Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 December 2005 NAIS, NAIT AND NAIU v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL A prolonged delay in the determination of a visa application by the Refugee Review Tribunal resulted in procedural unfairness, the High Court of Australia held today. Three Bangladeshi citizens, a husband and wife and their daughter, arrived in Australia in August 1996 and lodged applications for protection visas in January 1997. They claimed they had a well- founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh because the husband was Muslim and the wife Catholic. The Immigration Department refused the application in May 1997 and the family immediately applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal for a review. The parents gave oral evidence at a hearing on 6 May 1998 and sent in further written material. They did not hear from the RRT until 30 November 2001 when the RRT invited the family to attend another hearing on 19 December 2001. The RRT also sought out expert evidence and country information from the Australian High Commission which reported that mixed marriages are readily accepted, although resistance is greater in rural areas, and that if the family accepts a marriage so will the community. On 14 January 2003, the RRT handed down its decision that the family was not entitled to protection visas. It noted that the husband made admissions that certain claims made by him and his wife were fabricated and it suggested that this indicated collusion. The RRT rejected particular incidents of apparent persecution. It accepted that the husband was alienated from his family but that this did not affect his right to remain married or to find work. It held that the couple did not face a real chance of harm and any fears they held were not well-founded. The Federal Court dismissed an application for judicial review of the RRT decision. The family appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court, which by a 2-1 majority dismissed the appeal. The family then appealed to the High Court. They argued that the delay meant that the RRT could not possibly properly assess and comment fairly on their demeanour by the time it made its decision. The Court, by a 4-2 majority, allowed the appeal. The majority held that the RRT’s decision, which significantly depended on the credibility of the asylum seekers, was not made fairly. The procedure was flawed in a manner likely to affect the RRT’s capacity to make a proper assessment of the family’s sincerity and reliability. When the RRT, without explanation, draws out its procedures to such an extent that its capacity to discharge its statutory obligations is likely to be materially diminished, then a case of procedural unfairness arises. The Court remitted the matter to the RRT for redetermination.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 April 2022 COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v NATALIE CARTER & ORS [2022] HCA 10 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia concerning the operation of s 97(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). Section 97(1) relevantly provides that "where a beneficiary of a trust estate who is not under any legal disability is presently entitled to a share of the income of the trust estate ... the assessable income of the beneficiary shall include ... so much of that share of the net income of the trust estate as is attributable to a period when the beneficiary was a resident". The principal question for determination was whether a beneficiary's present entitlement under s 97(1) is to be determined immediately prior to the end of an income year or whether events after the end of the income year may be considered. The respondents were beneficiaries of a trust estate. The trust deed provided that if the trustee did not pay, apply, set aside or accumulate any part of the trust income in a given accounting period, the trustee would hold that income in trust for specified beneficiaries, including the respondents. An accounting period was relevantly defined as a 12-month period ending on 30 June. In this way, the trust deed ensured that in each accounting period, the whole of the trust income was distributed, if not otherwise dealt with. In the 2014 income year, the trustee failed to pay, apply, set aside or accumulate the income of the trust. As a result, one-fifth of the trust income was held on trust for each of the respondents. On 27 October 2015, the appellant, the Commissioner of Taxation ("the Commissioner"), issued an amended assessment to each respondent for the 2014 income year ("the 2014 Assessments") which included as assessable income one-fifth of the trust income on the basis that the respondents were "presently entitled" to that income within the meaning of s 97(1). On 30 September 2016, the respondents disclaimed their interest in the trust income. They subsequently objected to the 2014 Assessments in reliance on the disclaimers. On appeal on a question of law from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the Full Court of the Federal Court relevantly held that the respondents' disclaimers operated retrospectively so as to disapply s 97(1) in respect of the 2014 income year. The High Court held that s 97(1) is directed to the position existing immediately before the end of the income year for the purpose of identifying the beneficiaries who are to be assessed with the income of the trust. The section looks to the right to receive an amount of distributable income, not the receipt of income. Events occurring after the end of the income year cannot disentitle a beneficiary who was "presently entitled" immediately before the end of the income year. The respondents' disclaimers were therefore not effective to retrospectively expunge the rights of the Commissioner against the respondents which were in existence at midnight on 30 June 2014 and which gave rise to the 2014 Assessments.