Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 February 2019 WORK HEALTH AUTHORITY v OUTBACK BALLOONING PTY LTD & ANOR [2019] HCA 2 Today the High Court, by majority, allowed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory. The majority held that ss 19 and 32 of the Work Health and Safety (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) ("the NT WHS Act") are not inconsistent with a body of Commonwealth civil aviation laws ("the Commonwealth civil aviation law") which includes the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) ("the CA Act"). Outback Ballooning Pty Ltd ("Outback Ballooning") operates a business in Alice Springs which provides rides in hot air balloons. In July 2013, an incident occurred during embarkation of one of the hot air balloons which resulted in the death of an intended passenger. The Work Health Authority ("the WHA") filed a complaint against Outback Ballooning under s 32 of the NT WHS Act, in which it was alleged that Outback Ballooning failed to comply with the duty imposed on it by s 19(2) of that Act to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the health and safety of persons was not put at risk from work carried out as part of the conduct of its business. The WHA's complaint was particularised as a failure to eliminate or minimise risks to embarking passengers that arose from the use of a fan to inflate the hot air balloon. The complaint was dismissed by the Northern Territory Court of Summary Jurisdiction as invalid on the basis that the subject matter of the complaint was within the field covered by the Commonwealth regulatory scheme with respect to aviation. The WHA sought an order in the nature of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, which was granted on the basis that embarkation procedure, the subject of the complaint, is not so closely connected with safety in flight as to be exclusively regulated by the Commonwealth civil aviation law. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against that decision on the basis that the Commonwealth civil aviation law was a complete statement of the relevant law, which extended to the embarkation of passengers. By grant of special leave, the WHA appealed to the High Court. By majority, the High Court held that, as a matter of construction, the NT WHS Act is not inconsistent with the Commonwealth civil aviation law. The CA Act in relevant respects is designed to operate within the framework of other State, Territory and Commonwealth laws. The NT WHS Act is one such law. The CA Act does not contain an implicit negative proposition that it is to be the only law with respect to the safety of persons who might be affected by operations associated with aircraft, including embarkation of passengers.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 December 2014 COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE v LEND LEASE DEVELOPMENT PTY LTD COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE v LEND LEASE IMT 2 (HP) PTY LTD COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE v LEND LEASE REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS LIMITED [2014] HCA 51 Today the High Court unanimously allowed appeals from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria and held that the Commissioner of State Revenue was entitled to assess duty to be charged on transfers of land in the Docklands area of Melbourne by reference not only to payments made under specified land sale contracts but also to payments made under a "development agreement" which, together with the land sale contracts, formed a single, integrated and indivisible transaction for the sale and development of the Docklands area. In 2001, the Victorian Urban Development Authority ("VicUrban") and one of the Lend Lease respondents (together "Lend Lease") made an agreement for the development of the Docklands area. It was agreed that Lend Lease would buy parcels of land in Docklands from VicUrban and that Lend Lease would design, construct and then sell large residential and commercial buildings on that land. It was also agreed that each of VicUrban and Lend Lease would build various forms of infrastructure on and around the land, including a road extension, bridge and park. Each transfer of land was to be made pursuant to a land sale contract. But the development agreement also required Lend Lease to pay to VicUrban not only the amounts payable under each land sale contract but also certain additional amounts, including payments for infrastructure and for remediation of areas on and around the land and a share of gross proceeds received by Lend Lease on sale. Under the Duties Act 2000 (Vic), the transfers of land were subject to duty payable by Lend Lease. The Commissioner assessed duty according to the consideration for each transfer of land, which it determined to be the total of the sums payable by Lend Lease to VicUrban under the development agreement. Lend Lease objected to the assessments, claiming that the consideration for each transfer was the payment of the amount specified only in the land sale contract. After the Commissioner disallowed the objections, Lend Lease requested that each be treated as an appeal to the Supreme Court of Victoria. Those appeals were dismissed by a single judge of the Supreme Court but were allowed on further appeals to the Court of Appeal. By special leave, the Commissioner appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeals. The Court held that the transaction recorded in the development agreement made between VicUrban and Lend Lease was a single, integrated and indivisible transaction. The Court held that the consideration for the transfer of land was the performance by Lend Lease of the several promises of payments under the development agreement, and that the Commissioner was right to include those amounts in the assessments.