Introduction Though the Crimean crisis is between Ukraine and Russia, it is considered a global crisis due to the involvement of the various nations, particularly the European Union and the United States. The crisis began when Russia decided to annex the Crimean Black Sea peninsula from Ukraine, a move considered by the international community, particularly the west as an invasion of Ukraine. The motives behind Russia behaviour remain hypothetical. However, some have interpreted the intervention as a means through which Russia strengthens its internal audience and increases its global presence (Dawber Par 3). However, historically, the Crimean have always considered themselves as Russians and the region part of Russia. Also, the Crimean majority belongs to the ethnic Russians and always tends to believe that they belong to Russia. Moreover, most of the people living in Crimea are Russians. The reasons provide increased room for Russia to intervene in Ukraine in the pretext that they are protecting the Russians and the pro-Russia Crimean majority particularly against the new regime, which is associated with the west. Russia often indicates that its main objective is to protect the Russian interests in Crimea as well as the majority ethnic group. However, its unfolding actions indicate otherwise. Origin of the Crimea’s crisis As indicated, over the decades, Crimea has often considered itself a pro-Russian part of Ukraine. Crimea is tied to Russia more than Ukraine in various social, political, and economic grounds (Hagendoorn, Linssen and Tumanov 116). For instance, Sevastopol, the capital city of Crimea, remains strategic to the Russian military, particularly the navy personnel that have stayed in the region since the Soviet era. The Russian navy personnel and the Black Sea Fleet were inherited from the former Soviet Union. However, in 2009 the relation between Russia and Ukraine was put into test when Ukrainian president Victor Yuschenko, considered by Russia as pro-western ordered the Russians to vacate the key port city by 2017 (Dawber Par 3). The ultimatum did not go well with the Russian authorities, and the tensed relationship between Russia and Yuschenko’s regime began. As such, Russia decided to change the regime at Kyiv, which they succeeded by throwing their weight behind Viktor Yanukovych in the subsequent elections of 2010. Viktor Yanukovych later won the elections and became Ukraine’s president. With a new president in office, Russia ensured that its economic and military interest in Crimea is fully secured (Hagendoorn, Linssen and Tumanov 116). On assuming the presidency, Yanukovych first business with the Russian government was to extend the Russian naval stay at Sevastopol for over three decades. The extension of the stay also benefitted Ukraine economically. The deal between the new regime and the Russian government reduced the fear of eviction that was installed by former Ukraine’s pro-western regime. Even though Sevastopol remains strategic to Russia’s unlimited access to the Mediterranean Sea, it is important to note that the same city also plays host to Ukraine’s naval base (Legvold 231). The presence of Muslim Tatars in Crimea also contributed hugely to the conflict. Muslim Tatars occupied Crimea even before the Nazi regime. However, the Muslim