Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 December 2015 [2015] HCA 47 Today the High Court delivered judgment in an appeal from the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, unanimously allowing the appeal in part and dismissing it in part. The Court held that the respondent, who suffered major injuries as a result of a motor vehicle accident, was not contributorily negligent under s 47 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) ("the Act") for travelling in a car driven by an intoxicated driver, but that she was contributorily negligent under s 49 of the Act for failing to wear a seatbelt. At approximately 2 am on 12 March 2007, the appellant, the respondent and the appellant's friend went for a drive around Port Victoria, South Australia. The respondent was driving, and the appellant and his friend had been drinking alcohol. After about 15 minutes, the respondent stopped the car on the side of the road and went to urinate behind some bushes. When she returned to the car, the appellant was in the driver's seat and insisted that she get in the car, which she did. The car was outside the township and approximately 500 metres from the Port Victoria Hotel, where the group was staying. It was dark, and the respondent gave evidence that she was disoriented and did not know how near she was to the hotel. The appellant drove erratically for several minutes, during which time the respondent did not fasten her seatbelt. The respondent was flung from the car when it collided with a tree, and sustained spinal injuries that rendered her paraplegic. The appellant's blood alcohol level was estimated to have been 0.229 per cent at the time of the accident. At trial, it was held that the appellant's negligence caused the respondent's injuries. The trial judge held that the respondent was not contributorily negligent under s 47 of the Act for relying on the care and skill of an intoxicated person because the exception in s 47(2)(b) of the Act applied such that the respondent could not reasonably be expected to have avoided the risk of travelling with the appellant in the circumstances. Failure to wear a seatbelt constitutes contributory negligence under s 49 of the Act and the trial judge rejected the respondent's contention that the appellant's erratic driving had prevented her from fastening her seatbelt. On appeal, a majority of the Full Court dismissed the appellant's appeal on the s 47(2)(b) issue. The Full Court unanimously allowed the respondent's cross-appeal on the s 49 issue, holding that her failure to fasten her seatbelt was a result of her direct and natural response to the appellant's erratic driving. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court on both issues. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal on the s 47(2)(b) issue and held that, given the facts of the case, the respondent could not reasonably be expected to have avoided the risk of travelling with the appellant. The Court allowed the appeal in respect of the s 49 issue, on the basis that there was no reason to interfere with the trial judge's finding of fact that the appellant's driving did not prevent the respondent from fastening her seatbelt.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 20 June 2018 PAUL IAN LANE v THE QUEEN [2018] HCA 28 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant was charged with murder. The offence was alleged to have occurred during an altercation between the appellant and the deceased. CCTV footage of the incident showed the deceased falling to the ground on two occasions. On the first occasion, the deceased retreated towards a roadway, with the appellant in pursuit, before falling backwards and striking his head. After rising to his feet, the deceased could be seen to fall to the road a second time. After the second fall, the deceased lost consciousness, and died in hospital nine days later. The jury acquitted the appellant of murder, but found him guilty of manslaughter. The appellant appealed against his conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that the trial judge had erred in failing to direct the jury that it must be unanimous in its deliberations as to the factual basis on which it might convict the appellant of manslaughter; that being the first fall, the second fall, or both falls. However, the Court of Criminal Appeal, by majority, dismissed the appeal under the proviso to s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), on the basis that no substantial miscarriage of justice had actually occurred. The majority held that the evidence was not capable of supporting a finding beyond reasonable doubt that a deliberate act of the appellant caused the first fall. The absence of a specific unanimity direction did not prevent the jury from considering the appellant's guilt on the basis that his deliberate act caused the second fall and, having done so, it was not open to the jury to have had a reasonable doubt as to his being guilty of manslaughter by that unlawful and dangerous act. