Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 27 November 2013 BCM v THE QUEEN [2013] HCA 48 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland which upheld the conviction of BCM (the appellant) on two counts of unlawfully and indecently dealing with a child under 12 years who was for the time being under the appellant's care, contrary to s 210 of the Criminal Code (Q). The complainant, E, was six years old at the date of the offences. Her stepfather was the appellant's stepson. Three offences were alleged to have occurred on the one occasion when E was staying overnight at the appellant's home. When she was nine years old, E complained to her mother that during that stay the appellant had, on two occasions, put his hand underneath her underpants. These incidents formed the basis of the first two counts of indecently dealing with E. Eleven months after first telling her mother about the first two incidents, E complained of a third incident which was said to have occurred during the same stay at the appellant's house. This incident formed the basis of the third count of indecently dealing with E. The appellant was convicted of the first two counts after a trial by jury in the District Court of Queensland. The jury was unable to reach a verdict with respect to the third count. There were some inconsistencies between the various statements and cross-examinations of E. At the time of the trial E was 10 years old. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal on the ground that the verdicts reached by the jury were unreasonable, or could not be supported having regard to the evidence. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. By special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. He argued that the Court of Appeal failed to assess the evidence given at trial and did not give adequate reasons for its conclusion that the verdicts were supported by evidence. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. The Court held that the Court of Appeal's reasons did not sufficiently disclose its assessment of the capacity of the evidence to support the verdict against the appellant. The High Court undertook its own assessment of the whole of the evidence before the jury and held that the verdicts were not unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. Any inconsistencies in E's evidence were to be considered in light of her age at the date of the offences and the intervals between the offending, her first interview with police and her evidence. The High Court held that the Court of Appeal was correct to treat as believable E's explanation that she was scared and embarrassed as the reason for her delay in coming forward about the third incident. None of the criticisms of E's evidence put by the appellant led to a conclusion that it was not open to the jury to convict him.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 16 December 2014 [2014] HCA 52 Today the High Court, by majority, dismissed an appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland and held that the appellant, who applied for the exclusion of certain property from forfeiture under the Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (Q) ("the Act"), had failed to discharge the onus placed upon him by s 68(2)(b) of the Act. The appellant was found by the police in possession of cash to the value of $598,325 ("the property"). The property was the proceeds of the sale of jewellery given to the appellant by his now deceased father. On the application of the State of Queensland under s 28(3)(a) of the Act, the Supreme Court made a restraining order under s 31(1) in relation to the property. The State made a further application to the Supreme Court under s 56(1) seeking the forfeiture of the property. Section 58(1)(a) provided that the Supreme Court must make a forfeiture order if the court finds it more probable than not that, for property restrained on an application made under s 28(3)(a), the respondent to the application had engaged in a serious crime related activity during the six year period prior to the application. The appellant had engaged in such an activity during that period. The appellant applied under s 65(2) of the Act for an order excluding the property from forfeiture. Section 68(2)(b) provided that the Supreme Court must, and may only, make an exclusion order if it was satisfied that it was more probable than not that the property to which the application related was not illegally acquired property. The primary judge dismissed the exclusion application. On the hearing of the application, the appellant gave evidence that he had been told by his father that the jewellery had been a gift to the appellant's great grandfather from Russian royalty. The primary judge found that that account of the provenance of the jewellery could not be true, with the consequence that it was not known how the appellant's father had come into possession of the jewellery. On that basis, his Honour held that the appellant had been unable to establish that the jewellery was not illegally acquired property. The term "illegally acquired property" was defined in s 22(2)(a) of the Act to include all or part of the proceeds of dealing with illegally acquired property. It followed that the property the subject of the exclusion application had not been shown, on the balance of probabilities, not to be illegally acquired property. