Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 18 December 2013 [2013] HCA 56 Today the High Court, by majority, allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales concerning the measure of damages that the purchaser of assets of a business was entitled to recover from the vendor who broke its contractual promise to deliver stock complying with a warranty. The appellant and respondent were registered medical practitioners who each specialised in providing assisted reproductive technology services. The appellant agreed to buy assets of St George Fertility Centre Pty Limited, a company which was controlled by the respondent and which provided medical and assisted reproductive technology services to patients. The company ("the vendor") agreed to sell certain assets of the practice, including a stock of frozen donated sperm. The respondent guaranteed the vendor's obligations under the contract. The vendor warranted that the identification of donors of the sperm complied with specified guidelines. Of the stock of sperm delivered, 1,996 straws of sperm which the appellant would have expected to be able to use were not as warranted and were unusable. The appellant could not buy suitable replacement sperm in Australia but could in the United States of America. The primary judge found that buying 1,996 straws of replacement sperm from the American supplier ("Xytex") would have cost about $1 million at the time the contract was breached. The purchase price for the assets (including the stock of frozen donated sperm) was less than $400,000. The appellant accepted that ethically she could not charge, and in fact had not charged, any patient a fee for using donated sperm greater than the amount the appellant had outlaid to acquire it. The Supreme Court of New South Wales entered judgment for the appellant against the vendor for breach of warranty, and against the respondent as guarantor of the vendor's obligations. The primary judge assessed the damages for breach of warranty as the amount that the appellant would have had to pay Xytex (at the time the contract was breached) to buy 1,996 straws of sperm. On appeal against the assessment of damages, the Court of Appeal held that the appellant should have no damages for the vendor's breach of warranty. The appellant had bought straws of sperm from Xytex to use in treating patients and had charged each patient a fee which covered the costs the appellant had incurred in buying the straws that were used in treating that patient. The Court of Appeal held that the appellant had thus avoided any loss she would otherwise have sustained. By special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court seeking orders reinstating the award of damages made by the primary judge. The Court allowed the appeal by majority. It held that the appellant should recover the amount it would have cost (at the date of the breach of warranty) to acquire 1,996 straws of sperm from Xytex.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 February 2005 GUY EDWARD SWAIN v WAVERLEY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL The High Court of Australia today upheld a damages award to Mr Swain who became a quadriplegic in an accident at Bondi Beach in November 1997. Mr Swain, then 24, was at the beach with his friend Kathryn Galvin and her flatmate Earl Wilson. He waded out about 15 metres into waist-deep water and dived through a wave but hit his head on a sandbar. Mr Swain sued Waverley Council for negligence, alleging that the red-and-yellow flags induced him to swim where he did and that the Council had failed to take reasonable care in positioning the flags and in not erecting signs warning swimmers of the sandbar. The case was heard by Acting Justice Ken Taylor and a four-member jury in the New South Wales Supreme Court. Justice Taylor instructed the jury that the Council had a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of people using the beach. It was for the jury to decide whether there had been a breach of that duty. The jury found the Council liable and found contributory negligence of 25 per cent on the part of Mr Swain. He was awarded $3.75 million. The Council successfully appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal on two issues. The Court of Appeal unanimously accepted there was no evidence to support the decision against the Council for failing to warn swimmers of the sandbar and by a 2-1 majority accepted that there was no evidence to support the verdict on the flag placement issue. Mr Swain appealed to the High Court on this latter issue. The Court allowed the appeal by a 3-2 majority. It held that the Court of Appeal had erred in setting aside the jury verdict. The High Court majority held that there was sufficient evidence on which a jury could be reasonably satisfied that the Council had been negligent. It was open to the jury to accept Mr Swain’s version of how he was injured. It was also open to the jury to conclude that in placing the flags the Council should have exercised reasonable care to prevent injury to bathers. Whether or not the risk posed by the sandbar was obvious was a question of fact and it was open to the jury to conclude that the sandbar was a concealed hazard. The flags were not moved on the day of Mr Swain’s accident. The Council called no evidence to explain why the flags could not have been moved so as to avoid the hazard. The majority held there was sufficient material to sustain a finding in favour of Mr Swain on the issue of negligence and that, since it was for the jury to decide whether such a finding should be made, the verdict should stand. The majority pointed out that the case, properly analysed, was one concerned with the correct approach by appeal courts to overturning jury verdicts rather than the liability of local government authorities to surfers as such.