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 August 2020 MONDELEZ AUSTRALIA PTY LTD v AUTOMOTIVE, FOOD, METALS, ENGINEERING, PRINTING AND KINDRED INDUSTRIES UNION KNOWN AS THE AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURING WORKERS UNION (AMWU) & ORS; MINISTER FOR JOBS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS v AUTOMOTIVE, FOOD, METALS, ENGINEERING, PRINTING AND KINDRED INDUSTRIES UNION KNOWN AS THE AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURING WORKERS UNION (AMWU) & ORS [2020] HCA 29 Today the High Court allowed an appeal from a judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia ("Full Federal Court") concerning how the entitlement to paid personal/carer's leave is calculated under s 96(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). Section 96(1) says that "[f]or each year of service with his or her employer, an employee is entitled to 10 days of paid personal/carer's leave". Section 96(2) says that an employee's entitlement to this leave "accrues progressively during a year of service according to the employee's ordinary hours of work, and accumulates from year to year". Under s 99, payment for leave taken is calculated by reference to an employee's "ordinary hours of work". Section 55(4) says that an enterprise agreement may only include terms not detrimental to an employee when compared to certain provisions of the Fair Work Act including s 96. Mondelez Australia Pty Ltd ("Mondelez") employs Ms Triffitt and Mr McCormack. Under their enterprise bargaining agreement, Ms Triffitt and Mr McCormack each work, on average, 36 ordinary hours of work per week. They work an average of three 12-hour shifts per week. Mondelez credits Ms Triffitt and Mr McCormack with 96 hours of paid personal/carer's leave per year of service. When they take paid personal/carer's leave for one 12-hour shift, Mondelez deducts 12 hours from their accrued leave balance. Over the course of one year of service, Ms Triffitt and Mr McCormack accrue paid personal/carer's leave sufficient to cover eight 12-hour shifts. Ms Triffitt and Mr McCormack (together with the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union) argued that s 96(1) entitles them to paid personal/carer's leave sufficient to cover ten absences from work per year. That argument was accepted by a majority of the Full Federal Court which held that "day" in s 96(1) refers to "the portion of a 24 hour period that would otherwise be allotted to work" ("the 'working day' construction"). A majority of the High Court rejected the "working day" construction and instead held that what is meant by a "day" or "10 days" must be calculated by reference to an employee's ordinary hours of work. "10 days" in s 96(1) is two standard five-day working weeks. One "day" refers to a "notional day" consisting of one-tenth of the equivalent of an employee's ordinary hours of work in a two-week period. Because patterns of work do not always follow two-week cycles, the entitlement to "10 days" of paid personal/carer's leave can be calculated as 1/26 of an employee's ordinary hours of work in a year.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 29 September 2005 ROBYN VANESSA LAYBUTT v GLOVER GIBBS PTY LIMITED trading as BALFOURS NSW PTY LIMITED An employer was held to have negligently caused a worker’s injury after rejecting her request for instructions on how to reassemble a doughnut machine, the High Court of Australia held today. Ms Laybutt was a 30-year-old pastry cook who had been was employed by Glover Gibbs for about six weeks in its Sydney factory when her team leader asked her to reassemble the machine after washing. She told him that she did not know how to do it and he responded “just give it a go”. Ms Laybutt was not given supervision, gloves, an instruction manual or a practical demonstration. Part of the machine consisted of five cylinders into which smaller cylinders were fitted. These were held together by a U-shaped piece with protruding lugs which had to slot into grooves on the outer cylinder. The larger outer cylinder had sharp edges and the cylinders were slippery after being washed. As Ms Laybutt attempted to join a pair of cylinders the outer one slipped and sliced her right little finger. This injury also affected her arm. On later occasions she was able to reassemble the machine without mishap. Ms Laybutt sued her employer in negligence in the New South Wales District Court. She alleged Glover Gibbs was negligent in failing to implement a safe system of work, to provide adequate instructions and training, to supervise her properly, to dry the parts to be reassembled, to heed her warnings that she was unskilled in the task, to provide manufacturer’s instructions for the safe cleaning and assembly, and to provide protective gloves. Glover Gibbs pleaded contributory negligence by Ms Laybutt as she failed to carry out her duties as instructed, to carry out her duties safely, to have proper regard for her own safety, and to wear gloves as instructed. However at the hearing her account was substantially unchallenged and the defence was her ineptness in not holding the cylinder tightly enough. Glover Gibbs’s production manager criticised the direction to “just give it a go”. The jury found Glover Gibbs liable and rejected the claim of contributory negligence. Ms Laybutt was awarded damages of $471,000 plus costs. Glover Gibbs successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal which held that Ms Laybutt had not spelled out what instructions should have been given. She appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal and held there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury of a failure to give appropriate instructions. It was not necessary in this case to formulate a precise set of instructions that Glover Gibbs should have given when she sought them. The Court held that jurors use their knowledge and experience to contemplate what might reasonably be expected in a workplace and it was open to them to find Glover Gibbs negligent in failing to give instructions or warnings.