The reading of Arthur Clarke’s short story “Superiority” had brought me to the following set of conclusions, in regards to how story’s motifs relate to particulars of my professional affiliation:   * The implementation of groundbreaking technologies to achieve practical results poses a variety of operational challenges. If these challenges are not being thoroughly observed, during the course of an implementation process, the actual effectiveness of revolutionary technologies’ deployment will be severely undermined . As it appears from Clarke’s story, the ultimate reason why practical utilization of Norden’s Sphere of Annihilation, the Battle Analyzer and the Exponential Field by Fleet’s commanders has failed to reach its strategic objectives is that it never occurred to these commanders that Norden’s inventions had changed the very essence of space warfare, as described by Clarke. After having been given powerful new weapons, Fleet’s commanders proceeded with deploying them in a conventional manner. Such course of their action was utterly inappropriate because: a) No research was conducted on possible side effects, associated with deployment of new weapons, prior to them attaining fully operational status, b) Commanders have failed at realizing a simple fact that the deployment of Sphere of Annihilation, the Battle Analyzer and the Exponential Field would never bring about the full spectrum of expected beneficial effects, unless Fleet’s tactics would be adjusted to correspond to new challenges and opportunities, associated with these new weapons.   * The juxtaposition of quality vs. quantity does not necessarily imply quality’s upper hand, within the context of a confrontation, especially when this confrontation is being concerned with military matters . During the course of WW2, Germans had produced 1.300 heavy Tiger tanks. These tanks were superior to Soviet and Allied armor in all possible respects. However, the utilization of Tiger tanks on WW2 battlefields did not achieve expected results, simply because these tanks’ utter technological complexity had prevented Germans from being able to manufacture them in sufficient numbers; whereas, the number of produced T-34’s alone accounted for 35.467. By embarking upon Fleet’s rearmament in the middle of war, its commanders had lost strategic initiative – thus, allowing the enemy to take full advantage of its numerical superiority: “While we had been equipping as many of our ships as we could with the irresistible weapon, the enemy had been building feverishly. His ships were of the old pattern with the old weapons – but they now out-numbered ours” (1951, p. 3). Apparently, the enemy was quick enough to realize that the process of Fleet’s rearmament had reduced its technological superiority down to a minimum, which automatically provided the opposing party with an opportunity to use the realization of this fact to its own advantage.   * Under no circumstances should the empirical scientists be allowed to affect the process of designing military (organizational) strategy, due to their incompetence in this particular field . There is evidence in the story as to the fact that, after having been appointed as a Chief of the Research Staff, Nord