sales of vacant blocks were inflated due to the scarcity factor, but the New South Wales Court of Appeal reversed that decision. It held that land was to be valued as though vacant and without improvements. The High Court unanimously upheld Justice Cowdroy’s ruling. It held that the valuation method was unduly selective and that a few sales of vacant land were unrepresentative of sales in Hunters Hill. The Court held that the Valuation of Land Act did not require valuations to be made in comparison with vacant blocks whose buyers may constitute a special class. The Court ordered that the case be remitted to Commissioner Nott for rehearing and awarded costs to Mr Maurici for his appeals to the Court of Appeal and the High Court.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 4 May 2011 [2011] HCA 13 SKA was convicted of five counts of sexual offences against a child committed when the child was staying at the house of SKA and his family. The offences were alleged to have been committed in two time periods. Three counts were alleged to have occurred in 2004. Counts four and five were alleged to have occurred between 1 December 2006 and 25 December 2006. In relation to counts four and five, the child was unable to specify a date on which the incidents took place but gave evidence that it was around Christmas 2006. The date on which these two offences were said to have occurred was critical because SKA led evidence at trial which provided an alibi for the period from the evening of 22 December 2006 up to and including Christmas Eve. SKA appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales against conviction and sentence, including under s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) on the ground that the verdicts of the jury were perverse and not supported by the evidence. Section 6(1) states that the Court of Criminal Appeal "shall allow the appeal if it is of opinion that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable, or cannot be supported, having regard to the evidence". The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed SKA's appeals and allowed the Crown's cross-appeal against sentence. SKA's application for special leave to appeal to the High Court from the Court of Criminal Appeal's decision was referred to the Full Court. Today, the High Court granted special leave on three grounds of appeal, and a majority of the Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Court of Criminal Appeal had incorrectly concerned itself with whether, as a question of law, there was evidence to support the verdicts, rather than making its own assessment of the evidence. The High Court held that it was critical for the Court of Criminal Appeal to determine the date at which it was alleged, in the evidence, that SKA committed the offences the subject of counts four and five. The Court of Criminal Appeal's failure to do so led the Court into error when considering the sufficiency of evidence to support the jury's verdict. The High Court also refused special leave to appeal on two grounds of appeal, holding that the Court of Criminal Appeal was not in error in not viewing a video recording of an interview between the child and the police, instead relying on a transcript of the recording. The order of the Court of Criminal Appeal dismissing SKA's appeal against conviction to that Court was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Court of Criminal Appeal for rehearing.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 September 2012 ANDREWS v AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LTD [2012] HCA 30 Today the High Court granted leave to appeal against a decision of the Federal Court of Australia and allowed the appeal. The Court held that the fact that particular fees were not charged by the respondent, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd ("the ANZ"), upon breach of contract did not render the fees incapable of being characterised as penalties. The applicants, approximately 38,000 group members, commenced representative proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia. They sought, amongst other remedies, declaratory relief that certain provisions between each of them and the ANZ were void or unenforceable as penalties. On that basis, the applicants claimed repayment of fees charged to them by way of "honour fees", "dishonour fees", "late payment fees", "non-payment fees" and "over limit fees" (collectively, "exception fees"). The applicants asked the Federal Court, by way of separate questions, whether the exception fees were payable by the applicants upon breach of contractual obligations owed to the ANZ, and, in the alternative, whether it had been the responsibility of the applicants to see that the circumstances occasioning the imposition of the exception fees did not arise. If either question was answered in the affirmative, the applicants then asked whether such fees were capable of being characterised as penalties. On 5 December 2011, the Federal Court held that only the late payment fees were payable upon breach of contract. Following the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd v Integral Home Loans Pty Ltd (2008) 257 ALR 292, the primary judge held that the penalty doctrine was limited to breaches of contract and thus could only be applied to the late payment fees. The applicants sought leave to appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. On 11 May 2012 the High Court, acting pursuant to s 40(2) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), removed the application for leave. A question before the Court was whether the Interstar decision correctly stated the law with respect to penalties and whether the modern doctrine respecting penalties had become wholly a doctrine of the common law, rather than of Equity. The High Court unanimously rejected the proposition that the penalty doctrine applies only where there has been a breach of contract. The question is one of substance rather than form. The Court also rejected the proposition in Interstar that the doctrine had been absorbed into the common law. The fact that the honour, dishonour, non-payment and over limit fees were not payable for breach of contract did not prevent them from being characterised as penalties. It will be for the Federal Court on the further hearing of the matter to decide whether these exception fees are penalties.