Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 December 2014 ARGOS PTY LTD & ORS v SIMON CORBELL, MINISTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT & ORS [2014] HCA 50 Today the High Court unanimously allowed appeals by two supermarket businesses and held that they are persons aggrieved by the decision of the Minister for the Environment and Sustainable Development to approve an application for a commercial development at a site near their premises. By majority, the Court dismissed an appeal by the landlord of one of the businesses and held that the landlord is not a person aggrieved by the Minister's decision. In 2011, the Minister made a decision under s 162 of the Planning and Development Act 2007 (ACT) to approve a development application made by the second and third respondents for a commercial development, which was to include a supermarket and specialty shops, at the Giralang Local Centre. The second and third appellants each conduct a supermarket business at a Local Centre near Giralang, and the first appellant is the second appellant's landlord. Section 5(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT) ("the ADJR Act") provided, at the relevant times, that a person aggrieved by a decision was entitled to apply to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory to have that decision reviewed on one or more stated grounds. Section 3B(1)(a) provided that a reference to a "person aggrieved" by a decision includes a reference to "a person whose interests are adversely affected by the decision". The appellants sought judicial review of the Minister's decision under the ADJR Act. The primary judge accepted that, by increasing competition and reducing the annual turnover of the Local Centres at which they conduct their businesses, the development will have an adverse economic effect on the second and third appellants. The primary judge also accepted that the economic interests of the first appellant may be "indirectly affected" by the development. But the primary judge concluded that none of the appellants were persons aggrieved by the Minister's decision, because the adverse effects were "too remote" and the appellants' interests were not sufficiently "directly affected". The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' appeals, stating that "[a]s a general rule mere detriment to the economic interests of a business will not give rise to standing". By special leave, the appellants appealed to the High Court. The High Court rejected the existence of such a general rule and unanimously held that, on the facts established before the primary judge, the second and third appellants had demonstrated that they were each a person whose interests are adversely affected by the Minister's decision and that they are therefore each a person aggrieved by the decision. By majority, the Court held that the first appellant had not established that its interests are adversely affected by the Minister's decision. The Court also held, by majority, that the statutory criterion for standing under s 3B does not alter according to the scope and purpose of the enactment under which a decision is made or purported to be made.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 February 2015 LAVIN & ANOR v TOPPI & ORS [2015] HCA 4 Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had held that the first and second respondents ("the respondents"), being sureties who paid a creditor a disproportionate amount of a guaranteed debt, were entitled to recover contribution from their co-sureties, the appellants, notwithstanding that the creditor had covenanted not to sue the appellants for payment of the guaranteed debt. In 2008, the National Australia Bank ("the Bank") consolidated various loans into one loan to Luxe Studios Pty Ltd. The consolidated loan was guaranteed by, among others, the appellants and the respondents. In 2010, the Bank made demands upon each of the guarantors for payment of the balance of the loan debt. When those demands were not met, the Bank commenced proceedings against all of the guarantors to enforce the guarantee. The appellants and the Bank entered into a deed of release and settlement whereby the Bank covenanted not to sue the appellants if the first appellant paid, relevantly, a minor portion of the guaranteed debt. The first appellant paid that portion and the Bank's covenant not to sue took effect. Thereafter, the respondents paid the remaining major portion of the guaranteed debt. The respondents commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales claiming contribution from the appellants in respect of the amount of their payment in excess of their proportionate share of the guaranteed debt. The appellants resisted the respondents' claim on the basis that the appellants and respondents were not under "coordinate liabilities" because, by reason of the Bank's covenant not to sue, the respondents' liability under the guarantee was enforceable while the appellants' liability was not. The primary judge rejected that argument and gave judgment for the respondents. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the Bank's covenant not to sue did not alter the appellants' liability under the guarantee and, as a result, the appellants and the respondents continued to share "coordinate liabilities" of the same nature and extent so as to entitle the respondents to recover contribution. By grant of special leave, the appellants appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appellants' appeal. The Court held that the Court of Appeal was correct in holding that the Bank's covenant not to sue did not extinguish the appellants' liability under the guarantee. Further, the respondents, subject to proving their readiness and ability to perform their own obligations under the guarantee, were entitled in equity to contribution from the time the appellants and the respondents were called upon to satisfy the guarantee. That entitlement could not be defeated by the Bank giving the appellants a covenant not to sue.