Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 19 June 2014 RONALD WILLIAMS v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA & ORS [2014] HCA 23 Today the High Court unanimously decided that legislation enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament which purported to provide legislative authority to make agreements for the outlay of public money, and to make payments under those agreements, is invalid in its operation with respect to a funding agreement between the Commonwealth and Scripture Union Queensland ("SUQ"). By that agreement, the Commonwealth was to pay SUQ to provide chaplaincy services at schools in Queensland. In December 2010, Ronald Williams brought a proceeding in the High Court challenging the payment of money by the Commonwealth to SUQ for SUQ to provide chaplaincy services at the state school Mr Williams' four children attended. In 2012, the Court held that the funding agreement between SUQ and the Commonwealth, and the payments made under it, were not supported by the executive power of the Commonwealth under s 61 of the Constitution. Soon after the Court made orders in that proceeding, the Parliament enacted the Financial Framework Legislation Amendment Act (No 3) 2012 (Cth) ("the FFLA Act"). The FFLA Act amended the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) ("the FMA Act") and the Financial Management and Accountability Regulations 1997 (Cth) ("the FMA Regulations") to provide legislative support not only for the making of agreements and payments of the kind which were in issue in the first proceeding, but also for the making of other arrangements and grants. Mr Williams then brought a fresh proceeding in the High Court against the Commonwealth, the relevant Minister and SUQ, challenging the validity of the relevant provisions of the FMA Act and FMA Regulations inserted by the FFLA Act. He challenged the validity of those provisions both generally and in their particular operation with respect to the payment of money by the Commonwealth to SUQ under the then funding agreement. Both the agreement and the payments made under it were said to be made under the "National School Chaplaincy and Student Welfare Program". The Court held that, in their operation with respect to the challenged funding agreement and the challenged payments made under that agreement, none of the challenged provisions is a valid law of the Commonwealth. The provisions are not, in their relevant operation, supported by a head of legislative power under the Constitution. Providing at a school the services of a chaplain or welfare worker for the objective described in the FMA Regulations is not a provision of "benefits to students" within the meaning of s 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution. The Court further held that the Commonwealth's entry into, and expenditure of money under, the funding agreement was not supported by the executive power of the Commonwealth. The making of the payments was therefore held to be unlawful.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 17 August 2022 ARISTOCRAT TECHNOLOGIES AUSTRALIA PTY LTD v COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS [2022] HCA 29 Today, the High Court dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal concerned whether the appellant's patent claim for a system and method for providing a feature game to be played on an electronic gaming machine ("EGM") was a "manner of manufacture" within the meaning of s 18(1A)(a) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). The appellant manufactures EGMs. It owned four innovation patents concerning various embodiments of an EGM. The specification of one patent, which was sufficiently similar to the others for the purpose of analysis, described the claimed invention as the combination of a player interface, being the physical features of an ordinary EGM, and a game controller, being the computerised components that interacted with the player interface to implement a base game and a feature game. Both the player interface and game controller contained elements that were part of the common general knowledge. The specification also described the triggering of a feature game from the base game using configurable symbols; those elements, which were part of the game controller, were not part of the common general knowledge. Following examination by the respondent, each patent was revoked on the ground that none of the claims in any of the innovation patents was a manner of manufacture. The appellant successfully appealed the revocation to the Federal Court of Australia. The primary judge found that the claimed invention was not a mere scheme and was therefore patentable subject matter. The Full Court allowed an appeal, with a majority of that Court holding that while the claimed invention was computer-implemented, it was not an advance in computer technology and therefore not patentable subject matter. The High Court unanimously held that s 18 of the Patents Act imposes a threshold requirement that there be an invention and that the only question in assessing whether a manner of manufacture exists under s 18(1) or (1A) is whether there is a manner of manufacture within s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. The Court divided on the proper characterisation of the appellant's invention. Three Justices would have dismissed the appeal, characterising the invention, in light of the specification as a whole and the common general knowledge, as nothing other than a claim for a new system or method of gaming. The only thing differentiating it from the common general knowledge was the unpatentable idea of the feature game. Three Justices would