Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 4 August 2005 THE QUEEN v WAYNE KELVIN LAVENDER Malice is not an element of the offence of manslaughter either at common law or under the New South Wales Crimes Act, the High Court of Australia held today. On 2 October 2001, Mr Lavender ran over a 13-year-old boy with a front-end loader when he pursued four boys trespassing at the sand mine at Redhead near Newcastle where he worked. The loader travelled at four kilometres per hour. The driver’s vision was obscured by a bucket on the front. Mr Lavender was driving the loader through thick vegetation after the boys when he ran over the victim. He was convicted in 2003 of manslaughter by criminal negligence and was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months. The conviction came at the end of his third trial, the first ending in a jury disagreement and the second ending when an unrelated point of law was referred for decision. Mr Lavender successfully appealed against his conviction. The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, by majority, held that the trial judge’s directions to the jury on manslaughter by criminal negligence were inadequate because he failed to address whether the act causing death was done maliciously. The prosecution appealed to the High Court, contending that malice is not an element of involuntary manslaughter, either at common law or under the Crimes Act. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal and overturned the Court of Criminal Appeal’s decision. At common law, murder was the form of unlawful homicide accompanied by malice aforethought, while manslaughter was unlawful homicide not involving malice aforethought. That distinction was reflected in section 376 of the Crimes Act which provided that in an indictment for murder the accused would be charged with feloniously and maliciously murdering the deceased and in an indictment for manslaughter with feloniously slaying the deceased. Section 18 defines the crime of murder, and goes on to provide that every other punishable homicide shall be taken to be manslaughter. It also states: “No act or omission which was not malicious … shall be within this section”. The Court held that section 18, understood in context, did not alter the common law of unlawful homicide by involuntary manslaughter. The words “within this section” refer to the work done by the section in defining the crime of murder. Mr Lavender was released from prison after the Court of Criminal Appeal decision, seven months before the end of the 18-month non-parole period. In view of the three trials and the time elapsed, the High Court stayed its orders for 28 days to allow Mr Lavender to seek leave from the Court of Criminal Appeal to appeal against his sentence.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 26 October 2011 COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v MALGORZATA [2011] HCA 43 Today the High Court granted special leave to appeal but dismissed an appeal by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions against the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, which had set aside the respondent's convictions under s 135.2(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) ("the Code"). Section 135.2(1) of the Code makes it an offence for a person to engage in conduct and, as a result of that conduct, to obtain a financial advantage from a Commonwealth entity, knowing or believing that he or she is not eligible to receive that financial advantage. Section 4.1(2) of the Code relevantly defines "conduct" as including "an omission to perform an act" and "engage in conduct" as including "omit to perform an act". Section 4.3(a) of the Code provides that an omission to perform an act can only be a physical element of an offence if the law creating the offence makes it The respondent was charged with 17 counts of obtaining a financial advantage contrary to s 135.2(1). Each of the charges against the respondent related to her receipt of part-payments of the Parenting Payment Single ("PPS") from the Commonwealth entity "Centrelink". The allegation in each case was that the respondent was not entitled to part-payment of the PPS because she had failed to advise Centrelink of her receipt of payments of commission from her employer. It was not alleged that the respondent was under a duty imposed by a law of the Commonwealth to advise Centrelink of the receipt of those commission payments. The respondent pleaded guilty before the Magistrates Court of South Australia to each of the charges and was sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment, subject to the direction that she be released immediately upon entering a bond to be of good behaviour for two years. The respondent unsuccessfully appealed against the severity of the sentence to the Supreme Court of South Australia. The respondent then appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, challenging her convictions on the grounds that the counts did not charge offences known to law, and that the counts were deficient in their failure to identify the transaction, act or omission on which liability was said to depend. The Full Court allowed the appeal and set aside the respondent's convictions. The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions' application for special leave to appeal to the High Court was referred to the Full Court, where it was heard as on appeal. The central issue on appeal was whether the omission to perform an act that a person is not under a legal obligation to perform may be a physical element of the offence created by s 135.2(1) of the Code. The Court held by majority that the law creating the offence in s 135.2(1) does not make the omission of an act a physical element of the offence, either expressly or impliedly, within the meaning of s 4.3(a).
