Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 8 November 2007 MATTHEW JAMES ELLIOTT v THE QUEEN BRONSON MATTHEW BLESSINGTON v THE QUEEN The High Court of Australia today refused Mr Elliott and Mr Blessington leave to reopen their 1992 appeal and held that a recommendation that they never be released did not give them grounds to appeal against their life sentences. The two men, along with Stephen Jamieson, were convicted in the NSW Supreme Court in 1990 in relation to the abduction, rape and murder of 20-year-old bank teller Janine Balding in Sydney on 8 September 1988. Mr Elliott was 16, Mr Blessington 14, and Mr Jamieson 22 at the time of the murder. Justice Peter Newman jailed the three for life and recommended that they never be released. At the time, such a recommendation had no legal effect. The Court of Criminal Appeal (CCA) in 1992 dismissed appeals by Mr Elliott and Mr Blessington against the severity of their sentences. The final orders made those appeals were not perfected (properly finalised), and in 2006, they brought another appeal to the CCA in which they sought to have the sentences imposed by Justice Newman quashed and to be resentenced in light of subsequent changes to sentencing laws. The CCA dismissed the appeal, but Justice David Kirby, in dissent, would have resentenced them to 28 years’ jail with a non-parole period of 21 years. They appealed to the High Court. Mr Elliott and Mr Blessington argued that Justice Newman’s recommendation had legal effect upon their punishment and it could then have been the subject of an appeal against sentence. They also argued that, in any event, the treatment of the recommendation by later legislation gave it the status of an order made by the trial court against which they could appeal. The High Court unanimously dismissed their appeals. It held that the non-release recommendation did not have the character of an order by the trial court against which an appeal against sentence would lie. The Court also rejected the submission regarding the effect of subsequent legislation. Any subsequent legal effect resulting from Justice Newman’s recommendation was a matter of legislation, not judicial power. The High Court held that the recommendation never was and did not subsequently acquire the character of an order made by the trial court, with the result that the CCA was correct to dismiss the 2006 appeal. Although the orders made in the 1992 appeal had not been perfected, the High Court held that the CCA was correct to refuse to grant leave to reopen the 1992 decision. Subsequent legislation affecting the position of Mr Elliott and Mr Blessington did not create any miscarriage of justice in the 1992 CCA decision which would call for interference in that decision. The 1992 decision did not proceed upon any misapprehension of the relevant law, and there was no other reason to reopen the case.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 7 October 2004 RE KIT WOOLLEY, MANAGER OF THE BAXTER IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTRE, AND THE HONOURABLE AMANDA VANSTONE, MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS; EX PARTE APPLICANTS M276/2003 AND GS AS THEIR NEXT FRIEND The detention of asylum seeker children was lawful, the High Court of Australia unanimously held today. The Court dismissed an application for orders for habeas corpus, prohibition and injunction to end the detention of four Afghan children. The children, aged between seven and 15 when the application was filed in October 2003, their parents and an adult brother arrived in Australia from Afghanistan in January 2001. The family had been detained in the Woomera then Baxter detention centres but have been released into the community since the appeal hearing. The father, GS, applied for a protection visa and the children were included as dependents. The Immigration Department and the Refugee Review Tribunal refused the application. The children sought a writ of habeas corpus requiring Mr Woolley to release them, and either a writ of prohibition or an injunction to prohibit or restrain the Minister from detaining or continuing to detain them. The Court held that it was within the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate for the detention of children as well as adults. It held that sections 189 and 196 of the Migration Act do not distinguish between unlawful non-citizens who are above and below the age of 18 years and other provisions of the Act contemplate the presence of children in detention centres. The Court also rejected the contention that the Act was invalid because children lacked the capacity to request their removal from Australia. The Court held that the discretion to request departure was vested in parents and guardians and that some children would be mature enough to make such a request for themselves.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 18 June 2003 DARREN GIFFORD v STRANG PATRICK STEVEDORING PTY LTD KELLY GIFFORD v STRANG PATRICK STEVEDORING PTY LTD MATTHEW GIFFORD v STRANG PATRICK STEVEDORING PTY LTD An employer owed a duty of care to a dead worker’s children to guard against nervous shock to them as a result of their father’s death, the High Court of Australia held today. Barry Gifford, a wharf labourer and wharf clerk with Strang Patrick Stevedoring, was killed in a forklift accident at Sydney’s Darling Harbour on June 14, 1990. His family was told of his death later that day and did not see his disfigured body. Strang Patrick admitted negligence causing Mr Gifford’s death. The issue was whether Strang Patrick owed a duty of care to the children, who brought claims for damages for negligently inflicted psychiatric injury. The children’s claim they suffered psychiatric injury has not yet been determined. The New South Wales District Court dismissed the children’s claims in 1999, holding that under section 4 