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 13 December 2007 KOOMPAHTOO LOCAL ABORIGINAL LAND COUNCIL AND TERRY LAWLER v SANPINE PTY LIMITED AND KLALC PROPERTY & INVESTMENT PTY LTD Serious breaches by Sanpine of its administrative obligations under an agreement to develop land justified termination of the contract by the Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council, the High Court of Australia held today. In 1997, Koompahtoo and Sanpine entered into a joint venture agreement for the development of a large area of land near Morisset, south of Newcastle. Koompahtoo contributed the land, which had been acquired under the NSW Aboriginal Land Rights Act, and Sanpine managed the project. Each party had a 50 per cent interest and Sanpine was also to receive a management fee equal to 25 per cent of the total project costs. Despite accruing costs of more than $2 million, the project did not proceed to rezoning. It involved sensitive environmental issues, was controversial within the Koompahtoo community, and had difficulty attracting finance. A mortgagee took possession in April 2003. In February 2003, Mr Lawler was appointed as administrator. He attempted to obtain from Sanpine information on the financial position of the joint venture, including how money from two lenders had been used. In December 2003, Mr Lawler terminated the joint venture agreement. Sanpine commenced proceedings in the NSW Supreme Court, seeking a declaration that the termination was invalid and the agreement still on foot. Justice Joseph Campbell held that the agreement was validly terminated. He found Sanpine had committed serious breaches of its obligations under the joint venture agreement. Those obligations were categorised as document production and maintenance, banking and spending of money, and failures to maintain proper books. Proper accounts and financial records were never kept, and documentation was lacking to explain or justify significant amounts it claimed to be expenses chargeable to the joint venture, including a payment of more than $183,000 to the wife of a Sanpine controller. Sanpine argued that by reasons of waiver or estoppel Koompahtoo could not complain of these breaches. Justice Campbell rejected this argument and found that the Koompahtoo members of the joint venture’s management committee made no representations on which Sanpine relied concerning non- performance of its obligations. He described the failure to keep books for the joint venture so that annual accounts could be drawn up and audited each year as a gross departure from the terms of the agreement. The NSW Court of Appeal, by majority, allowed an appeal by Sanpine. Koompahtoo appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal. It held that the breaches deprived Koompahtoo’s representatives of the capacity to make informed decisions. Sanpine’s breaches went to the root of the contract and justified termination of the contract.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 December 2012 TAHIRI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP [2012] HCA 61 Today the High Court held that a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship did not err in refusing a combined application for a Subclass 202 Refugee and Humanitarian (Class XB) visa by the plaintiff's mother and her four dependent children. The plaintiff is a citizen of Afghanistan. He arrived unaccompanied in Australia as a 17-year-old and was granted a protection visa. The plaintiff proposed his mother's application for a visa with four of her children as additional applicants. The mother and the four children are citizens of Afghanistan living in Pakistan. The children's father has been missing since 2003. The criteria for granting the combined application included satisfaction of public interest criterion 4015 ("PIC 4015"). PIC 4015 relevantly required the delegate to be satisfied either that the law of the children's home country permitted their removal, or that each person who could lawfully determine where the children were to live consented to the grant of the visa. The delegate found that the children's home country was Afghanistan and was not satisfied that the law of Afghanistan permitted the removal of the children. The delegate also found that the persons who could lawfully determine where the children were to live included the children's father, or (if he was dead) his relatives, and was not satisfied that any of them consented to the grant of the visa. In a proceeding commenced in the original jurisdiction of the Court, the plaintiff sought to have the delegate's decision quashed and the defendant compelled to determine the visa application according to law. Under the rules of the Court, the parties agreed to submit a special case stating questions of law for the opinion of the Full Court. The High Court held that the delegate's factual conclusions were reasonably open and that the plaintiff failed to establish that the delegate proceeded on an incorrect legal understanding of PIC 4015. It also held that although the delegate may have taken into account certain material not disclosed to the plaintiff's mother, that material was not shown to be adverse in any sense requiring its disclosure in accordance with obligations of procedural fairness.