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 27 June 2014 FTZK v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION & ANOR [2014] HCA 26 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia and held that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the AAT") committed jurisdictional error in affirming the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection ("the Minister") to refuse the appellant a protection visa. The appellant, a national of the People's Republic of China ("the PRC"), applied for a protection visa under s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act"), claiming to be a person in respect of whom Australia owed protection obligations under the Refugees Convention ("the Convention"). In refusing the appellant a protection visa, the Minister found that notwithstanding that the appellant was a refugee within the meaning of Art 1A(2) of the Convention, he was excluded from protection under the Convention by Art 1F(b) on account of his alleged involvement in the crimes of kidnapping and murder in the PRC in 1996. Article 1F(b) provides that the Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he or she has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to admission to that country as a refugee. In the exercise of its review function, the AAT applied Art 1F(b) to affirm the Minister's decision. The AAT recorded that it was not in dispute that the crimes alleged against the appellant were serious non-political crimes for the purposes of Art 1F(b). The AAT was satisfied, on the basis of several findings, that there were serious reasons for considering that the appellant had committed serious non-political crimes. An appeal against the orders made by the AAT to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia was dismissed. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously held that the reasons of the AAT revealed jurisdictional error. The factors relied upon by the AAT were not logically probative of the appellant having committed one or more of the crimes alleged. Accordingly, the AAT misconstrued the test it had to apply. The Court quashed the AAT's decision and ordered that a differently constituted AAT review the Minister's decision according to law.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 March 2007 Public Information Officer ROSS FORSYTH v DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION The District Court of New South Wales had jurisdiction to hear and determine an action by the Deputy Commissioner against Mr Forsyth to recover a penalty for failure to remit income tax deducted from employees’ wages, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Forsyth was a director of Premium Technology Pty Ltd. Between 1 August 1997 and 31 May 1999, Premium deducted PAYE instalments totalling $668,845.97 from the salary and wages of its employees but failed to remit the full amount to the Commissioner. Directors are personally liable to pay penalties for failure to comply with the obligation to pass on the deductions. The Deputy Commissioner issued penalty notices to Mr Forsyth on 27 October 1998 and 15 June 1999. The unpaid amount was ultimately assessed at $414,326.45. On 29 August 2001, the Deputy Commissioner instituted action in the District Court against Mr Forsyth to recover this money. Under section 39(2) of the Judiciary Act, state courts are invested with federal jurisdiction in all matters in which the High Court has original jurisdiction. Judgment was entered in favour of the Deputy Commissioner. Mr Forsyth had not objected to the District Court determining proceedings, but he appealed in the NSW Court of Appeal, claiming the District Court lacked jurisdiction. Two Acts, both called the Courts Legislation Further Amendment Act, took effect in 1998 and 1999. The first Amendment Act introduced the current form of section 44(1)(a) to the District Court Act. This provided that the Court has jurisdiction to hear any action relating to claims of up to $750,000 which if brought in the Supreme Court would be assigned to the Common Law Division. The second Amendment Act reduced the divisions of the Supreme Court to two, Common Law and Equity, and the business of the Court was reassigned between them. Mr Forsyth argued that the District Court was deprived of jurisdiction when an amendment to the Supreme Court Rules in 2000 assigned to the Equity Division of the Supreme Court any proceedings relating to a tax, fee, duty or other impost levied, collected or administered by or on behalf of the State or the Commonwealth. (These matters were transferred to the Common Law Division by a 2004 change to the Rules.) The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Mr Forsyth appealed to the High Court which, by a 6-1 majority, dismissed the appeal. It held that the jurisdiction of the District Court was to be identified by reference to the time the first Amendment Act introduced section 44(1)(a), not at 29 August 2001 when the action against Mr Forsyth was instituted. It held that when the first Amendment Act commenced, cases such as his would have been assigned to the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court. Therefore the action was within the section 44(1)(a) jurisdiction of the District Court. The Court noted that, even if Mr Forsyth had succeeded, a fresh action by the Deputy Commissioner could still have been brought in a court of competent jurisdiction.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 April 2015 QUEENSLAND NICKEL PTY LIMITED v THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA [2015] HCA 12 Today the High Court unanimously upheld the validity of provisions of the Clean Energy Regulations 2011 (Cth) that provided for the free issue of carbon "units" to entities engaged in the production of nickel. The Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth), Clean Energy (Charges – Excise) Act 2011 (Cth), Clean Energy (Charges – Customs) Act 2011 (Cth) and Clean Energy (Unit Shortfall Charge – General) Act 2011 (Cth) established and imposed a tax on liable entities for certain greenhouse gas emissions in excess of a specified threshold volume. Entities could reduce their tax liability by surrendering "units" that were set-off against emissions in excess of the threshold. Schedule 1 to the Clean Energy Regulations 2011 (Cth), titled the "Jobs and Competitiveness Program" ("JCP"), provided for the issue of free units to entities engaged in "emissions-intensive trade-exposed" activities. One such activity was the "production of nickel", which