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944, Strang Patrick was under no liability for their alleged nervous shock because Mr Gifford had not been killed, injured or put in peril within their sight or hearing. The NSW Court of Appeal in 2001 concluded that section 4 did not exclude liability at common law, but it held that because the children did not directly perceive the event resulting in their father’s death or its aftermath there was no duty of care at common law. After the Court of Appeal decision, the High Court handed down its decision in Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd, in which it held that the parents of a teenage jackaroo who died in the Western Australian desert, could claim for nervous shock upon hearing of their son James’s death. Mr and Mrs Annetts also had no direct perception of an incident or its aftermath. The High Court held the Gifford children’s claims would need to be reconsidered in light of the Annetts decision. The Court held that as an employer Strang Patrick was under a duty of care to Mr Gifford. It held that Strang Patrick also owed his children a duty of care to take reasonable care to avoid causing them a psychiatric illness as a consequence of their father’s death in the course of his employment. The Court held that section 4 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act did not seek to exhaustively define liability and was intended to confer rather than take away rights. The High Court unanimously allowed each appeal and ordered that the children’s claims be remitted to the District Court for determination of whether the children suffered psychiatric injury.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 May 2013 MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP v XIUJUAN LI & ANOR [2013] HCA 18 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, which held that a refusal by the Migration Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") to adjourn review proceedings was unreasonable. The first respondent, Ms Xiujuan Li, was refused a skilled overseas student residence visa by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship ("the Minister") on the basis that some of the employment history provided to support the assessment of her relevant skills was not genuine. Ms Li applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate's decision. She also applied for a fresh skills assessment. Upon obtaining that assessment, Ms Li's migration agent informed the Tribunal that it was unfavourable but explained that because fundamental errors had been made in it, Ms Li was confident of succeeding on her application to the assessing authority for a review. The migration agent requested the Tribunal delay making a final decision on Ms Li's review application until the skills assessment review was finalised. The Tribunal refused that request. It considered that Ms Li had been provided with enough opportunities to present her case and was not prepared to delay any further. The Tribunal found that, because the first skills assessment had been affected by fraud, the relevant visa criterion was not met. The delegate's decision was affirmed. Ms Li successfully applied for review of the Tribunal's decision to the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia. Burnett FM considered that the Tribunal's decision to proceed was unreasonable in circumstances where the review of the second skills assessment was the only outstanding matter and where it could be inferred that Ms Li was not attempting to deliberately delay a decision in her case. The Full Court of the Federal Court unanimously dismissed the Minister's appeal. Greenwood and Logan JJ held that the Tribunal had exercised its discretion to adjourn, pursuant to s 363(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), in an unreasonable manner. The Minister appealed by special leave to the High Court. The High Court held that the Tribunal's exercise of the discretion under s 363(1)(b) was unreasonable. The Tribunal's reasons failed to identify any consideration weighing in favour of the abrupt conclusion it brought to the review and none was suggested by the Minister on the appeal. The failure by the Tribunal to discharge its function under s 363(1)(b) of the Migration Act according to law meant that the Tribunal had acted beyond its jurisdiction in affirming the delegate's decision.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 June 2013 THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES v GREGORY WAYNE KABLE [2013] HCA 26 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal by the State of New South Wales and held that a detention order made by a judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales under legislation later held to be unconstitutional was a defence to a claim for false imprisonment. The order was held to be valid until it was set aside. Mr Gregory Wayne Kable was detained in custody for six months in 1995 pursuant to an order of the Supreme Court made under s 9 of the Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) ("the Community Protection Act"). Mr Kable unsuccessfully appealed against the detention order to the Court of Appeal. After Mr Kable was released from detention, he successfully appealed to the High Court. The High Court ordered that the detention order be set aside on the basis that the Community Protection Act was unconstitutional and was therefore invalid. Following the decision of the High Court setting aside the detention order, Mr Kable commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court, ultimately claiming damages against the State for abuse of process, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. A number of preliminary questions were decided by the primary judge against Mr Kable and judgment was entered for the State. Mr Kable appealed to the Court of Appeal. That Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that Mr Kable should have judgment against the State for damages to be assessed on his claim for false imprisonment. By special leave, the State appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal, and held that the detention order was valid until set aside. It had therefore provided lawful authority for Mr Kable's detention. The primary judge's orders dismissing Mr Kable's claims were reinstated.