Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 27 June 2013 GEORGE ELIAS v THE QUEEN & ANOR CHAFIC ISSA v THE QUEEN & ANOR [2013] HCA 31 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal by two men from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria which had rejected their appeals against the severity of the sentences imposed for their respective convictions for attempting to pervert the course of justice. The appellants each pleaded guilty before the Supreme Court of Victoria to offences which included a count of attempting to pervert the course of justice, which, under Victorian law, carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 25 years. The appellants were each sentenced to eight years' imprisonment for that offence. The conduct constituting the attempted perversion of justice consisted of acts of assistance given to a fugitive, Antonios (Tony) Mokbel, who had been convicted and sentenced for a Commonwealth offence. The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal against the severity of their sentences. They submitted that the sentencing judge was wrong not to take into account, as a factor in mitigation of their sentences, that there was a Commonwealth offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice which carried a lesser maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment. The Court of Appeal rejected that argument on the basis that the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) does not permit a sentencing judge to have regard to some other maximum penalty prescribed for a Commonwealth offence when sentencing for a Victorian offence. The appellants sought, and were granted, special leave to appeal to the High Court. The High Court unanimously dismissed their appeals. The Court said that there is no common law principle requiring a sentencing judge to take into account as a matter of mitigation that a different offence, for which it was open to prosecute a person, has a lesser maximum penalty. The Court said that the decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria in R v Liang (1995) 124 FLR 350, which held that a sentencing judge must take into account in mitigation of sentence that there is a less punitive offence upon which the prosecution could have proceeded and which is as appropriate to the facts as the charged offence, should not be followed.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 August 2022 [2022] HCA 25 Today, the High Court allowed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeal ("Court of Criminal Appeal"). The issue on appeal was whether the majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal correctly applied the test in M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 ("M") to determine whether the verdict of guilt in respect of the appellant was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence. The appellant was tried and convicted of the murder of his wife, by judge alone, in the Supreme Court of South Australia. The prosecution case was that the appellant had deliberately pushed his wife's wheelchair into a pond in the South Parklands in Adelaide with the intention of drowning her. The defence case was that she had drowned as a result of her wheelchair accidentally entering the water whilst the appellant was attempting to manoeuvre it away from the pond. The issue at trial was whether the prosecution could prove that the appellant murdered his wife, thus excluding accidental drowning as a reasonable possibility. At trial, there was little dispute about the primary facts established by the evidence. The critical question was what inferences could be drawn from those primary facts. The trial judge drew a number of inferences adverse to the appellant and concluded that the only rational inference available on the whole of the evidence was that the appellant deliberately pushed the wheelchair into the pond with intent to kill his wife. The trial judge therefore found the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction on the unreasonableness ground. Placing particular reliance on reasoning in a decision prior to M, the majority reasoned that the inferences drawn, and the weight to be given to those inferences, were primarily matters for the trial judge as the trier of fact. The High Court unanimously found that the majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal had misapplied the test in M. As a consequence of M, prior formulations of principle on the unreasonableness ground must be approached with caution. What each member of the Court of Criminal Appeal needed to do in order to apply the test in M in the circumstances of this case was to ask whether they were independently satisfied, as a result of their own assessment of the whole of the evidence adduced at trial, that the only rational inference available on that evidence was that the appellant deliberately pushed the wheelchair into the pond with intent to kill his wife and, if not, whether the satisfaction arrived at by the trial judge could be attributed to some identified advantage which the trial judge had over the appeal judge in the assessment of the evidence. The matter was remitted to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of South Australia for rehearing.