was defined in Div 48 of Pt 3 of the JCP ("Div 48"). The number of free units issued to nickel producers was calculated by reference to the volume of nickel produced and industry averages for greenhouse gas emissions per unit volume of nickel production. The plaintiff, Queensland Nickel Pty Limited, carried out the production of nickel at a refinery in Queensland. Its major competitors carried out the production of nickel in Western Australia. Due to differences in the kinds of ore processed, the production processes employed and the types of nickel products produced, the plaintiff's refinery emitted more greenhouse gases per unit volume of nickel than its Western Australian competitors. The issue of free units under the JCP therefore effected a proportionately smaller reduction in the plaintiff's overall tax liability than it did for the plaintiff's competitors. Section 99 of the Constitution prohibits the Commonwealth, by any law or regulation of trade, commerce, or revenue, giving preference to one State or any part thereof over another State or any part thereof. The plaintiff commenced proceedings in the High Court, claiming that Div 48 contravened s 99 because it made no allowance for the differences in inputs, production processes and outputs between the plaintiff and the Western Australian nickel producers. The plaintiff argued those differences were caused, at least to some extent, by differences in natural, business or other circumstances between Queensland and Western Australia. The Court found that the differences between the plaintiff's and the Western Australian producers' inputs, production processes and outputs were not due to differences between Queensland and Western Australia in natural, business or other circumstances. As a matter of fact, therefore, the Court held that Div 48 did not give a preference to one State over other States and did not contravene s 99 of the Constitution.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 30 March 2011 STUBLEY v THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2011] HCA 7 On 20 October 2010, at the conclusion of the hearing of oral argument on the appeal, the High Court ordered that the appeal of Dr Alan John Stubley against his conviction for various sexual offences be allowed, that his convictions be set aside and that a new trial be held. Today the High Court published its reasons for the making of those orders. Dr Stubley, a psychiatrist, was charged under the Criminal Code (WA) with 14 offences which included rape, attempting to commit rape, and unlawful and indecent assault, relating to sexual activity with two women who were his patients, JG and CL. The charges were founded on incidents alleged by JG and CL to have occurred between 1975 and 1978 during treatment sessions with Dr Stubley. At trial, Dr Stubley stated that he had been sexually intimate with the two women, however he maintained that JG and CL had consented on each occasion. Following the trial in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, Dr Stubley was found guilty of 10 offences. An appeal to the Court of Appeal against his conviction was unsuccessful. At issue in the appeal to the High Court was whether the prosecution was entitled to adduce the evidence of three other women who each alleged that Dr Stubley had engaged in sexual activity with them while they were his patients. These allegations were not the subject of the charges against Dr Stubley, however the prosecution at trial successfully submitted that the evidence was admissible against him as "propensity evidence" or "relationship evidence" within the meaning of s 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA). However, by majority, the High Court held that the evidence of the three other women did not have significant probative value as propensity evidence or relationship evidence, and therefore that it should not have been admitted at the trial. This was because the only issue at the trial was whether the sexual activity between Dr Stubley and JG and CL was consensual, and the evidence of the three other women could not have probative value with respect to whether JG or CL consented to the sexual activity.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 June 2022 THOMS v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA [2022] HCA 20 Today, the High Court answered in the negative a question as to whether the detention of the applicant under s 189(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was unlawful. Section 189(1) provides that, if an officer knows or reasonably suspects that a person in the migration zone is an unlawful non-citizen, they must detain that person. The applicant was a citizen of New Zealand and held a temporary visa to reside in Australia. On 27 September 2018, his visa was cancelled by the Minister pursuant to s 501(3A) of the Migration Act. Thereafter he was an "unlawful non-citizen" within the meaning of s 14(1) of the Migration Act. On 28 September 2018, the applicant was detained by an officer of the Department of Home Affairs in the purported exercise of s 189(1) of the Migration Act. His detention was continued by two other officers subsequently involved with reviewing his case. On 11 February 2020, the High Court delivered judgment in Love v The Commonwealth (2020) 270 CLR 152 ("Love"), in which a majority of the Court relevantly determined that the applicant was not an "alien" within the meaning of s 51(xix) of the Constitution. The applicant was released from detention on the same day. The balance of the applicant's matter, including relevantly a claim for damages for wrongful imprisonment, was remitted to the Federal Court of Australia for determination. On 6 July 2021, a judge of that Court ordered that the question of whether the applicant's detention was unlawful be heard and determined separately. On 11 October 2021, that question was removed into the High Court. The applicant's primary argument before the High Court was that his detention was unlawful because s 189(1) of the Migration Act is not supported by s 51(xix) of the Constitution in its application to a person who is reasonably suspected of being an unlawful non-citizen but who is in fact not an alien. The High Court unanimously rejected the applicant's argument. All members of the Court held that Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612 ("Ruddock") was dispositive of the applicant's case. Ruddock held that s 189(1) of the Migration Act could validly apply to non-aliens who are reasonably suspected of being unlawful non-citizens. It followed from Ruddock that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was to be determined by reference to the terms of s 189(1), judged as at the time of detention. The Court therefore concluded that the applicant's detention was lawful because the objective facts at the time provided reasonable grounds for each of the officers to suspect that he was an unlawful non-citizen. The decision of the majority in Love did not retrospectively make the suspicion unreasonable.