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 3 May 2017 PLAINTIFF M96A/2016 & ANOR v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA & ANOR [2017] HCA 16 Today the High Court unanimously held that ss 189 and 196 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") validly authorised the detention of unlawful non-citizens who were brought to Australia from a regional processing country for a temporary purpose. In August 2013, the plaintiffs, a mother and her daughter, arrived in Australia at Christmas Island. As "unauthorised maritime arrivals", they were taken to the Republic of Nauru in February 2014. They claimed to be owed refugee protection. In November 2014, the plaintiffs were brought to Australia for the temporary purpose of medical treatment. They were detained in Darwin and at the Melbourne Immigration Transit Accommodation. In December 2016, they were released after the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection made a residence determination permitting them to reside at a specified place subject to conditions. At all material times, the plaintiffs needed to be in Australia for medical treatment, and had no right to apply for a visa whilst in Australia. By an application for an order to show cause, the plaintiffs challenged the validity of ss 189 and 196 of the Act insofar as those provisions purported to authorise their detention in Australia. The plaintiffs submitted that their detention was unlawful because it was not necessary for a legitimate, non-punitive purpose, and because the duration of their detention was not reasonably capable of objective determination as it was governed only by the question whether and when they no longer needed to be in Australia. The plaintiffs did not challenge the lawfulness of the Commonwealth's act of bringing them to Australia, or the lawfulness of their eventual removal from Australia. The defendants demurred to the whole of the plaintiffs' amended statement of claim, submitting that the detention was authorised by the Act. By an order of a single Justice of the High Court, the demurrer was referred to the Full Court. The Court unanimously allowed the defendants' demurrer on the basis that ss 189 and 196 of the Act validly authorised the plaintiffs' detention whilst they were in Australia. The Court held that the plaintiffs' detention was for a lawful purpose, namely the purpose of removal from Australia. The Court also held that the duration of the plaintiffs' detention was able to be objectively determined at any time and from time to time by reference to various preconditions provided for in the Act, and that the temporal limits of their detention were connected with the purpose of their detention.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 August 2018 MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION v SZVFW & ORS [2018] HCA 30 Today the High Court unanimously held that a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") to proceed in the absence of the first and second respondents ("the respondents") was not unreasonable, and that the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia should have set aside a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia which had found the Tribunal's decision to be unreasonable. The respondents sought review by the Tribunal of a decision of a delegate of the appellant ("the Minister") to refuse their application for protection visas. In May 2014, the Tribunal wrote to the respondents, inviting them to provide material or written arguments on the review. In August 2014, the Tribunal invited the respondents to appear before it at a hearing. The respondents did not contact the Tribunal or attend the hearing. Section 426A(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provided that, if an applicant for review was invited to appear before the Tribunal and failed to so appear, the Tribunal could proceed to make a decision on the review without taking further action to allow or enable the applicant to appear before it. The Tribunal, relying on s 426A(1), proceeded to determine the review application, affirming the delegate's decision to refuse the protection visas. The respondents sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision to proceed in their absence. The primary judge held that the Tribunal's decision to proceed to determine the review application was legally unreasonable, because the Tribunal ought to have taken some further action to allow or enable the respondents to appear before proceeding to its decision on the review. On appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court upheld the primary judge's decision, holding that the Minister was required to demonstrate that the primary judge's evaluation of the legal unreasonableness ground involved appealable error of fact or law akin to that required in appeals from discretionary judgments (which are subject to the principles explained in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499). Such error not having been demonstrated, the Full Court dismissed the appeal. By grant of special leave, the Minister appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal. Principles analogous to those stated in House v The King had no application to an appeal by way of rehearing from a judicial review of an administrative decision on the ground that the decision was legally unreasonable. Rather, the Full Court of the Federal Court was required to examine for itself the administrative decision of the Tribunal to determine whether the primary judge was correct to conclude that the decision was unreasonable. The High Court unanimously held that, in the circumstances of the respondents' failure to respond to the Tribunal's invitations, and having regard to the statutory context of s 426A(1), the Tribunal's decision to proceed in the absence of the respondents was not unreasonable.