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. By special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously rejected the appellant's contention that, in order to satisfy the requirements of s 68(2)(b) of the Act, he needed to prove no more than that the jewellery was not the proceeds of any illegal activity on his part. Rather, it was necessary for the appellant to satisfy the Supreme Court that it was more probable than not that the jewellery was not illegally acquired in his father's hands. By majority, the Court concluded that the appellant had failed to discharge that onus.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 3 March 2004 STUART ANTHONY SILBERT (as executor of the estate of Stephen Retteghy) v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA The High Court of Australia has held that the property of a deceased person charged with a serious offence but not convicted before their death could be confiscated under Western Australian legislation. Three members of the Court heard Mr Silbert’s application for special leave to appeal in May 2003 but adjourned the matter to allow it to be heard by all seven members in December because of the constitutional issues that arose. The second hearing enabled Commonwealth and State attorneys- general to intervene and the matter was argued as if it was an appeal. The Court dismissed the special leave application in December and today issued written reasons for its decision. Mr Retteghy died in August 1997 while on remand awaiting trial in the WA District Court on charges of cultivation and intention to sell or supply cannabis. Mr Silbert is the executor of his estate. Each offence was a serious offence for the purpose of the Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1988. Mr Retteghy had pleaded not guilty to both counts. In November 2000 the WA Supreme Court ordered that his property and a pecuniary penalty, totalling about $500,000, be forfeited to the Crown. For the purposes of the Act, a dead person could be deemed to have been convicted of a serious offence. The Full Court of the Supreme Court dismissed Mr Silbert’s appeal. He contended that the Act was invalid in its operation for deceased estates because deeming provisions of the Act precluded the Supreme Court making sufficient inquiry into whether the deceased person had actually committed the offence in question. But the High Court held that the Act required a court not to make a forfeiture order unless it was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the dead person had committed the offence. For pecuniary penalty orders, a court was empowered to assess the value of benefits derived from commission of the serious offence. The Court held that nothing in the application for an order, the assessment of benefits derived from crime, and the making of a pecuniary penalty was contrary to sections of the Constitution concerning the administration of justice.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 7 May 2014 JAMES HENRY STEWART IN HIS CAPACITY AS LIQUIDATOR OF NEWTRONICS PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) & ANOR v ATCO CONTROLS PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) [2014] HCA 15 Today the High Court unanimously held that the first appellant, a liquidator, was entitled to an equitable lien over a fund constituted by a settlement sum with respect to costs and expenses incurred in litigation against the respondent, a secured creditor, and receivers appointed by the respondent. The second appellant, Newtronics Pty Ltd ("Newtronics"), is a wholly owned subsidiary of the respondent, Atco Controls Pty Ltd ("Atco"). For many years, Atco provided Newtronics with financial support and ultimately took a fixed and floating charge over Newtronics' assets. In January 2002, Atco appointed receivers to Newtronics. The receivers sold the business of Newtronics to another subsidiary of Atco and credited book entries against the debt owed to Atco by Newtronics. In February 2002, Newtronics was wound up and the first appellant was appointed liquidator. The liquidator brought an action on behalf of Newtronics against Atco and the receivers. The liquidator's costs and expenses reasonably incurred in pursuing the action were paid by Seeley International Pty Ltd, Newtronics' largest unsecured creditor, under an indemnity agreement. Newtronics was successful at trial against Atco, but not against the receivers. Prior to an appeal being heard, the receivers paid Newtronics a settlement sum. Atco proceeded with its appeal and was successful. It subsequently demanded payment of the settlement sum pursuant to its charge. The liquidator refused, on the basis that he was entitled to an equitable lien over the sum. Atco brought proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria, by way of an appeal under s 1321 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) from the liquidator's decision not to pay it the settlement sum. The Court ordered that the sum be paid to Atco. On an appeal by way of a new hearing, the Court found for the liquidator and Newtronics. The Court of Appeal in turn allowed Atco's appeal. By grant of special leave, the liquidator and Newtronics appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal. The Court held that there was no basis for excepting the case from the application of the principle that a secured creditor may not have the benefit of a fund created by a liquidator without the liquidator's costs and expenses of creating that fund first being met. The fund constituted by the settlement sum was created by the efforts of the liquidator, who was acting with propriety and in the course of his duties. In those circumstances, the liquidator was entitled to an equitable lien over the settlement sum in priority to Atco's charge.