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 16 May 2018 DWN027 v THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU [2018] HCA 20 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Nauru that the Refugee Status Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") had not erred in dismissing the appellant's claim for complementary protection under the Refugees Convention Act 2012 (Nr) ("the Refugees Act"). The appellant was a Sunni Muslim man of Pashtun ethnicity from Peshawar in Pakistan where he resided with his wife and young child. He arrived in the Republic of Nauru ("Nauru") and applied to the Secretary of the Department of Justice and Border Control of Nauru ("the Secretary") to be recognised as a refugee under the Refugees Act or, alternatively, as a person to whom Nauru owed complementary protection under the Act. He claimed that he had a well-founded fear of being persecuted by the Taliban by reason of his actual or imputed political opinion. The Secretary rejected the application. The Tribunal affirmed the Secretary's decision on the basis that, while there was a real possibility that if the appellant were returned to Peshawar he would be harmed by the Taliban, it would be reasonable in the circumstances for him to relocate to another area in Pakistan. The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal against the Tribunal's decision. The appellant appealed as of right to the High Court, alleging that the Tribunal had erred in determining his claim for complementary protection by reference to his ability reasonably to relocate within Pakistan, and in failing to take into account a number of integers said to be relevant to the question of whether he could reasonably relocate. The appellant further alleged that the Tribunal erred in determining his claim for complementary protection without having regard to Nauru's international obligation under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) ("the CRC") to give primary consideration to the best interests of his child. The High Court held that, having regard to international jurisprudence, unless the feared persecution emanates from or is condoned or tolerated by State actors (which was not an issue in this case), an applicant's ability reasonably to relocate within his or her country of origin, including the ability safely and legally to travel to the place of relocation, is relevant to whether the applicant is in need of complementary protection. It was also held that the Tribunal had not failed to take into account the factors relevant to the appellant's ability reasonably to relocate within Pakistan. Further, the Court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether the Tribunal were bound to give primary consideration to the best interests of the appellant's child under the CRC because the appellant did not contend before the Tribunal that they were bound to decide his claim for complementary protection by reference to the best interests of his child and, consequently, he did not adduce any persuasive evidence that his child's best interests would be adversely affected by the refusal of his claim. The Court therefore dismissed the appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 June 2016 [2016] HCA 25 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The High Court held that the general rule – that the appellate court's assessment of whether some other sentence is warranted in law is made on the material before the sentencing court and any relevant evidence of post-sentence conduct – applied to the appellant's case. However, the Court noted that the general rule does not deny that an appellate court has the flexibility to receive new evidence where it is necessary to do so to avoid a miscarriage of justice. On 17 April 2010, the appellant stabbed the complainant, his former partner, some 28 times in a sustained attack. He pleaded guilty in the District Court of New South Wales to wounding with intent to murder, and detaining the complainant without her consent with intent to obtain a psychological advantage, and immediately before the detaining, occasioning actual bodily harm to her. For the offence of wounding with intent, the appellant was sentenced to 16 years' imprisonment with a non- parole period of 11 years. He was sentenced to a concurrent eight year term of imprisonment for the detaining offence. The appellant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal against the severity of the sentences. At the commencement of the hearing in that Court, the appellant produced a folder of additional material on the basis that it would be admissible in the event that the Court came to re-sentence the appellant. The prosecutor did not object to the Court receiving the additional material "on the usual basis". The additional material included a report by Dr Nielssen, a psychiatrist. He opined that the appellant’s intoxication with a hallucinogenic drug, together with an underlying emotional state shaped by violence and sexual abuse in childhood, and a pattern of substance use, significantly contributed to his offending behaviour. Having found error in the trial judge's application of sentencing principle, the Court of Criminal Appeal turned to consider the exercise of its sentencing discretion. The Court declined to take into account Dr Nielssen's opinion concerning factors that may have caused or contributed to the commission of the offences, holding that the sentence hearing had been the occasion to address these matters. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The appellant contended that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in refusing to take into account Dr Nielssen's opinion. The High Court held that Dr Nielssen's opinion was based on a history which seemed to depart from the agreed facts on which the appellant was sentenced, and that his opinion that the appellant was in a psychotic state, or its equivalent, appeared to traverse the appellant's pleas. Their Honours held that nothing in the additional material supported the appellant's submission that the Court of Criminal Appeal’s refusal to permit him to run a different case before it had occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 December, 2003 NOEL JEBATHILAKAN ARULTHILAKAN v THE QUEEN CHISEKO MARK MKOKA v THE QUEEN The High Court of Australia, by a 4-1 majority, today dismissed appeals from two men convicted of murder, wounding with intent to grievous bodily harm and attempted armed robbery following a bungled bid to steal a mobile