One of the reasons why many people experience a hard time while trying to ensure that the verbal/written messages that they convey to others are being properly understood is that it is in the very essence of language, as a communicational medium, to alter the semiotics of informational transactions. In its turn, this can be discussed as the direct result of the fact that there are two semantic aspects (sense and reference/denotation) to just about any linguistic unit (sign), which denotes a particular emanation of the surrounding reality – hence, the sheer ease with which some individuals tend to misinterpret the referential ‘identity’ of verbal/written sentences. Apparently, the mentioned aspects are not easily identifiable. However, for those who are aware of the discursive significance of the issue at stake, this should not prove too challenging – the idea that Gottlob Frege used to promote. In this paper, I will explain the meaning of Frege’s idea, in this respect, and provide a critical evaluation of the proposed solution, on his part. The conceptual essence of Frege’s line of argumentation, in regards to what accounts for the ‘problem of identity’, can be outlined as follows. When we come up with an object-denoting sentence, there is a certain chance for the concerned message to end up misread. The reason for this is that the object of denotation does not always correlate with the denotation’s semantic significance. The validity of this suggestion can be illustrated, in regards to the referential sentences “the country that is being the most committed to promoting the cause of democracy in the world”, on one hand, and “the country that dropped a nuclear bomb on the innocent civilians in Hiroshima”, on the other. As it can be well seen, in both cases, the referential point appears to be the U.S. At the same time, however, there are only a few doubts that the mentioned sentences convey messages that can hardly be considered semiotically compatible. Why would this be the case, given the fact that both sentences denote exactly the same? The reason for this is that both of them represent the denoted object in a specific contextual light, which Frege used to refer to as the ‘mode of representation’: “A difference can arise only if the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of that which is designated” (24). Apparently, the denoted object’s ‘mode of representation’ accounts for the actual sense of the sentence’s semantic connotation. In its turn, this implies that one of the ways towards solving the ‘puzzle of identity’, is concerned with ensuring that there is a semiotic unity between three qualitatively different aspects of the actual manner of how a particular object is being referred to – ‘sign’ (name), ‘reference’ (denotation) and ‘sense’ (idea). Nevertheless, there can also be cases when, despite not denoting a particular object of reference, some sentences make a semantically legitimate sense, such as the following: “I would like to meet the smartest person on Earth”. As it can be well seen, this sentence does not refer to any concrete person, who is being deemed the world-smartest’, but rather implies his possible existence. We can discuss long and hard wheth