In the court case, the Counsel for the Government of Yunkel has requested that Judge Rosemelle Hasty, one of the three Pre-Trial Chamber members assigned to the matter, be disqualified. They justify this request using articles 40 and 41 of the Court’s Statute, which govern judge independence and disqualification, respectively. Before assuming her current position, Judge Hasty wrote a book in which she wrote, “The scourge of Somalia Piracy may someday trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction in a variety of contexts. For example, recruitment and use of juvenile pirates could be tried as a crime against humanity by the International Criminal Court if the Court had personal jurisdiction over parties responsible for this heinous practice.” The Counsel for the Government of Yunkel takes issue with these statements, claiming that they indicate the Judge’s lack of impartiality in the matter. Such a bias would be problematic, given the novel nature of the question of juvenile piracy and its relationship with crimes against humanity. The crux of the Counsel’s arguments lies in the wording of the Articles that they cite as their grounds for requesting the disqualification. Article 40(2) of the Court’s Statute states, “Judges shall not engage in any activity which is likely to interfere with their judicial functions or to affect confidence in their independence.” The Council takes issue with the confidence aspect, as Judge Hasty’s prior writings have demonstrated her familiarity with the matter of juvenile piracy. She has likely already deliberated on scenarios similar to that currently taking place, as her mention of such a situation in her book indicates. Moreover, she names juvenile piracy a heinous practice, which demonstrates the presence of a bias. The Counsel case makes the case that this indication of a particular leaning is significant enough to damage confidence in Judge Hasty’s impartiality. Following this conclusion, the Council makes a case for disqualification based on Article 41(2)(a) of the Statute. This clause adds the additional qualifier of “reasonable” doubts regarding any impartiality as the requirement for not permitting a judge to participate in a case. As an inter alia example, Article 41(2)(a) uses the Judge’s prior involvement in any national or ICC cases that also featured the person currently being investigated or prosecuted by the Court. Lastly, the Statute refers to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as a potential reason for a judge’s disqualification, though this clause is unlikely to be relevant in this case, as the matter in contention is the Judge’s behavior before they assumed their current position. It can be presumed that the Counsel’s opinion is that Judge Hasty’s prior writing creates a reasonable doubt as to her impartiality in the present case. The Prosecution asserts that there is no reason to consider the provided evidence substantial enough to warrant the Judge’s disqualification. All that the passage indicates is Judge Hasty’s familiarity with the matter of juvenile piracy and its potential legal implications. It is not unusual for judges to be aware of such issues, and if they are, they will almost inevitably develop an opinion regarding the stance that should be taken concerning them. This consideration is particularly relevant in the case of Judge Hasty, who presumably researched the topic to be able to present it in some detail in her book. This prior familiarity and theoretical opin