phone. The men were convicted, along with a third man, Carlos Escalante, who pleaded guilty, in the South Australian Supreme Court, and appealed unsuccessfully to the SA Court of Criminal Appeal. They appealed to the High Court only on their murder convictions. Five men in a stolen car driving through Stepney in Adelaide looked for someone to rob of a mobile phone. When they spotted Matthew Bourne and Colin Hugh Hillam, who was speaking on a mobile, Mr Arulthilakan, Mr Mkoka and Mr Escalante approached them. Mr Mkoka carried a cosh – a cue ball in a sock – and a knife passed to him by Mr Arulthilakan. Mr Escalante also carried a knife, which was used to stab Mr Hillam and Mr Bourne during the tussle over the phone. Mr Hillam was stabbed four times, receiving serious wounds to his chest and side. Mr Mkoka admitted attacking Mr Bourne with the cosh and kicking him as he lay on the ground. Mr Escalante allegedly stabbed Mr Bourne in the heart, and he died of rapid blood loss. The central issue in the appeal concerned the complicity of Mr Arulthilakan and Mr Mkoka in Mr Escalante’s stabbing of Mr Bourne. The defence case was that the stabbing of Mr Bourne was an independent act by Mr Escalante, done in the heat of an affray, and after any robbery attempt had ceased. The prosecution case was the use of the knife was part of the armed robbery, and resistance from the two victims was foreseeable, for which the men had armed themselves. Under the SA criminal code, a person intentionally committing a violent act while engaged in a major indictable offence – such as armed robbery – which results in another person’s death is guilty of murder. The High Court held that trial judge Justice Bruce Debelle technically misdirected the jury in telling them that as a matter of law Mr Escalante producing the knife was an act of violence when it should have been left as a question of fact for the jury, but the majority held that it did not give rise to a miscarriage of justice, since no other view of the facts was reasonably open. The appellants also argued that Justice Debelle’s directions withdrew from the jury’s consideration the issue of whether the production of the knife was a significant cause of Mr Bourne’s death, but the majority rejected their argument. The majority held that, after Mr Escalante presented the knife, it was open to the jury to reason that the victims’ resistance, the struggle and the fatal stabbing were all part of a brief sequence of events resulting from the act of violence.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 April 2015 DUNCAN v THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES NUCOAL RESOURCES LIMITED v STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES CASCADE COAL PTY LIMITED & ORS v THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES [2015] HCA 13 Today the High Court unanimously upheld the validity of certain provisions of Sched 6A to the Mining Act 1992 (NSW), which cancelled, without compensation, three specified exploration licences issued under the Mining Act. Schedule 6A was inserted into the Mining Act by the Mining Amendment (ICAC Operations Jasper and Acacia) Act 2014 (NSW) ("the Amendment Act"), which was enacted following consideration by both Houses of the New South Wales Parliament of reports prepared by the Independent Commission Against Corruption. Those reports contained findings that a number of individuals had engaged in corrupt conduct in relation to the grant of the exploration licences, and that the licences were so tainted by corruption that they should be cancelled. By special case in three separate proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the High Court, the corporate licensees of two of the cancelled exploration licences and their parent company ("the Cascade proceedings"), a former director of that parent company ("the Duncan proceedings") and the parent company of the corporate licensee of the other cancelled exploration licence ("the NuCoal proceedings"), challenged the validity of Sched 6A as inserted by the Amendment Act. In each proceeding, it was contended that the Amendment Act involved the legislative exercise of judicial power in the nature of, or akin to, a bill of pains and penalties, and that such an exercise of power contravened an implied limitation on State legislative power deriving either from Ch III of the Commonwealth Constitution or an historical limitation on colonial, and subsequently State, legislative power. In the Cascade and Duncan proceedings, it was contended that the Amendment Act is not a law within the meaning of s 5 of the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW). In the Cascade and NuCoal proceedings, it was contended that a provision of the Amendment Act, relating to the use and disclosure of information required to be provided by the licensees, is inconsistent with provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and was therefore inoperative to the extent of that inconsistency by force of s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution. The Court held that the Amendment Act is a law within the competence of the New South Wales Parliament because the grant of legislative power by s 5 of the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) implied no relevant limitation as to the content of an enactment of that Parliament. It also held that the Amendment Act did not involve the exercise of judicial power and did not bear the characteristics of a bill of pains and penalties. The existence and scope of any implied limitation on the ability of a State Parliament to exercise judicial power did not, therefore, arise for consideration. It was unnecessary for the Court to address the contention concerning s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution because it was not shown by the facts agreed in the special cases to be the subject of real controversy.