Shuaiqi/CLSum huggingface dataset:
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 16 June 2004 GEORGE PETER OSTROWSKI v JEFFREY RYDER PALMER Ignorance of the law would not enable a Western Australian commercial rock lobster fisherman to escape a conviction for fishing in a prohibited area, the High Court of Australia held today. Mr Palmer was charged by Mr Ostrowski, a Fisheries WA officer, with fishing for rock lobster in a marine life protection zone on the Point Quobba reef near Carnarvon in February 1999. In November 1998, when he was planning to revert to lobster fishing from line fishing, Mr Palmer twice visited the Fremantle office of Fisheries WA to obtain regulations covering Zone B of the WA fishing grounds. On the second visit, when copies of regulations for the 1998-99 lobster season were still unavailable, a staff member photocopied the office copy of the documentation, but these did not include the relevant regulations. Mr Palmer set 54 lobster pots in the exclusion zone near Point Quobba, believing his licence entitled him to do so. Fisheries officers observing him checking and setting pots did not point out his error. A Carnarvon magistrate held that any mistake by Mr Palmer was a mistake of law, not a mistake of fact, so he could not rely on the defence in section 24 of the WA Criminal Code. Section 24 provides that a person who does an act under an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief in the existence of the state of things is not criminally responsible. Section 22 provides that ignorance of the law does not afford an excuse for an act or omission which constitutes an offence. The offence created by the regulation had three elements: holding a commercial fishing licence; fishing for rock lobsters; and doing so in waters around Quobba Point. Mr Palmer satisfied all three elements and held no erroneous belief about any element. What he did not know was that there was a regulation prohibiting his conduct. His conviction resulted in a mandatory penalty of $26,700, a $500 fine and $2,000 costs. Mr Palmer successfully appealed to the Full Court of the WA Supreme Court. Mr Ostrowski appealed to the High Court, undertaking to pay Mr Palmer’s costs. At the end of the appeal hearing Mr Ostrowski also undertook that the penalty, fine and costs would be remitted to Mr Palmer. The Court held that section 24 was not concerned with mistakes at large, particularly whether there was a law against certain conduct. Section 24 applies to mistakes about the elements of the offence, not mistakes about the existence of the law creating the offence. The Court held that the case fell within section 22, not section 24. It allowed the appeal and reinstated Mr Palmer’s conviction.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA Public Information Officer 3 September, 2003 WHISPRUN PTY LIMITED v SONYA LEA DIXON The High Court of Australia today upheld the decision of a New South Wales Supreme Court trial by Justice Peter Newman who rejected Ms Dixon’s claim that she was suffering from chronic fatigue syndrome as a result of Q fever infection. Ms Dixon contracted Q fever in April 1994 while working at an Inverell, NSW, abattoir where her job was to suck foetal blood into a pipette from unborn calves’ hearts. The disease lasted up to 10 months. Her employer, Whisprun, conceded it had breached a duty of care owed to her but denied she also developed chronic fatigue syndrome, as up to 20 per cent of Q fever sufferers do. Between 1994 and the 2000 trial Ms Dixon saw numerous doctors complaining of headaches, aches and pains, nausea and fatigue. Justice Newman held that Ms Dixon lacked credibility after surveillance videos, photographs and her own testimony showed inconsistencies between what she said she could do and what she did do. There was evidence of brisk walking around Sydney, attending race meetings, riding horses, driving cars and horse floats, riding a jet ski and an inner tube towed by a speedboat, and drinking and dancing at a wedding. Ms Dixon claimed her mood swings caused the break-up of her relationship but there was evidence it had continued. Because the damages which Justice Newman would otherwise have awarded fell short of the statutory threshold that the NSW Workers Compensation Act then provided, he dismissed Ms Dixon’s action with costs. The NSW Court of Appeal unanimously held that Justice Newman had not given weight to medical reports about Ms Dixon’s condition and erred in concluding that it rested on subjective symptoms when there were objective symptoms such as weight loss, abdominal tenderness, pallor and depression, and impaired memory. The Court allowed Ms Dixon’s appeal and ordered a new trial. Whisprun appealed to the High Court. The High Court, by a 3-2 majority, allowed Whisprun’s appeal and restored the judgment of the trial judge. The majority held that, having regard to the way the trial was conducted, Justice Newman had not overlooked relevant evidence and there was no miscarriage of justice.