Fog and Friction Since time immemorial, when humans started waging war on each other, the ability to reduce and understand the unknowns of warfare has determined the victor in most cases. These unknowns of war, described by Karl von Clausewitz as the fog and friction of war [1] , have ever been present in warfare. Until recently, there was little in a commander’s ability to reduce the unknowns on the battlefield. However, with the development of the digital age and improved command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and common operating picture (COP), the ability of the commander staff to have real time visualization of every aspect of the battlefield, including the enemy, is now at large. Clausewitz gives the following definition of friction in his book On War : Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction. [2] It continues to illustrate that this friction is all over with opportunity, resulting in effects whose determination may not be possible since they are caused by chance. Simply, “Friction is . the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.” [3] It is the unknown of war, enemies and friends to which commanders must adapt, overcome, or alleviate. Clausewitz, who is considered an early strategist in the military and the first to offers description of warfare friction points out that it takes place when several small accidents make a combination to bring down the performance levels in such a way that ending down lower than intended is what one gets.” [4] There are many examples throughout history that depict warfare. For example, an historical account of air operations during Desert Storm showed that: Aircrews had to cope with equipment malfunctions, inadequate mission-planning materials, lapses in intelligence on both targets and enemy defenses, coordination problems between strike and support aircraft, target and time-on-target (TOT) changes after takeoff, unanticipated changes in prewar tactics, adverse weather, the traditional lack of timely bomb damage assessment (BDA), and, in many wings, minimal understanding of what higher headquarters was trying to accomplish from one day to the next. [5] Watts asserts that “frictional impediments experienced by [Coalition Forces] were not appreciably different in scope or magnitude than they were for the Germans during their lightning conquest of France and the Low Countries in May 1940.” [6] Too Much Information On the battlefield, commanders’ crave for information is always intensive. Whether it is about the enemy or friendly units, they want it badly. In the digital age, like never before in history, commanders will have near uninterrupted real-time pictures of conditions on the battlefield. However, a new kind of friction may replace the old, where information saturation will confuse commanders and staff. A good, recent illustration is during the battle for Fallujah in late 2004 when army and Marine units found it difficult to communicate as a result of multiple communications and COP systems employed by both services in support of the b