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court on the ground that the majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in applying the proviso. The High Court accepted this contention. The Court noted that the case was left to the jury on the basis that it was open to it to convict the appellant by pooling individual jurors' conclusions on issues in respect of which the jury was required to be unanimous. Irrespective of whether an appellate court might conclude that the evidence in respect of the first fall was incapable of supporting a conviction, it was distinctly possible that some jurors may have convicted on the basis of the first fall alone. To dismiss the appeal, as the majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal did, was to disregard the requirement of a unanimous verdict on the part of the jury and to substitute trial by appeal court for trial by jury. The Court held that such an error is apt to deny the application of the proviso because it means that it cannot be said that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the appellant's appeal be allowed, his conviction be quashed, and a new trial be had.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 1 October, 2003 AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATION EXCHANGE LIMITED v DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION The High Court of Australia today held that the superannuation guarantee charge paid by an employer of casual workers under a specific award was required to make superannuation deductions from wages payable for work performed during ordinary working hours. Australian Communication Exchange operated a national telephone relay service for people with hearing or speech impairments. Relay officers acted as a medium, converting typed messages to voice and vice versa. The company provided the service 24 hours a day under an agreement with the federal government. It operated call centres in Melbourne and Brisbane, but the appeal related to workers at the Brisbane call centre only. The workers, all casual, were paid according to Queensland’s Clerical Employees Award. The company paid the employer superannuation guarantee charge (then three per cent of pay for the period in question between June 1, 1995, to June 30, 1998) based on rates for ordinary hours, while the Australian Taxation Office claimed the contribution was also payable on hours worked in excess of the 38-hour standard week. Under the relevant legislation, the Superannuation Guarantee Charge Act 1992 and the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992, employers’ obligations with respect to deductions depended upon the terms used in and the language of the award. The outcome of the appeal essentially depended therefore upon the construction to be placed on the award. In the Federal Court, Justice John Dowsett found in favour of the company. The ATO appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court, which adopted a compromise between the parties’ positions by unanimously holding that the contribution was owed on the ordinary hourly rate paid for overtime but not on the overtime loading. The company appealed to the High Court and the ATO cross-appealed. The High Court, by a 4-3 majority, allowed Australian Communication Exchange’s appeal, reinstating Justice Dowsett’s decision, and dismissed the cross-appeal. The majority held that the contribution should be calculated on ordinary time earnings only and not on any component of overtime pay.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 8 March 2005 RAYMOND AKHTAR ALI v THE QUEEN Mr Ali’s defence counsel’s conduct at his trial was not such as to result in a miscarriage of justice, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Ali, 51, was convicted of murdering his daughter just after she was born to 20-year-old Amanda Leanne Blackwell who lived with the Ali family at Logan Village between Brisbane and the Gold Coast. Mr Ali was also convicted of improperly interfering with a corpse, Ms Blackwell was convicted of manslaughter and both were convicted of concealing the birth of a child. Ms Blackwell gave birth beside a tank stand in September 1998 and the dismembered corpse of the baby, with her reproductive organs removed, was found on an adjoining property. DNA evidence showed the child was Mr Ali’s. Ms Blackwell gave conflicting accounts to police but at the trial she said Mr Ali was the father, he was present at the birth, he took the baby away and she never saw her again, and Mr Ali told her he had disposed of the body. Mr Ali was a butcher who slaughtered goats and removed their sexual organs and sold halal meat to other Muslims. He allegedly prostituted Ms Blackwell and demanded she become engaged to a relative. He denied all involvement and did not give evidence at his trial. Queensland Supreme Court Justice Margaret Wilson sentenced Mr Ali to life imprisonment. Mr Ali twice unsuccessfully appealed to the Queensland Court of Appeal, first on the grounds of alleged unreasonableness of the verdicts and errors in Justice Wilson’s summing up, and then later on a claim of a miscarriage of justice because of the incompetence of his counsel. Special leave to appeal to the High Court was granted in relation to the second appeal. Mr Ali listed 27 instances where he claimed his counsel failed to object to evidence or otherwise acted incompetently. The Court held that these claims were either not made out, or any harm has been cured by Justice Wilson’s directions. Other evidence either had strong probative value so was unlikely to have been rejected by Justice Wilson or was innocuous. There may also have been tactical reasons for not objecting to evidence that might be technically inadmissible. Mr Ali complained about some of his counsel’s cross-examination of Ms Blackwell and other witnesses, but again the Court found any errors were minor. The Court held that the case against Mr Ali was strong and any suggested defects in counsel’s performance were not so significant that he lost the