Latin American countries by and large have democratic systems of government that mirror that of the United States. Marring some distinct differences, policy is shaped by some of the same basic principles. Politicians are people. These people have jobs, and to keep those jobs they must satisfy their electorates. The question, when observing how policy is formed in Latin America, then becomes, “How do politicians find it necessary in Latin America to satisfy their respective electorates?” Many believe that Brazil is a country in which pork barreling legislation is a major factor in reelection for incumbent federal deputies. This belief encourages individuals to infer that at least segments of the general public’s needs are in fact being met. This may be the case, but it is not because these deputies are doling out funds to meet the needs of the people. In Columbia, a very similar impeachment process to that which exists in the U.S. is law. The Columbian Chamber of Representatives is much like the United States Congress in its ability to decide to impeach a president. This may lead one to believe that impeachment policy is one dictated by law, but this is not the case. Policy, it is no surprise, is created in Latin American countries in manners that directly correlate with each system’s structure of accountability for their representatives, as is the case in every democracy. Pork barrel add-ons in Brazil are indirect examples of this, as well as are the actions to impeach taken in Columbia in the mid 1990’s. In Brazil, the president possesses the power to wield a line-item veto (Samuels 847). Also, Brazil is an open-list PR system, which means that incumbent deputies have to run as individuals within their own parties against members of their own parties across entire states of the country. These two facts greatly impact the manner in which legislation and policy is formed, especially in terms of pork barrel add-ons that do not result in much opportunity for credit claiming. Politicians need to be able to claim credit while before their electorates to keep their positions in government in a democratic system. What the line-item veto means in Brazil is that pork barrel add-ons are dispersed by deputies in small amounts throughout proposed legislation to increase the chances of each piece of pork being signed into law. Much of the appropriations for special public works are in such small sums of money that very little can be done to serve the greater good, although that small sum posed a very little threat, and therefore was not vetoed. This makes credit claiming futile for many deputies who do not have much to show in the way of life-changing public projects. The open-list PR system makes credit claiming for pork even more complex by lack of districts within a state. The deputies run to represent the entire state, and must maintain constituencies in unofficial districts chosen out of necessity to concentrate campaign resources. This, however, does not mean that their opponents will not vie for the same votes. Small public works projects could have been done in a region by two or three different deputies, canceling out the benefit of claiming credit, and of focusing efforts to satisfy a manufactured constituency. The practice of pork barreling in Brazil is suspect then. Why? If there is no