have allowed the appeal, characterising the invention as an EGM incorporating an interdependent player interface and a game controller which included feature games and configurable symbols. That operation involved an artificial state of affairs and a useful result amounting to a manner of manufacture. Where the High Court is equally divided in opinion, s 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) requires that the decision appealed from shall be affirmed. Accordingly, the High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 16 November 2004 EQUUSCORP AND RURAL FINANCE PTY LTD (in liquidation) v GLENGALLAN INVESTMENTS PTY LTD EQUUSCORP AND RURAL FINANCE PTY LTD (in liquidation) v EDWIN THOMAS CODD EQUUSCORP AND RURAL FINANCE PTY LTD (in liquidation) v CYRIL WILLIAM EQUUSCORP AND RURAL FINANCE PTY LTD (in liquidation) v BRIAN THOMAS PRENDERGAST EQUUSCORP AND RURAL FINANCE PTY LTD (in liquidation) v BARRY THORNTON EQUUSCORP AND RURAL FINANCE PTY LTD (in liquidation) v HGT INVESTMENTS PTY LTD A written agreement for participation in a tax-effective investment scheme for farming crayfish overrode an inconsistent prior oral agreement that the investors claimed limited their liability, the High Court of Australia held today. Investors associated with GWA Pty Ltd (now GWA International Ltd) and its chairman Mr Thornton acquired units in the Red Claw crayfish project in north Queensland in June 1989 by borrowing $3.2 million. The project was managed by its promoter Tony Johnson’s company Johnson Farm Management. Terms of the partnership were recorded in a partnership deed between Eagle Star Trustees Ltd, the unit holders’ representative, and Forestell Securities (Australia) Ltd, the partnership managers. On 30 June 1989 Mr Thornton and the other respondents each executed a written loan agreement to borrow the whole purchase price from Rural Finance. (Equuscorp later became assignee of the loans.) The transactions appeared to be total payment from Rural Finance to Eagle Star to Forestell, which distributed sums to JFM and FJA, which then deposited them with Rural Finance as an interest-bearing deposit. The respondents claimed there was no loan, at least not of “real money”. The venture failed due to stock losses and expensive repairs to leaking ponds. Rural Finance and Equuscorp sued the respondents in the Queensland Supreme Court, claiming each defaulted on their repayments, but the respondents said they were not indebted as no money was lent. Justice John Helman concluded the transactions were merely book entries made to create an audit trail. Equuscorp and Rural Finance unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal. The respondents also alleged an oral agreement by which the liability of each was limited to one payment on 30 June 1989 and two more payments on 30 September and 31 December, then the income generated would extinguish the balance of the loan. They alleged they signed the written loan agreement relying on limited liability and on Rural Finance having sufficient funds to lend. The High Court held that the loan transaction was legally effective. It held that the allegation that liability was limited was at odds with the prospectus and a circular about the scheme. Neither the prospectus nor the written loan agreement suggested any limitation on borrowers’ liability and neither suggested any warranty about the project’s returns, instead warning the investment should be considered speculative. The Court held the respondents were bound by the written agreement. It unanimously allowed the appeal and ordered that matters be remitted to the Supreme Court for consideration of further issues not decided at trial.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 21 May 2014 DO YOUNG (AKA JASON) LEE v THE QUEEN SEONG WON LEE v THE QUEEN [2014] HCA 20 Today the High Court unanimously allowed two appeals from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had upheld the convictions of the appellants on various drug and firearms offences on the basis that there had not been a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). The appellants (a father and son) had been the subject of an investigation by the New South Wales Crime Commission ("the Commission"). As part of that investigation and pursuant to powers given by the New South Wales Crime Commission Act 1985 (NSW) ("the NSWCC Act"), the appellants were summoned by the Commission to give evidence before it. Section 13(9) of the NSWCC Act required the Commission to make a direction prohibiting the publication of evidence given before it where publication might prejudice the fair trial of a person who may be charged with an offence. The appellant in the first matter, Jason Lee, gave evidence on two occasions. He was subsequently charged with various drug and firearms offences. The appellant in the second matter, Seong Won Lee, gave evidence on one occasion. At that time, he had been charged with firearms offences and a charge relating to a drug offence was imminent. The transcripts of the appellants' evidence given before the Commission were unlawfully published to members of the New South Wales Police Force and to officers of the Director of Public Prosecutions before the appellants' joint trial. On 16 March 2011, the appellants were convicted of various drug and firearms offences. The appellants appealed their convictions on the basis that there had been a miscarriage of justice, by reason of the prosecution's possession and possible use of the appellants' evidence given before the Commission. The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeals. By grant of special leave, the appellants appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that the purpose of s 13(9) of the NSWCC Act was to protect the fair trial of a person who may be charged with offences. That purpose supports the fundamental principle of the common law referred to in X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29, that the prosecution is to prove the guilt of an accused person. That purpose was not met in the present case, with the consequence that the appellants' trial differed in a fundamental respect from that which our criminal justice system seeks to provide and amounted to a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act. The High Court quashed the appellants' convictions and ordered that a new trial be had.