Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 6 December 2007 GRAHAME JAMES GATELY v THE QUEEN No miscarriage of justice occurred when a jury, without the trial judge or lawyers present, was able to have a second viewing of a video of a child giving her evidence in a sexual offences trial, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Gately was convicted in the Queensland District Court in November 2004 of 10 counts of indecent treatment of a girl under 16 who is a lineal descendant and one count of incest. A further charge of attempting to procure a child under 16 to commit an indecent act was withdrawn during the trial. The girl was 14 at the time the offences allegedly occurred between 22 July and 4 August 2002 and 16 by the time of the trial. A pre-recorded video of the girl giving her evidence and being cross-examined was shown to the jury. During deliberations, the jury asked to see the video again. Counsel for both the prosecution and defence agreed that, rather than reconvening the court, the jury could watch the video in the courtroom supervised by the bailiff. Mr Gately appealed to the Court of Appeal against his convictions. It unanimously dismissed the appeal. He then appealed to the High Court, alleging that there had been a miscarriage of justice because Judge Milton Griffin erred in allowing the jury to watch the video again and he did not direct the jury not to give undue weight to the girl’s evidence. Mr Gately also alleged that Judge Griffin erred in permitting the prosecutor to tender the girl’s written statement to police when she had already given full pre-recorded evidence. The High Court, by a 4-1 majority, dismissed the appeal. The Court unanimously held that the way in which the video was replayed to the jury without the Court reconvening was irregular, but the majority held that in the circumstances of the case this had not led to a miscarriage of justice. Mr Gately’s counsel’s consent to the jury watching the video with the bailiff was significant. Mr Gately did not give evidence or call evidence in his defence and little other evidence was given apart from the girl’s pre-recorded testimony. Her evidence was critical to both the prosecution’s case and Mr Gately’s answer that the prosecution had not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Allowing only the girl’s evidence to be re-examined by the jury in the circumstances of this case presented no risk of an unbalanced consideration of competing accounts of what allegedly happened. The majority rejected Mr Gately’s contention that Judge Griffin should have directed the jury not to give undue weight to the video evidence. No such direction was sought at trial. The Court unanimously dismissed the third ground of appeal, that the girl’s police statement was wrongly received in evidence. It held that the statement was properly admitted under section 93A of the Queensland Evidence Act which concerns written statements by children or intellectually impaired persons where they were also available to give evidence at trial.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 5 October 2012 JT INTERNATIONAL SA v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA; BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO AUSTRALASIA LIMITED & ORS v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA [2012] HCA 43 On 15 August 2012 the High Court made orders in two matters concerning the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) ("the Act"). Today the High Court delivered its reasons in those matters. A majority of the High Court held that the Act was valid as it did not acquire property. It therefore did not engage s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution, which requires any acquisition of property effected by a Commonwealth law to be on just terms. The Act imposes restrictions on the colour, shape and finish of retail packaging for tobacco products and restricts the use of trademarks on such packaging. The plaintiffs brought proceedings in the High Court challenging the validity of the Act, arguing that the Commonwealth acquired their intellectual property rights and goodwill otherwise than on just terms. A majority of the Court held that to engage s 51(xxxi) an acquisition must involve the accrual to some person of a proprietary benefit or interest. Although the Act regulated the plaintiffs' intellectual property rights and imposed controls on the packaging and presentation of tobacco products, it did not confer a proprietary benefit or interest on the Commonwealth or any other person. As a result, neither the Commonwealth nor any other person acquired any property and s 51(xxxi) was not engaged.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 February 2015 COMMISSIONER OF THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE & ORS v ZHAO & ANOR [2015] HCA 5 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria, which had stayed proceedings brought by the appellant for the forfeiture of property of the respondents as proceeds of crime, pursuant to s 49 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) ("the Act"), until the determination of a criminal charge against the second respondent. The second respondent was charged that he aided and abetted another to deal with money or property that was the proceeds of crime and worth $100,000 or more, contrary to ss 11.2 and 400.4 of the Criminal Code (Cth). He has been committed to stand trial for that offence. The first respondent is the second respondent's wife, and has