Lebanonization of Hezbollah commenced in the 1990s after Hezbollah had adopted the policy of infitah, and decided to integrate with the democratic government of Lebanon. This contributed to the fact that Hezbollah has broader regional relations and agendas. The idea behind the Lebanonization of Hezbollah was to disarm the group by making it a domestic political force. Its party headship was always very clear, particularly in proclaiming Hezbollah’s natural ties with Iran, which did not end. Hassan Nasrallah, who was Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, for instance, asserted that nothing would make them leave the party of Wilayat al-Faqih. In the course of alleged “Lebanonization,” Hezbollah began to refute claims of conceding to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The secretary-general of the group, Sayyed Nasrallah, claimed that Hezbollah had private management and that it was not under the leadership of the Teheran. Nevertheless, he maintained that they experienced a strong and good relationship with Iran because the country supported the Palestinians and Lebanese people, as well as the Arabs and Muslims, in their resistance against domination by other groups (Byman, 2005). Hizbollah recognizes Ayatollah Khameini, who is the greatest chief of the Islamic State, being the leader in numerous religious dealings. On the other hand, the movement makes its own political decisions. Presently, Hezbollah follows the ideas of the modern Iranian President Muhammad Khatami. Hezbollah, similar to Khatami, has decided to start a discourse with the American citizens, but not the American government. According to Harik (2007), this shows that the organization was ready to change its tarnished reputation as a terrorist group and that Hezbollah was ready to cooperate with the new government in Teheran. Hezbollah and Iran’s policy in Lebanon is aimed at reaching a consensus that would co-opt and counteract the Sunnis through securing their backing for the Resistance agenda. This was simple with the Sunnis under the Syrians since the Sunni officials were powerless and acted like supporters of Hezbollah’s agenda. Following the killing of Rafiq Hariri in the year 2005, Syrian departure, and molest on the Sunni environs in Beirut in May of 2008, Hezbollah’s reputation amid the Sunnis decreased significantly. It turned into a problem for even pro-Syrian Sunnis, such as Omar Karami, who had to assume an incompetent pro-Hezbollah place, particularly during the summer 2008 conflicts in Tripoli, involving Hezbollah- and Syria-connected Alawite and Sunni groups. Sometime later, Hezbollah attempted to create a memorandum with a trivial group of Salafis. Although the force from the other Salafi sand typical Sunni spheres to abrogate, it was too tough that even the Salafi representatives who had earlier expressed consent had to withdraw. However, Iran and Hezbollah have created alliances with radical Islamists, such as Fathi Yakan, who is a friend to the Syrians and openly supports Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden. Yakan received official reception in Iran during March 2007, and his troop trains with Hezbollah. In conclusion, Hezbollah’s sponsorship by Iran continued even after Lebanonization because the