Introduction America’s political agenda in Vietnam is not as clear as it should be. Existing literature purports that, part of America’s agenda in Vietnam was to stop the spread of communism and in other literature excerpts, it is reported that, America was persuading North Vietnam to stop supporting the war in South Vietnam (Xomba, 2009, p. 1). Nonetheless, it is important to note that, North Vietnam was largely a communist state and South Vietnam was a capitalistic-friendly state. The war was therefore waged along this line, with partners grouping together along the same socio-political line. Regardless of the social grouping, the Vietnam War was many things to many people because it was seen to expose the divide existing between America’s civil leadership and its military wing. Comprehensively, the Vietnam War led to widespread casualties for Vietnamese and American soldiers because it continued for a long time (between 1957 and 1975). Though the war was initially meant to fight communism and its antecedents, it ended with severe casualties and mistrust of the American government (to its people and the international community). In addition, the American government suffered heavy financial losses of up to 140 billion dollars to finance the war alone (Xomba, 2009, p. 1). Most importantly, America failed to advance its agenda in the Asian nation. It is also a matter of no controversy that the Vietnam War was a unique American war as noted by Drew (1986) who explains that, “It illustrated the difficulty in prosecuting a conventional war against an unconventional enemy and in waging a limited war against an enemy waging an essentially unlimited war” (p. 1). North Vietnam perceived the Vietnam War as another form of colonial imperialism which was first advanced by France, US and now South Vietnam. In other words, North Vietnam perceived the South as another colonial puppet, but America perceived the war as part of North Vietnam’s strategy to take over the South (Xomba, 2009, p. 1). Most of America’s objectives were not achieved after the war ended in 1973 but both divides (North and South Vietnam) were unified in 1973 (Drew, 1986). With a keen emphasis on strategy and retrospect, this study establishes that America failed to advance its political agenda in Vietnam because of its failure to understand the nature of its enemy, its poor justification for engaging in the war, its political interference with the Vietnamese government, and the deep-seated contempt Americans had, about the war and its consequent impact on the morale of its soldiers. These reasons are further complemented by the tribulations American soldiers suffered in Vietnam. Domino Theory The Domino theory was introduced by the then American President, Dwight D. Eisenhower as an excuse to invade Vietnam. This strategy (as was later evidenced) was fear-driven by the fact that, after the French exited South Vietnam, the country would fall into communism and comprehensively, the entire Southeast Asia would follow the same precedent (Xomba, 2009). Obviously, this theory was entirely wrong. Eisenhower also believed that if Southeast Asia was entirely under communism, the sociopolitical trend would soon spread into America, and this would eventually cause social instability in the Western world. To America, communism was wrong and it acted like a deceptive tool used by its protagonists to make p