Introduction Since the exit of the US troops from Iraq in 2010, questions have been raised regarding the effectiveness of the withdrawal. During the withdrawal of troops, there was moderate stability in the region with moderate peace and a newly formed democratic government in power. However, there was always the fear of how the Arab and non-Arab neighbors would react to the American military withdrawal from Iraq. Today, when the fear of ISIS looms large on Iraq and Syria, many argue that the time of departure of the American troops from the Iraqi soil was hasty and their work there was left unfinished. However, there are still others who argue that the misadventure did not start when US troops were withdrawn, but when they landed in the country in 2003. The US failed whenever it tried to intervene in the nation-building process (e.g. South Vietnam and Haiti). 1 This trend seems to have continued in Iraq. This is because the desire to change the country’s regime radically has lead to administrative failures. Therefore, when the US tried to change the authoritarian regime in Iraq, it prompted a stressful realignment of the Iraqi politics. The presence of the US troops and the lack of a stabilizing-force in Iraq led to the Iraqi troop’s demise, and the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Consequently, was the breakup of Iraq inevitable after the withdrawal of US forces from the country? Further, how far is such a breakup more likely with the civil war in Syria? This paper will try to answer these questions using Bueno de Mesquita’s selectorate theory model and historical perspective. Theory of Foreign Intervention Exogenous state-building attempts in Iraq have failed, historically. According to the selectorate theory presented by Mesquita and Downs, a majority electorate that comprises of the people of the nation chooses a leader. 2 The leader remains in office and retains support by creating public policies and goods for the people. When he loses support due to failed policies, an autocrat is likely to become the leader. Intervening states, which try to establish a democratic government by overthrowing a non-democratic state structure (e.g. communism or autocracy), often face problems, as they are not part of the selectorate. Thus, the actions taken for the target country may directly affect the prospects of the intervening nation’s foreign policies. 3 A democratic intervener convinces its electorate that such intervention in a foreign country is essential to provide certain public good, such as safety of national security. 4 The main interest of an intervening state is to change the policies of the target country, and in certain cases, create a democracy as has been observed in the case of Vietnam and Iraq. However, uncertainty becomes the biggest hurdle for such policies, as it is impossible to ensure if the target state will adopt the policies of the intervener. 5 According to the selectorate theory, a democratic intervener will leave a symbolical democratic trait in countries that have negligible democracy vis-à-vis countries that have not experienced intervention. 6 In addition, in countries that have some degree of democracy, the intervener is more likely to leave a symbolic democratic traits and nothing m