Introduction Background of the Study Russia’s economy is booming as it has been for the past six years; since 1998 its economy has been growing at well over six percent a year with most, if not all, of its economical growth being attributed to increasing oil, gas and mineral prices (Vaknin 2006, p 1). As indicated by Cukrowski (2004), Russia is one of Europe’s largest suppliers of oil and natural gas especially to Eastern European countries and most importantly the E.U wherein the E.U. imports nearly one quarter of its energy needs from Russia (Cukrowski 2004, p 285 – 292). It is based on this that Cukrowski (2004) states that “when examining the history of resource trading within the European continent and its dependence on Russian energy exports the best way of tracing this is to go back to the 1970s when pipelines were constructed across Western Siberia to Europe to transport gas and oil and from here determine the extent of Russia’s control over several eastern and central European states” (Cukrowski 2004, p 285 – 292). It has become glaringly obvious that several European states understand that their foreign policy interests with regard to Russia are that of growing energy dependence. Robinson (2007) indicates in his study examining changes within Russia’s economy over the past decade states that “what must be understood is that there is a distinct need for the continued and uninterrupted supply of oil and gas from Russia to meet the needs of an ever increasingly dependent European market” (Robinson 2007, p 245 – 259). Robinson (2007) goes on to state the following factual data: it has been estimated that Russian gas composes around 40% of European gas imports which is also equivalent to 19% of all gas consumed in all of the states comprising the European Union (Robinson 2007, p 245 – 259). It is from the views of Robinson (2007) and Cukrowski (2004) that a picture emerges of a situation where Russia has slowly but surely expanded its consumer base within Europe since the 1970s and through this poised itself as one of main sources of oil and gas within region resulting in a form of energy dependence that could be utilized in the future for its own political means. The geographic location of the Central and Eastern European states, their susceptibility to monopoly provisions, the potentiality of stoppages whether intentional or otherwise as well as a lack of sufficient infrastructure in the form of self sufficiency in energy production, all undermine a collective response to Moscow by these states making them vulnerable towards external influences from Russia (Tompson 2005, p 335 – 359). The Start of Russia’s Economic Expansion After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian economy went through a major crisis. The October 1991 “shock therapy” reform advocated by Boris Yeltsin not only resulted in economic collapse, with GDP declining by roughly 50 percent between 1990 and 1995 and millions being plunged into poverty (L’vov 2001, 71). In 1998 Russia defaulted on its foreign debts due to its inability to pay them however from 1999 to 2002 rapid economic growth occurred in Russia as a direct result of an enforced devaluation of the ruble, then reinforced by a rise in oil prices and a surprisingly prudent fiscal