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 21 December 2016 ELECNET (AUST) PTY LTD (AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY SEVERANCE SCHEME) v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA [2016] HCA 51 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The High Court held that the Electrical Industry Severance Scheme ("the EISS") is not a unit trust within the meaning of Div 6C of Pt III of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ("the ITAA"). The appellant ("ElecNet") was the trustee of the EISS pursuant to a trust settled by deed. Under the EISS, employers within the electrical contracting industry could become members of the scheme and, upon doing so, became obliged to make payments to ElecNet. These payments were credited by ElecNet to accounts in the name of each of the employees in respect of whom a payment was made. The deed contemplated that, at such time as an employee's employment was terminated, ElecNet was to make a severance or redundancy payment to that employee. ElecNet requested a private ruling from the respondent ("the Commissioner") as to whether the EISS was a public trading trust for the purposes of Div 6C. The Commissioner ruled that the EISS was not a public trading trust, on the ground, among others, that the EISS was not a unit trust within the meaning of Div 6C. ElecNet's objection to the ruling was disallowed in full by the Commissioner. ElecNet appealed to the Federal Court of Australia. At first instance, the Court allowed the appeal, holding that the EISS was a unit trust for the purposes of Div 6C. The Commissioner appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The Full Court unanimously allowed the Commissioner's appeal, holding that the EISS was not a unit trust for the purposes of Div 6C. By grant of special leave, ElecNet appealed to the High Court. The Court held that the EISS was not a unit trust for the purposes of Div 6C because any interest created by the deed in favour of employees could not be characterised as a "unit". The Court also held that the meaning of "unit trust" in Div 6C accorded with the common usage of the expression "unit trust"; that is, a trust whereby the beneficial interest in the trust estate is divided into units as discrete parcels of rights, analogous to shares, which, when created or issued, are to be held by the persons for whose benefit the trustee maintains and administers the trust estate. The inclusive definition of "unit" in Div 6C did not expand the meaning of "unit trust" for the purposes of that Division.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 February 2013 COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v EATON & ANOR [2013] HCA 2 Today a majority of the High Court allowed an appeal brought by the appellant, the Commissioner of Police of New South Wales, against a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales which held that the unfair dismissal regime in the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) ("the IR Act") applied to the dismissal of a probationary police officer under the Police Act 1990 (NSW). The first respondent, Mr Eaton, had applied to the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales ("the IR Commission") for a remedy under s 84(1) of the IR Act claiming his dismissal from the New South Wales Police Force was harsh, unreasonable or unjust. He had been employed as a probationary police officer but was dismissed by a delegate of the appellant under s 80(3) of the Police Act, which permits the dismissal of a probationary police officer at any time and without reason. The IR Commission held that the first respondent's dismissal was harsh and unreasonable and unjust, and the appellant was ordered to reinstate him. On appeal, a Full Bench of the IR Commission held that the IR Commission lacked jurisdiction to determine the first respondent's claim and his claim was dismissed. The Full Bench held that a dismissal made pursuant to s 80(3) of the Police Act was excluded from review by the IR Commission under the unfair dismissal regime of the IR Act. The first respondent successfully applied to the Court of Appeal for judicial review of the Full Bench's decision. The Court of Appeal held that the IR Commission had jurisdiction and remitted the matter to the Full Bench to be determined according to law. On appeal by special leave to the High Court, the appellant submitted that the terms of s 80(3) of the Police Act were inconsistent with a right to review under the IR Act. The Court, by majority, agreed and allowed the appeal. The majority held that the Police Act indicated a legislative intention that a decision made under s 80(3) to dismiss a probationary police officer was not to be subject to review by the IR Commission. This was indicated in several ways including the manner in which s 80(3) was framed, suggesting as it did that the appellant's power to dismiss was unfettered. There was incoherence between reasons not being required by s 80(3) and the matters to be considered by the IR Commission in determining an unfair dismissal claim and, in addition, the relief available under the IR Act was at odds with the appellant's right under s 80(3) to dismiss. The majority also considered that an anomalous position would result if probationary police officers were given greater procedural rights under the IR Act's unfair dismissal regime than confirmed police officers whose unfair dismissal claims are regulated by the Police Act.