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 16 October 2014 CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION v BHP COAL PTY LTD [2014] HCA 41 Today the High Court by majority held that the respondent's termination of the employment of an employee, who was a member of the appellant, was not an action taken for a reason which is prohibited by the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ("the Act"). The appellant, Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union ("the CFMEU"), is an industrial association which has members employed by the respondent, BHP Coal Pty Ltd ("BHP Coal"). One of the CFMEU's members, Mr Doevendans, participated in a lawful protest organised by the CFMEU, in the course of which he held up and waved a sign at passing motorists, which read "No principles SCABS No guts". Mr Doevendans' employment with BHP Coal was subsequently terminated. The CFMEU brought proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia, claiming that the termination of Mr Doevendans' employment contravened the Act. Section 346(b) of the Act prohibits an employer from taking adverse action against an employee, which includes terminating the employee, because the employee has engaged in industrial activity. Section 347 of the Act provides that a person engages in industrial activity if the person, among other things, participates in a lawful activity organised or promoted by an industrial association, or represents or advances the views, claims or interests of an industrial association. The primary judge accepted evidence given by BHP Coal's officer as to the reasons for the termination of Mr Doevendans' employment. Nonetheless, the primary judge concluded that s 346(b) had been contravened. This conclusion was reversed by a majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court. By special leave, the CFMEU appealed to the High Court. By majority, the High Court dismissed the appeal. A majority of the Court held that the reasons found by the primary judge to actuate the decision to dismiss Mr Doevendans did not include his participation in industrial activity, or his representing the views of the CFMEU, but rather related to the nature of Mr Doevendans' conduct and what it represented to the officer about Mr Doevendans as an employee. The termination was, therefore, not contrary to s 346(b) of the Act.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 2 April 2014 NSW REGISTRAR OF BIRTHS, DEATHS AND MARRIAGES v NORRIE [2014] HCA 11 Today the High Court unanimously held that the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) permits the Registrar to register that a person's sex is "non-specific". Norrie, who had undergone a "sex affirmation procedure", applied to the Registrar under the Act to register both a change of sex to "non-specific" and a change of name. The Registrar issued Norrie a Change of Sex certificate and a Change of Name certificate, both of which recorded Norrie's sex as "not specified". Later, the Registrar advised Norrie that the Change of Sex certificate was invalid, and re-issued a Change of Name certificate which recorded Norrie's sex as "not stated". Norrie lodged an application for review of the Registrar's decision in the Administrative Decisions Tribunal (NSW). The Tribunal rejected Norrie's application, holding that it was not open to the Registrar to record Norrie's sex as "non-specific". The appeal panel of the Tribunal dismissed an appeal against that decision. Norrie's appeal to the Court of Appeal was upheld. By special leave, the Registrar appealed to the High Court. The issue was whether it was within the Registrar's power to record the sex of a person as "non-specific". The High Court decided that the Act recognises that a person may be neither male nor female, and so permits the registration of a person's sex as "non-specific". The High Court ordered that Norrie's applications be remitted to the Registrar for determination in accordance with its reasons and otherwise dismissed the appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 2 March 2016 TABCORP HOLDINGS LIMITED v STATE OF VICTORIA [2016] HCA 4 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The High Court held that Tabcorp Holdings Limited ("Tabcorp") was not entitled to payment by the State of Victoria ("the State") under s 4.3.12(1) of the Gambling Regulation Act 2003 (Vic) ("the 2003 Act") because there was no "grant of new licences". The appeal was heard concurrently with the appeal in Victoria v Tatts Group Ltd [2016] HCA 5. Tabcorp relevantly held conjoined licences – a wagering licence and a gaming licence – under the 2003 Act. Those licences were to expire in 2012. The gaming licence authorised Tabcorp to conduct gaming on gaming machines at approved venues in Victoria until that time. The licences were dealt with in Pt 3 of Ch 4 of the 2003 Act which included s 4.3.12(1). That section contained what was known as the "terminal payment provision" and relevantly provided that "[o]n the grant of new licences", the holder of the former licences would be entitled to be paid a certain amount by the State. In 2008, the Premier of Victoria announced that Tabcorp's licences would not be renewed upon their expiry and the 2003 Act was amended so that no further wagering licence or gaming licence could be granted. In 2009, further amendments to the 2003 Act provided for a new authority called a "gaming machine entitlement" ("GME"). A GME permitted its holder to conduct gaming on an approved gaming machine. 