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 24 April 2008 SB v THE QUEEN OAE v THE QUEEN Evidence of sexual misconduct against a complainant, other than the subject of the charges brought against the alleged offender, may be given in sexual assault trials for limited purposes and with appropriate directions from trial judges, the High Court of Australia held today. Such evidence was subject to a requirement to exclude it if necessary standards concerning probative value and prejudicial effect were not met. HML was convicted in 2006 of two counts of unlawful sexual intercourse by fellatio and sodomy with his nine-year-old daughter. He and his wife separated when the girl was a baby and he did not see her for several years. The daughter, who lived in South Australia, began access visits to her father, who lived a short distance away in Victoria. The offences allegedly occurred in 1999 when she accompanied HML to Adelaide for eye surgery. HML allegedly said after the anal penetration: “Why isn’t it working? It’s worked before.” When the allegations came to police attention in 2003, HML was questioned by a Victorian detective in Mount Gambier about incidents in Victoria. He has not been charged in Victoria but some of these “uncharged acts” (which were not necessarily criminal) were adduced at his trial in SA. SB was convicted in 2006 of three counts of indecent assault and two counts of incest involving his daughter in 1983 when she was 13 or 14 and in 1986 when she was 17 and visiting. Evidence of other “uncharged acts” was received. OAE was charged with indecently assaulting his sister’s foster daughter in mid-1999 when she was 12 and of digitally penetrating her in 2003. He was convicted of the latter offence only. OAE owned a horse stud and his sister lived on the adjoining property. The foster daughter often helped OAE with his horses. Evidence of “uncharged acts” was allowed at trial. HML and SB appealed to the High Court. OAE’s application for special leave to appeal was heard with the two appeals and was argued as on appeal. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeals by HML and SB. OAE’s application for special leave to appeal was granted unanimously, but the appeal was dismissed by a 4-3 majority. The Court in HML and SB and the majority in OAE held that the “uncharged acts” evidence in each case was admissible and that the judges’ directions to the juries, including warnings against the use of propensity reasoning, were sufficient.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 10 September, 2003 JOHN FAIRFAX PUBLICATIONS PTY LIMITED v RENE RIVKIN The High Court of Australia today ordered a retrial in relation to five imputations stockbroker Rene Rivkin claimed could be drawn from articles run in The Australian Financial Review and The Sydney Morning Herald in February 1998. The two stories and a second Sydney Morning Herald story in March 1998 concerned the mysterious death of model Caroline Byrne, the girlfriend of Mr Rivkin’s employee Gordon Wood and Mr Rivkin’s business and other activities. In a New South Wales Supreme Court defamation trial in 2001, the jury rejected all 17 imputations that Mr Rivkin said could be drawn from the three stories. As the jury found none of the pleaded imputations were conveyed it was unnecessary for the jury to determine whether any of them were defamatory of Mr Rivkin. He appealed to the Court of Appeal which unanimously held that no reasonable jury could find that the first two stories did not contain at least six of the alleged imputations and ordered a general retrial. It also held, by majority, that Justice Carolyn Simpson should have given Mr Rivkin’s counsel a right of reply after Fairfax’s counsel gave the final address to the jury. Two imputations concerned Mr Rivkin’s conduct in relation to the Offset Alpine Press Group, two were that Mr Rivkin was criminally liable in respect of the murder of Ms Byrne, another was that he had engaged in homosexual intercourse with Mr Wood, and the sixth was that Mr Rivkin associated with criminals. The High Court, by a 4-1 majority, held that a retrial was required. Three members of the Court held that the trial should consider five potential imputations, one member held that the trial should consider four. The fifth member of the Court would have allowed Fairfax’s appeal in its entirety. The Court unanimously rejected Mr Rivkin’s claim of a right of reply, holding there was no error in the ruling of the trial judge, Justice Carolyn Simpson, on the point.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 27 February 2013 MAN HORAN MONIS v THE QUEEN & ANOR AMIRAH DROUDIS v THE QUEEN & ANOR [2013] HCA 4 Today the High Court dismissed two appeals from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which held that s 471.12 of the Criminal Code (Cth) is valid insofar as it makes it a crime to use a postal or similar service in a way that reasonable persons would regard as offensive. The appellants allegedly sent letters (and in one case a recorded message) to the relatives of Australian soldiers killed in action in Afghanistan and to the mother of an Austrade official killed in Indonesia. The communications criticised Australia's military involvement in Afghanistan. They opened with expressions of sympathy for the grieving relatives but then proceeded to criticise and condemn the deceased person. Section 471.12 makes it a crime for a person to use a postal or similar service "in a way ... that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, menacing, harassing or offensive". One appellant was charged with 12 counts of using a postal service in an offensive way and one count of using a postal service in a harassing way, and the other appellant was charged with eight counts of aiding and abetting in the commission of some of those offences. In the District Court of New South Wales, the appellants unsuccessfully sought orders quashing the indictment on the basis that s 471.12 was invalid because it was inconsistent with the implied constitutional freedom of political communication. The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed an appeal to that Court. By special