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 8 October, 2003 RE PHILIP RUDDOCK IN HIS CAPACITY AS MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS; EX PARTE APPLICANT S154 OF 2002 The High Court of Australia today dismissed an application for constitutional writs by a Sri Lankan woman who belatedly raised claims she was raped by police in Sri Lanka. The woman, 29, known as Applicant S154, is an ethnic Tamil and a Christian. In 1996 she moved to the Maldives and lived with her employer, a Muslim Pakistani. They married in 1998 and a few days later arrived in Australia, along with S154’s mother. S154 applied for a protection visa, contending she was suspected by the authorities of belonging to the Tamil Tigers separatist group. The Immigration Department denied her a protection visa because it was not satisfied she was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. She was not regarded as being associated with the Tamil Tigers, had never been arrested or detained under anti-terrorist laws, had been free to travel in and out of Sri Lanka, was of no interest to the authorities and had no well-founded fear of persecution. The decision was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal, but was reversed by the Federal Court in 2000 on the ground that the RRT failed to make findings about S154’s claim, made for the first time at the RRT hearing, that she feared being recruited by the Tamil Tigers. The matter was remitted to the RRT and heard by another Member. At the second hearing, S154 said she was raped by police questioning her about the Tamil Tigers. She said she had not raised this before because she did not want her mother or husband to know. The Member replied, “OK, I don’t need to ask you any further question about that particular incident.” The Member subsequently asked S154 whether she wanted to say anything further about the claim The RRT also affirmed the original decision to refuse S154 a protection visa, holding that she had never even mentioned being taken to the police station until the second hearing. She had also not mentioned rape to a psychologist whom she saw 10 times. The Member said he was satisfied the claim was untrue and designed to bolster S154’s case. S154 then applied to the High Court for constitutional writs. S154 claimed the Member’s comment conveyed the impression that the Member had accepted her evidence and she was denied natural justice. The Court held that the Member was openly sceptical and gave her several opportunities to say more about the incident at the police station, so he did not mislead her. The Court, by a 4-1 majority, dismissed the application.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 June 2004 ANDAR TRANSPORT PTY LTD v BRAMBLES LIMITED Brambles could not claim an indemnity against liability for negligence in the case of an injured driver, Daryl Wail, but it was entitled to a contribution towards an award of damages from Mr Wail’s company, the High Court of Australia held today. Brambles provides laundry delivery services to hospitals but since 1990 it has contracted out the work. Mr Wail had been a driver for Princes Linen Service, which was taken over by Brambles. When Brambles decided to contract out laundry deliveries, Mr Wail and Andrew Parker set up Andar Transport and bought the truck from Brambles. Mr Wail was employed as a driver. On 26 July 1993, Mr Wail, then aged 28, loaded a truck with 22 trolleys of clean linen at Brambles laundry for delivery to Cotham Private Hospital in Kew in Melbourne. While unloading, a trolley became jammed against another. Attempting to pull it free Mr Wail felt a searing pain across his lower back. His lumbosacral disc had been damaged and he could no longer work as a truck driver. Mr Wail commenced negligence proceedings against Brambles in 1998 in the Victorian County Court, claiming Brambles failed to ensure fully laden trolleys could be manoeuvred without risk of injury. A jury found in favour of Mr Wail and he was awarded damages totalling $415,000. After subtracting $104,411.60 pursuant to section 135A of the Accident Compensation Act and a reduction of 35 per cent for Mr Wail’s contributory negligence, the Court entered judgment for him of $201,822.46 plus interest. This result is not the subject of the appeal to the High Court. Brambles joined Andar as a party in the proceedings and sought an indemnity from Andar in respect of any damages Brambles might be ordered to pay or contribution due to Andar’s alleged negligence as Mr Wail’s employer. The County Court dismissed Brambles’ third-party claims against Andar. In the Court of Appeal Brambles appealed against the outcomes of both the original proceeding and the third-party proceeding. The Court dismissed the appeal on the first but allowed the appeal on the latter. It held that the contract between Brambles and Andar indemnified Brambles against liability so did not need to consider the extent of the contribution Brambles was also entitled to under section 23B of the Wrongs Act. Andar appealed to the High Court, arguing that the Court of Appeal erred in concluding Andar was contractually bound to indemnify Brambles and that it erred in holding that a claim for contribution against Andar was otherwise available. The High Court, by a 6-1 majority, held that Andar was not obliged to indemnify Brambles as indemnity clauses in the contract did not extend to injured drivers. However it held that a claim for contribution was available to Brambles. The Court held that an employer such as Andar owed a duty to its employees, including directors, to provide a safe system of work in the loading and unloading of trolleys. The Court allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal for calculation of any contribution to which Brambles was entitled.