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 October 2014 BROOKFIELD MULTIPLEX LTD v OWNERS CORPORATION STRATA PLAN 61288 & ANOR [2014] HCA 36 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The High Court held that Brookfield, the builder of a strata-titled apartment complex, did not owe a duty of care to the Owners Corporation to avoid causing it economic loss resulting from latent defects in the common property. Brookfield built the complex pursuant to a design and construct contract with a developer who owned the land on which it was built. Upon the registration of a strata plan in relation to the part of the complex which was to be used for serviced apartments, the Owners Corporation was created by operation of law. The common property was vested in the Owners Corporation as manager of the strata scheme and as agent for the owners of the serviced apartments. The design and construct contract contained detailed provisions with respect to the quality of the work to be performed by Brookfield and required Brookfield to remedy defects or omissions in the work within a defined defects liability period. The standard form contract of sale to purchasers of the serviced apartments, annexed to the design and construct contract, conferred on each purchaser specific contractual rights in relation to defects in the property, including the common property. The Owners Corporation commenced proceedings against Brookfield in the Supreme Court of New South Wales to recover damages including the cost of repairing latent defects in the common property of the apartment complex. Brookfield was said to be liable in negligence for breach of a duty to take reasonable care to avoid a reasonably foreseeable economic loss to the Owners Corporation in having to make good the consequences of latent defects caused by the building's defective design and/or construction. The primary judge held that Brookfield did not owe the duty propounded by the Owners Corporation. On appeal, the Court of Appeal unanimously held that Brookfield did owe the Owners Corporation a duty of care, albeit a narrower duty to avoid causing loss resulting from latent defects which were structural or dangerous or which made the serviced apartments uninhabitable. By grant of special leave, Brookfield appealed to the High Court. The Owners Corporation was granted special leave to cross-appeal, and sought orders providing for a wider duty of care than that found by the Court of Appeal. The High Court allowed the appeal, dismissed the cross-appeal, and held that Brookfield did not owe the duty of care propounded by the Owners Corporation or found by the Court of Appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 7 April 2011 [2011] HCA 10 Today the High Court allowed an appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland to increase the sentence imposed on Mr Dionne Matthew Lacey following an appeal by the Attorney-General of Queensland. By majority, the High Court held that a legislative provision allowing for appeals against sentence to be made by the Attorney-General did not permit the Court of Appeal to vary a sentence in the absence of demonstrated or inferred error on the part of the original sentencing judge. Mr Lacey was convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. The Crown Prosecutor had sought a sentence of 13 years, with a two year deduction for time already served on remand. The trial judge indicated that he would have imposed a sentence of 12 years, but had taken the two years served on remand into account. Mr Lacey appealed against the conviction and sought leave to appeal against his sentence. The Attorney-General appealed against the sentence on the alternative grounds that it was "inadequate" or "manifestly inadequate". Section 669A(1) of the Criminal Code (Qld) empowers the Attorney-General to appeal against any sentence imposed by a trial court, and provides that the court hearing the appeal "may in its unfettered discretion vary the sentence and impose such sentence as to the Court seems proper." In the proceedings before the Court of Appeal, the Solicitor-General (on behalf of the Attorney- General) sought a sentence in the range of 15 to 18 years, before deduction for time on remand. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Lacey's appeal against conviction and application for leave to appeal against sentence, and allowed the Attorney-General's appeal. The Court, by majority, increased the sentence to 11 years, holding that the "unfettered discretion" conferred by s 669A(1) required the Court of Appeal to have regard to the sentence below, but come to its own view as to the proper sentence to be imposed. The High Court today held that the Court of Appeal's construction was erroneous. The words of s 669A(1) neither expressly nor by implication defined a jurisdiction which enlivened a general power to vary sentences simply because the Attorney-General chose to appeal. Such a construction would require clear language to that effect. The appellate jurisdiction conferred by the section required error on the part of the sentencing judge to be demonstrated before the appellate court's "unfettered discretion" to vary the sentence arose. The High Court allowed the appeal, and set aside the order of the Court of Appeal, ordering that the appeal to that Court be dismissed.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 May 2017 THE QUEEN v STEVEN LAKAMU SIOSIUA AFFORD [2017] HCA 19 Today the High Court held in relation to two appeals that an inference that an accused intended to import a substance contrary to s 307.1(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) ("the Code") could be drawn from the accused's knowledge or belief that there was a real or significant chance that he or she was importing the substance. The first appeal, Smith v The Queen, involved the importation into Australia of illicit drugs, secreted in golf sets, shoes, containers of vitamins and soap. Although admitting that he had some concerns about the items he had been given by an acquaintance in India, Mr Smith claimed that he had no intention to import the illicit drugs concealed in them. Mr Smith was convicted in the District Court of New South Wales on one count of importing a commercial quantity of a border controlled drug contrary to s 307.1(1) of the Code. He unsuccessfully appealed against conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales on the