not been charged with any offence, but is registered as the proprietor of a residential property which is a subject of the forfeiture proceedings. On the application of the appellant, the County Court of Victoria made an order under s 19 of the Act restraining the disposition of certain property owned by the respondents on the basis that it was the proceeds of crime. Later, the appellant applied for forfeiture of this property pursuant to s 49 of the Act. In the proceedings for the restraining order and the forfeiture order, it was alleged that the property sought to be forfeited is the proceeds of the same offence as that for which the second respondent is to be prosecuted in the criminal proceedings, save that in the criminal proceedings the offence is stated with respect to a particular period. The respondents filed applications commencing proceedings for the exclusion of certain property from the restraining order and from forfeiture. Thereafter, they made an application for a stay of the forfeiture proceedings and the exclusion proceedings until the completion of the criminal proceedings against the second respondent. The High Court unanimously found that the Court of Appeal was correct to order a stay of the forfeiture proceedings and the exclusion proceedings. The Court held that the issue, offences and circumstances in the forfeiture proceedings and in the criminal proceedings were substantially identical. It was not necessary for the second respondent to say any more than he did on the application for a stay in order to identify the risk of prejudice to him in the criminal proceedings. The Court found that the interests of justice were not served by requiring the second respondent to defend the forfeiture proceedings or pursue the exclusion proceedings before his criminal proceedings were finalised, especially since the appellant would suffer no relevant prejudice from a delay in the continuation of the forfeiture proceedings.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 17 June 2015 GNYCH & ANOR v POLISH CLUB LIMITED [2015] HCA 23 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The High Court held that a lease granted in contravention of s 92(1)(d) of the Liquor Act 2007 (NSW) ("the Liquor Act") was not void and unenforceable. In 2012, the respondent leased part of its licensed premises to the appellants for the running of a restaurant. Section 92(1)(d) of the Liquor Act provides that a licensee must not lease certain parts of a licensed premises without the approval of the Independent Liquor and Gaming Authority ("the Authority"). The respondent did not obtain the approval of the Authority for the lease to the appellants and thereby contravened s 92(1)(d) of the Liquor Act. Subsequently, relations between the parties deteriorated and, in 2013, the appellants were excluded from the premises. The appellants commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales seeking a declaration that they had a "retail shop lease", which has a minimum term of five years, under the Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW). The appellants also sought an injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with their possession of the leased premises. The respondent contended that the lease was unenforceable, having been granted in breach of the Liquor Act. At trial, the Supreme Court held that, although there had been a breach of s 92(1)(d), the lease was not unenforceable. The respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed on the basis that a lease granted in breach of s 92(1)(d) conflicts with the purpose and policy of the Liquor Act, in particular the responsibility of the licensee to supervise the conduct of the business on the licensed premises. By grant of special leave, the appellants appealed to the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal, holding that on the proper construction of the Liquor Act the respondent's breach of s 92(1)(d) did not automatically render the lease void and unenforceable.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 September 2004 TANIA SINGH (AN INFANT BY HER NEXT FRIEND MALKIT SINGH) v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AND MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS The High Court of Australia today dismissed a challenge to the validity of a Commonwealth law providing for the removal, as an unlawful non-citizen, of a child born in Australia of Indian parents. Tania Singh was born in Mildura on 5 February 1998. Her parents and nine-year-old brother were born in India. They arrived in Australia in April 1997 and lodged applications for protection visas, claiming refugee status. Those applications have been rejected by the Immigration Department and the Refugee Review Tribunal. Further proceedings are ongoing in the Federal Court. In 2003 Tania, via her father, filed a writ of summons in the High Court seeking a declaration that, because she was born in Australia, section 198 of the Migration Act, providing for removal of unlawful non-citizens, did not validly apply to her. Section 10 of the Citizenship Act provides that a person born in Australia is an Australian citizen if at least one parent was an Australian citizen or permanent resident or other long-term resident. Tania is a non-citizen. The primary issue before the Court was whether section 51(xix) of the Constitution, which gives Parliament power to make laws with respect to naturalisation and aliens, empowered Parliament to legislate for the removal of someone in Tania’s position. Tania’s case was that, despite her lack of Australian citizenship, her birth in Australia necessarily meant she was not an alien and treating her as such was beyond the legislative competence of Parliament. It was argued that at the time of federation in 1901 “alien” had an accepted and fixed legal meaning which excluded someone born in Australia, therefore Parliament had no power to treat Tania as an alien. The High Court, by a 5-2 majority, held that laws treating Tania as having alien status were within the power conferred on Parliament by section 51(xix). The majority held that the meaning of alien in 1901 was far from fixed, and would not necessarily have excluded someone in Tania’s position. The common law position that anyone born in the British Dominions was a British subject had already by then been modified several times by the British Parliament. Naturalisation, allegiance, nationality and alien status were controversial subjects in Britain and Europe during the latter part of the 19th century and also at Australia’s constitutional Convention Debates in the 1890s.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Manager, Public Information 30 April 2009 AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION CHANNEL SEVEN BRISBANE PTY LTD & ORS The High Court today handed down a decision about the scope of what is sometimes called the "media safe-harbour" protecting media outlets from liability for misleading or deceptive conduct under the Trade Practices Act. Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act prohibits a corporation from engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct, or in conduct that is likely to mislead or deceive. Section 65A of that Act exempts "prescribed information providers" from the application of section 52, except in certain circumstances. Television broadcasters holding licences under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 are "prescribed information providers". Prescribed information providers do not have the benefit of the exemption where a misleading or deceptive publication concerns the supply or possible supply of goods or services and is made pursuant to a contract, arrangement or understanding with a person who supplies good or services “of that kind”. Today a majority of the High Court allowed an appeal by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (the ACCC) against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court, which found that the media exemption under section 65A applied to members of the Channel Seven network. The High Court was required to determine what was meant by goods or services “of that kind”. The case concerned the broadcast of two episodes of Today Tonight containing segments concerning a business called "Wildly Wealthy Women". The business offered to train women to make money out of real estate investment. At the hearing of the appeal in the High Court, there was no dispute that the relevant Today Tonight episodes contained untrue claims about the wealth and assets of the two women who were offering the training. Nor was it in dispute that certain representations made in the episodes were misleading and deceptive. The main question to be determined was whether section 65A exempted the television stations which carried the broadcast from the operation of section 52. The ACCC argued that because of the arrangement made between the television stations and the two women to broadcast the program, the broadcast was not covered by the section 65A exemption. The primary judge had held that the television channels were not exempt from the operation of section 52 in these circumstances. The Full Court of the Federal Court, on the other hand, held that the benefit of the exemption did apply to the broadcasters. The High Court granted special leave to the ACCC to appeal the decision of the Full Court. A majority of members of the High Court considered that the primary judge had properly construed section 65A. The exemption conferred by section 65A does not apply to situations in which a media outlet publishes matter in relation to goods or services where the publication is pursuant to an arrangement with a supplier of goods or services. The High Court allowed the ACCC's appeal, set aside the Full Court's orders and restored the orders made by the primary judge.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 30 April, 2003 The High Court of Australia today dismissed Ms Fox’s appeal against a New South Wales Court of Appeal decision that her horse was on the wrong side of the road when it collided with a Kombi van on a dirt road near Bega in south-eastern NSW. Ms Fox had sued Ms Percy for damages for negligent driving. Ms Fox and Ms Percy, the driver of the van, each claimed they were on their correct side of the road. Ms Percy was driving downhill and Ms Fox and her partner Christopher Murdoch were riding their horses uphill when the collision occurred on April 11, 1992. Ms Fox was seriously injured and her horse was killed. At the accident scene, Constable Peter Volf sketched a diagram of straight 10-metre-long skidmarks on the left-hand side of the road behind the van, which came to rest facing forward on the correct side of the road. However, the NSW District Court trial judge accepted the evidence of Ms Fox. The case raised questions of principle as to the approach to be taken by an appellate court on reviewing a trial judge’s holding of fact. The High Court held that the NSW Court of Appeal was correct to set aside the District Court’s