A famous quote by Vladimir Lenin sounds like follows, “Every cook has to learn how to govern the state ” (Ralhan 1998, p. 807) . The efficiency of the employees’ participation in the company’s governance remains an issue for discussion. This work is aimed at describing different approaches in this field and comparing them. The model of shareholder capitalism is characterized by the smallest involvement of employees into the managerial process. The national economical systems with the shareholder model prevailing are mostly the liberal market economies, with the primacy of labor market (Tylecote & Visintin, 2007). This group includes the USA and the other Anglo-Saxon countries, such as Canada, Australia, and the UK. The second model called stakeholder capitalism implies that employees become the companies’ major stakeholders and participate in their management (Tylecote and Visintin, 2007). The German practices of Mitbestimmung (a system of codetermination) and Betriebsate (representation of the employees on the supervisory board) are the good examples for this model. In their (2007), Mjoset and Clausen mark that in the German companies with the staff exceeding 2000 employees, positions in the supervisory board are equally distributed between the shareholders and the workers (p. 46). The employees participate in decision making in terms of the company’s investment, their work condition and salary rates. State-led capitalism is characterized by strong governmental coordination and protection of the employees. France and Korea are the examples of economies where this model dominates (Tylecote and Visintin, 2007). In order to compare three approaches in terms of their long-term effect, it is necessary to outline whose interests are prevailing in each of them and what they consist of. The shareholder capitalism is oriented to the interest of the shareholders, which is profit, as high as possible. Nevertheless, this model is the most effective in terms of the long-term prospect for several reasons: firstly, if a shareholder invests into a firm, he already orients to long-term cooperation; secondly, shareholders whose shares are able to influence the decision making and the firm’s top executives have knowledge in the managerial matters of balance between short and long-term benefits. Thirdly, the quality of the chief executives’ decisions is observed and controlled by the shareholders. The other two models have their weaknesses in terms of the long-term performance: the government is interested in a company’s short and long-term success; however, the competence of the government’s representatives is often below the necessary level, or they may represent the interest of some other sides, and the decisions may be inappropriate. At the same time, the stakeholders are focused on short-term benefits, such as salary increase etc.; moreover, they do not see the whole picture in the market. Thus, the company will focus on bringing benefits to the stakeholders instead of decreasing price or investing, which will affect the long-term performance. In the market economy, the first model is able to work within the competitive environment the most effectively. The last statement begs the question about significance and reasonability of the employees’ participation in governance. In order to find an answer, it is necessary to “calc