leave, the appellants appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously held that s 471.12 restricted political communication, but divided in assessing the purpose of s 471.12. Three Justices would have dismissed the appeals, holding that the section protects against the misuse of the postal service to deliver seriously offensive material into a person's home or workplace in a manner which is compatible with the system of representative and responsible government established by the Constitution. Three Justices would have allowed the appeals, holding that the end pursued by the section is neither legitimate nor implemented in a manner that is compatible with the constitutional system of government. Where the High Court is equally divided in opinion, s 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) provides that the decision appealed from shall be affirmed. Accordingly, the High Court ordered that the appeals be dismissed.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 17 June 2004 NORTH AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL LEGAL AID SERVICE INC v HUGH BURTON BRADLEY AND THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA Mr Bradley was validly appointed Chief Magistrate of the Northern Territory in March 1998, the High Court of Australia held today, dismissing a challenge from the NAALAS. When appointed Mr Bradley indicated he wanted to serve only two years. Later he changed his mind and two further determinations were made by Territory Administrator Neil Conn in November 1999, one to revoke the 1998 determination and one to reappoint him until the mandatory retirement age of 65, which Mr Bradley attains in 2009. In the NT Supreme Court in 2000 the NAALAS sought a declaration that his appointment was invalid. The action was transferred to the Federal Court of Australia. Justice Mark Weinberg dismissed the NAALAS application in 2001 and the Full Court of the Federal Court dismissed an appeal. On appeal to the High Court, the NAALAS argued the NT Magistrates Act was invalid insofar as it authorised the appointment of a Chief Magistrate to age 65 but with remuneration fixed for only the first two years. The High Court accepted the NAALAS proposition that under the Constitution a court capable of exercising Commonwealth judicial power (as the NT Magistrates Court was) be, and appear to be, an independent and impartial tribunal, but the Court held that this requirement had not been infringed. Section 6 of the Magistrates Act provides that a magistrate shall be paid such remuneration and allowances and hold office on such terms and conditions as the Administrator from time to time determines. The Court held that this should be construed as impliedly conferring on the Administrator the statutory authority to make determinations from time to time and the power to make determinations necessarily carries a power to revoke them. The phrase “from time to time” was not to be read as permitting the Administrator to fail to exercise power under section 6 where that failure would produce a hiatus where no determination was in operation. There was no such hiatus as the 1999 determinations preceded the end of the two-year period covered by the 1998 determination, and none was contemplated or provided for by section 6. The Court held that NT magistrates were not inappropriately dependent on the legislature or executive in a way that compromised or jeopardised their integrity. Rather, the legislative requirement of continued attention by the NT executive to preserving adequate remuneration of magistrates was apt to defend the interests of judicial independence and impartiality. The High Court unanimously dismissed the appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 14 September 2012 [2012] HCA 35 On 20 June 2012, the High Court allowed an appeal by the appellant against her conviction for the manslaughter of David Hay, quashing her conviction for manslaughter and directing that a verdict of acquittal be entered. Today the High Court published its reasons for allowing the appeal. The appellant and her husband were registered participants in a methadone programme conducted by a Sydney clinic. They were in the business of selling some of their methadone to friends and acquaintances. On 9 February 2007, the deceased attended the Burns' unit to purchase methadone. His body was discovered in the toilet block at the rear of the block of units the next day. The deceased died as a result of the combined effect of methadone and a prescription drug. The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the New South Wales District Court. At trial, the prosecution case was left to the jury on the basis that either the appellant was a party to a joint criminal enterprise with her husband to supply methadone to the deceased and that the supply of methadone was an unlawful and dangerous act which caused the deceased's death, or the appellant's failure to seek medical attention for the deceased was a grossly negligent cause of his death. The appellant appealed against her conviction to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, but that appeal was dismissed. By special leave, the appellant then appealed to the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal because, as the Crown conceded, the supply of methadone to the deceased without more was not a dangerous act that was capable of supporting the appellant's conviction for unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter. That was one of the two possibilities left to the jury to consider, and it could not be known whether the jury convicted the appellant on this impermissible basis. The Court held that the appellant was not under a legal duty to take steps to preserve the deceased's life and a majority held that the evidence given at the trial was not capable of establishing the appellant's complicity in injecting, or assisting to inject, the deceased with the drug. Accordingly, a majority of the Court declined to order a new trial and the Court made orders quashing the appellant's conviction and entering a verdict of acquittal.