Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 14 June 2007 JOHN FAIRFAX PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD AND MATTHEW EVANS v ALEKSANDRA GACIC, LJILJANA GACIC AND BRANISLAV CIRIC The jury in proceedings in a defamation action found that a newspaper had published in a review of the Coco Roco restaurant that its food was unpalatable and the service sometimes bad. However the jury found that the review did not have the tendency to injure the restaurant owners’ business reputation. The NSW Court of Appeal found that the jury’s decision was unreasonable and directed an answer in favour of the restaurant owners on the question put to the jury. The High Court of Australia today upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision. The Coco Roco restaurant complex – comprising the fine dining Coco and the Roco bistro – opened at King Street Wharf at Darling Harbour in Sydney in 2003 after a $3 million fitout. After two dinners at Coco, Sydney Morning Herald restaurant critic Matthew Evans gave it a score of nine out of 20 and said Coco was expensive, with many unpalatable flavours, a menu flawed in concept and execution, and good and bad service, and that the best thing was the view. Coco Roco subsequently closed. The owners sued The Sydney Morning Herald’s publisher, John Fairfax Publications, and Mr Evans for defamation. Before the trial of any issue by a jury, the NSW Supreme Court ruled that four imputations could be drawn from the review and they were reasonable capable of bearing a defamatory meaning: (a) Coco Roco’s owners sell unpalatable food; (b) they charge excessive prices; (c) they provide some bad service; and (d) they are incompetent as restaurant owners because they employ a chef who makes poor-quality food. At the trial, the jury found that imputations (a) and (c) were conveyed but were not defamatory and (b) and (d) were not conveyed. The restaurant owners appealed to the Court of Appeal in respect of the findings on imputations (a), (c) and (d), arguing that the jury’s answers were unreasonable. The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal, finding for the owners on (a) and (c) and remitting (d) for reconsideration by a jury. Fairfax and Mr Evans appealed to the High Court in relation to imputations (a) and (c), arguing that the Court of Appeal exceeded its powers under section 108(3) of the Supreme Court Act. This provides that where it appears to the Court of Appeal that upon the evidence a party is entitled as a matter of law to a verdict in the proceedings the Court may direct a verdict and give judgment accordingly. The Court of Appeal concluded that no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that imputations (a) and (c) were not defamatory. The High Court, by a 6-1 majority, dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal. It held that the Court of Appeal properly exercised the power conferred by section 108(3) of the Act to correct unreasonable jury verdicts. As well as the defamatory nature of imputation (d), further litigation will determine any defences available to Fairfax and Mr Evans and questions of damages.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 December 2010 COMMISSIONER OF STATE TAXATION v CYRIL HENSCHKE PTY LTD & ORS [2010] HCA 43 Today the High Court held that a deed of retirement ("the Deed") giving effect to the retirement of one partner from a partnership that carried on a business, which was to be carried on by the other partners after her retirement, attracted stamp duty under the Stamp Duties Act 1923 (SA) ("the Act"). A winemaking business trading as CA Henschke & Co was conducted, prior to execution of the Deed, as a partnership ("the Partnership") comprising four partners. The Deed provided for the retirement of one partner from the Partnership, and stated that the remaining partners "shall continue the Partnership under the Partnership Agreement (without purchasing [the retiring partner's] interest in the Partnership and without the Partnership being dissolved)". It provided for a payment to the retiring partner "in full satisfaction of all claims she has against the Partnership", and a release and indemnity by the remaining partners in favour of the retiring partner. The Deed purported to reallocate the interests in the Partnership to the remaining partners. Under the Act, stamp duty is charged on a conveyance or transfer on sale of any property. A conveyance is defined to include every instrument "by which or by virtue of which or by the operation of which … any … personal property or any estate or interest in any such property is assured to, or vested in, any person". The Treasurer of South Australia upheld an assessment of stamp duty on the Deed made by the Commissioner of State Taxation, which had determined that the Deed conveyed the retiring partner's interest in the partnership property to the remaining partners. In the South Australian Supreme Court, the trial judge upheld the Commissioner's assessment, but this was reversed on appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court. The Full Court considered that the effect of the Deed was not to convey the retiring partner's interest but rather to convert her existing partnership interest (an equitable chose in action) into an entitlement to payment of a specific amount. It held that as her interest was not transferred, the transaction was not, and did not effect, a conveyance on sale. The High Court unanimously held that the Deed had the legal effect of dissolving the Partnership, and constituting a new partnership between the remaining partners. The Court accepted that a partner's interest in partnership assets is an equitable chose in action. The Deed extinguished the retiring partner's existing equitable chose in action against the remaining partners, and created a new partnership through which equitable choses in action representing the remaining partners' "reallocated" partnership interests were vested. On this basis, the Deed was a conveyance and attracted stamp duty under the Act. The respondents were ordered to pay the Commissioner's costs.