Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 February 2014 MARK SHARNE SMITH v THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2014] HCA 3 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, which had held that a note found in the jury room after the jury had delivered its verdict could not be admitted as evidence. The note suggested that one juror may have been physically coerced by another juror into arriving at the verdict of guilty. On 17 January 2012, the appellant was convicted upon the verdict of a jury in the District Court of Western Australia of two counts of indecently dealing with a child under the age of 13 years. The following day, the trial judge informed counsel that a note in an envelope addressed to the judge had been found on the table in the jury room after the jury had been discharged. The note, which did not identify its author, was in the following terms: "I have been physically coerced by a fellow juror to change my plea to be aligned with the majority vote. This has made my ability to perform my duty as a juror on this panel [sic]". The trial judge was of the opinion that, because the verdict had already been entered, he could not do anything about the note. His Honour did, however, remark that there were a number of unusual factors surrounding the delivery of the verdict, including that one male juror seemed somewhat upset. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal on the ground that his trial had miscarried due to a juror being physically coerced into changing his verdict to guilty. The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that the note was inadmissible and that no order should be made directing the Sheriff to make inquiries concerning the allegations raised in the note. By special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court, arguing that the Court of Appeal failed to appreciate that the general rule which renders evidence of the conduct of jury deliberations inadmissible does not operate to preserve the secrecy of criminal conduct. The High Court held that, because the note was capable of giving rise to a reasonable apprehension or suspicion on the part of a fair-minded and informed member of the public that a juror did not discharge his task because of unlawful coercion, the Court of Appeal should have allowed the appellant's appeal. The High Court remitted the matter to the Court of Appeal to be heard and determined according to law.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 December 2013 THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY [2013] HCA 55 Today the High Court decided unanimously that the Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013, enacted by the Legislative Assembly for the Australian Capital Territory, cannot operate concurrently with the federal Marriage Act 1961. The Court held that the federal Parliament has power under the Australian Constitution to legislate with respect to same sex marriage, and that under the Constitution and federal law as it now stands, whether same sex marriage should be provided for by law is a matter for the federal Parliament. The Court held that "marriage" in s 51(xxi) of the Constitution refers to a consensual union formed between natural persons in accordance with legally prescribed requirements which is not only a union the law recognises as intended to endure and be terminable only in accordance with law but also a union to which the law accords a status affecting and defining mutual rights and obligations. "Marriage" in s 51(xxi) includes a marriage between persons of the same sex. The Marriage Act does not now provide for the formation or recognition of marriage between same sex couples. The Marriage Act provides that a marriage can be solemnised in Australia only between a man and a woman and that a union solemnised in a foreign country between a same sex couple must not be recognised as a marriage in Australia. That Act is a comprehensive and exhaustive statement of the law of marriage. The Court held that the object of the ACT Act is to provide for marriage equality for same sex couples and not for some form of legally recognised relationship which is relevantly different from the relationship of marriage which federal law provides for and recognises. Accordingly, the ACT Act cannot operate concurrently with the federal Act. Because the ACT Act does not validly provide for the formation of same sex marriages, its provisions about the rights of parties to such marriages and the dissolution of such marriages cannot have separate operation and are also of no effect. The Court held that the whole of the ACT Act is of no effect.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 13 December 2017 REGIONAL EXPRESS HOLDINGS LIMITED v AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION OF AIR PILOTS [2017] HCA 55 Today, the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The High Court held that an industrial association registered under the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth) ("the FWRO Act") is entitled to represent the industrial interests of a person, within the meaning of s 540(6)(b)(ii) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), where that person is eligible for membership of the industrial association pursuant to its eligibility rules but is not a member of the industrial association. The respondent is an industrial association registered as an organisation of employees under the FWRO Act. The appellant sent a letter to a number of persons to the effect that any person who completed its cadet programme and insisted on his or