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 16 April 2008 BRETT DWYER v CALCO TIMBERS PTY LTD The Victorian Court of Appeal failed to exercise its jurisdiction under section 134AD of the Victorian Accident Compensation Act to decide for itself whether an injured worker met the definition of “serious injury”, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Dwyer was injured on 27 March 2000 by a crane mounted on the back of a semitrailer with which he delivered timber products. One arm of the crane became disengaged and fell on Mr Dwyer’s right arm. The rights he had against his employer, Calco Timbers, were limited by the Accident Compensation Act which provided that a worker in Mr Dwyer’s position may recover damages for a serious injury. “Serious injury” was defined as including “permanent serious disfigurement” and “permanent serious impairment or loss of body function”. If the degree of impairment was assessed as less than 30 per cent, as was the case with Mr Dwyer, the worker could not bring legal proceedings for damages unless the County Court had given leave under section 134AB(16) of the Act to bring the proceedings. The Court was obliged not to give leave unless satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the injury was a “serious injury”. In the County Court, Judge Frances Millane held that the impairment and loss of function in Mr Dwyer’s right arm and his disfigurement were not a “serious injury” within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly on 1 December 2005 she refused him leave to bring proceedings to recover damages. Section 134AD of the Act stated that on applications made under section 134AB(16) the Court of Appeal shall decide for itself whether the injury is a serious injury on the evidence before the judge who heard the application and on any other evidence which the Court of Appeal may receive. On 8 September 2006, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Dwyer’s appeal. Mr Dwyer appealed to the High Court on the ground that the Court of Appeal had erred in its approach to the nature of the appeal provided under the Act and consequently failed to exercise its jurisdiction. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal and held that the Court of Appeal erred in its construction of the provisions providing for the appeal from the County Court. The Court of Appeal’s emphasis on the importance of demonstration by Mr Dwyer of specific error by Judge Millane when deciding whether there was “serious injury” distracted attention from the terms of section 134AD, which required the Court of Appeal to decide for itself whether an injury was a “serious injury”. The High Court ordered that the appeal to the Court of Appeal be reheard.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 March 2004 SHANE LESLIE KELLY v THE QUEEN The High Court of Australia today unanimously dismissed an appeal from a Tasmanian man who had argued that an alleged confession was inadmissible at his trial for murder. Mr Kelly was convicted in 2001 along with Michael John Marlow of murdering Tony George Tanner, who had admitted to police his involvement in a robbery and implicated Mr Marlow. A third man was acquitted of the murder. Mr Tanner disappeared in November 1990 after his girlfriend heard him on the telephone arranging to meet “Ned” (Mr Kelly). In November 1999 Mr Kelly allegedly told police that he and Mr Marlow had murdered Mr Tanner and asked about indemnity in return for his cooperation. Mr Tanner’s body was found in March 2000 with shotgun wounds in a hole dug in the Tasmanian Central Highlands by a skilled excavator operator, which Mr Kelly was. He was arrested and in a video-taped police interview he retracted his confession, giving various explanations for having made it. Sometime later, while police were taking him to Launceston General Hospital for blood and hair samples to be taken, Mr Kelly allegedly said: “Sorry about the interview – no hard feelings, I was just playing the game.” The Supreme Court trial judge ruled this statement to be admissible as it was not made in the course of official questioning, with the result that section 8 of the Criminal Law (Detention and Interrogation) Act did not apply. The Court of Criminal Appeal, by majority, upheld the trial judge’s reasoning. The minority judge disagreed but also dismissed Mr Kelly’s appeal on the ground that no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred. The primary issue for the High Court was whether the impugned statement was made in the course of official questioning. Under section 8, no confession made by a person suspected by police of having committed an offence was admissible if made in the course of official questioning unless video-taped (subject to some exceptions). Three members of the Court held that the statement was not made in the course of official questioning so section 8 did not apply, as the course of official questioning ended when police ceased to ask questions. They also held that even if the Court of Criminal Appeal majority had erred no miscarriage of justice had occurred. Two members of the High Court held that the confession was inadmissible as it was made within the course of official questioning but not video-taped, but agreed that other evidence against Mr Kelly was so overwhelming that no miscarriage of justice had occurred.