Political Control of Bureaucracy Three decades ago, political theories of political control of bureaucracy underwent complete transformation; shifting from the paradigm that emphasizes the extreme difficulty with which electoral institutions have in controlling the massive powers of the federal bureaucracies to one which insists that the elected officials have powers to control and shape bureaucratic behaviors systematically. Historically, this was demonstrated by the Reagan Administration, which changed a number of programs (Dye, 2003). These developments triggered a number of scholars in the field of social sciences to develop tools to measure and evaluate the extent of this control. What followed was a series of empirical studies that were meant to establish the extent to which the electoral institutions would control the then overbearing bureaucratic institutions. To date, the political theory of bureaucratic control holds the view that political office has a massive power to control bureaucracies. However, what is the extent of control? Several empirical studies have been done in the past to explore the dynamics of political control, scope or how manipulation can occur, and to some extent, what variables are there for manipulation to occur. Wood & Waterman (1991), cited in Dye (2003), examined the dynamism in this political control of the bureaucracy to explicitly determine the scope and mechanisms of this influence. In this study, the two researchers investigated seven bureaucracies in relation to their responsiveness to political tools applied by Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan administrations (Dye, 2003). Their findings revealed that all the seven public bureaucracies were responsive. Furthermore, the results also indicated that political appointments (a shared power between the president and the congress ) are the most important instrument of political control, while changing budget, legislation, congressional signals, and administrative reorganizations were considered less significant (Dye, 2003). Meier, O’TooleO’Toole & Hawes, cited in Holland (1999), tested multiple theoretical determinants of political control over bureaucracies and justified the concept that political office has a huge influence on the nature and effectiveness of these bureaucracies. These findings illustrate the importance of the scholars’ insistence that a method of policy control monitoring is necessary for the better democratic future of America. In other words, the future of America’sAmerica’s democracy is hinged on current policies that will shape the extent of political control of the bureaucratic office to avoid misuse. Representative Bureaucracy Representative bureaucracy theory is based on the belief that an organization would work effectively and efficiently if the constituents were well represented in the workforce. That is to say, the organization’s elected persons have the discretion to choose members from their constituency to occupy the non-elective positions within the organization, taking into consideration the constituent’s population characteristics. Many believe that this kind of organizational arrangement is based on the strategy of the organization. In this