Since the beginning of the financial crisis, the big question is whether the crisis will ever reoccur. Many players in the financial sector fear that re-occurrence of the crisis is imminent given the fact that the full stability have not been achieved. In addition, weak growths in almost all sectors of the economy have been persistent particularly in the major economies (Kalter and Holland 145). Moreover, unemployment rates have remained persistently high as investment banks and individuals continue to pay back the excessive debts they accumulated during the bubble years. The result is stifled investments, slowed economic growth that in turn negatively affects the rate of employment (Kalter and Holland 146). The problem has been exacerbated by lack of international co-operation on ways through which the crisis can be brought to an end. More worse is the high possibility of the global economic recession because of the US economic slow growth and the divisions in the euro zone. The major European economies require political determination to enforce international co-operation required to prevent breakdown of the euro as a single currency (Eichengreen 16). In addition, major economies such as US and the euro zone are reluctant to co-operate with emerging economies such as China, which are still immune to the global financial crisis and can inject more capital flows into the global capital markets. Moreover, countries are planning for short-term measures such as austerity measures rather than long-term policies that can finally end the crisis. The reluctance by countries to borrow for fiscal stimulus packages offered by major investment banks deepens the possibility for the re-occurrence of the crisis (Kalter and Holland 147). The deregulations in the capital markets can still lead to the re-occurrence of the crisis. The regulatory measures that have been put in place are short-term while long-term measures and policies have not been formulated. In addition, many countries are still indifferent on whether to apply regulatory measures that can avert the crisis in the end or to live the whole problem to the market forces, which have failed in the past (Kregel 5). Given these failures, the likelihood of the re-occurrence of the crisis is high. The re-regulations of the capital markets Though the capital markets crisis was blamed on longer periods of deregulations, the debate whether the re-regulations should be imposed still rages on. The fact is that there were regulations that governed the capital markets institutions that brought about the crisis. The problem was poor implementation of the regulatory measures and the non-compliant of the regulatory measures by the capital markets institutions (Watt and Botsch 1007). Financial history indicates that there are greater gains when the financial markets are deregulated. Therefore, the gains of deregulations cannot easily be devalued. However, following the crisis, there have been calls by the public and the players to develop and better implement the regulations that were put in place. Nevertheless, there have been problems with the re-regulations. The first problem is the where to re-regulate. The second issue is how to effect re-regulations and finally how to deal with effects of restrictive regulations. With these complexities and the failure of the complicated and elaborative measures, regulatory institutions have been p