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 February 2013 GOOGLE INC v AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION [2013] HCA 1 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, in which it was found that Google Inc ("Google") had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct contrary to s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the Act") by displaying certain internet search results. The Google search engine displayed two types of search results in response to a user's search request: "organic search results" and "sponsored links". Organic search results were links to web pages that were ranked in order of relevance to the search terms entered by the user. A sponsored link was a form of advertisement. Each sponsored link was created by, or at the direction of, an advertiser, who paid Google to display advertising text which directed users to a web site of the advertiser's choosing. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ("the ACCC") claimed that particular sponsored links displayed by the Google search engine between 2005 and 2008 had conveyed misleading and deceptive representations. By publishing or displaying those search results, Google was said to have contravened s 52 of the Act, which provided that a corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. At first instance, the primary judge found that although the impugned representations were misleading and deceptive, those representations had not been made by Google. Ordinary and reasonable members of the relevant class of consumers who might be affected by the alleged conduct would have understood that sponsored links were advertisements and would not have understood Google to have endorsed or to have been responsible in any meaningful way for the content of those advertisements. The ACCC successfully appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court, which unanimously found that Google had itself engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct by publishing and displaying the sponsored links. By special leave, Google appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal. Google did not create the sponsored links that it published or displayed. Ordinary and reasonable users of the Google search engine would have understood that the representations conveyed by the sponsored links were those of the advertisers, and would not have concluded that Google adopted or endorsed the representations. Accordingly, Google did not engage in conduct that was misleading or deceptive.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 November 2012 BRADLEY DOUGLAS COOPER v THE QUEEN [2012] HCA 50 Today a majority of the High Court allowed an appeal by Mr Bradley Douglas Cooper against the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to uphold his conviction for murder. The appellant was charged with murder. Post mortem examination showed that the deceased had four wounds to the head. At trial, the prosecution presented two alternative cases. The prosecution alleged that either the appellant alone hit and killed the deceased or the appellant's partner struck and killed the deceased as part of a joint criminal enterprise with the appellant to kill the deceased. The appellant was convicted of murder. The appellant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. That Court held that there had been an error in the trial because there was no evidence of a joint criminal enterprise, and so the jury should not have been directed to consider that alternative case. But the Court of Criminal Appeal upheld the appellant's conviction on the basis that the error did not result in a "substantial miscarriage of justice" under s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). By special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. A majority of the Court allowed the appeal. The majority concluded that, on the evidence admitted at trial, an appellate court could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that only one weapon had been used or that the appellant struck the blow which caused the deceased's death. An appellate court could not therefore be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of murder. The Court quashed the appellant's conviction and ordered a retrial.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 December 2013 AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION v TPG INTERNET PTY LTD [2013] HCA 54 Today a majority of the High Court allowed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, holding that TPG Internet Pty Ltd ("TPG") engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the TPA") and the Australian Consumer Law in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ("the ACL"). Between 2010 and 2011, TPG deployed a multi-media advertising campaign. The advertisements displayed a prominent offer of unlimited ADSL2+ service for $29.99 per month. Much less prominently, the advertisements displayed the requirement that consumers bundle that service with a home telephone service provided by TPG for an additional $30 per month for a minimum of six months. Further, a setup fee of $129.95 and a $20 deposit for telephone charges also applied. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ("the ACCC") claimed that the advertisements were misleading and deceptive contrary to s 52 of the TPA and s 18 of the ACL by reason of the disparity between the prominent headline offer and the less prominent terms qualifying that offer. The ACCC also claimed that some of the advertisements contravened s 53C(1)(c) of the TPA by failing to specify, in a prominent way and as a single figure, the single price for the package of services offered. The primary judge upheld the ACCC's claims and imposed a pecuniary penalty of $2 million. TPG appealed to the Full Court which set aside all but three of the primary judge's findings. The pecuniary penalty was reduced to a total of $50,000. In the High Court, the ACCC argued that it was not open to the Full Court, in the proper exercise of its appellate function, to hold that the advertisements were not misleading. Further, the ACCC contended that the penalty imposed by the primary judge should be restored, given the circumstances of TPG's offending and the need for the penalty to reflect the important considerations of general and specific deterrence. A majority of the High Court held that the Full Court erred, first, in holding that the primary judge was wrong to regard the "dominant message" of the advertisements as critically important; and secondly, in failing to appreciate that the tendency of TPG's advertisements to mislead was not neutralised by the Full Court's attribution to members of the target audience of knowledge that ADSL2+ services may be offered as a "bundle". A majority held that these errors, reflecting differences in point of principle with the approach taken by the primary judge, led the Full Court into error in the performance of its appellate function. The pecuniary penalty of $2 million imposed by the primary judge was reinstated.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 16 June 2005 POLYAIRE PTY LTD v K-AIRE PTY LTD, KEMALEX PTY LTD, RICHARD KEMPLEY COLEBATCH, BRUCE VICTOR BENFIELD, K-AIRE SALES PTY LTD, K-AIRE WHOLESALE PTY LTD, CONNECT AIRE PTY LTD AND ACN 079 795 814 PTY LTD K-Aire had infringed copyright of a new kind of air-conditioning outlet, even though some of the design features had been changed, the High Court of Australia held today. Polyaire, a South Australian manufacturer and seller of air-conditioning components, had a registered design for a new grille, which directs the flow of air from the air-conditioning unit into a room. It brought proceedings against K-Aire and the other respondents for infringement of its design. In the SA Supreme Court, Justice Anthony Besanko held that the respondents’ outlet director was a fraudulent imitation of Polyaire’s design. After a K-Aire grille, known as KA1, appeared on the market, Polyaire complained, and a different grille, KA2, appeared in its place. Justice Besanko held that both KA1 and KA2 were fraudulent imitations. He found that industrial designer Andrew Rogers, whom Mr Colebatch asked to design an air-conditioning outlet for Kemalex, had reason to suspect that any outlet director produced by Polyaire was subject to a registered design. Mr Colebatch wanted certain features that were part of Polyaire’s design. Justice Besanko found that KA1 was not distinctly different from Polyaire’s grille. KA1 lacked a chamfered lip and vertical ribs on the outside of the frame but a snap-fit mechanism, control bars and the blade ends including the spigots had been copied. K-Aire successfully appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court. (Under the Design Act 1906, repealed 12 months ago, appeals lay to the Federal Court from a “prescribed court” which included the Supreme Court.) Polyaire then appealed to the High Court. The appeal turned on the construction of section 30(1)(a) in the Design Act which deemed that a person infringed a registered design if, without permission, they applied the design or any fraudulent or obvious imitation of it to any article in respect of which the design is registered. As Justice Besanko found no obvious imitation in KA1 and KA2 it was necessary for him to decide whether there was nevertheless a fraudulent imitation. The Court upheld Justice Besanko’s judgment that there had been copying of features giving the Polyaire design its distinctive appearance. It held that fraudulent imitation could include a copy with significant differences but which have been made merely to disguise the copying. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 28 September 2011 ROY MORGAN RESEARCH PTY LTD v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION & ANOR [2011] HCA 35 Today the High Court dismissed an appeal by Roy Morgan Research Pty Ltd against the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia which had upheld the constitutional validity of the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth) ("the Administration Act") and the Superannuation Guarantee Charge Act 1992 (Cth) ("the Charge Act"). The challenged legislation imposes the superannuation guarantee charge ("the Charge") on an employer who fails to provide to all employees a prescribed minimum level of superannuation, specified in the Administration Act. Any shortfall created by the employer's failure to meet the minimum level in full becomes the Charge, which is levied on the employer by the Charge Act. The Charge Act does no more than impose the Charge and fix its rate. The Administration Act deals with the incidence, assessment and collection of the Charge. The Charge is a debt due to the Commonwealth and payable to the respondent, the Commissioner of Taxation. It includes a component for interest and an administration cost. The revenue raised by the Charge is to be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The lesser of the employee's entitlement and the amount of the Charge actually paid by the employer is then to be paid out to a superannuation fund for the benefit of the relevant employee. The result is to supply an incentive to employers to make contributions to superannuation for their employees without incurring the Charge. The appeal to the High Court concerned the power of the Parliament to make laws with respect to taxation under s 51(ii) of the Constitution. The appellant challenged the validity of the provisions in the Administration Act and the Charge Act dealing with the Charge. The appellant argued that the Charge was not a "tax" because it was not imposed for "public purposes". This was said to be because the Charge conferred "a private and direct benefit" on the relevant employees. It followed, the appellant argued, that neither the Charge Act nor the Administration Act was a law with respect to taxation within the meaning of s 51(ii), and that the legislation establishing the Charge and providing for its administration was invalid. The High Court held unanimously that the Charge was a tax, and that the appellant's constitutional challenge to the Administration Act and the Charge Act failed. The receipt of funds into the Consolidated Revenue Fund established that the Charge was imposed for "public purposes". Once the Charge is paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund its identity is lost. The funds raised by the Charge are thereafter available under s 83 of the Constitution for an appropriation to be spent on any purpose for which the Commonwealth may lawfully spend money. Where other necessary constitutional criteria of a tax are met, as they were in this case, the receipt of funds into the Consolidated Revenue Fund establishes the character of the Charge as a valid tax.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 March 2004 JACK PLEDGE v ROADS AND TRAFFIC AUTHORITY, BLUE MOUNTAINS CITY COUNCIL AND NADIA CATHERINE RYAN by her tutor Heather Ryan NADIA CATHERINE RYAN by her tutor Heather Ryan v JACK PLEDGE, BLUE MOUNTAINS CITY COUNCIL AND ROADS AND TRAFFIC AUTHORITY The High Court of Australia today overturned a judgment of the New South Wales Court of Appeal and ordered that the Court of Appeal reapportion liability among Mr Pledge, the RTA and Blue Mountains Council. Nine-year-old Nadia Ryan was severely injured when struck by Mr Pledge’s vehicle on a service road beside the Great Western Highway at Blaxland in the Blue Mountains as she and her father and sister were about to cross the road in July 1994. They had walked through thick shrubbery planted on a nature strip between the service road and the highway. Ryan momentarily released his daughter’s hand and Nadia walked forward on to the roadway. The RTA designed the service road, the Council designed the parking beside the service road and both bodies were responsible for the nature strip. The vegetation prevented the family and Mr Pledge from seeing each other properly. Mr Pledge also claimed he was distracted by another car reversing from a parking space. Nadia sued Mr Pledge, the RTA and the Council for negligence. NSW Supreme Court Justice John Dunford, who visited the service road during the trial, held that Mr Pledge was negligent in driving too fast, although he was within the speed limit, and failing to keep a proper lookout, that the RTA was negligent in the design and construction of the nature strip, and that the Council was negligent in not properly maintaining the vegetation and allowing parking bays at a 90-degree angle. He held that a traffic sign warning drivers of pedestrians or suggesting a slower speed was needed. Justice Dunford ordered Mr Pledge to pay $2,925,000 in damages and the RTA and the Council a total of $3,712,500, adjusted to $4,781,250 against Mr Pledge and $1,856,250 against the RTA and the Council after judgment on cross-claims. Nadia’s damages were reduced by 10 per cent because of her contributory negligence in failing to look both ways before crossing. The High Court held that the Court of Appeal erred in three respects in absolving the RTA and the Blue Mountains Council from responsibility for Nadia’s injuries. The errors were: having no proper basis for preferring photos of the scene over the evidence of witnesses; reliance on time, speed and distance calculations that were too uncertain to be more than mere speculation; and failing to give sufficient weight to the advantage that Justice Dunford had by visiting the accident site. The High Court did however uphold the Court of Appeal’s findings that the absence of traffic signs and provision of perpendicular parking spaces did not amount to negligence by the RTA and the Council. The High Court unanimously allowed both appeals and remitted proceedings to the Court of Appeal for reapportionment of liability between Mr Pledge, the RTA and the Council and for determination of remaining issues not decided by the High Court, including costs.