Introduction Since its establishment in 1960, the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) has dominated the global oil markets and prices. However, the rising production of oil by non-OPEC countries has become the biggest threat to OPEC’s power. The powerful OPEC was established to safeguard the interest of member oil exporters, a role that the organization had managed to sustain until recently when its market share declined from over 50% to 40%. Oil extraction by non-OPEC countries has been on the rise until the recent mid-2014 fall in oil prices. Countries such as the US have intensified their oil extraction in the shale fields. Russia has also increased its oil extraction to the extent of becoming a major non-OPEC oil producer. As the paper confirms, the increase in oil production by non-OPEC countries has led to the witnessed non-cooperation among OPEC members, disparity in technology and innovation between OPEC and non-OPEC countries, and the issue of non-OPEC countries taking over the role of swing oil producer and price marker, and hence the biggest threat to the power of OPEC. Non-cooperation among OPEC Members The increased production of oil by non-OPEC countries has resulted in reduced oil prices across the globe. According to Yergin (2006), the power of OPEC has been sourced from its ability to regulate oil prices in the world markets by managing the supply and access of oil by other countries. Birol (2007) affirms that the mechanism that OPEC used to cling to this power as a cartel was the cutback in oil production by the dominant Saudi Arabia if oil prices went down. According to Guidi, Russell, and Tarbert (2006), Saudi Arabia accounts for approximately a fifth of all the oil reserves in the world. A cut down in its oil production means low supply in the market. Hence, the demand for oil goes up, followed by price increment, which in turn results in high asset prices in the US and other OPEC countries (Ahmadian, Hassan, & Regassa, 2013). Since Saudi Arabia accounts for more than half of all the OPEC oil reserve capacity, it acts as the swing producer and regulator of oil prices (Portman, 2007; Guidi et al., 2006). Hence, it can reduce its oil production to raise prices. However, this trend has been threatened by the recent increase in oil production by non-OPEC countries. For instance, Braml (2007) observes that an increase in oil production by non-OPEC countries has resulted in increased oil supply in the market, hence reducing oil prices. Therefore, OPEC members have called for meetings to deliberate on their position concerning the falling world oil prices. However, the meetings have ended in disarray after members fail to agree. OPEC remains a divided organization, owing to competition from non-OPEC countries in terms of oil prices (Birol, 2007). For instance, OPEC members within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that include countries such as Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have been willing to let world oil prices fall for them to increase their market share in the world. On the other hand, member countries of OPEC such as Venezuela and Iran have opposed the policy that allows oil prices to fall. They have advocated higher oil prices in the