Introduction Some of the most dreadful incidents in the US are easy to pinpoint. Such cases include the death of President John Kennedy, the Pearl Harbor attack, and the 9/11 terrorist assault. In particular, the Pearl Harbor and the 9/11 may be viewed as the most traumatic events, considering the tension they caused in the entire US. Remarkably, many studies have continuously compared the two events pointing that they share many similarities. The most prominent claim, which forms the basis of the discussion in this paper, is that both events were a case of intelligence failure. Indeed, the cases of intelligence failure reoccur with disappointing regularity. Subsequently, a committee is formed to identify the faults and/or recommend how they can be averted. Both traumatic events led to the formation of a body to investigate of the shortfalls. Based on the findings of the bodies and the ongoing discussion among Americans concerning the similarities, the ensuing discourse compares the events of 7 December and 11 September. The initial section will briefly describe the facts of the incidents. Subsequently, it will offer a comparison of the intelligence failure in both cases with a substantial consideration of the intelligence process. The discussion will conclude that the events were more different, rather than similar as many people suggest. Facts of 9/11 and the Pearl Harbor Attack The Pearl Harbor Incident The attacks of the Pearl Harbor began during late 1941. About 350 Japanese planes struck the US Pacific Fleet based in Pearl Harbor and the neighboring airfields. The synchronized attack lasted for about two hours, leaving appalling results. About 2,400 Americans died while 1000 others suffered injuries. Close to 10 battleships were dented while more than 160 American planes were damaged. The Japanese people only lost about 30 aircrafts and five submarines. About 185 Japanese soldiers were also killed while others were injured. Evidently, Americans lost in the attack. Traditionally, the expected ratio of an aggressor against a defender should be three to one. At the close of 1941, the ratio was nothing close to the normal ratio. One Japanese casualty accounted for every twenty Americans deaths or injuries. The scenario was not only disheartening but also unforeseen. Americans were devastated. Four investigative bodies were established to examine the probable causes of the attack and/or recommend the way forward. Justice Owen J. Roberts led the first panel. He was serving as the Supreme Court Associate Justice. The panel also comprised retired Army Generals and Navy admirals. After conducting its investigation, the Roberts Commission concluded that top Army and Navy officials in Hawaii should have been held accountable for the traumatic events that occurred in 7 December. Subsequently, according to Blewett (2015, p. 86), the Navy and Army who were in charge of the Hawaii jurisdiction were relieved of their duties. After the Roberts Commission completed the assignment, the Army Pearl Harbor Board was instituted under the leadership of the Secretary of War, as well as Secretary of the Navy, to examine information concerning the calamity. The panel perfor