chance of acquittal. No miscarriage of justice was shown. The Court unanimously dismissed his appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 March 2013 ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER MICHAEL JAMES CONDON v POMPANO PTY LTD & ANOR [2013] HCA 7 Today the High Court unanimously upheld the validity of provisions of the Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Q) ("the Act") which relate to "criminal intelligence" relied upon in support of applications to the Supreme Court of Queensland to have an organisation declared a "criminal organisation". The High Court held that the provisions were not inconsistent with the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court. On 1 June 2012, the Assistant Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service filed an application in the Supreme Court seeking a declaration that the Finks Motor Cycle Club, Gold Coast Chapter, and Pompano Pty Ltd, said to be a part of that Chapter (together "the respondents"), constituted a criminal organisation under s 10 of the Act ("the substantive application"). In support of the substantive application, which is still pending, information which the Supreme Court had previously declared to be criminal intelligence is relied upon. Information which is criminal intelligence relates to actual or suspected criminal activity, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to "prejudice a criminal investigation", "enable the discovery of the existence or identity of a confidential source of information relevant to law enforcement", or "endanger a person's life or physical safety". As required by ss 66 and 70 of the Act, the Supreme Court heard the application to declare that particular information was criminal intelligence without notice to the respondents and in a "special closed hearing". Because the Supreme Court made the declaration sought, it will be required by s 78(1) of the Act to order any part of the hearing of the substantive application in which the criminal intelligence is to be considered a closed hearing. The effect is that the criminal intelligence will be kept secret from the respondents. In the High Court, the respondents contended that those provisions of the Act (among others) were invalid because they denied procedural fairness to a respondent to an application to have an organisation declared a criminal organisation. The parties agreed to submit a special case to the High Court asking whether such provisions were invalid for impairing the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court, thereby infringing Ch III of the Constitution. The High Court upheld the validity of the provisions. The Court held that while the provisions may depart from the usual incidents of procedure and judicial process, the Supreme Court nonetheless retains its capacity to act fairly and impartially. The Court held that the provisions do not impair the essential characteristics of the Supreme Court, or its continued institutional integrity.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 9 November 2016 VAUGHAN RUDD BLANK v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION [2016] HCA 42 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The High Court held that a lump sum paid to a taxpayer in instalments pursuant to an incentive profit participation agreement after termination of his employment was income according to ordinary concepts, and therefore part of the taxpayer's assessable income under s 6-5 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). The taxpayer ("Mr Blank") was employed by various companies within the Glencore Group. Glencore International AG ("GI"), a company within the Glencore Group, operated employee profit participation plans for the benefit of certain employees of GI and its subsidiaries. Mr Blank was selected to participate in such a plan. His participation was governed by various agreements at various stages. Relevantly, under a profit participation agreement executed in 1999 ("PPA 1999"), he was granted claims to a share of GI's profits in the form of a contractual claim and Genussscheine ("GS"), which were profit sharing certificates provided for under Swiss law. Under a related agreement, Mr Blank was issued shares in Glencore Holding AG ("GH"), the ultimate holding company of the Glencore Group. The PPA 1999 was relevantly replaced in 2005 by another agreement, the IPPA 2005. All GS or equivalents issued under previous agreements became "Profit Participation Units" ("PPU") under the IPPA 2005. Under the IPPA 2005, Mr Blank was granted "deferred compensation" such that if he ceased employment with the Glencore Group, and executed a declaration under which he relinquished his claims under his PPU and assigned his shares in GH, he would be entitled to a lump sum paid in instalments. Mr Blank's employment with the Glencore Group was terminated on 31 December 2006. He relinquished his claims under his PPU and assigned his shares in GH in consideration of the payment of USD 160,033,328.25 in 20 quarterly instalments ("the Amount"). Edmonds J of the Federal Court of Australia held that the Amount was income according to ordinary concepts because it was deferred compensation for services rendered by Mr Blank. That decision was upheld by a majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court. By grant of special leave, Mr Blank appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously held that the Amount was paid as deferred compensation for the services Mr Blank had performed for the Glencore Group and was therefore income according to ordinary concepts. The Amount was not assessable as a capital gain because it did not represent, as Mr Blank contended, the proceeds of the exploitation of interconnected rights that conferred on him a right to receive, in the future, a proportion of the profit of GI.