27,500 GMEs were created. They came into effect on 16 August 2012, being the day after Tabcorp's wagering licence and gaming licence expired. The result was that the gaming operations which Tabcorp conducted under its gaming licence ceased and were then carried on by the holders of GMEs. Tabcorp claimed it was entitled to payment under the terminal payment provision. Before the primary judge, it contended that the allocation of the GMEs was the "grant of new licences" within the meaning of s 4.3.12(1) of the 2003 Act because the GMEs were "substantially similar" to the licences held by Tabcorp. The primary judge dismissed Tabcorp's claim on the basis that the "grant of new licences" in s 4.3.12 was confined to new licences granted under Pt 3 of Ch 4 of the 2003 Act. The Court of Appeal dismissed Tabcorp's appeal from that decision. By grant of special leave, Tabcorp appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously held that the phrase "grant of new licences" in s 4.3.12(1) of the 2003 Act meant the grant of a new wagering licence and a new gaming licence under Pt 3 of Ch 4 of the 2003 Act. As no new wagering licence and gaming licence were issued under Pt 3 of Ch 4 of the 2003 Act, Tabcorp was not entitled to payment under the terminal payment provision.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 8 October, 2003 VISY PAPER PTY LIMITED, WILLIAM GUTHRIDGE AND STEVEN RICHARDS v AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION The High Court of Australia today dismissed an appeal by Visy Paper and two Visy executives against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court that the company attempted to enter into a contract with another waste paper collector in breach of the Trade Practices Act (TPA). Visy proposed to make an agreement with Sydney-based Northern Pacific Paper Pty Ltd under which NPP would not acquire waste paper from Visy’s suppliers or potential suppliers. Visy’s business including collecting and processing waste paper into recycled paper and cardboard. NPP collected waste paper which it sold to recycling companies including Visy. They competed in acquiring waste paper and also dealt with each other as supplier and customer. The principal issue in the appeal concerned the inter-relationship between certain provisions of the TPA. In the Federal Court, the ACCC sought declarations, restraining orders and fines against Visy, but Justice Ronald Sackville dismissed the proceedings, holding that section 45(6) would have applied to save the potential contract from the prohibition in section 45(2)(a)(i). The Full Court, by majority, allowed the ACCC’s appeal. Visy appealed to the High Court. The High Court, by a 5-1 majority, upheld the decision of the Full Court.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 20 June 2018 [2018] HCA 26 Today the High Court, by majority, dismissed an appeal from the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeal, holding that the trial judge's reasons for convicting the appellant were not inadequate. The appellant was charged under s 50(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) with one count of persistent sexual exploitation of a child. At the relevant time, s 50(1) provided that it was an offence for an adult to commit "over a period of not less than 3 days ... more than 1 act of sexual exploitation of a particular child". The complainant, the appellant's nephew, alleged that the appellant committed various acts of sexual exploitation when the complainant was aged between five and 15 years. The appellant was tried by judge alone, convicted and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. The appellant had submitted that a number of alleged inconsistencies and implausibilities in the complainant's evidence meant that the complainant could not be "relied upon about the substantive allegations". The trial judge described the complainant as having given evidence "in a forthright and convincing manner", and said the complainant was "a straightforward man", was "a man endeavouring to tell the truth" and "was describing real events that happened to him". Although the trial judge accepted that the complainant's evidence about the timing of some events was inaccurate, he regarded the complainant as "a reliable witness as to the core allegations". The appellant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal, but the appeal was dismissed. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The appellant's argument reduced ultimately to whether the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because they failed to identify the two or more acts of sexual exploitation found to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the process of reasoning leading to the conclusion of the appellant's guilt of those acts. By majority, the Court dismissed the appeal. It held that the trial judge's ultimate conclusion was that the appellant sexually assaulted the complainant on numerous occasions over a period of some years. This conclusion meant that the elements of the offence had been proved. The majority held that the trial judge's findings that the complainant was reliable as to the "core allegations" and was describing "real events" were an acceptance that the complainant was truthful and reliable about all of the sexual acts that he had described. The majority concluded that the reasons were sufficient to identify, and to disclose the process of reasoning leading to the trial judge's finding of, two or more acts of sexual exploitation upon which the conviction was based.