verdict. The Court held that the skidmarks were an incontestable fact contradicting Ms Fox’s evidence and it unanimously dismissed her appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 18 May 2006 PETER JAMES BATTERHAM AND MAYLORD EQUITY MANAGEMENT PTY LTD v QSR LIMITED AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF NEW SOUTH WALES A former company director who lost his share options when the company did not perform sufficiently well could not have recourse to the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales, the High Court of Australia held today. In November 1999, QSR sought to raise capital to acquire 41 KFC stores in NSW from the American owner of the KFC brand. Mr Batterham was a QSR director. QSR’s share prospectus stated that the directors had been issued with share options, exercisable in early 2003, if QSR met certain performance criteria, including the company achieving earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) of an average of at least 18 per cent for the calendar years 2000, 2001 and 2002. However, the deed setting out the terms in which Mr Batterham’s options were issued described as a condition the achieving of EBITDA of 18 per cent in each of the three calendar years. In its first two years, QSR achieved EBITDA of more than 18 per cent, but in 2002 the figure slipped to 16.2 per cent. Although QSR achieved an average EBITDA of 18 per cent of funds invested over the three years, it did not achieve EBITDA of 18 per cent in each of those years. Mr Batterham performed various work for the company until he resigned as a director in April 2002. He contends that he was forced to resign. Mr Batterham and his trust company Maylord applied to the IRC under section 106 of the Industrial Relations Act, alleging that the option deed was unfair, harsh or unconscionable and seeking to have it varied. Section 106(1) of the Act provides that the IRC may make an order declaring wholly or partly void, or varying, any contract whereby a person performs work in any industry if the IRC finds the contract is unfair. QSR applied to the IRC for orders dismissing the proceedings for want of jurisdiction. The IRC refused to dismiss the proceedings. QSR then applied to the NSW Court of Appeal for prohibition directed to the IRC and certiorari removing the proceedings into the Court of Appeal for the purpose of dismissing the proceedings. By majority, the Court of Appeal ordered that the IRC be prohibited from hearing the proceedings in respect of the option deed except where they were based on a contract or arrangement whereby Mr Batterham performed work in an industry. He and Maylord appealed to the High Court. The Court, by a 5-2 majority, dismissed the appeal and upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 20 May 2005 COMMISSIONER OF MAIN ROADS v LLOYD RUSSELL JONES A motorist who was seriously injured when his car collided with a horse was unlikely to have taken notice of warning signs or a lower speed limit had these been in place, the High Court of Australia held today. On 11 May 1992, Mr Jones left Kununurra to drive 358km to Halls Creek on the Great Northern Highway in the Kimberley region in north-western Western Australia. Waterholes along the highway attract wild horses, feral donkeys and kangaroos. About 7pm, after 200km travel in about 90 minutes, the car hit a horse then struck a tree, 5.8km south of Turkey Creek. Mr Jones, then aged 57, suffered serious head injuries and never recovered total consciousness. His claim for damages in negligence was brought by his wife Janet Jones as his next friend in the WA District Court. Mr Jones alleged that the Commissioner had breached a duty of care by failing to erect road signs warning of the danger of animals on the highway and by failing to impose a speed limit of 80km/hour rather than the general limit of 110km/hour. Judge David Charters dismissed the action, holding that a reasonable response by the highway authority did not require either measure, and that Mr Jones’s conduct showed he would not have slowed down or driven more cautiously even if there had been a warning sign or a reduced speed limit. Mr Jones’s average speed on the trip was estimated at between 135 and 140km/hour, despite the highway having sections of winding road. Turkey Creek has a 90km/hour limit but his speed there attracted comment, with one witness estimating it at about 140km/hour. Judge Charters held that the risk of straying animals was no greater around the accident site than along the rest of the route, although the danger increased at night. Judge Charters held that Mr Jones drove at a dangerous speed at night and his own negligence was the sole cause of the accident. The Full Court of the Supreme Court, by majority, allowed an appeal by Mr Jones, and held that warning signs and an 80km/hour speed limit were required on that section of the highway, between two creeks, where the accident happened. The Commissioner appealed to the High Court. The Court upheld Judge Charters’ finding that even if warning signs had been erected and the speed limit reduced these measures would not have prevented the accident or lessened his injuries. The evidence showed that Mr Jones travelled at excessive speeds despite knowing of the dangers of straying animals in the Kimberleys. He had ignored the 90km/hour speed limit sign on the outskirts of Turkey Creek. The evidence supported the inference that additional signs would not have influenced his conduct. The Court unanimously allowed the appeal.