ground that the trial judge misdirected the jury with respect to the fault element of intent. The second appeal, The Queen v Afford, also involved the importation of illicit drugs. The drugs were found in packages stitched inside the lining of luggage given to Mr Afford by an acquaintance in Manila. Mr Afford denied that he intended to import the illicit drugs and submitted that even if he had been suspicious that the suitcase might contain drugs, such a suspicion could not establish an intention to import the substances. Mr Afford was convicted in the County Court of Victoria on one count of importing a commercial quantity of a border controlled drug contrary to s 307.1(1) of the Code. He successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria on the grounds that the verdict was unreasonable and that a substantial miscarriage of justice occurred by reason of a misdirection with respect to the fault element of intent. By grants of special leave, the appeals came before the High Court and were heard together. The Court held that the process of inferential reasoning posited in Bahri Kural v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 502; [1987] HCA 16 is applicable to proof of an intention to import a substance contrary to s 307.1(1) of the Code. Consequently, where it is established that an accused perceived there to be a real or significant chance of a substance being present in an object which the accused brought into Australia, it is open to infer on the basis of all the facts and circumstances of the case that the accused intended to import the substance. It is also appropriate for a trial judge so to direct the jury. A majority of the Court held that the trial judge's directions to the jury were sufficient in both appeals. The Court also held that it was open to the jury to be satisfied of Mr Afford's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the appeal in Smith v The Queen was dismissed and the appeal in The Queen v Afford was allowed.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1 May 2013 TAMAR RIVQA BECK v AMIRAM DAVID WEINSTOCK & ORS [2013] HCA 15 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal by Mrs Tamar Beck regarding whether shares in LW Furniture Consolidated (Aust) Pty Ltd, described as "C" Redeemable Preference Shares (the "C class shares"), were able to be redeemed under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Court rejected Mrs Beck's argument that the C class shares were not preference shares (and could not be redeemable preference shares) because no ordinary shares or other shares with lesser rights were issued. LW Furniture was incorporated in 1971. Its articles of association provided for several different classes of shares, including C class shares. In 1971, eight C class shares were issued to Mrs Hedy Weinstock. The company issued other preference shares having the same rights as the C class shares, but never issued any ordinary shares. Mrs Weinstock died in 2004 and, after her death, the company sought to redeem the C class shares for one dollar each. As executor of the estate of Mrs Weinstock, Mrs Beck claimed that the C class shares were not redeemable because they were not preference shares. In the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Hamilton AJ held that the C class shares were not validly issued as preference shares because there were no other shares on issue over which they had preference. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the C class shares were preference shares and had been validly redeemed. By special leave, Mrs Beck appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. The High Court held that the C class shares were preference shares and the redemption of shares was valid. The C class shares were preference shares, as they had rights attached that preferred the holder of those shares to the holder of any ordinary shares in the company on issue when the relevant right was to be examined.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 December 2010 MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP v SZJSS & ORS [2010] HCA 48 In reviewing the unsuccessful protection visa application of a Nepalese citizen ("SZJSS"), the Refugee Review Tribunal ("RRT") chose to give "no weight" to certain letters provided by SZJSS which appeared to corroborate some of the assertions made by him in support of his application. The RRT also described the giving of certain oral evidence by him as a "baseless tactic". An application by SZJSS and his wife for judicial review of the decision was dismissed by the Federal Magistrates Court on 11 September 2009. However, the Federal Court allowed an appeal from that decision, and quashed the decision of the RRT. It found that the RRT had fallen into jurisdictional error by failing to give "proper, genuine and realistic consideration" to the letters, and by referring to the giving of certain evidence as a "baseless tactic". The Federal Court also found that the reasons of the RRT gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, by reason of pre- judgment. The High Court today unanimously upheld an appeal by the Minister against the decision of the Federal Court. It found that the weight to be placed on the letters was a matter on which reasonable minds might come to different conclusions, and that the RRT's preference for other evidence could not be said to entail a jurisdictional error. It held further that the RRT's use of the expression "baseless tactic" did not, in the circumstances, give rise to any jurisdictional error. On the question of apprehended bias, the Court found that the RRT's use of the expression "baseless tactic" did not provide any foundation for a contention that the RRT pre-judged a central but contestable issue in the matter. Pursuant to an undertaking given to the Court, the Minister was ordered to pay the costs of the visa applicants.