her workplace right to appropriate accommodation during layovers would not be given a position of command. The respondent alleged that the letter contravened various civil remedy provisions of the Fair Work Act and applied to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for pecuniary penalty orders. The persons to whom the letter had been sent were not members of the respondent. The appellant applied to have the claim summarily dismissed on the basis that the respondent lacked standing because it was not an industrial association "entitled to represent the industrial interests of" the persons who had received the letter as required by s 540(6)(b)(ii) of the Fair Work Act. The primary judge dismissed that application, holding that, because the persons to whom the letter had been sent were eligible for membership of the respondent, the respondent was entitled to represent their industrial interests within the meaning of s 540(6)(b)(ii) of the Fair Work Act. The appellant appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court. The Full Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an historical survey of legislative development of the expression "entitled to represent the industrial interests of" in s 540(6)(b)(ii) of the Fair Work Act demonstrated that it had been legislatively deployed and understood as allowing an industrial organisation to represent the industrial interests of employees who are eligible for membership of the organisation. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The Court held that, in the case of an industrial association which is registered as an organisation under the FWRO Act, the fact that a person is eligible for membership of the association in accordance with its eligibility rules is sufficient to make the association "entitled to represent the industrial interests of" that person within the meaning of s 540(6)(b)(ii) of the Fair Work Act. This construction was consistent with the context of the provision both within the Fair Work Act and against the background of its legislative history. Accordingly, the Full Court did not err in their construction of the expression and the appeal was dismissed.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 18 March 2020 SWAN v THE QUEEN [2020] HCA 11 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant and an accomplice were charged with the murder of 79-year-old Mr Kormilets. Mr Kormilets was an active man who was in apparently good health when the appellant and the accomplice attacked him after breaking into his home, causing severe injuries to his brain, face, kidneys and chest. Following the assault, Mr Kormilets spent almost four months in hospital before being transferred to a high-level care facility. His mental and physical condition was so poor that he was unable to undertake, or comprehend, any daily living activities. Eight months after the assault, Mr Kormilets suffered a fracture to the neck of his left femur. A decision was made not to operate on Mr Kormilets and he died in hospital from the consequences of the fracture shortly thereafter. Whether the appellant caused Mr Kormilets' death was a live issue at trial. The Crown advanced three possible pathways for the jury to conclude that the appellant caused the death. The central issue before the Court of Criminal Appeal and the High Court was whether it was open to the jury to convict upon the third pathway: that Mr Kormilets' low quality of life as a consequence of the assault caused the decision not to undergo surgery, which would reasonably have been expected to save his life. The Court of Criminal Appeal concluded that there was sufficient evidence for this pathway to be open to the jury. There was no dispute on appeal that causation is satisfied where an accused's act is "a substantial or significant cause of death" or a "sufficiently substantial" cause of the death charged. The High Court unanimously held that on the evidence it was open to the jury to conclude that surgery was available and would reasonably have been expected to save Mr Kormilets' life, that Mr Kormilets or his son made a decision that the surgery should not be undertaken, and that the decision not to operate was motivated by Mr Kormilets' low quality of life due to the assault. Accordingly, it was open to the jury to convict the appellant on the third pathway of causation.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 18 December 2013 UNIONS NSW & ORS v STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES [2013] HCA 58 Today the High Court unanimously held that ss 96D and 95G(6) of the Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Act 1981 (NSW) ("the EFED Act") are invalid because they impermissibly burden the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters, contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution. Section 96D of the EFED Act prohibits the making of a political donation to a political party, elected member, group, candidate or third-party campaigner, unless the donor is an individual enrolled on the electoral roll for State, federal or local government elections. The EFED Act also caps the total expenditure that political parties, candidates and third-party campaigners can incur for political advertising and related election material. For the purposes of this cap, s 95G(6) of the EFED Act aggregates the amount spent on electoral communication by a political party and by any affiliated organisation of that party. An "affiliated organisation" of a party is defined as a body or organisation "that is authorised under the rules of that party to appoint