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 27 May 2004 APPLICANT S v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS The High Court of Australia today allowed an appeal by a young Afghan man who resisted being drafted into the Afghanistan army and who had been refused a protection visa. S, an Afghan of Pashtun ethnicity, arrived by boat in 2000 aged 20, leaving behind his wife, parents and four brothers. The Taliban practised ad hoc, random and forced recruitment of able- bodied young men and thousands of young men left Afghanistan to avoid recruitment. The Taliban tried twice to forcibly recruit S for military service. The first time he paid off the recruiters, and on the second occasion S told them he needed to speak to his parents first, then immediately departed from Afghanistan with the assistance of a people smuggler. The Immigration Department rejected his application for a protection visa, a decision affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal. In the Federal Court Justice Christopher Carr held that the RRT had not considered whether S was a member of a “particular social group” within the meaning of the Refugees Convention and whether he was persecuted due to membership of that group. He said the RRT should have considered whether able-bodied young men comprised a “particular social group”. Justice Carr remitted the matter to the RRT for redetermination, but the Minister successfully appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court. S appealed to the High Court on the ground that the Full Court had erred in requiring evidence that Afghan society perceived young able-bodied men as comprising a “particular social group” before the RRT was obliged to consider whether S was a member of that group. The High Court upheld S’s submission that evidence of Afghan society’s perceptions would be relevant to the question of whether there was a “particular social group”, but absence of such evidence was not determinative. The Court held that a group could be a “particular social group” under the Convention if the group is identifiable by a characteristic common to all members, and if that characteristic distinguishes the group from society at large. The Minister also argued that recruitment by the Taliban did not amount to persecution as a critical element of enmity or malice was absent. The High Court held that persecution did not require this element. The Court also rejected the argument that conscription was a law of general application, as the conscription policy was ad hoc and random. Although the Taliban was in power at the time, the Court held it was not pursuing legitimate national objectives. The High Court, by a 4-1 majority, allowed the appeal with costs and remitted the matter to the RRT for redetermination according to the judgment, although the Court noted that the RRT will also have to take into account developments in Afghanistan since its original decision.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 11 September 2019 DANIEL TAYLOR v ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH [2019] HCA 30 Today the High Court published reasons for the answers given on 19 June 2019 to questions stated in a special case. A majority of the Court held that it was unnecessary to answer the substantive questions stated in the special case in order to determine the plaintiff's entitlement to relief, on the basis that s 268.121(2) of the Criminal Code (Cth) precludes the private prosecution of an offence against Div 268 of the Criminal Code. Under s 13(a) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), any person may institute proceedings for the commitment for trial of a person in respect of an indictable offence against the law of the Commonwealth, unless the contrary intention appears in the Act creating the offence. Section 268.121(1) of the Criminal Code provides that proceedings for an offence against Div 268 of the Criminal Code must not be commenced without the written consent of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth. Section 268.121(2) of the Criminal Code provides that an offence against Div 268 "may only be prosecuted in the name of the Attorney-General". On 16 March 2018, the plaintiff lodged a charge-sheet and draft summons at the Melbourne Magistrates' Court alleging that Aung San Suu Kyi, Minister for the Office of the President and Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, had committed a crime against humanity in contravention of s 268.11 of the Criminal Code, a Commonwealth indictable offence that appears in Div 268 of the Criminal Code and is unable to be heard and determined summarily. The plaintiff lodged the charge-sheet and draft summons in purported reliance on s 13(a) of the Crimes Act. Also on 16 March 2018, the plaintiff requested the consent of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth under s 268.121(1) of the Criminal Code to the commencement of the prosecution. The Attorney-General did not consent to the prosecution. On 23 March 2018, the plaintiff commenced a proceeding against the Attorney-General in the original jurisdiction of the High Court, seeking to quash the decision not to consent to the commencement of the prosecution and to compel the Attorney-General to reconsider the request for consent. A majority of the Court held that, by providing that an offence against Div 268 of the Criminal Code "may only be prosecuted in the name of the Attorney-General", s 268.121(2) of the Criminal Code provides a contrary intention for the purpose of s 13(a) of the Crimes Act so as to preclude the private prosecution of an offence against that Division. Accordingly, a majority of the Court held that the decision made by the Attorney-General not to consent to the plaintiff's proposed prosecution of Ms Suu Kyi was the only decision legally open and that the relief sought by the plaintiff could only be refused.