Truth wars have raged for centuries. Today, wars still exist. As Huw Price puts it, if Pilate was to wait for an answer from philosophers for his question, “What is truth?” it could have taken centuries for an answer to be forthcoming (Price 2008). Several philosophers have tried to explain their positions as to what consists the word truth. This article seeks to explore Professor Huw Price’s perspective of truth and identify what he feels are the weaknesses of some of the earlier theories and conceptualizations of truth. One thing that remains unmistakable is what can be true. Among the things that can be true are assertions, propositions, claims, beliefs and statements. For instance, the assertion that I am writing this paper is true. Similarly, the claim that I am writing this paper is true. However, the war on truth begins from what does it take for a claim or assertion to be true? It is from here that theories have been developed. Some of the theories conceptualize truth from coherence. Others conceptualize truth from correspondence while others conceptualize it from a pragmatic perspective (Price 1988). Price views all these theories as wanting. The coherence theory for instance posits that truth is established if assertions or claims are in coherence with others. However, using this theory limits truth to subjectivity and gives it a narrow approach. Furthermore, a system could still be strongly knit together but wrong. This means that coherence cannot define truth because falsehood can cohere too. Truth as a conceptualization of correspondence also has its flows. This theory purports that assertions that carry truth should correspond with the world. Unfortunately, there are different kinds of truth, some of them not matching with anything. This means that correspondence does not capture the aspect of truth wholesomely. Finally, pragmatism argues that an assertion contains truth if it works for the good of humanity. This, according to Price is not the best definition of truth. A falsehood can work for the better of the speaker. For instance, believing that you are the most handsome person on earthworks for the best of your ego but this may not be true. On the other hand, some truths are valueless. They improve nothing (Joachim 1906; Frege 1956). It is from such controversial perspectives that some of the philosophers found it advisable to walk away from the concept of truth. Among the philosophers who opted that the best way to approach the concept of truth is walking away from it were Gottlob Frege, Simon Blackburn and Ramsey. Precisely, these philosophers view truth as a transparent concept that adds nothing to a sentence. For instance, to elucidate his position, Frege (1956) uses the sentence, “I smell the scent of violets” (p. 5) he then argues that this assertion remains similar in value if it was changed to, “It’s true that I smell the scent of violets” (p. 5) he, therefore, argues that ascribing truth on the existing thought adds no truth on the assertion. He concludes that truth could not be a property at all. Hence walk away from it. Blackburn assumes a similar position by arguing that the word truth acts like a spectrum through which you view the assertion. To Ramsey, truth is simply a “linguistic muddle” (Frege 1956; Ramsey 1927). Price does not view truth from a similar perspective. It is not important to run away from the truth instead, it is important to define it. Assuming the mentioned conception is a disas