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 27 February 2007 LEICHHARDT MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v LESLIE MONTGOMERY Roads authorities, such as councils, do not have an automatic liability for the negligent behaviour of employees of independent roadworks contractors, the High Court of Australia held today. Leichhardt Council engaged Roan Constructions to upgrade a footpath on Parramatta Road in Sydney. Work was carried out between 7.30pm and 5.30am. Carpet was placed over a Telstra pit with a broken lid. As Mr Montgomery walked with two others on their way to his birthday celebration on 7 April 2001 the lid gave way and he fell into the pit, seriously injuring one knee. He sued both Roan and the Council. The claim against Roan was settled for $50,000. After a trial in the New South Wales District Court, Mr Montgomery was awarded damages of $264,450.75 in damages against the Council, minus the $50,000 already received. Both the District Court and the NSW Court of Appeal accepted that the Council owed Mr Montgomery a non-delegable duty of care and that that duty had been breached. The Court of Appeal agreed with the primary judge that, there having been negligence on the part of Roan’s employees, the Council was liable without any need for Mr Montgomery to show fault on the part of Council officers. The Council was granted leave to appeal to the High Court on condition that it paid the costs of the appeal. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal. It held that the Council did not owe Mr Montgomery a non-delegable duty of care. A non-delegable duty of care when an independent contractor was engaged was not supported by statute, policy or recent High Court cases. Instead, the Council’s duty was the ordinary duty to take reasonable care to prevent injury. The NSW Roads Act did not contain any express or implied requirement that roads authorities undertake road construction and maintenance only through their own employees, and use of contractors was common. The Court held that a special responsibility or duty to ensure reasonable care was taken by an independent contractor and the contractor’s employees went beyond the general duty to act reasonably in exercising prudent oversight of what the contractor does. It was implausible to impose a duty on the Council to ensure that such carelessness as placing carpet over the broken pit lid did not occur, regardless of whether the Council’s own employees were at fault. The Council had a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising a contractor or in approving a contractor’s plans and system of work, but it was not automatically liable for the negligence of an independent contractor’s employees. The Court held that a line of Court of Appeal decisions to the contrary should be overruled. As the appeal was confined to the issue of whether the Council owed a non-delegable duty of care, and there was an unresolved allegation of lack of care on the part of Council officers, the Court remitted the case to the Court of Appeal to resolve outstanding negligence issues.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 23 April 2008 There was no legal or factual basis for a shorter sentence for a person convicted of possessing a commercial quantity of ecstasy on the ground that ecstasy was less harmful than heroin, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Adams, an American citizen, was convicted in the Victorian County Court in 2004 of possessing prohibited imports, which were almost 20kg of a mixture containing almost 9kg of MDMA, or ecstasy. He was charged under the Customs Act following the interception of containers shipped from overseas. The trafficable quantity of MDMA was 0.5 grams; that of heroin or cocaine was two grams. The commercial quantity of MDMA was 0.5kg; that of heroin was 1.5kg; that of cocaine 2kg. Offences involving a trafficable quantity of any form of narcotic carry a penalty of up to 25 years’ jail and/or a fine of $500,000. Offences involving commercial quantities carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and/or a fine of $750,000. Mr Adams was sentenced to nine years’ jail, on top of 260 days already in custody, with a non-parole period of seven years. In sentencing Mr Adams, Judge Anthony Duckett said that the courts treat ecstasy, for sentencing purposes, as being similar to heroin. Mr Adams argued that this was an error and that he should have been sentenced on the basis that MDMA was less harmful than heroin. He appealed unsuccessfully to the Victorian Court of Appeal. He then appealed to the High Court. Four Justices of the Court dismissed his appeal and the fifth Justice would have revoked special leave to appeal. The Court held that generalisations seeking to differentiate between the evils of the illegal trade in heroin and MDMA could not be sustained by evidence. Furthermore, the Customs Act fixed the penalties for drug importation offences and the courts could not apply a harm-based gradation of penalties that cut across the legislative scheme. There was nothing in the Act, or the evidence, or the available knowledge or opinion which required or permitted a court to sentence on the basis that possessing a commercial quantity of MDMA was in some way less anti-social than possessing a commercial quantity of heroin. The Court held that Mr Adams had failed to demonstrate either a legal or a factual foundation for the contention that he should have been sentenced on the basis that MDMA was less harmful than heroin.