Introduction Realism in the background of international relations includes a diversity of hypotheses and advances, all of which allocate a belief that states are chiefly inspired by the desire for military and financial power or safety, rather than ideals or morals. This term is often identical with power government. (Brodsky, 1996) The realist approach has the following key statements:   * The international structure is anarchic. There is no power over the states able to control and regulate their communications; states must come to contact with other states on their own, but not on someone other’s desire.   * Independent states are the key actors in the international structure.   * States are rational unitary actors each moving towards their own national attention. There is a universal doubt of long-term collaboration or coalition.   * The overwhelming ‘national interest’ of each state is its state safety.   * Relations among states are defined by their relative level of power obtained chiefly from their military and financial capacities. Realists suggest that mankind is not essentially generous but rather competitive. This Hobbesian viewpoint, which regards human nature as selfish and conflictual unless given suitable conditions under which to collaborate, contrasts with the approach of acceptance to international relations. Further, they believe that states are intrinsically violent and/or preoccupied with safety; and that territorial expansion is only limited by opposing authorities. This aggressive build-up heads to a safety dilemma where escalating one’s own safety can bring along larger unsteadiness as the opponent builds up its own forces. Thus, safety is a zero-sum game where only comparative gains can be created. (Sittser, 1997). The origins of war Neville Chamberlain’s politics of pacification were motivated by good reasons; he was perhaps less inspired by deliberations of individual power than were lots of other British prime ministers and he searched to keep peace and to guarantee the happiness of all distressed. Yet his actions led to the Second World War. Sir Winston Churchill’s reasons, on the other hand, were much less general in extent and much more barely oriented toward individual and state power, yet the foreign policies that originated from these substandard reasons were surely greater in the ethnic and political extent to those chased by his forerunner. (Thompson, 1960). A realist approach of international politics also avoids the other well-liked erroneous belief of comparing the foreign policies of a statesman with his philosophic or political preferring, and of deducing the previous from the following. Statesmen, particularly under fashionable situations, may well make a habit of offering their foreign actions in terms of their philosophic and opinionated sympathies in order to gain admired support for them. Yet they will differentiate with Lincoln among their “official duty,” which is to regard and act in expressions of the state interest, and their “individual desire,” which is to see their own honest charges and political rules applied all over the world. Political realism does not necessitate, nor does it overlook, unresponsiveness to political perf