Introduction Ever since the September 11 attacks, the capacity of the US federal government to effectively and efficiently ward off or respond to the impacts of portable nuclear weapons used by Al Qaeda has been under close public scrutiny. Structural measures Carrying out aerial background surveys could help deter attacks from portable nuclear devices. These are able to detect a threat from radioactive devise, measure radioactivity levels after an attack and decrease the cost of clean up (GAO, 2007). This is however costly which hampers implementation. This challenge can be solved through increased funding of the Department of Energy and Department of Homeland security. The increasing capability of the Remote sensing laboratories will also help to contain possible attacks. These facilitate detection and mobilization of response to impending nuclear attacks. The challenge is that the laboratories are not dispersed and equipped enough to be effective against attacks. Dispersing the centers across the states and equipping them will resolve this impediment. Screening at airports and other entry points has also been automated using the latest technology to curb the sneaking of suitcases like portable nuclear devices. This has increased the efficiency and effectiveness of any explosive or radioactive devices since the 9-11 attacks. However, terrorists are always devising new techniques mechanisms of evading detection. This can be solved by boosting vigilance and research into emerging loopholes that could be exploited by terrorist networks. The closure of nuclear reactors producing highly enriched uranium could help reduce the possibility of portable nuclear attacks by starving the black market from such supply. This will deny Al Qaeda the supply of such weapons. The greatest challenge is how to get all key stakeholders to agree with such a strategy due to suspicion existing among the nuclear power. This can be implemented by bringing the dissenting groups to the negotiation table so as to arrive at a possible agreement to cut such production. Non-structural measures In order to avert the danger of possible portable nuclear attacks, it is important to assess the possibility and impact of attacks in the first place. In 2002, the national security strategy assessed the possibility of these weapons landing in the hands of extremist groups through the aid of tyrannical and failed governments (Millar, 2006). Its bottlenecks are devising the most effective and efficient way of assessment. With proper research, the development of suitable impact and threat analysis mechanisms can be possible. To deal with possible leakage of a portable nuclear arsenal to the terrorist, the Russian surveillance program should be strengthened in partnership with other major powers. Russia is known as the greatest stock of fissile and suitcase nuclear bombs which could easily be sneaked to terrorists due to corruption and unemployment among the nuclear scientist along with a poor surveillance system. Getting its cooperation amidst spying suspicions would be the major impediment. Negotiations and multilateral agreements will be important in allaying the fears. The enrichment and reprocessing process of uranium should be banned on its whole. Terrorist groups have little capacity to produce complete nuclear arms and rely on th