Introduction Legitimate political authority is that which is derived from the consent given by the people to be governed. This is based on Locke’s explanation in which he applies the social contract technique. The authority may, however, be withdrawn when a state interferes with or reduces the freedom to be enjoyed by subjects (Mukherjee & Ramaswamy 2001). In the assumption of legitimate political power, a state has the right to develop laws and measures to be used for the purpose of controlling and conserving individual or public property. In certain instances, the state may use the community to ensure that stipulated laws are well respected and adhered to for the sake of every person. Typically, legitimate political power is controlled by trust and the entire community is expected to play a big role in stipulating the intentions. Freedom and Nature of Political Authority Generally, the legitimacy of any state has to do with the right the state has to control its subjects (Corbett 2009, p. 45). This right and its correlative obligations constitute a special moral relationship between the state and each individual who consents. In Lockean’s view, the justification of a state ultimately gives us moral reasons to refrain from undermining it. Ordinarily, it gives subjects moral reasons to positively support the state or perhaps promote the existence of similar states. Seemingly, justice and happiness of others look like ends that may require positive promotion by all moral agents. However, the justification of a state in this manner cannot form the basis of any special moral relationship between it and its subjects. Ordinarily, no single individual can be made to succumb to another without his or her own consent (Simmons 2001, p. 129). Ostensibly, the legitimacy of political power springs from the morals that often exist in societies. Subjects, therefore, have a moral duty to obey. However, Locke also offers a different and quite general argument for the moral and prudential preferences of states ruled by the limited governments to life in the state of nature (Jahanbegloo 2004, p. 32). This argument is plainly addressed to those who maintain that the state in any form is morally or prudentially inferior to life without the state. As a result, state legitimacy is the logical correlation of various obligations, including the subjects’ political obligations. A state’s legitimacy right is in part a right held specifically against the subjects bound by any state imposed duties arising from morally significant relations (Rawls 2009, p. 23). It follows, therefore, that state legitimacy may be complete or partial, depending on whether such relations hold with all or only with some of those against whom the state enforces the duties it imposes. By and large, governments can presumably be illegitimate even where the states they govern are not. According to Estlund (2012, p. 35), however, state and legitimacy seem not to be independent of one another, since an illegitimate state could not have a legitimate government. Arguably, states earn their legitimacy by virtue of the consent of their members. This consent empowers a central authority to create a viable political society for the ben