Introduction In recent years, management scholars, policy makers, and mainstream media commentators have debated over the high levels of executive compensation, inquiring whether they are consistent with other important variables such as shareholder interests, firm performance, national and international economic projections, and employee pay (Gong 1; Moriarty 235). Although most advocates of the high levels of executive compensation, especially for CEOs, argue that the suitability of compensation is determined through the market process of wage negotiation rather than a simple process of introspection (Kaplan 5; Kolb 679), it is the interest of this paper to demonstrate that CEOs are grossly overpaid despite the incapacity of many to deliver long-term results for the organisation. Issue The problem is that CEOs are grossly overpaid as an incentive to deliver long-term results for the organisation, yet available literature demonstrates that the current compensation practices for CEOs in many countries globally only motivate them to maximise short-term profits at the expense of long-term benefit (Gong 2), hence the need for governments to implement regulations to limit executive compensation. Recent statistics demonstrate that “in 2006, the median total compensation of the top U.S. CEOs was $10.1 million. This is 314 times the $32,142 earned by the median full-time private industry worker in the U.S. in 2006” (Moriarty 235). Yet, despite the high compensation packages for CEOs, majority of the executives are unable to maximise the value of the firms’ revenues while minimising costs (Kolb 679-680). Competing Claims While many scholars have argued against the high compensation practices for CEOs, a substantial number argue that executives are rightly remunerated since pay for the typical CEO is to a large extent driven by existing market forces. Jeffrey Moriarty, cited extensively in executive pay literature, projects a valid argument that CEOs must respect their fiduciary duties, and therefore must be morally obligated “to reject excessive compensation from the firms they lead, even when such compensation is the outcome of an entirely arm’s length negotiation” (Kolb 679). This scholar argues that organisations may be unable to maximise their value and competitiveness due to high compensation practices for CEOs, hence calls for a minimum effective compensation or “maximum morally permissible compensation” necessary to attract, retain, and motivate CEOs to maximise the value of the organisations in the delivery of long-term results. Additionally, it is common practice that CEOs receiving very high compensation packages would forego a project with positive net present value (NPV) if such a project causes them to fall short of the current quarter consensus forecast, and instead choose to invest in a short-term project that generates higher short-term returns in order to illustrate a perception of greater ability and hence justify their hefty payouts and market value. In the long-term, however, “stock price will drop due to sacrificed long-run profit for short-term profit, and CEO wealth will be negatively affected when the CEO holds a large number of stocks or stock options” (Gong 2). This assertion demonstrates why financial institutions, such as Frontier Bank and First Commerc