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 29 January 2019 UNIONS NSW & ORS v STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES [2019] HCA 1 Today the High Court unanimously answered a question stated in a special case to the effect that s 29(10) of the Electoral Funding Act 2018 (NSW) ("the EF Act") is invalid because it impermissibly burdens the freedom of communication on governmental and political matters implied and protected by the Commonwealth Constitution. The EF Act replaced the Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Act 1981 (NSW) ("the EFED Act"). The general scheme of the relevant provisions of the EFED Act was to limit the amount or value of political donations to, and the amounts which could be expended by, political parties, candidates, elected members and others, including "third-party campaigners". According to the Second Reading Speech to the Bill which became the EF Act, it was designed to "preserve[] the key pillars of [the EFED Act], namely, disclosure, caps on donations, limits on expenditure and public funding". Although the scheme of the EFED Act remains largely intact, s 29(10) of the EF Act reduces the expenditure cap applicable to registered third-party campaigners from $1,050,000 to $500,000, which is less than half the amount applicable to, for example, certain political parties. Section 35 of the EF Act prohibits a third-party campaigner from acting in concert with others to incur electoral expenditure above the applicable cap for the third-party campaigner. The EF Act will apply to the next New South Wales State election, which is due to occur in March 2019 ("the 2019 election"). The plaintiffs are a collection of trade union bodies. With the exception of the sixth plaintiff, each plaintiff has registered as a third-party campaigner under the EF Act. Each of the plaintiffs has asserted an intention to incur electoral expenditure during the capped State expenditure period for the 2019 election. In the March 2015 election campaign, three plaintiffs incurred more than $500,000 in electoral communication expenditure. The plaintiffs commenced proceedings in the High Court shortly after the EF Act commenced, seeking declarations of invalidity in respect of ss 29(10) and 35 of the EF Act, and the parties agreed a special case for the consideration of the Full Court. The defendant, the State of New South Wales, contended that a purpose of the EF Act, and in particular s 29(10), was to prevent the drowning out of voices in the political process by the distorting influence of money ("the identified purpose"). A majority of the Court held that, accepting or assuming that the identified purpose was the real purpose of s 29(10) and that it was a legitimate purpose, the reduction in the cap applicable to third-party campaigners was not demonstrated to be reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose. As a result, s 29(10) was held to be invalid. For the majority, that invalidity had the result that it was unnecessary to answer the question concerning s 35 of the EF Act, because there was no applicable cap upon which the section could operate.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 20 July 2006 CAROL ANNE STINGEL v GEOFFREY CLARK Ms Stingel was within the six-year limitation period when she brought an action against Mr Clark for post-traumatic stress disorder in 2000 over alleged rapes in 1971, the High Court of Australia held today. Ms Stingel, 51, alleges she was assaulted and raped by Mr Clark on two occasions in March and April 1971, first at the Warrnambool Municipal Gardens and then at a nearby beach. She alleges she now suffers injury in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder of delayed onset and that she only became aware of the connection between the attacks and the injury in 2000. In August 2002 Ms Stingel commenced an action for damages against Mr Clark in the Victorian County Court. She claims aggravated, exemplary and punitive damages for trespass against the person. The merits of the case have not yet been tried. Under Victoria’s Limitation of Actions Act, actions in tort have a general limitation period of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued – in the case of trespass, from the date of the trespass – which had long expired by 2002. Ms Stingel claims her case falls under section 5(1A) of the Act which provides that an action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty, where damages are for personal injuries from a disease or disorder contracted by a person, may be brought within six years of the date on which the person first knew they had suffered injury. Mr Clark argued that section 5(1A) did not apply because an action for trespass is not an action for breach of duty so the general limitation period applied. The County Court rejected this argument. Mr Clark appealed to the Court of Appeal, which, by a 3-2 majority, allowed the appeal on the ground that the facts did not attract section 5(1A). The Court of Appeal held that Ms Stingel’s injury was traumatic, not insidiously progressive in the manner of asbestos-related diseases, so her action was statute-barred. Ms Stingel appealed to the High Court. Mr Clark also contended that the “breach of duty” argument should be accepted by the Court. The High Court, by a 5-2 majority, allowed the appeal and rejected Mr Clark’s contention. The words “breach of duty” had been held in Victoria to cover trespass to the person, including intentional trespass. The Court held that these earlier decisions should be followed and that this construction accorded with the legislative history, context and purpose of the Act. The Court overturned the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of “disease or disorder contracted” as these words are not limited to insidious conditions. The Victorian Parliament used general language and made no reference to insidious diseases. The High Court held that nothing in section 5(1A) limits its operation to cases in which a disorder was contracted before the expiry of the usual six-year limitation period.