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 15 December 2010 ROWE & ANOR v ELECTORAL COMMISSIONER & ANOR [2010] HCA 46 On 6 August 2010, the High Court declared, by majority, that certain provisions that amended the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) were invalid. Today, the Court published the reasons for its decision. The provisions that were declared invalid related to the cut-off dates for consideration of claims for enrolment and for transfer of enrolment as an elector. The provisions prevented the Electoral Commissioner from considering claims for enrolment lodged after 8 pm on the date of the issue of writs for an election for the House of Representatives or the Senate until after the close of polling. They also prevented consideration of claims for transfer of enrolment from one divisional roll to another from 8 pm on the third working day after the date of the issue of the writs until after the close of polling. In separate judgments, Chief Justice French, Justices Gummow and Bell, and Justice Crennan held that these provisions contravened the requirement, contained in ss 7 and 24 of the Constitution, that members of both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament be "directly chosen by the people". The Chief Justice considered that the adverse legal and practical effect of the challenged provisions upon the exercise of the entitlement to vote was disproportionate to their advancement of the requirement of direct choice by the people. Justices Gummow and Bell, with whom Justice Crennan broadly agreed, held that the provisions operated to achieve a disqualification from the entitlement to vote and that the disqualification was not reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve an end compatible with the maintenance of the system of government prescribed by the Constitution. Justice Crennan held that the democratic right to vote is supported and protected by the Constitution. In separate dissenting judgments, Justices Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel each held that the provisions did not contravene any limitation imposed by the Constitution on the legislative power of the Commonwealth to fix the date and time after which claims for enrolment or transfer of enrolment may not be considered before an election. Their Honours considered that the requirement of direct choice by the people was not infringed by the provisions challenged.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 3 February 2017 IN THE MATTER OF QUESTIONS REFERRED TO THE COURT OF DISPUTED RETURNS PURSUANT TO SECTION 376 OF THE COMMONWEALTH ELECTORAL ACT 1918 (CTH) [2017] HCA 4 Today the High Court unanimously held that Rodney Norman Culleton was a person who was convicted and subject to be sentenced for an offence punishable by imprisonment for one year or longer at the time of the 2016 federal election, and therefore was incapable of being chosen as a Senator under s 44(ii) of the Constitution. On 2 March 2016, Mr Culleton was convicted, in his absence, in the Local Court of New South Wales at Armidale of the offence of larceny. As the offence of which Mr Culleton was convicted concerned property of a value less than $5,000, he was liable to imprisonment for a maximum term of two years. Under s 25(1)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ("the CSP Act"), a sentence of imprisonment may not be imposed upon an "absent offender". The Local Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Mr Culleton in order to have him brought to the Court for sentencing. On 16 May 2016, a writ was issued for the election of 12 Senators for the State of Western Australia to serve in the Senate of the Parliament of the Commonwealth. Mr Culleton was nominated as a candidate in a group nomination for Pauline Hanson's One Nation party. Polling day for the election was 2 July 2016. On the return of the writ, Mr Culleton was noted as elected and he has since sat as a Senator. On 8 August 2016, the warrant for the arrest of Mr Culleton was executed, and the Local Court granted an annulment of Mr Culleton's conviction pursuant to s 8 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW). On 25 October 2016, the Local Court found Mr Culleton guilty of the offence of larceny on his own plea but, pursuant to s 10(1)(a) of the CSP Act, dismissed the charge without proceeding to conviction. On 8 November 2016, the President of the Senate referred to the High Court, in its capacity as the Court of Disputed Returns, the question whether Mr Culleton's conviction had the effect of disqualifying him from being chosen as a Senator by reason of s 44(ii) of the Constitution. The Senate's reference also asked how the vacancy should be filled if Mr Culleton were found to have been incapable of being chosen as a Senator. The Court held that Mr Culleton was convicted and subject to be sentenced for an offence punishable by imprisonment for one year or longer at the date of the 2016 election, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law. The subsequent annulment of the conviction had no effect on that state of affairs. The Court held that the resulting vacancy should be filled by a special count of the ballot papers.