Overview Incorrect assumption in alleviating the threat posed by industrial terrorism is the main setback in the fight against acts of terror that target industrial chemical establishments. In the past, much of the effort had been directed towards responding to disasters caused by terrorism with minimal consideration of protective measures that can be put in place. Although the September 11, 2001 incidence did not target chemical plants but real human life, first responders have made significant progress strengthening capabilities needed to defend the nation against the threat of WMD (Kosal, 2006). The DHS national guidelines developed and implemented nationwide have provided a durable framework for multi-agency coordination and cooperation. This is important because terrorist attacks or major disasters often are beyond what a single jurisdiction can respond to effectively. However, whether levels of preparedness are adequate at all levels of government may prove difficult to assess. Many emergency response and management professionals believe that the nation is better prepared than it was prior to 11th September 2001, but still has plenty of room for improvement. For example, priority missions identified in Homeland Security Strategic Plans have associated capabilities taken from the DHS Target Capabilities List. Each capability must reach target levels of performance if an adequate level of preparedness is to be achieved. It is clear that the emergency response community benefits from national standards that allow response entities to coordinate more effectively than before. However, to reiterate, is this level of preparedness where it needs to be? If not, what are the shortfalls and how should they be addressed? The biggest challenge for achieving an appropriate level of preparedness nationwide remains the need for continued strengthening of multi-agency capabilities. Multi-agency preparedness, in terms of multi-agency capabilities achieving target levels of performance, is critical for safeguarding the country. This paper offers a succinct overview of industrial terrorism with cross reference to regulatory measures in place and some of the loopholes that need to be sealed in fully addressing the menace. Incidents It is highly possible that close to 2.4 million people may either sustain serious injuries or be killed altogether in the event that a terrorist attack is directed in a heavy industrial plant establishment with several employees (Perrow, 2007). Secondly, it also worth to note that substantial quantities of industrial chemicals emanating from over 15,000 chemical plants are transported, stored and produced. It is against this background that “a worst vase release” was determined by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1996 and established the fact that over 100 of the identified chemical facilities had the potential of jeopardizing over one million lives located near the plants. Further, it is also estimated that between100, 000 and 1,000,000 people are currently at risk of the chemical facilities should they turn to be targets of industrial terrorists. Indeed, these are staggering numbers that authorities cannot merely develop policy documents without implementing the proposals. While politi