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 12 March, 2003 MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS v JI DONG WANG The High Court of Australia today overturned a decision by the Full Court of the Federal Court directing a Refugee Review Tribunal matter be reheard by the same tribunal member because that member had made findings of fact favourable to Mr Wang. Mr Wang arrived in Australia from China in 1997, claiming persecution as a Protestant Christian after being repeatedly detained for attending unregistered religious meetings rather than worshipping in official churches. He was refused a protection visa. A review by RRT member Kerry Boland confirmed that decision. The Federal Court dismissed Mr Wang’s application for review of Ms Boland’s decision. On appeal, the Full Court set aside the decision and ordered that the matter be remitted to the RRT as previously constituted, that is, to be reheard by Ms Boland. The Full Court held that her findings of fact were generally favourable to Mr Wang but deficient in some respects. The Full Court was concerned that Mr Wang might be treated less favourably by other RRT members. At first, the Full Court did not order that Ms Boland review Mr Wang’s case, but that if there was a dispute over the constitution of the RRT the parties had liberty to apply for a fresh order. When his matter was not relisted before Ms Boland Mr Wang exercised the liberty to apply and the Full Court ordered that Ms Boland rehear the case. The Minister argued that the Federal Court lacked the power to make this order or that it erred in the exercise of its discretion. The High Court held that neither Ms Boland nor any other RRT member would be bound by her earlier findings of fact, even if the circumstances of Mr Wang’s religious status in China was unchanged. The RRT was required to decide whether a person had a well-founded fear of persecution, a decision to be made on its merits on the basis of information the RRT had before it at the time, not according to earlier findings of fact preserved for the person’s benefit. The Federal Court could possibly direct the RRT to correct a legal error or to make a particular finding as a matter of law, but directing the RRT to act on facts found at a previous hearing was not open to it. The High Court, by a 4-1 majority, held that the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court should be set aside and substituted with an order to dismiss Mr Wang’s application to have Ms Boland conduct another review of his case.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 October 2004 ROBERT JOHN FARDON v RODNEY JON WELFORD, ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND Queensland legislation under which dangerous sexual offenders can continue to be held in detention after serving their prison terms in certain circumstances is valid, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Fardon was sentenced in 1980 to 13 years’ imprisonment for rape and after eight years was released on parole. Twenty days later he committed rape, sodomy and assault occasioning actual body harm. He was sentenced to a 14-year jail term which expired 27 June 2003. The Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act came into force on 6 June 2003. Mr Welford applied for an order that Mr Fardon be detained indefinitely under section 13 of the Act. Pursuant to section 8, Supreme Court Justice John Muir granted an interim detention order on 27 June, pending a final hearing of Mr Welford’s application. The Court of Appeal, by majority, dismissed an appeal against Justice Muir’s order and his judgment affirming the validity of the Act. After a four-day hearing, Justice Margaret White last November made an order for continuing detention. She said the major concern was Mr Fardon’s refusal to participate in therapy to treat his sexual violence and alcohol and drug abuse. Mr Fardon also instituted an appeal against Justice White’s order. The High Court granted Mr Fardon special leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal decision relating to Justice Muir’s order and later removed into the High Court so much of the cause pending in the Court of Appeal relating to Justice White’s order. Mr Fardon challenged the validity of both section 8 concerning interim detention orders and section 13 concerning the process for granting continuing detention orders. The Court, by a 6-1 majority, held that the Act was valid and dismissed the appeal. It held that the Act did not compromise the integrity of the Supreme Court or conflict with the power conferred on Federal Parliament by the Constitution to invest State courts with federal jurisdiction. The Act contained many safeguards of a trial, unlike the NSW Community Protection Act. The Court held in 1996 that the NSW Act, which provided for the continuing detention of convicted wife killer Gregory Wayne Kable, was invalid. By contrast, the Queensland Act is directed at a class of offenders rather than at one particular person, the Supreme Court exercises judicial power in determining whether the release of a sexual offender is an unacceptable risk, the Attorney-General bore the onus of proving a prisoner is a serious danger to the community, if the Supreme Court is satisfied a prisoner is a serious danger it had discretion to order a continuing detention order or a supervision order, such orders are subject to periodic review, the issue of unacceptable risk must be satisfied to a high degree of probability having regard to matters listed in section 13(4), detailed reasons must be given for any order, and there is a right of appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 February 2004 CHARLES DELIUS SOMERVILLE ALEXANDER AND OTHERS trading as MINTER ELLISON v PERPETUAL TRUSTEES WA LIMITED AND PERPETUAL TRUSTEES COMPANY LIMITED The High Court of Australia today dismissed an appeal by Minter Ellison, which had sought to have the Perpetual Trustees companies contribute to repayment of trust money lost by 40 investors. The decision follows a related April 2003 decision, Youyang Pty Ltd as trustee of the Bill Hayward Discretionary Trust v Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher (later Minter Ellison), in which the Court unanimously held Minters liable in respect of an investment by a family trust and ordered the law firm to restore the lost $500,000, plus interest and costs, to the trust fund. In both cases, investors had invested substantial amounts in a preference share issue by EC Consolidated Capital Limited (ECCCL) which went into liquidation in 1997, resulting in the loss of all money invested. In today’s decision, investments were made via the Perpetual Trustees companies, which were trustees of two managed superannuation funds, identified as first-level trusts. Minters were both solicitors for ECCCL and agents for Perpetual Trustees. Perpetual Trustees handed over investors’ subscriptions which Minters held in its trust account, constituting the second-level trust. ECCCL was to receive the money only after providing deposit certificates, issued by a Dresdner Bank subsidiary as security for subscribers’ investments. Minters never received the deposit certificates, but released the funds to ECCCL. Perpetual Trustees failed to ensure subscriptions conformed with the required terms. The investors, some of whom were trustees for other investors, successfully sued Perpetual Trustees in the New South Wales Supreme Court. Minters were then found liable to the Perpetual Trustees companies for $12.44 million to replenish trust funds or to repay investors. Minters claimed Perpetual Trustees should share this liability. The NSW Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by Minters, which appealed to the High Court, claiming the Court of Appeal erred in holding that it was not entitled to contribution from Perpetual Trustees to the repayments. The High Court appeal turned on construction of sections of Victoria’s Wrongs Act concerning contribution. Section 23B provides for claims for contribution from anyone liable for the same damage. Minters was not liable to the investors. Perpetual Trustees were liable to the investors for breach of the first-level trusts. Minters were liable to Perpetual Trustees for breach of the second- level trusts. The question was whether Minters and Perpetual Trustees were liable for the same damage. Only six members of the Court sat on the appeal, the other member of the court having been involved in the proceedings as counsel. The High Court being evenly divided, the appeal failed and was dismissed (Judiciary Act section 23(2)(b)).
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 2 October, 2003 RE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS The High Court of Australia today upheld a decision of the Minister Philip Ruddock to revoke the visa of a German man who had lived in Australia since he was 10 years old. Mr Palme sought relief under section 75(v) of the Constitution against Mr Ruddock, but the Court, by a 4-1 majority, dismissed his application. Mr Palme, 42, was born in Germany and brought up by a foster family who moved to Australia in 1971. He never took out Australian citizenship, but contended he had been effectively absorbed into the Australian community. He is divorced and has two teenage children. In 1992, Mr Palme pleaded guilty in the New South Wales Supreme Court to murdering David Roberts who disappeared during a fishing trip in 1989. Although a coronial inquiry found Mr Roberts had drowned, Mr Palme later told two friends he had smashed a rock over Mr Roberts’s head and thrown him into the water. He alleged he had killed Mr Roberts to extricate Mr Roberts’s wife and her children from intolerable abuse. Mr Palme was jailed for 16 years with a minimum sentence of 10 years, but is now in an immigration detention centre. Mr Ruddock exercised his discretion to cancel Mr Palme’s visa before Mr Palme was due for release in 2002. Under section 501(2) of the Migration Act, the Minister could cancel a visa if a person did not pass the character test, in this case by having been jailed for 12 months or more. The majority of the High Court held that Mr Palme had not made out his entitlement to relief under section 75(v) of the Constitution and declined to issue the writs of certiorari to quash Mr Ruddock’s decision and prohibition to prevent his decision being implemented. The majority held that Mr Ruddock had not failed to observe procedural fairness in making his decision to cancel the visa and that other grounds of complaint had not been made out.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 19 June, 2003 PAUL JOHN COOK (as trustee of the property of Peter Robert Benson) v PETER ROBERT BENSON, LEGAL AND GENERAL SUPERANNUATION SERVICES PTY LTD, PRUDENTIAL CORPORATION AUSTRALIA LIMITED, AND MERCANTILE MUTUAL CUSTODIANS PTY LTD The High Court of Australia today dismissed an appeal by Mr Benson’s trustee in bankruptcy, Mr Cook, who sought to recover $80,000 from a lump-sum superannuation pay-out that Mr Benson rolled over to three other super funds. Mr Benson was employed by Industrial Sales and Service (Tas) Pty Ltd from 1972 to 1990 and was a member of ISAS’s super fund. When ISAS went into liquidation in 1990, Mr Benson lost his job and received a lump-sum benefit of $96,192.36. He re-invested $80,000 in other superannuation funds: $20,000 each to Legal and General and Mercantile Mutual and $40,000 to Prudential. Mr Benson became bankrupt in July 1992. The trustee sought to recover the $80,000 for the benefit of creditors. The Federal Court and Full Court of the Federal Court held that the payments were dispositions of property covered by section 120 of the Bankruptcy Act. But the Full Court, by majority, held that they fell within an exception made for settlements of property in favour of a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration and this defeated Mr Cook’s claim. The High Court, by a 4-1 majority, upheld the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court. The High Court held that the payments were made in return for obligations undertaken by the trustees of the super schemes to provide Mr Benson with the rights and benefits to which he would eventually become entitled. Those rights and benefits constituted substantial and valuable consideration for Mr Benson’s contributions and the trustees of the superannuation schemes were purchasers for valuable consideration.