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 June 2013 KAKAVAS v CROWN MELBOURNE LIMITED (ACN 006 973 262) & ORS [2013] HCA 25 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria, which held that Crown Melbourne Limited ("Crown") did not act unconscionably in allowing the appellant to gamble and lose large sums of money at its casino. The appellant was a high-stakes gambler and regular patron of Crown's casino. Between June 2005 and August 2006, he turned over $1.479 billion playing baccarat at the casino. He brought a claim to recover his net loss of $20.5 million over that period. The appellant issued proceedings against Crown and two of its employees in the Supreme Court of Victoria, claiming that they had engaged in unconscionable conduct contrary to s 51AA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and under the general law. At trial, the appellant alleged that Crown had lured him, a known problem gambler, to gamble at its casino by providing incentives, such as rebates on losses and the use of Crown's private jet. In dismissing the appellant's claims, the primary judge held that the appellant's gambling problem was not a kind of special disadvantage that rendered him susceptible to exploitation. Further, Crown had not sought to exploit, nor was there any scheme to exploit, any disadvantage from which the appellant might suffer. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that the primary judge's conclusion, that he was not in a position of special disadvantage, was erroneous, or that the wagering transactions that he engaged in with Crown were unfair, unjust or unreasonable. The Court of Appeal upheld the primary judge's finding that Crown was entitled to accept the appellant as he presented himself to it: a successful businessman entirely capable of making decisions in his own interests. The appellant appealed by special leave to the High Court. In the High Court, the appellant did not seek to challenge any findings of fact made by the primary judge. His argument shifted emphasis to a claim that Crown, by allowing him to gamble at its casino, had exploited his inability, by reason of his pathological urge to gamble, to make worthwhile decisions in his own interests while actually engaged in gambling. The High Court dismissed the appeal and concluded that the appellant's attempt to invoke principles of unconscionability failed. The Court did not accept that the appellant's pathological interest in gambling was a special disadvantage which made him susceptible to exploitation by Crown. He was able to make rational decisions in his own interests, including deciding from time to time to refrain from gambling altogether. Crown did not knowingly victimise the appellant by allowing him to gamble at its casino.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 7 October, 2003 TANWAR ENTERPRISES PTY LIMITED v JOSEPH CAUCHI, ANGELO CAUCHI, MARY CAUCHI AND JULIAN DALLEY JOSEPH JOHN ROMANOS AND JOSEPH JOHN ROMANOS AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE TERESA ROMANOS v PENTAGOLD INVESTMENTS PTY LIMITED AND MAROON BROTHERS INVESTMENTS PTY LIMITED The High Court of Australia today handed down two judgments in favour of property vendors who terminated contracts of sale after the purchasers failed to observe stipulations as to time for performance. In the first case, Tanwar arranged to buy three parcels of land at Glenwood, near Blacktown in Sydney, from the Cauchis and Mr Dalley for a total purchase price of $4.5 million. The vendors terminated the contracts on June 26, 2001, after Tanwar failed to complete the contract by 4pm the day before. Tanwar had still been arranging Singaporean finance which was finalised on June 26, but the vendors refused to proceed. Tanwar had paid a 10 per cent deposit, another $397,473.40 towards the purchase price and $80,000 in consideration of an earlier extension of time. A revised contract had stipulated that time was of the essence and that Tanwar would forfeit all money already paid if the sale was not completed on June In the second case, investment companies Pentagold and Maroon Brothers exchanged contracts with Joseph and Teresa Romanos for the sale of three adjoining parcels of land at Harris Park, near Parramatta in Sydney, for a total purchase price of $1.875 million. The buyers planned to build 24 units and sought development approval from Parramatta Council. Time for completion was extended to March 1, 2001, and the buyers paid a total of $50,000 towards the 10 per cent deposit. The balance of the deposit, $137,500, was payable upon approval of the development application. The purchasers received notice of the approval on December 1, 2000. The vendors terminated the contracts on December 19. In both cases, the purchasers sought specific performance of the contracts but their claims were rejected by Justice William Windeyer in the New South Wales Supreme Court. However, Justice Windeyer ordered the Romanoses to return the $50,000 deposit. In the Tanwar case, the NSW Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed its appeal. In the Pentagold-Maroon Brothers case, a differently constituted Court of Appeal, by majority, allowed their appeal and dismissed a cross-appeal by the Romanoses. Tanwar and Joseph Romanos appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously dismissed Tanwar’s appeal and allowed the Romanos appeal. It held that the stipulations as to time were to be applied according to their terms. Of Tanwar, the Court held that there was no relevant breach of contract by the vendors and they exercised a contractual right to terminate the contract and had not acted unconscionably. In the Romanos case, the Court held that Justice Windeyer erred in ordering the return of the deposit where there was a lack of evidence that it was unjust for the Romanoses to retain the deposit. It ordered that the deposit be forfeited to Mr Romanos.