Introduction The 5 th of September, 1972 looked like an ordinary night for Israeli Olympic team in the Olympic village at 31 Connollystrasse. Everything was normal as each member contemplated on his strategies to ensure that they emerged victors in their respective sports. However, things changed at exactly 4: 00 a.m. in the morning when armed Arab terrorists scaled the fence of the stadium and held nine of the team’s members hostage after having killed two. Although the German forces outlined a rescue plan, the final result was pathetic as it left 11 of the team members dead. This prompted an aggressive retaliation plan from Israel that led to execution of 12 Arabs believed to have organized the attack (Becker, 1985). Given this scenario, this paper intends to analyze the decision of Israel to employ the retaliation measure and ascertain the effectiveness of the approach. Terrorist activities are, without doubt, among the central concerns of most of the developed countries. Militia groups and extremist Muslim organizations have time and again organized attacks or offered threats in order to compel governments to act according to their demands. This has thus led to great losses both economically, socially and politically. For instance, the 9/11 attack on the twin towers left more than 2000 people dead. This is cue enough to trigger response through counter terrorism measures. Equally, Israel had to react to the Munich Olympic attack by its own counter terrorist approach of which was dubbed the wrath of God. The Attack On that fateful day, Fadayeen terrorists sneaked their way over the fence and forced entry into apartments one and three of 31 Connollystrasse Olympic village at Kusoczinskidamm stadium and captured nine Israeli athletes alive. During the commotion, the terrorists had been forced to kill two athletes, Moshe Weinberger and Yossef Romanno who had staged a spirited resistance against the attackers. As a result of the battle and the unexpected resistance by the team members, the terrorists allowed eight more Israeli athletes to escape because the attackers failed to complete their searches in rooms two, four and five (Morris, 1999). By five am, the terrorists had already written their demands to the Israeli and German governments. To prove their seriousness, the Palestinian based group Black September Organization dropped the body of Moshe Weinberger in the streets. The main theme in their demands was release of certain Arab and German prisoners under Israel and West German custody. The next logical step was a discussion between West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and his counterpart, the Israeli Premier, Golda Meir. The discussion did not end up fruitful as Meir clearly stipulated that her government would, by no means, negotiate with terror groups. The only way German would accept cooperation between the two governments was allowing specially trained Israeli sniper group called Sayeret to carry out a rescue operation. Again, the German government refused to offer Israel this privilege and offered to use their own less experienced snipers to rescue the nine captives held in a helicopter (Black & Morris, 1991). The German operation was very poorly executed. The five snipers were not adequate to bring down eight terrorists who were holding the Israelis hostage. In addition, the police