delegates to the governing body of that party or to participate in pre-selection of candidates for that party (or both)". Each of the plaintiffs intends to make political donations to the Australian Labor Party, the Australian Labor Party (NSW Branch) or other entities, and to incur electoral communication expenditure within the meaning of the EFED Act. The second, third and sixth plaintiffs are authorised to appoint delegates to the annual conference of the Australian Labor Party (NSW Branch) and to participate in the pre-selection of that party's candidates for State elections. A special case stated questions of law for determination by the High Court. The High Court unanimously held that ss 96D and 95G(6) burdened the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters. that political communication at a State level may have a federal dimension. The Court accepted that the EFED Act had general anti-corruption purposes. However, the Court held that the impugned provisions were not connected to those purposes or any other legitimate end. The Court held
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 9 April, 2003 AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION v C G BERBATIS HOLDINGS PTY LTD & ORS The High Court of Australia today dismissed an appeal by the ACCC which alleged a shopping centre’s insistence on tenants discontinuing litigation if they wanted their lease renewed constituted unconscionable conduct under the Trade Practices Act. The High Court held, by a 4-1 majority, that the tenant was not under any special disadvantage or disability. Inequality of bargaining power was not in itself a special disadvantage. The problem for the tenants was that they had no option to renew their lease. This was not a relevant form of disability for the purposes of the law relating to unconscionable conduct. Margaret and James Roberts ran a seafood shop in Farrington Fayre Shopping Centre in the Perth suburb of Leeming from 1989 until the end of 1996 when they sold the business. The Roberts’ lease was due to expire in early 1997 and the sale was on the basis that a new lease was granted. The Roberts had joined other tenants in legal proceedings against the owners for various charges imposed on them under their leases. The shopping centre owners said they would renew the Roberts’ lease but only on condition that they abandoned the litigation. The Roberts felt they had no choice but to agree. In 1998, the ACCC instituted Federal Court proceedings, claiming that the condition that the Roberts withdraw from litigation contravened section 51AA of the Trade Practices Act which prohibits unconscionable conduct by corporations. Justice French held that the owners had breached s 51AA, but his decision was overturned by the Full Court of the Federal Court. The ACCC appealed to the High Court. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that taking advantage of a superior bargaining position was not to be confused with unconscientious exploitation of another’s inability to protect their own interests. The Court held that the Roberts were not under any relevant disability, nor was the shopping centre’s owners’ conduct unconscionable.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 22 August 2011 HIH CLAIMS SUPPORT LIMITED v INSURANCE AUSTRALIA LIMITED [2011] HCA 31 Today the High Court dismissed an appeal by HIH Claims Support Limited ("HCSL") from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The High Court upheld the Court of Appeal's finding that HCSL was not entitled to equitable contribution from Insurance Australia Limited ("IAL") in respect of amounts HCSL had paid to satisfy certain liabilities incurred by Mr Ronald Steele. Steele was sub-contracted to erect a scaffold at Albert Park, Melbourne, for the 1998 Australian Grand Prix. He was insured under a general liability insurance policy ("the HIH policy") issued by a company ("HIH") in the HIH group of insurance companies ("the HIH Group"). As a sub-contractor of the Australian Grand Prix Corporation, Steele was also insured under a policy issued by IAL's predecessor in title. In March 1998, Steele's scaffold collapsed and damaged a valuable "jumbotron" video screen. The operator of the screen subsequently won an action against Steele in the Supreme Court of New South Wales ("the NSW proceeding") for damages for losses caused by the collapse of the scaffold. Steele made a claim under the HIH policy in relation to the incident and any liability established in the NSW proceeding. HIH accepted his claim. However, before the trial in the NSW proceeding, the HIH Group collapsed. In 2001, the Commonwealth Government established a scheme for providing financial assistance to policyholders, insureds and beneficiaries under insurance policies issued by the HIH Group who had suffered loss as a result of the collapse of the HIH Group ("the Scheme"). HCSL was appointed as the Scheme's trustee, administrator and manager. Steele applied and was accepted for assistance. In accordance with the Scheme, Steele assigned to HCSL all of his rights against HIH, including his right to prove in the liquidation of HIH. In return, HCSL paid 90 per cent of the amount HIH would have paid under the HIH policy in satisfaction of Steele's liability and his costs in defending the NSW proceeding, excluding some amounts HIH had already paid. HCSL then brought proceedings against IAL in the Supreme Court of Victoria, seeking equitable contribution in the sum of one half of all of the payments HCSL had made in respect of Steele. Both the primary judge and the Court of Appeal dismissed HCSL's claim. HCSL was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal on the basis that the liabilities of HCSL and IAL were not co-ordinate. The parties did not share a common burden because the Scheme was structured to prevent contractual obligations between HCSL and Steele from arising if Steele had already been indemnified by IAL and to prevent IAL from claiming equitable contribution from HCSL. Further, in its contract to indemnify Steele, HCSL did not undertake the same risk as IAL had undertaken in its insurance policy covering Steele.