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 April 2013 CASTLE CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD v SAHAB HOLDINGS PTY LTD & ANOR [2013] HCA 11 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales requiring the Registrar-General to restore to the Register an easement which the Registrar-General had deliberately removed. A majority of the Court held that the deliberate removal of an easement from the Register by the Registrar-General was not an "omission" of an easement within the meaning of s 42(1)(a1) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) ("the Act"). That provision provides that, subject to some exceptions, a registered proprietor of land holds title free from all other estates and interests. One exception is in the case of the "omission" of an easement. In 1921, a parcel of land was subdivided and sold. As part of the transaction, an easement of way was created. The easement was in favour of what was to become known as the "Strathallen land", and burdened land that became known as the "Sailors Bay land". In 2001, the appellant, Castle Constructions, became the registered proprietor of the Sailors Bay land and requested that the Registrar-General remove the easement over its land from the Register. The Registrar-General notified the then registered proprietors of the Strathallen land that he intended to remove the easement from the Register. The registered proprietors did not object and, in November 2001, the Registrar-General removed the easement from the Register. In April 2007, the first respondent, Sahab, became the registered proprietor of the Strathallen land and in September 2008, it asked the Registrar-General to restore the easement to the Register. When the Registrar-General in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, seeking to have the easement restored. to do so, Sahab brought proceedings against the Registrar-General refused At first instance, the Supreme Court refused to compel the Registrar-General to restore the easement to the Register. Sahab appealed to the Court of Appeal, which allowed the appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the easement had been omitted from the Register within the meaning of s 42(1)(a1) of the Act because "omission" in that section meant simply that the easement was "not there". The Court of Appeal made orders requiring the Registrar-General to restore the easement to the Register. By special leave, Castle Constructions appealed to the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal. A majority of the Court held that the easement had not been omitted from the Register because it had been deliberately removed by the Registrar-General. Because this was not a case of the omission of an easement within the meaning of the exception to indefeasibility in s 42(1)(a1) of the Act, Castle Constructions' title to the Sailors Bay land was not subject to the easement.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 12 November 2014 MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION v SZSCA & ANOR [2014] HCA 45 Today the High Court, by majority, held that the Refugee Review Tribunal failed to properly address whether an applicant for a protection visa had a well-founded fear of persecution. The first respondent ("the respondent"), an Afghan citizen of Hazara ethnicity, arrived in Australia by boat on 21 February 2012. Before coming to Australia, the respondent had lived in Kabul with his family and worked as a self-employed truck driver transporting construction materials between Kabul and Jaghori. Around late January 2011, the respondent was stopped en route to Jaghori by the Taliban, who warned him not to carry construction materials. Thereafter, he took measures to avoid Taliban checkpoints, but continued to carry construction materials. In about November 2011, another truck driver showed the respondent a letter from the Taliban which called on "local council people to perform their Islamic duty ... to get rid of" the respondent. The respondent left Afghanistan 10 days later. The respondent's application for a protection visa was refused by a delegate of the Minister and that decision was affirmed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal accepted that, if the respondent was again intercepted by the Taliban on the roads on which he usually travelled, he would face a real chance of serious harm and even death for a reason specified in the Refugees Convention. However, the Tribunal found that the risk of persecution would only arise on these roads, which could be avoided by the respondent. It therefore concluded that the respondent did not satisfy the criteria for the grant of a protection visa. The Tribunal's decision was quashed by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and an appeal from that Court was dismissed by a majority of a Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. Both Courts considered that the Tribunal had committed the error identified by the High Court in Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473; [2003] HCA 71. By grant of special leave, the Minister appealed to the High Court. The High Court unanimously held that the Tribunal did not fall into the error identified in S395, but that the Tribunal was required to address whether it would be reasonable to expect the respondent to remain in Kabul and not drive trucks outside it. A majority of the Court held that the Tribunal had failed to address that question and was therefore unable to make a final determination as to whether the respondent had a well-founded fear of persecution. As this constituted an error of law, the Court dismissed the appeal.