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 March 2016 R & ANOR v INDEPENDENT BROAD-BASED ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSIONER [2016] HCA 8 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The High Court held that the power of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission ("the IBAC") to hold an examination under Pt 6 of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 (Vic) ("the IBAC Act") can be exercised in relation to persons who have not been, but might subsequently be, charged and put on trial for an offence relating to the subject matter of the examination. On 20 March 2015, the IBAC commenced an investigation into the conduct of certain members of Victoria Police stationed at Ballarat police station. The investigation, named "Operation Ross", was concerned with whether the appellants, two officers of Victoria Police, assaulted a woman in a cell at the Ballarat police station on 15 January 2015 as well as with a number of other incidents alleged to have occurred at the Ballarat police station in recent years which might have involved human rights violations in respect of other women. On 1 April 2015, the IBAC issued a witness summons to each of the appellants, requiring them to give evidence in a public examination of their knowledge of matters falling within the scope of Operation Ross. The appellants each delivered written submissions to the IBAC Commissioner submitting that the examinations should be held in private. The first appellant also submitted that the first appellant could not be compelled to give evidence. The Commissioner rejected the appellants' submissions. On 16 April 2015, the appellants commenced judicial review proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria seeking orders preventing the IBAC from examining them. The primary judge dismissed the claim. His Honour held that because the appellants had not yet been charged with an offence, the process of criminal justice had not commenced and the principle whereby an accused person cannot be compelled to assist the prosecution to make its case ("the companion principle") had not been engaged. The primary judge also held that the IBAC Act had abrogated each appellant's privilege against self-incrimination. The Court of Appeal refused the appellants leave to appeal against the primary judge's decision. By grant of special leave, the appellants appealed to the High Court. The Court held that the companion principle was not engaged, and so could not prevent the IBAC's examination, because the appellants had not been charged with any offence and there was no prosecution pending. There was no reason to extend the principle to the circumstances of the present case and to do so would fetter the pursuit and exposure of a lack of probity within the police force contrary to the object of the IBAC Act. The Court also held that the privilege against self-incrimination was abrogated by s 144 of the IBAC Act.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 28 May, 2003 ROSE SHOREY v PT LIMITED AS TRUSTEE FOR McNAMARA AUSTRALIA PROPERTY TRUST, CIC INSURANCE LIMITED (in liquidation) AND VENTURE STORES (RETAILERS) PTY LTD (in liquidation) The High Court of Australia today allowed an appeal by Ms Shorey. Ms Shorey suffered soft tissue injuries to her back in a fall in a Blacktown, Sydney, shopping centre in April 1988, when she was 56. She had had surgery in 1986 for a pre-existing degenerative spinal condition and was pain-free, but after the fall her condition deteriorated until she progressed to using a walking stick, the two sticks, then a walking frame and then in 1993 a wheelchair. Ms Shorey was diagnosed as having a conversion disorder, a psychiatric condition said to explain her debilitating symptoms. The New South Wales District Court held the fall was a contributing factor to her condition and that she was not a malingerer, and awarded damages of $555,212.55 against PT Limited and Venture Stores. The three respondents did not challenge the District Court’s finding that negligence led to Ms Shorey’s fall, but appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal seeking a reduction in damages. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, although it upheld the finding that Ms Shorey was not malingering. She then appealed to the High Court. The issue in the appeal was whether Ms Shorey had established that her fall was a cause of her disability. The High Court, by a 4-1 majority, held that Ms Shorey was not required to prove the fall was the sole cause of her disorder, only that the fall was a cause. Other factors rendered her more susceptible to the consequences of the fall. A long-established legal principle is that defendants must take victims as they find them, even if there is an apparent disproportion between cause and effect. The High Court allowed the appeal and ordered that the matter be reheard by the Court of Appeal in accordance with the Court’s reasons.