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 16 March 2022 STUBBINGS v JAMS 2 PTY LTD & ORS [2022] HCA 6 Today, the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The appeal concerned whether the enforcement of the respondents' rights against the appellant, in the context of asset-based lending, was unconscionable. The respondents were in the business of asset-based lending. Their system of lending operated on the basis that potential borrowers, such as the appellant, would meet with an intermediary working with a law firm. The law firm provided a service to clients, including the respondents, to facilitate the making of secured loans by those clients. It acted as agent for the respondents and, because of the intermediary, never dealt directly with the appellant. The appellant was unemployed and had no regular income. He owned two properties, both of which were mortgaged. In 2015, the appellant sought to purchase another property and he met on a number of occasions with the intermediary. In accordance with the system of lending, the appellant acted as guarantor for a loan made to a company by the respondents, of which he was the sole director and shareholder, with the three properties as security for his guarantee. As part of the transactions, the law firm prepared a certificate of "Independent Financial Advice" and a certificate of "Independent Legal Advice" to be signed by an accountant and lawyer, respectively, whom the law firm referred the appellant to. The property was purchased in late 2015. When the company defaulted on the third month's interest payments, the respondents commenced proceedings against the appellant, seeking to enforce the guarantee and their rights as mortgagees of the properties. The Court of Appeal overruled the primary judge, concluding that there was nothing inherently unconscionable about asset-based lending, and that the respondents' agent had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the appellant's desperate personal and financial circumstances and was entitled to rely on the certificates of independent advice. The High Court held that the respondents had acted unconscionably contrary to equitable principle. It was not in dispute that the appellant suffered from a special disadvantage, because of his poor financial literacy, inability to understand the nature and risks of the transactions, and bleak financial circumstances. The respondents' agent had sufficient appreciation of the appellant's vulnerability and the likelihood that loss would be suffered. A finding of actual knowledge was not essential to the appellant's case for relief. The dangerous nature of the loan, obvious to the agent but not the appellant, was sufficient to establish that the agent had exploited the appellant's vulnerability contrary to good conscience. It was open to the primary judge to infer that the certificates were mere "window dressing", so that they could not negate the agent's actual appreciation of the dangerous nature of the loans and the appellant's vulnerability. It was therefore unconscionable for the respondents to insist upon their rights under the mortgages.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 14 December 2006 VBAO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL For an asylum seeker to show a well-founded fear of persecution, a threat of harm must mean a real risk of harm, not merely an earlier communication of intention to harm, the High Court of Australia held today. VBAO is a Sri Lankan national who held an entertainment visa issued to him as a visiting member of a dance troupe sponsored by the Sinhala Cultural and Community Services Foundation. He entered Australia in November 2001. The foundation withdrew sponsorship when it became clear that the troupe was not a troupe of genuine dancers. VBAO applied for a protection visa. He told an Australian official that he wanted to work in Australia to pay off a loan and provide for his family. He also said he was a member of the Sri Lankan Freedom Party, attending and performing at political rallies and organising political meetings. VBAO said his life had been threatened by United National Party members and claimed he would be killed if the UNP, as he expected, came to power in Sri Lanka. He said on his way home from a wedding UNP members pulled him into a van, beat him and cut his hair. He said he had been intentionally struck by a rear-view mirror of a passing van and that eggs had been thrown at him. VBAO said he had lost his job as a musician because of his political involvement, been threatened by UNP members and left his home. The Immigration Department refused him a protection visa. The Refugee Review Tribunal upheld that decision. It found that VBAO had not been actively involved in politics as his knowledge of Sri Lankan politics was limited. The RRT was prepared to accept that he may have received threatening phone calls and letters and that UNP thugs may have assaulted him after the wedding, but it was not satisfied that these incidents constituted persecution within the Refugees Convention. The RRT said the egg throwing and the collision with the rear-view mirror also did not amount to harm as severe as persecution, assuming they actually occurred. The Federal Magistrates Court reversed the RRT decision, holding that threats, in the sense of statements of intention to harm, amounted to persecution and that VBAO had a fear of future threats. The Federal Court of Australia allowed an appeal by the Minister. VBAO appealed to the High Court. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. VBAO had argued that the phrase “threat ... to life and liberty” in section 91R of the Migration Act means a communication of an intention to cause harm. The Minister argued that it means a real risk of harm. The Court held that, depending on context, the word “threat” could mean either a risk or a hostile communication. In the context of the Migration Act, and the definition of a fear of persecution in the future, it meant a risk of harm. On the RRT’s finding that there was no such risk, VBAO’s claim must fail.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 6 December 2013 KAREN KLINE v OFFICIAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL & ANOR [2013] HCA 52 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, which held that documents relating to nominations of a person to the Order of Australia were not subject to disclosure under s 6A(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) ("the Act"). The appellant made a request under the Act for access to certain categories of documents held by the first respondent, the Official Secretary to the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia ("the Official Secretary"). The categories of documents requested related to two nominations of a person to the Order of Australia, submitted by the appellant. Section 6A(1) of the Act provides that the Act does not apply to any request for access to a document of the Official Secretary, unless the document "relates to matters of an administrative nature". By letter, the Official Secretary refused the appellant's request, informing her that no documents relating to matters of an administrative nature had been identified, although she could be provided with copies of her two nomination forms. The appellant applied for review of the Official Secretary's decision by the Australian Information Commissioner, who affirmed the decision to refuse the appellant access to the balance of documents requested. The appellant appealed to the second respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal"), which affirmed the decision of the Official Secretary. On appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court upheld the Tribunal's decision. By special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that documents relating to the Governor-General's substantive powers and functions were excluded from disclosure by operation of s 6A(1) of the Act. The exception of a class of documents which related to "matters of an administrative nature" referred to documents concerning the management and administration of the office resources of the Official Secretary, or the provision of logistical support, which the Official Secretary was required to disclose. The High Court held that the documents sought by the appellant were excluded from disclosure by s 6A(1) of the Act. Relevant criteria for the making of awards in the Order were already available to the public. Further, the Official Secretary accepted that any documents relating to review processes, if such documents existed, would be publicly available without recourse to the Act.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 2 September, 2003 BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO (AUSTRALIA) LTD v STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA AND COMMISSIONER OF STATE TAXATION (WESTERN AUSTRALIA) British American Tobacco (formerly Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Ltd) had a right to proceed in an action against Western Australia to recover almost $7 million worth of tobacco licence fees, the High Court of Australia held today. In August 1997 in the Ha v New South Wales decision, the High Court found similar licence fees imposed by New South Wales were excise duties, therefore unconstitutional, as under section 90 of the Constitution excise could only be imposed by the Commonwealth. Following the Ha decision, Rothmans commenced action in the WA Supreme Court, claiming a declaration that WA licence fees were also excise duties, and seeking an order for the repayment of $6,957,528.30 paid by Rothmans three weeks before Ha was handed down. Negotiations between Rothmans and the WA government failed to resolve the issue and Rothmans gave notice in April 1998 under section 6 of WA’s Crown Suits Act 1947 that it proposed to commence action. Section 5 of the Act provides that the Crown (the State of WA) may sue and be sued in the same manner as a subject but section 6 provides that no right of action lies against the Crown unless the party proposing the action gave written notice as soon as practicable or within three months (whichever was longer). Rothmans’ cause of action had accrued by August 1997 but the company did not give notice until April 1998, so there was no compliance with section 6. The Full Court of the WA Supreme Court entered summary judgment for the State and the State Tax Commissioner. The issue in the appeal to the High Court was whether sections 5 and 6 were relevant, bearing in mind that the WA Supreme Court was exercising federal jurisdiction. The High Court unanimously ordered that the summary judgment be set aside to allow Rothmans, as British American Tobacco, the right to proceed against the State. The Court held sections 5 and 6 of the Crown Suits Act did not apply. The decision only dealt with the right to proceed. It did not deal with the legal merits of the claim for recovery of the taxes. The case was remitted to the WA Supreme Court to deal with that issue.