Introduction Nowadays, it became a commonplace practice among Westerners to refer to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, which were violently suppressed by the Chinese government, as such that have been fueled by the ordinary Chinese citizens’ longing for democracy (Wright, 1999; Beja, 2009). In its turn, this prompts many people to discuss these protests in necessarily positive terms; whereas, the manner in which the government has dealt with supposedly freedom-seeking Chinese citizens is being usually deemed thoroughly inappropriate. At the same time, however, there is a certain rationale in believing that the reason why today’s China is considered nothing short of a world’s major superpower, is that in 1989, the Chinese government had proven itself resourceful enough not to allow the country to begin descending into the chaos of a ‘street democracy’. In my paper, I will aim to explore the validity of this suggestion at length. Main Body As of today, it represents a universally shared assumption, among political analysts in the West, that it was specifically the ineptness of Deng Xiaoping’s market-oriented reforms, which resulted in the fact that by 1989, many ordinary Chinese citizens have grown to dislike the country’s formally Communist leaders. However, if anything, the presumed ineffectiveness of these reforms contributed to the outbreak of the 1989 student ‘uprising’ the least. The reason for this is quite apparent – due to the implementation of Xiaoping’s reforms, through the years 1978-1988, the extent of Chinese citizens’ economic well-being was improving rather rapidly, even though that a bulk of these citizens continued to experience difficulties, while trying to take an immediate advantage of the situation. This is because, just as it has always been the case in countries, set on the path of free-market reforms, the implementation of these reforms initially benefit the representatives of social elites. Hence, a certain dichotomy between people’s reform-related hopes, on the one hand, and the reforms’ immediately felt outcomes, on the other. As Xiaobo (2006) noted, “Stability at the macro level under strongmen does not mean that there is stability at the micro level… the rapid growth under reform do not mean that the entire population is prosperous” (p. 125). As it has always been the case, throughout the course of history, the process of people’s living standards being steadily improved necessarily falls back on the concerned individuals’ irrational expectations, in this respect. In its turn, this explains why people in industrialized countries tend to complain about their current living standards being ‘unbearable’, even though that economically speaking, they fare so much better than it used to be the case with them, even as recent as 10 years ago. Therefore, it would be wrong to refer to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, as such have been dialectically predetermined. Instead, these protests should be looked upon as such that have been orchestrated by the agents of foreign influence – just as it was the case with the orchestration of earlier mentioned ‘orange’/’Jasmin’ revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. In fact, the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests should be referred to in terms of an unsuccessful attempt to undermine a large sovereign