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 10 August 2022 O'DEA v THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2022] HCA 24 Today, the High Court allowed an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The appeal concerned the meaning of s 7(a) of the Criminal Code (WA) and raised the question of whether an accused person who did not actually do the act constituting an offence, or who the Crown could not prove beyond reasonable doubt actually did the act constituting an offence, could be "deemed ... to be guilty of the offence" under s 7(a). The appellant ("Mr O'Dea") was charged jointly with another ("Mr Webb") with the offence under s 294(1)(a) of the Criminal Code of unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or do some grievous bodily harm. The prosecution's case relied in part upon s 7(a) of the Criminal Code, which, "[w]hen an offence is committed", deems "[e]very person who actually does the act ... which constitutes the offence" to be guilty of the offence. The expert evidence led at trial was inconclusive as to which act or acts of Mr O'Dea or Mr Webb, or combination of their acts, caused the victim's traumatic brain injury amounting to grievous bodily harm. The trial judge's directions to the jury relevantly stated that they could convict Mr O'Dea under s 7(a) if they were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that "Mr O'Dea and Mr Webb were acting in concert, each of them doing one or more of the acts which caused the traumatic brain injury" and that "[t]he relevant accused's acts were unlawful". While Mr O'Dea was convicted of the offence, the jury could not agree upon a verdict in respect of Mr Webb, who was retried and ultimately convicted of the alternative offence of unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm to another contrary to s 297(1) of the Criminal Code. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr O'Dea's appeal against conviction, concluding that the jury directions given were not erroneous and that it was open to the jury to convict Mr O'Dea under s 7(a) by amalgamating the acts of each accused without concluding that Mr Webb's acts were unlawful. By majority, the High Court held that the Court of Appeal should have found that the trial judge erred in his directions to the jury, which amounted to a miscarriage of justice. The proper approach to s 7(a) requires that the accused person "actually does the act" which constitutes the offence. That approach does not require the recognition of a fictitious implication in s 7(a) that the acts of another person can be attributed to an accused, and treated as "actually" having been committed by the accused, where the accused acts "in concert" with the other person. In the case of an offence under s 294(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, criminal responsibility will only arise under s 7(a) where the act causing the grievous bodily harm is the actual and not the attributed act of the accused person. That interpretation of s 7(a) is consistent with its plain textual meaning, drafting history and statutory context, and with the unchallenged reasoning of the Court in Pickett v Western Australia (2020) 270 CLR 323.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 3 May 2017 RODNEY PETER PICKERING v THE QUEEN [2017] HCA 17 Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The High Court held that a miscarriage of justice occurred in the trial of the appellant because the trial judge did not direct the jury on s 31(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Q) ("the Code"). The appellant was tried before a judge and jury on a count of murder. The Crown alleged that the appellant had stabbed the deceased. The appellant was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter, which was available as an alternative verdict under the Code. The appellant appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal on the sole ground that a miscarriage of justice had occurred because s 31(1)(c) of the Code was not left to the jury. Under s 31(1)(c), a person is not criminally responsible for an act if the act is reasonably necessary in order to resist actual and unlawful violence threatened to the person. But under s 31(2), that protection does not extend, among other things, "to an act … which would constitute the crime of murder, or an offence of which grievous bodily harm to the person of another, or an intention to cause such harm, is an element". Grievous bodily harm or an intention to cause such harm is not an element of the offence of manslaughter in Queensland. It was not in dispute, and the Court of Appeal accepted, that s 31(1)(c) was fairly raised on the evidence at trial unless it was excluded by s 31(2). The Court of Appeal held that s 31(2) applied if, on the evidence, the act for which an accused seeks to avoid criminal responsibility would constitute an offence described in s 31(2), irrespective of whether such an offence had actually been charged. The Court of Appeal held that s 31(1)(c) did not avail the appellant, because his act of stabbing the deceased in the way he did was an act that would constitute the offence of unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm to another, that being an offence described in s 31(2). The Court of Appeal therefore dismissed the appellant's appeal. By grant of special leave, the appellant appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that s 31(2) of the Code applies to an act only if the accused has been charged in relation to that act with an offence described in s 31(2) and seeks to invoke s 31(1) to deny criminal responsibility on that charge. Therefore, s 31(1) is not available to deny criminal responsibility on a charge of any of the offences described in s 31(2), but may be available in relation to any other offence that is charged or that is available as an alternative verdict. In this case, the protection afforded by s 31(1)(c) was available to the appellant in relation to the offence of manslaughter, which was not an offence described in s 31(2). The appellant's conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.