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 26 May 2010 Manager, Public Information THE QUEEN v LK THE QUEEN v RK [2010] HCA 17 On 19 May 2008, the respondents, LK and RK, were charged under s 11.5 of the Criminal Code (Cth) ("the Code") with conspiring to deal with money worth $1 million or more, being reckless as to the fact that the money was proceeds of crime. The money was part of a larger sum, in the order of $150 million, of which the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme had been defrauded. Neither respondent was said to be a party to the fraud or to have knowledge of it. However, RK had agreed to a proposal, made by LK at the behest of a third party, that RK's Swiss bank account be used for the transfer of funds from Australia. At the conclusion of the Crown's case in the District Court of NSW, the respondents submitted that there was no case to answer and requested that the trial judge direct the jury to acquit. The trial judge held that the offence with which the respondents had been charged was bad at or unknown to law. The Crown appealed under s 107 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) to the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal. That Court dismissed the appeal, holding that, to support the charge of conspiracy under the Code, the Crown had to prove that the respondents knew the facts constituting the offence the object of the conspiracy. Special leave to appeal to the High Court was granted on 19 June 2009. Before the High Court, the Crown argued that the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation of the Code was incorrect. Today, that argument was rejected. The Court held that a person cannot be found guilty of conspiracy under the Code unless he or she knows — and is not simply reckless as to — the facts that make the proposed act or acts unlawful. In this case, the relevant fact was that the money was proceeds of crime. The respondents had argued that no appeal lay to the Court of Criminal Appeal because s 107 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act did not come into effect until after the proceedings against the respondents had been commenced. The High Court rejected the argument on the basis that the respondents' trial commenced with their arraignment in the District Court, which was after 15 December 2006, when the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act came into operation. The respondents had also argued that the provision of an appeal by the Crown against a directed verdict of acquittal infringed the guarantee in s 80 of the Constitution of trial by jury for offences against Commonwealth law tried on indictment. This argument was also rejected. The High Court held that the creation of such a right of appeal did not interfere with the jury's function because a jury can exercise no discretion in the face of a direction from a trial judge to return a verdict of acquittal. As the appeal against the directed verdict involved only questions of law, there was no infringement of s 80 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 March 2005 AMCOR LIMITED v CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION, NEVILLE GEORGE ANDERSON AND THE MINISTER FOR EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS MINISTER FOR EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS v CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION, NEVILLE GEORGE ANDERSON AND AMCOR LIMITED The transfer of employees from Amcor to one of its subsidiaries in a corporate restructure did not entitle the employees to redundancy payments, the High Court of Australia held today. Until 1998, Amcor owned four paper mills, with the employees covered by a 1997 certified agreement between Amcor and the CFMEU. Amcor transferred the paper mills to a wholly owned subsidiary, Paper Australia Pty Ltd, but Amcor continued to employ the workers. In 2000 Amcor went through a demerger to concentrate on packaging, with its paper manufacturing business transferred to another subsidiary, PaperlinX Ltd, which was floated as a public company. Amcor gave notice terminating employment from 31 March 2000 in all Paper Australia businesses. Paper Australia, which was to become a wholly owned subsidiary of PaperlinX, wrote to all employees offering employment on the same terms and conditions, with all benefits carried over from Amcor, including those related to length of service and accrued leave entitlements. The offer was accepted by reporting for duty at their first shift on or after 1 April 2000 and virtually all employees did so. The CFMEU claimed the workers were entitled under the certified agreement to redundancy payments due to the jobs with Amcor being terminated, regardless of whether they were offered immediate work with another company. The Federal Court and the Full Court of the Federal Court agreed. Amcor and the Minister, who intervened in the Full Court, appealed to the High Court. Amcor argued that they were not compelled to pay out the workers unless their positions in the business were abolished, whereas the positions remained unaffected by the demerger. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeals. It held that none of the positions involved in the paper manufacturing business became redundant. Neither the sale of Amcor’s assets nor the later termination of employment by Amcor meant that the work undertaken by the employees was no longer required by the company which conducted the business in which the positions existed. Their new employer, Paper Australia, owned and operated the business in which they worked before the demerger. As no job became redundant the redundancy provision in the certified agreement was not engaged.