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 14 June 2006 LOMANI JOEY KOROITAMANA (an infant by her next friend Sereana Naikelekele) AND MEREANI DIVOLIVOLI ((an infant by her next friend Sereana Naikelekele) v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AND MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS Two girls, who were born in Australia to Fijian parents, and who have the right to take out Fijian citizenship but who have not done so, are aliens under Australian law, the High Court of Australia held today. Lomani was born in Australia on 26 August 2000 and Mereani on 3 September 1998. They have remained continuously in Australia. Neither their mother, Sereana Naikelekele, nor their father, Maika Koroitamana, is an Australian citizen or a permanent resident and neither girl is an Australian citizen. Under the Constitution of Fiji, the girls may become citizens of Fiji by registration, but no application for registration has been made by them or on their behalf. The girls, who have been placed in immigration detention, commenced proceedings to challenge section 189 of the Migration Act which provides for detention of unlawful non-citizens and section 198 which provides for removal from Australia of unlawful non-citizens. They claim that under section 51(xix) of the Constitution the power to make laws with respect naturalisation and aliens does not extend to a power to treat them as aliens. In the Federal Court of Australia, Justice Arthur Emmett stated a case for the consideration of the Full Court which answered “yes” to the question of whether the girls were aliens within the meaning of section 51(xix). Lomani and Mereani sought special leave to appeal to the High Court. Their application was referred to a Full Court of seven Justices and argued fully as on an appeal. The Court unanimously granted the application for leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal. In 2004, the Court, by a 5-2 majority, in Singh v Commonwealth held that birth in Australia does not of itself mean that a person is beyond the reach of the power conferred on Parliament by section 51(xix) and does not mean that that person cannot be treated as an alien. Tania Singh was born in Australia to Indian parents. Lomani and Mereani said the difference between their case and Singh was that Tania was a citizen of India by descent from her parents whereas they are not citizens of Fiji. They argued that a person born in Australia could not possibly answer the description of “alien” unless they could be shown to have foreign allegiance. The Court held that it is open to Parliament to decide that an Australian-born child of parents who are foreign nationals is not automatically entitled to citizenship.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 8 March 2006 JASON CHARLES BUCKLEY v THE QUEEN Errors were made in assessing whether Mr Buckley should be jailed indefinitely and the Queensland Court of Appeal must re-examine the case in accordance with principles governing the exceptional imposition of indefinite sentences, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Buckley, 34, pleaded guilty to five counts of rape, and one count each of burglary with violence, indecent assault and inflicting grievous bodily harm, arising from three violent attacks on women, one in Dalby and two in Toowoomba, between March 1999 and January 2000. Under Part 10 of the Queensland Penalties and Sentences Act, a court may impose an indefinite sentence on an offender convicted of violent offences if a court is satisfied that they are a serious danger to the community. The court must state the prison term that would otherwise be imposed – in Mr Buckley's case, 22 years – which affected reviews of the indefinite sentence and any new term that might be set if the indefinite term is lifted. The court must have regard to whether the nature of the offence is exceptional and to the offender's age, background, character, psychiatric or other reports, the risk of serious harm to the community, and the need to protect the community from such risk. The court must set out detailed reasons for imposing an indefinite sentence. The Court of Appeal, by majority, refused Mr Buckley's application for leave to appeal. Justice Catherine Holmes in dissent would have granted leave to appeal, as she found that there were three material errors of fact made by Judge Warren Howell. However, she would have come to the same conclusion that an indefinite sentence should be imposed. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal. It agreed with Justice Holmes's findings of errors of fact but it held that, more significantly, Judge Howell had failed to apply the principles applicable to a decision as to whether to impose an indefinite sentence. The Court held that Mr Buckley's case was one where Part 10 of the Act could apply but the outcome was not inevitable and the Court of Appeal should have given leave to appeal and exercised its own discretion. The Court remitted the matter to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration.