Introduction By definition, economic relationships imply that at least two stakeholders are involved in an exchange, which suggests that a system of standards and regulations should be in place as the method of controlling the economic machine (Klettner, 2017; Okoye, 2015). Herein the importance of corporate governance (CG) as a phenomenon lies. The very concept of CG is fairly simple; it mainly renders the idea of establishing and exerting control over a particular organisation (OECD, 2015; Baker & Filbeck, 2015). However, due to the multiple aspects of running a company, different approaches toward CG exist. A Risk Management (RM) strategy is the process aimed at locating, assessing, and mitigating risks (Yoe, 2016). Therefore, RM should be seen as an inseparable part of CG within the context of an organisation (Waring, 2016; Miller, 2017). To understand how CG and RM function in tandem, it is necessary to consider several key CG theories that allow viewing the process of RM from the perspective of different stakeholders and, thus explore how each of the theories defines its key stakeholders and what tools it uses to meet their needs. Agency Theory The concept of the Agency Theory (AT) is quite self-explanatory since it revolves around determining the relationships between the participants, or agents, of business relationships. According to the AG postulates, the principal is superior to the agent (Clarke, 2017). The latter, in turn, is expected to act on behalf of the former in order to encourage the corporate growth and increase the profits (Dana & Ramadani 2015). Thus, despite the rigid hierarchy, the relationships between an agent and a principal are largely symbiotic, agents striving to represent the interests of their principals in the best way possible since the outcome aligns with their concept of a profit (Xi, Kraus, Filser, & Kellermanns, 2015). Pros and Cons The theory provides a rather clear and self-evident explanation of why agents pursue the objectives that cause their principals to benefit extensively (Sarkar, Wingreen, & Cragg, 2017). However, the opponents of the theory often point to a very problematic aspect to the AT framework. Specifically, it is often mentioned that the very existence of a company hinges on the notion that the needs of agents and principals are at the very least intersecting (Dawson, Denford, Williams, Preston, & Desouza, 2016). Therefore, even in case of the slightest contradictions between the interests of agents and the goals of principals, their further cooperation becomes highly questionable. Corporate Governance In regard to CG, the AT allows addressing the conflicts that emerge between an agent and a principal in case of the misalignment of their interests. In the scenarios that involve the lack of similarities between the objectives that agents, which are typically represented by employees, and principals, or their organisations, pursue, the AT can be used (Shi, Connelly, & Hoskisson, 2017). As a result, one can manage risks faced by the specified stakeholders of business relationships more efficiently than they would otherwise (Tricker, 2015; Bosse & Phillips, 2016). The AT framework offers the tools for an extensive analysis of the confl